Verifiable Outsourced Decryption of Attribute-Based Encryption with Constant Ciphertext Length

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jiguo Li

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Outsourced decryption ABE system largely reduces the computation cost for users who intend to access the encrypted files stored in cloud. However, the correctness of the transformation ciphertext cannot be guaranteed because the user does not have the original ciphertext. Lai et al. provided an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption which helps the user to check whether the transformation done by the cloud is correct. In order to improve the computation performance and reduce communication overhead, we propose a new verifiable outsourcing scheme with constant ciphertext length. To be specific, our scheme achieves the following goals. (1 Our scheme is verifiable which ensures that the user efficiently checks whether the transformation is done correctly by the CSP. (2 The size of ciphertext and the number of expensive pairing operations are constant, which do not grow with the complexity of the access structure. (3 The access structure in our scheme is AND gates on multivalued attributes and we prove our scheme is verifiable and it is secure against selectively chosen-plaintext attack in the standard model. (4 We give some performance analysis which indicates that our scheme is adaptable for various limited bandwidth and computation-constrained devices, such as mobile phone.

An innovative approach for testing bioinformatics programs using metamorphic testing

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Liu Huai

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Abstract Background Recent advances in experimental and computational technologies have fueled the development of many sophisticated bioinformatics programs. The correctness of such programs is crucial as incorrectly computed results may lead to wrong biological conclusion or misguide downstream experimentation. Common software testing procedures involve executing the target program with a set of test inputs and then verifying the correctness of the test outputs. However, due to the complexity of many bioinformatics programs, it is often difficult to verify the correctness of the test outputs. Therefore our ability to perform systematic software testing is greatly hindered. Results We propose to use a novel software testing technique, metamorphic testing (MT, to test a range of bioinformatics programs. Instead of requiring a mechanism to verify whether an individual test output is correct, the MT technique verifies whether a pair of test outputs conform to a set of domain specific properties, called metamorphic relations (MRs, thus greatly increases the number and variety of test cases that can be applied. To demonstrate how MT is used in practice, we applied MT to test two open-source bioinformatics programs, namely GNLab and SeqMap. In particular we show that MT is simple to implement, and is effective in detecting faults in a real-life program and some artificially fault-seeded programs. Further, we discuss how MT can be applied to test programs from various domains of bioinformatics. Conclusion This paper describes the application of a simple, effective and automated technique to systematically test a range of bioinformatics programs. We show how MT can be implemented in practice through two real-life case studies. Since many bioinformatics programs, particularly those for large scale simulation and data analysis, are hard to test systematically, their developers may benefit from using MT as part of the testing strategy. Therefore our work

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert

2004-01-01

The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The 'Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels (PALs) agreed to by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This ROTC specifically discusses the radiological PALs and their application to the findings of the CAU 204 corrective action investigation. The scope of this CADD consists of the following: (1) Develop corrective action objectives; (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria; (3) Develop corrective action alternatives; (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of corrective action alternatives in relation to corrective action objectives and screening criteria; and (5) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204

Tonopah Test Range Environmental Restoration Corrective Action Sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ronald B. Jackson

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and Corrective Action Units (CAUs) at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) may be placed into three categories: Clean Closure/No Further Action, Closure in Place, or Closure in Progress

Standard test method for verifying the alignment of X-Ray diffraction instrumentation for residual stress measurement

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2010-01-01

1.1 This test method covers the preparation and use of a flat stress-free test specimen for the purpose of checking the systematic error caused by instrument misalignment or sample positioning in X-ray diffraction residual stress measurement, or both. 1.2 This test method is applicable to apparatus intended for X-ray diffraction macroscopic residual stress measurement in polycrystalline samples employing measurement of a diffraction peak position in the high-back reflection region, and in which the θ, 2θ, and ψ rotation axes can be made to coincide (see Fig. 1). 1.3 This test method describes the use of iron powder which has been investigated in round-robin studies for the purpose of verifying the alignment of instrumentation intended for stress measurement in ferritic or martensitic steels. To verify instrument alignment prior to stress measurement in other metallic alloys and ceramics, powder having the same or lower diffraction angle as the material to be measured should be prepared in similar fashion...

Attenuation correction method for single photon emission CT

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Morozumi, Tatsuru; Nakajima, Masato [Keio Univ., Yokohama (Japan). Faculty of Science and Technology; Ogawa, Koichi; Yuta, Shinichi

1983-10-01

A correction method (Modified Correction Matrix method) is proposed to implement iterative correction by exactly measuring attenuation constant distribution in a test body, calculating a correction factor for every picture element, then multiply the image by these factors. Computer simulation for the comparison of the results showed that the proposed method was specifically more effective to an application to the test body, in which the rate of attenuation constant change is large, than the conventional correction matrix method. Since the actual measurement data always contain quantum noise, the noise was taken into account in the simulation. However, the correction effect was large even under the noise. For verifying its clinical effectiveness, the experiment using an acrylic phantom was also carried out. As the result, the recovery of image quality in the parts with small attenuation constant was remarkable as compared with the conventional method.

Privacy-Preserving Verifiability: A Case for an Electronic Exam Protocol

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Giustolisi, Rosario; Iovino, Vincenzo; Lenzini, Gabriele

2017-01-01

We introduce the notion of privacy-preserving verifiability for security protocols. It holds when a protocol admits a verifiability test that does not reveal, to the verifier that runs it, more pieces of information about the protocol’s execution than those required to run the test. Our definition...... of privacy-preserving verifiability is general and applies to cryptographic protocols as well as to human security protocols. In this paper we exemplify it in the domain of e-exams. We prove that the notion is meaningful by studying an existing exam protocol that is verifiable but whose verifiability tests...... are not privacy-preserving. We prove that the notion is applicable: we review the protocol using functional encryption so that it admits a verifiability test that preserves privacy according to our definition. We analyse, in ProVerif, that the verifiability holds despite malicious parties and that the new...

Development and testing of multigroup library with correction of self-shielding effects in fusion-fission hybrid reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zou Jun; He Zhaozhong; Zeng Qin; Qiu Yuefeng; Wang Minghuang

2010-01-01

A multigroup library HENDL2.1/SS (Hybrid Evaluated Nuclear Data Library/Self-Shielding) based on ENDF/B-VII.0 evaluate data has been generated using Bondarenko and flux calculator method for the correction of self-shielding effect of neutronics analyses. To validate the reliability of the multigroup library HENDL2.1/SS, transport calculations for fusion-fission hybrid system FDS-I were performed in this paper. It was verified that the calculations with the HENDL2.1/SS gave almost the same results with MCNP calculations and were better than calculations with the HENDL2.0/MG which is another multigroup library without self-shielding correction. The test results also showed that neglecting resonance self-shielding caused underestimation of the K eff , neutron fluxes and waste transmutation ratios in the multigroup calculations of FDS-I.

Auto-identification fiberoptical seal verifier

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamamoto, Yoichi; Mukaiyama, Takehiro

1998-08-01

An auto COBRA seal verifier was developed by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) to provide more efficient and simpler inspection measures for IAEA safeguards. The verifier is designed to provide means of a simple, quantitative and objective judgment on in-situ verification for the COBRA seal. The equipment is a portable unit with hand-held weight and size. It can be operated by battery or AC power. The verifier reads a COBRA seal signature by using a built-in CCD camera and carries out the signature comparison procedure automatically on digital basis. The result of signature comparison is given as a YES/NO answer. The production model of the verifier was completed in July 1996. The development was carried out in collaboration with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. This report describes the design and functions of the COBRA seal verifier and the results of environmental and functional tests. The development of the COBRA seal verifier was carried out in the framework of Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS) as a project, JD-4 since 1981. (author)

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Work Plan for Corrective Action Unit 461: Joint Test Assembly Sites and Corrective Action Unit 495: Unconfirmed Joint Test Assembly Sites Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeff Smith

1998-08-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration plan addresses the action necessary for the clean closure of Corrective Action Unit 461 (Test Area Joint Test Assembly Sites) and Corrective Action Unit 495 (Unconfirmed Joint Test Assembly Sites). The Corrective Action Units are located at the Tonopah Test Range in south central Nevada. Closure for these sites will be completed by excavating and evaluating the condition of each artillery round (if found); detonating the rounds (if necessary); excavating the impacted soil and debris; collecting verification samples; backfilling the excavations; disposing of the impacted soil and debris at an approved low-level waste repository at the Nevada Test Site

Status of personnel identity verifiers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maxwell, R.L.

1985-01-01

Identity verification devices based on the interrogation of six different human biometric features or actions now exist and in general have been in development for about ten years. The capability of these devices to meet the cost and operational requirements of speed, accuracy, ease of use and reliability has generally increased although the verifier industry is still immature. Sandia Laboratories makes a continuing effort to stay abreast of identity verifier developments and to assess the capabilities and improvements of each device. Operating environment and procedures more typical of field use can often reveal performance results substantially different from laboratory tests. An evaluation of several recently available verifiers is herein reported

A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme.

OpenAIRE

Chaum, D; Ryan, PYA; Schneider, SA

2005-01-01

We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to verify that their vote is accurately included in the count. The scheme provides a high degree of transparency whilst ensuring the secrecy of votes. Assurance is derived from close auditing of all the steps of the vote recording and counting process with minimal dependence on the system components. Thus, assurance arises from verification of the election rather than having to place trust in the correct behaviour of components of the vot...

Modular correction method of bending elastic modulus based on sliding behavior of contact point

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ma, Zhichao; Zhao, Hongwei; Zhang, Qixun; Liu, Changyi

2015-01-01

During the three-point bending test, the sliding behavior of the contact point between the specimen and supports was observed, the sliding behavior was verified to affect the measurements of both deflection and span length, which directly affect the calculation of the bending elastic modulus. Based on the Hertz formula to calculate the elastic contact deformation and the theoretical calculation of the sliding behavior of the contact point, a theoretical model to precisely describe the deflection and span length as a function of bending load was established. Moreover, a modular correction method of bending elastic modulus was proposed, via the comparison between the corrected elastic modulus of three materials (H63 copper–zinc alloy, AZ31B magnesium alloy and 2026 aluminum alloy) and the standard modulus obtained from standard uniaxial tensile tests, the universal feasibility of the proposed correction method was verified. Also, the ratio of corrected to raw elastic modulus presented a monotonically decreasing tendency as the raw elastic modulus of materials increased. (technical note)

Tonopah Test Range Environmental Restoration Corrective Action Sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This report describes the status (closed, closed in place, or closure in progress) of the Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and Corrective Action Units (CAUs) at the Tonopah Test Range. CASs and CAUs where contaminants were either not detected or were cleaned up to within regulatory action levels are summarized

Testing and Inference in Nonlinear Cointegrating Vector Error Correction Models

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kristensen, Dennis; Rahbæk, Anders

In this paper, we consider a general class of vector error correction models which allow for asymmetric and non-linear error correction. We provide asymptotic results for (quasi-)maximum likelihood (QML) based estimators and tests. General hypothesis testing is considered, where testing...... of non-stationary non-linear time series models. Thus the paper provides a full asymptotic theory for estimators as well as standard and non-standard test statistics. The derived asymptotic results prove to be new compared to results found elsewhere in the literature due to the impact of the estimated...... symmetric non-linear error correction considered. A simulation study shows that the fi…nite sample properties of the bootstrapped tests are satisfactory with good size and power properties for reasonable sample sizes....

Testing and Inference in Nonlinear Cointegrating Vector Error Correction Models

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kristensen, Dennis; Rahbek, Anders

In this paper, we consider a general class of vector error correction models which allow for asymmetric and non-linear error correction. We provide asymptotic results for (quasi-)maximum likelihood (QML) based estimators and tests. General hypothesis testing is considered, where testing...... of non-stationary non-linear time series models. Thus the paper provides a full asymptotic theory for estimators as well as standard and non-standard test statistics. The derived asymptotic results prove to be new compared to results found elsewhere in the literature due to the impact of the estimated...... symmetric non-linear error correction are considered. A simulation study shows that the finite sample properties of the bootstrapped tests are satisfactory with good size and power properties for reasonable sample sizes....

Rail Impact Testing. Test Operations Procedure (TOP)

Science.gov (United States)

2008-09-15

impact test. The rail impact test is used to verify structural integrity of the test item and the adequacy of the tie-down system and tie-down...strength of provisions, connection and supporting structural frame, paragraph 5.2.3 ** Superscript...parts, to include outriggers and booms) without advanced approval by SDDCTEA. Torque nuts on wire rope clips to their correct value. Torque cable

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 252: Area 25 Engine Test Stand 1 Decontamination Pad, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

1999-08-20

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit 252 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 252 consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-07-02, Engine Test Stand-1 (ETS-1) Decontamination Pad. Located in Area 25 at the intersection of Road H and Road K at the Nevada Test Site, ETS-1 was designed for use as a mobile radiation checkpoint and for vehicle decontamination. The CAS consists of a concrete decontamination pad with a drain, a gravel-filled sump, two concrete trailer pads, and utility boxes. Constructed in 1966, the ETS-1 facility was part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) complex and used to test nuclear rockets. The ETS-1 Decontamination Pad and mobile radiation check point was built in 1968. The NRDS complex ceased primary operations in 1973. Based on site history, the focus of the field investigation activities will be to determine if any primary contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) (including radionuclides, total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total pesticides, and polychlorinated biphenyls) are present at this site. Vertical extent of migration of suspected vehicle decontamination effluent COPCs is expected to be less than 12 feet below ground surface. Lateral extent of migration of COPCs is expected to be limited to the sump area or near the northeast corner of the decontamination pad. Using a biased sampling approach, near-surface and subsurface sampling will be conducted at the suspected worst-case areas including the sump and soil near the northeast corner of the decontamination pad. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible e

A control system verifier using automated reasoning software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.E.; Seeman, S.E.

1985-08-01

An on-line, automated reasoning software system for verifying the actions of other software or human control systems has been developed. It was demonstrated by verifying the actions of an automated procedure generation system. The verifier uses an interactive theorem prover as its inference engine with the rules included as logical axioms. Operation of the verifier is generally transparent except when the verifier disagrees with the actions of the monitored software. Testing with an automated procedure generation system demonstrates the successful application of automated reasoning software for verification of logical actions in a diverse, redundant manner. A higher degree of confidence may be placed in the verified actions of the combined system

The status of personnel identity verifiers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maxwell, R.L.

1985-01-01

Identity verification devices based on the interrogation of six different human biometric features or actions now exist and in general have been in development for about ten years. The capability of these devices to meet the cost and operational requirements of speed, accuracy, ease of use and reliability has generally increased although the verifier industry is still immature. Sandia Laboratories makes a continuing effort to stay abreast of identity verifier developments and to assess the capabilities and improvements of each device. Operating environment and procedures more typical of field use can often reveal performance results substantially different from laboratory tests. An evaluation of several recently available verifiers is herein reported

Verifying Digital Components of Physical Systems: Experimental Evaluation of Test Quality

Science.gov (United States)

Laputenko, A. V.; López, J. E.; Yevtushenko, N. V.

2018-03-01

This paper continues the study of high quality test derivation for verifying digital components which are used in various physical systems; those are sensors, data transfer components, etc. We have used logic circuits b01-b010 of the package of ITC'99 benchmarks (Second Release) for experimental evaluation which as stated before, describe digital components of physical systems designed for various applications. Test sequences are derived for detecting the most known faults of the reference logic circuit using three different approaches to test derivation. Three widely used fault types such as stuck-at-faults, bridges, and faults which slightly modify the behavior of one gate are considered as possible faults of the reference behavior. The most interesting test sequences are short test sequences that can provide appropriate guarantees after testing, and thus, we experimentally study various approaches to the derivation of the so-called complete test suites which detect all fault types. In the first series of experiments, we compare two approaches for deriving complete test suites. In the first approach, a shortest test sequence is derived for testing each fault. In the second approach, a test sequence is pseudo-randomly generated by the use of an appropriate software for logic synthesis and verification (ABC system in our study) and thus, can be longer. However, after deleting sequences detecting the same set of faults, a test suite returned by the second approach is shorter. The latter underlines the fact that in many cases it is useless to spend `time and efforts' for deriving a shortest distinguishing sequence; it is better to use the test minimization afterwards. The performed experiments also show that the use of only randomly generated test sequences is not very efficient since such sequences do not detect all the faults of any type. After reaching the fault coverage around 70%, saturation is observed, and the fault coverage cannot be increased anymore. For

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant Evenson

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 139 is comprised of the seven corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-35-01, Burn Pit; (2) 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; (3) 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; (4) 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; (5) 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; (6) 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and (7) 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives with the exception of CASs 09-23-01 and 09-34-01. Regarding these two CASs, CAS 09-23-01 is a gravel gertie where a zero-yield test was conducted with all contamination confined to below ground within the area of the structure, and CAS 09-34-01 is an underground detection station where no contaminants are present. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for the other five CASs where information is insufficient. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 4, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 139

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 528: Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2003-05-08

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 528, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination (PCBs), Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in the southwestern portion of Area 25 on the NTS in Jackass Flats (adjacent to Test Cell C [TCC]), CAU 528 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-27-03, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Surface Contamination. Test Cell C was built to support the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (operational between 1959 and 1973) activities including conducting ground tests and static firings of nuclear engine reactors. Although CAU 528 was not considered as a direct potential source of PCBs and petroleum contamination, two potential sources of contamination have nevertheless been identified from an unknown source in concentrations that could potentially pose an unacceptable risk to human health and/or the environment. This CAU's close proximity to TCC prompted Shaw to collect surface soil samples, which have indicated the presence of PCBs extending throughout the area to the north, east, south, and even to the edge of the western boundary. Based on this information, more extensive field investigation activities are being planned, the results of which are to be used to support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C (TCC) Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 116 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (as amended February 2008) and consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping; and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 is described in the FFACO as the TCC Facility but actually includes Building 3210 and attached concrete shield wall only. CAU 116 will be closed by demolishing Building 3210, the attached concrete shield wall, and the nuclear furnace piping. In addition, as a best management practice (BMP), Building 3211 (moveable shed) will be demolished due to its close proximity to Building 3210. This will aid in demolition and disposal operations. Radiological surveys will be performed on the demolition debris to determine the proper disposal pathway. As much of the demolition debris as space allows will be placed into the Building 3210 basement structure. After filling to capacity with demolition debris, the basement structure will be mounded or capped and closed with administrative controls. Prior to beginning demolition activities and according to an approved Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP), representative sampling of surface areas that are known, suspected, or have the potential to contain hazardous constituents such as lead or polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) will be performed throughout all buildings and structures. Sections 2.3.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3, and 6.2.6.1 address the methodologies employed that assure the solid debris placed in the basement structure will not contain contaminants of concern (COCs) above hazardous waste levels. The anticipated post

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No. 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Boehlecke

2004-04-01

The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels (PALs) agreed to by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This ROTC specifically discusses the radiological PALs and their application to the findings of the CAU 204 corrective action investigation. The scope of this CADD consists of the following: (1) Develop corrective action objectives; (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria; (3) Develop corrective action alternatives; (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of corrective action alternatives in relation to corrective action objectives and screening criteria; and (5) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204.

Computer processing of 14C data; statistical tests and corrections of data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Obelic, B.; Planinic, J.

1977-01-01

The described computer program calculates the age of samples and performs statistical tests and corrections of data. Data are obtained from the proportional counter that measures anticoincident pulses per 20 minute intervals. After every 9th interval the counter measures total number of counts per interval. Input data are punched on cards. The output list contains input data schedule and the following results: mean CPM value, correction of CPM for normal pressure and temperature (NTP), sample age calculation based on 14 C half life of 5570 and 5730 years, age correction for NTP, dendrochronological corrections and the relative radiocarbon concentration. All results are given with one standard deviation. Input data test (Chauvenet's criterion), gas purity test, standard deviation test and test of the data processor are also included in the program. (author)

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 500: Test Cell A Septic System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 500: Test Cell A Septic System, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 500 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site, CAS 25-04-05. This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) recommendation that no corrective action is deemed necessary for CAU 500. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report have been combined into one report based on sample data collected during the field investigation performed between February and May 1999, which showed no evidence of soil contamination at this site. The clean closure justification for CAU 500 is based on these results. Analytes detected were evaluated against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine contaminants of concern (COCs) for CAU 500, and it was determined that the PALs were not exceeded for total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, gamma-emitting radionuclides, isotopic uranium, and strontium-90 for any of the soil samples collected. COCs were identified only within the septic tank and distribution box at the CAU. No COCs were identified outside these two areas; therefore, no corrective action was necessary for the soil. Closure activities were performed to address the COCs identified within the septic tank and distribution box. The DOE/NV recommended that neither corrective action nor a corrective action plan was required at CAU 500. Further, no use restrictions were required to be placed on CAU 500, and the septic tank and distribution box have been closed in accordance with all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site

Preoperational test report, primary ventilation system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-11-04

This represents a preoperational test report for Primary Ventilation Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides vapor space filtered venting of tanks AY101, AY102, AZ101, AZ102. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Preoperational test report, primary ventilation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents a preoperational test report for Primary Ventilation Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides vapor space filtered venting of tanks AY101, AY102, AZ101, AZ102. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Corrections of the NIST Statistical Test Suite for Randomness

OpenAIRE

Kim, Song-Ju; Umeno, Ken; Hasegawa, Akio

2004-01-01

It is well known that the NIST statistical test suite was used for the evaluation of AES candidate algorithms. We have found that the test setting of Discrete Fourier Transform test and Lempel-Ziv test of this test suite are wrong. We give four corrections of mistakes in the test settings. This suggests that re-evaluation of the test results should be needed.

Direct cointegration testing in error-correction models

NARCIS (Netherlands)

F.R. Kleibergen (Frank); H.K. van Dijk (Herman)

1994-01-01

textabstractAbstract An error correction model is specified having only exact identified parameters, some of which reflect a possible departure from a cointegration model. Wald, likelihood ratio, and Lagrange multiplier statistics are derived to test for the significance of these parameters. The

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

T. M. Fitzmaurice

2000-08-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Corrective Action Unit (CAU)261 Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999). Investigation of CAU 261 was conducted from February through May of 1999. There were no Constituents of Concern (COCs) identified at Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-07 Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP). COCs identified at CAS 25-05-01 included diesel-range organics and radionuclides. The following closure actions will be implemented under this plan: Because COCs were not found at CAS 25-05-07 AWLP, no action is required; Removal of septage from the septic tank (CAS 25-05-01), the distribution box and the septic tank will be filled with grout; Removal of impacted soils identified near the initial outfall area; and Upon completion of this closure activity and approval of the Closure Report by NDEP, administrative controls, use restrictions, and site postings will be used to prevent intrusive activities at the site.

Optimised resource construction for verifiable quantum computation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kashefi, Elham; Wallden, Petros

2017-01-01

Recent developments have brought the possibility of achieving scalable quantum networks and quantum devices closer. From the computational point of view these emerging technologies become relevant when they are no longer classically simulatable. Hence a pressing challenge is the construction of practical methods to verify the correctness of the outcome produced by universal or non-universal quantum devices. A promising approach that has been extensively explored is the scheme of verification via encryption through blind quantum computation. We present here a new construction that simplifies the required resources for any such verifiable protocol. We obtain an overhead that is linear in the size of the input (computation), while the security parameter remains independent of the size of the computation and can be made exponentially small (with a small extra cost). Furthermore our construction is generic and could be applied to any universal or non-universal scheme with a given underlying graph. (paper)

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, received sanitary effluent from four buildings within the Test Cell ''C'' Facility from the mid-1960s through approximately 1996. The Test Cell ''C'' Facility was used to develop nuclear propulsion technology by conducting nuclear test reactor studies. Based on the site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, herbicides, gamma emitting radionuclides, isotopic plutonium, isotopic uranium, and strontium-90. A detailed conceptual site model is presented in Section 3.0 and Appendix A of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The conceptual model serves as the basis for the sampling strategy. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the Corrective Action Decision Document

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

USDOE/NV

1999-05-01

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, received sanitary effluent from four buildings within the Test Cell ''C'' Facility from the mid-1960s through approximately 1996. The Test Cell ''C'' Facility was used to develop nuclear propulsion technology by conducting nuclear test reactor studies. Based on the site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, herbicides, gamma emitting radionuclides, isotopic plutonium, isotopic uranium, and strontium-90. A detailed conceptual site model is presented in Section 3.0 and Appendix A of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The conceptual model serves as the basis for the sampling strategy. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the Corrective Action Decision Document.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 104: Area 7 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2012-10-01

CAU 104 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 07-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-7C • 07-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T7-1 • 07-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site • 07-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T7-5a • 07-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Dog (T-S) • 07-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (T-S) • 07-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (T-S) • 07-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie • 07-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie • 07-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (Bus) • 07-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (Buster) • 07-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Ruth • 07-23-15, Atmospheric Test Site T7-4 • 07-23-16, Atmospheric Test Site B7-b • 07-23-17, Atmospheric Test Site - Climax These 15 CASs include releases from 30 atmospheric tests conducted in the approximately 1 square mile of CAU 104. Because releases associated with the CASs included in this CAU overlap and are not separate and distinguishable, these CASs are addressed jointly at the CAU level. The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to evaluate potential corrective action alternatives (CAAs), provide the rationale for the selection of recommended CAAs, and provide the plan for implementation of the recommended CAA for CAU 104. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 4, 2011, through May 3, 2012, as set forth in the CAU 104 Corrective Action Investigation Plan.

Testing and inference in nonlinear cointegrating vector error correction models

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kristensen, D.; Rahbek, A.

2013-01-01

We analyze estimators and tests for a general class of vector error correction models that allows for asymmetric and nonlinear error correction. For a given number of cointegration relationships, general hypothesis testing is considered, where testing for linearity is of particular interest. Under...... the null of linearity, parameters of nonlinear components vanish, leading to a nonstandard testing problem. We apply so-called sup-tests to resolve this issue, which requires development of new(uniform) functional central limit theory and results for convergence of stochastic integrals. We provide a full...... asymptotic theory for estimators and test statistics. The derived asymptotic results prove to be nonstandard compared to results found elsewhere in the literature due to the impact of the estimated cointegration relations. This complicates implementation of tests motivating the introduction of bootstrap...

How to verify lightning protection efficiency for electrical systems? Testing procedures and practical applications

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Birkl, Josef; Zahlmann, Peter [DEHN and SOEHNE, Neumarkt (Germany)], Emails: Josef.Birkl@technik.dehn.de, Peter.Zahlmann@technik.dehn.de

2007-07-01

There are increasing numbers of applications, installing Surge Protective Devices (SPDs), through which partial lightning currents flow, and highly sensitive, electronic devices to be protected closely next to each other due to the design of electric distribution systems and switchgear installations which is getting more and more compact. In these cases, the protective function of the SPDs has to be co-ordinated with the individual immunity of the equipment against energetic, conductive impulse voltages and impulse currents. In order to verify the immunity against partial lightning currents of the complete system laboratory tests on a system level are a suitable approach. The proposed test schemes for complete systems have been successfully performed on various applications. Examples will be presented. (author)

Application of automated reasoning software: procedure generation system verifier

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.E.; Seeman, S.E.

1984-09-01

An on-line, automated reasoning software system for verifying the actions of other software or human control systems has been developed. It was demonstrated by verifying the actions of an automated procedure generation system. The verifier uses an interactive theorem prover as its inference engine with the rules included as logic axioms. Operation of the verifier is generally transparent except when the verifier disagrees with the actions of the monitored software. Testing with an automated procedure generation system demonstrates the successful application of automated reasoning software for verification of logical actions in a diverse, redundant manner. A higher degree of confidence may be placed in the verified actions gathered by the combined system

All of the above: When multiple correct response options enhance the testing effect.

Science.gov (United States)

Bishara, Anthony J; Lanzo, Lauren A

2015-01-01

Previous research has shown that multiple choice tests often improve memory retention. However, the presence of incorrect lures often attenuates this memory benefit. The current research examined the effects of "all of the above" (AOTA) options. When such options are correct, no incorrect lures are present. In the first three experiments, a correct AOTA option on an initial test led to a larger memory benefit than no test and standard multiple choice test conditions. The benefits of a correct AOTA option occurred even without feedback on the initial test; for both 5-minute and 48-hour retention delays; and for both cued recall and multiple choice final test formats. In the final experiment, an AOTA question led to better memory retention than did a control condition that had identical timing and exposure to response options. However, the benefits relative to this control condition were similar regardless of the type of multiple choice test (AOTA or not). Results suggest that retrieval contributes to multiple choice testing effects. However, the extra testing effect from a correct AOTA option, rather than being due to more retrieval, might be due simply to more exposure to correct information.

Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 348, Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at twelve Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 348 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 347, Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 347 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 135: Areas 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

D. H. Cox

2001-06-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135, Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, was closed in accordance with the approved Corrective Action Plan (DOE/NV, 2000). CAU 135 consists of three Corrective Action Sites (CAS). Two of these CAS's were identified in the Corrective Action Investigation Data Quality Objective meeting as being improperly identified as underground storage tanks. CAS 25-02-03 identified as the Deluge Valve Pit was actually an underground electrical vault and CAS 25-02-10 identified as an Underground Storage Tank was actually a former above ground storage tank filled with demineralized water. Both of these CAS's are recommended for a no further action closure. CAS 25-02-01 the Underground Storage Tanks commonly referred to as the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault was closed by decontaminating the vault structure and conducting a radiological verification survey to document compliance with the Nevada Test Site unrestricted use release criteria. The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive and cell service area drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999, discussed in ''The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (DOE/NV, 199a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples exceeded the preliminary action levels for polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. The CAU 135 closure activities consisted of scabbling radiological ''hot spots

Preoperational test report, vent building ventilation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents a preoperational test report for Vent Building Ventilation Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) for the W-030 Ventilation Building. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick

2013-09-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 105 comprises the following five corrective action sites (CASs): -02-23-04 Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney Closure In Place -02-23-05 Atmospheric Test Site T-2A Closure In Place -02-23-06 Atmospheric Test Site T-2B Clean Closure -02-23-08 Atmospheric Test Site T-2 Closure In Place -02-23-09 Atmospheric Test Site - Turk Closure In Place The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 105 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 22, 2012, through May 23, 2013, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices.

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 538: Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alfred Wickline

2006-04-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions necessary for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 538: Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. It has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. A SAFER may be performed when the following criteria are met: (1) Conceptual corrective actions are clearly identified (although some degree of investigation may be necessary to select a specific corrective action before completion of the Corrective Action Investigation [CAI]). (2) Uncertainty of the nature, extent, and corrective action must be limited to an acceptable level of risk. (3) The SAFER Plan includes decision points and criteria for making data quality objective (DQO) decisions. The purpose of the investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. This SAFER Plan identifies decision points developed in cooperation with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and where DOE will reach consensus with NDEP before beginning the next phase of work.

Robustness and device independence of verifiable blind quantum computing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gheorghiu, Alexandru; Kashefi, Elham; Wallden, Petros

2015-01-01

Recent advances in theoretical and experimental quantum computing bring us closer to scalable quantum computing devices. This makes the need for protocols that verify the correct functionality of quantum operations timely and has led to the field of quantum verification. In this paper we address key challenges to make quantum verification protocols applicable to experimental implementations. We prove the robustness of the single server verifiable universal blind quantum computing protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi (2012 arXiv:1203.5217) in the most general scenario. This includes the case where the purification of the deviated input state is in the hands of an adversarial server. The proved robustness property allows the composition of this protocol with a device-independent state tomography protocol that we give, which is based on the rigidity of CHSH games as proposed by Reichardt et al (2013 Nature 496 456–60). The resulting composite protocol has lower round complexity for the verification of entangled quantum servers with a classical verifier and, as we show, can be made fault tolerant. (paper)

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

T. M. Fitzmaurice

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Corrective Action Unit (CAU)261 Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection[NDEP] et al., 1996). This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999). Investigation of CAU 261 was conducted from February through May of 1999. There were no Constituents of Concern (COCs) identified at Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-07 Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP). COCs identified at CAS 25-05-01 included diesel-range organics and radionuclides. The following closure actions will be implemented under this plan: Because COCs were not found at CAS 25-05-07 AWLP, no action is required; Removal of septage from the septic tank (CAS 25-05-01), the distribution box and the septic tank will be filled with grout; Removal of impacted soils identified near the initial outfall area; and Upon completion of this closure activity and approval of the Closure Report by NDEP, administrative controls, use restrictions, and site postings will be used to prevent intrusive activities at the site

An investigation of error correcting techniques for OMV and AXAF

Science.gov (United States)

Ingels, Frank; Fryer, John

1991-01-01

The original objectives of this project were to build a test system for the NASA 255/223 Reed/Solomon encoding/decoding chip set and circuit board. This test system was then to be interfaced with a convolutional system at MSFC to examine the performance of the concantinated codes. After considerable work, it was discovered that the convolutional system could not function as needed. This report documents the design, construction, and testing of the test apparatus for the R/S chip set. The approach taken was to verify the error correcting behavior of the chip set by injecting known error patterns onto data and observing the results. Error sequences were generated using pseudo-random number generator programs, with Poisson time distribution between errors and Gaussian burst lengths. Sample means, variances, and number of un-correctable errors were calculated for each data set before testing.

Corrective Action Investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 546: Injection Well and Surface Releases, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alfred Wickline

2008-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 546 is located in Areas 6 and 9 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 546 is comprised of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: 06-23-02, U-6a/Russet Testing Area 09-20-01, Injection Well These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 8, 2007, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process has been used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 546

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alfred Wickline

2008-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 190, Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (1996, as amended January 2007). Corrective Action Unit 190 is comprised of the following four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 11-02-01, Underground Centrifuge; (2) 11-02-02, Drain Lines and Outfall; (3) 11-59-01, Tweezer Facility Septic System; (4) 14-23-01, LTU-6 Test Area The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 190 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from March 21 through June 26, 2007. All CAI activities were conducted as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 190 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the data quality objective data needs

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2017-05-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan provides the rationale and supporting information for the selection and implementation of corrective actions at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413, Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR). CAU 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range and includes one corrective action site, TA-23-02CS. CAU 413 consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of data quality objectives decisions, the releases at CAU 413 were divided into seven study groups: 1 Undisturbed Areas 2 Disturbed Areas 3 Sedimentation Areas 4 Former Staging Area 5 Buried Debris 6 Potential Source Material 7 Soil Mounds Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities, as set forth in the CAU 413 Corrective Action Investigation Plan, were performed from June 2015 through May 2016. Radionuclides detected in samples collected during the CAI were used to estimate total effective dose using the Construction Worker exposure scenario. Corrective action was required for areas where total effective dose exceeded, or was assumed to exceed, the radiological final action level (FAL) of 25 millirem per year. The results of the CAI and the assumptions made in the data quality objectives resulted in the following conclusions: The FAL is exceeded in surface soil in SG1, Undisturbed Areas; The FAL is assumed to be exceeded in SG5, Buried Debris, where contaminated debris and soil were buried after the CSII test; The FAL is not exceeded at SG2, SG3, SG4, SG6, or SG7. Because the FAL is exceeded at CAU 413, corrective action is required and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) must be evaluated. For CAU 413, three CAAs were evaluated: no further action, clean closure, and

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151, Septic Systems and Discharge Area, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 151 consists of eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 12, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada

49 CFR 40.271 - How are alcohol testing problems corrected?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false How are alcohol testing problems corrected? 40.271 Section 40.271 Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation PROCEDURES FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAMS Problems in Alcohol Testing § 40.271 How are alcohol testing...

49 CFR 40.205 - How are drug test problems corrected?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false How are drug test problems corrected? 40.205 Section 40.205 Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation PROCEDURES FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAMS Problems in Drug Tests § 40.205 How are drug test problems...

Risks of Using Bedside Tests to Verify Nasogastric Tube Position in Adult Patients

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Melody Ni

2014-12-01

Full Text Available Nasogastric (NG tubes are commonly used for enteral feeding. Complications of feeding tube misplacement include malnutrition, pulmonary aspiration, and even death. We built a Bayesian network (BN to analyse the risks associated with available bedside tests to verify tube position. Evidence on test validity (sensitivity and specificity was retrieved from a systematic review. Likelihood ratios were used to select the best tests for detecting tubes misplaced in the lung or oesophagus. Five bedside tests were analysed including magnetic guidance, aspirate pH, auscultation, aspirate appearance, and capnography/colourimetry. Among these, auscultation and appearance are non-diagnostic towards lung or oesophagus placements. Capnography/ colourimetry can confirm but cannot rule out lung placement. Magnetic guidance can rule out both lung and oesophageal placement. However, as a relatively new technology, further validation studies are needed. The pH test with a cut-off at 5.5 or lower can rule out lung intubation. Lowering the cut-off to 4 not only minimises oesophageal intubation but also provides extra safety as the sensitivity of pH measurement is reduced by feeding, antacid medication, or the use of less accurate pH paper. BN is an effective tool for representing and analysing multi-layered uncertainties in test validity and reliability for the verification of NG tube position. Aspirate pH with a cut-off of 4 is the safest bedside method to minimise lung and oesophageal misplacement.

Lunar Laser Ranging Test of the Invariance of c: a Correction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bruchholz U. E.

2010-10-01

Full Text Available In the APOLLO test, a speed of light was found, which seemingly supports a Galileian addition theorem of velocities. However, the reported difference of 200 +/- 10 m/s is based on a simple error. The correct evaluation of this test leads to the known value of c within the given precision. This correction does not mean an impossibility of detecting spatial anisotropies or gravitational waves.

PUREX exhaust ventilation system installation test report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blackaby, W.B.

1997-01-01

This Acceptance Test Report validates the testing performed, the exceptions logged and resolved and certifies this portion of the SAMCONS has met all design and test criteria to perform as an operational system. The proper installation of the PUREX exhaust ventilation system components and wiring was systematically evaluated by performance of this procedure. Proper operation of PUREX exhaust fan inlet, outlet, and vortex damper actuators and limit switches were verified, using special test equipment, to be correct and installed wiring connections were verified by operation of this equipment

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DOE/NV Operations Office

1999-05-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense. The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO, CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. A CAU consists of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of CAS 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon, located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1) (DOE/NV, 1996a). The Area 25 Sewage Lagoons (Figure 1-2) (IT, 1999b) are located approximately 0.3 mi south of the Test Cell 'C' (TCC) Facility and were used for the discharge of sanitary effluent from the TCC facility. For purposes of this discussion, this site will be referred to as either CAU 232 or the sewage lagoons.

Hardware Testing for the Optical PAyload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS)

Science.gov (United States)

Slagle, Amanda

2011-01-01

Hardware for several subsystems of the proposed Optical PAyload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS), including the gimbal and avionics, was tested. Microswitches installed on the gimbal were evaluated to verify that their point of actuation would remain within the acceptable range even if the switches themselves move slightly during launch. An inspection of the power board was conducted to ensure that all power and ground signals were isolated, that polarized components were correctly oriented, and that all components were intact and securely soldered. Initial testing on the power board revealed several minor problems, but once they were fixed the power board was shown to function correctly. All tests and inspections were documented for future use in verifying launch requirements.

Addendum to: Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443: Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA)-Subsurface Central Nevada Test Area, DOE/NV-977

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The environmental remediation closure process for the nuclear test at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) has progressed from the approved Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) to this addendum. The closure process required the installation of three monitoring/validation (MV) wells and validation analysis of the flow and transport model. The model validation analysis led to the conclusion that the hydraulic heads simulated by the flow model did not adequately predict observed heads at the MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3 validation points (wells and piezometers). The observed heads from screened intervals near the test horizon were higher than the model predicted and are believed to be the result of detonation-related effects that have persisted since the nuclear test. These effects, which include elevated heads out from the detonation zone and lower heads in the immediate vicinity of the detonation, are seen at other nuclear tests and typically dissipate within a few years. These effects were not included in the initial head distribution of the model. The head variations at CNTA are believed to have persisted due to the very low permeability of the material at the detonation level.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 554: Area 23 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert F.

2004-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 554: Area 23 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental samples. Corrective Action Unit 554 is located in Area 23 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 554 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS), which is: 23-02-08, USTs 23-115-1, 2, 3/Spill 530-90-002. This site consists of soil contamination resulting from a fuel release from underground storage tanks (USTs). Corrective Action Site 23-02-08 is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation prior to evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document for CAU 554. Corrective Action Site 23-02-08 will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on July 15, 2004, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; and contractor personnel. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 554. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to CAS 23-02-08. The scope of the corrective action investigation

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2004-05-03

The general purpose of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan is to ensure that adequate data are collected to provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and select technically viable corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. Located in Areas 6 and 15 on the NTS, CAU 543 is comprised of a total of seven corrective action sites (CASs), one in Area 6 and six in Area 15. The CAS in Area 6 consists of a Decontamination Facility and its components which are associated with decontamination of equipment, vehicles, and materials related to nuclear testing. The six CASs in Area 15 are located at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Farm and are related to waste disposal activities at the farm. Sources of possible contamination at Area 6 include potentially contaminated process waste effluent discharged through a process waste system, a sanitary waste stream generated within buildings of the Decon Facility, and radiologically contaminated materials stored within a portion of the facility yard. At Area 15, sources of potential contamination are associated with the dairy operations and the animal tests and experiments involving radionuclide uptake. Identified contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated biphenyls, metals, and radionuclides. Three corrective action closure alternatives - No Further Action, Close in Place, or Clean Closure - will be recommended for CAU 543 based on an evaluation of all the data quality objective-related data. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document.

Dispersion correction through movement of the closed orbit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Parzen, G.

1980-01-01

The closed orbit correction system can be used to correct the vertical dispersion by displacing the orbit at the quadrupoles and sextupoles. The accuracy of the results have been verified by comparison with exact calculations. Results for correcting the horizontal dispersion are also given

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 490: Station 44 Burn Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. B. Campbell

2002-04-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 490, Station 44 Burn Area is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). CAU 490 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and includes for Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) Fire Training Area (CAS 03-56-001-03BA); (2) Station 44 Burn Area (CAS RG-56-001-RGBA); (3) Sandia Service Yard (CAS 03-58-001-03FN); and (4) Gun Propellant Burn Area (CAS 09-54-001-09L2).

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 240: Area 25 Vehicle Washdown, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Offices's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 240: Area 25 Vehicle Washdown, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This corrective action investigation was conducted in accordance with the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for CAU 240 as developed under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 240 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-07-01, Vehicle Washdown Area (Propellant Pad); 25-07-02, Vehicle Washdown Area (F and J Roads Pad); and 25-07-03, Vehicle Washdown Station (RADSAFE Pad). In March 1999, the corrective action investigation was performed to detect and evaluate analyte concentrations against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine contaminants of concern (COCs). There were no COCs identified at CAS 25-07-01 or CAS 25-07-03; therefore, there was no need for corrective action at these two CASs. At CAS 25-07-02, diesel-range organics and radionuclide concentrations in soil samples from F and J Roads Pad exceeded PALs. Based on this result, potential CAAs were identified and evaluated to ensure worker, public, and environmental protection against potential exposure to COCs in accordance with Nevada Administrative Code 445A. Following a review of potential exposure pathways, existing data, and future and current operations in Area 25, two CAAs were identified for CAU 240 (CAS 25-07-02): Alternative 1 - No Further Action and Alternative 2 - Clean Closure by Excavation and Disposal. Alternative 2 was identified as the preferred alternative. This alternative was judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated, compliance with all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site, as well as minimizing potential future exposure

75 FR 3153 - Drug and Alcohol Testing Program; Correction

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-20

... definition of prohibited drugs. In Sec. Sec. 120.103 and 120.211, we omitted the reference to Sec. 135.1 from.... FAA-2008-0937; Amendment No. 120-0A, 135-117A] RIN 2120-AJ37 Drug and Alcohol Testing Program... Aviation Administration (FAA) is correcting its drug and alcohol testing regulations published on May 14...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2006-04-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 139 is comprised of the seven corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-35-01, Burn Pit; (2) 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; (3) 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; (4) 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; (5) 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; (6) 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and (7) 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives with the exception of CASs 09-23-01 and 09-34-01. Regarding these two CASs, CAS 09-23-01 is a gravel gertie where a zero-yield test was conducted with all contamination confined to below ground within the area of the structure, and CAS 09-34-01 is an underground detection station where no contaminants are present. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for the other five CASs where information is insufficient. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 4, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 139.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert F.

2004-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the 'Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 551 is located in Area 12 of the NTS, which is approximately 110 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Area 12 is approximately 40 miles beyond the main gate to the NTS. Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; (2) 12-06-05, Muckpile; (3) 12-06-07, Muckpile; and (4) 12-06-08, Muckpile. Corrective Action Site 12-01-09 is located in Area 12 and consists of an above ground storage tank (AST) and associated stain. Corrective Action Site 12-06-05 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 B-Tunnel. Corrective Action Site 12-06-07 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 C-, D-, and F-Tunnels. Corrective Action Site 12-06-08 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 B-Tunnel. In keeping with common convention, the U12B-, C-, D-, and F-Tunnels will be referred to as the B-, C-, D-, and F-Tunnels. The corrective action investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, and sampling of media, where appropriate. Data will also be obtained to support waste management decisions

49 CFR 40.137 - On what basis does the MRO verify test results involving marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, or PCP?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... involving marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, or PCP? 40.137 Section 40.137 Transportation Office of the... results involving marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, or PCP? (a) As the MRO, you must verify a confirmed positive test result for marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and/or PCP unless the employee presents a...

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-07-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139, Waste Disposal Sites, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 139 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 139 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Details of the site history and site characterization results for CAU 139 are provided in the approved Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006) and in the approved Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to present the detailed scope of work required to implement the recommended corrective actions as specified in Section 4.0 of the approved CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The approved closure activities for CAU 139 include removal of soil and debris contaminated with plutonium (Pu)-239, excavation of geophysical anomalies, removal of surface debris, construction of an engineered soil cover, and implementation of use restrictions (URs). Table 1 presents a summary of CAS-specific closure activities and contaminants of concern (COCs). Specific details of the corrective actions to be performed at each CAS are presented in Section 2.0 of this report.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139, Waste Disposal Sites, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 139 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 139 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Details of the site history and site characterization results for CAU 139 are provided in the approved Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006) and in the approved Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to present the detailed scope of work required to implement the recommended corrective actions as specified in Section 4.0 of the approved CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The approved closure activities for CAU 139 include removal of soil and debris contaminated with plutonium (Pu)-239, excavation of geophysical anomalies, removal of surface debris, construction of an engineered soil cover, and implementation of use restrictions (URs). Table 1 presents a summary of CAS-specific closure activities and contaminants of concern (COCs). Specific details of the corrective actions to be performed at each CAS are presented in Section 2.0 of this report

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 5: Landfills, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0) includes Record of Technical Change No. 1 (dated 9/17/2002)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

IT Corporation, Las Vegas, NV

2002-05-28

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 5 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 5 consists of eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-15-01, Sanitary Landfill; 05-16-01, Landfill; 06-08-01, Landfill; 06-15-02, Sanitary Landfill; 06-15-03, Sanitary Landfill; 12-15-01, Sanitary Landfill; 20-15-01, Landfill; 23-15-03, Disposal Site. Located between Areas 5, 6, 12, 20, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), CAU 5 consists of unlined landfills used in support of disposal operations between 1952 and 1992. Large volumes of solid waste were produced from the projects which used the CAU 5 landfills. Waste disposed in these landfills may be present without appropriate controls (i.e., use restrictions, adequate cover) and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment. During the 1992 to 1995 time frame, the NTS was used for various research and development projects including nuclear weapons testing. Instead of managing solid waste at one or two disposal sites, the practice on the NTS was to dispose of solid waste in the vicinity of the project. A review of historical documentation, process knowledge, personal interviews, and inferred activities associated with this CAU identified the following as potential contaminants of concern: volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, petroleum hydrocarbons (diesel- and gasoline-range organics), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Metals, plus nickel and zinc. A two-phase approach has been selected to collect information and generate data to satisfy needed resolution

Testing effort dependent software reliability model for imperfect debugging process considering both detection and correction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peng, R.; Li, Y.F.; Zhang, W.J.; Hu, Q.P.

2014-01-01

This paper studies the fault detection process (FDP) and fault correction process (FCP) with the incorporation of testing effort function and imperfect debugging. In order to ensure high reliability, it is essential for software to undergo a testing phase, during which faults can be detected and corrected by debuggers. The testing resource allocation during this phase, which is usually depicted by the testing effort function, considerably influences not only the fault detection rate but also the time to correct a detected fault. In addition, testing is usually far from perfect such that new faults may be introduced. In this paper, we first show how to incorporate testing effort function and fault introduction into FDP and then develop FCP as delayed FDP with a correction effort. Various specific paired FDP and FCP models are obtained based on different assumptions of fault introduction and correction effort. An illustrative example is presented. The optimal release policy under different criteria is also discussed

Streamlined approach for environmental restoration (SAFER) plan for corrective action unit 412: clean slate I plutonium dispersion (TTR) tonopah test range, Nevada, revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick K.

2015-04-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 412. CAU 412 is located on the Tonopah Test Range and consists of a single corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-01CS, Pu Contaminated Soil. There is sufficient information and historical documentation from previous investigations and the 1997 interim corrective action to recommend closure of CAU 412 using the SAFER process. Based on existing data, the presumed corrective action for CAU 412 is clean closure. However, additional data will be obtained during a field investigation to document and verify the adequacy of existing information and determine whether the CAU 412 closure objectives have been achieved. This SAFER Plan provides the methodology to gather the necessary information for closing the CAU.The following summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 412:• Collect environmental samples from designated target populations to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information.• If no COCs are present, establish clean closure as the corrective action. • If COCs are present, the extent of contamination will be defined and further corrective actions will be evaluated with the stakeholders (NDEP, USAF).• Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. Campbell

2000-04-01

This Corrective Action Plan provides methods for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as provided in the Corrective Action Decision Document for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 (DOE/NV, 1999). The CNTA is located in the Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, approximately 137 kilometers (85 miles) northeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CNTA consists of three separate land withdrawal areas commonly referred to as UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4, all of which are accessible to the public. CAU 417 consists of 34 Corrective Action Sites (CASs). Results of the investigation activities completed in 1998 are presented in Appendix D of the Corrective Action Decision Document (DOE/NV, 1999). According to the results, the only Constituent of Concern at the CNTA is total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH). Of the 34 CASs, corrective action was proposed for 16 sites in 13 CASs. In fiscal year 1999, a Phase I Work Plan was prepared for the construction of a cover on the UC-4 Mud Pit C to gather information on cover constructibility and to perform site management activities. With Nevada Division of Environmental Protection concurrence, the Phase I field activities began in August 1999. A multi-layered cover using a Geosynthetic Clay Liner as an infiltration barrier was constructed over the UC-4 Mud Pit. Some TPH impacted material was relocated, concrete monuments were installed at nine sites, signs warning of site conditions were posted at seven sites, and subsidence markers were installed on the UC-4 Mud Pit C cover. Results from the field activities indicated that the UC-4 Mud Pit C cover design was constructable and could be used at the UC-1 Central Mud Pit (CMP). However, because of the size of the UC-1 CMP this design would be extremely costly. An alternative cover design, a vegetated cover, is proposed for the UC-1 CMP.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

T. M. Fitzmaurice

2001-04-01

The purpose of this Closure Report (CR) is to provide documentation of the completed corrective action at the Test Cell A Leachfield System and to provide data confirming the corrective action. The Test Cell A Leachfield System is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 261. Remediation of CAU 261 is required under the FFACO (1996). CAU 261 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) which is approximately 140 kilometers (87 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 261 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASS): CAS 25-05-01, Leachfield; and CAS 25-05-07, Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP) (Figures 2 and 3). Test Cell A was operated during the 1960s and 1970s to support the Nuclear Rocket Development Station. Various operations within Building 3124 at Test Cell A resulted in liquid waste releases to the Leachfield and the AWLP. The following existing site conditions were reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOE/NV], 1999): Soil in the leachfield was found to exceed the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) preliminary remediation goals for semi volatile organic compounds, and background concentrations for strontium-90; Soil below the sewer pipe and approximately 4.5 meters (m) (15 feet [ft]) downstream of the initial outfall was found to exceed background concentrations for cesium-137 and strontium-90; Sludge in the leachfield septic tank was found to exceed the NDEP Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons and to contain americium-241, cesium-137, uranium-234, uranium-238, potassium-40, and strontium-90; No constituents of concern (COC) were identified at the AWLP. The NDEP-approved CADD (DOWNV, 1999) recommended Corrective Action Alternative 2, ''Closure of the Septic Tank and Distribution Box

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wickline, Alfred

2005-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting corrective action

Corrective action investigation plan for the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area, Corrective Action Unit 407, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-04-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. CAUs consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU No. 407, the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area (RCRSA) which is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, included in the Nellis Air Force Range Complex, is approximately 255 km (140 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU No. 407 is comprised of only one CAS (TA-23-001-TARC). The RCRSA was used during May and June 1963 to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the Clean Slate tests. The surface and subsurface soils are likely to have been impacted by plutonium and other contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) associated with decontamination activities at this site. The purpose of the corrective action investigation described in this CAIP is to: identify the presence and nature of COPCs; determine the vertical and lateral extent of COPCs; and provide sufficient information and data to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for the CAS

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2004-06-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental corrective action alternatives. Corrective Action Unit 151 is located in Areas 2, 12, 18, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 151 is comprised of the nine Corrective Action Sites (CAS) listed below: (1) 02-05-01, UE-2ce Pond; (2) 12-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (6); (3) 12-04-01, Septic Tanks; (4) 12-04-02, Septic Tanks; (5) 12-04-03, Septic Tank; (6) 12-47-01, Wastewater Pond; (7) 18-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; (8) 18-99-09, Sewer Line (Exposed); and (9) 20-19-02, Photochemical Drain. The CASs within CAU 151 are discharge and collection systems. Corrective Action Site 02-05-01 is located in Area 2 and is a well-water collection pond used as a part of the Nash test. Corrective Action Sites 12-03-01, 12-04-01, 12-04-02, 12-04-03, and 12-47-01 are located in Area 12 and are comprised of sewage lagoons, septic tanks, associated piping, and two sumps. The features are a part of the Area 12 Camp housing and administrative septic systems. Corrective Action Sites 18-03-01 and 18-99-09 are located in the Area 17 Camp in Area 18. These sites are sewage lagoons and associated piping. The origin and terminus of CAS 18-99-09 are unknown; however, the type and configuration of the pipe indicates that it may be a part of the septic systems in Area 18. Corrective Action Site 20-19-02 is located in the Area 20 Camp. This site is comprised of a surface discharge of photoprocessing chemicals.

Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 349, Area 12, Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 349 Area 12 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 349, Area 12, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-01-01

This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 349 Area 12 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms.

Multiple testing corrections in quantitative proteomics: A useful but blunt tool.

Science.gov (United States)

Pascovici, Dana; Handler, David C L; Wu, Jemma X; Haynes, Paul A

2016-09-01

Multiple testing corrections are a useful tool for restricting the FDR, but can be blunt in the context of low power, as we demonstrate by a series of simple simulations. Unfortunately, in proteomics experiments low power can be common, driven by proteomics-specific issues like small effects due to ratio compression, and few replicates due to reagent high cost, instrument time availability and other issues; in such situations, most multiple testing corrections methods, if used with conventional thresholds, will fail to detect any true positives even when many exist. In this low power, medium scale situation, other methods such as effect size considerations or peptide-level calculations may be a more effective option, even if they do not offer the same theoretical guarantee of a low FDR. Thus, we aim to highlight in this article that proteomics presents some specific challenges to the standard multiple testing corrections methods, which should be employed as a useful tool but not be regarded as a required rubber stamp. © 2016 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matthews, Patrick

2016-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2016-09-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.

Loop corrections and a new test of inflation

CERN Document Server

Tasinato, Gianmassimo; Nurmi, Sami; Wands, David

2013-01-01

Inflation is the leading paradigm for explaining the origin of primordial density perturbations and the observed temperature fluctuations of the cosmic microwave background. However many open questions remain, in particular whether one or more scalar fields were present during inflation and how they contributed to the primordial density perturbation. We propose a new observational test of whether multiple fields, or only one (not necessarily the inflaton) generated the perturbations. We show that our test, relating the bispectrum and trispectrum, is protected against loop corrections at all orders, unlike previous relations.

The AutoProof Verifier: Usability by Non-Experts and on Standard Code

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Carlo A. Furia

2015-08-01

Full Text Available Formal verification tools are often developed by experts for experts; as a result, their usability by programmers with little formal methods experience may be severely limited. In this paper, we discuss this general phenomenon with reference to AutoProof: a tool that can verify the full functional correctness of object-oriented software. In particular, we present our experiences of using AutoProof in two contrasting contexts representative of non-expert usage. First, we discuss its usability by students in a graduate course on software verification, who were tasked with verifying implementations of various sorting algorithms. Second, we evaluate its usability in verifying code developed for programming assignments of an undergraduate course. The first scenario represents usability by serious non-experts; the second represents usability on "standard code", developed without full functional verification in mind. We report our experiences and lessons learnt, from which we derive some general suggestions for furthering the development of verification tools with respect to improving their usability.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

K. B. Campbell email = campbek@nv.doe.gov

2002-01-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides selected corrective action alternatives and proposes the closure methodology for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262, Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point. CAU 262 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Remediation of CAU 262 is required under the FFACO. CAU 262 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), approximately 100 kilometers (km) (62 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 262 are located in the Nuclear Rocket Development Station complex. Individual CASs are located in the vicinity of the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD); Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD); and Test Cell C compounds. CAU 262 includes the following CASs as provided in the FFACO (1996); CAS 25-02-06, Underground Storage Tank; CAS 25-04-06, Septic Systems A and B; CAS 25-04-07, Septic System; CAS 25-05-03, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-05, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-06, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-08, Radioactive Leachfield; CAS 25-05-12, Leachfield; and CAS 25-51-01, Dry Well. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the locations of the R-MAD, the E-MAD, and the Test Cell C CASs, respectively. The facilities within CAU 262 supported nuclear rocket reactor engine testing. Activities associated with the program were performed between 1958 and 1973. However, several other projects used the facilities after 1973. A significant quantity of radioactive and sanitary waste was produced during routine operations. Most of the radioactive waste was managed by disposal in the posted leachfields. Sanitary wastes were disposed in sanitary leachfields. Septic tanks, present at sanitary leachfields (i.e., CAS 25-02-06,2504-06 [Septic Systems A and B], 25-04-07, 25-05-05,25-05-12) allowed solids to settle out of suspension prior to entering the leachfield. Posted leachfields do not contain septic tanks. All CASs located in CAU 262 are

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit Number 427: Area 3 septic waste system numbers 2 and 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the Area 3 Compound, specifically Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Number 427, which is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, included in the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 255 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The Corrective Action Unit Work Plan, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada divides investigative activities at TTR into Source Groups. The Septic Tanks and Lagoons Group consists of seven CAUs. Corrective Action Unit Number 427 is one of three septic waste system CAUs in TTR Area 3. Corrective Action Unit Numbers 405 and 428 will be investigated at a future data. Corrective Action Unit Number 427 is comprised of Septic Waste Systems Number 2 and 6 with respective CAS Numbers 03-05-002-SW02 and 03-05-002-SW06

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, is listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. CAU 543 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven CASs: (sm b ullet) CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad (sm b ullet) CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield (sm b ullet) CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping From January 24, 2005 through April 14, 2005, CAU 543 site characterization activities were conducted, and are reported in Appendix A of the CAU 543 Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2005). The recommended corrective action as stated in the approved CADD is No Further Action for five of the CAU 543 CASs, and Closure In Place for the remaining two CASs

Model Checking Artificial Intelligence Based Planners: Even the Best Laid Plans Must Be Verified

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, Margaret H.; Holzmann, Gerard J.; Cucullu, Gordon C., III; Smith, Benjamin D.

2005-01-01

Automated planning systems (APS) are gaining acceptance for use on NASA missions as evidenced by APS flown On missions such as Orbiter and Deep Space 1 both of which were commanded by onboard planning systems. The planning system takes high level goals and expands them onboard into a detailed of action fiat the spacecraft executes. The system must be verified to ensure that the automatically generated plans achieve the goals as expected and do not generate actions that would harm the spacecraft or mission. These systems are typically tested using empirical methods. Formal methods, such as model checking, offer exhaustive or measurable test coverage which leads to much greater confidence in correctness. This paper describes a formal method based on the SPIN model checker. This method guarantees that possible plans meet certain desirable properties. We express the input model in Promela, the language of SPIN and express the properties of desirable plans formally.

DOUBLE TRACKS Test Site interim corrective action plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-06-01

The DOUBLE TRACKS site is located on Range 71 north of the Nellis Air Force Range, northwest of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). DOUBLE TRACKS was the first of four experiments that constituted Operation ROLLER COASTER. On May 15, 1963, weapons-grade plutonium and depleted uranium were dispersed using 54 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) explosive. The explosion occurred in the open, 0.3 m above the steel plate. No fission yield was detected from the test, and the total amount of plutonium deposited on the ground surface was estimated to be between 980 and 1,600 grams. The test device was composed primarily of uranium-238 and plutonium-239. The mass ratio of uranium to plutonium was 4.35. The objective of the corrective action is to reduce the potential risk to human health and the environment and to demonstrate technically viable and cost-effective excavation, transportation, and disposal. To achieve these objectives, Bechtel Nevada (BN) will remove soil with a total transuranic activity greater then 200 pCI/g, containerize the soil in ``supersacks,`` transport the filled ``supersacks`` to the NTS, and dispose of them in the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site. During this interim corrective action, BN will also conduct a limited demonstration of an alternative method for excavation of radioactive near-surface soil contamination.

Efficient Verifiable Range and Closest Point Queries in Zero-Knowledge

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ghosh Esha

2016-10-01

Full Text Available We present an efficient method for answering one-dimensional range and closest-point queries in a verifiable and privacy-preserving manner. We consider a model where a data owner outsources a dataset of key-value pairs to a server, who answers range and closest-point queries issued by a client and provides proofs of the answers. The client verifies the correctness of the answers while learning nothing about the dataset besides the answers to the current and previous queries. Our work yields for the first time a zero-knowledge privacy assurance to authenticated range and closest-point queries. Previous work leaked the size of the dataset and used an inefficient proof protocol. Our construction is based on hierarchical identity-based encryption. We prove its security and analyze its efficiency both theoretically and with experiments on synthetic and real data (Enron email and Boston taxi datasets.

Corrective action investigation plan for Central Nevada Test Area, CAU No. 417

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-04-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) is part of a US Department of Energy (DOE)-funded environmental investigation of the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA). This CAIP addresses the surface investigation and characterization of 15 identified Corrective Action Sites (CASs). In addition, several other areas of the CNTA project area have surface expressions that may warrant investigation. These suspect areas will be characterized, if necessary, in subsequent CAIPs or addendums to this CAIP prepared to address these sites. This CAIP addresses only the 15 identified CASs as shown in Table 2-1 that are associated with the drilling and construction of a number of testing wells designed as part of an underground nuclear testing program. The purpose of the wells at the time of construction was to provide subsurface access for the emplacement, testing, and post detonation evaluations of underground nuclear devices. If contamination is found at any of the 15-surface CASs, the extent of contamination will be determined in order to develop an appropriate corrective action

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 107: Low Impact Soil Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan covers activities associated with Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107 of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996 (as amended February 2008)). CAU 107 consists of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site. (1) CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt; (2) CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2); (3) CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm; (4) CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area; (5) CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area; (6) CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area; (7) CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area; (8) CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area; (9) CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area; (10) CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area; (11) CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a; (12) CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site; (13) CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil; (14) CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10; and (15) CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky). Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, engineering drawings, field screening, analytical results, and the results of data quality objectives process (Section 3.0), closure in place with administrative controls or no further action will be implemented for CAU 107. CAU 107 closure activities will consist of verifying that the current postings required under Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835 are in place and implementing use restrictions (URs) at two sites, CAS 03-23-29 and CAS 18-23-02. The current radiological postings combined with the URs are adequate administrative controls to limit site access and worker dose

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 214 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 5, 11, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, CAU 214 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-99-01, Fallout Shelters; 11-22-03, Drum; 25-99-12, Fly Ash Storage; 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials; 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-99-18, Storage Area; 25-34-03, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); 25-34-04, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); and 25-34-05, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker). These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). The suspected contaminants and critical analyte s for CAU 214 include oil (total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel-range organics [TPH-DRO], polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), pesticides (chlordane, heptachlor, 4,4-DDT), barium, cadmium, chronium, lubricants (TPH-DRO, TPH-gasoline-range organics [GRO]), and fly ash (arsenic). The land-use zones where CAU 214 CASs are located dictate that future land uses will be limited to nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the corrective action decision document

Preoperational test report, raw water system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-10-29

This represents the preoperational test report for the Raw Water System, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system supplies makeup water to the W-030 recirculation evaporative cooling towers for tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102. The Raw Water pipe riser and associated strainer and valving is located in the W-030 diesel generator building. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Preoperational test report, raw water system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents the preoperational test report for the Raw Water System, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system supplies makeup water to the W-030 recirculation evaporative cooling towers for tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102. The Raw Water pipe riser and associated strainer and valving is located in the W-030 diesel generator building. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Operational test procedure for SY tank farm replacement exhauster unit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McClees, J.

1995-01-01

This operational test procedure will verify that the remaining functions not tested per WHC-SD-WM-ATP-080, or components disturbed during final installation, as well as interfaces with other tank farm equipment and remote monitoring stations are operating correctly

"None of the above" as a correct and incorrect alternative on a multiple-choice test: implications for the testing effect.

Science.gov (United States)

Odegard, Timothy N; Koen, Joshua D

2007-11-01

Both positive and negative testing effects have been demonstrated with a variety of materials and paradigms (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). The present series of experiments replicate and extend the research of Roediger and Marsh (2005) with the addition of a "none-of-the-above" response option. Participants (n=32 in both experiments) read a set of passages, took an initial multiple-choice test, completed a filler task, and then completed a final cued-recall test (Experiment 1) or multiple-choice test (Experiment 2). Questions were manipulated on the initial multiple-choice test by adding a "none-of-the-above" response alternative (choice "E") that was incorrect ("E" Incorrect) or correct ("E" Correct). The results from both experiments demonstrated that the positive testing effect was negated when the "none-of-the-above" alternative was the correct response on the initial multiple-choice test, but was still present when the "none-of-the-above" alternative was an incorrect response.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 487: Thunderwell Site, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, January 2001)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DOE/NV

2001-01-02

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 487, Thunderwell Site, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 487 consists of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS), RG 26-001-RGRV, Thunderwell Site. The site is located in the northwest portion of the TTR, Nevada, approximately five miles northwest of the Area 3 Control Point and closest to the Cactus Flats broad basin. Historically, Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico used CAU 487 in the early to mid-1960s for a series of high explosive tests detonated at the bottom of large cylindrical steel tubes. Historical photographs indicate that debris from these tests and subsequent operations may have been scattered and buried throughout the site. A March 2000 walk-over survey and a July 2000 geophysical survey indicated evidence of buried and surface debris in dirt mounds and areas throughout the site; however, a radiological drive-over survey also performed in July 2000 indicated that no radiological hazards were identified at this site. Based on site history, the scope of this plan is to resolve the problem statement identified during the Data Quality Objectives process that detonation activities at this CAU site may have resulted in the release of contaminants of concern into the surface/subsurface soil including total volatile and total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, radionuclides, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and high explosives. Therefore, the scope of corrective action field investigation will involve excavation, drilling, and extensive soil sampling and analysis activities to determine the extent (if any) of both the lateral and vertical contamination

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gustafason, D.L.

2001-01-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2000). The CAU includes two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-23-09, Contaminated Waste Dump Number 1; and 25-23-03, Contaminated Waste Dump Number 2. Investigation of CAU 143 was conducted in 1999. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against preliminary action levels to determine constituents of concern for CAU 143. Radionuclide concentrations in disposal pit soil samples associated with the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility West Trenches, the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility East Trestle Pit, and the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility Trench are greater than normal background concentrations. These constituents are identified as constituents of concern for their respective CASs. Closure-in-place with administrative controls involves use restrictions to minimize access and prevent unauthorized intrusive activities, earthwork to fill depressions to original grade, placing additional clean cover material over the previously filled portion of some of the trenches, and placing secondary or diversion berm around pertinent areas to divert storm water run-on potential

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2004-04-06

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach for collecting the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 12 on the NTS, CAU 552 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 12-06-04, Muckpile; 12-23-05, Ponds. Corrective Action Site 12-06-04 in Area 12 consists of the G-Tunnel muckpile, which is the result of tunneling activities. Corrective Action Site 12-23-05 consists of three dry ponds adjacent to the muckpile. The toe of the muckpile extends into one of the ponds creating an overlap of two CASs. The purpose of the investigation is to ensure that adequate data are collected to provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and select technic ally viable corrective actions. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 529: Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert F. Boehlecke

2004-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 529, Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, is the only CAS in CAU 529 and is located in Area 25 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Site 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, was divided into nine parcels because of the large area impacted by past operations and the complexity of the source areas. The CAS was subdivided into separate parcels based on separate and distinct releases as determined and approved in the Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process and Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Table 1-1 summarizes the suspected sources for the nine parcels. Corrective Action Site 25-23-17 is comprised of the following nine parcels: (1) Parcel A, Kiwi Transient Nuclear Test (TNT) 16,000-foot (ft) Arc Area (Kiwi TNT); (2) Parcel B, Phoebus 1A Test 8,000-ft Arc Area (Phoebus); (3) Parcel C, Topopah Wash at Test Cell C (TCC); (4) Parcel D, Buried Contaminated Soil Area (BCSA) l; (5) Parcel E, BCSA 2; (6) Parcel F, Borrow Pit Burial Site (BPBS); (7) Parcel G, Drain/Outfall Discharges; (8) Parcel H, Contaminated Soil Storage Area (CSSA); and (9) Parcel J, Main Stream/Drainage Channels.

Nondestructive test for estimating strength of concrete in structure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nozaki, Yoshitsugu; Soshiroda, Tomozo

1997-01-01

Evaluation of the quality of concrete in structures, especially strength estimation is said to be one of the most important problem and needed to establish test method especial tv for non-destructive method in situ. The paper describes the nondestructive test to estimate strength of concrete. From experimental study using full scale model wall, strength estimating equations are proposed by ultra-sonic pulse velocity, rebound hardness of Schmidt hammer and combined with two methods. From statistical study of the results of experiments, errors of estimated strength by the proposed equations are suggested. The validity of the equations are verified by investigation for existing reinforced concrete buildings aged 20 - 50 years. And it was found from the statistical study that the strength estimating equations need to be corrected in applying to tons aged concrete, and correction factor to those squat ions were suggested. Furthermore the corrected proposed equations were verified by applying to buildings investigated the other case.

On the non-existence of a Bartlett correction for unit root tests

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jensen, Jens Ledet; Wood, Andrew T.A.

1997-01-01

There has been considerable recent interest in testing for a unit root in autoregressive models, especially in the context of cointegration models in econometrics. The likelihood ratio test for a unit root has non-standard asymptotic behaviour. In particular, when the errors are Gaussian, the lim...... for improved distributional approximations, and the question of whether W admits a Bartlett correction is of interest. In this note we establish that a Bartlett correction does not exist in the simplest unit root model. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V....

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 254: Area 25 R-MAD Decontamination Facility Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Obi, C.M.

2000-01-01

The Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Decontamination Facility is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 254. CAU 254 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site and consists of a single Corrective Action Site CAS 25-23-06. CAU 254 will be closed, in accordance with the FFACO of 1996. CAU 254 was used primarily to perform radiological decontamination and consists of Building 3126, two outdoor decontamination pads, and surrounding soil within an existing perimeter fence. The site was used to decontaminate nuclear rocket test-car hardware and tooling from the early 1960s through the early 1970s, and to decontaminate a military tank in the early 1980s. The site characterization results indicate that, in places, the surficial soil and building materials exceed clean-up criteria for organic compounds, metals, and radionuclides. Closure activities are expected to generate waste streams consisting of nonhazardous construction waste. petroleum hydrocarbon waste, hazardous waste, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed waste. Some of the wastes exceed land disposal restriction limits and will require off-site treatment before disposal. The recommended corrective action was revised to Alternative 3- ''Unrestricted Release Decontamination, Verification Survey, and Dismantle Building 3126,'' in an addendum to the Correction Action Decision Document

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wickline, Alfred

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 190 is located in Areas 11 and 14 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 190 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 11-02-01, Underground Centrifuge; (2) 11-02-02, Drain Lines and Outfall; (3) 11-59-01, Tweezer Facility Septic System; and (4) 14-23-01, LTU-6 Test Area. These sites are being investigated because existing information is insufficient on the nature and extent of potential contamination to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI). The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on August 24, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture, and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 190. The scope of the CAU 190 CAI includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling; (2) Conduct radiological and geophysical surveys; (3) Perform field screening; (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; (5) If COCs are present, collect additional step-out samples to define the lateral and vertical extent of the contamination; (6) Collect samples of source material, if present

Correction of Pressure Drop in Steam and Water System in Performance Test of Boiler

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Jinglong; Zhao, Xianqiao; Hou, Fanjun; Wu, Xiaowu; Wang, Feng; Hu, Zhihong; Yang, Xinsen

2018-01-01

Steam and water pressure drop is one of the most important characteristics in the boiler performance test. As the measuring points are not in the guaranteed position and the test condition fluctuation exsits, the pressure drop test of steam and water system has the deviation of measuring point position and the deviation of test running parameter. In order to get accurate pressure drop of steam and water system, the corresponding correction should be carried out. This paper introduces the correction method of steam and water pressure drop in boiler performance test.

Automated measurement and control of concrete properties in a ready mix truck with VERIFI.

Science.gov (United States)

2014-02-01

In this research, twenty batches of concrete with six different mixture proportions were tested with VERIFI to evaluate 1) accuracy : and repeatability of VERIFI measurements, 2) ability of VERIFI to adjust slump automatically with water and admixtur...

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units is listed in Appendix III of the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) which was agreed to by the state of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). CAU 543 sites are located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (Figure 1): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; and CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping. All Area 15 CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm, which operated from 1963 to 1981 and was used to support animal experiments involving the uptake of radionuclides. Each of the Area 15 CASs, except CAS 15-23-01, is associated with the disposal of waste effluent from Building 15-06, which was the primary location of the various tests and experiments conducted onsite. Waste effluent disposal from Building 15-06 involved piping, sumps, outfalls, a septic tank with leachfield, underground storage tanks, and an aboveground storage tank (AST). CAS 15-23-01 was associated with decontamination activities of farm equipment potentially contaminated with radiological constituents, pesticides, and herbicides. While the building structures were removed before the investigation took place, all the original tanks, sumps, piping, and concrete building pads remain in place. The Area 6 CAS is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, a facility which operated from 1971 to 2001 and was used to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, clothing, and other materials that had become contaminated during nuclear testing activities. The CAS includes the effluent collection and distribution systems for Buildings

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2008-02-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563, Septic Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996; as amended January 2007). The corrective action sites (CASs) for CAU 563 are located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, and are comprised of the following four sites: •03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank •03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool •12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks •12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative (CAA) for the four CASs within CAU 563. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 17 through November 19, 2007, as set forth in the CAU 563 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2007). Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern (COCs) for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at one of the four CASs in CAU 563 and required the evaluation of CAAs. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 563 revealed the following: •CASs 03-04-02, 03-59-05, and 12-60-01 do not contain contamination at concentrations exceeding the FALs. •CAS 12-59-01 contains arsenic and chromium contamination above FALs in surface and near-surface soils surrounding a stained location within the site. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at CAS 12-59-01, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 563.

Externally Verifiable Oblivious RAM

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gancher Joshua

2017-04-01

Full Text Available We present the idea of externally verifiable oblivious RAM (ORAM. Our goal is to allow a client and server carrying out an ORAM protocol to have disputes adjudicated by a third party, allowing for the enforcement of penalties against an unreliable or malicious server. We give a security definition that guarantees protection not only against a malicious server but also against a client making false accusations. We then give modifications of the Path ORAM [15] and Ring ORAM [9] protocols that meet this security definition. These protocols both have the same asymptotic runtimes as the semi-honest original versions and require the external verifier to be involved only when the client or server deviates from the protocol. Finally, we implement externally verified ORAM, along with an automated cryptocurrency contract to use as the external verifier.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 410: Waste Disposal Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision No.:0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 410 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 410 is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), which is included in the Nevada Test and Training Range (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range) approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of five Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-19-002-TAB2, Debris Mound; TA-21-003-TANL, Disposal Trench; TA-21-002-TAAL, Disposal Trench; 09-21-001-TA09, Disposal Trenches; 03-19-001, Waste Disposal Site. This CAU is being investigated because contaminants may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment, and waste may have been disposed of with out appropriate controls. Four out of five of these CASs are the result of weapons testing and disposal activities at the TTR, and they are grouped together for site closure based on the similarity of the sites (waste disposal sites and trenches). The fifth CAS, CAS 03-19-001, is a hydrocarbon spill related to activities in the area. This site is grouped with this CAU because of the location (TTR). Based on historical documentation and process know-ledge, vertical and lateral migration routes are possible for all CASs. Migration of contaminants may have occurred through transport by infiltration of precipitation through surface soil which serves as a driving force for downward migration of contaminants. Land-use scenarios limit future use of these CASs to industrial activities. The suspected contaminants of potential concern which have been identified are volatile organic compounds; semivolatile organic compounds; high explosives; radiological constituents including depleted uranium

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2005-05-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 224, Decon Pad and Septic Systems, in Areas 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 224 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 02-04-01, Septic Tank (Buried); (2) 03-05-01, Leachfield; (3) 05-04-01, Septic Tanks (4)/Discharge Area; (4) 06-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (3); (5) 06-05-01, Leachfield; (6) 06-17-04, Decon Pad and Wastewater Catch; (7) 06-23-01, Decon Pad Discharge Piping; (8) 11-04-01, Sewage Lagoon; and (9) 23-05-02, Leachfield. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for the nine CASs within CAU 224. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from August 10, 2004, through January 18, 2005, as set forth in the CAU 224 Corrective Action Investigation Plan.

A two-dimensional matrix correction for off-axis portal dose prediction errors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bailey, Daniel W.; Kumaraswamy, Lalith; Bakhtiari, Mohammad; Podgorsak, Matthew B.

2013-01-01

Purpose: This study presents a follow-up to a modified calibration procedure for portal dosimetry published by Bailey et al. [“An effective correction algorithm for off-axis portal dosimetry errors,” Med. Phys. 36, 4089–4094 (2009)]. A commercial portal dose prediction system exhibits disagreement of up to 15% (calibrated units) between measured and predicted images as off-axis distance increases. The previous modified calibration procedure accounts for these off-axis effects in most regions of the detecting surface, but is limited by the simplistic assumption of radial symmetry. Methods: We find that a two-dimensional (2D) matrix correction, applied to each calibrated image, accounts for off-axis prediction errors in all regions of the detecting surface, including those still problematic after the radial correction is performed. The correction matrix is calculated by quantitative comparison of predicted and measured images that span the entire detecting surface. The correction matrix was verified for dose-linearity, and its effectiveness was verified on a number of test fields. The 2D correction was employed to retrospectively examine 22 off-axis, asymmetric electronic-compensation breast fields, five intensity-modulated brain fields (moderate-high modulation) manipulated for far off-axis delivery, and 29 intensity-modulated clinical fields of varying complexity in the central portion of the detecting surface. Results: Employing the matrix correction to the off-axis test fields and clinical fields, predicted vs measured portal dose agreement improves by up to 15%, producing up to 10% better agreement than the radial correction in some areas of the detecting surface. Gamma evaluation analyses (3 mm, 3% global, 10% dose threshold) of predicted vs measured portal dose images demonstrate pass rate improvement of up to 75% with the matrix correction, producing pass rates that are up to 30% higher than those resulting from the radial correction technique alone. As

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 487: Thunderwell Site, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, January 2001); TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 487, Thunderwell Site, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 487 consists of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS), RG 26-001-RGRV, Thunderwell Site. The site is located in the northwest portion of the TTR, Nevada, approximately five miles northwest of the Area 3 Control Point and closest to the Cactus Flats broad basin. Historically, Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico used CAU 487 in the early to mid-1960s for a series of high explosive tests detonated at the bottom of large cylindrical steel tubes. Historical photographs indicate that debris from these tests and subsequent operations may have been scattered and buried throughout the site. A March 2000 walk-over survey and a July 2000 geophysical survey indicated evidence of buried and surface debris in dirt mounds and areas throughout the site; however, a radiological drive-over survey also performed in July 2000 indicated that no radiological hazards were identified at this site. Based on site history, the scope of this plan is to resolve the problem statement identified during the Data Quality Objectives process that detonation activities at this CAU site may have resulted in the release of contaminants of concern into the surface/subsurface soil including total volatile and total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, radionuclides, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and high explosives. Therefore, the scope of corrective action field investigation will involve excavation, drilling, and extensive soil sampling and analysis activities to determine the extent (if any) of both the lateral and vertical contamination and whether

Preoperational test report, recirculation ventilation systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-11-11

This represents a preoperational test report for Recirculation Ventilation Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides vapor space cooling of tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102 and supports the ability to exhaust air from each tank. Each system consists of a valved piping loop, a fan, condenser, and moisture separator; equipment is located inside each respective tank farm in its own hardened building. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Preoperational test report, recirculation ventilation systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents a preoperational test report for Recirculation Ventilation Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides vapor space cooling of tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102 and supports the ability to exhaust air from each tank. Each system consists of a valved piping loop, a fan, condenser, and moisture separator; equipment is located inside each respective tank farm in its own hardened building. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Errata Sheet

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2004-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's corrective action alternative recommendation for each of the corrective action sites (CASs) within Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. An evaluation of analytical data from the corrective action investigation, review of current and future operations at each CAS, and a detailed comparative analysis of potential corrective action alternatives were used to determine the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. There are six CASs in CAU 204, which are all located between Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 on the NTS. The No Further Action alternative was recommended for CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, and 05-99-02; and a Closure in Place with Administrative Controls recommendation was the preferred corrective action for CASs 05-18-02 and 05-33-01. These alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated as well as applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the sites and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated media at CAU 204.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 254: Area 25 R-MAD Decontamination Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 254, R-MAD Decontamination Facility, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 254 is comprised of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-23-06, Decontamination Facility. A corrective action investigation for this CAS as conducted in January 2000 as set forth in the related Corrective Action Investigation Plan. Samples were collected from various media throughout the CAS and sent to an off-site laboratory for analysis. The laboratory results indicated the following: radiation dose rates inside the Decontamination Facility, Building 3126, and in the storage yard exceeded the average general dose rate; scanning and static total surface contamination surveys indicated that portions of the locker and shower room floor, decontamination bay floor, loft floor, east and west decon pads, north and south decontamination bay interior walls, exterior west and south walls, and loft walls were above preliminary action levels (PALs). The investigation-derived contaminants of concern (COCs) included: polychlorinated biphenyls, radionuclides (strontium-90, niobium-94, cesium-137, uranium-234 and -235), total volatile and semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Metals). During the investigation, two corrective action objectives (CAOs) were identified to prevent or mitigate human exposure to COCs. Based on these CAOs, a review of existing data, future use, and current operations at the Nevada Test Site, three CAAs were developed for consideration: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Unrestricted Release Decontamination and Verification Survey; and Alternative 3 - Unrestricted

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1, 2, and Errata

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2004-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204 Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) north of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). The Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 204 are located in Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Unit 204 is comprised of the six CASs identified in Table 1-1. As shown in Table 1-1, the FFACO describes four of these CASs as bunkers one as chemical exchange storage and one as a blockhouse. Subsequent investigations have identified four of these structures as instrumentation bunkers (CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, 05-33-01), one as an explosives storage bunker (CAS 05-99-02), and one as both (CAS 05-18-02). The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 234: Mud Pits, Cellars, and Mud Spills, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant Evenson

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit 234, Mud Pits, Cellars, and Mud Spills, consists of 12 inactive sites located in the north and northeast section of the NTS. The 12 CAU 234 sites consist of mud pits, mud spills, mud sumps, and an open post-test cellar. The CAU 234 sites were all used to support nuclear testing conducted in the Yucca Flat and Rainier Mesa areas during the 1950s through the 1970s. The CASs in CAU 234 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting appropriate corrective action alternatives

Geochemical and Isotopic Evaluation of Groundwater Movement in Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Farnham, Irene

2006-02-01

This report describes the results of a comprehensive geochemical evaluation of the groundwater flow system in the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine Corrective Action Unit (CAU). The main objectives of this study are to identify probable pathways for groundwater flow within the study area and to develop constraints on groundwater transit times between selected data collection sites. This work provides an independent means of testing and verifying predictive flow models being developed for this CAU using finite element methods. The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU constitutes the largest of six underground test areas on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) specified for remedial action in the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order''. A total of 747 underground nuclear detonations were conducted in this CAU. Approximately 23 percent of these detonations were conducted below or near the water table, resulting in groundwater contamination in the vicinity and possibly downgradient of these underground test locations. Therefore, a rigorous evaluation of the groundwater flow system in this CAU is necessary to assess potential long-term risks to the public water supply at downgradient locations.

Differential Deposition for Surface Figure Corrections in Grazing Incidence X-Ray Optics

Science.gov (United States)

Ramsey, Brian D.; Kilaru, Kiranmayee; Atkins, Carolyn; Gubarev, Mikhail V.; Broadway, David M.

2015-01-01

Differential deposition corrects the low- and mid- spatial-frequency deviations in the axial figure of Wolter-type grazing incidence X-ray optics. Figure deviations is one of the major contributors to the achievable angular resolution. Minimizing figure errors can significantly improve the imaging quality of X-ray optics. Material of varying thickness is selectively deposited, using DC magnetron sputtering, along the length of optic to minimize figure deviations. Custom vacuum chambers are built that can incorporate full-shell and segmented Xray optics. Metrology data of preliminary corrections on a single meridian of full-shell x-ray optics show an improvement of mid-spatial frequencies from 6.7 to 1.8 arc secs HPD. Efforts are in progress to correct a full-shell and segmented optics and to verify angular-resolution improvement with X-ray testing.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2006-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. The corrective actions proposed in this document are in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) that are shown on Figure 1-2 and listed below: CAS 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; CAS 12-06-05, U-12b Muckpile; CAS 12-06-07, Muckpile; and CAS 12-06-08, Muckpile. A detailed discussion of the history of this CAU is presented in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This CADD/CR provides justification for the closure of CAU 551 in place with administrative controls. This justification is based upon process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The CAIP provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, this information will not be repeated in the CADD/CR. Corrective Action Unit 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, consists of four inactive sites located in the southwestern portion of Area 12. The four CAU 551 sites consist of three muckpiles, and an aboveground storage tank (AST) and stain. The CAU 551 sites were all used during underground nuclear testing at the B-, C-, D- and F-Tunnels in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have mostly remained inactive since that period.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wickline, Alfred

2006-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. The corrective actions proposed in this document are in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) that are shown on Figure 1-2 and listed below: CAS 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; CAS 12-06-05, U-12b Muckpile; CAS 12-06-07, Muckpile; and CAS 12-06-08, Muckpile. A detailed discussion of the history of this CAU is presented in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This CADD/CR provides justification for the closure of CAU 551 in place with administrative controls. This justification is based upon process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The CAIP provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, this information will not be repeated in the CADD/CR. Corrective Action Unit 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, consists of four inactive sites located in the southwestern portion of Area 12. The four CAU 551 sites consist of three muckpiles, and an aboveground storage tank (AST) and stain. The CAU 551 sites were all used during underground nuclear testing at the B-, C-, D- and F-Tunnels in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have mostly remained inactive since that period

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2012-09-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 105 is a geographical grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 105, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney • 02-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site T-2A • 02-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T-2B • 02-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site T-2 • 02-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Turk These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 105. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with all CAU 105 CASs are from atmospheric nuclear testing activities. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU

MAC mini acceptance test procedure, software Version 3.0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russell, V.K.

1994-01-01

The K Basins Materials Accounting (MAC) programs had some major improvements made to it to organize the main-tables by Location, Canister, and Material. This ATP describes how the code was to be tested to verify its correctness

Testing and correction of underground tanks at LLNL: Workplan and schedule

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henry, R.K.; Schwartz, W.W.; Castro, D.J.

1987-01-01

This report defines a workplan and time schedule for leak tightness testing of underground tank systems and for corrective measures for systems shown by testing to leak. The systems addressed by this report failed a leak tightness test or the test results were inconclusive. The workplan prescribes testing all systems to yield conclusive results. Systems shown to leak will be repaired, retested, and either left in service or be closed. Materials effected by leakage will be cleaned up or removed. 2 figs., 2 tabs

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with Errata Sheet

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2007-03-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166, Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (1996). The corrective action sites (CASs) are located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 166 is comprised of the following CASs: • 02-42-01, Cond. Release Storage Yd - North • 02-42-02, Cond. Release Storage Yd - South • 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area • 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard • 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum • 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank • 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative (CAA) for the seven CASs within CAU 166. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 31, 2006, through February 28, 2007, as set forth in the CAU 166 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2006).

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 542: Disposal Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laura Pastor

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 542 is located in Areas 3, 8, 9, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 542 is comprised of eight corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 03-20-07, ''UD-3a Disposal Hole''; (2) 03-20-09, ''UD-3b Disposal Hole''; (3) 03-20-10, ''UD-3c Disposal Hole''; (4) 03-20-11, ''UD-3d Disposal Hole''; (5) 06-20-03, ''UD-6 and UD-6s Disposal Holes''; (6) 08-20-01, ''U-8d PS No.1A Injection Well Surface Release''; (7) 09-20-03, ''U-9itsy30 PS No.1A Injection Well Surface Release''; and (8) 20-20-02, ''U-20av PS No.1A Injection Well Surface Release''. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 30, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 542. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the CAI for CAU 542 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct radiological surveys. (3) Conduct geophysical surveys to

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick; Burmeister, Mark; Gallo, Patricia

2016-04-21

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-01-01

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 105 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 22, 2012, through May 23, 2013, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices.

Corrective action investigation plan for CAU Number 453: Area 9 Landfill, Tonopah Test Range

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the Area 9 Landfill, Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 453/Corrective Action (CAS) 09-55-001-0952, which is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, included in the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 255 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The Area 9 Landfill is located northwest of Area 9 on the TTR. The landfill cells associated with CAU 453 were excavated to receive waste generated from the daily operations conducted at Area 9 and from range cleanup which occurred after test activities

A performance evaluation of personnel identity verifiers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maxwell, R.L.; Wright, L.J.

1987-01-01

Personnel identity verification devices, which are based on the examination and assessment of a body feature or a unique repeatable personal action, are steadily improving. These biometric devices are becoming more practical with respect to accuracy, speed, user compatibility, reliability and cost, but more development is necessary to satisfy the varied and sometimes ill-defined future requirements of the security industry. In an attempt to maintain an awareness of the availability and the capabilities of identity verifiers for the DOE security community, Sandia Laboratories continues to comparatively evaluate the capabilities and improvements of developing devices. An evaluation of several recently available verifiers is discussed in this paper. Operating environments and procedures more typical of physical access control use can reveal performance substantially different from the basic laboratory tests

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant Evenson

2008-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 561 is located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 22, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 561 is comprised of the 10 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 01-19-01, Waste Dump; (2) 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area; (3) 03-19-02, Debris Pile; (4) 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile; (5) 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump; (6) 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site; (7) 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches; (8) 25-08-02, Waste Dump; (9) 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump; and (10) 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 561. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the Corrective Action Investigation for CAU 561 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 104: Area 7 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2011-08-01

CAU 104 comprises the 15 CASs listed below: (1) 07-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-7C; (2) 07-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T7-1; (3) 07-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site; (4) 07-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T7-5a; (5) 07-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Dog (T-S); (6) 07-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (T-S); (7) 07-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (T-S); (8) 07-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (9) 07-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (10) 07-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (Bus); (11) 07-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (Buster); (12) 07-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Ruth; (13) 07-23-15, Atmospheric Test Site T7-4; (14) 07-23-16, Atmospheric Test Site B7-b; (15) 07-23-17, Atmospheric Test Site - Climax These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 104. The releases at CAU 104 consist of surface-deposited radionuclides from 30 atmospheric nuclear tests. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 104 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison

BARTTest: Community-Standard Atmospheric Radiative-Transfer and Retrieval Tests

Science.gov (United States)

Harrington, Joseph; Himes, Michael D.; Cubillos, Patricio E.; Blecic, Jasmina; Challener, Ryan C.

2018-01-01

Atmospheric radiative transfer (RT) codes are used both to predict planetary and brown-dwarf spectra and in retrieval algorithms to infer atmospheric chemistry, clouds, and thermal structure from observations. Observational plans, theoretical models, and scientific results depend on the correctness of these calculations. Yet, the calculations are complex and the codes implementing them are often written without modern software-verification techniques. The community needs a suite of test calculations with analytically, numerically, or at least community-verified results. We therefore present the Bayesian Atmospheric Radiative Transfer Test Suite, or BARTTest. BARTTest has four categories of tests: analytically verified RT tests of simple atmospheres (single line in single layer, line blends, saturation, isothermal, multiple line-list combination, etc.), community-verified RT tests of complex atmospheres, synthetic retrieval tests on simulated data with known answers, and community-verified real-data retrieval tests.BARTTest is open-source software intended for community use and further development. It is available at https://github.com/ExOSPORTS/BARTTest. We propose this test suite as a standard for verifying atmospheric RT and retrieval codes, analogous to the Held-Suarez test for general circulation models. This work was supported by NASA Planetary Atmospheres grant NX12AI69G, NASA Astrophysics Data Analysis Program grant NNX13AF38G, and NASA Exoplanets Research Program grant NNX17AB62G.

Preoperational test report, primary ventilation condensate system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-29

Preoperational test report for Primary Ventilation Condensate System, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system provides a collection point for condensate generated by the W-030 primary vent offgas cooling system serving tanks AYIOI, AY102, AZIOI, AZI02. The system is located inside a shielded ventilation equipment cell and consists of a condensate seal pot, sampling features, a drain line to existing Catch Tank 241-AZ-151, and a cell sump jet pump. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 145: Wells and Storage Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2004-09-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 145: Wells and Storage Holes. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental samples. Corrective Action Unit 145 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 145 is comprised of the six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-20-01, Core Storage Holes; (2) 03-20-02, Decon Pad and Sump; (3) 03-20-04, Injection Wells; (4) 03-20-08, Injection Well; (5) 03-25-01, Oil Spills; and (6) 03-99-13, Drain and Injection Well. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. One conceptual site model with three release scenario components was developed for the six CASs to address all releases associated with the site. The sites will be investigated based on data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 24, 2004, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQOs process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 145.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Revision 1)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

USDOE/NV

1999-07-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed for Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98. The Frenchman Flat CAU is located along the eastern border of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and includes portions of Areas 5 and 11. The Frenchman Flat CAU constitutes one of several areas of the Nevada Test Site used for underground nuclear testing in the past. The nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity as well as downgradient of the underground test areas. The CAIP describes the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) to be conducted at the Frenchman Flat CAU to evaluate the extent of contamination in groundwater due to the underground nuclear testing. The Frenchman Flat CAI will be conducted by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project which is a part of the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) Environmental Restoration Project. The CAIP is a requirement of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 ) agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Based on the general definition of a CAI from Section IV.14 of the FFACO, the purpose of the CAI is ''...to gather data sufficient to characterize the nature, extent, and rate of migration or potential rate of migration from releases or discharges of pollutants or contaminants and/or potential releases or discharges from corrective action units identified at the facilities...'' (FFACO, 1996). However, for the Underground Test Area (UGTA) CAUs, ''...the objective of the CAI process is to define boundaries around each UGTA CAU that establish areas that contain water that may be unsafe for domestic and municipal use.'', as stated in Appendix VI of the FFACO (1996). According to the UGTA strategy (Appendix VI of the FFACO), the CAI of a given CAU starts with the evaluation of the existing data. New

a Semi-Empirical Topographic Correction Model for Multi-Source Satellite Images

Science.gov (United States)

Xiao, Sa; Tian, Xinpeng; Liu, Qiang; Wen, Jianguang; Ma, Yushuang; Song, Zhenwei

2018-04-01

Topographic correction of surface reflectance in rugged terrain areas is the prerequisite for the quantitative application of remote sensing in mountainous areas. Physics-based radiative transfer model can be applied to correct the topographic effect and accurately retrieve the reflectance of the slope surface from high quality satellite image such as Landsat8 OLI. However, as more and more images data available from various of sensors, some times we can not get the accurate sensor calibration parameters and atmosphere conditions which are needed in the physics-based topographic correction model. This paper proposed a semi-empirical atmosphere and topographic corrction model for muti-source satellite images without accurate calibration parameters.Based on this model we can get the topographic corrected surface reflectance from DN data, and we tested and verified this model with image data from Chinese satellite HJ and GF. The result shows that the correlation factor was reduced almost 85 % for near infrared bands and the classification overall accuracy of classification increased 14 % after correction for HJ. The reflectance difference of slope face the sun and face away the sun have reduced after correction.

Scheduling system for test automation framework

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Wahyudi, Djohan

2014-01-01

An Interventional X-ray (iXR) system provides real time X-ray imaging with high image clarity and low X-ray dose. After several years of development, the iXR System has become complex. In order to verify the correct operation of the system, the system integration and test group performs extensive

Rank-based Tests of the Cointegrating Rank in Semiparametric Error Correction Models

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hallin, M.; van den Akker, R.; Werker, B.J.M.

2012-01-01

Abstract: This paper introduces rank-based tests for the cointegrating rank in an Error Correction Model with i.i.d. elliptical innovations. The tests are asymptotically distribution-free, and their validity does not depend on the actual distribution of the innovations. This result holds despite the

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada Appendix D - Corrective Action Investigation Report, Central Nevada Test Area, CAU 417

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, and consisting of three separate land withdrawal areas (UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4), CAU 417 is comprised of 34 corrective action sites (CASs) including 2 underground storage tanks, 5 septic systems, 8 shaker pad/cuttings disposal areas, 1 decontamination facility pit, 1 burn area, 1 scrap/trash dump, 1 outlier area, 8 housekeeping sites, and 16 mud pits. Four field events were conducted between September 1996 and June 1998 to complete a corrective action investigation indicating that the only contaminant of concern was total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH) which was found in 18 of the CASs. A total of 1,028 samples were analyzed. During this investigation, a statistical approach was used to determine which depth intervals or layers inside individual mud pits and shaker pad areas were above the State action levels for the TPH. Other related field sampling activities (i.e., expedited site characterization methods, surface geophysical surveys, direct-push geophysical surveys, direct-push soil sampling, and rotosonic drilling located septic leachfields) were conducted in this four-phase investigation; however, no further contaminants of concern (COCs) were identified. During and after the investigation activities, several of the sites which had surface debris but no COCs were cleaned up as housekeeping sites, two septic tanks were closed in place, and two underground storage tanks were removed. The focus of this CADD was to identify CAAs which would promote the prevention or mitigation of human exposure to surface and subsurface soils with contaminant

Record of Technical Change No.2 for ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada''

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This Record of Technical Change provides updates to the technical information included in ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada.''

Penetration Testing Professional Ethics: a conceptual model and taxonomy

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Justin Pierce

2006-05-01

Full Text Available In an environment where commercial software is continually patched to correct security flaws, penetration testing can provide organisations with a realistic assessment of their security posture. Penetration testing uses the same principles as criminal hackers to penetrate corporate networks and thereby verify the presence of software vulnerabilities. Network administrators can use the results of a penetration test to correct flaws and improve overall security. The use of hacking techniques, however, raises several ethical questions that centre on the integrity of the tester to maintain professional distance and uphold the profession. This paper discusses the ethics of penetration testing and presents our conceptual model and revised taxonomy.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with Errata

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boehlecke, Robert

2004-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 536 is comprised of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS), 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge, and is located in Area 3 of the NTS (Figure 1-2). The CAU was investigated in accordance with the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) and Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 (NNSA/NV, 2003). The CADD provides or references the specific information necessary to support the recommended corrective action alternative selected to complete closure of the site. The CAU 536, Area 3 Release Site, includes the Steam Jenny Discharge (CAS 03-44-02) that was historically used for steam cleaning equipment in the Area 3 Camp. Concerns at this CAS include contaminants commonly associated with steam cleaning operations and Area 3 Camp activities that include total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), unspecified solvents, radionuclides, metals, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The CAIP for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NV, 2003), provides additional information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for the CAS within CAU 536. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2003) that was approved prior to the start of the

Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 119: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, US Department of Energy, and US Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts to the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purpose of determining appropriate corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 19 CASs with in CAU 119 on the NTS. The form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Activities included verification of the prior removal of both aboveground and underground gas/oil storage tanks, gas sampling tanks, pressure fuel tanks, tank stands, trailers, debris, and other material. Based on these former activities, no further action is required at these CASs

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, CAU 232 is comprised of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) recommendation that no corrective action is deemed necessary for CAU 232. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report have been combined into one report because sample data collected during the July 1999 corrective action investigation (CAI) activities disclosed no evidence of contamination at the site. Contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) addressed during the CAI included total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total pesticides, total herbicides, total petroleum hydrocarbons (gasoline and diesel/oil range), polychlorinated biphenyls, isotopic uranium, isotopic plutonium, strontium-90, and gamma-emitting radionuclides. The data confirmed that none of the COPCs identified exceeded preliminary action levels outlined in the CAIP; therefore, no corrective actions were necessary for CAU 232. After the CAI, best management practice activities were completed and included installation of a fence and signs to limit access to the lagoons, cementing Manhole No. 2 and the diverter box, and closing off influent and effluent ends of the sewage lagoon piping. As a result of the CAI, the DOE/NV recommended that: (1) no further actions were required; (2) no Corrective Action Plan would be required; and (3) no use restrictions were required to be placed on the CAU

MAC mini acceptance test procedures, software Version 3.3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russell, V.K.

1994-01-01

The K Basins Materials Accounting (MAC) programs had some improvements made to it to to change slightly the access authorized users had to the modification of critical data. This ATP describes how the code was to be tested to verify its correctness

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Septic Systems' and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: (1) CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank; (2) CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool; (3) CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks; and (4) CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-02-28

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as “Septic Systems” and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: · CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank · CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool · CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks · CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure.

Programs for Testing Processor-in-Memory Computing Systems

Science.gov (United States)

Katz, Daniel S.

2006-01-01

The Multithreaded Microbenchmarks for Processor-In-Memory (PIM) Compilers, Simulators, and Hardware are computer programs arranged in a series for use in testing the performances of PIM computing systems, including compilers, simulators, and hardware. The programs at the beginning of the series test basic functionality; the programs at subsequent positions in the series test increasingly complex functionality. The programs are intended to be used while designing a PIM system, and can be used to verify that compilers, simulators, and hardware work correctly. The programs can also be used to enable designers of these system components to examine tradeoffs in implementation. Finally, these programs can be run on non-PIM hardware (either single-threaded or multithreaded) using the POSIX pthreads standard to verify that the benchmarks themselves operate correctly. [POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX) is a set of standards that define how programs and operating systems interact with each other. pthreads is a library of pre-emptive thread routines that comply with one of the POSIX standards.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2012-08-01

CAU 570 comprises the following six corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Tesla • 09-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site T-9 • 09-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site S-9G • 09-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Rushmore • 09-23-15, Eagle Contamination Area • 09-99-01, Atmospheric Test Site B-9A These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 570. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 570 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological

USCIS E-Verify Program Reports

Data.gov (United States)

Department of Homeland Security — The report builds on the last comprehensive evaluation of the E-Verify Program and demonstrates that E-Verify produces accurate results and that accuracy rates have...

Evaluation of wastewater contaminant transport in surface waters using verified Lagrangian sampling

Science.gov (United States)

Antweiler, Ronald C.; Writer, Jeffrey H.; Murphy, Sheila F.

2014-01-01

Contaminants released from wastewater treatment plants can persist in surface waters for substantial distances. Much research has gone into evaluating the fate and transport of these contaminants, but this work has often assumed constant flow from wastewater treatment plants. However, effluent discharge commonly varies widely over a 24-hour period, and this variation controls contaminant loading and can profoundly influence interpretations of environmental data. We show that methodologies relying on the normalization of downstream data to conservative elements can give spurious results, and should not be used unless it can be verified that the same parcel of water was sampled. Lagrangian sampling, which in theory samples the same water parcel as it moves downstream (the Lagrangian parcel), links hydrologic and chemical transformation processes so that the in-stream fate of wastewater contaminants can be quantitatively evaluated. However, precise Lagrangian sampling is difficult, and small deviations – such as missing the Lagrangian parcel by less than 1 h – can cause large differences in measured concentrations of all dissolved compounds at downstream sites, leading to erroneous conclusions regarding in-stream processes controlling the fate and transport of wastewater contaminants. Therefore, we have developed a method termed “verified Lagrangian” sampling, which can be used to determine if the Lagrangian parcel was actually sampled, and if it was not, a means for correcting the data to reflect the concentrations which would have been obtained had the Lagrangian parcel been sampled. To apply the method, it is necessary to have concentration data for a number of conservative constituents from the upstream, effluent, and downstream sites, along with upstream and effluent concentrations that are constant over the short-term (typically 2–4 h). These corrections can subsequently be applied to all data, including non-conservative constituents. Finally, we

Evaluation of wastewater contaminant transport in surface waters using verified Lagrangian sampling.

Science.gov (United States)

Antweiler, Ronald C; Writer, Jeffrey H; Murphy, Sheila F

2014-02-01

Contaminants released from wastewater treatment plants can persist in surface waters for substantial distances. Much research has gone into evaluating the fate and transport of these contaminants, but this work has often assumed constant flow from wastewater treatment plants. However, effluent discharge commonly varies widely over a 24-hour period, and this variation controls contaminant loading and can profoundly influence interpretations of environmental data. We show that methodologies relying on the normalization of downstream data to conservative elements can give spurious results, and should not be used unless it can be verified that the same parcel of water was sampled. Lagrangian sampling, which in theory samples the same water parcel as it moves downstream (the Lagrangian parcel), links hydrologic and chemical transformation processes so that the in-stream fate of wastewater contaminants can be quantitatively evaluated. However, precise Lagrangian sampling is difficult, and small deviations - such as missing the Lagrangian parcel by less than 1h - can cause large differences in measured concentrations of all dissolved compounds at downstream sites, leading to erroneous conclusions regarding in-stream processes controlling the fate and transport of wastewater contaminants. Therefore, we have developed a method termed "verified Lagrangian" sampling, which can be used to determine if the Lagrangian parcel was actually sampled, and if it was not, a means for correcting the data to reflect the concentrations which would have been obtained had the Lagrangian parcel been sampled. To apply the method, it is necessary to have concentration data for a number of conservative constituents from the upstream, effluent, and downstream sites, along with upstream and effluent concentrations that are constant over the short-term (typically 2-4h). These corrections can subsequently be applied to all data, including non-conservative constituents. Finally, we show how data

Verifier Theory and Unverifiability

OpenAIRE

Yampolskiy, Roman V.

2016-01-01

Despite significant developments in Proof Theory, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the concept of proof verifier. In particular, the mathematical community may be interested in studying different types of proof verifiers (people, programs, oracles, communities, superintelligences) as mathematical objects. Such an effort could reveal their properties, their powers and limitations (particularly in human mathematicians), minimum and maximum complexity, as well as self-verificati...

Verified OS Interface Code Synthesis

Science.gov (United States)

2016-12-01

results into the larger proof framework of the seL4 microkernel to be directly usable in practice. Beyond the stated project goals, the solution...CakeML, can now also be used in the Isabelle/HOL system that was used for the verified seL4 microkernel. This combination increases proof productivity...were used for the verified ML compiler CakeML, can now also be used in the Isabelle/HOL system that was used for the verified seL4 microkernel. This

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 321: Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage, Nevada Test Site, Nevada; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. A CAU consists of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the CAU 321 Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage, CAS 22-99-05 Fuel Storage Area. For purposes of this discussion, this site will be referred to as either CAU 321 or the Fuel Storage Area. The Fuel Storage Area is located in Area 22 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles[mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1) (DOE/NV, 1996a). The Fuel Storage Area (Figure 1-2) was used to store fuel and other petroleum products necessary for motorized operations at the historic Camp Desert Rock facility which was operational from 1951 to 1958 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The site was dismantled after 1958 (DOE/NV, 1996a)

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mark Krause

2010-08-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) presents information supporting the selection of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) leading to the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 562 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of CAAs for the 13 CASs within CAU 562. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 27, 2009, through May 12, 2010, as set forth in the CAU 562 Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: • Determine whether COCs are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. A data quality assessment (DQA) performed on the CAU 562 data demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the data for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the COCs for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at 10 of the 13 CASs in CAU 562, and thus corrective

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

David Strand

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit 166 is located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166 is comprised of the seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 02-42-01, Cond. Release Storage Yd - North; (2) 02-42-02, Cond. Release Storage Yd - South; (3) 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area; (4) 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard; (5) 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum; (6) 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (7) 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on February 28, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 166. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the CAI for CAU 166 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct radiological surveys. (3) Perform field screening. (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine if

Experimental Validation Of An Innovative Procedure For The Rolling Noise Correction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Viscardi Massimo

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Among the wide contest of the train vehicles rolling noise evaluation, the aim of the paper is the development, implementation and experimental testing of a new method for roughness calculation according to FprCEN/TR 16891:2015 and the successive evaluation of the correction parameters of the measured rolling noise due to the presence of not compliant rail roughness. It is, in-fact, a very often operative condition, the execution of rolling noise tests over standard in-operation rails that are characterized by roughness profiles very different from standard one as those prescribed within the ISO 3095 procedure. Very often, this difference lead to the presence of an exceeding noise that needs to be evaluated and revised for a correct definition of the phenomena. Within the paper, the procedure implementation is presented and later on verified in operative experimental contest; forecasted and measured data are compared and successively commented.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 409: Other Waste Sites, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. 0)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 409 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 409 consists of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-53-001-TAB2, Septic Sludge Disposal Pit No.1; TA-53-002-TAB2, Septic Sludge Disposal Pit No.2; and RG-24-001-RGCR, Battery Dump Site. The Septic Sludge Disposal Pits are located near Bunker Two, close to Area 3, on the Tonopah Test Range. The Battery Dump Site is located at the abandoned Cactus Repeater Station on Cactus Peak. The Cactus Repeater Station was a remote, battery-powered, signal repeater station. The two Septic Sludge Disposal Pits were suspected to be used through the late 1980s as disposal sites for sludge from septic tanks located in Area 3. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern are the same for the disposal pits and include: volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPHs) as gasoline- and diesel-range organics, polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, and radionuclides (including plutonium and depleted uranium). The Battery Dump Site consists of discarded lead-acid batteries and associated construction debris, placing the site in a Housekeeping Category and, consequently, no contaminants are expected to be encountered during the cleanup process. The corrective action the at this CAU will include collection of discarded batteries and construction debris at the Battery Dump Site for proper disposal and recycling, along with photographic documentation as the process progresses. The corrective action for the remaining CASs involves the collection of background radiological data through borings drilled at

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ITLV

1999-01-01

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428, Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 428 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03- 05- 002- SW01 and 03- 05- 002- SW05, respectively known as Area 3 Septic Waste System 1 and Septic Waste System 5. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan is used in combination with the Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada , Rev. 1 (DOE/ NV, 1998c). The Leachfield Work Plan was developed to streamline investigations at leachfield Corrective Action Units by incorporating management, technical, quality assurance, health and safety, public involvement, field sampling, and waste management information common to a set of Corrective Action Units with similar site histories and characteristics into a single document that can be referenced. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan provides investigative details specific to Corrective Action Unit 428. A system of leachfields and associated collection systems was used for wastewater disposal at Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range until a consolidated sewer system was installed in 1990 to replace the discrete septic waste systems. Operations within various buildings at Area 3 generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with contaminants of potential concern and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Corrective Action Unit 428 is composed of two leachfield systems in the northern portion of Area 3. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern for the site include oil/ diesel range total petroleum hydrocarbons, and Resource Conservation

Towards the ’Verified Verifier’. Theory and Practice

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

D. A. Kondratyev

2014-01-01

Full Text Available As opposed to traditional testing, the deductive verification represents a formal way to examine the program correctness. But what about the correctness of the verification system itself? The theoretical foundations of Hoare’s logic were examined in classical works, and some soundness/completeness theorems are well-known. However, we practically are not aware of implementations of those theoretical methods which were subjected to anything more than testing. In other words, our ultimate goal is a verification system which can be self-applicable (at least partially. In our recent studies we addressed ourselves to the metageneration approach in order to make such a task more feasible.

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 342: Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-03-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO, CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU 342, the Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit (FTP), which is located in Area 23 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 88 km (55 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 342 is comprised of CAS 23-56-01. The FTP is an area approximately 100 m by 140 m (350 ft by 450 ft) located west of the town of Mercury, Nevada, which was used between approximately 1965 and 1990 to train fire-fighting personnel (REECo, 1991; Jacobson, 1991). The surface and subsurface soils in the FTP have likely been impacted by hydrocarbons and other contaminants of potential concern (COPC) associated with burn activities and training exercises in the area.

The Impact of Correction for Guessing Formula on MC and Yes/No Vocabulary Tests' Scores

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

abdollah baradaran

2009-10-01

Full Text Available A standard correction for random guessing (cfg formula on multiple-choice and Yes/Noexaminations was examined retrospectively in the scores of the intermediate female EFL learners in an English language school. The correctionwas a weighting formula for points awarded for correct answers,incorrect answers, and unanswered questions so that the expectedvalue of the increase in test score due to guessing was zero. The researcher compared uncorrected and corrected scores on examinationsusing multiple-choice and Yes/No formats. These short-answer formats eliminatedor at least greatly reduced the potential for guessing the correctanswer. The expectation for students to improve their grade by guessingon multiple-choice and Yes/No format examinations is well known. The researcher examined a method for correcting for random guessing (cfg " no knowledge" on multiple- choice and Yes/No vocabulary examinations by comparing application and non-application of correction for guessing (cfg formula on scores on these examinations. It was done to determine whether the test takers really knew the correct answer, or they had resorted to a kind of guessing. This study represented a unique opportunity to compare scores from multiple-choice and Yes/No examinations in a settingin which students were given the same number of questions ineach of the two format types testing their knowledge over thesame subject matter. The results of this study indicated that the significant differences were highlighted between the subjects' scores when cfg formula was applied and when it was not.

[Do we always correctly interpret the results of statistical nonparametric tests].

Science.gov (United States)

Moczko, Jerzy A

2014-01-01

Mann-Whitney, Wilcoxon, Kruskal-Wallis and Friedman tests create a group of commonly used tests to analyze the results of clinical and laboratory data. These tests are considered to be extremely flexible and their asymptotic relative efficiency exceeds 95 percent. Compared with the corresponding parametric tests they do not require checking the fulfillment of the conditions such as the normality of data distribution, homogeneity of variance, the lack of correlation means and standard deviations, etc. They can be used both in the interval and or-dinal scales. The article presents an example Mann-Whitney test, that does not in any case the choice of these four nonparametric tests treated as a kind of gold standard leads to correct inference.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.:0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2005-12-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting

Optical proximity correction for anamorphic extreme ultraviolet lithography

Science.gov (United States)

Clifford, Chris; Lam, Michael; Raghunathan, Ananthan; Jiang, Fan; Fenger, Germain; Adam, Kostas

2017-10-01

The change from isomorphic to anamorphic optics in high numerical aperture (NA) extreme ultraviolet (EUV) scanners necessitates changes to the mask data preparation flow. The required changes for each step in the mask tape out process are discussed, with a focus on optical proximity correction (OPC). When necessary, solutions to new problems are demonstrated, and verified by rigorous simulation. Additions to the OPC model include accounting for anamorphic effects in the optics, mask electromagnetics, and mask manufacturing. The correction algorithm is updated to include awareness of anamorphic mask geometry for mask rule checking (MRC). OPC verification through process window conditions is enhanced to test different wafer scale mask error ranges in the horizontal and vertical directions. This work will show that existing models and methods can be updated to support anamorphic optics without major changes. Also, the larger mask size in the Y direction can result in better model accuracy, easier OPC convergence, and designs which are more tolerant to mask errors.

Well Installation Report for Corrective Action Unit 443, Central Nevada Test Area, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tim Echelard

2006-01-01

A Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) was performed in several stages from 1999 to 2003, as set forth in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for the Central Nevada Test Area Subsurface Sites, Corrective Action Unit 443'' (DOE/NV, 1999). Groundwater modeling was the primary activity of the CAI. Three phases of modeling were conducted for the Faultless underground nuclear test. The first phase involved the gathering and interpretation of geologic and hydrogeologic data, and inputting the data into a three-dimensional numerical model to depict groundwater flow. The output from the groundwater flow model was used in a transport model to simulate the migration of a radionuclide release (Pohlmann et al., 2000). The second phase of modeling (known as a Data Decision Analysis [DDA]) occurred after NDEP reviewed the first model. This phase was designed to respond to concerns regarding model uncertainty (Pohll and Mihevc, 2000). The third phase of modeling updated the original flow and transport model to incorporate the uncertainty identified in the DDA, and focused the model domain on the region of interest to the transport predictions. This third phase culminated in the calculation of contaminant boundaries for the site (Pohll et al., 2003). Corrective action alternatives were evaluated and an alternative was submitted in the ''Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 443: Central Nevada Test Area-Subsurface'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). Based on the results of this evaluation, the preferred alternative for CAU 443 is Proof-of-Concept and Monitoring with Institutional Controls. This alternative was judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated and will control inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater at CAU 443

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, and consisting of three separate land withdrawal areas (UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4), CAU 417 is comprised of 34 corrective action sites (CASs) including 2 underground storage tanks, 5 septic systems, 8 shaker pad/cuttings disposal areas, 1 decontamination facility pit, 1 burn area, 1 scrap/trash dump, 1 outlier area, 8 housekeeping sites, and 16 mud pits. Four field events were conducted between September 1996 and June 1998 to complete a corrective action investigation indicating that the only contaminant of concern was total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH) which was found in 18 of the CASs. A total of 1,028 samples were analyzed. During this investigation, a statistical approach was used to determine which depth intervals or layers inside individual mud pits and shaker pad areas were above the State action levels for the TPH. Other related field sampling activities (i.e., expedited site characterization methods, surface geophysical surveys, direct-push geophysical surveys, direct-push soil sampling, and rotosonic drilling located septic leachfields) were conducted in this four-phase investigation; however, no further contaminants of concern (COCs) were identified. During and after the investigation activities, several of the sites which had surface debris but no COCs were cleaned up as housekeeping sites, two septic tanks were closed in place, and two underground storage tanks were removed. The focus of this CADD was to identify CAAs which would promote the prevention or mitigation of human exposure to surface and subsurface soils with contaminant

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1 with ROTC 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alfred N. Wickline

2004-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516, Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 516 is comprised of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) 03-59-01 - Bldg 3C-36 Septic System; (2) 03-59-02 - Bldg 3C-45 Septic System; (3) 06-51-01 - Sump and Piping; (4) 06-51-02 - Clay Pipe and Debris; (5) 06-51-03 - Clean Out Box and Piping; and (7) 22-19-04 - Vehicle Decontamination Area. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of an acceptable corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 516. Corrective action investigation activities were performed between July 22 and August 14, 2003, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan. Supplemental sampling was conducted in late 2003 and early 2004.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit No. 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DOE/NV

1997-10-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), and the US Department of Defense. The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUS) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (FFACO, 1996). As per the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU No. 423, the Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP), which is located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, part of the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figures 1-1 and 1-2). Corrective Action Unit No. 423 is comprised of only one CAS (No. 03-02-002-0308), which includes the Building 03-60 UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60 to a point approximately 73 meters (m) (240 feet [ft]) northwest as shown on Figure 1-3.

POSSIBILITIES TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION BY VERIFYING THE DISTRIBUTION OF MARKS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alexandru BOROIU

2015-05-01

Full Text Available In the higher education, for the evaluation of education process it is of high interest to use some numeric indicators obtained from the database with the final results realized by the students on exams session. For this purpose could be used the following numeric indicators: proportion of students absent on final evaluation, proportion of non-promoted students, normality degree of passing marks distribution. In order to do this we realized an Excel calculation program that could be applied to each discipline. The inputs are concrete (students total, students present to final evaluation, marks absolute frequency and the outputs for the three indicators are binary (competent or noncompetent, in the last situation the verdict being: “Give explanations. Propose an action plan, with actions, responsible and terms”. To verify the imposed normality degree we elaborate a calculation program based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov concordance test. So, it was realized the increase of analyze objectivity and it was created the opportunity to apply corrective measures in order to improve the education process.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 266: Area 25 Building 3124 Leachfield, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NV

2000-02-17

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 266, Area 25 Building 3124 Leachfield, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 266 includes Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-09. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report were combined into one report because sample data collected during the corrective action investigation (CAI) indicated that contaminants of concern (COCs) were either not present in the soil, or present at concentrations not requiring corrective action. This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's recommendation that no corrective action was necessary for CAU 266. From February through May 1999, CAI activities were performed as set forth in the related Corrective Action Investigation Plan. Analytes detected during the three-stage CAI of CAU 266 were evaluated against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine COCs, and the analysis of the data generated from soil collection activities indicated the PALs were not exceeded for total volatile/semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, gamma-emitting radionuclides, isotopic uranium/plutonium, and strontium-90 for any of the samples. However, COCs were identified in samples from within the septic tank and distribution box; and the isotopic americium concentrations in the two soil samples did exceed PALs. Closure activities were performed at the site to address the COCs identified in the septic tank and distribution box. Further, no use restrictions were required to be placed on CAU 266 because the CAI revealed soil contamination to be less than the 100 millirems per year limit established by DOE Order 5400.5.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 266: Area 25 Building 3124 Leachfield, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 266, Area 25 Building 3124 Leachfield, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 266 includes Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-09. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report were combined into one report because sample data collected during the corrective action investigation (CAI) indicated that contaminants of concern (COCs) were either not present in the soil, or present at concentrations not requiring corrective action. This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's recommendation that no corrective action was necessary for CAU 266. From February through May 1999, CAI activities were performed as set forth in the related Corrective Action Investigation Plan. Analytes detected during the three-stage CAI of CAU 266 were evaluated against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine COCs, and the analysis of the data generated from soil collection activities indicated the PALs were not exceeded for total volatile/semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, gamma-emitting radionuclides, isotopic uranium/plutonium, and strontium-90 for any of the samples. However, COCs were identified in samples from within the septic tank and distribution box; and the isotopic americium concentrations in the two soil samples did exceed PALs. Closure activities were performed at the site to address the COCs identified in the septic tank and distribution box. Further, no use restrictions were required to be placed on CAU 266 because the CAI revealed soil contamination to be less than the 100 millirems per year limit established by DOE Order 5400.5

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2004-04-28

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 on the NTS, CAU 516 includes six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) consisting of two septic systems, a sump and piping, a clean-out box and piping, dry wells, and a vehicle decontamination area. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from July 22 through August 14, 2003, with supplemental sampling conducted in late 2003 and early 2004. The potential exposure pathways for any contaminants of concern (COCs) identified during the development of the DQOs at CAU 516 gave rise to the following objectives: (1) prevent or mitigate exposure to media containing COCs at concentrations exceeding PALs as defined in the corrective action investigation plan; and (2) prevent the spread of COCs beyond each CAS. The following alternatives have been developed for consideration at CAU 516: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Clean Closure; and Alternative 3 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Alternative 1, No Further Action, is the preferred corrective action for two CASs (06-51-02 and 22-19-04). Alternative 2, Clean Closure, is the preferred corrective action for four CASs (03-59-01, 03-59-02, 06-51-01, and 06-51-03). The selected alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated, as well as meeting all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will further eliminate the contaminated media at CAU 516.

A proposed orbit and vertical dispersion correction system for PEP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Close, E.; Cornacchia, M.; King, A.S.; Lee, M.J.

1978-07-01

The proposed arrangement of position monitors and dipole magnets for the closed orbit correction system in PEP is described. The computer code ALIGN, which simulates and corrects closed orbit displacements, has been used to study the most effective layout of monitors and correctors. The vertical dispersion function has been computed before and after closed orbit correction. The results indicate that the residual vertical dispersion after the orbit is corrected could exceed the tolerable values. A correction procedure for the vertical dispersion has been studied with the compute code CO-OP and this scheme of correction has been verified experimentally in SPEAR. 9 refs., 8 figs., 2 tabs

Closure Report Central Nevada Test Area Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443 January 2016

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Findlay, Rick [US Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). Office of Legacy Management

2015-11-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) prepared this Closure Report for the subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site. CNTA was the site of a 0.2- to 1-megaton underground nuclear test in 1968. Responsibility for the site’s environmental restoration was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended 2011) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. This Closure Report provides justification for closure of CAU 443 and provides a summary of completed closure activities; describes the selected corrective action alternative; provides an implementation plan for long-term monitoring with well network maintenance and approaches/policies for institutional controls (ICs); and presents the contaminant, compliance, and use-restriction boundaries for the site.

Corrective action decision document, Second Gas Station, Tonopah test range, Nevada (Corrective Action Unit No. 403)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for Second Gas Station (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] No. 403) has been developed for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Nevada Environmental Restoration Project to meet the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as stated in Appendix VI, open-quotes Corrective Action Strategyclose quotes (FFACO, 1996). The Second Gas Station Corrective Action Site (CAS) No. 03-02-004-0360 is the only CAS in CAU No. 403. The Second Gas Station CAS is located within Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), west of the Main Road at the location of former Underground Storage Tanks (USTs) and their associated fuel dispensary stations. The TTR is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, by air and approximately 56 km (35 mi) southeast of Tonopah, Nevada, by road. The TTR is bordered on the south, east, and west by the Nellis Air Force Range and on the north by sparsely populated public land administered by the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. The Second Gas Station CAS was formerly known as the Underground Diesel Tank Site, Sandia Environmental Restoration Site Number 118. The gas station was in use from approximately 1965 to 1980. The USTs were originally thought to be located 11 meters (m) (36 feet [ft]) east of the Old Light Duty Shop, Building 0360, and consisted of one gasoline UST (southern tank) and one diesel UST (northern tank) (DOE/NV, 1996a). The two associated fuel dispensary stations were located northeast (diesel) and southeast (gasoline) of Building 0360 (CAU 423). Presently the site is used as a parking lot, Building 0360 is used for mechanical repairs of vehicles

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

T. M. Fitzmaurice

2000-05-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area Corrective Action Unit 407 in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved Corrective Action Alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999). The RCRSA was used during May and June of 1963 to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the Clean Slate tests. The Constituents of Concern (COCs) identified during the site characterization include plutonium, uranium, and americium. No other COCS were identified. The following closure actions will be implemented under this plan: (1) Remove and dispose of surface soils which are over three times background for the area. Soils identified for removal will be disposed of at an approved disposal facility. Excavated areas will be backfilled with clean borrow soil fi-om a nearby location. (2) An engineered cover will be constructed over the waste disposal pit area where subsurface COCS will remain. (3) Upon completion of the closure and approval of the Closure Report by NDEP, administrative controls, use restrictions, and site postings will be used to prevent intrusive activities at the site. Barbed wire fencing will be installed along the perimeter of this unit. Post closure monitoring will consist of site inspections to determine the condition of the engineered cover. Any identified maintenance and repair requirements will be remedied within 90 working days of discovery and documented in writing at the time of repair. Results of all inspections/repairs for a given year will be addressed in a single report submitted annually to the NDEP.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dave Madsen

1998-08-01

This Closure Report provides the documentation for closure of the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 426. The site is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 225 kilometers northwest of Las Vegas, NV. CAU 426 consists of one corrective action site (CAS) which is comprised of four waste trenches. The trenches were excavated to receive solid waste generated in support of Operation Roller Coaster, primary the Double Tracks Test in 1963, and were subsequently backfilled. The Double Tracks Test involved use of live animals to assess the biological hazards associated with the nonnuclear detonation of plutonium-bearing devices. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP)which proposed ''capping'' methodology. The closure activities were completed in accordance with the approved CAP and consisted of constructing an engineered cover in the area of the trenches, constructing/planting a vegetative cover, installing a perimeter fence and signs, implementing restrictions on future use, and preparing a Post-Closure Monitoring Plan.

Preoperational test report, recirculation condenser cooling systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-11-04

This represents a preoperational test report for Recirculation Condenser Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The four system provide condenser cooling water for vapor space cooling of tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102. Each system consists of a valved piping loop, a pair of redundant recirculation pumps, a closed-loop evaporative cooling tower, and supporting instrumentation; equipment is located outside the farm on concrete slabs. Piping is routed to the each ventilation condenser inside the farm via below-grade concrete trenches. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Preoperational test report, recirculation condenser cooling systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents a preoperational test report for Recirculation Condenser Systems, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The four system provide condenser cooling water for vapor space cooling of tanks AY1O1, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102. Each system consists of a valved piping loop, a pair of redundant recirculation pumps, a closed-loop evaporative cooling tower, and supporting instrumentation; equipment is located outside the farm on concrete slabs. Piping is routed to the each ventilation condenser inside the farm via below-grade concrete trenches. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, REV 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps. CAU 168 consists of twelve Corrective Action Sites (CASs) in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The CASs contain surface and subsurface debris, impacted soil, and contaminated materials. Site characterization activities were conducted in 2002, and the results are presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 168 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). Site characterization results indicated that soil at several sites exceeded the clean-up criteria for total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and radionuclides. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved the proposed corrective actions specified in the CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The approved corrective actions include no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls

STREAMLINED APPROACH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PLAN FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 116: AREA 25 TEST CELL C FACILITY NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada

A project of X-ray hardening correction in large ICT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fang Min; Liu Yinong; Ni Jianping

2005-01-01

This paper presents a means of polychromatic X-ray beam hardening correction using a standard function to transform the polychromatic projection to monochromatic projection in large Industrial Computed Tomography (ICT). Some parameters were defined to verify the validity of hardening correction in large ICT and optimized. Simulated experiments were used to prove that without prior knowledge of the composition of the scanned object, the correction method using monochromatic reconstruction arithmetic could remove beam hardening artifact greatly. (authors)

Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Branzei, Simina; Procaccia, Ariel D.

2015-01-01

the computational sense). Our approach involves three steps: (i) specifying the structure of mechanisms, (ii) constructing a verification algorithm, and (iii) measuring the quality of verifiably truthful mechanisms. We demonstrate this approach using a case study: approximate mechanism design without money...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 541: Small Boy Nevada National Security Site and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada with ROTC 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2014-09-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 541 is co-located on the boundary of Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site and Range 65C of the Nevada Test and Training Range, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 541 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 541, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-04, Atmospheric Tests (6) - BFa Site; 05-45-03, Atmospheric Test Site - Small Boy. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 1, 2014, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 541. The site investigation process also will be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with CASs 05-23-04 and 05-45-03 are from nuclear testing activities conducted at the Atmospheric Tests (6) - BFa Site and Atmospheric Test Site - Small Boy sites. The presence and nature of

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, July 2002, Rev. No. 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 140 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-08-01, Detonation Pits; 05-08-02, Debris Pits; 05-17-01, Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Buried); 05-19-01, Waste Disposal Site; 05-23-01, Gravel Gertie; 05-35-01, Burn Pit; 05-99-04, Burn Pit; 22-99-04, Radioactive Waste Dump; 23-17-01, Hazardous Waste Storage Area. All nine of these CASs are located within Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. This CAU is being investigated because disposed waste may be present without appropriate controls (i.e., use restrictions, adequate cover) and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present or migrating at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The NTS has been used for various research and development projects including nuclear weapons testing. The CASs in CAU 140 were used for testing, material storage, waste storage, and waste disposal. A two-phase approach has been selected to collect information and generate data to satisfy needed resolution criteria and resolve the decision statements. Phase I will determine if contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) are present in concentrations exceeding preliminary action levels. This data will be evaluated at all CASs. Phase II will determine the extent of the contaminant(s) of concern (COCs). This data will only be evaluated for CASs with a COC identified during Phase I. Based on process knowledge, the COPCs for CAU 140 include volatile organics, semivolatile organics, petroleum hydrocarbons, explosive residues

Unclassified Source Term and Radionuclide Data for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farnham, Irene

2005-01-01

Frenchman Flat is one of several areas of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). These nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the Frenchman Flat underground test areas. Since 1996, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) has regulated NNSA/NSO corrective actions through the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' ([FFACO], 1996). Appendix VI of the FFACO agreement, ''Corrective Action Strategy'', was revised on December 7, 2000, and describes the processes that will be used to complete corrective actions, including those in the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project. The individual locations covered by the agreement are known as corrective action sites (CASs), which are grouped into corrective action units (CAUs). The UGTA CASs are grouped geographically into five CAUs: Frenchman Flat, Central Pahute Mesa, Western Pahute Mesa, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, and Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (Figure 1-1). These CAUs have distinctly different contaminant source, geologic, and hydrogeologic characteristics related to their location (FFACO, 1996). The Frenchman Flat CAU consists of 10 CASs located in the northern part of Area 5 and the southern part of Area 11 (Figure 1-1). This report documents the evaluation of the information and data available on the unclassified source term and radionuclide contamination for Frenchman Flat, CAU 98. The methodology used to estimate hydrologic source terms (HSTs) for the Frenchman Flat CAU is also documented. The HST of an underground nuclear test is the portion of the total inventory of radionuclides that is released over time into the groundwater following the test. The total residual inventory of radionuclides associated with one or

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit Number 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Number 423, the Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP), which is located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, part of the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 225 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU Number 423 is comprised of only one Corrective Action Site (CAS) which includes the Building 03-60 UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60 to a point approximately 73 meters (240 feet) northwest. The UDP was used between approximately 1965 and 1990 to dispose of waste fluids from the Building 03-60 automotive maintenance shop. It is likely that soils surrounding the UDP have been impacted by oil, grease, cleaning supplies and solvents as well as waste motor oil and other automotive fluids released from the UDP

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit Number 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-10-27

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Number 423, the Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP), which is located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, part of the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 225 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU Number 423 is comprised of only one Corrective Action Site (CAS) which includes the Building 03-60 UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60 to a point approximately 73 meters (240 feet) northwest. The UDP was used between approximately 1965 and 1990 to dispose of waste fluids from the Building 03-60 automotive maintenance shop. It is likely that soils surrounding the UDP have been impacted by oil, grease, cleaning supplies and solvents as well as waste motor oil and other automotive fluids released from the UDP.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 555: Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with Errata

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pastor, Laura

2005-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 555: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 555 is located in Areas 1, 3 and 6 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and is comprised of the five corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-59-01, Area 1 Camp Septic System; (2) CAS 03-59-03, Core Handling Building Septic System; (3) CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well; (4) CAS 06-59-01, Birdwell Septic System; and (5) CAS 06-59-02, National Cementers Septic System. An FFACO modification was approved on December 14, 2005, to include CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well, as part of the scope of CAU 555. The work scope was expanded in this document to include the investigation of CAS 06-20-05. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 555 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 555: Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with Errata

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pastor, Laura

2005-12-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 555: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 555 is located in Areas 1, 3 and 6 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and is comprised of the five corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-59-01, Area 1 Camp Septic System; (2) CAS 03-59-03, Core Handling Building Septic System; (3) CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well; (4) CAS 06-59-01, Birdwell Septic System; and (5) CAS 06-59-02, National Cementers Septic System. An FFACO modification was approved on December 14, 2005, to include CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well, as part of the scope of CAU 555. The work scope was expanded in this document to include the investigation of CAS 06-20-05. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 555 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision No. 1 (9/2001)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This corrective action investigation plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 262 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): Underground Storage Tank (25-02-06), Septic Systems A and B (25-04-06), Septic System (25-04-07), Leachfield (25-05-03), Leachfield (25-05-05), Leachfield (25-05-06), Radioactive Leachfield (25-05-08), Leachfield (25-05-12), and Dry Well (25-51-01). Situated in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), sites addressed by CAU 262 are located at the Reactor-Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD); Test Cell C; and Engine-Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) facilities. The R-MAD, Test Cell C, and E-MAD facilities supported nuclear rocket reactor and engine testing as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station. The activities associated with the testing program were conducted between 1958 and 1973. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) for the site include oil/diesel-range total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, and gamma-emitting radionuclides, isotopic uranium, isotopic plutonium, strontium-90, and tritium. The scope of the corrective action field investigation at the CAU will include the inspection of portions of the collection systems, sampling the contents of collection system features in situ of leachfield logging materials, surface soil sampling, collection of samples of soil underlying the base of inlet and outfall ends of septic tanks and outfall ends of diversion structures and distribution boxes, collection of soil samples from biased or a combination of

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563, Septic Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. CAU 563 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 563 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Site characterization activities were performed in 2007, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the CAU 563 Corrective Action Decision Document. The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives is summarized below. CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank, contains no contaminants of concern (COCs) above action levels. No further action is required for this site; however, as a best management practice (BMP), all aboveground features (e.g., riser pipes and bumper posts) will be removed, the septic tank will be removed, and all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout. CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool, contains no COCs above action levels. No further action is required for this site; however, as a BMP, all aboveground features (e.g., riser pipes and bumper posts) will be removed, the cesspool will be abandoned by filling it with sand or native soil, and all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout. CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks, will be clean closed by excavating approximately 4 cubic yards (yd3) of arsenic- and chromium-impacted soil. In addition, as a BMP, the liquid in the South Tank will be removed, the North Tank will be removed or filled with grout and left in place, the South Tank will be filled with grout and left in place, all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout or similar material, approximately 10 yd3 of chlordane-impacted soil will be excavated, and debris within the CAS boundary will be removed. CAS 12

Corrective Action Decision Document/ Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 556: Dry Wells and Surface Release Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with Errata Sheet, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2008-09-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 556, Dry Wells and Surface Release Points, located at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008). Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 556 is comprised of four corrective action sites (CASs): • 06-20-04, National Cementers Dry Well • 06-99-09, Birdwell Test Hole • 25-60-03, E-MAD Stormwater Discharge and Piping • 25-64-01, Vehicle Washdown and Drainage Pit The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 556 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities began on February 7 and were completed on June 19, 2008, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 556: Dry Wells and Surface Release Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 556 data were evaluated based on the data quality assessment process, which demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the data for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the COCs for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at one of the four CASs in CAU 556 that required the completion of a corrective action. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 556 revealed the following: • Corrective Action Sites 06-20-04, 06-99-09, and 25-64-01 do not contain contamination at

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with ROTC 1, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2008-07-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 561 is located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 22, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 561 is comprised of the 10 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 01-19-01, Waste Dump • 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area • 03-19-02, Debris Pile • 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile • 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump • 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site • 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches • 25-08-02, Waste Dump • 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump • 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 561. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the Corrective Action Investigation for CAU 561 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2013-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The purpose of the CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed.

28 CFR 802.13 - Verifying your identity.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Verifying your identity. 802.13 Section... COLUMBIA DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS Privacy Act § 802.13 Verifying your identity. (a) Requests for your own records. When you make a request for access to records about yourself, you must verify your identity. You...

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 134: Aboveground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 134 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Aboveground Storage Tanks' and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 15, and 29 of the Nevada Test Site: (1) CAS 03-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; (2) CAS 03-01-04, Tank; (3) CAS 15-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (4) CAS 29-01-01, Hydrocarbon Stain

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 204: STORAGE BUNKERS, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 330 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 6, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The unit is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) as CAU 330: Areas 6, 22, and 23 Tanks and Spill Sites. CAU 330 consists of the following CASs: CAS 06-02-04, Underground Storage Tank (UST) and Piping CAS 22-99-06, Fuel Spill CAS 23-01-02, Large Aboveground Storage Tank (AST) Farm CAS 23-25-05, Asphalt Oil Spill/Tar Release

Effects of correcting for prematurity on cognitive test scores in childhood.

Science.gov (United States)

Wilson-Ching, Michelle; Pascoe, Leona; Doyle, Lex W; Anderson, Peter J

2014-03-01

The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that test scores should be corrected for prematurity up to 3 years of age, but this practice varies greatly in both clinical and research settings. The aim of this study was to contrast the effects of using chronological age and those of using corrected age on measures of cognitive outcome across childhood. A theoretical model was constructed using norms from the Bayley Scales of Infant and Toddler Development, Third Edition; the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence, Third Edition Australian; and the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children, Fourth Edition Australian. Baseline scores representing different levels of functioning (70, below average; 85, borderline; and 100, average) were recalculated using the normative data for ages 6 months to 16 years to account for 1, 2, 3 and 4 months of prematurity. The model created depicted the difference in standardised scores between chronological and corrected age. Compared with scores corrected for prematurity, the absolute reduction in scores using chronological age was greater for increasing degree of prematurity, younger ages at assessment and higher baseline scores and was substantial even beyond 3 years of age. However, the pattern was erratic, with considerable fluctuation evident across different ages and baseline scores. Chronological age results in a lowering of scores at all ages for preterm-born subjects that is greater in the first few years and in those born at earlier gestational ages. Whether or not to correct for prematurity depends upon the context of the assessment. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health © 2014 Paediatrics and Child Health Division (Royal Australasian College of Physicians).

2008 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2009-03-01

This report presents the 2008 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada. The corrective action strategy for the site includes proof-of-concept monitoring in support of site closure. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 443 that were conducted at the site during fiscal year 2008. This is the second groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA.

2008 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

This report presents the 2008 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada. The corrective action strategy for the site includes proof-of-concept monitoring in support of site closure. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 443 that were conducted at the site during fiscal year 2008. This is the second groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 107: Low Impact Soil Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Low Impact Soil Sites' and consists of the following 15 Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt; CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2); CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm; CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area; CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area; CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area; CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a; CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site; CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil; CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10; and CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky). Closure activities were conducted from February through April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996; as amended February 2008) and Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 107 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2009). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized.

Demographically corrected norms for African Americans and Caucasians on the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised, Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised, Stroop Color and Word Test, and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 64-Card Version.

Science.gov (United States)

Norman, Marc A; Moore, David J; Taylor, Michael; Franklin, Donald; Cysique, Lucette; Ake, Chris; Lazarretto, Deborah; Vaida, Florin; Heaton, Robert K

2011-08-01

Memory and executive functioning are two important components of clinical neuropsychological (NP) practice and research. Multiple demographic factors are known to affect performance differentially on most NP tests, but adequate normative corrections, inclusive of race/ethnicity, are not available for many widely used instruments. This study compared demographic contributions for widely used tests of verbal and visual learning and memory (Brief Visual Memory Test-Revised, Hopkins Verbal Memory Test-Revised) and executive functioning (Stroop Color and Word Test, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test-64) in groups of healthy Caucasians (n = 143) and African Americans (n = 103). Demographic factors of age, education, gender, and race/ethnicity were found to be significant factors on some indices of all four tests. The magnitude of demographic contributions (especially age) was greater for African Americans than for Caucasians on most measures. New, demographically corrected T-score formulas were calculated for each race/ethnicity. The rates of NP impairment using previously published normative standards significantly overestimated NP impairment in African Americans. Utilizing the new demographic corrections developed and presented herein, NP impairment rates were comparable between the two race/ethnicities and were unrelated to the other demographic characteristics (age, education, gender) in either race/ethnicity group. Findings support the need to consider extended demographic contributions to neuropsychological test performance in clinical and research settings.

20 CFR 401.45 - Verifying your identity.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 20 Employees' Benefits 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Verifying your identity. 401.45 Section 401... INFORMATION The Privacy Act § 401.45 Verifying your identity. (a) When required. Unless you are making a... representative, you must verify your identity in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section if: (1) You make a...

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No. 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert F.

2006-01-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions necessary for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. It has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. A SAFER may be performed when the following criteria are met: (1) Conceptual corrective actions are clearly identified (although some degree of investigation may be necessary to select a specific corrective action before completion of the Corrective Action Investigation [CAI]); (2) Uncertainty of the nature, extent, and corrective action must be limited to an acceptable level of risk; (3) The SAFER Plan includes decision points and criteria for making data quality objective (DQO) decisions. The purpose of the investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. This SAFER Plan identifies decision points developed in cooperation with the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP), where the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) will reach consensus with the NDEP before beginning the next phase of work. Corrective Action Unit 553 is located in Areas 19 and 20 of the NTS, approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 553 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: 19-99-01, Mud Spill; 19-99-11, Mud Spill; 20-09-09, Mud Spill; and 20-99-03, Mud Spill. There is sufficient information and process

Verifying seismic design of nuclear reactors by testing. Volume 1: test plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1979-07-20

This document sets forth recommendations for a verification program to test the ability of operational nuclear power plants to achieve safe shutdown immediately following a safe-shutdown earthquake. The purpose of the study is to develop a program plan to provide assurance by physical demonstration that nuclear power plants are earthquake resistant and to allow nuclear power plant operators to (1) decide whether tests should be conducted on their facilities, (2) specify the tests that should be performed, and (3) estimate the cost of the effort to complete the recommended test program.

Verifying seismic design of nuclear reactors by testing. Volume 1: test plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

This document sets forth recommendations for a verification program to test the ability of operational nuclear power plants to achieve safe shutdown immediately following a safe-shutdown earthquake. The purpose of the study is to develop a program plan to provide assurance by physical demonstration that nuclear power plants are earthquake resistant and to allow nuclear power plant operators to (1) decide whether tests should be conducted on their facilities, (2) specify the tests that should be performed, and (3) estimate the cost of the effort to complete the recommended test program

Aging and memory: corrections for age, sex and education for three widely used memory tests.

Science.gov (United States)

Zappalà, G; Measso, G; Cavarzeran, F; Grigoletto, F; Lebowitz, B; Pirozzolo, F; Amaducci, L; Massari, D; Crook, T

1995-04-01

The associate learning subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale; Benton's Visual Retention test and a Controlled Word Association Task (FAS) were administered to a random sample of normal, healthy individuals whose age ranged from 20 to 79 years, recruited within the Italian peninsula. The neuropsychological examination took place on a mobile unit and the tests were given by the same team of neuropsychologists to reduce variability among examiners. The Research Project was known as Progetto Memoria. Corrections to the scores of these tests were calculated for age, sex, and education. These corrected values will allow clinicians to screen for memory impairment with greater precision among normally aging individuals, thus improving differential diagnosis between physiologic and pathologic deterioration of cognitive functions.

Acceptance/operational test procedure 101-AW tank camera purge system and 101-AW video camera system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Castleberry, J.L.

1994-01-01

This procedure will document the satisfactory operation of the 101-AW Tank Camera Purge System (CPS) and the 101-AW Video Camera System. The safety interlock which shuts down all the electronics inside the 101-AW vapor space, during loss of purge pressure, will be in place and tested to ensure reliable performance. This procedure is separated into four sections. Section 6.1 is performed in the 306 building prior to delivery to the 200 East Tank Farms and involves leak checking all fittings on the 101-AW Purge Panel for leakage using a Snoop solution and resolving the leakage. Section 7.1 verifies that PR-1, the regulator which maintains a positive pressure within the volume (cameras and pneumatic lines), is properly set. In addition the green light (PRESSURIZED) (located on the Purge Control Panel) is verified to turn on above 10 in. w.g. and after the time delay (TDR) has timed out. Section 7.2 verifies that the purge cycle functions properly, the red light (PURGE ON) comes on, and that the correct flowrate is obtained to meet the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association. Section 7.3 verifies that the pan and tilt, camera, associated controls and components operate correctly. This section also verifies that the safety interlock system operates correctly during loss of purge pressure. During the loss of purge operation the illumination of the amber light (PURGE FAILED) will be verified

Improving follow-up of abnormal cancer screens using electronic health records: trust but verify test result communication

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Reis Brian

2009-12-01

Full Text Available Abstract Background Early detection of colorectal cancer through timely follow-up of positive Fecal Occult Blood Tests (FOBTs remains a challenge. In our previous work, we found 40% of positive FOBT results eligible for colonoscopy had no documented response by a treating clinician at two weeks despite procedures for electronic result notification. We determined if technical and/or workflow-related aspects of automated communication in the electronic health record could lead to the lack of response. Methods Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, we evaluated positive FOBT communication in the electronic health record of a large, urban facility between May 2008 and March 2009. We identified the source of test result communication breakdown, and developed an intervention to fix the problem. Explicit medical record reviews measured timely follow-up (defined as response within 30 days of positive FOBT pre- and post-intervention. Results Data from 11 interviews and tracking information from 490 FOBT alerts revealed that the software intended to alert primary care practitioners (PCPs of positive FOBT results was not configured correctly and over a third of positive FOBTs were not transmitted to PCPs. Upon correction of the technical problem, lack of timely follow-up decreased immediately from 29.9% to 5.4% (p Conclusion Electronic communication of positive FOBT results should be monitored to avoid limiting colorectal cancer screening benefits. Robust quality assurance and oversight systems are needed to achieve this. Our methods may be useful for others seeking to improve follow-up of FOBTs in their systems.

Neuropsychological Testing in Pathologically Verified Alzheimer Disease and Frontotemporal Dementia: How Well Do the Uniform Data Set Measures Differentiate Between Diseases?

Science.gov (United States)

Ritter, Aaron R; Leger, Gabriel C; Miller, Justin B; Banks, Sarah J

2017-01-01

Differences in cognition between frontotemporal dementia (FTD) and Alzheimer disease (AD) are well described in clinical cohorts, but have rarely been confirmed in studies with pathologic verification. For emerging therapeutics to succeed, determining underlying pathology early in the disease course is increasingly important. Neuropsychological evaluation is an important component of the diagnostic workup for AD and FTD. Patients with FTD are thought to have greater deficits in language and executive function while patients with AD are more likely to have deficits in memory. To determine if performance on initial cognitive testing can reliably distinguish between patients with frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) and AD neuropathology. In addition, are there other factors of the neuropsychological assessment that can be used to enhance the accuracy of underlying pathology? Using a logistic regression we retrospectively compared neurocognitive performance on initial evaluation of 106 patients with pathologically verified FTLD (pvFTLD), with 558 pathologically verified AD (pvAD) patients from the National Alzheimer's Coordinating Center using data from the Uniform Data Set (UDS) and the neuropathology data set. As expected, pvFTLD patients were younger, demonstrated better memory performance, and had more neuropsychiatric symptoms than pvAD patients. Other results were less predictable: pvFTLD patients performed better on one test of executive function (trail making test part B) but worse on another (digit span backward). Performance on language testing did not strongly distinguish the 2 groups. To determine what factors led to a misdiagnosis of AD in patients with FTLD, we further analyzed a small group of pvFTLD patients. These patients demonstrated older age and lower Neuropsychiatric Inventory Questionnaire counts compared with accurately diagnosed cases. Other than memory, numerical scores of neurocognitive performance on the UDS are of limited value in

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 410: Waste Disposal Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0 (includes ROTCs 1, 2, and 3)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NV

2002-07-16

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 410 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 410 is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), which is included in the Nevada Test and Training Range (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range) approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of five Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-19-002-TAB2, Debris Mound; TA-21-003-TANL, Disposal Trench; TA-21-002-TAAL, Disposal Trench; 09-21-001-TA09, Disposal Trenches; 03-19-001, Waste Disposal Site. This CAU is being investigated because contaminants may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment, and waste may have been disposed of with out appropriate controls. Four out of five of these CASs are the result of weapons testing and disposal activities at the TTR, and they are grouped together for site closure based on the similarity of the sites (waste disposal sites and trenches). The fifth CAS, CAS 03-19-001, is a hydrocarbon spill related to activities in the area. This site is grouped with this CAU because of the location (TTR). Based on historical documentation and process know-ledge, vertical and lateral migration routes are possible for all CASs. Migration of contaminants may have occurred through transport by infiltration of precipitation through surface soil which serves as a driving force for downward migration of contaminants. Land-use scenarios limit future use of these CASs to industrial activities. The suspected contaminants of potential concern which have been identified are volatile organic compounds; semivolatile organic compounds; high explosives; radiological constituents including depleted

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

2000-02-08

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 428, Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada, CAU 428 is comprised of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 03-05-002-SW01, Septic Waste System 1 and (2) CAS 03-05-002- SW05, Septic Waste System 5. A corrective action investigation performed in 1999 detected analyte concentrations that exceeded preliminary action levels; specifically, contaminants of concern (COCs) included benzo(a) pyrene in a septic tank integrity sample associated with Septic Tank 33-1A of Septic Waste System 1, and arsenic in a soil sample associated with Septic Waste System 5. During this investigation, three Corrective Action Objectives (CAOs) were identified to prevent or mitigate exposure to contents of the septic tanks and distribution box, to subsurface soil containing COCs, and the spread of COCs beyond the CAU. Based on these CAOs, a review of existing data, future use, and current operations in Area 3 of the TTR, three CAAs were developed for consideration: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls; and Alternative 3 - Clean Closure by Excavation and Disposal. These alternatives were evaluated based on four general corrective action standards and five remedy selection decision factors. Based on the results of the evaluation, the preferred CAA was Alternative 3. This alternative meets all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated soils at the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1 with ROTC 1 and 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2005-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 552 is comprised of the one Corrective Action Site which is 12-23-05, Ponds. One additional CAS, 12-06-04, Muckpile (G-Tunnel Muckpile), was removed from this CAU when it was determined that the muckpile is an active site. A modification to the FFACO to remove CAS 12-06-04 was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on December 16, 2004. The G-Tunnel ponds were first identified in the 1991 Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. document entitled, ''Nevada Test Site Inventory of Inactive and Abandoned Facilities and Waste Sites'' (REECo, 1991). Corrective Action Unit 552 is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Therefore, additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating and selecting the corrective action alternatives for the site. The CAI will include field inspections, radiological surveys, and sampling of appropriate media. Data will also be obtained to support investigation-derived waste (IDW) disposal and potential future waste management decisions.

Verifying FreeRTOS; a feasibility study

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Pronk, C.

2010-01-01

This paper presents a study on modeling and verifying the kernel of Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS). The study will show advances in formally verifying such an RTOS both by refinement and by model checking approaches. This work fits in the context of Hoare’s verification challenge. Several

CENRTC Project number-sign 2F3EOA, OCB A-376, acceptance test procedure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Akerson, A.W.

1995-01-01

This test procedure provides the steps necessary to verify correct functional operation of controls, annunciators, alarms, protective relays and related systems impacted by CENRTC number-sign 2F3E0A, Microwave Transfer Trip Project, modification work performed under work package 6B-93-00041/M. This procedure separates three tests into separate sections: energization of A-376 duplex panel and circuits; SCADA tests; and A-376 local trip tests

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David Strand

2006-06-01

Corrective Action Unit 166 is located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166 is comprised of the seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 02-42-01, Cond. Release Storage Yd - North; (2) 02-42-02, Cond. Release Storage Yd - South; (3) 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area; (4) 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard; (5) 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum; (6) 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (7) 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on February 28, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 166. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the CAI for CAU 166 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct radiological surveys. (3) Perform field screening. (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine if

Independent technique of verifying high-dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy treatment plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saw, Cheng B.; Korb, Leroy J.; Darnell, Brenda; Krishna, K. V.; Ulewicz, Dennis

1998-01-01

Purpose: An independent technique for verifying high-dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy treatment plans has been formulated and validated clinically. Methods and Materials: In HDR brachytherapy, dwell times at respective dwell positions are computed, using an optimization algorithm in a HDR treatment-planning system to deliver a specified dose to many target points simultaneously. Because of the variability of dwell times, concerns have been expressed regarding the ability of the algorithm to compute the correct dose. To address this concern, a commercially available low-dose rate (LDR) algorithm was used to compute the doses at defined distances, based on the dwell times obtained from the HDR treatment plans. The percent deviation between doses computed using the HDR and LDR algorithms were reviewed for HDR procedures performed over the last year. Results: In this retrospective study, the difference between computed doses using the HDR and LDR algorithms was found to be within 5% for about 80% of the HDR procedures. All of the reviewed procedures have dose differences of less than 10%. Conclusion: An independent technique for verifying HDR brachytherapy treatment plans has been validated based on clinical data. Provided both systems are available, this technique is universal in its applications and not limited to either a particular implant applicator, implant site, or implant type

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 411. Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis), Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick K. [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2015-03-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 411, Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis). CAU 411 is located on the Nevada Test and Training Range and consists of a single corrective action site (CAS), NAFR-23-01, Pu Contaminated Soil. There is sufficient information and historical documentation from previous investigations and the 1996 interim corrective action to recommend closure of CAU 411 using the SAFER process. Based on existing data, the presumed corrective action for CAU 411 is clean closure. However, additional data will be obtained during a field investigation to document and verify the adequacy of existing information, and to determine whether the CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. This SAFER Plan provides the methodology to gather the necessary information for closing the CAU. The results of the field investigation will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The site will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 20, 2014, by representatives of NDEP, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine whether CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 411; Collect environmental samples from designated target populations to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information; If COCs are no longer present, establish clean closure as the corrective action; If COCs are present, the extent of contamination will be defined and further corrective actions

Electromedical devices test laboratories accreditation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murad, C; Rubio, D; Ponce, S; Alvarez Abri, A; Terron, A; Vicencio, D; Fascioli, E

2007-01-01

In the last years, the technology and equipment at hospitals have been increase in a great way as the risks of their implementation. Safety in medical equipment must be considered an important issue to protect patients and their users. For this reason, test and calibrations laboratories must verify the correct performance of this kind of devices under national and international standards. Is an essential mission for laboratories to develop their measurement activities taking into account a quality management system. In this article, we intend to transmit our experience working to achieve an accredited Test Laboratories for medical devices in National technological University

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0 / June 2003), Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2003-06-27

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 536 consists of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge. The CAU 536 site is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of possible contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for CAS 03-44-02. The additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of this field investigation are to be used to support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document. Record of Technical Change No. 1 is dated 3-2004.

The Method of a Standalone Functional Verifying Operability of Sonar Control Systems

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

A. A. Sotnikov

2014-01-01

Full Text Available This article describes a method of standalone verifying sonar control system, which is based on functional checking of control system operability.The main features of realized method are a development of the valid mathematic model for simulation of sonar signals at the point of hydroacoustic antenna, a valid representation of the sonar control system modes as a discrete Markov model, providing functional object verification in real time mode.Some ways are proposed to control computational complexity in case of insufficient computing resources of the simulation equipment, namely the way of model functionality reduction and the way of adequacy reduction.Experiments were made using testing equipment, which was developed by department of Research Institute of Information Control System at Bauman Moscow State Technical University to verify technical validity of industrial sonar complexes.On-board software was artificially changed to create malfunctions in functionality of sonar control systems during the verifying process in order to estimate verifying system performances.The method efficiency was proved by the theory and experiment results in comparison with the basic methodology of verifying technical systems.This method could be also used in debugging of on-board software of sonar complexes and in development of new promising algorithms of sonar signal processing.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with ROTC 1 and 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2004-05-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S Department of Defense (DoD). Corrective Action Unit 543 is located in Area 6 and Area 15 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Seven corrective action sites (CASs) comprise CAU 543 and are listed below: (1) 06-07-01, Decon Pad; (2) 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; (3) 15-04-01, Septic Tank; (4) 15-05-01, Leachfield; (5) 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; (6) 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; and (7) 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping. Corrective Action Site 06-07-01, Decon Pad, is located in Area 6 and consists of the Area 6 Decontamination Facility and its components that are associated with decontamination of equipment, vehicles, and materials related to nuclear testing. The six CASs in Area 15 are located at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm and are related to waste disposal activities at the EPA Farm. The EPA Farm was a fully-functional dairy associated with animal experiments conducted at the on-site laboratory. The corrective action investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, video-mole surveys, and sampling of media, where appropriate. Data will also be obtained to support waste management decisions. The CASs within CAU 543 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present at concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The seven CASs in CAU 543

Preoperational test report, primary ventilation condenser cooling system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-10-29

This represents the preoperational test report for the Primary Ventilation Condenser Cooling System, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system uses a closed chilled water piping loop to provide offgas effluent cooling for tanks AY101, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102; the offgas is cooled from a nominal 100 F to 40 F. Resulting condensation removes tritiated vapor from the exhaust stack stream. The piping system includes a package outdoor air-cooled water chiller with parallel redundant circulating pumps; the condenser coil is located inside a shielded ventilation equipment cell. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System.

Preoperational test report, primary ventilation condenser cooling system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clifton, F.T.

1997-01-01

This represents the preoperational test report for the Primary Ventilation Condenser Cooling System, Project W-030. Project W-030 provides a ventilation upgrade for the four Aging Waste Facility tanks. The system uses a closed chilled water piping loop to provide offgas effluent cooling for tanks AY101, AY102, AZ1O1, AZ102; the offgas is cooled from a nominal 100 F to 40 F. Resulting condensation removes tritiated vapor from the exhaust stack stream. The piping system includes a package outdoor air-cooled water chiller with parallel redundant circulating pumps; the condenser coil is located inside a shielded ventilation equipment cell. The tests verify correct system operation and correct indications displayed by the central Monitor and Control System

Lee-Yang zeroes and logarithmic corrections in the Φ44 theory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kenna, R.; Lang, C.B.

1993-01-01

The leading mean-field critical behaviour of φ 4 4 -theory is modified by multiplicative logarithmic corrections. We analyse these corrections both analytically and numerically. In particular we present a finite-size scaling theory for the Lee-Yang zeroes and temperature zeroes, both of which exhibit logarithmic corrections. On lattices from size 8 4 to 24 4 , Monte-Carlo cluster methods and multi-histogram techniques are used to determine the partition function zeroes closest to the critical point. Finite-size scaling behaviour is verified and the logarithmic corrections are found to be in good agreement with our analytical predictions. (orig.)

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 230: Area 22 Sewage Lagoons and Corrective Action Unit 320: Area 22 Desert Rock Airport Strainer Box, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operation Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 230/320 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 230 consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 22-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; while CAU 320 consists of CAS 22-99-01, Strainer Box. These CAUs are referred to as CAU 230/320 or the Sewage Lagoons Site. The Sewage Lagoons Site also includes an Imhoff tank, sludge bed, and associated buried sewer piping. Located in Area 22, the site was used between 1951 to 1958 for disposal of sanitary sewage effluent from the historic Camp Desert Rock Facility at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada. Based on site history, the contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), and radionuclides. Vertical migration is estimated to be less than 12 feet below ground surface, and lateral migration is limited to the soil immediately adjacent to or within areas of concern. The proposed investigation will involve a combination of field screening for VOCs and TPH using the direct-push method and excavation using a backhoe to gather soil samples for analysis. Gamma spectroscopy will also be conducted for waste management purposes. Sampling locations will be biased to suspected worst-case areas including the nearby sludge bed, sewage lagoon inlet(s) and outlet(s), disturbed soil surrounding the lagoons, surface drainage channel south of the lagoons, and the area near the Imhoff tank. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document

Corrective action investigation plan for Central Nevada Test Area CAU No. 417

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) is part of a US Department of Energy (DOE)-funded environmental investigation of the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA). The CNTA is located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, adjacent to US Highway 6, about 15 kilometers (10 miles) northeast of Warm Springs. The CNTA was the site of Project Faultless, a nuclear device detonated in the subsurface by the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in January 1968. The purpose of this test was to gauge the seismic effects of relatively large, high-yield detonations completed outside of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The test was also used to determine the suitability of the site for future large detonations. The yield of the Faultless test was between 200 kilotons and 1 megaton (DOE, 1994c).

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCord, John

2004-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) was developed for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain. The CAIP is a requirement of the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) (FFACO, 1996). The FFACO addresses environmental restoration activities at U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) facilities and sites including the underground testing area(s) of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This CAIP describes the investigation activities currently planned for the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain CAU. These activities are consistent with the current Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project strategy described in Section 3.0 of Appendix VI, Revision No. 1 (December 7, 2000) of the FFACO (1996) and summarized in Section 2.1.2 of this plan. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain CAU extends over several areas of the NTS (Figure 1-1) and includes former underground nuclear testing locations in Areas 12 and 16. The area referred to as ''Rainier Mesa'' includes the geographical area of Rainier Mesa proper and the contiguous Aqueduct Mesa. Figure 1-2 shows the locations of the tests (within tunnel complexes) conducted at Rainier Mesa. Shoshone Mountain is located approximately 20 kilometers (km) south of Rainier Mesa, but is included within the same CAU due to similarities in their geologic setting and in the nature and types of nuclear tests conducted. Figure 1-3 shows the locations of the tests conducted at Shoshone Mountain. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain CAU falls within the larger-scale Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain Investigation Area, which also includes the northwest section of the Yucca Flat CAU as shown in Figure 1-1. Rainier Mesa and Shoshone Mountain lie adjacent to the Timber Mountain Caldera Complex and are composed of volcanic rocks that erupted from the

Programmable cellular arrays. Faults testing and correcting in cellular arrays

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cercel, L.

1978-03-01

A review of some recent researches about programmable cellular arrays in computing and digital processing of information systems is presented, and includes both combinational and sequential arrays, with full arbitrary behaviour, or which can realize better implementations of specialized blocks as: arithmetic units, counters, comparators, control systems, memory blocks, etc. Also, the paper presents applications of cellular arrays in microprogramming, in implementing of a specialized computer for matrix operations, in modeling of universal computing systems. The last section deals with problems of fault testing and correcting in cellular arrays. (author)

Biochemically verified smoking cessation and vaping beliefs among vape store customers.

Science.gov (United States)

Tackett, Alayna P; Lechner, William V; Meier, Ellen; Grant, DeMond M; Driskill, Leslie M; Tahirkheli, Noor N; Wagener, Theodore L

2015-05-01

To evaluate biochemically verified smoking status and electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) use behaviors and beliefs among a sample of customers from vapor stores (stores specializing in ENDS). A cross-sectional survey of 215 adult vapor store customers at four retail locations in the Midwestern United States; a subset of participants (n = 181) also completed exhaled carbon monoxide (CO) testing to verify smoking status. Outcomes evaluated included ENDS preferences, harm beliefs, use behaviors, smoking history and current biochemically verified smoking status. Most customers reported starting ENDS as a means of smoking cessation (86%), using newer-generation devices (89%), vaping non-tobacco/non-menthol flavors (72%) and using e-liquid with nicotine strengths of ≤20 mg/ml (72%). There was a high rate of switching (91.4%) to newer-generation ENDS among those who started with a first-generation product. Exhaled CO readings confirmed that 66% of the tested sample had quit smoking. Among those who continued to smoke, mean cigarettes per day decreased from 22.1 to 7.5 (P customers in the United States who use electronic nicotine delivery devices to stop smoking, vaping longer, using newer-generation devices and using non-tobacco and non-menthol flavored e-liquid appear to be associated with higher rates of smoking cessation. © 2015 Society for the Study of Addiction.

Verified Interval Orbit Propagation in Satellite Collision Avoidance

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Römgens, B.A.; Mooij, E.; Naeije, M.C.

2011-01-01

Verified interval integration methods enclose a solution set corresponding to interval initial values and parameters, and bound integration and rounding errors. Verified methods suffer from overestimation of the solution, i.e., non-solutions are also included in the solution enclosure. Two verified

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NNSA/NV

2002-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; the Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of

On the Computation of the RMSEA and CFI from the Mean-And-Variance Corrected Test Statistic with Nonnormal Data in SEM.

Science.gov (United States)

Savalei, Victoria

2018-01-01

A new type of nonnormality correction to the RMSEA has recently been developed, which has several advantages over existing corrections. In particular, the new correction adjusts the sample estimate of the RMSEA for the inflation due to nonnormality, while leaving its population value unchanged, so that established cutoff criteria can still be used to judge the degree of approximate fit. A confidence interval (CI) for the new robust RMSEA based on the mean-corrected ("Satorra-Bentler") test statistic has also been proposed. Follow up work has provided the same type of nonnormality correction for the CFI (Brosseau-Liard & Savalei, 2014). These developments have recently been implemented in lavaan. This note has three goals: a) to show how to compute the new robust RMSEA and CFI from the mean-and-variance corrected test statistic; b) to offer a new CI for the robust RMSEA based on the mean-and-variance corrected test statistic; and c) to caution that the logic of the new nonnormality corrections to RMSEA and CFI is most appropriate for the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator, and cannot easily be generalized to the most commonly used categorical data estimators.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5 Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

D. S. Tobiason

2000-08-01

Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5 are located in Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) (Figure 1). The site is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 428 and includes Corrective Action Sites 03-05-002-SW01 (Septic Waste System 1 [SWS 1]), and 03-05-002-SW05 (Septic Waste System 5 [SWS 5]). The site history for the CAU is provided in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOE/NV], 1999). SWS 1 consists of two leachfields and associated septic tanks. SWS 1 received effluent from both sanitary and industrial sources from various buildings in Area 3 of the TTR (Figure 2). SWS 5 is comprised of one leachfield and outfall with an associated septic tank. SWS 5 received effluent from sources in Building 03-50 in Area 3 of the TTR (Figure 2). Both systems were active until 1990 when a consolidated sewer system was installed. The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to provide the strategy and methodology to close the Area 3 SWS 1 and 5. The CAU will be closed following state and federal regulations and the FFACO (1996). Site characterization was done during May and June 1999. Samples of the tank contents, leachfield soil, and soil under the tanks and pipes were collected. The results of the characterization were reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (DOE/NV, 2000). Additional sampling was done in May 2000, the results of which are presented in this plan. Soil sample results indicated that two constituents of concern were detected above Preliminary Action Levels (PALs). Total arsenic was detected at a concentration of 68.7 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg). The arsenic was found under the center distribution line at the proximal end of the SWS 5 Leachfield (Figure 3). Total benzo(a)pyrene was detected at a concentration of 480 micrograms per kilogram ({micro}g/kg). The benzo(a)pyrene was found in the soil under the

Standard practice of calibration of force-measuring instruments for verifying the force indication of testing machines

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2006-01-01

1.1 The purpose of this practice is to specify procedures for the calibration of force-measuring instruments. Procedures are included for the following types of instruments: 1.1.1 Elastic force-measuring instruments, and 1.1.2 Force-multiplying systems, such as balances and small platform scales. Note 1Verification by deadweight loading is also an acceptable method of verifying the force indication of a testing machine. Tolerances for weights for this purpose are given in Practices E 4; methods for calibration of the weights are given in NIST Technical Note 577, Methods of Calibrating Weights for Piston Gages. 1.2 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as the standard. Other metric and inch-pound values are regarded as equivalent when required. 1.3 This practice is intended for the calibration of static force measuring instruments. It is not applicable for dynamic or high speed force calibrations, nor can the results of calibrations performed in accordance with this practice be assumed valid for...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 545: Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alfred Wickline

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit 545, Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials, consists of seven inactive sites located in the Yucca Flat area and one inactive site in the Pahute Mesa area. The eight CAU 545 sites consist of craters used for mud disposal, surface or buried waste disposed within craters or potential crater areas, and sites where surface or buried waste was disposed. The CAU 545 sites were used to support nuclear testing conducted in the Yucca Flat area during the 1950s through the early 1990s, and in Area 20 in the mid-1970s. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted following approval

Verifying design patterns in Hoare Type Theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Kasper; Buisse, Alexandre; Birkedal, Lars

In this technical report we document our experiments formally verifying three design patterns in Hoare Type Theory.......In this technical report we document our experiments formally verifying three design patterns in Hoare Type Theory....

A bandwidth correction to the Allegri-Zhang solution for accelerated random vibration testing

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Benasciutti Denis

2018-01-01

Full Text Available In 2008, Allegri and Zhang published a study [Int. J. Fatigue. 2008, 30(6:967-977] in which they provided an exact analytical solution to the inverse scaling law for accelerated vibration tests of linear systems submitted to stationary Gaussian excitations By combining finite element analysis with multiaxial spectral methods defined in the frequency-domain, their solution generalised the simple inverse power law model suggested in some standards. The solution adopted the “equivalent von Mises stress” multiaxial criterion combined with the narrow-band damage expression. This work aims to propose a bandwidth correction to the original Allegri-Zhang solution to account for the actual spectral banwidth of the local multiaxial stress. The corrected Allegri-Zhang solution is also extended to another multiaxial spectral method, namely the “Projection-by-Projection” criterion. A numerical example is finally discussed, in which the corrected solution is applied to an L-shaped beam submitted to random accelerations.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No. 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Boehlecke

2004-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 322, Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 322 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 01-25-01 - AST Release Site; (2) 03-25-03 - Mud Plant and AST Diesel Release; and (3) 03-20-05 - Injection Wells and BOP Shop. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 322. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from April 2004 through September 2004, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: (1) Determine if contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent; and (3) Provide sufficient information and data to recommend appropriate corrective actions for the CASs. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against appropriate preliminary action levels to identify contaminants of concern for each corrective action site. Radiological field measurements were compared to unrestricted release criteria. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities revealed the following: (1) CAS 01-25-01 contains an AST berm contaminated with total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) diesel-range organics (DRO). (2) CAS 03-25-03 includes two distinct areas: Area A where no contamination remains from a potential spill associated with an AST, and Area B where TPH-DRO contamination associated with various activities at the mud plant was identified. The Area B contamination was found at various locations and depths. (3) CAS 03-25-03 Area B contains TPH-DRO contamination at various

SELF CORRECTION WORKS BETTER THAN TEACHER CORRECTION IN EFL SETTING

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Azizollah Dabaghi

2012-11-01

Full Text Available Learning a foreign language takes place step by step, during which mistakes are to be expected in all stages of learning. EFL learners are usually afraid of making mistakes which prevents them from being receptive and responsive. Overcoming fear of mistakes depends on the way mistakes are rectified. It is believed that autonomy and learner-centeredness suggest that in some settings learner's self-correction of mistakes might be more beneficial for language learning than teacher's correction. This assumption has been the subject of debates for some time. Some researchers believe that correction whether that of teacher's or on behalf of learners is effective in showing them how their current interlanguage differs from the target (Long &Robinson, 1998. Others suggest that correcting the students whether directly or through recasts are ambiguous and may be perceived by the learner as confirmation of meaning rather than feedback on form (Lyster, 1998a. This study is intended to investigate the effects of correction on Iranian intermediate EFL learners' writing composition in Payam Noor University. For this purpose, 90 English majoring students, studying at Isfahan Payam Noor University were invited to participate at the experiment. They all received a sample of TOFEL test and a total number of 60 participants whose scores were within the range of one standard deviation below and above the mean were divided into two equal groups; experimental and control. The experimental group went through some correction during the experiment while the control group remained intact and the ordinary processes of teaching went on. Each group received twelve sessions of two hour classes every week on advanced writing course in which some activities of Modern English (II were selected. Then after the treatment both groups received an immediate test as post-test and the experimental group took the second post-test as the delayed recall test with the same design as the

New concepts in nuclear arms control: verified cutoff and verified disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donnelly, W.H.

1990-01-01

Limiting the numbers of nuclear warheads by reducing military production and stockpiles of fissionable materials has been a constant item on the nuclear arms control agenda for the last 45 years. It has become more salient recently, however, because of two events: the enforced closure for safety reasons of the current United States military plutonium production facilities; and the possibility that the US and USSR may soon conclude an agreement providing for the verified destruction of significant numbers of nuclear warheads and the recovery of the fissionable material they contain with the option of transferring these materials to peaceful uses. A study has been made of the practical problems of verifying the cut off of fissionable material production for military purposes in the nuclear weapon states, as well as providing assurance that material recovered from warheads is not re-used for proscribed military purposes and facilitating its transfer to civil uses. Implementation of such measures would have important implications for non-proliferation. The resultant paper was presented to a meeting of the PPNN Core Group held in Baden, close to Vienna, over the weekend of 18/19th November 1989 and is reprinted in this booklet. (author)

Verification and testing of the RTOS for safety-critical embedded systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Na Young [Seoul National University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Jin Hyun; Choi, Jin Young [Korea University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Sung, Ah Young; Choi, Byung Ju [Ewha Womans University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jang Soo [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2003-07-01

Development in Instrumentation and Control (I and C) technology provides more convenience and better performance, thus, adopted in many fields. To adopt newly developed technology, nuclear industry requires rigorous V and V procedure and tests to assure reliable operation. Adoption of digital system requires verification and testing of the OS for licensing. Commercial real-time operating system (RTOS) is targeted to apply to various, unpredictable needs, which makes it difficult to verify. For this reason, simple, application-oriented realtime OS is developed for the nuclear application. In this work, we show how to verify the developed RTOS at each development lifecycle. Commercial formal tool is used in specification and verification of the system. Based on the developed model, software in C language is automatically generated. Tests are performed for two purposes; one is to identify consistency between the verified model and the generated code, the other is to find errors in the generated code. The former assumes that the verified model is correct, and the latter incorrect. Test data are generated separately to satisfy each purpose. After we test the RTOS software, we implement the test board embedded with the developed RTOS and the application software, which simulates the safety critical plant protection function. Testing to identify whether the reliability criteria is satisfied or not is also designed in this work. It results in that the developed RTOS software works well when it is embedded in the system.

Verification and testing of the RTOS for safety-critical embedded systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Na Young; Kim, Jin Hyun; Choi, Jin Young; Sung, Ah Young; Choi, Byung Ju; Lee, Jang Soo

2003-01-01

Development in Instrumentation and Control (I and C) technology provides more convenience and better performance, thus, adopted in many fields. To adopt newly developed technology, nuclear industry requires rigorous V and V procedure and tests to assure reliable operation. Adoption of digital system requires verification and testing of the OS for licensing. Commercial real-time operating system (RTOS) is targeted to apply to various, unpredictable needs, which makes it difficult to verify. For this reason, simple, application-oriented realtime OS is developed for the nuclear application. In this work, we show how to verify the developed RTOS at each development lifecycle. Commercial formal tool is used in specification and verification of the system. Based on the developed model, software in C language is automatically generated. Tests are performed for two purposes; one is to identify consistency between the verified model and the generated code, the other is to find errors in the generated code. The former assumes that the verified model is correct, and the latter incorrect. Test data are generated separately to satisfy each purpose. After we test the RTOS software, we implement the test board embedded with the developed RTOS and the application software, which simulates the safety critical plant protection function. Testing to identify whether the reliability criteria is satisfied or not is also designed in this work. It results in that the developed RTOS software works well when it is embedded in the system

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 500: Test Cell A Septic System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0, DOE/NV--528 UPDATED WITH TECHNICAL CHANGE No.1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ITLV

1998-12-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) addresses one of three leachfield systems associated with Test Cell A, which is located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (see Leachfield Work Plan Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 500 is comprised of the Test Cell A Septic System (CAS 25-04-05) and the associated leachfield system presented in Figure 1-1 (FFACO, 1996). The leachfield is located 60 meters (m) (200 feet [ft]) southeast of the Building 3124 gate, and approximately 45 m (150 ft) southwest of Building 3116 at Test Cell A. Test Cell A operated during the 1960s to support nuclear rocket reactor testing as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) (SNPO, 1970). Various operations within Buildings 3113B (Mechanical Equipment Room), 3115 (Helium Compressor Station), 3116 (Pump House), a water tank drain and overflow, a ''yard and equipment drain system'' outside of Building 3116, and a trailer have resulted in potentially hazardous effluent releases to the leachfield system (DOE, 1988a). The leachfield system components include discharge lines, manways, a septic tank, an outfall line, a diversion chamber, and a 15 by 30 m (50 by 100 ft) leachfield (see Leachfield Work Plan Figure 3-1 for explanation of terminology). In addition, engineering drawings show an outfall system that may or may not be connected to the CAU 500 leachfield. In general, effluent contributed to the leachfield was sanitary wastewater associated with floor drains, toilet and lavatory facilities in Building 3113B and floor drains in the remaining source buildings. The surface and subsurface soils in the vicinity of the collection system, outfall, and leachfield may have been impacted by effluent containing contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) generated by support activities associated with Test Cell A reactor testing operations.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2010-07-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 371, Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe, located within Areas 11 and 18 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 comprises two corrective action sites (CASs): • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 371 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at both CASs. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 8, 2009, through February 16, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 371 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface soil. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within the Johnnie Boy crater and the fissure at Pin Stripe. Due to the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken

Well Completion Report for Corrective Action Unit 443 Central Nevada Test Area Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The drilling program described in this report is part of a new corrective action strategy for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA). The drilling program included drilling two boreholes, geophysical well logging, construction of two monitoring/validation (MV) wells with piezometers (MV-4 and MV-5), development of monitor wells and piezometers, recompletion of two existing wells (HTH-1 and UC-1-P-1S), removal of pumps from existing wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3), redevelopment of piezometers associated with existing wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3), and installation of submersible pumps. The new corrective action strategy includes initiating a new 5-year proof-of-concept monitoring period to validate the compliance boundary at CNTA (DOE 2007). The new 5-year proof-of-concept monitoring period begins upon completion of the new monitor wells and collection of samples for laboratory analysis. The new strategy is described in the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan addendum (DOE 2008a) that the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved (NDEP 2008)

Well Completion Report for Corrective Action Unit 443 Central Nevada Test Area Nye County, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2009-12-01

The drilling program described in this report is part of a new corrective action strategy for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA). The drilling program included drilling two boreholes, geophysical well logging, construction of two monitoring/validation (MV) wells with piezometers (MV-4 and MV-5), development of monitor wells and piezometers, recompletion of two existing wells (HTH-1 and UC-1-P-1S), removal of pumps from existing wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3), redevelopment of piezometers associated with existing wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3), and installation of submersible pumps. The new corrective action strategy includes initiating a new 5-year proof-of-concept monitoring period to validate the compliance boundary at CNTA (DOE 2007). The new 5-year proof-of-concept monitoring period begins upon completion of the new monitor wells and collection of samples for laboratory analysis. The new strategy is described in the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan addendum (DOE 2008a) that the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved (NDEP 2008).

FTREX Testing Report (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) Version 1.5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jung, Woo Sik

2009-07-01

In order to verify FTREX functions and to confirm the correctness of FTREX 1.5, various tests were performed 1.fault trees with negates 2.fault trees with house events 3.fault trees with multiple tops 4.fault trees with logical loops 5.fault trees with initiators, house events, negates, logical loops, and flag events By using the automated cutest propagation test, the FTREX 1.5 functions are verified. FTREX version 1.3 and later versions have capability to perform bottom-up cutset-propagation test in order check cutest status. FTREX 1.5 always generates the proper minimal cut sets. All the output cutsets of the tested problems are MCSs (Minimal Cut Sets) and have no non-minimal cutsets and improper cutsets. The improper cutsets are those that have no effect to top, have multiple initiators, or have disjoint events A * -A

Various verifying tests using full size partial models of PCCV

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nagata, Kaoru; Fukihara, Masaaki; Takemoto, Yasushi.

1987-01-01

The prestressed concrete containment vessel (PCCV) for Tsuruga No.2 plant of Japan Atomic Power Co. was adopted for the first time in Japan, and the necessity of experimental verification was pointed out about a number of items in the design and construction. In this report, the various tests carried out with full size models are described. The tendon system adopted for this PCCV is BBRV type, in which PC wires are bundled in parallel to make cables, and involves many matters inexperienced in Japan, such as the stretching capacity is as large as 1000 t class, the longest cable is 160 m, and it is the unbonded system of injecting rust inhibitor. It was demanded to confirm by testing the propriety of the small coefficient of friction at the time of stretching tendons. For the tests, the materials, equipment and their size were prepared all as those for actual works. The test works became the rehearsal of the actual prestressing works. Besides, by utilizing these full size test beds, the workability test on concrete at the time of their construction, the confirmation test on tendon strength and the safety of concrete at fixing part at the time of friction test, thereafter, greasing test, the simulation test of in-service inspection, and the thermal loading test on liners were carried out. The results of these tests are briefly reported. (Kako, I.)

Tank Monitor and Control System sensor acceptance test procedure. Revision 6

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scaief, C.C. III.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) is to verify the correct reading of sensor elements connected to the Tank Monitor and Control System (TMACS). The system functional requirements are contained in WHC-SD-WM-RD-013, Rev. 1 (WHC 1992a). This ATP is intended to be used for testing of the connection of existing temperature sensors, new temperature sensors, pressure sensing equipment, new Enraf level gauges, sensors that generate a current output, and discrete (on/off) inputs. The TMACS operation was verified by the original ATP (WHC 1991 c). It is intended that this ATP will be used each time sensors are added to the system. As a result, the data sheets have been designed to be generic

Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD), Area 12 fleet operations steam cleaning discharge area, Nevada Test Site Corrective Action Unit 339

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bonn, J.F.

1996-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) incorporates the methodology used for evaluating the remedial alternatives completed for a former steam cleaning discharge area at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The former steam cleaning site is located in Area 12, east of the Fleet Operations Building 12-16. The discharge area has been impacted by Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) F Listed volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and petroleum hydrocarbons waste. Based upon these findings, resulting from Phase 1 and Phase 2 site investigations, corrective action is required at the site. To determine the appropriate corrective action to be proposed, an evaluation of remedial alternatives was completed. The evaluation was completed using a Corrective Measures Study (CMS). Based on the results of the CMS, the favored closure alternative for the site is plugging the effluent discharge line, removing the sandbagged barrier, completing excavation of VOC impacted soils, and fencing the soil area impacted by total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), east of the discharge line and west of the soil berm. Management of the F Listed VOCs are dictated by RCRA. Due to the small volume of impacted soil, excavation and transportation to a Treatment Storage and Disposal Facility (TSDF) is the most practical method of management. It is anticipated that the TPH (as oil) impacted soils will remain in place based upon; the A through K Analysis, concentrations detected (maximum 8,600 milligrams per kilogram), expected natural degradation of the hydrocarbons over time, and the findings of the Phase 2 Investigation that vertical migration has been minimal

Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD), Area 12 fleet operations steam cleaning discharge area, Nevada Test Site Corrective Action Unit 339

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bonn, J.F.

1996-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) incorporates the methodology used for evaluating the remedial alternatives completed for a former steam cleaning discharge area at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The former steam cleaning site is located in Area 12, east of the Fleet Operations Building 12-16. The discharge area has been impacted by Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) F Listed volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and petroleum hydrocarbons waste. Based upon these findings, resulting from Phase 1 and Phase 2 site investigations, corrective action is required at the site. To determine the appropriate corrective action to be proposed, an evaluation of remedial alternatives was completed. The evaluation was completed using a Corrective Measures Study (CMS). Based on the results of the CMS, the favored closure alternative for the site is plugging the effluent discharge line, removing the sandbagged barrier, completing excavation of VOC impacted soils, and fencing the soil area impacted by total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), east of the discharge line and west of the soil berm. Management of the F Listed VOCs are dictated by RCRA. Due to the small volume of impacted soil, excavation and transportation to a Treatment Storage and Disposal Facility (TSDF) is the most practical method of management. It is anticipated that the TPH (as oil) impacted soils will remain in place based upon; the A through K Analysis, concentrations detected (maximum 8,600 milligrams per kilogram), expected natural degradation of the hydrocarbons over time, and the findings of the Phase 2 Investigation that vertical migration has been minimal.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NV

2002-08-27

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; the Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 2 with Errata Sheet

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2006-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168: Area 25 and 26, Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each corrective action site (CAS) within CAU 168. The corrective action investigation (CAI) was conducted in accordance with the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26, Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'', as developed under the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 168 is located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada and is comprised of the following 12 CASs: CAS 25-16-01, Construction Waste Pile; CAS 25-16-03, MX Construction Landfill; CAS 25-19-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 25-23-02, Radioactive Storage RR Cars; CAS 25-23-13, ETL - Lab Radioactive Contamination; CAS 25-23-18, Radioactive Material Storage; CAS 25-34-01, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-34-02, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-99-16, USW G3; CAS 26-08-01, Waste Dump/Burn Pit; CAS 26-17-01, Pluto Waste Holding Area; and CAS 26-19-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine contaminants of concern (COCs) for CASs within CAU 168. Radiological measurements of railroad cars and test equipment were compared to unrestricted (free) release criteria. Assessment of the data generated from the CAI activities revealed the following: (1) Corrective Action Site 25-16-01 contains hydrocarbon-contaminated soil at concentrations exceeding the PAL. The contamination is at discrete locations associated with asphalt debris. (2) No COCs were identified at CAS 25-16-03. Buried construction waste is present in at least two

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sloop, Christy

2013-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 569 comprises the following nine corrective action sites (CASs): • 03-23-09, T-3 Contamination Area • 03-23-10, T-3A Contamination Area • 03-23-11, T-3B Contamination Area • 03-23-12, T-3S Contamination Area • 03-23-13, T-3T Contamination Area • 03-23-14, T-3V Contamination Area • 03-23-15, S-3G Contamination Area • 03-23-16, S-3H Contamination Area • 03-23-21, Pike Contamination Area The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 569 based on the implementation of the corrective actions listed in Table ES-2.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5 Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

D. S. Tobiason

2000-01-01

Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5 are located in Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) (Figure 1). The site is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 428 and includes Corrective Action Sites 03-05-002-SW01 (Septic Waste System 1[SWS 1]), and 03-05-002-SW05 (Septic Waste System 5[SWS 5]). The site history for the CAU is provided in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office[DOE/NV], 1999). SWS 1 consists of two leachfields and associated septic tanks. SWS 1 received effluent from both sanitary and industrial sources from various buildings in Area 3 of the TTR (Figure 2). SWS 5 is comprised of one leachfield and outfall with an associated septic tank. SWS 5 received effluent from sources in Building 03-50 in Area 3 of the TTR (Figure 2). Both systems were active until 1990 when a consolidated sewer system was installed. The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to provide the strategy and methodology to close the Area 3 SWS 1 and 5. The CAU will be closed following state and federal regulations and the FFACO (1996). Site characterization was done during May and June 1999. Samples of the tank contents, leachfield soil, and soil under the tanks and pipes were collected. The results of the characterization were reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (DOE/NV, 2000). Additional sampling was done in May 2000, the results of which are presented in this plan. Soil sample results indicated that two constituents of concern were detected above Preliminary Action Levels (PALs). Total arsenic was detected at a concentration of 68.7 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg). The arsenic was found under the center distribution line at the proximal end of the SWS 5 Leachfield (Figure 3). Total benzo(a)pyrene was detected at a concentration of 480 micrograms per kilogram ((micro)g/kg). The benzo(a)pyrene was found in the soil under the discharge

How important is self-consistency for the dDsC density dependent dispersion correction?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brémond, Éric; Corminboeuf, Clémence, E-mail: clemence.corminboeuf@epfl.ch [Laboratory for Computational Molecular Design, Institut des Sciences et Ingénierie Chimiques, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Golubev, Nikolay [Laboratory for Computational Molecular Design, Institut des Sciences et Ingénierie Chimiques, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Department of Chemistry, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow 119991 (Russian Federation); Steinmann, Stephan N., E-mail: sns25@duke.edu [Laboratory for Computational Molecular Design, Institut des Sciences et Ingénierie Chimiques, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Department of Chemistry, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708 (United States)

2014-05-14

The treatment of dispersion interactions is ubiquitous but computationally demanding for seamless ab initio approaches. A highly popular and simple remedy consists in correcting for the missing interactions a posteriori by adding an attractive energy term summed over all atom pairs to standard density functional approximations. These corrections were originally based on atom pairwise parameters and, hence, had a strong touch of empiricism. To overcome such limitations, we recently proposed a robust system-dependent dispersion correction, dDsC, that is computed from the electron density and that provides a balanced description of both weak inter- and intramolecular interactions. From the theoretical point of view and for the sake of increasing reliability, we here verify if the self-consistent implementation of dDsC impacts ground-state properties such as interaction energies, electron density, dipole moments, geometries, and harmonic frequencies. In addition, we investigate the suitability of the a posteriori scheme for molecular dynamics simulations, for which the analysis of the energy conservation constitutes a challenging tests. Our study demonstrates that the post-SCF approach in an excellent approximation.

Corrections of the whole body counting for various measurement geometries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fueloep, M.; Ragan, P.; Lahham, A.

1996-01-01

A simple method was suggested for making corrections during the calibration of HPGe detectors employed for the whole-body counting of humans ranging from infants to adults. The results obtained by calculations were verified by using phantoms. (P.A.). 1 tab., 5 figs., 3 refs

Appraising the value of independent EIA follow-up verifiers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wessels, Jan-Albert, E-mail: janalbert.wessels@nwu.ac.za [School of Geo and Spatial Sciences, Department of Geography and Environmental Management, North-West University, C/O Hoffman and Borcherd Street, Potchefstroom, 2520 (South Africa); Retief, Francois, E-mail: francois.retief@nwu.ac.za [School of Geo and Spatial Sciences, Department of Geography and Environmental Management, North-West University, C/O Hoffman and Borcherd Street, Potchefstroom, 2520 (South Africa); Morrison-Saunders, Angus, E-mail: A.Morrison-Saunders@murdoch.edu.au [School of Geo and Spatial Sciences, Department of Geography and Environmental Management, North-West University, C/O Hoffman and Borcherd Street, Potchefstroom, 2520 (South Africa); Environmental Assessment, School of Environmental Science, Murdoch University, Australia. (Australia)

2015-01-15

Independent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) follow-up verifiers such as monitoring agencies, checkers, supervisors and control officers are active on various construction sites across the world. There are, however, differing views on the value that these verifiers add and very limited learning in EIA has been drawn from independent verifiers. This paper aims to appraise how and to what extent independent EIA follow-up verifiers add value in major construction projects in the developing country context of South Africa. A framework for appraising the role of independent verifiers was established and four South African case studies were examined through a mixture of site visits, project document analysis, and interviews. Appraisal results were documented in the performance areas of: planning, doing, checking, acting, public participating and integration with other programs. The results indicate that independent verifiers add most value to major construction projects when involved with screening EIA requirements of new projects, allocation of financial and human resources, checking legal compliance, influencing implementation, reporting conformance results, community and stakeholder engagement, integration with self-responsibility programs such as environmental management systems (EMS), and controlling records. It was apparent that verifiers could be more creatively utilized in pre-construction preparation, providing feedback of knowledge into assessment of new projects, giving input to the planning and design phase of projects, and performance evaluation. The study confirms the benefits of proponent and regulator follow-up, specifically in having independent verifiers that disclose information, facilitate discussion among stakeholders, are adaptable and proactive, aid in the integration of EIA with other programs, and instill trust in EIA enforcement by conformance evaluation. Overall, the study provides insight on how to harness the learning opportunities

Appraising the value of independent EIA follow-up verifiers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wessels, Jan-Albert; Retief, Francois; Morrison-Saunders, Angus

2015-01-01

Independent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) follow-up verifiers such as monitoring agencies, checkers, supervisors and control officers are active on various construction sites across the world. There are, however, differing views on the value that these verifiers add and very limited learning in EIA has been drawn from independent verifiers. This paper aims to appraise how and to what extent independent EIA follow-up verifiers add value in major construction projects in the developing country context of South Africa. A framework for appraising the role of independent verifiers was established and four South African case studies were examined through a mixture of site visits, project document analysis, and interviews. Appraisal results were documented in the performance areas of: planning, doing, checking, acting, public participating and integration with other programs. The results indicate that independent verifiers add most value to major construction projects when involved with screening EIA requirements of new projects, allocation of financial and human resources, checking legal compliance, influencing implementation, reporting conformance results, community and stakeholder engagement, integration with self-responsibility programs such as environmental management systems (EMS), and controlling records. It was apparent that verifiers could be more creatively utilized in pre-construction preparation, providing feedback of knowledge into assessment of new projects, giving input to the planning and design phase of projects, and performance evaluation. The study confirms the benefits of proponent and regulator follow-up, specifically in having independent verifiers that disclose information, facilitate discussion among stakeholders, are adaptable and proactive, aid in the integration of EIA with other programs, and instill trust in EIA enforcement by conformance evaluation. Overall, the study provides insight on how to harness the learning opportunities

Trust, but verify - Accuracy of clinical commercial radiation Treatment Planning Systems

Science.gov (United States)

Lehmann, J.; Kenny, J.; Lye, J.; Dunn, L.; Williams, I.

2014-03-01

Computer based Treatment Planning Systems (TPS) are used worldwide to design and calculate treatment plans for treating radiation therapy patients. TPS are generally well designed and thoroughly tested by their developers and local physicists prior to clinical use. However, the wide-reaching impact of their accuracy warrants ongoing vigilance. This work reviews the findings of the Australian national audit system and provides recommendations for checks of TPS. The Australian Clinical Dosimetry Service (ACDS) has designed and implemented a national system of audits, currently in a three year test phase. The Level III audits verify the accuracy of a beam model of a facility's TPS through a comparison of measurements with calculation at selected points in an anthropomorphic phantom. The plans are prescribed by the ACDS and all measurement equipment is brought in for independent onsite measurements. In this first version of audits, plans are comparatively simple, involving asymmetric fields, wedges and inhomogeneities. The ACDS has performed 14 Level III audits to-date. Six audits returned at least one measurement at Action Level, indicating that the measured dose differed more than 3.3% (but less than 5%) from the planned dose. Two audits failed (difference >5%). One fail was caused by a data transmission error coupled with quality assurance (QA) not being performed. The second fail was investigated and reduced to Action Level with the onsite audit team finding phantom setup at treatment a contributing factor. The Action Level results are attributed to small dose calculation deviations within the TPS, which are investigated and corrected by the facilities. Small deviations exist in clinical TPS which can add up and can combine with output variations to result in unacceptable variations. Ongoing checks and independent audits are recommended.

CENRTC Project No. 2F3EOA, OCB A-372, acceptance test procedure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Akerson, A.W.

1995-01-01

This test procedure provides the steps necessary to verify correct functional operation of controls, annunciators, alarms, protective relays and related systems impacted by CENRTC No. 2F3EOA, Microwave Transfer Trip Project, modification work performed under work package 6B-93-00038/M (CENRTC 2F3EOA MWTT OCB A-372 PACKAGE)

Friction correction for model ship resistance and propulsion tests in ice at NRC's OCRE-RC

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Michael Lau

2018-05-01

Full Text Available This paper documents the result of a preliminary analysis on the influence of hull-ice friction coefficient on model resistance and power predictions and their correlation to full-scale measurements. The study is based on previous model-scale/full-scale correlations performed on the National Research Council - Ocean, Coastal, and River Engineering Research Center's (NRC/OCRE-RC model test data. There are two objectives for the current study: (1 to validate NRC/OCRE-RC's modeling standards in regarding to its practice of specifying a CFC (Correlation Friction Coefficient of 0.05 for all its ship models; and (2 to develop a correction methodology for its resistance and propulsion predictions when the model is prepared with an ice friction coefficient slightly deviated from the CFC of 0.05. The mean CFC of 0.056 and 0.050 for perfect correlation as computed from the resistance and power analysis, respectively, have justified NRC/OCRE-RC's selection of 0.05 for the CFC of all its models. Furthermore, a procedure for minor friction corrections is developed. Keywords: Model test, Ice resistance, Power, Friction correction, Correlation friction coefficient

Unclassified Source Term and Radionuclide Data for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Farnham, Irene

2005-09-01

Frenchman Flat is one of several areas of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). These nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the Frenchman Flat underground test areas. Since 1996, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) has regulated NNSA/NSO corrective actions through the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' ([FFACO], 1996). Appendix VI of the FFACO agreement, ''Corrective Action Strategy'', was revised on December 7, 2000, and describes the processes that will be used to complete corrective actions, including those in the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project. The individual locations covered by the agreement are known as corrective action sites (CASs), which are grouped into corrective action units (CAUs). The UGTA CASs are grouped geographically into five CAUs: Frenchman Flat, Central Pahute Mesa, Western Pahute Mesa, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, and Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (Figure 1-1). These CAUs have distinctly different contaminant source, geologic, and hydrogeologic characteristics related to their location (FFACO, 1996). The Frenchman Flat CAU consists of 10 CASs located in the northern part of Area 5 and the southern part of Area 11 (Figure 1-1). This report documents the evaluation of the information and data available on the unclassified source term and radionuclide contamination for Frenchman Flat, CAU 98. The methodology used to estimate hydrologic source terms (HSTs) for the Frenchman Flat CAU is also documented. The HST of an underground nuclear test is the portion of the total inventory of radionuclides that is released over time into the groundwater following the test. The total residual inventory

Wall Correction Model for Wind Tunnels with Open Test Section

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Sørensen, Jens Nørkær; Shen, Wen Zhong; Mikkelsen, Robert Flemming

2004-01-01

, the corrections from the model are in very good agreement with the CFD computaions, demonstrating that one-dimensional momentum theory is a reliable way of predicting corrections for wall interference in wind tunnels with closed as well as open cross sections. Keywords: Wind tunnel correction, momentum theory...

49 CFR 40.203 - What problems cause a drug test to be cancelled unless they are corrected?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false What problems cause a drug test to be cancelled unless they are corrected? 40.203 Section 40.203 Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation PROCEDURES FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAMS Problems in Drug Tests § 40.203...

CENRTC Project number-sign 2F3EOA, OCB A-386, acceptance test procedure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Akerson, A.W.

1995-01-01

This test procedure provides the steps necessary to verify correct functional operation of controls, annunciators, alarms, protective relays and related systems impacted by CENRTC number-sign 2F3EOA, Microwave Transfer Trip Project, modification work performed under work package 6B-93-00043/M (CENRTC 2F3EOA MWTT OCB A-386 PACKAGE). This procedure separates four tests into separate sections: Energization of A-386 Duplex Panel and Circuits; Local RFL 6750 function tests and start-up; SCADA tests; and A-386 local trip tests

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Campbell, K.B.

2001-11-01

This Closure Report provides the documentation for closure of the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417. The CNTA is located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, approximately 22.5 kilometers (14 miles) west of U.S. State Highway 6 near the Moores Station historical site, and approximately 137 kilometers (85 miles) northeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CNTA consists of three separate land withdrawal areas commonly referred to as UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4, all of which are accessible to the public. A nuclear device for Project Faultless was detonated approximately 975 meters (3,200 feet) below ground surface on January 19, 1968, in emplacement boring UC-1 (Department of Energy, Nevada Operation Office [DOE/NV], 1997). CAU 417 consists of 34 Corrective Action Sites (CASs). Site closure was completed using a Nevada Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP) approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (DOE/NV, 2000) which was based on the recommendations presented in the NDEP-approved Corrective Action Decision Document (DOE/NV, 1999). Closure of CAU 417 was completed in two phases. Phase I field activities were completed with NDEP concurrence during 1999 as outlined in the Phase I Work Plan, Appendix A of the CAP (DOE/NV, 2000), and as summarized in Section 2.1.2 of this document

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobiason, D. S.

2002-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for the Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps (CWD), Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order [FFACO] (FFACO, 1996) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 143: Area 25, Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 143 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-23-09 CWD No.1, and 25-23-03 CWD No.2. The Area 25 CWDs are historic disposal units within the Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD), and Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) compounds located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The R-MAD and E-MAD facilities originally supported a portion of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Area 25 of the NTS. CWD No.1 CAS 25-23-09 received solid radioactive waste from the R-MAD Compound (East Trestle and West Trench Berms) and 25-23-03 CWD No.2 received solid radioactive waste from the E-MAD Compound (E-MAD Trench)

USCIS E-Verify Self-Check

Data.gov (United States)

Department of Homeland Security — E-Verify is an internet based system that contains datasets to compare information from an employee's Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to data from the...

A Finite Equivalence of Verifiable Multi-secret Sharing

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Hui Zhao

2012-02-01

Full Text Available We give an abstraction of verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. This abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus by using an equational theory which characterizes the cryptographic semantics of secret share. We also present an encoding from the equational theory into a convergent rewriting system, which is suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif. Based on that, we verify the threshold certificate protocol in ProVerif.

USCIS E-Verify Customer Satisfaction Survey, January 2013

Data.gov (United States)

Department of Homeland Security — This report focuses on the customer satisfaction of companies currently enrolled in the E-Verify program. Satisfaction with E-Verify remains high and follows up a...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2003-07-16

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 322, Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 322 consists of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 01-25-01, AST Release (Area 1); 03-25-03, Mud Plant AST Diesel Release (Area 3); 03-20-05, Injection Wells (Area 3). Corrective Action Unit 322 is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. The investigation of three CASs in CAU 322 will determine if hazardous and/or radioactive constituents are present at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. B. Campbell

2003-03-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 425 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 386 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 425 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS). CAS 09-08-001-TA09 consisted of a large pile of concrete rubble from the original Hard Target and construction debris associated with the Tornado Rocket Sled Tests. CAU 425 was closed in accordance with the FFACO and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection-approved Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2002). CAU 425 was closed by implementing the following corrective actions: The approved corrective action for this unit was clean closure. Closure activities included: (1) Removal of all the debris from the site. (2) Weighing each load of debris leaving the job site. (3) Transporting the debris to the U.S. Air Force Construction Landfill for disposal. (4) Placing the radioactive material in a U.S. Department of Transportation approved container for proper transport and disposal. (5) Transporting the radioactive material to the Nevada Test Site for disposal. (6) Regrading the job site to its approximate original contours/elevation.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 145: Wells and Storage Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0, with ROTC No. 1 and Addendum

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David Strand

2006-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 145, Wells and Storage Holes in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 145 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 03-20-01, Core Storage Holes; (2) 03-20-02, Decon Pad and Sump; (3) 03-20-04, Injection Wells; (4) 03-20-08, Injection Well; (5) 03-25-01, Oil Spills; and (6) 03-99-13, Drain and Injection Well. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for the six CASs within CAU 145. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from August 1, 2005, through November 8, 2005, as set forth in the CAU 145 Corrective Action Investigation Plan and Record of Technical Change No. 1. Analytes detected during the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) were evaluated against appropriate final action levels to identify the contaminants of concern for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified contaminants of concern at one of the six CASs in CAU 145 and required the evaluation of corrective action alternatives. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 145 revealed the following: CASs 03-20-01, 03-20-02, 03-20-04, 03-20-08, and 03-99-13 do not contain contamination; and CAS 03-25-01 has pentachlorophenol and arsenic contamination in the subsurface soils. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the six CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential corrective action alternatives, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 145. No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-20-01, 03-20-02, 03-20-04, 03-20-08, and 03-99-13. Close in place is the preferred corrective action

2012 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2013-04-01

The Central Nevada Test Area was the site of a 0.2- to 1-megaton underground nuclear test in 1968. The surface of the site has been closed, but the subsurface is still in the corrective action process. The corrective action alternative selected for the site was monitoring with institutional controls. Annual sampling and hydraulic head monitoring are conducted as part of the subsurface corrective action strategy. The site is currently in the fourth year of the 5-year proof-of-concept period that is intended to validate the compliance boundary. Analytical results from the 2012 monitoring are consistent with those of previous years. Tritium remains at levels below the laboratory minimum detectable concentration in all wells in the monitoring network. Samples collected from reentry well UC-1-P-2SR, which is not in the monitoring network but was sampled as part of supplemental activities conducted during the 2012 monitoring, indicate concentrations of tritium that are consistent with previous sampling results. This well was drilled into the chimney shortly after the detonation, and water levels continue to rise, demonstrating the very low permeability of the volcanic rocks. Water level data from new wells MV-4 and MV-5 and recompleted well HTH-1RC indicate that hydraulic heads are still recovering from installation and testing. Data from wells MV-4 and MV-5 also indicate that head levels have not yet recovered from the 2011 sampling event during which several thousand gallons of water were purged. It has been recommended that a low-flow sampling method be adopted for these wells to allow head levels to recover to steady-state conditions. Despite the lack of steady-state groundwater conditions, hydraulic head data collected from alluvial wells installed in 2009 continue to support the conceptual model that the southeast-bounding graben fault acts as a barrier to groundwater flow at the site.

Another method of dead time correction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sabol, J.

1988-01-01

A new method of the correction of counting losses caused by a non-extended dead time of pulse detection systems is presented. The approach is based on the distribution of time intervals between pulses at the output of the system. The method was verified both experimentally and by using the Monte Carlo simulations. The results show that the suggested technique is more reliable and accurate than other methods based on a separate measurement of the dead time. (author) 5 refs

Test stand for non-uniformity correction of microbolometer focal plane arrays used in thermal cameras

Science.gov (United States)

Krupiński, Michał; Bareła, Jaroslaw; Firmanty, Krzysztof; Kastek, Mariusz

2013-10-01

Uneven response of particular detectors (pixels) to the same incident power of infrared radiation is an inherent feature of microbolometer focal plane arrays. As a result an image degradation occurs, known as Fixed Pattern Noise (FPN), which distorts the thermal representation of an observed scene and impairs the parameters of a thermal camera. In order to compensate such non-uniformity, several NUC correction methods are applied in digital data processing modules implemented in thermal cameras. Coefficients required to perform the non-uniformity correction procedure (NUC coefficients) are determined by calibrating the camera against uniform radiation sources (blackbodies). Non-uniformity correction is performed in a digital processing unit in order to remove FPN pattern in the registered thermal images. Relevant correction coefficients are calculated on the basis of recorded detector responses to several values of radiant flux emitted from reference IR radiation sources (blackbodies). The measurement of correction coefficients requires specialized setup, in which uniform, extended radiation sources with high temperature stability are one of key elements. Measurement stand for NUC correction developed in Institute of Optoelectronics, MUT, comprises two integrated extended blackbodies with the following specifications: area 200×200 mm, stabilized absolute temperature range +15 °C÷100 °C, and uniformity of temperature distribution across entire surface +/-0.014 °C. Test stand, method used for the measurement of NUC coefficients and the results obtained during the measurements conducted on a prototype thermal camera will be presented in the paper.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 511: Waste Dumps (Piles and Debris) Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pastor, Laura

2005-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 511, Waste Dumps (Piles & Debris). The CAU is comprised of nine corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 4, 6, 7, 18, and 19 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 511 is comprised of nine CASs: (1) 03-08-02, Waste Dump (Piles & Debris); (2) 03-99-11, Waste Dump (Piles); (3) 03-99-12, Waste Dump (Piles & Debris); (4) 04-99-04, Contaminated Trench/Berm; (5) 06-16-01, Waste Dump (Piles & Debris); (6) 06-17-02, Scattered Ordnance/Automatic Weapons Range; (7) 07-08-01, Contaminated Mound; (8) 18-99-10, Ammunition Dump; and (9) 19-19-03, Waste Dump (Piles & Debris). The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 511 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) and closure activities were performed from January 2005 through August 2005, as set forth in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 511: Waste Dumps (Piles & Debris)'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004) and Record of Technical Change No. 1. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 511 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the data quality objective data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate preliminary

Analyser Framework to Verify Software Components

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rolf Andreas Rasenack

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Today, it is important for software companies to build software systems in a short time-interval, to reduce costs and to have a good market position. Therefore well organized and systematic development approaches are required. Reusing software components, which are well tested, can be a good solution to develop software applications in effective manner. The reuse of software components is less expensive and less time consuming than a development from scratch. But it is dangerous to think that software components can be match together without any problems. Software components itself are well tested, of course, but even if they composed together problems occur. Most problems are based on interaction respectively communication. Avoiding such errors a framework has to be developed for analysing software components. That framework determines the compatibility of corresponding software components. The promising approach discussed here, presents a novel technique for analysing software components by applying an Abstract Syntax Language Tree (ASLT. A supportive environment will be designed that checks the compatibility of black-box software components. This article is concerned to the question how can be coupled software components verified by using an analyzer framework and determines the usage of the ASLT. Black-box Software Components and Abstract Syntax Language Tree are the basis for developing the proposed framework and are discussed here to provide the background knowledge. The practical implementation of this framework is discussed and shows the result by using a test environment.

Relap5/mod2 post-test calculation of a loss of feedwater experiment at the Pactel test facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Protze, M. [Siemens-KWU, Erlangen (Germany)

1995-12-31

Post-test calculations for verification purposes of the thermal hydraulic code RELAP5/MOD2 are of fundamental importance for the licensing procedure. The RELAP5/MOD2 code has a large international assessment base regarding western PWR. WWER-reactors are russian designed PWRs with some specific differences compared with the western PWR`s, especially the horizontal steam generators. For that reason some post-test calculations have to be performed to verify the RELAP5/MOD2 code for these WWER typical phenomena. The impact of the horizontal steam generators on the accident behaviour during transients or pipe ruptures on the secondary side is significant. The nodalization of the test facility PACTEL was chosen equally to WWER plant nodalization to verify the use of a coarse modelling of the steam generator secondary side for analyses of transient with decreasing water level in the SG secondary side. The calculational results showed a good compliance to the test results, demonstrating the correct use of a coarse nodalization. To sum up, the RELAP5/ MOD2 results met the test results appropriately thereby the RELAP5/ MOD2 code is validated for analyses of transients with decreasing water level in a horizontal steam generator secondary side. (orig.). 4 refs.

Relap5/mod2 post-test calculation of a loss of feedwater experiment at the Pactel test facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Protze, M [Siemens-KWU, Erlangen (Germany)

1996-12-31

Post-test calculations for verification purposes of the thermal hydraulic code RELAP5/MOD2 are of fundamental importance for the licensing procedure. The RELAP5/MOD2 code has a large international assessment base regarding western PWR. WWER-reactors are russian designed PWRs with some specific differences compared with the western PWR`s, especially the horizontal steam generators. For that reason some post-test calculations have to be performed to verify the RELAP5/MOD2 code for these WWER typical phenomena. The impact of the horizontal steam generators on the accident behaviour during transients or pipe ruptures on the secondary side is significant. The nodalization of the test facility PACTEL was chosen equally to WWER plant nodalization to verify the use of a coarse modelling of the steam generator secondary side for analyses of transient with decreasing water level in the SG secondary side. The calculational results showed a good compliance to the test results, demonstrating the correct use of a coarse nodalization. To sum up, the RELAP5/ MOD2 results met the test results appropriately thereby the RELAP5/ MOD2 code is validated for analyses of transients with decreasing water level in a horizontal steam generator secondary side. (orig.). 4 refs.

Trust, but verify – accuracy of clinical commercial radiation treatment planning systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lehmann, J; Kenny, J; Lye, J; Dunn, L; Williams, I

2014-01-01

Computer based Treatment Planning Systems (TPS) are used worldwide to design and calculate treatment plans for treating radiation therapy patients. TPS are generally well designed and thoroughly tested by their developers and local physicists prior to clinical use. However, the wide-reaching impact of their accuracy warrants ongoing vigilance. This work reviews the findings of the Australian national audit system and provides recommendations for checks of TPS. The Australian Clinical Dosimetry Service (ACDS) has designed and implemented a national system of audits, currently in a three year test phase. The Level III audits verify the accuracy of a beam model of a facility's TPS through a comparison of measurements with calculation at selected points in an anthropomorphic phantom. The plans are prescribed by the ACDS and all measurement equipment is brought in for independent onsite measurements. In this first version of audits, plans are comparatively simple, involving asymmetric fields, wedges and inhomogeneities. The ACDS has performed 14 Level III audits to-date. Six audits returned at least one measurement at Action Level, indicating that the measured dose differed more than 3.3% (but less than 5%) from the planned dose. Two audits failed (difference >5%). One fail was caused by a data transmission error coupled with quality assurance (QA) not being performed. The second fail was investigated and reduced to Action Level with the onsite audit team finding phantom setup at treatment a contributing factor. The Action Level results are attributed to small dose calculation deviations within the TPS, which are investigated and corrected by the facilities. Small deviations exist in clinical TPS which can add up and can combine with output variations to result in unacceptable variations. Ongoing checks and independent audits are recommended.

Acceptance test procedure for SY Tank Farm replacement exhauster unit

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Becken, G.W.

1994-12-16

The proper functioning of a new 241-SY Tank Farm replacement exhauster will be acceptance tested, to establish operability and to provide an operational baseline for the equipment. During this test, a verification of all of the alarm and control circuits associated with the exhaust, which provide operating controls and/or signals to local and remote alarm/annunciator panels, shall be performed. Test signals for sensors that provide alarms, warnings, and/or interlocks will be applied to verify that alarm, warning, and interlock setpoints are correct. Alarm and warning lights, controls, and local and remote readouts for the exhauster will be verified to be adequate for proper operation of the exhauster. Testing per this procedure shall be conducted in two phases. The first phase of testing, to verify alarm, warning, and interlock setpoints primarily, will be performed in the MO-566 Fab Shop. The second phase of testing, to verify proper operation and acceptable interface with other tank farm systems, will be conducted after the exhauster and all associated support and monitoring equipment have been installed in the SY Tank Farm. The exhauster, which is mounted on a skid and which will eventually be located in the SY tank farm, receives input signals from a variety of sensors mounted on the skid and associated equipment. These sensors provide information such as: exhauster system inlet vacuum pressure; prefilter and HEPA filter differential pressures; exhaust stack sampler status; exhaust fan status; system status (running/shut down); and radiation monitoring systems status. The output of these sensors is transmitted to the exhauster annunciator panel where the signals are displayed and monitored for out-of-specification conditions.

Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2008-04-01

This report presents the 2007 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. Requirements for CAU 443 are specified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada and includes groundwater monitoring in support of site closure. This is the first groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA The CNTA is located north of U.S. Highway 6, approximately 30 miles north of Warm Springs in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). Three emplacement boreholes, UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4, were drilled at the CNTA for underground nuclear weapons testing. The initial underground nuclear test, Project Faultless, was conducted in borehole UC-1 at a depth of 3,199 feet (ft) (975 meters) below ground surface on January 19, 1968. The yield of the Project Faultless test was estimated to be 0.2 to 1 megaton (DOE 2004). The test resulted in a down-dropped fault block visible at land surface (Figure 2). No further testing was conducted at the CNTA, and the site was decommissioned as a testing facility in 1973.

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 contaminated waste dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1 (with Record of Technical Change No. 1 and 2)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

USDOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV)

1999-06-28

This plan contains the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate correction action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 143 consists of two waste dumps used for the disposal of solid radioactive wastes. Contaminated Waste Dump No.1 (CAS 25-23-09) was used for wastes generated at the Reactor Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (R-MAD) Facility and Contaminated Waste Dump No.2 (CAS 25-23-03) was used for wastes generated at the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility. Both the R-MAD and E-MAD facilities are located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site. Based on site history, radionuclides are the primary constituent of concern and are located in these disposal areas; vertical and lateral migration of the radionuclides is unlikely; and if migration has occurred it will be limited to the soil beneath the Contaminated Waste Disposal Dumps. The proposed investigation will involve a combination of Cone Penetrometer Testing within and near the solid waste disposal dumps, field analysis for radionuclides and volatile organic compounds, as well as sample collection from the waste dumps and surrounding areas for off-site chemical, radiological, and geotechnical analyses. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

Phase II Transport Model of Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gregg Ruskuaff

2010-01-01

This document, the Phase II Frenchman Flat transport report, presents the results of radionuclide transport simulations that incorporate groundwater radionuclide transport model statistical and structural uncertainty, and lead to forecasts of the contaminant boundary (CB) for a set of representative models from an ensemble of possible models. This work, as described in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) strategy (FFACO, 1996; amended 2010), forms an essential part of the technical basis for subsequent negotiation of the compliance boundary of the Frenchman Flat corrective action unit (CAU) by Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Underground nuclear testing via deep vertical shafts was conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) from 1951 until 1992. The Frenchman Flat area, the subject of this report, was used for seven years, with 10 underground nuclear tests being conducted. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA/NSO initiated the UGTA Project to assess and evaluate the effects of underground nuclear tests on groundwater at the NTS and vicinity through the FFACO (1996, amended 2010). The processes that will be used to complete UGTA corrective actions are described in the “Corrective Action Strategy” in the FFACO Appendix VI, Revision No. 2 (February 20, 2008).

The Comparative Effect of Online Self-Correction, Peer- correction, and Teacher Correction in Descriptive Writing Tasks on Intermediate EFL Learners’ Grammar Knowledge The Prospect of Mobile Assisted Language Learning (MALL

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mojtaba Aghajani

2018-05-01

Full Text Available 60 participants of the study were selected based on their scores on the Nelson proficiency test and divided into three Telegram groups comprising a peer-correction, a self-correction and a teacher-correction group, each with 20 students. The pretest was administered to measure the subjects' grammar knowledge. Subsequently, three Telegram groups each with 21 members (20 students + 1 teacher were formed. Then during a course of nearly one academic term the grammatical notions were taught by the teacher. The members were required to write on the prompt in about 50 to 70 words and post it on the group. Then, their writings were corrected through self-correction, peer-correction and teacher-correction under the feedback provided by the researcher. The study used a pretest-posttest design to compare the learners’ progress after the application of three different types of treatment. One-Way between-groups ANOVA was run to test whether there was any statistically significant difference in grammar knowledge in descriptive writing of intermediate EFL learners’ who receive mobile-assisted self-correction, peer-correction and teacher-correction. The researcher also used Post-Hoc Tests to determine the exact difference between correction methods. Online self-correction, peer-correction and teacher-correction were the independent variables and grammar knowledge was the dependent variable. Examining the result of the study prove that significance level between self-correction and teacher-correction was the strongest (sig. = 0.000 but the significance level was a little less strong between peer-correction and teacher-correction whereas no significance was observed between self-correction and peer-correction.

C-106 tank process ventilation test

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bailey, J.W.

1998-01-01

the equipment was not correct for that type of operation. To correct this problem an ECN was generated against the design documents, the equipment modified accordingly, and the ATP re-performed. The last type of problem was where the equipment operated per the direct ions in the ATP, agreed with the design documents, yet violated requirements of the Basis of Interim Operation (BIO). In this instance a Non Conformance Report (NCR) was generated. To correct problems documented on an NCR, an ECN was generated to modify the design and field work performed, followed by retesting to verify modifications corrected noted deficiencies. To expedite the completion of testing and maintain project schedules, testing was performed concurrent with construct on, calibrations and the performance of other ATP's

Test documentation for the GENII Software Version 1.485

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rittmann, P.D.

1994-01-01

Version 1.485 of the GENII software was released by the PNL GENII custodian in December of 1990. At that time the WHC GENII custodian performed several tests to verify that the advertised revisions were indeed present and that these changes had not introduced errors in the calculations normally done by WHC. These tests were not documented at that time. The purpose of this document is to summarize suitable acceptance tests of GENII and compare them with a few hand calculations. The testing is not as thorough as that used by the PNL GENII Custodian, but is sufficient to establish that the GENII program appears to work correctly on WHC managed personal computers

Error prevention in radiotherapy treatments using a record and verify system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Navarrete Campos, S.; Hernandez Vitoria, A.; Canellas Anoz, M.; Millan Cebrian, E.; Garcia Romero, A.

2001-01-01

Computerized record-and-verify systems (RVS) are being used increasingly to improve the precision of radiotherapy treatments. With the introduction of new treatment devices, such as multileaf or asymmetric collimators and virtual wedges, the responsibility to ensure correct treatment has increased. The purpose of this paper is to present the method that we are following to prevent some potential radiotherapy errors and to point out some errors that can be easily detected using a RVS, through a check of the daily recorded treatment information. We conclude that a RVS prevents the occurrence of many errors, when the settings of the treatment machine do not match the intended parameters within some maximal authorized deviation, and allows to detect easily other potential errors related with a incorrect selection of the treatment patient data. A quality assurance program, including a check of all beam data and a weekly control of the manual and electronic chart, has helped reduce errors. (author)

Verifying the functional ability of microstructured surfaces by model-based testing

Science.gov (United States)

Hartmann, Wito; Weckenmann, Albert

2014-09-01

Micro- and nanotechnology enables the use of new product features such as improved light absorption, self-cleaning or protection, which are based, on the one hand, on the size of functional nanostructures and the other hand, on material-specific properties. With the need to reliably measure progressively smaller geometric features, coordinate and surface-measuring instruments have been refined and now allow high-resolution topography and structure measurements down to the sub-nanometre range. Nevertheless, in many cases it is not possible to make a clear statement about the functional ability of the workpiece or its topography because conventional concepts of dimensioning and tolerancing are solely geometry oriented and standardized surface parameters are not sufficient to consider interaction with non-geometric parameters, which are dominant for functions such as sliding, wetting, sealing and optical reflection. To verify the functional ability of microstructured surfaces, a method was developed based on a parameterized mathematical-physical model of the function. From this model, function-related properties can be identified and geometric parameters can be derived, which may be different for the manufacturing and verification processes. With this method it is possible to optimize the definition of the shape of the workpiece regarding the intended function by applying theoretical and experimental knowledge, as well as modelling and simulation. Advantages of this approach will be discussed and demonstrated by the example of a microstructured inking roll.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al Wickline

2007-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 553 are located within Areas 19 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site. Corrective Action Unit 553 is comprised of the following CASs: 19-99-01, Mud Spill 19-99-11, Mud Spill 20-09-09, Mud Spill 20-99-03, Mud Spill. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 553 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were or will be performed: Review the current site conditions including the concentration and extent of contamination. Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. Document the Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 553 to be issued by Nevada Division of Environmental Protection

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision No. 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2003-10-17

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the NTS, CAU 140 consists of nine corrective action sites (CASs). Investigation activities were performed from November 13 through December 11, 2002, with additional sampling to delineate the extent of contaminants of concern (COCs) conducted on February 4 and March 18 and 19, 2003. Results obtained from the investigation activities and sampling indicated that only 3 of the 9 CASs at CAU 140 had COCs identified. Following a review of existing data, future land use, and current operations at the NTS, the following preferred alternatives were developed for consideration: (1) No Further Action - six CASs (05-08-02, 05-17-01, 05-19-01, 05-35-01, 05-99-04, and 22-99-04); (2) Clean Closure - one CAS (05-08-01), and (3) Closure-in-Place - two CASs (05-23-01 and 23-17-01). These alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. Additionally, the alternatives meet all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated media at CAU 140.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 124, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with Errata Sheet, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alfred Wickline

2008-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 124, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This report complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996; as amended January 2007). This CR provides documentation and justification for the closure of CAU 124 without further corrective action. This justification is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 124: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The SAFER Plan provides information relating to site history as well as the scope and planning of the investigation. Therefore, this information will not be repeated in this CR.

Reasoning about knowledge: Children's evaluations of generality and verifiability.

Science.gov (United States)

Koenig, Melissa A; Cole, Caitlin A; Meyer, Meredith; Ridge, Katherine E; Kushnir, Tamar; Gelman, Susan A

2015-12-01

In a series of experiments, we examined 3- to 8-year-old children's (N=223) and adults' (N=32) use of two properties of testimony to estimate a speaker's knowledge: generality and verifiability. Participants were presented with a "Generic speaker" who made a series of 4 general claims about "pangolins" (a novel animal kind), and a "Specific speaker" who made a series of 4 specific claims about "this pangolin" as an individual. To investigate the role of verifiability, we systematically varied whether the claim referred to a perceptually-obvious feature visible in a picture (e.g., "has a pointy nose") or a non-evident feature that was not visible (e.g., "sleeps in a hollow tree"). Three main findings emerged: (1) young children showed a pronounced reliance on verifiability that decreased with age. Three-year-old children were especially prone to credit knowledge to speakers who made verifiable claims, whereas 7- to 8-year-olds and adults credited knowledge to generic speakers regardless of whether the claims were verifiable; (2) children's attributions of knowledge to generic speakers was not detectable until age 5, and only when those claims were also verifiable; (3) children often generalized speakers' knowledge outside of the pangolin domain, indicating a belief that a person's knowledge about pangolins likely extends to new facts. Findings indicate that young children may be inclined to doubt speakers who make claims they cannot verify themselves, as well as a developmentally increasing appreciation for speakers who make general claims. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Robust Approach to Verifying the Weak Form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis

Science.gov (United States)

Střelec, Luboš

2011-09-01

The weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis states that prices incorporate only past information about the asset. An implication of this form of the efficient markets hypothesis is that one cannot detect mispriced assets and consistently outperform the market through technical analysis of past prices. One of possible formulations of the efficient market hypothesis used for weak form tests is that share prices follow a random walk. It means that returns are realizations of IID sequence of random variables. Consequently, for verifying the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis, we can use distribution tests, among others, i.e. some tests of normality and/or some graphical methods. Many procedures for testing the normality of univariate samples have been proposed in the literature [7]. Today the most popular omnibus test of normality for a general use is the Shapiro-Wilk test. The Jarque-Bera test is the most widely adopted omnibus test of normality in econometrics and related fields. In particular, the Jarque-Bera test (i.e. test based on the classical measures of skewness and kurtosis) is frequently used when one is more concerned about heavy-tailed alternatives. As these measures are based on moments of the data, this test has a zero breakdown value [2]. In other words, a single outlier can make the test worthless. The reason so many classical procedures are nonrobust to outliers is that the parameters of the model are expressed in terms of moments, and their classical estimators are expressed in terms of sample moments, which are very sensitive to outliers. Another approach to robustness is to concentrate on the parameters of interest suggested by the problem under this study. Consequently, novel robust testing procedures of testing normality are presented in this paper to overcome shortcomings of classical normality tests in the field of financial data, which are typical with occurrence of remote data points and additional types of deviations from

Corrective action plan for CAU No. 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-07-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides the selected corrective action alternative and proposes the closure implementation methodology for the Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench Corrective Action Unit (CAU) No. 404. The site is located on the Tonopah Test Range. CAU 404 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CAS): the Roller Coaster Lagoons (CAS No TA-03-001-TA-RC) and the North Disposal Trench (CAS No TA-21-001-TA-RC). A site map of the lagoons and trench is provided. The Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons are comprised of two unlined lagoons that received liquid sanitary waste in 1963 from the Operation Roller Coaster Man Camp and debris from subsequent construction and range cleanup activities. The North Disposal Trench was excavated in approximately 1963 and received solid waste and debris from the man camp and subsequent construction and range cleanup activities. A small hydrocarbon spill occurred during the 1995 Voluntary Corrective Action (VCA) activities in an area associated with the North Disposal Trench CAS.

Corrective action plan for CAU No. 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-07-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides the selected corrective action alternative and proposes the closure implementation methodology for the Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench Corrective Action Unit (CAU) No. 404. The site is located on the Tonopah Test Range. CAU 404 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CAS): the Roller Coaster Lagoons (CAS No TA-03-001-TA-RC) and the North Disposal Trench (CAS No TA-21-001-TA-RC). A site map of the lagoons and trench is provided. The Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons are comprised of two unlined lagoons that received liquid sanitary waste in 1963 from the Operation Roller Coaster Man Camp and debris from subsequent construction and range cleanup activities. The North Disposal Trench was excavated in approximately 1963 and received solid waste and debris from the man camp and subsequent construction and range cleanup activities. A small hydrocarbon spill occurred during the 1995 Voluntary Corrective Action (VCA) activities in an area associated with the North Disposal Trench CAS

Error Correction of Measured Unstructured Road Profiles Based on Accelerometer and Gyroscope Data

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jinhua Han

2017-01-01

Full Text Available This paper describes a noncontact acquisition system composed of several time synchronized laser height sensors, accelerometers, gyroscope, and so forth in order to collect the road profiles of vehicle riding on the unstructured roads. A method of correcting road profiles based on the accelerometer and gyroscope data is proposed to eliminate the adverse impacts of vehicle vibration and attitudes change. Because the power spectral density (PSD of gyro attitudes concentrates in the low frequency band, a method called frequency division is presented to divide the road profiles into two parts: high frequency part and low frequency part. The vibration error of road profiles is corrected by displacement data obtained through two times integration of measured acceleration data. After building the mathematical model between gyro attitudes and road profiles, the gyro attitudes signals are separated from low frequency road profile by the method of sliding block overlap based on correlation analysis. The accuracy and limitations of the system have been analyzed, and its validity has been verified by implementing the system on wheeled equipment for road profiles’ measuring of vehicle testing ground. The paper offers an accurate and practical approach to obtaining unstructured road profiles for road simulation test.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert

2004-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 322, Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 322 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 01-25-01 - AST Release Site; (2) 03-25-03 - Mud Plant and AST Diesel Release; and (3) 03-20-05 - Injection Wells and BOP Shop. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 322. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from April 2004 through September 2004, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: (1) Determine if contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent; and (3) Provide sufficient information and data to recommend appropriate corrective actions for the CASs. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against appropriate preliminary action levels to identify contaminants of concern for each corrective action site. Radiological field measurements were compared to unrestricted release criteria. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities revealed the following: (1) CAS 01-25-01 contains an AST berm contaminated with total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) diesel-range organics (DRO). (2) CAS 03-25-03 includes two distinct areas: Area A where no contamination remains from a potential spill associated with an AST, and Area B where TPH-DRO contamination associated with various activities at the mud plant was identified. The Area B contamination was found at various locations and depths. (3) CAS 03-25-03 Area B contains TPH-DRO contamination at various locations and

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boehlecke, Robert

2004-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 322, Areas 1 and 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 322 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 01-25-01 - AST Release Site; (2) 03-25-03 - Mud Plant and AST Diesel Release; and (3) 03-20-05 - Injection Wells and BOP Shop. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 322. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from April 2004 through September 2004, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: (1) Determine if contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent; and (3) Provide sufficient information and data to recommend appropriate corrective actions for the CASs. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against appropriate preliminary action levels to identify contaminants of concern for each corrective action site. Radiological field measurements were compared to unrestricted release criteria. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities revealed the following: (1) CAS 01-25-01 contains an AST berm contaminated with total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) diesel-range organics (DRO). (2) CAS 03-25-03 includes two distinct areas: Area A where no contamination remains from a potential spill associated with an AST, and Area B where TPH-DRO contamination associated with various activities at the mud plant was identified. The Area B contamination was found at various locations and depths. (3) CAS 03-25-03 Area B contains TPH-DRO contamination at various

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 383: Area E-Tunnel Sites, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 383, Area 12 E-Tunnel Sites, which is the joint responsibility of DTRA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 383 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and two adjacent areas: • CAS 12-06-06, Muckpile • CAS 12-25-02, Oil Spill • CAS 12-28-02, Radioactive Material • Drainage below the Muckpile • Ponds 1, 2, and 3 The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation to support the recommendation for closure with no further corrective action, by placing use restrictions at the three CASs and two adjacent areas of CAU 383.

Dosimetric tests for treatment planning commissioning in 3DCRT; Testes dosimetricos para comissionamento de sistemas de planejamento em radioterapia 3DCRT

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Goncalves, Leandro R.; Pieri, Karen; Silva, Marco A.; Santos, Gabriela R.; Sales, Camila P.; Rubo, Rodrigo A.; Nakandakari, Marcos V.N.; Cunha, Ana Paula V; Santos, Caroline Z.; Rodrigues, Laura N.; Furnari, Laura, E-mail: leandrorg11@hotmail.com [Universidade de Sao Paulo (USP), SP (Brazil). Hospital das Clinicas. Servico de Radioterapia

2012-12-15

The radiotherapy evolution from 2D treatments to 3D conformal treatments was possible after the advent the treatment planning systems commercially available and tridimensional images techniques like computed tomography. These systems have tools that allow delineate anatomical structures from tomographic images. Calculations dose tools allow the planner evaluate the dose received in the anatomical structures. When these systems are acquired or an upgrade is made many dosimetric and non-dosimetric tests need to be performed to know the system limitations and correct functioning and to verify the correct dosimetric data insertion. This study was based in International Atomic Energy Agency protocols, Task Groups documents from American Association of Physics in Medicine, and other papers. A dosimetric test set was done to commissioning the Eclipse 10.0.28 (Varian Medical Systems) treatments planning system This version has two photon calculation algorithm (Pencil Beam Convolution and Analytical Anisotropic Algorithm – AAA) and Gaussian Pencil Beam algorithm for electron beams. However, tests for AAA it was not performed. In this study was possible to conclude that the dosimetric data was correctly added in the treatment planning system. Some results allowed to understand the algorithm limitations to calculate dose distributions in specifics situations, that was not clinically relevant in our routine. (author)

Post-upgrade testing on a radiotherapy oncology information system with an embedded record and verify system following the IAEA Human Health Report No. 7 recommendations.

Science.gov (United States)

Nyathi, Thulani; Colyer, Christopher; Bhardwaj, Anup Kumar; Rijken, James; Morton, Jason

2016-06-01

Record and verify (R&V) systems have proven that their application in radiotherapy clinics leads to a significant reduction in mis-treatments of patients. The purpose of this technical note is to share our experience of acceptance testing, commissioning and setting up a quality assurance programme for the MOSAIQ® oncology information system and R&V system after upgrading from software version 2.41 to 2.6 in a multi-vendor, multi-site environment. Testing was guided primarily by the IAEA Human Report No. 7 recommendations, but complemented by other departmental workflow specific tests. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time successful implementation of the IAEA Human Health Report Series No. 7 recommendations have been reported in the literature. Copyright © 2016 Associazione Italiana di Fisica Medica. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

MBA acceptance test procedures, software Version 1.4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mullaney, J.E.; Russell, V.K.

1994-01-01

The Mass Balance Program (MBA) is an adjunct to the Materials Accounting database system, Version 3.4. MBA was written to equip the personnel performing K-Basin encapsulation tasks with a conservative estimate of accumulated sludge during the processing of canisters into and out of the chute. The K Basins Materials Balance programs had some minor improvements made to it to feedback the chute processing status to the operator better. This ATP describes how the code was to be tested to verify its correctness

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Patrick Matthews

2010-12-01

Corrective Action Unit 365 comprises one corrective action site (CAS), CAS 08-23-02, U-8d Contamination Area. This site is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for the CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The site will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on July 6, 2010, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for the Baneberry site. The primary release associated with Corrective Action Unit 365 was radiological contamination from the Baneberry nuclear test. Baneberry was an underground weapons-related test that vented significant quantities of radioactive gases from a fissure located in close proximity to ground zero. A crater formed shortly after detonation, which stemmed part of the flow from the fissure. The scope of this investigation includes surface and shallow subsurface (less than 15 feet below ground surface) soils. Radionuclides from the Baneberry test with the potential to impact groundwater are included within the Underground Test Area Subproject. Investigations and corrective actions associated with the Underground Test Area Subproject include the radiological inventory resulting from the Baneberry test.

Research on self-absorption corrections for laboratory γ spectral analysis of soil samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tian Zining; Jia Mingyan; Li Huibin; Cheng Ziwei; Ju Lingjun; Shen Maoquan; Yang Xiaoyan; Yan Ling; Fen Tiancheng

2010-01-01

Based on the calibration results of the point sources,dimensions of HPGe crystal were characterized.Linear attenuation coefficients and detection efficiencies of all kinds of samples were calculated,and the function F(μ) of φ75 mm x 25 mm sample was established. Standard surface source was used to simulate the source of different heights in the soil sample. And the function ε(h) which reflect the relationship between detection efficiencies and heights of the surface sources was determined. The detection efficiency of calibration source can be obtained by integration, F(μ) functions of soil samples established is consistent with the result of MCNP calculation code. Several φ75 mm x 25 mm soil samples were measured by the HPGe spectrometer,and the function F(μ) was used to correct the self absorption. F(μ) functions of soil samples of various dimensions can be calculated by MCNP calculation code established, and self absorption correction can be done. To verify the efficiency of calculation results, φ75 mm x 75 mm soil samples were measured. Several φ75 mm x 25 mm soil samples from aerosphere nuclear testing field was measured by the HPGe spectrometer,and the function F(μ) was used to correct the self absorption. The function F(m) was established, and the technical method which is used to correct the soil samples of unknown area is also given. The correction method of surface source greatly improves the gamma spectrum's metrical accuracy, and it will be widely applied to environmental radioactive investigation. (authors)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fitzmaurice, T. M.

2001-01-01

This closure report (CR) provides documentation for the closure of the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area (RCRSA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 407 identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). CAU 407 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The TTR is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The RCRSA is located on the northeast comer of the intersection of Main Road and Browne's Lake Road, which is approximately 8 km (5 mi) south of Area 3 (Figure 1). The RCRSA was used during May and June of 1963 to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the Double Tracks and Clean Slate tests. Investigation of the RCRSA was conducted from June through November of 1998. A Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOEN], 1999) was approved in October of 1999. The purpose of this CR is to: Document the closure activities as proposed in the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (DOEM, 2000). Obtain a Notice of Completion from the NDEP. Recommend the movement of CAU 407 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO. The following is the scope of the closure actions implemented for CAU 407: Removal and disposal of surface soils which were over three times background for the area. Soils identified for removal were disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Excavated areas were backfilled with clean borrow soil located near the site. A soil cover was constructed over the waste disposal pit area, where subsurface constituents of concern remain. The site was fenced and posted as an ''Underground Radioactive Material'' area

31 CFR 363.14 - How will you verify my identity?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How will you verify my identity? 363... you verify my identity? (a) Individual. When you establish an account, we may use a verification service to verify your identity using information you provide about yourself on the online application. At...

Some Proxy Signature and Designated verifier Signature Schemes over Braid Groups

OpenAIRE

Lal, Sunder; Verma, Vandani

2009-01-01

Braids groups provide an alternative to number theoretic public cryptography and can be implemented quite efficiently. The paper proposes five signature schemes: Proxy Signature, Designated Verifier, Bi-Designated Verifier, Designated Verifier Proxy Signature And Bi-Designated Verifier Proxy Signature scheme based on braid groups. We also discuss the security aspects of each of the proposed schemes.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1 with ROTC 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehlecke, Robert

2004-01-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 140 is located within Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the NTS and is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): 05-08-01, Detonation Pits; 05-08-02, Debris Pits; 05-17-01, Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Buried); 05-19-01, Waste Disposal Site; 05-23-01, Gravel Gertie; 05-35-01, Burn Pit; 05-99-04, Burn Pit; 22-99-04, Radioactive Waste Dump; and 23-17-01, Hazardous Waste Storage Area. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide a rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 140. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from November 13 through December 11, 2002. Additional sampling to delineate the extent of contaminants of concern (COCs) was conducted on February 4 and March 18 and 19, 2003. Corrective action investigation activities were performed as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for CAU 140. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against appropriate preliminary action levels to identify COCs for each CAS. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities revealed the following: (1) CAS 05-08-01 contains the COCs lead and the radioisotope thorium-234 in the surface soil at sample location A05. (2) CAS 05-23-01 did not have any COCs identified during the field investigation; however, based on historical knowledge of activities at this site, the interior of the Gravel Gertie is considered contaminated with uranium. (3) CAS 23-17-01 contains the COC total petroleum hydrocarbons (diesel-range organics) at location J20 at a depth of 9 to 10 feet below ground surface. (4) No COCs were identified at CASs 05-08-02, 05-17-01, 05-19-01, 05

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 477: Area 12 N-Tunnel Muckpile, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 477, N-Tunnel Muckpile. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 477 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): • 12-06-03, Muckpile The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure with no further action, by placing use restrictions on CAU 477.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 476: Area 12 T-Tunnel Muckpile, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 476, Area 12 T-Tunnel Muckpile. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 476 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): • 12-06-02, Muckpile The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with use restrictions for CAU 476.

Correction factor for the experimental prompt neutron decay constant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talamo, Alberto; Gohar, Y.; Sadovich, S.; Kiyavitskaya, H.; Bournos, V.; Fokov, Y.; Routkovskaya, C.

2013-01-01

Highlights: • Definition of a spatial correction factor for the experimental prompt neutron decay constant. • Introduction of a MCNP6 calculation methodology to simulate Rossi-alpha distribution for pulsed neutron sources. • Comparison of MCNP6 results with experimental data for count rate, Rossi-alpha, and Feynman-alpha distributions. • Improvement of the comparison between numerical and experimental results by taking into account the dead-time effect. - Abstract: This study introduces a new correction factor to obtain the experimental effective multiplication factor of subcritical assemblies by the point kinetics formulation. The correction factor is defined as the ratio between the MCNP6 prompt neutron decay constant obtained in criticality mode and the one obtained in source mode. The correction factor mainly takes into account the longer neutron lifetime in the reflector region and the effects of the external neutron source. For the YALINA Thermal facility, the comparison between the experimental and computational effective multiplication factors noticeably improves after the application of the correction factor. The accuracy of the MCNP6 computational model of the YALINA Thermal subcritical assembly has been verified by reproducing the neutron count rate, Rossi-α, and Feynman-α distributions obtained from the experimental data

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (December 2002, Revision No.: 0), Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NSO

2002-12-12

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 204 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) which include: 01-34-01, Underground Instrument House Bunker; 02-34-01, Instrument Bunker; 03-34-01, Underground Bunker; 05-18-02, Chemical Explosives Storage; 05-33-01, Kay Blockhouse; 05-99-02, Explosive Storage Bunker. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for Corrective Action Unit 204 collectively include radionuclides, beryllium, high explosives, lead, polychlorinated biphenyls, total petroleum hydrocarbons, silver, warfarin, and zinc phosphide. The primary question for the investigation is: ''Are existing data sufficient to evaluate appropriate corrective actions?'' To address this question, resolution of two decision statements is required. Decision I is to ''Define the nature of contamination'' by identifying any contamination above preliminary action levels (PALs); Decision II is to ''Determine the extent of contamination identified above PALs. If PALs are not exceeded, the investigation is completed. If PALs are exceeded, then Decision II must be resolved. In addition, data will be obtained to support waste management decisions. Field activities will include radiological land area surveys, geophysical surveys to identify any subsurface metallic and nonmetallic debris, field screening for applicable contaminants of potential concern, collection and analysis of surface and subsurface soil samples from biased locations

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 560: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2010-04-01

Corrective Action Unit 560 comprises seven corrective action sites (CASs): •03-51-01, Leach Pit •06-04-02, Septic Tank •06-05-03, Leach Pit •06-05-04, Leach Bed •06-59-03, Building CP-400 Septic System •06-59-04, Office Trailer Complex Sewage Pond •06-59-05, Control Point Septic System The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 560 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 7, 2008, through February 24, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 560: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, and Record of Technical Change No. 1. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: •Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. •If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. •Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 560 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. The following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: •No contamination exceeding the FALs was identified at CASs 03-51-01, 06-04-02, and 06-59-04. •The soil at the base of the leach pit chamber at CAS 06-05-03 contains arsenic above the FAL of 23 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) above the FAL of 0.74 mg/kg, confined vertically from a depth of approximately 5 to 20 feet (ft) below ground surface. The contamination is confined laterally to the walls of the

Unconditionally verifiable blind quantum computation

Science.gov (United States)

Fitzsimons, Joseph F.; Kashefi, Elham

2017-07-01

Blind quantum computing (BQC) allows a client to have a server carry out a quantum computation for them such that the client's input, output, and computation remain private. A desirable property for any BQC protocol is verification, whereby the client can verify with high probability whether the server has followed the instructions of the protocol or if there has been some deviation resulting in a corrupted output state. A verifiable BQC protocol can be viewed as an interactive proof system leading to consequences for complexity theory. We previously proposed [A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, in Proceedings of the 50th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Atlanta, 2009 (IEEE, Piscataway, 2009), p. 517] a universal and unconditionally secure BQC scheme where the client only needs to be able to prepare single qubits in separable states randomly chosen from a finite set and send them to the server, who has the balance of the required quantum computational resources. In this paper we extend that protocol with additional functionality allowing blind computational basis measurements, which we use to construct another verifiable BQC protocol based on a different class of resource states. We rigorously prove that the probability of failing to detect an incorrect output is exponentially small in a security parameter, while resource overhead remains polynomial in this parameter. This resource state allows entangling gates to be performed between arbitrary pairs of logical qubits with only constant overhead. This is a significant improvement on the original scheme, which required that all computations to be performed must first be put into a nearest-neighbor form, incurring linear overhead in the number of qubits. Such an improvement has important consequences for efficiency and fault-tolerance thresholds.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matthews, Patrick

2016-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the clean closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), located on the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. CAU 412 consists of a release of radionuclides to the surrounding soil from a storage-transportation test conducted on May 25, 1963. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed in April and May 2015, as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objectives process. The CAU 412 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the data needs identified by the data quality objectives process. This CR provides documentation and justification for the clean closure of CAU 412 under the FFACO without further corrective action. This justification is based on historical knowledge of the site, previous site investigations, implementation of the 1997 interim corrective action, and the results of the CAI. The corrective action of clean closure was confirmed as appropriate for closure of CAU 412 based on achievement of the following closure objectives: Radiological contamination at the site is less than the final action level using the ground troops exposure scenario (i.e., the radiological dose is less than the final action level): Removable alpha contamination is less than the high contamination area criterion: No potential source material is present at the site, and any impacted soil associated with potential source material has been removed so that remaining soil contains contaminants at concentrations less than the final action levels: and There is

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2016-08-22

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the clean closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), located on the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. CAU 412 consists of a release of radionuclides to the surrounding soil from a storage–transportation test conducted on May 25, 1963. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed in April and May 2015, as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objectives process. The CAU 412 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the data needs identified by the data quality objectives process. This CR provides documentation and justification for the clean closure of CAU 412 under the FFACO without further corrective action. This justification is based on historical knowledge of the site, previous site investigations, implementation of the 1997 interim corrective action, and the results of the CAI. The corrective action of clean closure was confirmed as appropriate for closure of CAU 412 based on achievement of the following closure objectives: Radiological contamination at the site is less than the final action level using the ground troops exposure scenario (i.e., the radiological dose is less than the final action level): Removable alpha contamination is less than the high contamination area criterion: No potential source material is present at the site, and any impacted soil associated with potential source material has been removed so that remaining soil contains contaminants at concentrations less than the final action levels: and There is

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 536 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 3 Release Site, and comprises a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): (sm b ullet) CAS 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CAS 03-44-02 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)- and polyaromatic hydrocarbon (PAH)-impacted soil, soil impacted with plutonium (Pu)-239, and concrete pad debris. CAU 536 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 536 Corrective Action Plan (CAP), with minor deviations as approved by NDEP. The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 536 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 536 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 1,000 cubic yards (yd3) of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH- and PAH-impacted soil and debris, approximately 8 yd3 of Pu-239-impacted soil, and approximately 100 yd3 of concrete debris were generated, managed, and disposed of appropriately. Additionally, a previously uncharacterized, buried drum was excavated, removed, and disposed of as hydrocarbon waste as a best management practice. Waste minimization techniques, such as the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This corrective action decision document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 271, Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Located on the NTS approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, CAU 271 consists of fifteen Corrective Action Sites (CASs). The CASs consist of 13 septic systems, a radioactive leachfield, and a contaminated reservoir. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended CAA for each CAS within CAU 271. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 29, 2001, through February 22, 2002, and April 29, 2002, through June 25, 2002. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against preliminary action levels and regulatory disposal limits to determine contaminants of concern (COC) for each CAS. It was determined that contaminants of concern included hydrocarbon-contaminated media, polychlorinated biphenyls, and radiologically-contaminated media. Three corrective action objectives were identified for these CASs, and subsequently three CAAs developed for consideration based on a review of existing data, future use, and current operations in Areas 25, 26, and 27 of the NTS. These CAAs were: Alternative 1 - No Further Action, Alternative 2 - Clean Closure, and Alternative 3 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Alternative 2, Clean Closure, was chosen as the preferred CAA for all but two of the CASs (25-04-04 and 27-05-02) because Nevada Administrative Control 444.818 requires clean closure of the septic tanks involved with these CASs. Alternative 3, Closure in Place, was chosen for the final two CASs because the short-term risks of

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NV

2002-09-16

This corrective action decision document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 271, Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Located on the NTS approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, CAU 271 consists of fifteen Corrective Action Sites (CASs). The CASs consist of 13 septic systems, a radioactive leachfield, and a contaminated reservoir. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended CAA for each CAS within CAU 271. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 29, 2001, through February 22, 2002, and April 29, 2002, through June 25, 2002. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against preliminary action levels and regulatory disposal limits to determine contaminants of concern (COC) for each CAS. It was determined that contaminants of concern included hydrocarbon-contaminated media, polychlorinated biphenyls, and radiologically-contaminated media. Three corrective action objectives were identified for these CASs, and subsequently three CAAs developed for consideration based on a review of existing data, future use, and current operations in Areas 25, 26, and 27 of the NTS. These CAAs were: Alternative 1 - No Further Action, Alternative 2 - Clean Closure, and Alternative 3 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Alternative 2, Clean Closure, was chosen as the preferred CAA for all but two of the CASs (25-04-04 and 27-05-02) because Nevada Administrative Control 444.818 requires clean closure of the septic tanks involved with these CASs. Alternative 3, Closure in Place, was chosen for the final two CASs because the short-term risks of

Sierra/SolidMechanics 4.48 Verification Tests Manual.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Plews, Julia A.; Crane, Nathan K; de Frias, Gabriel Jose; Le, San; Littlewood, David John; Merewether, Mark Thomas; Mosby, Matthew David; Pierson, Kendall H.; Porter, Vicki L.; Shelton, Timothy; Thomas, Jesse David; Tupek, Michael R.; Veilleux, Michael; Xavier, Patrick G.

2018-03-01

Presented in this document is a small portion of the tests that exist in the Sierra / SolidMechanics (Sierra / SM) verification test suite. Most of these tests are run nightly with the Sierra / SM code suite, and the results of the test are checked versus the correct analytical result. For each of the tests presented in this document, the test setup, a description of the analytic solution, and comparison of the Sierra / SM code results to the analytic solution is provided. Mesh convergence is also checked on a nightly basis for several of these tests. This document can be used to confirm that a given code capability is verified or referenced as a compilation of example problems. Additional example problems are provided in the Sierra / SM Example Problems Manual. Note, many other verification tests exist in the Sierra / SM test suite, but have not yet been included in this manual.

Study on the influence of stochastic properties of correction terms on the reliability of instantaneous network RTK

Science.gov (United States)

Próchniewicz, Dominik

2014-03-01

The reliability of precision GNSS positioning primarily depends on correct carrier-phase ambiguity resolution. An optimal estimation and correct validation of ambiguities necessitates a proper definition of mathematical positioning model. Of particular importance in the model definition is the taking into account of the atmospheric errors (ionospheric and tropospheric refraction) as well as orbital errors. The use of the network of reference stations in kinematic positioning, known as Network-based Real-Time Kinematic (Network RTK) solution, facilitates the modeling of such errors and their incorporation, in the form of correction terms, into the functional description of positioning model. Lowered accuracy of corrections, especially during atmospheric disturbances, results in the occurrence of unaccounted biases, the so-called residual errors. The taking into account of such errors in Network RTK positioning model is possible by incorporating the accuracy characteristics of the correction terms into the stochastic model of observations. In this paper we investigate the impact of the expansion of the stochastic model to include correction term variances on the reliability of the model solution. In particular the results of instantaneous solution that only utilizes a single epoch of GPS observations, is analyzed. Such a solution mode due to the low number of degrees of freedom is very sensitive to an inappropriate mathematical model definition. Thus the high level of the solution reliability is very difficult to achieve. Numerical tests performed for a test network located in mountain area during ionospheric disturbances allows to verify the described method for the poor measurement conditions. The results of the ambiguity resolution as well as the rover positioning accuracy shows that the proposed method of stochastic modeling can increase the reliability of instantaneous Network RTK performance.

GMS/DACS interface acceptance test procedure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zuehlke, A.C.

1994-01-01

The readiness of the Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) to provide monitoring of existing, and newly installed, instrumentation associated with the SY-101 tank Gas Monitoring Systems will be systematically evaluated by performance of this procedure. All new alarms will be verified to function at the required setpoints. The change of I/O Drop 17 to I/O Drop 13 will be checked to verify that all associated alarms and screen displays are correct. All new or changed Control Screens which provide operator interface with the Gas Monitoring Systems readouts during operations will be verified to be adequate and correct. The DACS, which is housed in a trailer located just outside of the north fence at the SY tank farm, receives input signals from a variety of sensors located in and around the SY-101 tank. These sensors provide information such as: tank vapor space and ventilation system H 2 concentration; tank waste temperature; tank pressure; waste density; operating pump parameters such as speed, flow, rotational position, discharge pressure, and internal temperature; strain (for major equipment); and waste level. The output of these sensors is conditioned and transmitted to the DACS computers where these signals are displayed, recorded, and monitored for out-of-specification conditions. If abnormal conditions are detected, then, in certain situations, the DACS automatically generates alarms and causes the system to abort pump operations. The portions of the system to be tested include: new RGA5 gas monitor; existing gas chromatographs; FTIR; B ampersand K (Photo) NH 3 equipment; any new or changed Genesis screens; and I/O Drop 13

A vibration correction method for free-fall absolute gravimeters

Science.gov (United States)

Qian, J.; Wang, G.; Wu, K.; Wang, L. J.

2018-02-01

An accurate determination of gravitational acceleration, usually approximated as 9.8 m s-2, has been playing an important role in the areas of metrology, geophysics, and geodetics. Absolute gravimetry has been experiencing rapid developments in recent years. Most absolute gravimeters today employ a free-fall method to measure gravitational acceleration. Noise from ground vibration has become one of the most serious factors limiting measurement precision. Compared to vibration isolators, the vibration correction method is a simple and feasible way to reduce the influence of ground vibrations. A modified vibration correction method is proposed and demonstrated. A two-dimensional golden section search algorithm is used to search for the best parameters of the hypothetical transfer function. Experiments using a T-1 absolute gravimeter are performed. It is verified that for an identical group of drop data, the modified method proposed in this paper can achieve better correction effects with much less computation than previous methods. Compared to vibration isolators, the correction method applies to more hostile environments and even dynamic platforms, and is expected to be used in a wider range of applications.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 478: Area 12 T-Tunnel Ponds, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 478, Area 12 T-Tunnel Ponds. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 478 is comprised of one corrective action site (CAS): • 12-23-01, Ponds (5) RAD Area The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with use restrictions for CAU 478.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 559: T Tunnel Compressor/Blower Pad, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 559, T-Tunnel Compressor/Blower Pad. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 559 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): • 12-25-13, Oil Stained Soil and Concrete The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with use restrictions for CAU 559.

Six-Correction Logic (SCL Gates in Quantum-dot Cellular Automata (QCA

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Md. Anisur Rahman

2015-11-01

Full Text Available Quantum Dot Cellular Automata (QCA is a promising nanotechnology in Quantum electronics for its ultra low power consumption, faster speed and small size features. It has significant advantages over the Complementary Metal–Oxide–Semiconductor (CMOS technology. This paper present, a novel QCA representation of Six-Correction Logic (SCL gate based on QCA logic gates: the Maj3, Maj AND gate and Maj OR. In order to design and verify the functionality of the proposed layout, QCADesigner a familiar QCA simulator has been employed. The simulation results confirm correctness of the claims and its usefulness in designing a digital circuits.

Evaluation of thermal network correction program using test temperature data

Science.gov (United States)

Ishimoto, T.; Fink, L. C.

1972-01-01

An evaluation process to determine the accuracy of a computer program for thermal network correction is discussed. The evaluation is required since factors such as inaccuracies of temperatures, insufficient number of temperature points over a specified time period, lack of one-to-one correlation between temperature sensor and nodal locations, and incomplete temperature measurements are not present in the computer-generated information. The mathematical models used in the evaluation are those that describe a physical system composed of both a conventional and a heat pipe platform. A description of the models used, the results of the evaluation of the thermal network correction, and input instructions for the thermal network correction program are presented.

Spectrum correction algorithm for detectors in airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV based on a ratio processing method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cao, Ye; Tang, Xiao-Bin; Wang, Peng; Meng, Jia; Huang, Xi; Wen, Liang-Sheng; Chen, Da

2015-01-01

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radiation monitoring method plays an important role in nuclear accidents emergency. In this research, a spectrum correction algorithm about the UAV airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV was studied to measure the radioactive nuclides within a small area in real time and in a fixed place. The simulation spectra of the high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector and the lanthanum bromide (LaBr 3 ) detector in the equipment were obtained using the Monte Carlo technique. Spectrum correction coefficients were calculated after performing ratio processing techniques about the net peak areas between the double detectors on the detection spectrum of the LaBr 3 detector according to the accuracy of the detection spectrum of the HPGe detector. The relationship between the spectrum correction coefficient and the size of the source term was also investigated. A good linear relation exists between the spectrum correction coefficient and the corresponding energy (R 2 =0.9765). The maximum relative deviation from the real condition reduced from 1.65 to 0.035. The spectrum correction method was verified as feasible. - Highlights: • An airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV was developed to measure radionuclide after a nuclear accident. • A spectrum correction algorithm was proposed to obtain precise information on the detected radioactivity within a small area. • The spectrum correction method was verified as feasible. • The corresponding spectrum correction coefficients increase first and then stay constant

Spectrum correction algorithm for detectors in airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV based on a ratio processing method

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cao, Ye [Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China); Tang, Xiao-Bin, E-mail: tangxiaobin@nuaa.edu.cn [Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China); Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Nuclear Energy Equipment Materials Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China); Wang, Peng; Meng, Jia; Huang, Xi; Wen, Liang-Sheng [Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China); Chen, Da [Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China); Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Nuclear Energy Equipment Materials Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016 (China)

2015-10-11

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radiation monitoring method plays an important role in nuclear accidents emergency. In this research, a spectrum correction algorithm about the UAV airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV was studied to measure the radioactive nuclides within a small area in real time and in a fixed place. The simulation spectra of the high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector and the lanthanum bromide (LaBr{sub 3}) detector in the equipment were obtained using the Monte Carlo technique. Spectrum correction coefficients were calculated after performing ratio processing techniques about the net peak areas between the double detectors on the detection spectrum of the LaBr{sub 3} detector according to the accuracy of the detection spectrum of the HPGe detector. The relationship between the spectrum correction coefficient and the size of the source term was also investigated. A good linear relation exists between the spectrum correction coefficient and the corresponding energy (R{sup 2}=0.9765). The maximum relative deviation from the real condition reduced from 1.65 to 0.035. The spectrum correction method was verified as feasible. - Highlights: • An airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment NH-UAV was developed to measure radionuclide after a nuclear accident. • A spectrum correction algorithm was proposed to obtain precise information on the detected radioactivity within a small area. • The spectrum correction method was verified as feasible. • The corresponding spectrum correction coefficients increase first and then stay constant.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Record of Technical Change No. 1 and No. 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2003-05-16

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 214 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 5, 11, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, CAU 214 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-99-01, Fallout Shelters; 11-22-03, Drum; 25-99-12, Fly Ash Storage; 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials; 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-99-18, Storage Area; 25-34-03, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); 25-34-04, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); and 25-34-05, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker). These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). The suspected contaminants and critical analyte s for CAU 214 include oil (total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel-range organics [TPH-DRO], polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), pesticides (chlordane, heptachlor, 4,4-DDT), barium, cadmium, chronium, lubricants (TPH-DRO, TPH-gasoline-range organics [GRO]), and fly ash (arsenic). The land-use zones where CAU 214 CASs are located dictate that future land uses will be limited to nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the corrective action decision document.

Improving the accuracy of CT dimensional metrology by a novel beam hardening correction method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang, Xiang; Li, Lei; Zhang, Feng; Xi, Xiaoqi; Deng, Lin; Yan, Bin

2015-01-01

Its powerful nondestructive characteristics are attracting more and more research into the study of computed tomography (CT) for dimensional metrology, which offers a practical alternative to the common measurement methods. However, the inaccuracy and uncertainty severely limit the further utilization of CT for dimensional metrology due to many factors, among which the beam hardening (BH) effect plays a vital role. This paper mainly focuses on eliminating the influence of the BH effect in the accuracy of CT dimensional metrology. To correct the BH effect, a novel exponential correction model is proposed. The parameters of the model are determined by minimizing the gray entropy of the reconstructed volume. In order to maintain the consistency and contrast of the corrected volume, a punishment term is added to the cost function, enabling more accurate measurement results to be obtained by the simple global threshold method. The proposed method is efficient, and especially suited to the case where there is a large difference in gray value between material and background. Different spheres with known diameters are used to verify the accuracy of dimensional measurement. Both simulation and real experimental results demonstrate the improvement in measurement precision. Moreover, a more complex workpiece is also tested to show that the proposed method is of general feasibility. (paper)

Statistical test of anarchy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gouvea, Andre de; Murayama, Hitoshi

2003-01-01

'Anarchy' is the hypothesis that there is no fundamental distinction among the three flavors of neutrinos. It describes the mixing angles as random variables, drawn from well-defined probability distributions dictated by the group Haar measure. We perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistical test to verify whether anarchy is consistent with all neutrino data, including the new result presented by KamLAND. We find a KS probability for Nature's choice of mixing angles equal to 64%, quite consistent with the anarchical hypothesis. In turn, assuming that anarchy is indeed correct, we compute lower bounds on vertical bar U e3 vertical bar 2 , the remaining unknown 'angle' of the leptonic mixing matrix

Journal Impact Factor: Do the Numerator and Denominator Need Correction?

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Xue-Li; Gai, Shuang-Shuang; Zhou, Jing

2016-01-01

To correct the incongruence of document types between the numerator and denominator in the traditional impact factor (IF), we make a corresponding adjustment to its formula and present five corrective IFs: IFTotal/Total, IFTotal/AREL, IFAR/AR, IFAREL/AR, and IFAREL/AREL. Based on a survey of researchers in the fields of ophthalmology and mathematics, we obtained the real impact ranking of sample journals in the minds of peer experts. The correlations between various IFs and questionnaire score were analyzed to verify their journal evaluation effects. The results show that it is scientific and reasonable to use five corrective IFs for journal evaluation for both ophthalmology and mathematics. For ophthalmology, the journal evaluation effects of the five corrective IFs are superior than those of traditional IF: the corrective effect of IFAR/AR is the best, IFAREL/AR is better than IFTotal/Total, followed by IFTotal/AREL, and IFAREL/AREL. For mathematics, the journal evaluation effect of traditional IF is superior than those of the five corrective IFs: the corrective effect of IFTotal/Total is best, IFAREL/AR is better than IFTotal/AREL and IFAREL/AREL, and the corrective effect of IFAR/AR is the worst. In conclusion, not all disciplinary journal IF need correction. The results in the current paper show that to correct the IF of ophthalmologic journals may be valuable, but it seems to be meaningless for mathematic journals. PMID:26977697

Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 463: Areas 2, 3, 9, and 25 Housekeeping Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts of the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purposes of determining corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 13 CASs within CAU 463 on the NTS. The Housekeeping Closure Verification Form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Housekeeping activities at these sites included removal of debris (e.g., wooden pallets, metal, glass, and trash) and other material. In addition, these forms confirm prior removal of other contaminated materials such as metal drums or buckets, transformers, lead bricks, batteries, and gas cylinders. Based on these activities, no further action is required at these CASs

Method for verifying the pressure in a nuclear reactor fuel rod

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, W.J.

1979-01-01

Disclosed is a method of accurately verifying the pressure contained in a sealed pressurized fuel rod by utilizing a pressure balance measurement technique wherein an end of the fuel rod extends through and is sealed in a wall of a small chamber. The chamber is pressurized to the nominal (desired) fuel rod pressure and the fuel rod is then pierced to interconnect the chamber and fuel rod. The deviation of chamber pressure is noted. The final combined pressure of the fuel rod and drill chamber is substantially equal to the nominal rod pressure; departure of the combined pressure from nominal is in direct proportion to departure of rod pressure from nominal. The maximum error in computing the rod pressure from the deviation of the combined pressure from nominal is estimated at plus or minus 3.0 psig for rod pressures within the specified production limits. If the rod pressure is corrected for rod void volume using a digital printer data record, the accuracy improves to about plus or minus 2.0 psig

49 CFR 40.208 - What problem requires corrective action but does not result in the cancellation of a test?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false What problem requires corrective action but does not result in the cancellation of a test? 40.208 Section 40.208 Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation PROCEDURES FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAMS Problems...

Verifying different-modality properties for concepts produces switching costs.

Science.gov (United States)

Pecher, Diane; Zeelenberg, René; Barsalou, Lawrence W

2003-03-01

According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be slower after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless, switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to the cost of switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.

Phase II Documentation Overview of Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greg Ruskauff

2010-04-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) initiated the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Subproject to assess and evaluate radiologic groundwater contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing at the NTS. These activities are overseen by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended March 2010). For Frenchman Flat, the UGTA Subproject addresses media contaminated by the underground nuclear tests, which is limited to geologic formations within the saturated zone or 100 meters (m) or less above the water table. Transport in groundwater is judged to be the primary mechanism of migration for the subsurface contamination away from the Frenchman Flat underground nuclear tests. The intent of the UGTA Subproject is to assess the risk to the public from the groundwater contamination produced as a result of nuclear testing. The primary method used to assess this risk is the development of models of flow and contaminant transport to forecast the extent of potentially contaminated groundwater for the next 1,000 years, establish restrictions to groundwater usage, and implement a monitoring program to verify protectiveness. For the UGTA Subproject, contaminated groundwater is that which exceeds the radiological standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act (CFR, 2009) the State of Nevada’s groundwater quality standard to protect human health and the environment. Contaminant forecasts are expected to be uncertain, and groundwater monitoring will be used in combination with land-use control to build confidence in model results and reduce risk to the public. Modeling forecasts of contaminant transport will provide the basis for negotiating a compliance boundary for the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU). This compliance boundary represents a regulatory-based distinction between groundwater contaminated or not contaminated by underground testing. Transport modeling simulations

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 490: Station 44 Burn Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (with Record of Technical Change No.1)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 490 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Active Unit 490 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 03-56-001-03BA, Fire Training Area (FTA); RG-56-001-RGBA, Station 44 Burn Area; 03-58-001-03FN, Sandia Service Yard; and 09-54-001-09L2, Gun Propellant Burn Area. These CASs are located at the Tonopah Test Range near Areas 3 and 9. Historically, the FTA was used for training exercises where tires and wood were ignited with diesel fuel. Records indicate that water and carbon dioxide were the only extinguishing agents used during these training exercises. The Station 44 Burn Area was used for fire training exercises and consisted of two wooden structures. The two burn areas (ignition of tires, wood, and wooden structures with diesel fuel and water) were limited to the building footprints (10 ft by 10 ft each). The Sandia Service Yard was used for storage (i.e., wood, tires, metal, electronic and office equipment, construction debris, and drums of oil/grease) from approximately 1979 to 1993. The Gun Propellant Burn Area was used from the 1960s to 1980s to burn excess artillery gun propellant, solid-fuel rocket motors, black powder, and deteriorated explosives; additionally, the area was used for the disposal of experimental explosive items. Based on site history, the focus of the field investigation activities will be to: (1) determine the presence of contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) at each CAS, (2) determine if any COPCs exceed field-screening levels and/or preliminary action levels, and (3) determine the nature and extent of contamination with enough certainty to support selection of corrective action alternatives for each CAS. The scope of this CAIP is to resolve the

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 490: Station 44 Burn Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (with Record of Technical Change No.1)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

2000-06-09

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 490 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Active Unit 490 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 03-56-001-03BA, Fire Training Area (FTA); RG-56-001-RGBA, Station 44 Burn Area; 03-58-001-03FN, Sandia Service Yard; and 09-54-001-09L2, Gun Propellant Burn Area. These CASs are located at the Tonopah Test Range near Areas 3 and 9. Historically, the FTA was used for training exercises where tires and wood were ignited with diesel fuel. Records indicate that water and carbon dioxide were the only extinguishing agents used during these training exercises. The Station 44 Burn Area was used for fire training exercises and consisted of two wooden structures. The two burn areas (ignition of tires, wood, and wooden structures with diesel fuel and water) were limited to the building footprints (10 ft by 10 ft each). The Sandia Service Yard was used for storage (i.e., wood, tires, metal, electronic and office equipment, construction debris, and drums of oil/grease) from approximately 1979 to 1993. The Gun Propellant Burn Area was used from the 1960s to 1980s to burn excess artillery gun propellant, solid-fuel rocket motors, black powder, and deteriorated explosives; additionally, the area was used for the disposal of experimental explosive items. Based on site history, the focus of the field investigation activities will be to: (1) determine the presence of contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) at each CAS, (2) determine if any COPCs exceed field-screening levels and/or preliminary action levels, and (3) determine the nature and extent of contamination with enough certainty to support selection of corrective action alternatives for each CAS. The scope of this CAIP is to resolve

DIRECT CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK ON STUDENTS‟WRITING PERFORMANCE

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Testiana Deni Wijayatiningsih

2017-04-01

Full Text Available Teaching writing genre especially recount, narrative, and descriptive need brief and detail correction. Moreover, students aware about their mistakes in writing genre clearly. So, they can revise themselves. Based on the background above, this research aimed to know students‘achievement differences between using direct corrective feedback and indirect corrective feedback. The subject of this research was the fourth semester of English Department of Universitas Muhammadiyah Semarang. It employed quasi experiment and one group pre test post test design to analyze the students‘ writing achievement. The result showed that there is a significant differences between direct corrective feedback and indirect corrective feedback. Hopefully this research gives benefit for lecturers to use direct corrective feedback in their teaching writing process .

Verifying competence of operations personnel in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farber, G.H.

1986-01-01

To ensure that only competent people are authorized to fill positions in a nuclear power plant, both the initial competence of personnel and the continuous maintenance of competence have to be verified. Two main methods are normally used for verifying competence, namely evaluation of a person's performance over a period of time, and evaluation of his knowledge and skills at a particular time by means of an examination. Both methods have limitations, and in practice they are often used together to give different and to some extent complementary evaluations of a person's competence. Verification of competence itself is a problem area, because objective judging of human competence is extremely difficult. Formal verification methods, such as tests and examinations, are particularly or exclusively applied for the direct operating personnel in the control room (very rarely for management personnel). Out of the many elements contributing to a person's competence, the knowledge which is needed and the intellectual skills are the main subjects of the formal verification methods. Therefore the presentation will concentrate on the proof of the technical qualification of operators by means of examinations. The examination process in the Federal Republic of Germany for the proof of knowledge and skills will serve as an example to describe and analyze the important aspects. From that recommendations are derived regarding standardization of the procedure as well as validation. (orig./GL)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 408: Bomblet Target Area Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mark Krauss

2010-09-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 408: Bomblet Target Area (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 408 is located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) TA-55-002-TAB2, Bomblet Target Areas. This CAS includes the following seven target areas: • Mid Target • Flightline Bomblet Location • Strategic Air Command (SAC) Target Location 1 • SAC Target Location 2 • South Antelope Lake • Tomahawk Location 1 • Tomahawk Location 2 The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for the CAS within CAU 408 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 408 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From July 2009 through August 2010, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 408: Bomblet Target Area, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Identify and remove munitions of explosive concern (MEC) associated with DOE activities. • Investigate potential disposal pit locations. • Remove depleted uranium-contaminated fragments and soil. • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are

Reasoning about knowledge: Children’s evaluations of generality and verifiability

Science.gov (United States)

Koenig, Melissa A.; Cole, Caitlin A.; Meyer, Meredith; Ridge, Katherine E.; Kushnir, Tamar; Gelman, Susan A.

2015-01-01

In a series of experiments, we examined 3- to 8-year-old children’s (N = 223) and adults’ (N = 32) use of two properties of testimony to estimate a speaker’s knowledge: generality and verifiability. Participants were presented with a “Generic speaker” who made a series of 4 general claims about “pangolins” (a novel animal kind), and a “Specific speaker” who made a series of 4 specific claims about “this pangolin” as an individual. To investigate the role of verifiability, we systematically varied whether the claim referred to a perceptually-obvious feature visible in a picture (e.g., “has a pointy nose”) or a non-evident feature that was not visible (e.g., “sleeps in a hollow tree”). Three main findings emerged: (1) Young children showed a pronounced reliance on verifiability that decreased with age. Three-year-old children were especially prone to credit knowledge to speakers who made verifiable claims, whereas 7- to 8-year-olds and adults credited knowledge to generic speakers regardless of whether the claims were verifiable; (2) Children’s attributions of knowledge to generic speakers was not detectable until age 5, and only when those claims were also verifiable; (3) Children often generalized speakers’ knowledge outside of the pangolin domain, indicating a belief that a person’s knowledge about pangolins likely extends to new facts. Findings indicate that young children may be inclined to doubt speakers who make claims they cannot verify themselves, as well as a developmentally increasing appreciation for speakers who make general claims. PMID:26451884

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 504: 16a-Tunnel Muckpile, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-03-15

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 504, 16a-Tunnel Muckpile. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 504 is comprised of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs): • 16-06-01, Muckpile • 16-23-01, Contaminated Burial Pit • 16-23-02, Contaminated Area • 16-99-01, Concrete Construction Waste Corrective Action Site 16-23-01 is not a burial pit; it is part of CAS 16-06-01. Therefore, there is not a separate data analysis and assessment for CAS 16-23-01; it is included as part of the assessment for CAS 16-06-01. In addition to these CASs, the channel between CAS 16-23-02 (Contaminated Area) and Mid Valley Road was investigated with walk-over radiological surveys and soil sampling using hand tools. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with use restrictions for CAU 504. A CADD was originally submitted for CAU 504 and approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). However, following an agreement between NDEP, DTRA, and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office to change to a risk-based approach for assessing the corrective action investigation (CAI) data, NDEP agreed that the CAU could be re-evaluated using the risk-based approach and a CADD/CR prepared to close the site.

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farnham, Irene

2016-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Farnham, Irene [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2016-08-01

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bechel Nevada

2004-01-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration plan details the activities necessary to close Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (Tonopah Test Range). CAU 484 consists of sites located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. CAU 484 consists of the following six Corrective Action Sites: (1) CAS RG-52-007-TAML, Davis Gun Penetrator Test; (2) CAS TA-52-001-TANL, NEDS Detonation Area; (3) CAS TA-52-004-TAAL, Metal Particle Dispersion Test; (4) CAS TA-52-005-TAAL, Joint Test Assembly DU Sites; (5) CAS TA-52-006-TAPL, Depleted Uranium Site; and (6) CAS TA-54-001-TANL, Containment Tank and Steel Structure

Verifier-based three-party authentication schemes using extended chaotic maps for data exchange in telecare medicine information systems.

Science.gov (United States)

Lee, Tian-Fu

2014-12-01

Telecare medicine information systems provide a communicating platform for accessing remote medical resources through public networks, and help health care workers and medical personnel to rapidly making correct clinical decisions and treatments. An authentication scheme for data exchange in telecare medicine information systems enables legal users in hospitals and medical institutes to establish a secure channel and exchange electronic medical records or electronic health records securely and efficiently. This investigation develops an efficient and secure verified-based three-party authentication scheme by using extended chaotic maps for data exchange in telecare medicine information systems. The proposed scheme does not require server's public keys and avoids time-consuming modular exponential computations and scalar multiplications on elliptic curve used in previous related approaches. Additionally, the proposed scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model, and realizes the lower bounds of messages and rounds in communications. Compared to related verified-based approaches, the proposed scheme not only possesses higher security, but also has lower computational cost and fewer transmissions. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Visual performance in cataract patients with low levels of postoperative astigmatism: full correction versus spherical equivalent correction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Lehmann RP

2012-03-01

Full Text Available Robert P Lehmann1, Diane M Houtman21Lehmann Eye Center, Nacogdoches, TX, 2Alcon Research Ltd, Fort Worth, TX, USAPurpose: To evaluate whether visual performance could be improved in pseudophakic subjects by correcting low levels of postoperative astigmatism.Methods: An exploratory, noninterventional study was conducted using subjects who had been implanted with an aspheric intraocular lens and had 0.5–0.75 diopter postoperative astigmatism. Monocular visual performance using full correction was compared with visual performance using spherical equivalent correction. Testing consisted of high- and low-contrast visual acuity, contrast sensitivity, and reading acuity and speed using the Radner Reading Charts.Results: Thirty-eight of 40 subjects completed testing. Visual acuities at three contrast levels (100%, 25%, and 9% were significantly better using full correction than when using spherical equivalent correction (all P < 0.001. For contrast sensitivity testing under photopic, mesopic, and mesopic with glare conditions, only one out of twelve outcomes demonstrated a significant improvement with full correction compared with spherical equivalent correction (at six cycles per degree under mesopic without glare conditions, P = 0.046. Mean reading speed was numerically faster with full correction across all print sizes, reaching statistical significance at logarithm of the reading acuity determination (logRAD 0.2, 0.7, and 1.1 (P , 0.05. Statistically significant differences also favored full correction in logRAD score (P = 0.0376, corrected maximum reading speed (P < 0.001, and logarithm of the minimum angle of resolution/logRAD ratio (P < 0.001.Conclusions: In this study of pseudophakic subjects with low levels of postoperative astigmatism, full correction yielded significantly better reading performance and high- and low-contrast visual acuity than spherical equivalent correction, suggesting that cataractous patients may benefit from surgical

N-Back auditory test performance in normal individuals

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Vanessa Tomé Gonçalves

Full Text Available Abstract The working memory construct refers to the capacity to maintain information for a limited time. Objectives: To devise stimuli and adapt the 5-back test and to verify the effect of age in normal Brazilian individuals. Methods: 31 healthy adults (15 young adults and 16 older adults were evaluated by batteries of auditory stimuli to verify the inter-group differences (age effect in working memory span, total correct answers and intrusions, and the intra-group effect of type of stimulus. Results: There was no intra-group stimulus effect. Individuals from both groups processed di and tri-syllables similarly. No difference between groups (no age effect was observed for any N-Back parameters: total score, span, number of intrusions, in either di or tri-syllable presentation. Conclusion: the processing capacity of 5 elements in phonological working memory was not affected by age.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2008-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) documents closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, according to the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 543 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2007). CAU 543 is located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada (Figure 1), and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping; and CAS 06-07-01 is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, adjacent to Yucca Lake. The remaining CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm in Area 15. The purpose of this CR is to provide a summary of the completed closure activities, to document waste disposal, and to present analytical data confirming that the remediation goals were met. The closure alternatives consisted of closure in place for two of the CASs, and no further action with implementation of best management practices (BMPs) for the remaining five CASs.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516 is located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 516 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Septic Systems and Discharge Points, and is comprised of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (sm b ullet) CAS 03-59-01, Bldg 3C-36 Septic System (sm b ullet) CAS 03-59-02, Bldg 3C-45 Septic System (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-01, Sump and Piping (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-02, Clay Pipe and Debris (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-03, Clean Out Box and Piping (sm b ullet) CAS 22-19-04, Vehicle Decontamination Area The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 06-51-02 and 22-19-04 is no further action. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 03-59-01, 03-59-02, 06-51-01, and 06-51-03 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)-impacted septic tank contents, septic tanks, distribution/clean out boxes, and piping. CAU 516 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 516 Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 516 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 516 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 186 tons of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH-impacted soil and debris, as well as 89 tons of construction debris, were generated and managed and disposed of appropriately. Waste minimization techniques, such as field screening of soil samples and the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure work

A two-dimensional deformable phantom for quantitatively verifying deformation algorithms

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kirby, Neil; Chuang, Cynthia; Pouliot, Jean [Department of Radiation Oncology, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143-1708 (United States)

2011-08-15

Purpose: The incorporation of deformable image registration into the treatment planning process is rapidly advancing. For this reason, the methods used to verify the underlying deformation algorithms must evolve equally fast. This manuscript proposes a two-dimensional deformable phantom, which can objectively verify the accuracy of deformation algorithms, as the next step for improving these techniques. Methods: The phantom represents a single plane of the anatomy for a head and neck patient. Inflation of a balloon catheter inside the phantom simulates tumor growth. CT and camera images of the phantom are acquired before and after its deformation. Nonradiopaque markers reside on the surface of the deformable anatomy and are visible through an acrylic plate, which enables an optical camera to measure their positions; thus, establishing the ground-truth deformation. This measured deformation is directly compared to the predictions of deformation algorithms, using several similarity metrics. The ratio of the number of points with more than a 3 mm deformation error over the number that are deformed by more than 3 mm is used for an error metric to evaluate algorithm accuracy. Results: An optical method of characterizing deformation has been successfully demonstrated. For the tests of this method, the balloon catheter deforms 32 out of the 54 surface markers by more than 3 mm. Different deformation errors result from the different similarity metrics. The most accurate deformation predictions had an error of 75%. Conclusions: The results presented here demonstrate the utility of the phantom for objectively verifying deformation algorithms and determining which is the most accurate. They also indicate that the phantom would benefit from more electron density heterogeneity. The reduction of the deformable anatomy to a two-dimensional system allows for the use of nonradiopaque markers, which do not influence deformation algorithms. This is the fundamental advantage of this

Technique for unit testing of safety software verification and validation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Duo; Zhang Liangju; Feng Junting

2008-01-01

The key issue arising from digitalization of the reactor protection system for nuclear power plant is how to carry out verification and validation (V and V), to demonstrate and confirm the software that performs reactor safety functions is safe and reliable. One of the most important processes for software V and V is unit testing, which verifies and validates the software coding based on concept design for consistency, correctness and completeness during software development. The paper shows a preliminary study on the technique for unit testing of safety software V and V, focusing on such aspects as how to confirm test completeness, how to establish test platform, how to develop test cases and how to carry out unit testing. The technique discussed here was successfully used in the work of unit testing on safety software of a digital reactor protection system. (authors)

An introduction to Bartlett correction and bias reduction

CERN Document Server

Cordeiro, Gauss M

2014-01-01

This book presents a concise introduction to Bartlett and Bartlett-type corrections of statistical tests and bias correction of point estimators. The underlying idea behind both groups of corrections is to obtain higher accuracy in small samples. While the main focus is on corrections that can be analytically derived, the authors also present alternative strategies for improving estimators and tests based on bootstrap, a data resampling technique, and discuss concrete applications to several important statistical models.

A Toolchain to Produce Correct-by-Construction OCaml Programs

OpenAIRE

Filliâtre , Jean-Christophe; Gondelman , Léon; Paskevich , Andrei; Pereira , Mário; Melo De Sousa , Simão

2018-01-01

This paper presents a methodology to get correct-by-construction OCaml programs using the Why3 tool. First, a formal behavioral specification is given in the form of an OCaml module signature extended with type invariants and function contracts, in the spirit of JML. Second, an implementation is written in the programming language of Why3 and then verified with respect to the specification. Finally, an OCaml program is obtained by an automated translation. Our methodology is illustrated with ...

A Study on Virtual Operating Crew and Test Commander For the Experience Accumulating Test of Unproven MMIS Technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shin, Yeong Cheol; Kang, Sung Kon

2007-01-01

New MMIS (Man Machine Interface System) technology is rapidly advanced as digital technology provides opportunity for more functionality and better cost effectiveness. Also, NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) operators are inclined to use the new technology for the construction of new plant and for the upgrade of existing plants. However, this new technology may include risks at the same time. These risks are mainly due to the poor reliability of newly developed technology. According to the user requirement (KURD: Korean Utility Requirement Document), advanced MMIS technology may be applied if it could be apparently needed to obtain a defined gain in simplicity or performance. For applying new MMIS technology, reliability needs to be verified on the basis of the requirements of proven technology. KURD suggests two methods for verifying satisfaction of the requirement of proven technology. These methods are to verity whether or not unproven MMIS technology has adequate reliability. First method is that it has at least three years of documented, satisfactory service as modules of subsystems in power plant applications similar to that in LWRs or in other than power plant applications which are similar to the use in the APR1400 M-MIS. Second method is that it has satisfactorily completed a defined program of prototype testing which has been designed to verify its performance in the APR1400 M-MIS application. But, new MMIS technology had not yet opportunity to apply in the Nuclear Power Plant. Therefore, we think that second method is the effective method to demonstrate reliability and performance of new technology through the experience accumulation test. In here, Experience accumulation test means that we emulate the process of nuclear power plant such as installation after shipping, trial operation, operation, and maintenance with MMIS facility and verify reliability and performance through various test method under the circumstance of emulation and if any problem occurs

Illustrating, Quantifying, and Correcting for Bias in Post-hoc Analysis of Gene-Based Rare Variant Tests of Association

Science.gov (United States)

Grinde, Kelsey E.; Arbet, Jaron; Green, Alden; O'Connell, Michael; Valcarcel, Alessandra; Westra, Jason; Tintle, Nathan

2017-01-01

To date, gene-based rare variant testing approaches have focused on aggregating information across sets of variants to maximize statistical power in identifying genes showing significant association with diseases. Beyond identifying genes that are associated with diseases, the identification of causal variant(s) in those genes and estimation of their effect is crucial for planning replication studies and characterizing the genetic architecture of the locus. However, we illustrate that straightforward single-marker association statistics can suffer from substantial bias introduced by conditioning on gene-based test significance, due to the phenomenon often referred to as “winner's curse.” We illustrate the ramifications of this bias on variant effect size estimation and variant prioritization/ranking approaches, outline parameters of genetic architecture that affect this bias, and propose a bootstrap resampling method to correct for this bias. We find that our correction method significantly reduces the bias due to winner's curse (average two-fold decrease in bias, p bias and improve inference in post-hoc analysis of gene-based tests under a wide variety of genetic architectures. PMID:28959274

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 545: Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alfred Wickline

2008-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 545, Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials, in Areas 2, 3, 9, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (1996, as amended February 2008). Corrective Action Unit 545 is comprised of the following eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs): • 02-09-01, Mud Disposal Area • 03-08-03, Mud Disposal Site • 03-17-01, Waste Consolidation Site 3B • 03-23-02, Waste Disposal Site • 03-23-05, Europium Disposal Site • 03-99-14, Radioactive Material Disposal Area • 09-23-02, U-9y Drilling Mud Disposal Crater • 20-19-01, Waste Disposal Site While all eight CASs are addressed in this CADD/CR, sufficient information was available for the following three CASs; therefore, a field investigation was not conducted at these sites: • For CAS 03-08-03, though the potential for subsidence of the craters was judged to be extremely unlikely, the data quality objective (DQO) meeting participants agreed that sufficient information existed about disposal and releases at the site and that a corrective action of close in place with a use restriction is recommended. Sampling in the craters was not considered necessary. • For CAS 03-23-02, there were no potential releases of hazardous or radioactive contaminants identified. Therefore, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for CAU 545 concluded that: “Sufficient information exists to conclude that this CAS does not exist as originally identified. Therefore, there is no environmental concern associated with CAS 03-23-02.” This CAS is closed with no further action. • For CAS 03-23-05, existing information about the two buried sources and lead pig was considered to be

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 300: Surface Release Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-07-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 300 is located in Areas 23, 25, and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 300 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Surface Release Areas and is comprised of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), which are associated with the identified Building (Bldg): {sm_bullet} CAS 23-21-03, Bldg 750 Surface Discharge {sm_bullet} CAS 23-25-02, Bldg 750 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 23-25-03, Bldg 751 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-60-01, Bldg 3113A Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-60-02, Bldg 3901 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-62-01, Bldg 3124 Contaminated Soil {sm_bullet} CAS 26-60-01, Bldg 2105 Outfall and Decon Pad The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 23-21-03, 23-25-02, and 23-25-03 is no further action. As a best management practice, approximately 48 feet of metal piping was removed from CAS 23-25-02 and disposed of as sanitary waste. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 25-60-01, 25-60-02, 25-62-01, and 26-60-01, is clean closure. Closure activities for these CASs included removing and disposing of soil impacted with total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel range organics (TPH-DRO), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and cesium (Cs)-137, concrete impacted with TPH-DRO, and associated piping impacted with TPH-DRO. CAU 300 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 300 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 300 Corrective Action Decision Document (NNSA/NSO, 2005). This Closure Report documents CAU 300 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 40 cubic yards (yd3) of low-level waste consisting of TPH-DRO-, PCB

The exponential function expansion of the intra-nodal cross sections for the spectral history gradient correction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cho, J. Y.; Noh, J. M.; Cheong, H. K.; Choo, H. K.

1998-01-01

In order to simplify the previous spectral history effect correction based on the polynomial expansion nodal method, a new spectral history effect correction is proposed. The new spectral history correction eliminates four microscopic depletion points out of total 13 depletion points in the previous correction by approximating the group cross sections with exponential function. The neutron flux to homogenize the group cross sections for the correction of the spectral history effect is calculated by the analytic function expansion nodal method in stead of the conventional polynomial expansion nodal method. This spectral history correction model is verified against the three MOX benchmark cores: a checkerboard type, a small core with 25 fuel assemblies, and a large core with 177 fuel assemblies. The benchmark results prove that this new spectral history correction model is superior to the previous one even with the reduced number of the local microscopic depletion points

Wall correction model for wind tunnels with open test section

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Sørensen, Jens Nørkær; Shen, Wen Zhong; Mikkelsen, Robert Flemming

2006-01-01

In the paper we present a correction model for wall interference on rotors of wind turbines or propellers in wind tunnels. The model, which is based on a one-dimensional momentum approach, is validated against results from CFD computations using a generalized actuator disc principle. In the model...... good agreement with the CFD computations, demonstrating that one-dimensional momentum theory is a reliable way of predicting corrections for wall interference in wind tunnels with closed as well as open cross sections....

Clean Slate 1 corrective action decision document, Corrective Action Unit No. 412. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-04-01

A Corrective Action Investigation has been completed at the Clean Slate 1 (CS-1) Site, located in the central portion of the Tonopah Test Range. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and evaluate potential correct action alternatives at the CS-1 Site and to evaluate these alternatives with respect to their technical, human health, and environmental benefits and to their cost. Base on this evaluation a corrective action will be recommended for implementation at the CS-1 Site

AUTOMATIC ESTIMATION OF SIZE PARAMETERS USING VERIFIED COMPUTERIZED STEREOANALYSIS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Peter R Mouton

2011-05-01

Full Text Available State-of-the-art computerized stereology systems combine high-resolution video microscopy and hardwaresoftware integration with stereological methods to assist users in quantifying multidimensional parameters of importance to biomedical research, including volume, surface area, length, number, their variation and spatial distribution. The requirement for constant interactions between a trained, non-expert user and the targeted features of interest currently limits the throughput efficiency of these systems. To address this issue we developed a novel approach for automatic stereological analysis of 2-D images, Verified Computerized Stereoanalysis (VCS. The VCS approach minimizes the need for user interactions with high contrast [high signal-to-noise ratio (S:N] biological objects of interest. Performance testing of the VCS approach confirmed dramatic increases in the efficiency of total object volume (size estimation, without a loss of accuracy or precision compared to conventional computerized stereology. The broad application of high efficiency VCS to high-contrast biological objects on tissue sections could reduce labor costs, enhance hypothesis testing, and accelerate the progress of biomedical research focused on improvements in health and the management of disease.

A Comparison of Equality in Computer Algebra and Correctness in Mathematical Pedagogy (II)

Science.gov (United States)

Bradford, Russell; Davenport, James H.; Sangwin, Chris

2010-01-01

A perennial problem in computer-aided assessment is that "a right answer", pedagogically speaking, is not the same thing as "a mathematically correct expression", as verified by a computer algebra system, or indeed other techniques such as random evaluation. Paper I in this series considered the difference in cases where there was "the right…