WorldWideScience

Sample records for surplus weapons plutonium

  1. Safety issues in fabricating mixed oxide fuel using surplus weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buksa, J.; Badwan, F.; Barr, M.; Motley, F.

    1998-07-01

    This paper presents an assessment of the safety issues and implications of fabricating mixed oxide (MOX) fuel using surplus weapons plutonium. The basis for this assessment is the research done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in identifying and resolving the technical issues surrounding the production of PuO 2 feed, removal of gallium from the PuO 2 feed, the fabrication of test fuel, and the work done at the LANL plutonium processing facility. The use of plutonium in MOX fuel has been successfully demonstrated in Europe, where the experience has been almost exclusively with plutonium separated from commercial spent nuclear fuel. This experience in safely operating MOX fuel fabrication facilities directly applies to the fabrication and irradiation of MOX fuel made from surplus weapons plutonium. Consequently, this paper focuses on the technical difference between plutonium from surplus weapons, and light-water reactor recycled plutonium. Preliminary assessments and research lead to the conclusion that no new process or product safety concerns will arise from using surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel

  2. Surplus weapons plutonium: Technologies for pit disassembly/conversion and MOX fuel fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toevs, J.W.

    1997-01-01

    This paper will provide a description of the technologies involved in the disposition of plutonium from surplus nuclear weapon components (pits), based on pit disassembly and conversion and on fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for disposition through irradiation in nuclear reactors. The MOX/Reactor option is the baseline disposition plan for both the US and russian for plutonium from pits and other clean plutonium metal and oxide. In the US, impure plutonium in various forms will be converted to oxide and immobilized in glass or ceramic, surrounded by vitrified high level waste to provide a radiation barrier. A similar fate is expected for impure material in Russia as well. The immobilization technologies will not be discussed. Following technical descriptions, a discussion of options for monitoring the plutonium during these processes will be provided

  3. Superconducting RF Linacs Driving Subcritical Reactors for Profitable Disposition of Surplus Weapons-grade Plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cummings, Mary Anne; Johnson, Rolland

    Acceptable capital and operating costs of high-power proton accelerators suitable for profitable commercial electric-power and process-heat applications have been demonstrated. However, studies have pointed out that even a few hundred trips of an accelerator lasting a few seconds would lead to unacceptable thermal stresses as each trip causes fission to be turned off in solid fuel structures found in conventional reactors. The newest designs based on the GEM*STAR concept take such trips in stride by using molten-salt fuel, where fuel pin fatigue is not an issue. Other aspects of the GEM*STAR concept which address all historical reactor failures include an internal spallation neutron target and high temperature molten salt fuel with continuous purging of volatile radioactive fission products such that the reactor contains less than a critical mass and almost a million times fewer volatile radioactive fission products than conventional reactors. GEM*STAR is a reactor that without redesign will burn spent nuclear fuel, natural uranium, thorium, or surplus weapons material. It will operate without the need for a critical core, fuel enrichment, or reprocessing making it an excellent candidate for export. As a first application, the design for a pilot plant is described for the profitable disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by using process heat to produce green diesel fuel for the Department of Defense (DOD) from natural gas and renewable carbon.

  4. Surplus weapons-grade plutonium: a resource for exploring and terraforming Mars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muscatello, A.C.; Houts, M.G.

    1996-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, greater than 100 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) have become surplus to defense needs in the United States and the Former Soviet Union. This paper is a proposal for an option for WGPu disposition, i.e., use of the plutonium as a fuel for nuclear reactors for Mars exploration and eventual terraforming. WGPu was used in nuclear weapons because it has a much smaller critical mass than highly enriched uranium, allowing lighter weapons with consequent longer ranges. Similarly, WGPu reactors would also require smaller amounts of fuel to attain a critical mass, making the reactor much lighter overall and resulting in large savings in launch costs. The greater than 100 MT of WGPu would generate about 1000 billion kilowatt hours of heat energy, much of which could be converted into electricity. The waste heat would also be useful to a Martian outpost or colony. A potential way of getting the WGPu reactors into space is a large gas gun like that being developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to orbit materials by achieving high velocity at the surface, greatly reducing launch costs and enhancing reliability. Reactor components would be launched on conventional rockets or space shuttles, the reactor fuel rods would be injected into orbit using the gas gun, and the reactor would be assembled in space. Implementation of this proposal would allow disposition of a serious, expensive problem on earth by removing the WGPu from the planet and simultaneously provide a very large energy resource for Mars exploration and terraforming

  5. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C.; Edmunds, T.

    1997-01-01

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs

  6. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Edmunds, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1997-04-04

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs.

  7. The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapons plutonium as spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.; Kalashnikov, A.; Pavlovichev, A.

    1997-09-01

    In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years

  8. Safe disposal of surplus plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gong, W. L.; Naz, S.; Lutze, W.; Busch, R.; Prinja, A.; Stoll, W.

    2001-06-01

    About 150 tons of weapons grade and weapons usable plutonium (metal, oxide, and in residues) have been declared surplus in the USA and Russia. Both countries plan to convert the metal and oxide into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors. Russia has not yet decided what to do with the residues. The US will convert residues into a ceramic, which will then be over-poured with highly radioactive borosilicate glass. The radioactive glass is meant to provide a deterrent to recovery of plutonium, as required by a US standard. Here we show a waste form for plutonium residues, zirconia/boron carbide (ZrO 2/B 4C), with an unprecedented combination of properties: a single, radiation-resistant, and chemically durable phase contains the residues; billion-year-old natural analogs are available; and criticality safety is given under all conceivable disposal conditions. ZrO 2/B 4C can be disposed of directly, without further processing, making it attractive to all countries facing the task of plutonium disposal. The US standard for protection against recovery can be met by disposal of the waste form together with used reactor fuel.

  9. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. Volume 2 contains the appendices to the report and describe the following: Federal Register notices; contractor nondisclosure statement; adjunct melter

  10. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel

  11. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume includes background information; purpose of and need for the proposed action; alternatives for disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium; and

  12. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume has chapters on environmental consequences; environmental regulations, permits, and consultations; a glossary; list of preparers; distribution list

  13. Fuel qualification issues and strategies for reactor-based surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Copeland, G.L.; Moses, D.L.

    1997-08-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed irradiation of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial reactors as a disposition method for surplus plutonium from the weapons program. The burning of MOX fuel in reactors is supported by an extensive technology base; however, the infrastructure required to implement reactor-based plutonium disposition does not exist domestically. This report identifies and examines the actions required to qualify and license weapons-grade (WG) plutonium-based MOX fuels for use in domestic commercial light-water reactors (LWRs)

  14. Surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. Public scoping meeting: Comment summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S ampersand D PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229) on January 14, 1997. In that Record of Decision, DOE stated its decision to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and irradiating the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing reactors, while reserving the option to immobilize all the surplus weapons plutonium. The Department also decided that the extent to which either or both of these disposition approaches would ultimately be deployed would depend in part upon future National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review for surplus weapons plutonium disposition. On May 22, 1997, DOE published in the Federal Register (62 FR 28013) a Notice of Intent to prepare an environmental impact statement (tiered from the S ampersand D PEIS) on the disposition of United States' surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The purpose of the Notice of Intent was to describe DOE's proposed action, to solicit public input, and to announce the schedule for the public scoping meetings. During the public scoping period (May 22 - July 22, 1997), the public was invited to submit written comments by U.S. mail, fax, or through the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's Website, as well as to provide oral comments by voicemail or by participating in public scoping meetings. Written and oral comments on the scope of the SPD EIS that were submitted during the formal comment period have been uniquely identified and have become part of the official record. This is the case whether the comments were submitted via U.S. mail, fax, website, toll-free telephone number, or through participation at a public scoping meeting

  15. The GT-MHR for destruction of weapons plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baxter, A.M.; Neylan, A.J. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1995-12-31

    The disposal of nearly 100 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) made surplus by the disarmament treaties is receiving urgent attention, highlighted by the recent seizure in Germany of small quantities of weapons-useful plutonium. Unlike highly enriched uranium, simple denaturing cannot make this plutonium worthless for use in future weapons. The use of physical security and institutional barriers, including long-term storage in high-level waste repositories, to provide secure storage for centuries to come is questionable when considering government instability and the possibility of national recidivism. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and General Atomics have signed an agreement for the cooperative design of a gas turbine-modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) to burn the WG-Pu stockpile. A formal proposal for a joint U.S./Russian program for the development of this reactor has been submitted by MINATOM to Vice President Gore. The major benefit of this program is that the reactor would deplete the Russian surplus plutonium stockpile, provide jobs for technical specialists in the former weapons complex, and produce valuable electric power. It would also provide a mutually assured means of destroying the U.S. and Russian stockpiles.

  16. US and Russia face urgent decisions on weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-01-01

    Surplus plutonium poses a ''clear and present danger to national and international security,'' warns a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study released in January, titled ''The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.'' Over the past few years, many different methods of disposing of plutonium have been proposed. They range from shooting it into the Sun with missiles, to deep-seabed disposal, to fissioning it within a new generation of nuclear reactors. The NAS report rejects most of the methods suggested so far, but does recommend pursuing two of the options. One is to incorporate the plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, and use it to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. The other is to mix the plutonium with high-level waste and molten glass and mold the resulting material into large glass logs for eventual geologic disposal. Both are discussed here. The panel that wrote the NAS study is a standing committee called the Committee on International Security ampersand Arms Control. It suggests steps that should be taken now to guard supplies of plutonium removed from weapons. One step is bilateral US-Russian monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Others include setting up secure interim storage for the fissile materials and establishing an international monitoring system to verify the stockpiles and ensure that materials are not withdrawn for use in new weapons. The panel also urges Russia to stop producing fissile weapons materials and both countries to commit a very large fraction of their plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons to nonaggressive uses. The US and Russia have already made initial moves to accomplish these goals but have not fully implemented any of them

  17. History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE's record of decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

    1997-04-01

    This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives

  18. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering and Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone and Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process

  19. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    N/A

    1999-05-14

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested

  20. Weapon plutonium in accelerator driven power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shvedov, O.V.; Murin, B.P.; Kochurov, B.P.; Shubin, Yu.M.; Volk, V.I.; Bogdanov, P.V.

    1997-01-01

    Accelerator Driven Systems are planned to be developed for the use (or destruction) of dozens of tons of weapon-grade Plutonium (W-Pu) resulted from the reducing of nuclear weapons. In the paper are compared the parameters of various types of accelerators, the physical properties of various types of targets and blankets, and the results of fuel cycle simulation. Some economical aspects are also discussed

  1. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  2. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required

  3. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-01-01

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

  4. Performance assessment of DOE spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duguid, J.O.; Vallikat, V.; McNeish, J.

    1998-01-01

    Yucca Mountain, in southern Nevada, is under consideration by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as a potential site for the disposal of the nation's radioactive wastes in a geologic repository. The wastes consist of commercial spent fuel, DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF), high level waste (HLW), and surplus plutonium. The DOE was mandated by Congress in the fiscal 1997 Energy and Water Appropriations Act to complete a viability assessment (VA) of the repository in September of 1998. The assessment consists of a preliminary design concept for the critical elements of the repository, a total system performance assessment (TSPA), a plan and cost estimate for completion of the license application, and an estimate of the cost to construct and operate the repository. This paper presents the results of the sensitivity analyses that were conducted to examine the behavior of DOE SNF and plutonium waste forms in the environment of the base case repository that was modeled for the TSPA-VA. Fifteen categories of DOE SNF and two Plutonium waste forms were examined and their contribution to radiation dose to humans was evaluated

  5. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement

  6. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  7. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons

  8. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-01-01

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  9. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports (DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively). At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity

  10. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-08-31

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports [DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively]. At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity

  11. U.S. weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, A.L.; Gonzalez, V.L.

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective

  12. U.S. weapons-usable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woods, A.L. [ed.] [Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, TX (United States); Gonzalez, V.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Dept. of Political Science

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

  13. Neutronics benchmark of a MOX assembly with near-weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Difilippo, F.C.; Fisher, S.E.

    1998-01-01

    One of the proposed ways to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium (Pu) is to irradiate the high-fissile material in light-water reactors in order to reduce the Pu enrichment to the level of spent fuels from commercial reactors. Considerable experience has been accumulated about the behavior of mixed-oxide (MOX) uranium and plutonium fuels for plutonium recycling in commercial reactors, but the experience is related to Pu enrichments typical of spent fuels quite below the values of weapons-grade plutonium. Important decisions related to the kind of reactors to be used for the disposition of the plutonium are going to be based on calculations, so the validation of computational algorithms related to all aspects of the fuel cycle (power distributions, isotopics as function of the burnup, etc.), for weapons-grade isotopics is very important. Analysis of public domain data reveals that the cycle-2 irradiation in the Quad cities boiling-water reactor (BWR) is the most recent US destructive examination. This effort involved the irradiation of five MOX assemblies using 80 and 90% fissile plutonium. These benchmark data were gathered by General Electric under the sponsorship of the Electric Power Research Institute. It is emphasized, however, that global parameters are not the focus of this benchmark, since the five bundles containing MOX fuels did not significantly affect the overall core performance. However, since the primary objective of this work is to compare against measured post-irradiation assembly data, the term benchmark is applied here. One important reason for performing the benchmark on Quad Cities irradiation is that the fissile blends (up to 90%) are higher than reactor-grade and, quite close to, weapons-grade isotopics

  14. Characterization of Representative Materials in Support of Safe, Long Term Storage of Surplus Plutonium in DOE-STD-3013 Containers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Narlesky, Joshua E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stroud, Mary Ann [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul Herrick [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wayne, David M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mason, Richard E. [MET-1: ACTINIDE PROCESSING SUPPORT; Worl, Laura A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2013-02-15

    The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.

  15. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO 2 -ZrO 2 -CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO 2 ) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er 2 O 3 ) or europium oxide (Eu 2 O 3 ) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl 4 -Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams

  16. 77 FR 44222 - Notice of Availability of the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-27

    ... fabricated from surplus plutonium in domestic commercial nuclear power reactors to generate electricity... fuel in commercial nuclear reactors used to generate electricity. TVA is a cooperating agency on this... at SRS, and to irradiate the MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors used to generate electricity...

  17. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W. [New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, W.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ``logs``; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

  18. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W.; Weber, W.J.

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ''logs''; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium

  19. Chinese strategic weapons and the plutonium option (U)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewis, John W.; Xui Litai

    1988-04-01

    In their article "Chinese Strategic Weapons and the Plutonium Option," John W. Lewis and Xue Litai of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University's International Strategic Institute present an unclassified look at plutonium processing in the PRC. The article draws heavily on unclassified PRC sources for its short look at this important subject. Interested readers will find more detailed information in the recently available works referenced in the article.

  20. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements

  1. 75 FR 41850 - Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-19

    ... under construction at SRS, and to irradiate the MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors used to generate...). Finally, DOE already has disposed of approximately 3 MT of surplus plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP as...\\ \\5\\ Disposal of certain plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP was undertaken pursuant to several...

  2. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  3. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M. [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)

    1998-03-01

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard.{close_quotes} One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed.

  4. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S.

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition

  5. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  6. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; McKibben, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    The safe management of surplus weapons plutonium is a very important and urgent task with profound environmental, national and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Police Directive 13 and various analysis by renown scientific, technical and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths forward for the long term disposition of surplus weapons usable plutonium. The central, overarching goal is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons, as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in civilian spent reactor fuel. One disposition alternative considered for surplus Pu is immobilization, in which plutonium would be emplaced in glass, ceramic or glass-bonded zeolite. This option, along with some of the progress over the last year is discussed

  7. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-01-01

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste

  8. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule

  9. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  10. On weapons plutonium in the arctic environment (Thule, Greenland)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eriksson, M.

    2002-04-01

    This thesis concerns a nuclear accident that occurred in the Thule (Pituffik) area, NW Greenland in 1968, called the Thule accident.Results are based on different analytical techniques, i.e. gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, ICP-MS, SEM with EDX and different sediment models, i.e. (CRS, CIC). The scope of the thesis is the study of hot particles. Studies on these have shown several interesting features, e.g. that they carry most of the activity dispersed from the accident, moreover, they have been very useful in the determination of the source term for the Thule accident debris. Paper I, is an overview of the results from the Thule-97 expedition. This paper concerns the marine environment, i.e. water, sediment and benthic animals in the Bylot Sound. The main conclusions are; that plutonium is not transported from the contaminated sediments into the surface water in this shelf sea, the debris has been efficiently buried in the sediment to great depth as a result of biological activity and transfer of plutonium to benthic biota is low. Paper II, concludes that the resuspension of accident debris on land has been limited and indications were, that americium has a faster transport mechanism from the catchment area to lakes than plutonium and radio lead. Paper III, is a method description of inventory calculation techniques in sediment with heterogeneous activity concentration, i.e. hot particles are present in the samples. It is concluded that earlier inventory estimates have been under estimated and that the new inventory is about 3.8 kg (10 TBq) of 239,240 Pu. Paper IV, describes hot particle separation/identification techniques using real-time digital image systems. These techniques are much faster than conventionally used autoradiography and give the results in real time. Paper V, is a study of single isolated hot particles. The most interesting result is that the fission material in the weapons involved in the accident mostly consisted of 235 U (about 4times

  11. On weapons plutonium in the arctic environment (Thule, Greenland)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eriksson, M

    2002-04-01

    This thesis concerns a nuclear accident that occurred in the Thule (Pituffik) area, NW Greenland in 1968, called the Thule accident.Results are based on different analytical techniques, i.e. gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, ICP-MS, SEM with EDX and different sediment models, i.e. (CRS, CIC). The scope of the thesis is the study of hot particles. Studies on these have shown several interesting features, e.g. that they carry most of the activity dispersed from the accident, moreover, they have been very useful in the determination of the source term for the Thule accident debris. Paper I, is an overview of the results from the Thule-97 expedition. This paper concerns the marine environment, i.e. water, sediment and benthic animals in the Bylot Sound. The main conclusions are; that plutonium is not transported from the contaminated sediments into the surface water in this shelf sea, the debris has been efficiently buried in the sediment to great depth as a result of biological activity and transfer of plutonium to benthic biota is low. Paper II, concludes that the resuspension of accident debris on land has been limited and indications were, that americium has a faster transport mechanism from the catchment area to lakes than plutonium and radio lead. Paper III, is a method description of inventory calculation techniques in sediment with heterogeneous activity concentration, i.e. hot particles are present in the samples. It is concluded that earlier inventory estimates have been under estimated and that the new inventory is about 3.8 kg (10 TBq) of {sup 239,240}Pu. Paper IV, describes hot particle separation/identification techniques using real-time digital image systems. These techniques are much faster than conventionally used autoradiography and give the results in real time. Paper V, is a study of single isolated hot particles. The most interesting result is that the fission material in the weapons involved in the accident mostly consisted of {sup 235}U

  12. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitre, J.; Chan, P.; Dastur, A.

    1995-01-01

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs

  13. Preliminary process simulation and analysis of GMODS: Processing of plutonium surplus materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferrada, J.J.; Nehls, J.W. Jr.; Welch, T.D.; Giardina, J.L.; Forsberg, C.W. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Maliyekkel, A.T. [Oak Ridge Associated Universities, TN (United States)

    1996-01-02

    To address growing concerns in the areas of arms control, control of fissile materials, waste management, and environment and health, the US Department of Energy is studying and evaluating various options for the control and disposal of surplus fissile materials (SFMs). One of the options under consideration is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS) which directly converts plutonium-bearing materials such as metals, ceramics, and organics into a durable-high-quality glass for long-term storage or a waste form for disposal. This study undertook the development of a computer simulation of the GMODS process using FLOW. That computer simulation was used to perform an assessment of how GMODS would handle the treatment of plutonium, rich scrap (RS) and lead scrap (LS), and identify critical process parameters. Among the key process parameters affecting the glass formation were processing temperatures, additives, and the effects of varying them on the final product. This assessment looked at the quantity of glass produced, the quality of the final glass form, and the effect of blending different groups of the feed streams on the glass produced. The model also provided a way to study the current process assumptions and determine in which areas more experimental studies are required. The simulation showed that the glass chemistry postulated in the models is workable. It is expected that the glass chemistry assumed during the modeling process can be verified by the results of the laboratory experiments that are currently being conducted relating to the GMODS process.Further waste characterization, especially of the SFM waste streams not studied in this report, will provide more nearly accurate results and give a more detailed evaluation of the GMODS process.

  14. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sylvester, K.W.B. [Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA (United States)

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements` effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products).

  15. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements' effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products)

  16. Combining a gas turbine modular helium reactor and an accelerator and for near total destruction of weapons grade plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baxter, A.M.; Lane, R.K.; Sherman, R. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1995-10-01

    Fissioning surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) in a reactor is an effective means of rendering this stockpile non-weapons useable. In addition the enormous energy content of the plutonium is released by the fission process and can be captured to produce valuable electric power. While no fission option has been identified that can accomplish the destruction of more than about 70% of the WG-Pu without repeated reprocessing and recycling, which presents additional opportunities for diversion, the gas turbine modular helium-cooled reactor (GT-MHR), using an annular graphite core and graphite inner and outer reflectors combines the maximum plutonium destruction and highest electrical production efficiency and economics in an inherently safe system. Accelerator driven sub-critical assemblies have also been proposed for WG-Pu destruction. These systems offer almost complete WG-Pu destruction, but achieve this goal by using circulating aqueous or molten salt solutions of the fuel, with potential safety implications. By combining the GT-MHR with an accelerator-driven sub-critical MHR assembly, the best features of both systems can be merged to achieve the near total destruction of WG-Pu in an inherently safe, diversion-proof system in which the discharged fuel elements are suitable for long term high level waste storage without the need for further processing. More than 90% total plutonium destruction, and more than 99.9% Pu-239 destruction, could be achieved. The modular concept minimizes the size of each unit so that both the GT-MHR and the accelerator would be straightforward extensions of current technology.

  17. Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991

  18. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program

  19. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  20. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1976-01-01

    Discovery of the neutron made it easy to create elements which do not exist in nature. One of these is plutonium, and its isotope with mass number 239 has nuclear properties which make it both a good fuel for nuclear power reactors and a good explosive for nuclear weapons. Since it was discovered during a war the latter characteristic was put to use, but it is now evident that use of plutonium in a particular kind of nuclear reactor, the fast breeder reactor, will allow the world's resources of uranium to last for millennia as a major source of energy. Plutonium is very radiotoxic, resembling radium in this respect. Therefore the widespread introduction of fast breeder reactors to meet energy demands can be contemplated only after assurances on two points; that adequate control of the radiological hazard resulting from the handling of very large amounts of plutonium can be guaranteed, and that diversion of plutonium to illicit use can be prevented. The problems exist to a lesser degree already, since all types of nuclear reactor produce some plutonium. Some plutonium has already been dispersed in the environment, the bulk of it from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. (author)

  1. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program

  2. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the IFR closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1994-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the IFR closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode all at a constant heat rating of 840 MWt. For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode, and recycle corns using weapons material only as required for a make-up feed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium feed does not have an adverse impact on IFR core performance characteristics

  3. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the Integral Fast Reactor closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1995-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode, all at a constant heat rating of 840 MW(thermal). For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode and recycle cores using weapons material only as required for a makeup feed. In addition, the impact of alternative feeds (recycled light water reactor or liquid-metal reactor transuranics) on burner core performance is assessed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium does not have an adverse effect on IFR core performance characteristics; also, favorable performance can be maintained for a wide variety of feed materials and fuel cycle strategies

  4. The Concentration of (236)Pu Daughters in Plutonium for Application to MOX Production from Plutonium from Dismantled US Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sampson, T.E.; Cremers, T.L.

    2001-05-01

    The isotope {sup 236}Pu in the weapons-grade plutonium to be used in the US MOX (mixed-oxide) plant is of concern because the daughter products of {sup 236}Pu are sources of high-energy gamma rays. The {sup 208}Tl daughter of {sup 236}Pu emits intense, high-energy gamma rays that are important for radiation exposure calculations for plant design. It is generally thought that the concentrations of {sup 236}Pu and its daughters are well below 10{sup {minus}10}, but these concentrations are generally below the detection limits of most analytical techniques. One technique that can be used to determine the concentration {sup 208}Tl is the direct measurement of the intensity of the {sup 208}Tl gamma rays in the gamma-ray spectrum from plutonium. Thallium-208 will be in equilibrium with {sup 228}Th, and may very well be in equilibrium with {sup 232}U for most aged plutonium samples. We have used the FRAM isotopic analysis software to analyze dozens of archived high-resolution gamma ray spectra from various samples of US and foreign plutonium. We are able to quantify the ratio of minor isotopes with measurable gamma-ray emissions to the major isotope of plutonium and hence, through the measurement of the plutonium isotopic distribution of the sample, to elemental plutonium itself. Excluding items packaged in fluoropolymer vials, all samples analyzed with {sup 240}Pu < 9% gave {sup 228}Th/Pu ratios < 3.4 e-012 and all samples of US-produced plutonium, including {sup 240}Pu values up to 16.4%, gave {sup 228}Th/Pu ratios < 9.4 e-012. None of these values is significant from a radiation dose standpoint.

  5. Laboratory directed research and development on disposal of plutonium recovered from weapons. FY1994 final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pitts, J.H.; Choi, J.S.

    1994-11-14

    This research project was conceived as a multi-year plan to study the use of mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Four areas of investigation were originally proposed: (1) study reactor physics including evaluation of control rod worth and power distribution during normal operation and transients; (2) evaluate accidents focusing upon the reduced control rod worth and reduced physical properties of PuO{sub 2}; (3) assess the safeguards required during fabrication and use of plutonium bearing fuel assemblies; and (4) study public acceptance issues associated with using material recovered from weapons to fuel a nuclear reactor. First year accomplishments are described. Appendices contain 2 reports entitled: development and validation of advanced computational capability for MOX fueled ALWR assembly designs; and long-term criticality safety concerns associated with weapons plutonium disposition.

  6. Transportation requirements for the disposition of excess weapon plutonium by burning in fission reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovingh, J.; Walter, C.E.

    1996-01-01

    Both the US and Russia are planning to dispose of about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium over a 25-year period. One option is to transfer the plutonium to Advanced Light Water (power) Reactors (ALWRs) for use as fuel. Subsequent disposal would then be considered commercial spent fuel. This disposition option, like others, involves the transportation of plutonium in various material forms as it proceeds through various points in the recovery operation. This paper examines both the disposition option and the issues surrounding the transportation of 50 Mg of excess plutonium within the US under current regulatory and infrastructure constraints. Transportation issues include criticality control, shielding, and containment of the contents. Allowable limits on each of these issues are specified by the applicable (or selected) regulation. The composition and form of the radioactive materials to be transported will determine, in part, the applicable portions of the regulations as well as the packaging design. The regulations and the packaging design, along with safeguard and security issues, will determine the quantity of plutonium or fuel assemblies per package as well as the number of packages per shipment and the type of highway carrier. For the disposition of 50 Mg of weapon plutonium using ALWRs in a 25-year campaign, the annual shipment rates are determined for the various types of carriers

  7. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  8. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-01-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium

  9. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  10. Plutonium segregation in glassy aerodynamic fallout from a nuclear weapon test.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holliday, K S; Dierken, J M; Monroe, M L; Fitzgerald, M A; Marks, N E; Gostic, R C; Knight, K B; Czerwinski, K R; Hutcheon, I D; McClory, J W

    2017-02-14

    This study combines electron microscopy equipped with energy dispersive spectroscopy to probe major element composition and autoradiography to map plutonium in order to examine the spatial relationships between plutonium and fallout composition in aerodynamic glassy fallout from a nuclear weapon test. A sample set of 48 individual fallout specimens were interrogated to reveal that the significant chemical heterogeneity of this sample set could be described compositionally with a relatively small number of compositional endmembers. Furthermore, high concentrations of plutonium were never associated with several endmember compositions and concentrated with the so-called mafic glass endmember. This result suggests that it is the physical characteristics of the compositional endmembers and not the chemical characteristics of the individual component elements that govern the un-burnt plutonium distribution with respect to major element composition in fallout.

  11. Plutonium in the marine environment at Thule, NW-Greenland after a nuclear weapons accident

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Dahlgaard, H.; Eriksson, M.; Ilus, E.

    2001-01-01

    originates from at least two sources of different quality. The radioecological implication of the observed variations is that the use of plutonium isotope ratios in quantitatively determining the influence of different plutonium sources is a very complex affair requiring substantial data sets.......In January 1968, a B52 plane carrying 4 nuclear weapon!: crashed on the sea ice similar to 12 km from the Thule Air Base, in northwest Greenland. The benthic marine environment in the 180-230 m deep Bylot Sound was then contaminated with similar to1.4 TBq Pu-239,Pu-240 (similar to0.5 kg). The site...... was revisited in August 1997, 29 years after the accident. Water and brown algae data indicate that plutonium is not transported from the contaminated sediments into the surface waters in significant quantities. Sediment core data only indicate minor translocation of plutonium from the accident to the area...

  12. Some aspects of a technology of processing weapons grade plutonium to nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bibilashvili, Y.; Glagovsky, E.M.; Zakharkin, B.S.; Orlov, V.K.; Reshetnikov, F.G.; Rogozkin, B.G.; Soloni-N, M.I.

    2000-01-01

    The concept by Russia to use fissile weapons-grade materials, which are being recovered from nuclear pits in the process of disarmament, is based on an assessment of weapons-grade plutonium as an important energy source intended for use in nuclear power plants. However, in the path of involving plutonium excessive from the purposes of national safety into industrial power engineering there are a lot of problems, from which effectiveness and terms of its disposition are being dependent upon. Those problems have political, economical, financial and environmental character. This report outlines several technology problems of processing weapons-grade metallic plutonium into MOX-fuel for reactors based on thermal and fast neutrons, in particular, the issue of conversion of the metal into dioxide from the viewpoint of fabrication of pelletized MOX-fuel. The processing of metallic weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear fuel is a rather complicated and multi-stage process, every stage of which is its own production. Some of the stages are absent in production of MOX-fuel, for instance the stage of the conversion, i.e. transferring of metallic plutonium into dioxide of the ceramic quality. At this stage of plutonium utilization some tasks must be resolved as follows: I. As a result of the conversion, a material purified from ballast and radiogenic admixtures has to be obtained. This one will be applied to fabricate pelletized MOX-fuel going from morphological, physico-mechanical and technological properties. II. It is well known that metallic gallium, which is used as an alloying addition in weapons-grade plutonium, actively reacts with multiple metals. Therefore, an important issue is to study the effect of gallium on the technology of MOX-fuel production, quality of the pellets, as well as the interaction of gallium oxide with zirconium and steel shells of fuel elements depending upon the content of gallium in the fuel. The rate of the interaction of gallium oxide

  13. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 3: A new reactor concept without uranium or thorium for burning weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Schnitzler, B.G.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1993-06-01

    The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) requested that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) examine concepts that focus only on the destruction of 50,000 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. A concept has been developed by the INEL for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that destroys plutonium quickly without using uranium or thorium. This concept is very safe and could be designed, constructed, and operated in a reasonable time frame. This concept does not produce electricity. Not considering other missions frees the design from the paradigms and constraints used by proponents of other dispositioning concepts. The plutonium destruction design goal is most easily achievable with a large, moderate power reactor that operates at a significantly lower thermal power density than is appropriate for reactors with multiple design goals. This volume presents the assumptions and requirements, a reactor concept overview, and a list of recommendations. The appendices contain detailed discussions on plutonium dispositioning, self-protection, fuel types, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, off-site radiation releases, and economics

  14. A survey of the Maralinga atomic weapons testing range for residual plutonium contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, W.R.

    1979-06-01

    Residual plutonium levels in soil, flora, fauna and the air of the Maralinga (South Australia) Atomic Weapons Testing Range are presented and discussed. It is shown that only on rare occasions (and possibly never) would the plutonium concentration in air from wind resuspended dust exceed the maximum allowable concentration for continuous exposure of the general public. In the case of artificially resuspended dust, this maximum concentration could be exceeded for short periods, but the accompanying dust level would be such that working conditions would be uncomfortable, if not intolerable. Potential hazards from other possible exposure routes are so low that they are of no consequence

  15. progress on the U.S.-Russian excess weapons plutonium disposition program. Panel discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feinroth, Herb; Sicard, Bruno; Kudryavtsev, Evgeny; Sprankle, Kenneth A.; Nesbit, Steve; Gadsby, Robert; Aratani, Kiyonori

    2001-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: On September 1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed a historic agreement to each dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium by 2025, or sooner if possible. The agreement was conditional on international financing of the Russian program. The parties are now attempting to establish a specific program for disposition of the Russian plutonium and to secure commitments for international financing of the Russian program. In the United States, efforts are moving forward to design, license, and construct the necessary facilities for its disposition program. With the assistance of France and Germany, efforts are moving forward in Russia to plan and design appropriate reactor modifications as well as the needed facilities for plutonium conversion and mixed-oxide fabrication. Japan and Canada are also participants in the Russian disposition program. This panel session will review the status of actions taken to bring this agreement to fruition. (authors)

  16. The US program for disposition of excess weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1997-01-01

    After an exhaustive interagency study, the United States has declared that 52.7 tons of plutonium, over half of its stockpile, is excess to its military needs, and has decided to pursue a dual-track approach to eliminating this excess stockpile, burning some of it once-through as power-reactor fuel, and immobilizing the remainder with intensely radioactive fission products. This effort represents a significant step toward increasing the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions and reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. The United States expects to complete disposition of this material over the next 2-3 decades, at a net discounted present cost of approximately $1.5 billion. Intemational verification and stringent security and accounting for the material are planned for the entire program

  17. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lu, M.S.; Allentuck, J.

    1998-01-01

    It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form

  18. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  19. Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-Grade Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bolyatko, V. V. [Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (Russia)

    1998-01-29

    This technical report is a tangible and verifiable deliverable associated with the Nuclear Group subproject “Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-grade Plutonium.” This report is an assessment ofthe work performed by the Russian party from 1 October 1995 through 30 September 1996 regarding milestones defined in the contract between the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). In these interactions, TEES serves as agent of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) in the capacity oflead institution for the Nuclear Group of the ANRCP. The official Statement ofWork dated 8 April 1996 enumerates specific milestones and deliverables. In its present form, this report is an edited version ofthe translation submitted to TEES by MEPhI on 7 October 1996. The principal investigators for this subproject are Dr. Paul Nelson of TEES and Dr. Victor Bolyatko of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

  20. Plutonium Proliferation: The Achilles Heel of Disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, Paul

    2001-01-01

    Plutonium is a byproduct of nuclear fission, and it is produced at the rate of about 70 metric tons a year in the world's nuclear power reactors. Concerns about civilian plutonium ran high in the 1970s and prompted enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 to give the United States a veto over separating plutonium from U.S.-supplied uranium fuel. Over the years, however, so-called reactor-grade plutonium has become the orphan issue of nuclear non-proliferation, largely as a consequence of pressures from plutonium-separating countries. The demise of the fast breeder reactor and the reluctance of utilities to introduce plutonium fuel in light-water reactors have resulted in large surpluses of civilian, weapons-usable plutonium, which now approach in size the 250 tons of military plutonium in the world. Yet reprocessing of spent fuel for recovery and use of plutonium proceeds apace outside the United States and threatens to overwhelm safeguards and security measures for keeping this material out of the hands of nations and terrorists for weapons. A number of historical and current developments are reviewed to demonstrate that plutonium commerce is undercutting efforts both to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work toward eliminating existing nuclear arsenals. These developments include the breakdown of U.S. anti-plutonium policy, the production of nuclear weapons by India with Atoms-for-Peace plutonium, the U.S.-Russian plan to introduce excess military plutonium as fuel in civilian power reactors, the failure to include civilian plutonium and bomb-grade uranium in the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and the perception of emerging proliferation threats as the rationale for development of a ballistic missile defense system. Finally, immobilization of separated plutonium in high-level waste is explored as a proliferation-resistant and disarmament-friendly solution for eliminating excess stocks of civilian and military plutonium.

  1. A preliminary analysis of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternative deployment schedules

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zurn, R.M.

    1997-09-01

    This paper discusses the preliminary analysis of the implementation schedules of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives. These schedule analyses are a part of a larger process to examine the nine decision criteria used to determine the most appropriate method of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium. The preliminary analysis indicates that the mission durations for the reactor-based alternatives range from eleven years to eighteen years and the initial mission fuel assemblies containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium could be loaded into the reactors between nine and fourteen years after the Record of Decision.

  2. A preliminary analysis of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternative deployment schedules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zurn, R.M.

    1997-09-01

    This paper discusses the preliminary analysis of the implementation schedules of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives. These schedule analyses are a part of a larger process to examine the nine decision criteria used to determine the most appropriate method of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium. The preliminary analysis indicates that the mission durations for the reactor-based alternatives range from eleven years to eighteen years and the initial mission fuel assemblies containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium could be loaded into the reactors between nine and fourteen years after the Record of Decision

  3. A Mixed-Oxide Assembly Design for Rapid Disposition of Weapons Plutonium in Pressurized Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alonso, Gustavo; Adams, Marvin L.

    2002-01-01

    We have created a new mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assembly design for standard pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Design goals were to maximize the plutonium throughput while introducing the lowest perturbation possible to the control and safety systems of the reactor. Our assembly design, which we call MIX-33, offers some advantages for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium; it increases the disposition rate by 8% while increasing the worth of control material, compared to a previous Westinghouse design. The MIX-33 design is based upon two ideas: the use of both uranium and plutonium fuel pins in the same assembly, and the addition of water holes in the assembly. The main result of this paper is that both of these ideas are effective at increasing Pu throughput and increasing the worth of control material. With this new design, according to our analyses, we can transition smoothly from a full low-enriched-uranium (LEU) core to a full MIX-33 core while meeting the operational and safety requirements of a standard PWR. Given an interruption of the MOX supply, we can transition smoothly back to full LEU while meeting safety margins and using standard LEU assemblies with uniform pinwise enrichment distribution. If the MOX supply is interrupted for only one cycle, the transition back to a full MIX-33 core is not as smooth; high peaking could cause power to be derated by a few percent for a few weeks at the beginning of one transition cycle

  4. Building 834 -- Cost-effective and innovative design of remediation systems using surplus equipment from former weapons programs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Daley, P.F.; Landgraf, R.K.; Lima, M.R.; Lamarre, A.L.

    1995-07-01

    The Building 834 Complex at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Site 300, has been used by the weapons development programs at LLNL as a testing facility for measuring component response to environmental stresses such as extreme temperature. The heat-exchange system at the facility used trichloroethene TCE, at times with adjuvants, as the primary heat-transfer media for over 20 years. Accidental spills, pipe failures, and seal blowouts over that period contributed to a substantial contaminant plume in a perched water-bearing zone underlying the Complex. Individual wells near the source area have produced ground water samples with TCE concentrations exceeding 800,000 ppb. In the last several years, the authors have developed a modular ground water and soil vapor extraction system for remediating the plume source area. The modular facility design permits the testing of new technologies to expedite remediation, and/or reduce the quantity of hazardous wastes generated as byproducts of the primary remedial activities. To contain costs, the authors have used equipment and components recycled from the original Building 834 Complex heat-exchange system, and surplus equipment from other LLNL divisions. The authors have executed two large-scale tests of energy injection systems for TCE destruction in air (a free-air electron beam and a pulsed, ultraviolet photolysis system), and a soil heating test for accelerating vapor extraction. New work plans for this unique site are being prepared, incorporating the lessons learned in developing new technology with recycled equipment.

  5. Managing proliferation risks from civilian and weapon-grade plutonium and enriched uranium: A comprehensive cut-off convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    1997-01-01

    The problem of weapon-grade fissile materials is closely related to the aim of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Huge amounts of highly enriched uranium have been produced for nuclear weapons. More than 1000 tonnes of plutonium emerged as a by-product of civilian nuclear industry. Separated from spent fuel it is readily usable for nuclear weapons. The worldwide civilian tritium inventory may reach the same size as military stocks about the year 2010. This poses an increasing danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Production, stockpiling, trade, processing and uses of weapon-grade materials like Highly enriched uranium, plutonium and tritium promote its geographical spread, enlarge the group of people with the relate know-how and create the danger of diversion of material and the proliferation of knowledge for the purpose of weapons production. Therefore, a fundamental turn away from using weapon-grade materials in scientific and economic applications of nuclear energy is desirable in all countries. Priority should be given to using nuclear fuel cycles which are as proliferation resistant as possible. Without this, the continuation of civil nuclear programs seems to be irresponsible and unjustifiable. The role of the IAEA in export control safeguards related to the above problems is indispensable

  6. Utilization of Cs137 to generate a radiation barrier for weapons grade plutonium immobilized in borosilicate glass canisters. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.; Armantrout, G.A.; Collins, L.F.

    1995-01-01

    One of the ways recommended by a recent National Academy of Sciences study to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium is to encapsulate the plutonium in a glass in combination with high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) to generate an intense radiation dose rate field. The objective is to render the plutonium as difficult to access as the plutonium contained in existing US commercial spent light-water reactor (LWR) fuel until it can be disposed of in a permanent geological repository. A radiation dose rate from a sealed canister of 1,000 rem/h (10 Sv/h) at 1 meter for at least 30 years after fabrication was assumed in this paper to be a radiation dose comparable to spent LWR fuel. This can be achieved by encapsulating the plutonium in a borosilicate glass with an adequate amount of a single fission product in the HLWS, namely radioactive Cs 137 . One hundred thousand curies of Cs 137 will generate a dose rate of 1,000 rem/h (10 Sv/h) at 1 meter for at least 30 years when imbedded into canisters of the size proposed for the Savannah River Site's vitrified high-level wastes. The United States has a current inventory of 54 MCi of CS 137 that has been separated from defense HLWs and is in sealed capsules. This single curie inventory is sufficient to spike 50 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium if plutonium can be loaded at 5.5 wt% in glass, or 540 canisters. Additional CS 137 inventories exist in the United States' HLWs from past reprocessing operations, should additional curies be required. Using only one fission product, CS 137 , rather than the multiple chemical elements and compounds in HLWs to generate a high radiation dose rate from a glass canister greatly simplifies the processing engineering retirement for encapsulating plutonium in a borosilicate glass

  7. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium: Plant layout study and related design issues

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fontana, M.H. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Krakowski, R.A.; Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Davidson, J.W.; Sailor, W.C.; Williamson, M.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-04-01

    In preparation for and in support of a detailed R and D Plan for the Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium, an ABC Plant Layout Study was conducted at the level of a pre-conceptual engineering design. The plant layout is based on an adaptation of the Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) detailed conceptual design that was completed in the early 1070s. Although the ABC Plant Layout Study included the Accelerator Equipment as an essential element, the engineering assessment focused primarily on the Target; Primary System (blanket and all systems containing plutonium-bearing fuel salt); the Heat-Removal System (secondary-coolant-salt and supercritical-steam systems); Chemical Processing; Operation and Maintenance; Containment and Safety; and Instrumentation and Control systems. Although constrained primarily to a reflection of an accelerator-driven (subcritical) variant of MSBR system, unique features and added flexibilities of the ABC suggest improved or alternative approaches to each of the above-listed subsystems; these, along with the key technical issues in need of resolution through a detailed R&D plan for ABC are described on the bases of the ``strawman`` or ``point-of-departure`` plant layout that resulted from this study.

  8. Plutonium Disposition by Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gould, T.; DiSabatino, A.; Mitchell, M.

    2000-01-01

    The ultimate goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize between 17 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials in waste forms that meet the ''spent fuel'' standard and are acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. Using the ceramic can-in-canister technology selected for immobilization, surplus plutonium materials will be chemically combined into ceramic forms which will be encapsulated within large canisters of high level waste (HLW) glass. Deployment of the immobilization capability should occur by 2008 and be completed within 10 years. In support of this goal, the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) is conducting development and testing (D and T) activities at four DOE laboratories under the technical leadership of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Savannah River Site has been selected as the site for the planned Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP). The D and T effort, now in its third year, will establish the technical bases for the design, construction, and operation of the U. S. capability to immobilize surplus plutonium in a suitable and cost-effective manner. Based on the D and T effort and on the development of a conceptual design of the PIP, automation is expected to play a key role in the design and operation of the Immobilization Plant. Automation and remote handling are needed to achieve required dose reduction and to enhance operational efficiency

  9. Dealing with a dangerous surplus from the cold war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.

    1997-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear materials is a threat to national security and world peace. This threat complicates the safeguarding and management of fissile materials that have become surplus since the end of the Cold War. The dismantling of weapons and the cessation of new nuclear weapons manufacturing, while positive for world peace, have raised a problem: what to do about the fissile materials recovered from the weapons or in inventories that will remain unused. These materials--primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium--are environmental, safety, and health concerns. But of more urgency is the threat they pose to national and international security if they fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. As arms reduction continues and amounts of surplus fissile materials increase, the potential for such security breaches will increase

  10. A methodology for the analysis and selection of alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, April 1, 1995--June 30, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulder, R.

    1995-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is currently involved in the development of a comprehensive approach to the long-term storage and disposition of fissile materials. A major objective of this effort is to provide a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This will entail both the elimination of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and the insurance of the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is supporting an Interagency Working Group that has initiated a comprehensive review of alternatives for plutonium disposition which takes into account non-proliferation, economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. These alternatives were identified by the development of screening criteria as a guide to the selection of alternatives that best achieve the fissile nuclear material long-term storage and disposition goals of the US Government

  11. New glass material oxidation and dissolution system facility: Direct conversion of surplus fissile materials, spent nuclear fuel, and other material to high-level-waste glass. Storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials programmatic environmental impact statement data report: Predecisional draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Elam, K.R.; Reich, W.J.

    1995-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, countries have excess plutonium and other materials from the reductions in inventories of nuclear weapons. It has been recommended that these surplus fissile materials (SFMs) be processed so that they are no more accessible than plutonium in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This SNF standard, if adopted worldwide, would prevent rapid recovery of SFMs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This report provides for the PEIS the necessary input data on a new method for the disposition of SFMs: the simultaneous conversion of SFMs, SNF, and other highly radioactive materials into high-level-waste (HLW) glass. The SFMs include plutonium, neptunium, americium, and 233 U. The primary SFM is plutonium. The preferred SNF is degraded SNF, which may require processing before it can be accepted by a geological repository for disposal. The primary form of this SNF is Hanford-N SNF with preirradiation uranium enrichments between 0.95 and 1.08%. The final product is a plutonium, low-enriched-uranium, HLW, borosilicate glass for disposition in a geological repository. The proposed conversion process is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS), which is a new process. The initial analysis of the GMODS process indicates that a MODS facility for this application would be similar in size and environmental impact to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site. Because of this, the detailed information available on DWPF was used as the basis for much of the GMODS input into the SFMs PEIS

  12. Could weapon-grade plutonium be an asset for managing Pu inventories?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bairiot, H.; Bemden, E. van den

    1997-01-01

    Due to the temporary shortage of MOX fuel fabrication facilities, the stockpile of separated civilian grade Pu (CPu) is predicted to increase up to the turn of the century. An additional quantity of weapon grade Pu (WPu) will be progressively isolated at the same period. Both CPu and WPu surpluses require disposition as soon as feasible. Although non-proliferation concerns, established national policies, public acceptance problems and other considerations largely complicate the aspect of the use of WPu, it is worth examining the advantages which could result from a synergetic management of: LWR grade Pu to which AGR grade Pu might be associated; WPu; GCR grade Pu which should be considered as a Pu variety situated between the two first ones as far as their physical and neutronic characteristics are concerned. Two scenarios of integrated managements of the CPu varieties and WPu are being considered. They indicate several technical and economical advantages but also important problems to be resolved, mainly from the non-proliferation point of view. In that respect, it is concluded that, although no reasonable perspective exists to resolve these problems easily (or at all), the advantages justify an effort of the international community to consider how it could be implemented. (author). 24 refs, 2 figs, 5 tabs

  13. Robot vision system for remote plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.

    2000-01-01

    Tons of weapons-usable plutonium has been declared surplus to the national security needs of the United States. The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a US Department of Energy sponsored program to place excess plutonium in a stable form and make it unattractive for reuse. A vision system was developed as part of PIP robotic and remote systems development. This vision system provides visual feedback to a can-loading robot that places plutonium/ceramic pucks in stainless steel cans. Inexpensive grayscale CCD cameras were used in conjunction with an off-the-shelf video capture card and computer to build an effective two-camera vision system. Testing demonstrates the viability of this technology for use in the Plutonium Immobilization Project facility, which is scheduled to begin operations in 2008

  14. The AIDA-MOX 1 program: Results of the French-Russian study on peaceful use of plutonium from dismantled Russian Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yegorov, N.N.; Kudriavtsev, E.; Poplavsky, V.; Polyakov, A.; Ouin, X.; Camarcat, N.; Sicard, B.; Bernard, H.

    1997-01-01

    The Intergovernmental Agreement signed on November 12, 1992, between the governments of France and the Russian Federation instituted cooperation between the two countries for the safe elimination of the excess Russian nuclear weapons. France has allocated 400 million francs to this program, covering transportation and dismantling of nuclear weapons, interim storage and subsequent commercial use of the nuclear materials from the dismantled weapons, nuclear materials accountancy and safeguards, and scientific research. The concept of loading commercial Russian reactors with fuel fabricated from the plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union is gaining widespread acceptance, and is at the heart of the French-Russian AIDA/MOX project

  15. Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miner, William N

    1964-01-01

    This pamphlet discusses plutonium from discovery to its production, separation, properties, fabrication, handling, and uses, including use as a reactor fuel and use in isotope power generators and neutron sources.

  16. Nuclear weapon relevant materials and preventive arms control. Uranium-free fuels for plutonium elimination and spallation neutron sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, Wolfgang; Englert, Matthias; Pistner, Christoph

    2009-01-01

    Today, the most significant barrier against the access to nuclear weapons is to take hold on sufficient amounts of nuclear weapon-relevant nuclear materials. It is mainly a matter of fissionable materials (like highly enriched uranium and plutonium) but also of fusionable tritium. These can be used as reactor fuel in civil nuclear programmes but also in nuclear weapon programmes. To stop or to hinder nuclear proliferation, in consequence, there is not only a need to analyse open or covered political objectives and intentions. In the long term, it might be more decisive to analyse the intrinsic civil-military ambivalence of nuclear materials and technologies, which are suitable for sensitive material production. A farsighted strategy to avoid proliferation dangers should take much more account to technical capabilities as it is done in the political debate on nuclear non-proliferation so far. If a technical option is at a state's disposal, it is extremely difficult and lengthy to revert that again. The dangers, which one has to react to, are stemming from already existing stocks of nuclear weapon-relevant materials - in the military as well as in the civil realm - and from existing or future technologies, which are suitable for the production of such materials (cf. info 1 and 2). Therefore, the overall approach of this research project is to strive for a drastic reduction of the access to nuclear weapon-relevant material and its production capabilities. Thus, on one hand the nuclear proliferation by state actors could be answered more effectively, on the other hand by that approach a decisive barrier against the access on nuclear weapons by sub-national groups and terrorists could also be erected. For this purpose, safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other measures of physical accountancy will remain indispensable elements of arms control. However, one has to consider that the goal of nuclear non-proliferation could not be achieved and

  17. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made.

  18. Plutonium storage: Requirements and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cunningham, P.T.; Haschke, J.M.; Martz, J.C.

    1993-01-01

    The retirement of large numbers of nuclear weapons will necessitate management of unprecedented quantities of excess plutonium. In addition, surplus material and residues from previous weapon production activities comprise a substantial quantity of concentrated plutonium that exists in a variety of chemical forms. Storage of plutonium for an indefinite period will be necessary until a decision regarding ultimate disposition is made. Selection of the most suitable storage option(s) for this interim period is complicated by technical issues, nuclear proliferation concerns, contingency planning, political factors, and uncertainty regarding the length of the interim period. Options for excess plutonium include storage as intact weapon components and storage as extracted nuclear material. Specific advantages for storage of excess material in a variety of chemical forms have been presented. In this paper, technical issues associated with various storage options are examined with emphasis on relevant physical and chemical properties of candidate materials. Technology and facility requirements for preparing and certifying storage forms are considered and recommendations, based on our assessment of options, are presented

  19. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-09-01

    The subject is discussed under the headings: creation (fuel cycle, Pu formed in thermal reactors); properties; Pu in fast reactors; fast reactor experience; radioactivity; handling; Pu and weapons. (U.K.)

  20. Method of immobilizing weapons plutonium to provide a durable, disposable waste product

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ewing, Rodney C.; Lutze, Werner; Weber, William J.

    1996-01-01

    A method of atomic scale fixation and immobilization of plutonium to provide a durable waste product. Plutonium is provided in the form of either PuO.sub.2 or Pu(NO.sub.3).sub.4 and is mixed with and SiO.sub.2. The resulting mixture is cold pressed and then heated under pressure to form (Zr,Pu)SiO.sub.4 as the waste product.

  1. Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

    1999-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant

  2. The plutonium mountain: preventing diversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pohling-Brown, Pamela.

    1997-01-01

    With continued arms-reduction between the USA and the former Soviet Union, surplus nuclear materials, from dismantled weapons, requires handling. A number of risks are identified including occupational safety for workers involved with handling nuclear materials, and environmental protection. Perhaps the most sinister is the extra security needed to ensure that these materials are not diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups, as materials are handled in a larger number of countries. In particular, the author addresses the problem of plutonium reserves, and discusses the role of reprocessing in preventing diversion. (UK)

  3. Design of a weapons-grade plutonium assembly for optimal burnup in a standard pressurized water reactor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alonso-Vargas, Gustavo

    We created a new MOX fuel assembly design that can be used in standard Westinghouse pressurized water reactors (PWR) to maximize the plutonium throughput while introducing the lowest perturbation possible to the control and safety systems of the reactor. Our assembly design, which is called MIX-33, appears to be a good option for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu), increasing the plutonium disposition rate by 8% compared to a previous Westinghouse design. It is based in two novel ideas: the use of both uranium and plutonium fuel pins in the same assembly, and the increase of the moderation ratio of the assembly. We replaced 8 fuel pins by water holes to increase the moderation ratio. We can transition smoothly from a full LEU core to a full MIX-33 core meeting the operational and safety regulations of a standard PWR. Given a MOX supply interruption scenario we can transition smoothly to full LEU meeting the safety regulations and using standard LEU assemblies with uniform enriched pin-wise distribution. If the MOX supply is interrupted for only one cycle, we are able to transition back to full MIX-33 core. However, in this case we probably need to de-rate the power by a few percent for a few weeks at the beginning of the cycle (BOC) to accommodate high peaking. For comparison we created another assembly design without extra water holes, which we called "MIX-25". It behaves in all the conditions analyzed in a similar way to the MIX-33 but it does present minor control problems. These can be solved by making small modifications to the control and safety systems, namely by enriching the boron-10 content of some boron absorbers. Thus, the addition of water holes replacing fuel pins helps to improve the MIX-33 performance and eliminate the difficulties seen in the MIX-25 design. We also performed a benchmarking analysis to test the code CASMO-3 to analyze WG-Pu assemblies, using the code MCNP-4A to compare. We found good agreement between CASMO-3 and

  4. Review of Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition LLNL Contract Work in Russia-(English)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L; Borisov, G B

    2002-01-01

    This third meeting of the recently completed and ongoing Russian plutonium immobilization contract work was held at the State Education Center (SEC) in St. Petersburg on January 14-18, 2002. The meeting agenda is reprinted here as Appendix A and the attendance list as Appendix B. The meeting had 58 Russian participants from 21 Russian organizations, including the industrial sites (Mayak, Krasonayarsk-26, Tomsk), scientific institutes (VNIINM, KRI, VNIPIPT, RIAR), design organizations (VNIPIET and GSPI), universities (Nyzhny Novgorod, Urals Technical), Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute of Physical Chemistry or IPhCh, Institute of Ore-Deposit Geology, Petrography, Mineralogy, and Geochemistry or IGEM), Radon-Moscow, S and TC Podol'osk, Kharkov-Ukraine, GAN-SEC-NRS and SNIIChM, the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Gosatomnadzor (GAN). This volume, published by LLNL, documents this third annual meeting. Forty-nine technical papers were presented by the Russian participants, and nearly all of these have been collected in this Proceedings. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing this contract work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work amongst each other. (2) Publish a meeting summary and proceedings of all the excellent Russian plutonium immobilization and other plutonium disposition contract work in one document so that the wide extent of the Russian immobilization activities are documented, referencable and available for others to use, as were the Proceedings of the two previous meetings. Attendees gave talks describing their LLNL contract work and submitted written papers documenting their contract work (in English and Russian), in both hard copy and on computer disks. Simultaneous translation into Russian and English was used for presentations made at the State Region Educational Center (SEC)

  5. Modernization of RTC for fabrication of MOX fuel, Vibropac fuel pins and BN-600 FA with weapon grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grachyov, A.F.; Kalygin, V.V.; Skiba, O.V.; Mayorshin, A. A.; Bychkov, A.V.; Kisly, V.A.; Ovsyannikov, Y.F.; Bobrov, D.A.; Mamontov, S.I.; Tsyganov, A.N.; Churutkin, E.I.; Davydov, P.I.; Samosenko, E.A; Shalak, A.R.; Ojima, Hisao

    2004-01-01

    to provide the BN-600 hybrid core with vibro-pac MOX fuel produced from weapon-grade plutonium excess for defense needs

  6. An Opportunity to Immobilize 1.6 MT or More of Weapons-Grade Plutonium at the Mayak and Krasnoyarsk-26 Sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B; Rovny, S I; Kudinov, K G; Shvedov, A A

    2001-01-01

    The Mayak Production Association (PA Mayak), an industrial site in Russia, will be assigned multiple new plutonium disposition missions in order to implement the ''Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of Russian Federation Concerning The Management And Disposition Of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes And Related Cooperation'' signed September 1, 2000, by Gore and Kasyanov, In addition, the mission of industrial-scale mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication will be assigned to either the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC) industrial site at Krasnoyarsk-26 (K-26) or PA Mayak. Over the next decades, these new missions will generate radioactive wastes containing weapons-grade plutonium. The existing Mayak and K-26 onsite facilities and infrastructures cannot currently treat and immobilize these Pu-containing wastes for storage and disposal. However, the wastes generated under the Agreement must be properly immobilized, treated, and managed. New waste treatment and immobilization missions at Mayak may include operating facilities for plutonium metal-to-oxide conversion processes, industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication, BN-600 PAKET hybrid core MOX fuel fabrication, and a plutonium conversion demonstration process. The MCC K-26 site, if assigned the industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication mission, would also need to add facilities to treat and immobilize the Pu-containing wastes. This paper explores the approach and cost of treatment and immobilization facilities at both Mayak and K-26. The current work to date at Mayak and MCC K-26 indicates that the direct immobilization of 1.6 MT of weapons-grade plutonium is a viable and cost-effective alternative

  7. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission

  8. Disposition of surplus fissile materials via immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Sutcliffe, W.G.; McKibben, J.M.; Danker, W.

    1995-01-01

    In the Cold War aftermath, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, the USDOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One disposition alternative being considered is immobilization. Immobilization is a process in which surplus Pu would be embedded in a suitable material to produce an appropriate form for ultimate disposal. To arrive at an appropriate form, we first reviewed published information on HLW immobilization technologies to identify forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multi-attribute utility analysis to determine promising technologies for Pu immobilization. We further evaluated the most promising immobilization families to identify and seek solutions for chemical, chemical engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems; these problems remain to be solved before we can make technical decisions about the viability of using the forms for long-term disposition of Pu. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in Summer of 1996

  9. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results

  10. Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wendel, Cato Christian; Fifield, L Keith; Oughton, Deborah H; Lind, Ole Christian; Skipperud, Lindis; Bartnicki, Jerzy; Tims, Stephen G; Høibråten, Steinar; Salbu, Brit

    2013-09-01

    A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782μBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have

  11. Integrated development and testing plan for the plutonium immobilization project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kan, T.

    1998-01-01

    This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D and T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D and T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D and T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the

  12. Plutonium radiation surrogate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frank, Michael I [Dublin, CA

    2010-02-02

    A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.

  13. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  14. Global plutonium management: A security option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1998-01-01

    The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.hor-ellipsis) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints

  15. Development of the plutonium oxide vitrification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, K.M.; Marra, J.C.; Coughlin, J.T.; Calloway, T.B.; Schumacher, R.F.; Zamecnik, J.R.; Pareizs, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    Repository disposal of plutonium in a suitable, immobilized form is being considered as one option for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. Accelerated development efforts were completed in 1997 on two potential immobilization forms to facilitate downselection to one form for continued development. The two forms studied were a crystalline ceramic based on Synroc technology and a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. As part of the glass development program, melter design activities and component testing were completed to demonstrate the feasibility of using glass as an immobilization medium. A prototypical melter was designed and built in 1997. The melter vessel and drain tube were constructed of a Pt/Rh alloy. Separate induction systems were used to heat the vessel and drain tube. A Pt/Rh stirrer was incorporated into the design to facilitate homogenization of the melt. Integrated powder feeding and off-gas systems completed the overall design. Concurrent with the design efforts, testing was conducted using a plutonium surrogate LaBS composition in an existing (near-scale) melter to demonstrate the feasibility of processing the LaBS glass on a production scale. Additionally, the drain tube configuration was successfully tested using a plutonium surrogate LaBS glass

  16. Thermo-Mechanical Response of a TRISO Fuel Particle in a Fusion/Fission Engine for Incineration of Weapons Grade Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Caro, M; DeMange, P; Marian, J; Caro, A

    2009-12-08

    The Laser Inertial Fusion-based (LIFE) engine is an advanced energy concept under development at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). LIFE engine could be used to drive a subcritical fission blanket with fertile or fissile fuel. Current LIFE engine designs envisages fuel in pebble bed form with TRISO (tristructural isotropic) particles embedded in a graphite matrix, and pebbles flowing in molten salt Flibe (2LiF+BeF{sub 2}) coolant at T {approx} 700C. Weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) fuel is an attractive option for LIFE engine involving the achievement of high fractional burnups in a short lifetime frame. However, WGPu LIFE engine operating conditions of high neutron fast fluence, high radiation damage, and high Helium and Hydrogen production pose severe challenges for typical TRISO particles. The thermo-mechanical fuel performance code HUPPCO (High burn-Up fuel Pebble Performance COde) currently under development accounts for spatial and time dependence of the material elastic properties, temperature, and irradiation swelling and creep mechanisms. In this work, some aspects of the thermo-mechanical response of TRISO particles used for incineration of weapons grade fuel in LIFE engine are analyzed. Preliminary results show the importance of developing reliable high-fidelity models of the performance of these new fuel designs and the need of new experimental data relevant to WGPu LIFE conditions.

  17. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

  18. Direct conversion of surplus fissile materials, spent nuclear fuel, and other materials to high-level-waste glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Elam, K.R.

    1995-01-01

    With the end of the cold war the United States, Russia, and other countries have excess plutonium and other materials from the reductions in inventories of nuclear weapons. The United States Academy of Sciences (NAS) has recommended that these surplus fissile materials (SFMs) be processed so they are no more accessible than plutonium in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This spent fuel standard, if adopted worldwide, would prevent rapid recovery of SFMs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The NAS recommended investigation of three sets of options for disposition of SFMs while meeting the spent fuel standard: (1) incorporate SFMs with highly radioactive materials and dispose of as waste, (2) partly burn the SFMs in reactors with conversion of the SFMs to SNF for disposal, and (3) dispose of the SFMs in deep boreholes. The US Government is investigating these options for SFM disposition. A new method for the disposition of SFMs is described herein: the simultaneous conversion of SFMs, SNF, and other highly radioactive materials into high-level-waste (HLW) glass. The SFMs include plutonium, neptinium, americium, and 233 U. The primary SFM is plutonium. The preferred SNF is degraded SNF, which may require processing before it can be accepted by a geological repository for disposal

  19. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design's capability for plutonium disposition

  20. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design's capability for plutonium disposition

  1. Status and trends in plutonium recycling in nuclear power reactors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Onoufriev, Vladimir

    2000-07-01

    Already during the well-known IAEA International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Study of 1976-80,[1] the different aspects of plutonium utilization in the form of MOX fuel were discussed and followed up in the many international meetings during the last two decades. An International Symposium on MOX Fuel Cycle Technologies for Medium and Long Term Deployment, organized by the IAEA in co-operation with OECD/NEA and held in Vienna in May 1999, was a milestone which reviewed the past, present and future of Pu recycling in nuclear power reactors.[2] This paper presents major results of the Symposium in the context of present conditions of deregulated electricity market and in the future and its role in the reduction of stockpiles of separated civil and surplus ex-weapons plutonium.

  2. The use of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1980-01-01

    The use of plutonium as a vital energy source producing maximum economic benefit with minimum proliferation risks is discussed. Having considered the production of plutonium, several possible plutonium fuel cycle options are identified and the economic value to be attached to plutonium for each examined. It is shown how the use of plutonium in fast reactors gives an opportunity for a non-proliferation policy not available when plutonium is used only in thermal reactors. From the technical considerations reviewed concerning plutonium and fast reactors it is shown that an economic regime involving international trade in spent thermal reactor fuel is possible which benefits equally those countries with fast reactors and those without and also assists in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U.K.)

  3. Fissile material management, an international approach of the future of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michel, A.; Schryvers, V.; Vanderborck, Y.

    2000-01-01

    Plutonium management is a crucial issue in any discussion on the future of nuclear energy: plutonium is indeed a normal by-product of nuclear electricity generation. As a result of long-term reprocessing strategies and recent decisions on the dismantling of nuclear weapons, separated plutonium stockpiles are increasing. Observing this situation, the Belgian Nuclear Society decided that the turn of the century was the right time to invite all the parties involved in decision making on this question to confront their decisions or the absence of it. As an international program committee was created, interested companies and institutions delegated high level experts to it and a comprehensive program was put together. This program covers: - Prospects for nuclear energy; - Public perception of plutonium; - The civil plutonium cycle; - The management of surplus military plutonium; - Non-proliferation and safeguards; - The reasons to improve the plutonium fuels performance. The conference is not scientific but strategic. It does not cover too many technical aspects but looks at the managerial questions. It is devoted to the reasons why things are done much more than how things are done. It allows to confront opinions with a mind open to all and a desire to make strategies transparent, even to the least informed public. The present paper has been written before the conference takes place in early October 2000 and describes the orientations prepared by the Programme committee. The oral presentation to Atalante 2000 will report in full over the Pu 2000 conference. (authors)

  4. Mimas, a mature and flexible process to convert the stockpiles of separated civil and weapon grade plutonium into MOX fuel for use in LWR's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandergheynst, A.; Vanderborck, Y.

    2001-01-01

    The BELGONUCLEAIRE Dessel MOX fabrication plant started operation in 1973. The first ten years have laid down the bases for all the modifications and improvements in the field of fuel fabrication and quality control process and technology, waste management, safety and safeguards. In 1984, BELGONUCLEAIRE developed the MIMAS fabrication process and has used it on industrial scale to make MOX fuel complying with the most stringent fuel vendor specifications. From 1986 to 2000, more than 25 t Pu have been processed into more than 450 tHM of MIMAS fuel delivered in five countries. The MOX fuel produced has been demonstrated to reach at least the same performance as the UO 2 fuel used simultaneously in the same reactors. The BELGONUCLEAIRE MIMAS MOX fuel fabrication process was selected by COGEMA in the late 80(tm)s for its MELOX and its Cadarache plants. In 1999, the MIMAS process was chosen by the US DOE for the new MOX fabrication plant to be built in Savannah (SC-USA) to ''demilitarize'' 25,6 tons of weapon grade plutonium originating from nuclear war- heads. Recently MIMAS was selected by Japan for its domestic MOX plant to be built in Rokkasho-mura. (author)

  5. Trawsfynydd Plutonium Estimate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reid, Bruce D.; Gerlach, David C.; Heasler, Patrick G.; Livingston, J.

    2009-01-01

    Report serves to document an estimate of the cumulative plutonium production of the Trawsfynydd Unit II reactor (Traws II) over its operating life made using the Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM). The estimate of the plutonium production in Traws II provided in this report has been generated under blind conditions. In other words, the estimate ofthe Traws II plutonium production has been generated without the knowledge of the plutonium production declared by the reactor operator (Nuclear Electric). The objective of this report is to demonstrate that the GIRM can be employed to serve as an accurate tool to verify weapons materials production declarations.

  6. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-04-30

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

  7. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 1. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-04-30

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

  8. Global disarmament and disposal of surplus weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Global disarmament in the mid-1990s is unabated. The trend of reduction of military resource use has continued, although at a slower pace. Compared to the average (not the peak) for the period 1985-1993, global military sectors were 21 per cent smaller - or more than on fifth - in 1995. The large reductions among industrialized countries caused by the end of the cold war have given way to smaller cuts. Many developing countries are continuing to cut their military sectors and some have actually abolished their armed forces altogether. However, throughout the developing world, some countries are actually building up military sectors, generally parallel to the growth of their economies. (author)

  9. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1992-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  10. Stop plutonium; Stop plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  11. Plutonium safe handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tvehlov, Yu.

    2000-01-01

    The abstract, prepared on the basis of materials of the IAEA new leadership on the plutonium safe handling and its storage (the publication no. 9 in the Safety Reports Series), aimed at presenting internationally acknowledged criteria on the radiation danger evaluation and summarizing the experience in the safe management of great quantities of plutonium, accumulated in the nuclear states, is presented. The data on the weapon-class and civil plutonium, the degree of its danger, the measures for provision of its safety, including the data on accident radiation consequences with the fission number 10 18 , are presented. The recommendations, making it possible to eliminate the super- criticality danger, as well as ignition and explosion, to maintain the tightness of the facility, aimed at excluding the radioactive contamination and the possibility of internal irradiation, to provide for the plutonium security, physical protection and to reduce irradiation are given [ru

  12. Nuclear weapon relevant materials and preventive arms control. Uranium-free fuels for plutonium elimination and spallation neutron sources; Kernwaffenrelevante Materialien und Praeventive Ruestungskontrolle. Uranfreie Brennstoffe zur Plutoniumbeseitigung und Spallationsneutronenquellen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liebert, Wolfgang; Englert, Matthias [Technische Univ. Darmstadt (Germany). Interdisziplinaere Arbeitsgruppe Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Sicherheit (IANUS); Pistner, Christoph [Oeko-Institut e.V. - Institut fuer Angewandte Oekologie, Darmstadt (Germany)

    2009-07-01

    Today, the most significant barrier against the access to nuclear weapons is to take hold on sufficient amounts of nuclear weapon-relevant nuclear materials. It is mainly a matter of fissionable materials (like highly enriched uranium and plutonium) but also of fusionable tritium. These can be used as reactor fuel in civil nuclear programmes but also in nuclear weapon programmes. To stop or to hinder nuclear proliferation, in consequence, there is not only a need to analyse open or covered political objectives and intentions. In the long term, it might be more decisive to analyse the intrinsic civil-military ambivalence of nuclear materials and technologies, which are suitable for sensitive material production. A farsighted strategy to avoid proliferation dangers should take much more account to technical capabilities as it is done in the political debate on nuclear non-proliferation so far. If a technical option is at a state's disposal, it is extremely difficult and lengthy to revert that again. The dangers, which one has to react to, are stemming from already existing stocks of nuclear weapon-relevant materials - in the military as well as in the civil realm - and from existing or future technologies, which are suitable for the production of such materials (cf. info 1 and 2). Therefore, the overall approach of this research project is to strive for a drastic reduction of the access to nuclear weapon-relevant material and its production capabilities. Thus, on one hand the nuclear proliferation by state actors could be answered more effectively, on the other hand by that approach a decisive barrier against the access on nuclear weapons by sub-national groups and terrorists could also be erected. For this purpose, safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other measures of physical accountancy will remain indispensable elements of arms control. However, one has to consider that the goal of nuclear non-proliferation could not be achieved

  13. Plutonium production and utilization forecasts in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haijtink, B.

    1976-01-01

    The planned accelerated growth of nuclear energy generation in the near future will lead to a large production of plutonium in the thermal reactors. Therefore, up to 1985, the major part of the available plutonium will be plutonium recovered from spent uranium-metal, particularly in the United Kingdom and in France. Because of the low demand for fuelling the fast breeder reactors within the near future, a surplus of fissile plutonium will be accumulated in Europe. Even if the planned availability of the oxide reprocessing capacity will be delayed with two or three years, a plutonium surplus will still exist in Europe, e.g.; in 1985: 25-20 tons. On longer term, up to 2000, the plutonium production in thermal reactors will be sufficient to meet the estimated demand for fast breeder reactors at their commercial introduction foreseen for the nineties. That means that all the plutonium surplus needs not to be stocked for use in fast breeder reactors later on but could be recycled in thermal reactors. The magnitude of the available fissionable materials give an idea of the importance to promote, on an industrial scale, the plutonium recycling technology

  14. Reactor based plutonium disposition - physics and fuel behaviour benchmark studies of an OECD/NEA experts group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Hondt, P.; Gehin, J.; Na, B.C.; Sartori, E.; Wiesenack, W.

    2001-01-01

    One of the options envisaged for disposing of weapons grade plutonium, declared surplus for national defence in the Russian Federation and Usa, is to burn it in nuclear power reactors. The scientific/technical know-how accumulated in the use of MOX as a fuel for electricity generation is of great relevance for the plutonium disposition programmes. An Expert Group of the OECD/Nea is carrying out a series of benchmarks with the aim of facilitating the use of this know-how for meeting this objective. This paper describes the background that led to establishing the Expert Group, and the present status of results from these benchmarks. The benchmark studies cover a theoretical reactor physics benchmark on a VVER-1000 core loaded with MOX, two experimental benchmarks on MOX lattices and a benchmark concerned with MOX fuel behaviour for both solid and hollow pellets. First conclusions are outlined as well as future work. (author)

  15. Taming The Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats

    Science.gov (United States)

    2006-06-01

    of reducing or ending the U.S. security relationship with their country. This could become a significant factor in their calculations about whether...lower burnup and hence contain plutonium with a higher Pu-239 content than the plutonium in spent fuel of the full design burnup . Such plutonium is...The fuel grade plutonium is markedly superior for weapons use than reactor grade plutonium from spent fuel of the design burnup . The arguments

  16. Technical challenges in support of the plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mason, C.F.V.; Zygmunt, S.J.; Hahn, W.K.; James, C.A.; Costa, D.A.; Smith, W.H.; Yarbro, S.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Plutonium Materials Conversion Program for Russia is designed to assist Russia in defining a path for the destruction of weapons grade plutonium. A similar program is currently defining a program for destruction of US weapons grade plutonium. These two sister programs arose from the September 1998 meeting between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, after which they issued a 'Joint statement of principles for management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes'. The US and Russia have each committed to convert 50 metric tons of plutonium from nuclear weapons programs to forms which are unusable for weapons

  17. U.S. plutonium disposition policy...bombs for everybody forever?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowman, C.D.

    1996-01-01

    The US policy on the disposition of weapons and commercial plutonium by geologic storage is examined and compared with destruction in reactors or accelerator-driven systems. The close coupling with Russian weapons plutonium is considered. Strong emphasis is placed on the preference by terrorists and rogue states for commercial plutonium over weapons plutonium for fast and simple nuclear weapons acquisition. US policy faces now the issue of whether the plutonium is going to be with us essentially ''forever'' or whether several technical options for total destruction will be supported. Accelerator-driven transmutation technology is proposed as a safe, affordable, and complete solution to this problem

  18. Multi-generational stewardship of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1997-01-01

    The post-cold war era has greatly enhanced the interest in the long-term stewardship of plutonium. The management of excess plutonium from proposed nuclear weapons dismantlement has been the subject of numerous intellectual discussions during the past several years. In this context, issues relevant to long-term management of all plutonium as a valuable energy resource are also being examined. While there are differing views about the future role of plutonium in the economy, there is a recognition of the environmental and health related problems and proliferation potentials of weapons-grade plutonium. The long-term management of plutonium as an energy resource will require a new strategy to maintain stewardship for many generations to come

  19. Stop plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  20. Metal plutonium conversion to components of nuclear reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subbotin, V.G.; Panov, A.V.; Mashirev, V.P.

    2000-01-01

    Capabilities of different technologies for plutonium conversion to the fuel components of nuclear reactors are studied. Advantages and shortcomings of aqueous and nonaqueous methods of plutonium treatment are shown. Proposals to combine and coordinate efforts of world scientific and technological community in solving problems concerning plutonium of energetic and weapon origin treatment were put forward. (authors)

  1. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    Following President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations

  2. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  3. The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of plutonium and neptunium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenna, T.C.; Sayles, F.L.

    2002-01-01

    Isotopic ratios of Pu and Np measured in sediment cores from 5 locations in the Ob River drainage basin show clear evidence of input from sources other than global fallout (non-fallout sources). Historical contaminant records obtained by combining isotopic ratio information with chronological information indicate that non-fallout inputs are from several sources that have varied significantly over the past 50 years. Unique isotopic signatures observed in sediments from tributaries that drain areas containing known or suspected sources of non-fallout contamination are used to identify the source of materials in sediments collected at downstream locations. These data can lead to a better understanding of the transport behavior, fate, and relative importance of particle reactive, weapons related contaminants originating from the nuclear facilities Mayak, Tomsk-7, and Semipalitinsk, which lie within the drainage basin. From our work to date, we draw the following conclusions: (1) Persistent non-fallout contamination is observed in the Ob River above its confluence with the Irtysh River, indicating contamination from the Tomsk-7 facility. (2) Non-fallout contamination in the Tobol River above its confluence with the Irtysh River indicates contamination from the Mayak facility. (3) Non-fallout contamination in the Irtysh River above its confluence with the Tobol River indicates contamination from the Semipalitinsk weapons test site. (4) The occurrence of isotopic ratios in Ob Delta sediments that are similar to those observed in source tributaries suggests that contamination from at least two sources has been transported along the length of the river system. (5) Global fallout, a result of high-yield atmospheric weapons tests conducted by the FSU and USA primarily, is the dominant source of Pu and Np to the region; however, there have been brief periods when inputs from non-fallout sources exceeded those from global fallout

  4. Plutonium controversy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated. (ACR)

  5. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated

  6. Fissile material disposition program: Screening of alternate immobilization candidates for disposition of surplus fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    1996-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, the world faces for the first time the need to dismantle vast numbers of ''excess'' nuclear weapons and dispose of the fissile materials they contain, together with fissile residues in the weapons production complex left over from the production of these weapons. If recently agreed US and Russian reductions are fully implemented, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, containing a hundred tons or more of plutonium and hundreds of tonnes* of highly enriched uranium (HEU), will no longer be needed worldwide for military purposes. These two materials are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, and limits on access to them are the primary technical barrier to prospective proliferants who might desire to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Theoretically, several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of HEU, is sufficient to make a nuclear explosive device. Therefore, these materials will continue to be a potential threat to humanity for as long as they exist

  7. US Department of Energy Plutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop, December 12-14, 1995: Final proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    The purpose of the workshop was to foster communication within the technical community on issues surrounding stabilization and immobilization of the Department`s surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated wastes. The workshop`s objectives were to: build a common understanding of the performance, economics and maturity of stabilization and immobilization technologies; provide a system perspective on stabilization and immobilization technology options; and address the technical issues associated with technologies for stabilization and immobilization of surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated waste. The papers presented during this workshop have been indexed separately.

  8. International controls and the elimination of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, T.

    1997-01-01

    The elimination of nuclear weapons will require success in three interrelated efforts: stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons by states through indigenous programs; preventing the illicit acquisition o warheads, components or essential materials by states, sub-national organizations or individuals; and halting further production and eliminating existing nuclear weapons in acknowledged nuclear-weapon-states and in other states that may now possess such weapons. The elimination of nuclear weapons is a challenge for regional and global security and perhaps more than any other security issue, a matter of most appropriate for collective control measures. The most significant issues concerning control are related to proliferation and peaceful uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The IAEA has a special role, tasks and responsibilities concerning verification of non-proliferation, plutonium management, illegal trafficking of plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium, production cut-off of fissile material

  9. Repository and deep borehole disposition of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1996-02-01

    Control and disposition of excess weapons plutonium is a growing issue as both the US and Russia retire a large number of nuclear weapons> A variety of options are under consideration to ultimately dispose of this material. Permanent disposition includes tow broad categories: direct Pu disposal where the material is considered waste and disposed of, and Pu utilization, where the potential energy content of the material is exploited via fissioning. The primary alternative to a high-level radioactive waste repository for the ultimate disposal of plutonium is development of a custom geologic facility. A variety of geologic facility types have been considered, but the concept currently being assessed is the deep borehole

  10. Technical aspects of plutonium disposition in current community (Russian experience)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kiselev, G.V.

    2005-01-01

    The world nuclear power exists 50 years yet. The complicated problems on safe management of long-lived radioactive waste and disposition of plutonium arose for this period. The problem on disposition of plutonium has no satisfied decision so far. The inventory of plutonium in the world, including weapon-grade plutonium, on the end 2000 formed 1 600-1 700 t; to 2010 in spent uranium fuel of power reactors of the world by total power - 400 GWt in the absence of reprocessing and recycling ∼3 000 tons of plutonium, 140 t neptunium-237, -120 t isotope of americium will be kept. The accumulation of power plutonium in Russia up to 2050 can form 500 t. It's appears the natural question - that to do with this amount of plutonium? There are two opposite approaches to problem of plutonium. The first direction is connected with useful disposition of plutonium as nuclear fuel in power reactors for production of energy and reproduction of nuclear fuel. The second direction is motivated by representatives of ecological organisations, which consider the plutonium too dangerous for mankind, and so its does not follow to use in atomic power (AP), but it's necessary to burial into the earth. The technical aspects on disposition of plutonium in Russian thermal and fast reactors and Accelerator Driven System (ADS) are considered. Our proposal on technical measures to provide high level of proliferation resistance for plutonium is presented. The first direction, which is executed in Russia now, is disposition of 34 t weapon-grade plutonium according to Agreement between Russia and USA. There is a special Program of Minatom on disposition of weapon-grade plutonium. It's proposed to organize the production of MOX-fuel from weapon-grade plutonium to load in existing thermal reactors WWER-1000 of Balakov NPP and fast reactors BOR-60 and BN-600. The information about large volume of R and D program on this direction is presented. The cost of this program is minimum 2 billion $; the cost of

  11. Nukem's plutonium hitches a ride

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    The European repercussions of a scandal involving the illegal movement of plutonium and cobalt 60 in canisters in which it was claimed there was only low-level radioactive waste, from West Germany to the reprocessing centre at Mol, Belgium are considered. Large bribes were paid to employees of the nuclear industry and government inspectors to allow this illicit transport to carry on over a number of years. It is not yet clear where the plutonium came from or where it was going. The suggestion that it may have been sold to Libya or Pakistan for nuclear weapons is very damaging to the nuclear safety argument. Even if the plutonium was being disposed of because it could not be accounted for, the safeguard procedures do not give confidence to the European public more aware of nuclear safety than ever. (UK)

  12. Onsite Transfer of Plutonium Solutions with the Upgraded LR-56S Cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gromada, R.J.

    1998-07-01

    With the end of the cold war, quantities of plutonium (Pu) solutions remained in the nuclear material production complex at the Savannah River Site (SRS) These solutions, now surplus to the nuclear weapons program, have resulted in significant health, safety, and environmental vulnerabilities at the Site and require stabilization. The site plan for stabilizing the solutions is to transfer the material from H canyon storage to F canyon for processing and disposition. The proposed onsite transfer at SRS raised both regulatory and safety concerns since the material is prohibited for offsite shipment by the U. S. Hazardous Materials, Regulations (HMR). However, an onsite transfer may be approved if it can be demonstrated that proper safety, health, and environmental protection are maintained. The difficulty of performing such a task is the awareness that an onsite transfer of Pu solutions had never been approved in the U. S. To understand the difficulties associated with the planning the transfer, this paper will describe the methodology and compliance process that SRS used to demonstrate that the transfer is safe and that the public is adequately protected. The cask selected for the transfer will be described as well as the process used to confirm that the plutonium solutions are safely contained by the cask design. Additionally, the administrative controls and cask modifications mandated by the content form are also presented

  13. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition including comparison with other nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    DOE has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. Other objectives of the paper are to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact plutonium disposition cost and schedule. Also to compare the economics of a once-through weapons-derived MOX nuclear fuel cycle to other fuel cycles, such as those utilizing spent fuel reprocessing. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs

  14. PLUTONIUM METAL: OXIDATION CONSIDERATIONS AND APPROACH

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Estochen, E.

    2013-03-20

    Plutonium is arguably the most unique of all metals when considered in the combined context of metallurgical, chemical, and nuclear behavior. Much of the research in understanding behavior and characteristics of plutonium materials has its genesis in work associated with nuclear weapons systems. However, with the advent of applications in fuel materials, the focus in plutonium science has been more towards nuclear fuel applications, as well as long term storage and disposition. The focus of discussion included herein is related to preparing plutonium materials to meet goals consistent with non-proliferation. More specifically, the emphasis is on the treatment of legacy plutonium, in primarily metallic form, and safe handling, packaging, and transport to meet non-proliferation goals of safe/secure storage. Elevated temperature oxidation of plutonium metal is the treatment of choice, due to extensive experiential data related to the method, as the oxide form of plutonium is one of only a few compounds that is relatively simple to produce, and stable over a large temperature range. Despite the simplicity of the steps required to oxidize plutonium metal, it is important to understand the behavior of plutonium to ensure that oxidation is conducted in a safe and effective manner. It is important to understand the effect of changes in environmental variables on the oxidation characteristics of plutonium. The primary purpose of this report is to present a brief summary of information related to plutonium metal attributes, behavior, methods for conversion to oxide, and the ancillary considerations related to processing and facility safety. The information provided is based on data available in the public domain and from experience in oxidation of such materials at various facilities in the United States. The report is provided as a general reference for implementation of a simple and safe plutonium metal oxidation technique.

  15. Accelerator-driven assembly for plutonium transformation (ADAPT)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tuyle, Greorgy J. Van; Todosow, Michael; Powell, James; Schweitzer, Donald

    1995-01-01

    A particle accelerator-driven spallation target and corresponding blanket region are proposed for the ultimate disposition of weapons-grade plutonium being retired from excess nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. The highly fissle plutonium is contained within .25 to .5 cm diameter silicon-carbide coated graphite beads, which are cooled by helium, within the slightly subcritical blanket region. Major advantages include very high one-pass burnup (over 90%), a high integrity waste form (the coated beads), and operation in a subcritical mode, thereby minimizing the vulnerability to the positive reativity feedbacks often associated with plutonium fuel.

  16. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy

  17. Fuel cycles using adulterated plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooksbank, R.E.; Bigelow, J.E.; Campbell, D.O.; Kitts, F.G.; Lindauer, R.B.

    1978-01-01

    Adjustments in the U-Pu fuel cycle necessitated by decisions made to improve the nonproliferation objectives of the US are examined. The uranium-based fuel cycle, using bred plutonium to provide the fissile enrichment, is the fuel system with the highest degree of commercial development at the present time. However, because purified plutonium can be used in weapons, this fuel cycle is potentially vulnerable to diversion of that plutonium. It does appear that there are technologically sound ways in which the plutonium might be adulterated by admixture with 238 U and/or radioisotopes, and maintained in that state throughout the fuel cycle, so that the likelihood of a successful diversion is small. Adulteration of the plutonium in this manner would have relatively little effect on the operations of existing or planned reactors. Studies now in progress should show within a year or two whether the less expensive coprocessing scheme would provide adequate protection (coupled perhaps with elaborate conventional safeguards procedures) or if the more expensive spiked fuel cycle is needed as in the proposed civex pocess. If the latter is the case, it will be further necessary to determine the optimum spiking level, which could vary as much as a factor of a billion. A very basic question hangs on these determinations: What is to be the nature of the recycle fuel fabrication facilities. If the hot, fully remote fuel fabrication is required, then a great deal of further development work will be required to make the full cycle fully commercial

  18. A World made of Plutonium?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broda, E.

    1976-01-01

    This lecture by Engelbert Broda was written for the 26th Pugwash Conference in Mühlhausen, Germany, 26 – 31 August 1976: Public doubts about nuclear energy are generally directed at the problems of routine emissions of radionuclides, of catastrophic accidents, and of terminal waste disposal. Curiously, the most important problem is not being given sufficient attention: The use of plutonium from civilian reactors fpr weapons production. According to current ideas about a nuclear future, 5000 tons (order of magnitude) of plutonium are to be made annually by year 2000, and about 10 000 tons will all the time be in circulation (transport, reprocessing, reproduction of fuel elements, etc.). It is a misconception that plutonium from power reactors is unsuitable as a nuclear explosive. 5000 tons are enough for several hundred thousand (!) of bombs, Nagasaki type. By the year 2000 maybe 40 – 50 countries will have home-made plutonium. Plutonium production and proliferation are the most serious problems in a nuclear world. (author)

  19. Plutonium isotope measurements from across continental Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tims, Stephen G.; Fifield, L. Keith; Hancock, Gary J.; Lal, Rajeev R.; Hoo, Wee T.

    2013-01-01

    The 240 Pu/ 239 Pu ratio of the global plutonium fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing is typically in the range 0.17–0.19. However, the influence of regional nuclear installations or nearby weapons test sites can lead to local values outside this range. We report 240 Pu/ 239 Pu ratios at 14 representative sites across Australian continent, and find that the weapons tests carried out in Australia appear to have made a significant contribution to the total fallout in the center of the continent, despite their relatively small explosive yield.

  20. Plutonium isotope measurements from across continental Australia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tims, Stephen G., E-mail: steve.tims@anu.edu.au [Department of Nuclear Physics, Research School of Physics and Engineering, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 (Australia); Fifield, L. Keith [Department of Nuclear Physics, Research School of Physics and Engineering, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 (Australia); Hancock, Gary J. [CSIRO Land and Water, Black Mountain Laboratories, GPO Box 1666, Canberra, ACT 2601 (Australia); Lal, Rajeev R.; Hoo, Wee T. [Department of Nuclear Physics, Research School of Physics and Engineering, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 (Australia)

    2013-01-15

    The {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratio of the global plutonium fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing is typically in the range 0.17-0.19. However, the influence of regional nuclear installations or nearby weapons test sites can lead to local values outside this range. We report {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios at 14 representative sites across Australian continent, and find that the weapons tests carried out in Australia appear to have made a significant contribution to the total fallout in the center of the continent, despite their relatively small explosive yield.

  1. Surplus? What surplus? Did the pension funds second amendment ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act, 2001 required funds to provide statutory minimum benefits for exiting members and pensioners. Any surplus arising at the statutory valuation following the promulgation of this Act was to be distributed—initially to former members and pensioners to top up their benefits to the ...

  2. Plutonium in the arctic marine environment--a short review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skipperud, Lindis

    2004-06-18

    Anthropogenic plutonium has been introduced into the environment over the past 50 years as the result of the detonation of nuclear weapons and operational releases from the nuclear industry. In the Arctic environment, the main source of plutonium is from atmospheric weapons testing, which has resulted in a relatively uniform, underlying global distribution of plutonium. Previous studies of plutonium in the Kara Sea have shown that, at certain sites, other releases have given rise to enhanced local concentrations. Since different plutonium sources are characterised by distinctive plutonium-isotope ratios, evidence of a localised influence can be supported by clear perturbations in the plutonium-isotope ratio fingerprints as compared to the known ratio in global fallout. In Kara Sea sites, such perturbations have been observed as a result of underwater weapons tests at Chernaya Bay, dumped radioactive waste in Novaya Zemlya, and terrestrial runoff from the Ob and Yenisey Rivers. Measurement of the plutonium-isotope ratios offers both a means of identifying the origin of radionuclide contamination and the influence of the various nuclear installations on inputs to the Arctic, as well as a potential method for following the movement of water and sediment loads in the rivers.

  3. Plutonium in the Arctic Marine Environment — A Short Review

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lindis Skipperud

    2004-01-01

    Full Text Available Anthropogenic plutonium has been introduced into the environment over the past 50 years as the result of the detonation of nuclear weapons and operational releases from the nuclear industry. In the Arctic environment, the main source of plutonium is from atmospheric weapons testing, which has resulted in a relatively uniform, underlying global distribution of plutonium. Previous studies of plutonium in the Kara Sea have shown that, at certain sites, other releases have given rise to enhanced local concentrations. Since different plutonium sources are characterised by distinctive plutonium-isotope ratios, evidence of a localised influence can be supported by clear perturbations in the plutonium-isotope ratio fingerprints as compared to the known ratio in global fallout. In Kara Sea sites, such perturbations have been observed as a result of underwater weapons tests at Chernaya Bay, dumped radioactive waste in Novaya Zemlya, and terrestrial runoff from the Ob and Yenisey Rivers. Measurement of the plutonium-isotope ratios offers both a means of identifying the origin of radionuclide contamination and the influence of the various nuclear installations on inputs to the Arctic, as well as a potential method for following the movement of water and sediment loads in the rivers.

  4. Plutonium Immobilization Project Phase 1 Cold Pour Test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, M.E.

    2000-01-01

    This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping tests and results. The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium containing ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) test program was planned to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping tests and results

  5. Safety aspects with regard to plutonium vitrification techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.

    1995-01-01

    Substantial inventories of excess plutonium are expected to result from dismantling US and Russian nuclear weapons. Disposition of this material should be a high priority in both countries. Various disposition options are under consideration. One option is to vitrify the plutonium with the addition of 137 Cs or high-level waste to act as a deterrent to proliferation. The primary safety problem associated with vitrification of plutonium is to avoid criticality in form fabrication and in the final repository over geologic time. Recovery should be as difficult (costly) as the recovery of plutonium from spent fuel

  6. Plutonium immobilization program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  7. Plutonium Immobilization Program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  8. CANDU - a versatile reactor for plutonium disposition or actinide burning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, P.S.W.; Gagnon, M.J.N.; Boczar, P.G.; Ellis, R.J.; Verrall, R.A.

    1997-10-01

    High neutron economy, on-line refuelling, and a simple fuel-bundle design result in a high degree of versatility in the use of the CANDU reactor for the disposition of weapons-derived plutonium and for the annihilation of long-lived radioactive actinides, such as plutonium, neptunium, and americium isotopes, created in civilian nuclear power reactors. Inherent safety features are incorporated into the design of the bundles carrying the plutonium and actinide fuels. This approach enables existing CANDU reactors to operate with various plutonium-based fuel cycles without requiring major changes to the current reactor design. (author)

  9. Consumer surplus and CES demand

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    ten Raa, Thijs

    2015-01-01

    This article presents the consumer surplus formula for constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demands. The formula is used to compare the monopoly and optimum provisions of product variety. It is shown that a monopolist under-provides variety. This result is contrasted with Lambertini’s analysis

  10. Surplus yeast tank failing catastrophically

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2016-01-01

    GOOD REASON FOR CAUTION I A large surplus yeast tank shot into the air leaving the floor plate and the contents behind. Although not designed for overpressure, the tank was kept at “very slight overpressure” to suppress nuisance foaming. The brewery was unaware of the hazards of compressed air...

  11. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  12. Plutonium (Pu)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This pedagogical document presents the properties and uses of plutonium: where does it come from, the history of its discovery, its uses and energy content, its recycling and reuse in MOX fuels, its half-life, toxicity and presence in the environment. (J.S.)

  13. Waste minimization at a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    As part of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to reduce the nuclear danger throughout the world, the plutonium processing facility at LANL maintains expertise and skills in nuclear weapons technologies as well as leadership in all peaceful applications of plutonium technologies, including fuel fabrication for terrestrial and space reactors and heat sources and thermoelectric generators for space missions. Another near-term challenge resulted from two safety assessments performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Energy during the past two years. These assessments have necessitated the processing and stabilization of plutonium contained in tons of residues so that they can be stored safely for an indefinite period. This report describes waste streams and approaches to waste reduction of plutonium management

  14. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document offers chemical, metallurgical and economical information on the plutonium, a hard white radioelement. It deals also on the plutonium formation in the earth, the plutonium use in the nuclear industry, the plutonium in the environment and the plutonium toxicity. (A.L.B.)

  15. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume I: Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-11-01

    At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) stopped plutonium processing for nuclear weapons production. Facilities used for that purpose now hold significant quantities of plutonium in various forms. Unless properly stored and handled, plutonium can present environment, safety and health (ES ampersand H) hazards. Improperly stored plutonium poses a variety of hazards. When containers or packaging fail to fully protect plutonium metal from exposure to air, oxidation can occur and cause packaging failures and personnel contamination. Contamination can also result when plutonium solutions leak from bottles, tanks or piping. Plutonium in the form of scrap or residues generated by weapons production are often very corrosive, chemically reactive and difficult to contain. Buildings and equipment that are aging, poorly maintained or of obsolete design contribute to the overall problem. Inadvertent accumulations of plutonium of any form in sufficient quantities within facilities can result in nuclear criticality events that could emit large amounts of radiation locally. Contamination events and precursors of criticality events are causing safety and health concerns for workers at the Department's plutonium facilities. Contamination events also potentially threaten the public and the surrounding environment

  16. Nuclear power and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apold, A.

    1978-01-01

    The theme of Dr. Marshall's lecture was that it is, from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,preferable to use plutonium as a fuel in FBR reactors rather than store it in what, in effect, would be plutonium mines. The true threat of proliferation lies in uranium enrichment. The FBR reactor is misunderstood and the US policy is not against breeders as such. Safeguards against the misuse of plutonium by leaving a residue of radioactivity after reprocessing is quite feasible, despite certain practical problems and extra costs. Weapon proliferation is subject to political objectives and intentions. Definite proposals are, (a) a limited number of reprocessing centres, (b) an accelerated development of FBR reactors, (c) a new FBR fuel cycle, (d) stop storage of spent thermal reactor fuel, (e) reinforced safeguards. (JIW)

  17. Plutonium in the atmosphere: A global perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thakur, P; Khaing, H; Salminen-Paatero, S

    2017-09-01

    A number of potential source terms have contributed plutonium isotopes to the atmosphere. The atmospheric nuclear weapon tests conducted between 1945 and 1980 and the re-entry of the burned SNAP-9A satellite in 1964, respectively. It is generally believed that current levels of plutonium in the stratosphere are negligible and compared with the levels generally found at surface-level air. In this study, the time trend analysis and long-term behavior of plutonium isotopes ( 239+240 Pu and 238 Pu) in the atmosphere were assessed using historical data collected by various national and international monitoring networks since 1960s. An analysis of historical data indicates that 239+240 Pu concentration post-1984 is still frequently detectable, whereas 238 Pu is detected infrequently. Furthermore, the seasonal and time-trend variation of plutonium concentration in surface air followed the stratospheric trends until the early 1980s. After the last Chinese test of 1980, the plutonium concentrations in surface air dropped to the current levels, suggesting that the observed concentrations post-1984 have not been under stratospheric control, but rather reflect the environmental processes such as resuspension. Recent plutonium atmospheric air concentrations data show that besides resuspension, other environmental processes such as global dust storms and biomass burning/wildfire also play an important role in redistributing plutonium in the atmosphere. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Plutonium uniqueness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1984-01-01

    A standard is suggested against which the putative uniqueness of plutonium may be tested. It is common folklore that plutonium is unique among the chemical elements because its four common oxidation states can coexist in the same solution. Whether this putative uniqueness appears only during transit to equilibrium, or only at equilibrium, or all of the time, is not generally made clear. But while the folklore may contain some truth, it cannot be put to test until some measure of 'uniqueness' is agreed upon so that quantitative comparisons are possible. One way of measuring uniqueness is as the magnitude of the product of the mole fractions of the element at equilibrium. A 'coexistence index' is defined and discussed. (author)

  19. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  20. Long-term plutonium storage: Design concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkey, D.D.; Wood, W.T.; Guenther, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    An important part of the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Program is the development of facilities for long-term storage of plutonium. The WCR design goals are to provide storage for metals, oxides, pits, and fuel-grade plutonium, including material being held as part of the Strategic Reserve and excess material. Major activities associated with plutonium storage are sorting the plutonium inventory, material handling and storage support, shipping and receiving, and surveillance of material in storage for both safety evaluations and safeguards and security. A variety of methods for plutonium storage have been used, both within the DOE weapons complex and by external organizations. This paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of proposed storage concepts based upon functional criteria. The concepts discussed include floor wells, vertical and horizontal sleeves, warehouse storage on vertical racks, and modular storage units. Issues/factors considered in determining a preferred design include operational efficiency, maintenance and repair, environmental impact, radiation and criticality safety, safeguards and security, heat removal, waste minimization, international inspection requirements, and construction and operational costs

  1. Plutonium: The first 50 years. United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization from 1944 through 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1996-02-01

    The report contains important newly declassified information regarding the US production, acquisition, and removals of plutonium. This new information, when combined with previously declassified data, has allowed the DOE to issue, for the first time, a truly comprehensive report on the total DOE plutonium inventory. At the December 7, 1993, Openness Press Conference, the DOE declassified the plutonium inventories at eight locations totaling 33.5 metric tons (MT). This report declassifies the remainder of the DOE plutonium inventory. Newly declassified in this report is the quantity of plutonium at the Pantex Site, near Amarillo, Texas, and in the US nuclear weapons stockpile of 66.1 MT, which, when added to the previously released inventory of 33.5 MT, yields a total plutonium inventory of 99.5 MT. This report will document the sources which built up the plutonium inventory as well as the transactions which have removed plutonium from that inventory. This report identifies four sources that add plutonium to the DOE/DoD inventory, and seven types of transactions which remove plutonium from the DOE/DoD inventory. This report also discusses the nuclear material control and accountability system which records all nuclear material transactions, compares records with inventory and calculates material balances, and analyzes differences to verify that nuclear materials are in quantities as reported. The DOE believes that this report will aid in discussions in plutonium storage, safety, and security with stakeholders as well as encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data. These data will also be available for formulating policies with respect to disposition of excess nuclear materials. The information in this report is based on the evaluation of available records. The information contained in this report may be updated or revised in the future should additional or more detailed data become available.

  2. Waste forms for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.G.; O'Holleran, T.P.; Frank, S.M.; Meyer, M.K.; Hanson, M.; Staples, B.A.; Knecht, D.A.; Kong, P.C.

    1997-01-01

    The field of plutonium disposition is varied and of much importance, since the Department of Energy has decided on the hybrid option for disposing of the weapons materials. This consists of either placing the Pu into mixed oxide fuel for reactors or placing the material into a stable waste form such as glass. The waste form used for Pu disposition should exhibit certain qualities: (1) provide for a suitable deterrent to guard against proliferation; (2) be of minimal volume, i.e., maximize the loading; and (3) be reasonably durable under repository-like conditions. This paper will discuss several Pu waste forms that display promising characteristics

  3. Utilities face pointless ban on plutonium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smock, R.W.

    1977-01-01

    The U.S. electric utility industry could lose a potential saving of $10 million per nuclear reactor per year if the new policy to defer spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is adopted. The heart of the policy is the hope that other countries will also forgo plutonium recycle. Some American leaders have conceded, though, that unilateral action by the U.S. will have almost no effect on weapons proliferation. In interviews with some foreign officials, EL and P learned that indeed Japan, Iran, and West Germany were not considering cessation of plutonium recycle in their countries

  4. Guidelines for the responsible management of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agrell, P.H.

    1997-01-01

    Since 1994 an informal group of representatives of States party to the NPT has been trying to develop agreed international guidelines for the responsible management of non-military plutonium. This paper gives a brief description of the outcome. Since the results are still subject to decision by Governments, the description must be in general terms only. The paper describes the background to, and genesis of, the discussions and the general approach taken, which was based on commitment to the NPT, national responsibility for the management of nuclear materials and the fuel cycle, upholding of the IAEA's safeguards system, and a focus on civil material. An indication is given of the development of the Group's thinking, especially the decisions that any guidelines must be capable of accommodating surplus military plutonium, as well as civil, and that the main focus should be on measures to increase transparency. The resulting guidelines are described. Their main features are a re-statement of commitments and standards for the management of non-military plutonium with regard to non-proliferation, safety, and other fields, a commitment to the management of such plutonium according to a consistent national strategy, and a commitment to the publication of information on that strategy, and of annual statistics for holdings of plutonium in a consistent format. Other aspects of the guidelines are also explained. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the possible practical effects of the guidelines if adopted by governments. (author)

  5. Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kautz, D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-02

    A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

  6. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0 2 plant design is discussed here

  7. Plutonium contents of field crops in the southeastern US

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adriano, D.C.; Corey, J.C.; Dahlman, R.C.

    1980-01-01

    Agricultural crops were grown at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Plant (SRP) and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) on soils at field sites containing plutonium concentrations above background levels from nuclear weapon tests. Major US grain crops were grown adjacent to a reprocessing facility at SRP, which releases low chronic levels of plutonium through an emission stack. Major vegetable crops were grown at the ORNL White Oak Creek floodplain, which received plutonium effluent wastes in 1944 from the Manhattan Project weapon development. In general, the concentration ratios of vegetative parts of crops at SRP were approximately one order of magnitude higher than those at ORNL, which indicates the influence of aerial deposition of plutonium at the SRP site

  8. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

    1959-08-25

    A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

  9. Aerosol generation by oxidation and combustion of plutonium and its compounds: literature survey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballereau, P.

    1987-09-01

    Generation of aerosols by oxidation or combustion is one of the greatest risks due to plutonium. A review is made of the most interesting documents available on this topic. Following a brief study of plutonium oxydation conditions, characteristics of aerosols generated by accidents of fires involving metallic Pu and some of its compounds are assessed. Nuclear weapons are not included in this review [fr

  10. Decision model for evaluating reactor disposition of excess plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Edmunds, T.

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy is currently considering a range of technologies for disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Use of plutonium fuel in fission reactors to generate spent fuel is one class of technology options. This report describes the inputs and results of decision analyses conducted to evaluate four evolutionary/advanced and three existing fission reactor designs for plutonium disposition. The evaluation incorporates multiple objectives or decision criteria, and accounts for uncertainty. The purpose of the study is to identify important and discriminating decision criteria, and to identify combinations of value judgments and assumptions that tend to favor one reactor design over another.

  11. Decision model for evaluating reactor disposition of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmunds, T.

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy is currently considering a range of technologies for disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Use of plutonium fuel in fission reactors to generate spent fuel is one class of technology options. This report describes the inputs and results of decision analyses conducted to evaluate four evolutionary/advanced and three existing fission reactor designs for plutonium disposition. The evaluation incorporates multiple objectives or decision criteria, and accounts for uncertainty. The purpose of the study is to identify important and discriminating decision criteria, and to identify combinations of value judgments and assumptions that tend to favor one reactor design over another

  12. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium 1999 plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is to serve the Texas Panhandle, the State of Texas and the US Department of Energy by: conducting scientific and technical research; advising decision makers; and providing information on nuclear weapons materials and related environment, safety, health, and nonproliferation issues while building academic excellence in science and technology. This paper describes the electronic resource library which provides the national archives of technical, policy, historical, and educational information on plutonium. Research projects related to the following topics are described: Environmental restoration and protection; Safety and health; Waste management; Education; Training; Instrumentation development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage

  13. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-01-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  14. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium 1999 plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-01-30

    The purpose of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is to serve the Texas Panhandle, the State of Texas and the US Department of Energy by: conducting scientific and technical research; advising decision makers; and providing information on nuclear weapons materials and related environment, safety, health, and nonproliferation issues while building academic excellence in science and technology. This paper describes the electronic resource library which provides the national archives of technical, policy, historical, and educational information on plutonium. Research projects related to the following topics are described: Environmental restoration and protection; Safety and health; Waste management; Education; Training; Instrumentation development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage.

  15. Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferguson, K.L.

    1994-08-09

    This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified.

  16. Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, K.L.

    1994-01-01

    This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified

  17. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance

  18. International agreements on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dombey, N.

    1982-01-01

    The satellite detection of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic and Israel's destruction of a research reactor in Iraq make it essential to strengthen existing monitoring and enforcement programs to prevent proliferation. While there was no reliable evidence that either South Africa or Iraq was violating non-proliferation agreements, worst case scenarios can demonstrate to unfriendly countries that South Africa had diverted fuel to test a nuclear weapon and that Iraq is intending to produce weapons-grade plutonium 239. The situation can be improved by formulating better terms and conditions for internationalizing access to materials. Nuclear suppliers need to agree on terms that will assure their customers that contracts for civil programs will be honored. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes both nuclear suppliers and customers, could achieve stronger agreements that take into account recent technological advances that will expand enrichment and reprocessing activities. 23 references, 1 figure

  19. Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graf, W.L.

    1993-03-01

    Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi

  20. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1996-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficient reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  1. Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Graf, W.L. [Arizona Univ., Tempe, AZ (United States). Dept., of Geography

    1993-03-01

    Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi.

  2. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1995-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficiently reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  3. Plutonium-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ammerich, Marc; Frot, Patricia; Gambini, Denis-Jean; Gauron, Christine; Moureaux, Patrick; Herbelet, Gilbert; Lahaye, Thierry; Pihet, Pascal; Rannou, Alain

    2014-06-01

    This sheet belongs to a collection which relates to the use of radionuclides essentially in unsealed sources. Its goal is to gather on a single document the most relevant information as well as the best prevention practices to be implemented. These sheets are made for the persons in charge of radiation protection: users, radioprotection-skill persons, labor physicians. Each sheet treats of: 1 - the radio-physical and biological properties; 2 - the main uses; 3 - the dosimetric parameters; 4 - the measurement; 5 - the protection means; 6 - the areas delimitation and monitoring; 7 - the personnel classification, training and monitoring; 8 - the effluents and wastes; 9 - the authorization and declaration administrative procedures; 10 - the transport; and 11 - the right conduct to adopt in case of incident or accident. This sheet deals specifically with Plutonium-239

  4. Regulatory issues for deep borehole plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1995-03-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. Issues of concern include the regulatory, statutory and policy status of such a facility, the availability of sites with desirable characteristics and the technologies required for drilling deep holes, characterizing them, emplacing excess plutonium and sealing the holes. This white paper discusses the regulatory issues. Regulatory issues concerning construction, operation and decommissioning of the surface facility do not appear to be controversial, with existing regulations providing adequate coverage. It is in the areas of siting, licensing and long term environmental protection that current regulations may be inappropriate. This is because many current regulations are by intent or by default specific to waste forms, facilities or missions significantly different from deep borehole disposition of excess weapons usable fissile material. It is expected that custom regulations can be evolved in the context of this mission

  5. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  6. Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Egge, R.G.

    1997-01-01

    This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility

  7. The plutonium fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pigford, T.H.; Ang, K.P.

    1975-01-01

    The quantities of plutonium and other fuel actinides have been calculated for equilibrium fuel cycles for 1000-MW water reactors fueled with slightly enriched uranium, water reactors fueled with plutonium and natural uranium, fast-breder reactors, gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium and highly enriched uranium, and gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium, plutonium and recycled uranium. The radioactivity quantities of plutonium, americium and curium processed yearly in these fuel cycles are greatest for the water reactors fueled with natural uranium and recycled plutonium. The total amount of actinides processed is calculated for the predicted future growth of the U.S. nuclear power industry. For the same total installed nuclear power capacity, the introduction of the plutonium breeder has little effect upon the total amount of plutonium in this century. The estimated amount of plutonium in the low-level process wastes in the plutonium fuel cycles is comparable to the amount of plutonium in the high-level fission product wastes. The amount of plutonium processed in the nuclear fuel cycles can be considerably reduced by using gas-cooled reactors to consume plutonium produced in uranium-fueled water reactors. These, and other reactors dedicated for plutonium utilization, could be co-located with facilities for fuel reprocessing ad fuel fabrication to eliminate the off-site transport of separated plutonium. (author)

  8. IFR starts to burn up weapons-grade material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    With funding from different parts of the federal government, the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) project has survived into fiscal year 1994 and is now embarking on a demonstration of how this type of liquid-metal-cooled reactor (LMR) can be used to burn fuel derived from weapons-grade plutonium. This month, an assembly made from weapons-grade material is to be loaded into Experimental Breeder Reactor-II in Idaho, which is serving as the prototype for the IFR concept. Although FY 1994 work is being funded by the DOE, this particular examination of plutonium burnup is backed by the Department of Defense

  9. Plutonium alteration phases from lanthanide borosilicate glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortner, J.A.; Mertz, C.J.; Chamberlain, D.C.; Bates, J.K.

    1997-01-01

    A prototype lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass containing 10 mass % plutonium was reacted with water vapor at 200 C for periods of 14 to 56 days. These tests, while not designed to replicate specific conditions that may be found in a potential geologic repository (e.g., Yucca Mountain), have been shown to accelerate alteration phase formation. The surfaces of the glass samples, along with alteration phases, were examined with a transmission electron microscope (TEM). Tests of 14 days produced macroscopic (∼ 20 microm) crystallites of a plutonium-lanthanide silicate. An extensive alteration layer was found on the glass surface containing amorphous aluminosilicate layered with bands of a cryptocrystalline plutonium silicate. After 56 days of testing, additional alteration phases were formed, including a strontium lanthanide oxide phase. One of the options for disposal of surplus plutonium, particularly for impure residues that may be unfit for production of MOX fuel, is vitrification followed by geologic disposal. Since geologic disposal requires a passive system to isolate the radiotoxic elements from the biosphere, it is important to understand the possible corrosion mechanisms of the waste form

  10. Plutonium dispositioning in CANDU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boczar, P.G.; Feinroth, H.; Luxat, J.C.

    1995-07-01

    Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to evaluate salient technical, strategic, schedule, and cost-related parameters of using CANDU reactors for dispositioning of weapons-grade plutonium in the form of Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel. A study team, consisting of key staff from the CANDU reactor designers and researchers (AECL), operators (Ontario Hydro) and fuel suppliers, analyzed all significant factors involved in such application, with the objective of identifying an arrangement that would permit the burning of MOX in CANDU at the earliest date. One of Ontario Hydro's multi-unit stations, Bruce A nuclear generating station (4x769 MW(e)), was chosen as the reference for the study. The assessment showed that no significant modifications of reactor or process systems are necessary to operate with a full MOX core. Plant modifications would be limited to fuel handling and modifications necessary to accommodate enhanced security and safeguards requirements. No safety limitations were identified

  11. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 2, Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.

  12. Plutonium Training Opportunities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Wolkov, Benjamin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-03-26

    This report was created to examine the current state of plutonium training in the United States and to discover ways in which to ensure that the next generation of plutonium workers are fully qualified.

  13. Plutonium metal burning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausburg, D.E.; Leebl, R.G.

    1977-01-01

    A glove-box facility was designed to convert plutonium skull metal or unburned oxide to an oxide acceptable for plutonium recovery and purification. A discussion of the operation, safety aspects, and electrical schematics are included

  14. The dangers of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koelzer, W.

    1978-01-01

    After outlining the physical and chemical properties of plutonium, the author compares toxic substances inhaled and ingested; it is found that plutonium is far less dangerous than botulin or anthrax spores. (GL) [de

  15. Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Plutonium Finishing Plant, also known as PFP, represented the end of the line (the final procedure) associated with plutonium production at Hanford.PFP was also...

  16. Further Studies of Plutonium and Americium at Thule, Greenland

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Dahlgaard, Henning; Nilsson, Karen Kristina

    1984-01-01

    Eleven years after the accidental loss of nuclear weapons in 1968, the fourth scientific expedition to Thule occurred. The estimated inventory of 1 TBq 239,240Pu in the marine sediments was unchanged when compared with the estimate based on the 1974 data. Plutonium from the accident had moved...

  17. Optimization and plutonium equilibrium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1976-01-01

    The sequential simplex method has been used to estimate the extent of disproportionation of tetravalent plutonium in dilute acid. A method for simulating potentiometric titrations is proposed, and this method suggests that the stoichiometric end point and the inflection point may not always correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium. A possible characteristic equation for the nitrite-plutonium reaction is illustrated, and the method of proportional equations is extended to the iron-plutonium reaction

  18. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ULLAH, M.K.

    2001-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations

  19. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  20. Plutonium immobilization -- Can loading

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.

    2000-01-01

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) will immobilize excess plutonium in the proposed Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP). The PIP adds the excess plutonium to ceramic pucks, loads the pucks into cans, and places the cans into DWPF canisters. This paper discusses the PIP process steps, the can loading conceptual design, can loading equipment design, and can loading work completed

  1. Treatment of plutonium contaminations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafuma, J.

    1983-01-01

    Three kinds of plutonium contaminations were considered: skin contamination; contaminated wounds; contamination by inhalation. The treatment of these contaminations was studied for insoluble (oxide and metal forms) and soluble plutonium (complexes). The use of DTPA and therapeutic problems encountered with stable plutonium complexes were analyzed. The new possibilities of internal decontamination using Puchel and LICAM were evaluated [fr

  2. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    Autoradiographic techniques with liquid photographic emulsion and cellulose nitrate track-etch film are being used to investigate the spatial distribution of inhaled plutonium in the lungs of beagle dogs exposed to cigarette smoke or to the plutonium aerosol only. More plutonium than expected was detected on the inner surfaces of bronchi, and particles were observed beneath the bronchial mucosa. 2 figures, 2 tables

  3. Non-fertile fuels development for plutonium and high-enriched uranium dispositioning in water cooled reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Olsen, C.S.

    1994-09-01

    As a result of dismantling the bomb, there is about 100 MT of excess weapons grade plutonium in the United States and about 150 MT in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, there is another 1000 MT of plutonium in commercial spent fuel that may be used as degraded weapons material. This report discusses one means to disposition weapons grade plutonium is by irradiating the fuel in light water reactors (LWRs) using a non-fertile fuel based on plutonium dispersed in an oxide mixture of zirconia stabilized with calcia or yttria as a solid solution. Plutonium dispersed in a zirconia matrix offers the potential to achieve very high burnups while maintaining mechanical integrity.

  4. EXAFS and XANES analysis of plutonium and cerium edges from titanate ceramics for fissile materials disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortner, J. A.; Kropf, A. J.; Bakel, A. J.; Hash, M. C.; Aase, S. B.; Buck, E. C.; Chamerlain, D. B.

    1999-01-01

    We report x-ray absorption near edge structure (XANES) and extended x-ray absorption fine structure (EXAFS) spectra from the plutonium L III edge and XANES from the cerium L II edge in prototype titanate ceramic hosts. The titanate ceramics studied are based upon the hafnium-pyrochlore and zirconolite mineral structures and will serve as an immobilization host for surplus fissile materials, containing as much as 10 weight % fissile plutonium and 20 weight % (natural or depleted) uranium. Three ceramic formulations were studied: one employed cerium as a ''surrogate'' element, replacing both plutonium and uranium in the ceramic matrix, another formulation contained plutonium in a ''baseline'' ceramic formulation, and a third contained plutonium in a formulation representing a high-impurity plutonium stream. The cerium XANES from the surrogate ceramic clearly indicates a mixed III-IV oxidation state for the cerium. In contrast, XANES analysis of the two plutonium-bearing ceramics shows that the plutonium is present almost entirely as Pu(IV) and occupies the calcium site in the zirconolite and pyrochlore phases. The plutonium EXAFS real-space structure shows a strong second-shell peak, clearly distinct from that of PuO 2 , with remarkably little difference in the plutonium crystal chemistry indicated between the baseline and high-impurity formulations

  5. Prospects for plutonium recycling in light-water reactors in the European Communities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haijtink, B.

    1977-01-01

    On the basis of a forecast on nuclear power installation programmes and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capacities in the European Community, an assessment has been made of the developmnt of the plutonium handling industry up to the year 1990. Data on plutonium recovered in the reprocessing plants, requirements for fuelling the fast-breeder reactors and the remaining stockpile have been evaluated. A possible strategy for recycling the plutonium surplus in light-water reactors has been developed and its effects as regards saving on requirements for natural uranium and enrichment services have been estimated

  6. In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hecker, Siegfried

    2010-02-01

    In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )

  7. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.

    1995-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, DOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of plutonium (Pu) in keeping with the national policy that Pu must be subjected to the highest standards of safety, security, and accountability. One alternative being considered is immobilization. To arrive at a suitable immobilization form, the authors first reviewed published information on high-level waste (HLW) immobilization technologies in order to identify 72 possible Pu immobilization forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multiattribute analysis to determine the most promising technologies. Promising immobilization families were further evaluated to identify chemical, engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems that remain to be solved prior to making technical decisions as to the viability of using the form for long-term disposition of plutonium. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Project Office to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in the fourth quarter of FY96

  8. Safely disposing and controlling the various forms of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.

    1991-01-01

    The growing surplus of plutonium will continue to pose safety, health, and verification problems. Although long term storage and disposal of plutonium seems technically feasible, or at least comparable in technical difficulty to commercial spent fuel disposal, significant political obstacles within the government and the public, may make it difficult to solve this problem. Although options to build verifiable warhead dismantlement facilities or to recycle plutonium in reactors and thus convert separated plutonium into irradiated fuel are straight forward concepts, their realization remains difficult for economic and political reasons. The plutonium recycle option also raises additional proliferation concerns about its impact on civilian nuclear programs. In the absence of a long term solution, the United States can implement various storage or interim disposal options that involve minimal processing, but that ease verification problems and provide adequate safety and protection of public health

  9. Standard specification for sintered (Uranium-Plutonium) dioxide pellets

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2001-01-01

    1.1 This specification covers finished sintered and ground (uranium-plutonium) dioxide pellets for use in thermal reactors. It applies to uranium-plutonium dioxide pellets containing plutonium additions up to 15 % weight. This specification may not completely cover the requirements for pellets fabricated from weapons-derived plutonium. 1.2 This specification does not include (1) provisions for preventing criticality accidents or (2) requirements for health and safety. Observance of this specification does not relieve the user of the obligation to be aware of and conform to all applicable international, federal, state, and local regulations pertaining to possessing, processing, shipping, or using source or special nuclear material. Examples of U.S. government documents are Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 50Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities; Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 71Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material; and Code of Federal Regulations Tit...

  10. Defense against Space Weapons,

    Science.gov (United States)

    1983-02-24

    which can be used at present are space defense missiles, killer satellites, high energy laser weapons and particle beam weapons. In 1962, the U.S... laser weapons and particle beam weapons have the ad- 4vantages of high power, concentrated energy, hit accuracy, and conven- ience of use. They have... weapons development amounts to 5 US$200,000,000. At present, irradiation by a laser weapon operating on the earth’s surface can cause optical and infrared

  11. Assessment of plutonium in the Savannah River Site environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlton, W.H.; Evans, A.G.; Geary, L.A.; Murphy, C.E. Jr.; Pinder, J.E.; Strom, R.N.

    1992-01-01

    Plutonium in the Savannah River Site Environment is published as a part of the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP). It is the fifth in a series of eight documents on individual radioisotopes released to the environment as a result of Savannah River Site (SRS) operations. These are living documents, each to be revised and updated on a two-year schedule. This document describes the sources of plutonium in the environment, its release from SRS, environmental transport and ecological concentration of plutonium, and the radiological impact of SRS releases to the environment. Plutonium exists in the environment as a result of above-ground nuclear weapons tests, the Chernobyl accident, the destruction of satellite SNAP 9-A, plane crashes involving nuclear weapons, and small releases from reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium has been produced at SRS during the operation of five production reactors and released in small quantities during the processing of fuel and targets in chemical separations facilities. Approximately 0.6 Ci of plutonium was released into streams and about 12 Ci was released to seepage basins, where it was tightly bound by clay in the soil. A smaller quantity, about 3.8 Ci, was released to the atmosphere. Virtually all releases have occurred in F- and H-Area separation facilities. Plutonium concentration and transport mechanisms for the atmosphere, surface water, and ground water releases have been extensively studied by Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) and ecological mechanisms have been studied by Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). The overall radiological impact of SRS releases to the offsite maximum individual can be characterized by a total dose of 15 mrem (atmospheric) and 0.18 mrem (liquid), compared with the dose of 12,960 mrem from non-SRS sources during the same period of time (1954--1989). Plutonium releases from SRS facilities have resulted in a negligible impact to the environment and the population it supports

  12. EIS Data Call Report: Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  13. The mysterious world of plutonium metallurgy: Past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hecker, S.S.; Hammel, E.F.

    1998-01-01

    The first atomic bomb detonated at the Trinity Site in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, used plutonium, a man-made element discovered < 5 yr earlier. The story of how Manhattan Project scientists and engineers tackled the mysteries of this element and fabricated it into the first atomic bomb is one of the most fascinating in the history of metallurgy and materials. The authors are currently trying to generate renewed interest in plutonium metallurgy because of the challenge posed by President Clinton, i.e., to keep the nuclear stockpile of weapons safe and reliable without nuclear testing. The stockpile stewardship challenge requires either a lifetime extension of the plutonium components or a remanufacture--neither of which can be verified by testing. In turn, this requires that one achieve a better fundamental understanding of plutonium. Of special interest is the effect of self-irradiation on the properties and on the long-term stability of plutonium and its alloys. Additional challenges arise from long-term concerns about disposing of plutonium and dealing with its environmental legacy. It is imperative to interest the next generation of students in these plutonium challenges

  14. System Definition Document: Reactor Data Necessary for Modeling Plutonium Disposition in Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (USDOE) has contracted with Duke Engineering and Services, Cogema, Inc., and Stone and Webster (DCS) to provide mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services in support of USDOE's mission to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The nuclear station units currently identified as mission reactors for this project are Catawba Units 1 and 2 and McGuire Units 1 and 2. This report is specific to Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, but the details and materials for the McGuire reactors are very similar. The purpose of this document is to present a complete set of data about the reactor materials and components to be used in modeling the Catawba reactors to predict reactor physics parameters for the Catawba site. Except where noted, Duke Power Company or DCS documents are the sources of these data. These data are being used with the ORNL computer code models of the DCS Catawba (and McGuire) pressurized-water reactors

  15. The opportunity to limit and reduce inventories of fissionable weapon materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hebel, L.C.

    1991-01-01

    As the United States and the Soviet government agree on major reductions in nuclear weapon delivery systems, they need to address the disposal of the nuclear warheads and bombs for those systems. Such measures could be strongly reinforced if the two nations also institute restraints and reductions in the total amount of fissionable materials available for weapons. Many metric tonnes of such materials would be made surplus by the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons due to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I). Equally large reductions in short-range (theater) nuclear weapons are expected in the wake of the recent Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

  16. Thermal and Physical Properties of Plutonium Dioxide Produced from the Oxidation of Metal: a Data Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wayne, David M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-13

    The ARIES Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory removes plutonium metal from decommissioned nuclear weapons, and converts it to plutonium dioxide in a specially-designed Direct Metal Oxidation furnace. The plutonium dioxide is analyzed for specific surface area, particle size distribution, and moisture content. The purpose of these analyses is to certify that the plutonium dioxide powder meets or exceeds the specifications of the end-user, and the specifications for the packaging and transport of nuclear materials. Analytical results from plutonium dioxide from ARIES development activities, from ARIES production activities, from muffle furnace oxidation of metal, and from metal that was oxidized over a lengthy time interval in air at room temperature, are presented. The processes studied produce plutonium dioxide powder with distinct differences in measured properties, indicating the significant influence of oxidation conditions on physical properties.

  17. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ''Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs

  18. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

  19. Properties of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of)

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new.

  20. Properties of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new

  1. Civil plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicard, B.; Zaetta, A.

    2004-01-01

    During 1960 and 1970 the researches on the plutonium recycling in fast neutrons reactors were stimulated by the fear of uranium reserves diminishing. At the beginning of 1980, the plutonium mono-recycling for water cooled reactors is implementing. After 1990 the public opinion concerning the radioactive wastes management and the consequences of the disarmament agreements between Russia and United States, modified the context. This paper presents the today situation and technology associated to the different options and strategical solutions of the plutonium management: the plutonium use in the world, the neutronic characteristics, the plutonium effect on the reactors characteristics, the MOX behavior in the reactors, the MOX fabrication and treatment, the possible improvements to the plutonium use, the concepts performance in a nuclear park. (A.L.B.)

  2. The export of civil plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hesketh, R.V.

    1982-01-01

    The subject is discussed under the headings: UK plutonium production; US plutonium production; loss in reprocessing; finance value; military value; civil stock; separated stock; production and stocks; export consents; Non-Proliferation Treaty; IAEA safeguards; plutonium trade. (U.K.)

  3. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1983-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Because cigarette smokers constitute a large fraction of the population, a synergistic effect of plutonium and cigarette smoke might influence estimates of the health risk for plutonium and other transuranics released to the environment

  4. Neutronic design of a plutonium-thorium burner small nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartanto, Donny

    2010-02-01

    A small nuclear reactor using thorium and plutonium fuel has been designed from the neutronic point of view. The thermal power of the reactor is 150 MWth and it is proposed to be used to supply electricity in an island in Indonesia. Thorium and plutonium fuel was chosen because in recent years the thorium fuel cycle is one of the promising ways to deal with the increasing number of plutonium stockpiles, either from the utilization of uranium fuel cycle or from nuclear weapon dismantling. A mixed fuel of thorium and plutonium will not generate the second generation of plutonium which will be a better way to incinerate the excess plutonium compared with the MOX fuel. Three kinds of plutonium grades which are the reactor grade (RG), weapon grade (WG), and spent fuel grade (SFG) plutonium, were evaluated as the thorium fuel mixture in the 17x17 Westinghouse PWR Fuel assembly. The evaluated parameters were the multiplication factor, plutonium depletion, fissile buildup, neutron spectrum, and temperature reactivity feedback. An optimization was also done to increase the plutonium depletion by changing the Moderator to Fuel Ratio (MFR). The computer codes TRITON (coupled NEWT and ORIGEN-S) in SCALE version 6 were used as the calculation tool for this assembly level. From the evaluation and optimization of the fuel assembly, the whole core was designed. The core was consisted of 2 types of thorium fuel with different plutonium grade and it followed the checkerboard loading pattern. A new concept of enriched burnable poison was also introduced to the core. The core life is 6.4 EFPY or 75 GWd/MTHM. It can burn up to 58% of its total mass of initial plutonium. VENTURE was used as the calculation tool for the core level

  5. Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A

  6. Perspective on plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun, L.S.

    1993-01-01

    This paper is intended as a brief overview on the element plutonium. Plutonium is the first primarily man-made element to play a significant role not only in technological development, but also in the economic growth of many countries. The importance of plutonium centers around its enormous energy making it ideal for wide-scale use in reactors, while the nuclear industry continues to work toward improving safety and efficiency of plutonium as a reactor fuel politicians and the public still debate over the safety and benefits of nuclear power. (30 refs.)

  7. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  8. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  9. Habit formation, surplus consumption and return predictability

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Engsted, Tom; Hyde, Stuart; Vinther Møller, Stig

    2010-01-01

    On an international post World War II dataset, we use an iterated GMM procedure to estimate and test the Campbell and Cochrane (1999, By force of habit: a consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205–251.) habit formation model with a time...... empirical support in a variety of different dimensions, including reasonable estimates of risk-free rates. Further, for the majority of countries the surplus consumption ratio captures time-variation in expected returns. Together with the price-dividend ratio, the surplus consumption ratio contains...

  10. Decommissioning of surplus facilities at ORNL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myrick, T.E.; Coobs, J.H.

    1985-01-01

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. This program was established to provide for the management of certain DOE surplus radioactively contaminated facilities from the end of their operating life until final facility disposition is completed. As part of this program, the ORNL SFMP oversees some 75 facilities, ranging in complexity from abandoned waste storage tanks to large experimental reactors. This paper describes the scope of the ORNL program and outlines the decommissioning activities currently underway, including a brief description of the decontamination techniques being utilized. 4 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

  11. Flexible weapons architecture design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pyant, William C., III

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

  12. Plutonium contamination in soils and sediments at Mayak PA, Russia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skipperud, Lindis; Salbu, Brit; Oughton, Deborah H; Drozcho, Eugeny; Mokrov, Yuri; Strand, Per

    2005-09-01

    The Mayak Production Association (Mayak PA) was established in the late 1940's to produce plutonium for the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Programme. In total, seven reactors and two reprocessing plants have been in operation. Today, the area comprises both military and civilian reactors as well as reprocessing and metallurgical plants. Authorized and accidental releases of radioactive waste have caused severe contamination to the surrounding areas. In the present study, [alpha]-spectrometry and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) have been used to determine plutonium activities and isotope ratios in soil and sediment samples collected from reservoirs of the Techa River at the Mayak area and downstream Techa River. The objective of the study was to determine the total inventory of plutonium in the reservoirs and to identify the different sources contributing to the plutonium contamination. Results based on [alpha]-spectrometry and ICP-MS measurements show the presence of different sources and confirmed recent reports of civilian reprocessing at Mayak. Determination of activity levels and isotope ratios in soil and sediment samples from the Techa River support the hypothesis that most of the plutonium, like other radionuclides in the Techa River, originated from the very early waste discharges to the Techa River between 1949 and 1951. Analysis of reservoir sediment samples suggest that about 75% of the plutonium isotopes could have been released to Reservoir 10 during the early weapons production operation of the plant, and that the majority of plutonium in Reservoir 10 originates from discharges from power production or reprocessing. Enhanced 240Pu/239Pu atom ratios in river sediment upper layers (0-2 cm) between 50 and 250 km downstream from the plant indicate a contribution from other, non-fallout sources.

  13. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 1, Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.

  14. Plutonium storage phenomenology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szempruch, R.

    1995-12-01

    Plutonium has been produced, handled, and stored at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities since the 1940s. Many changes have occurred during the last 40 years in the sources, production demands, and end uses of plutonium. These have resulted in corresponding changes in the isotopic composition as well as the chemical and physical forms of the processed and stored plutonium. Thousands of ordinary food pack tin cans have been used successfully for many years to handle and store plutonium. Other containers have been used with equal success. This paper addressees the exceptions to this satisfactory experience. To aid in understanding the challenges of handling plutonium for storage or immobilization the lessons learned from past storage experience and the necessary countermeasures to improve storage performance are discussed

  15. The toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crouse, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    Shipments of plutonium occasionally pass around the Cape coastal waters on its way to Japan from Europe. This invariably leads to a great deal of speculation of the dangers involved and of the extreme toxicity of plutonium, with the media and environmental groups claiming that (a) plutonium is the most toxic substance known to man, and that (b) a few kilograms of plutonium ground finely and dispersed in the atmosphere could kill every human being on earth. Comparisons with other poisons are drawn, e.g. common inorganic chemicals and biological agents. The original scare around the extraordinary toxicity of Pu seems to have started in 1974 with the claims of Tamplin and Cochran's hot particle theory about plutonium lodging in the sensitive portions of the lungs in small concentrated aggregates where they are much more effective in producing cancers. This theory, however, is regarded as thoroughly discredited by the experts in the field of radiotoxicity. 8 refs

  16. Remote material handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    With the downsizing of the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium in the US are being declared excess and will be disposed of by the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To implement this program, DOE has selected the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the construction and operation of three new facilities: pit disassembly and conversion; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and plutonium immobilization. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize a portion of the excess plutonium in a hybrid ceramic and glass form containing high level waste for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. The PIP is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. Processing technology for the PIP is being developed jointly by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Westinghouse Savannah River Company. This paper will discuss development of the automated unpacking and sorting operations in the conversion area, and the automated puck and tray handling operations in the first stage immobilization area. Due to the high radiation levels and toxicity of the materials to be disposed of, the PIP will utilize automated equipment in a contained (glovebox) facility. Most operations involving plutonium-bearing materials will be performed remotely, separating personnel from the radiation source. Source term materials will be removed from the operations during maintenance. Maintenance will then be performed hands on within the containment using glove ports

  17. Using existing European MOX fabrication plants for the disposal of plutonium from dismantled Russian warheads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaper, A.

    1995-01-01

    One of the disposition options for excess weapons plutonium which is favored by the study of the American National Academy of Sciences is the fabrication and use as fuel, without reprocessing, in existing or modified nuclear reactors. An important criterion for reducing the proliferation risks is minimizing the time during which the plutonium is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons. The study recommends to either modify an almost completed facility for experimental fast reactors or to construct a new fuel fabrication capability. The estimated time for siting, building, and licensing is a decade or more

  18. 12 CFR 615.5330 - Minimum surplus ratios.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... POLICIES AND OPERATIONS, AND FUNDING OPERATIONS Surplus and Collateral Requirements § 615.5330 Minimum... a least 7 percent of total surplus to the risk-adjusted asset base. (2) The risk-adjusted asset base...) and weighted on the basis of risk in accordance with § 615.5210. (b) Core surplus. (1) Each...

  19. Optimisation of deep burn incineration of reactor waste plutonium in a PBMR DPP-400 core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serfontein, Dawid E.; Mulder, Eben J.; Reitsma, Frederik

    2014-01-01

    In this article an original set of coupled neutronics and thermo-hydraulic simulation results for the VSOP 99/05 diffusion code are presented for advanced fuel cycles for the incineration of weapons-grade plutonium, reactor-grade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium with its associated Minor Actinides in the 400 MW th Pebble Bed Modular Reactor Demonstration Power Plant. These results are also compared to those of the standard 9.6 wt% enriched 9 g/fuel sphere U/Pu fuel cycle. The weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium fuel cycles produced good burn-ups. However, the addition of the Minor Actinides to the reactor-grade plutonium caused a large decrease in the burn-up and thus an unacceptable increase in the heavy metal (HM) content in the spent fuel, which was intended for direct disposal in a deep geological repository, without chemical reprocessing. All the plutonium fuel cycles failed the adopted safety limits used in the PBMR400 in that either the maximum fuel temperature of 1130 °C during normal operation, or the maximum power density of 4.5 kW/sphere was exceeded. All the plutonium fuel cycles also produced positive uniform temperature reactivity coefficients, i.e. the reactivity coefficient where the temperatures of the fuel and the graphite moderator in the fuel spheres were varied together. These unacceptable positive coefficients were experienced at low temperatures, typically below 700 °C. This was due to the influence of the thermal fission cross-section resonances of 239 Pu and 241 Pu. Weapons-grade plutonium produced the worst safety performance. The safety performance of the reactor-grade plutonium also deteriorated when the HM loading was reduced from 3 g/sphere to 2 g or 1 g

  20. The characterization and testing of candidate immobilization forms for the disposal of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakel, A. J.; Buck, E. C.; Chamberlain, D. B.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Fortner, J. A.; Marra, J. C.; Mcgrail, B. P.; Mertz, C. J.; Peeler, D. K.; Shaw, H. F.; Strachan, D. M.; Van Konynenburg, R. A.; Vienna, J. D.; Wolf, S. F.

    1997-01-01

    Candidate immobilization forms for the disposal of surplus weapons-useable are being tested and characterized. The goal of the testing program was to provide sufficient data that, by August 1997, an informed selection of a single immobilization form could be made so that the form development and production R and D could be more narrowly focused. Two forms have been under consideration for the past two years: glass and ceramic. In August, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) selected ceramic for plutonium disposition, halting further work on the glass material. In this paper, we will briefly describe these two waste forms, then describe our characterization techniques and testing methods. The analytical methods used to characterize altered and unaltered samples are the same. A full suite of microscopic techniques is used. Techniques used include optical, scanning electron, and transmission electron microscopies. For both candidate immobilization forms, the analyses are used to characterize the material for the presence of crystalline phases and amorphous material. Crystalline materials, either in the untested immobilization form or in the alteration products from testing, are characterized with respect to morphology, crystal structure, and composition. The goal of these analyses is to provide data on critical issues such as Pu and neutron absorber volubility in the immobilization form, thermal stability, potential separation of absorber and Pu, and the long-term behavior of the materials. Results from these analyses will be discussed in the presentation. Testing methods include MCC-1 tests, product consistency tests (methods A and B), unsaturated ''drip'' tests, vapor hydration tests, single-pass flow-through tests, and pressurized unsaturated flow tests. Both candidate immobilization forms have very low dissolution rates; examples of typical test results will be reported

  1. Airborne plutonium transported during southwesterly winds near the Hanford Prosser Barricade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sehmel, G.A.

    1980-01-01

    Airborne plutonium could result from resuspension of nuclear-weapons-testing stratospheric fallout deposition. To determine this possible resuspension at the Hanford site, two field experiments between April 12 to june 29, 1976 and August 12, 1976 to January 11, 1977 were conducted near the Prosser Barricade in the Hanford area about 19 to 22 km southeast (140 0 to 160 0 ) of the fuel-processing areas. The primary objective of these experimentss was to determine if stratospheric fallout resuspension was reflected by airborne plutonium concentrations increasing with increasing wind speed. A secondary objective was to confirm the source of the airborne plutonium by determining the plutonium-240 isotopic content or the plutonium-240/plutonium-239-mass ratio. Stratospheric fallout can be identified by the ratio of 240 Pu to other plutonium isotopes in surface soils. Plutonium was transported during southwesterly winds during the two study periods at the Prosser Barricade. Airborne 239 240 Pu concentrations varied as powers of wind speed (U):U -0 2 to U 7 8 . The airborne solids content ranged from 6 x 10 -8 to 1.7 x 10 -6 μCi/g. The 240 Pu isotopic content ranged from 5.6 to 8.1 atom percent and the 240 Pu/ 239 Pu mass ratio ranged from 0.065 to 0.089. The estimated fraction of stratospheric fallout plutonium in these samples was less than 0.24. The remaining airborne plutonium was probably of Hanford origin. Airborne plutonium probably represents resuspension of plutonium from undetermined sites by mechanisms and events not clear at present. An increasing airborne plutonium concentration with increasing wind speed might be expected for an upwind resuspension source(s). However, the geographical source(s) location was not investigated in this study

  2. Toxicology of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bair, W.J.

    1974-01-01

    Data are reviewed from studies on the toxicity of Pu in experimental animals. Of the several plutonium isotopes, only 238 Pu and 239 Pu have been studied well. Sufficient results have been obtained to show that the behavior of 238 Pu in biological systems and the resulting biological effects cannot be precisely predicted from studies of 239 Pu. This probably applies also to other radiologically important plutonium isotopes which have half-lives ranging from 45 days to 10 7 years and decay by β-emission, electron capture, and spontaneous fission, as well as by emission of α-particles. All the biological effects of plutonium described in this review are attributed to alpha-particle radiation emitted by the plutonium. However, since plutonium is a chemically active heavy metal, one cannot ignore the possibility of chemical toxicity of the low-specific-activity isotopes, 239 Pu, 242 Pu, and 244 Pu. The preponderance of our knowledge of plutonium toxicology has come from short-term studies of relatively high dosage levels in several animal species. The consequences of high-level internal exposures can be predicted with confidence in experimental animals and probably also in man. However, considering the care with which plutonium is handled in the nuclear industry, a high-level contamination event is unlikely. Considerably less is known about the long-term effects of low levels of contamination. (250 references) (U.S.)

  3. Application of spent fuel treatment technology to plutonium immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McPheeters, C.C.; Ackerman, J.P.; Gay, E.C., Johnson, G.K.

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of the electrometallurgical treatment technology being developed at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is to convert certain spent nuclear fuels into waste forms that are suitable for disposal in a geological repository for nuclear waste. The spent fuels of interest are those that cannot be safely stored for a long time in their current condition, and those that cannot be qualified for repository disposal. This paper explores the possibility of applying this electrometallurgical treatment technology to immobilization of surplus fissile materials, primarily plutonium. Immobilization of surplus fissile materials by electrometallurgical treatment could be done in the same facilities, at the same time. and in the same equipment as the proposed treatment of the present inventory of spent nuclear fuel. The cost and schedule savings of this simultaneous treatment scheme would be significant

  4. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1982-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Progress was made on two fronts during the past year. The autoradiographic technique developed from detection of plutonium on the interior surface of pulmonary airways (Annual Report, 1978) has been adapted to routine use in examining tracheas and bronchi of rats. Also, dogs exposed to cigarette smoke for over a year after inhalation of plutonium were killed and necropsied

  5. PLUTONIUM ELECTROREFINING CELLS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mullins, L.J. Jr.; Leary, J.A.; Bjorklund, C.W.; Maraman, W.J.

    1963-07-16

    Electrorefining cells for obtaining 99.98% plutonium are described. The cells consist of an impure liquid plutonium anode, a molten PuCl/sub 3/-- alkali or alkaline earth metal chloanode, a molten PuCl/sub 3/-alkali or alkaline earth metal chloride electrolyte, and a nonreactive cathode, all being contained in nonreactive ceramic containers which separate anode from cathode by a short distance and define a gap for the collection of the purified liquid plutonium deposited on the cathode. Important features of these cells are the addition of stirrer blades on the anode lead and a large cathode surface to insure a low current density. (AEC)

  6. Automation of plutonium spectrophotometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, J.J.; Boisde, G.; Goujon de Beauvivier, M.; Chevalier, G.; Isaac, M.

    1980-01-01

    Instrumentation was designed and constructed for automatic control of plutonium by molecular absorption spectrophotometry, on behalf of the reprocessing facilities, to meet two objectives: on-line measurement, of the valency state of plutonium, on by-pass, with the measured concentration covering the process concentration range up to a few mg.l -1 ; laboratory measurement of plutonium adjusted to valency VI, with operation carried out using a preparative system meeting the required containment specifications. For this two objectives, the photometer, optical cell connections are made by optical fibers resistant to β, γ radiation. Except this characteristic the devices are different according to the quality required for result [fr

  7. The weapons effect.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

    2018-02-01

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  8. Recapitalizing Nuclear Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Vaughan, Edgar M

    2007-01-01

    The US nuclear weapons stockpile is aging and undergoing an extensive and expensive life-extension program to ensure the continuing safety, security, and reliability of the legacy weapons well into the future...

  9. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project, 1978-1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-09-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  10. Criticality characteristics of mixtures of plutonium, silicon dioxide, Nevada tuff, and water

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanchez, R.; Myers, W.; Hayes, D.

    1997-01-01

    The nuclear criticality characteristics of mixtures of plutonium, silicon dioxide, and water (Part A) or plutonium, silicon dioxide, Nevada Yucca Mountain tuff, and water (Part B) have become of interest because of the appearance of recent papers on the subject. These papers postulate that if excess weapons plutonium is vitrified into a silicate log and buried underground, a self-sustaining neutron chain reaction may develop given sufficient time and interaction with the burial medium. Moreover, given specific geologic actions resulting in postulated configurations, the referenced papers state that nuclear explosions could occur with multi-kiloton yields or yields equivalent to hundreds of tons of TNT

  11. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. open-quotes Militaryclose quotes refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. open-quotes Excessclose quotes refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC ampersand A), containment and surveillance (C ampersand S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. open-quotes Monitoringclose quotes is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized

  12. Weapons-grade nuclear material - open questions of a safe disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Closs, K.D.; Giraud, J.P.; Grill, K.D.; Hensing, I.; Hippel, F. von; Holik, J.; Pellaud, B.

    1995-01-01

    There are suitable technologies available for destruction of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Weapons-grade uranium, consisting to 90% of the isotope U-235, can be diluted with the uranium isotope U-238 to make it non-weapons-grade, but it will then still be a material that can be used as a fuel in civil nuclear reactors. For safe plutonium disposal, several options are under debate. There is for instance a process called ''reverse reprocessing'', with the plutonium being blended with high-level radioactive fission products and then being put into a waste form accepted for direct ultimate disposal. The other option is to convert weapons-grade plutonium into MOX nuclear fuel elements and then ''burn'' them in civil nuclear power reactors. This is an option favoured by many experts. Such fuel elements should stay for a long time in the reactor core in order to achieve high burnups, and should then be ready for ultimate disposal. This disposal pathway offers essential advantages: the plutonium is used up or depleted as a component of reactor fuel, and thus is no longer available for illegal activities, and it serves as an energy source for power generation. (orig./HP) [de

  13. French plutonium management program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greneche, D.

    2002-01-01

    The French plutonium management program is summarized in this paper. The program considers nuclear generation as a major component of national electric power supply and includes the reprocessing of the spent fuel. (author)

  14. Plutonium spectrophotometric analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Cassaniti, P.; Orosco, E.H.

    1990-01-01

    Plutonium ions in solution have absorption spectra so different that it is possible to use them for analytical purposes. Detailed studies have been performed in nitric solutions. Some very convenient methods for the determination of plutonium and its oxidation states, especially the ratios Pu(III):Pu(IV) and Pu(IV):Pu(VI) in a mixture of both, have been developed. These methods are described in this paper, including: a) Absorption spectra for plutonium (III), (IV), (VI) and mixtures. b) Relative extinction coefficients for the above mentioned species. c) Dependences of the relative extinction coefficients on the nitric acid concentration and the plutonium VI deviation from the Beer-Lambert law. The developed methods are simple and rapid and then, suitable in process control. Accuracy is improved when relative absorbance measurements are performed or controlled the variables which have effect on the spectra and extinction coefficients. (Author) [es

  15. Plutonium in coniferous forests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rantavaara, A.; Kostiainen, E.

    2002-01-01

    Our aim was to study the uptake of plutonium by trees, undervegetation and some wild foods. The ratio of 238 Pu/ 239,240 Pu in soil samples was determined for comparisons of the fallout origin. In twelve years the Chernobyl derived plutonium has not reached the mineral soil. This refers to a very slow downward migration in podsolic soil. The study confirmed also the low Pu uptake by vegetation and an insignificant contribution to human doses through wild foods. (au)

  16. Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    von Hippel, Frank

    2010-02-01

    Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

  17. Hitlers' bomb. The secret story of Germanys' nuclear weapon tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsch, R.

    2005-01-01

    This book reveals a sensation: Under supervision of the SS German scientists tested 1944/45 nuclear bombs on Ruegen and in Thuringia. During this period several hundred prisoners of war and prisoners died. Besides proofs for nuclear weapon testing the author also found a draft for a patent on plutonium bombs and discovered the first functioning German atom reactor in the environs of Berlin. (GL) [de

  18. Proliferation resistance attributes of advanced plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koch, L.

    2009-01-01

    To obtain public acceptance for future use of Pu, new concepts must overcome the present concerns about environmental compliance as well as concerns about misusing plutonium of the civil nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear explosives e.g. by terrorists. In future the preferable remedy is the multi-recycling of all transuranium elements in fast neutron reactors. In such a partitioning and transmutation scheme, P T, Pu becomes proliferation resistant, when mixed with self-generated actinides. This strategy will also reduce the long-term radio-toxicity, the radiogenic heat production and the Pu content of the nuclear waste per G We produced in the geological repositories, which otherwise could be regarded as future Pu-mines. The development of advanced spent fuel reprocessing should aim at technologies with intrinsic barriers that under normal operation exclude the production of weapon usable fissile material at all stages of the process. Complementary institutional, extrinsic measures would then have to verify the declared operation and the absence of weapon usable material, instead of presently verifying the declared mass of weapon usable Pu.

  19. Plutonium-236 traces determination in plutonium-238 by α spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acena, M.L.; Pottier, R.; Berger, R.

    1969-01-01

    Two methods are described in this report for the determination of plutonium-236 traces in plutonium-238 by a spectrometry using semi-conductor detectors. The first method involves a direct comparison of the areas under the peaks of the α spectra of plutonium-236 and plutonium-238. The electrolytic preparation of the sources is carried out after preliminary purification of the plutonium. The second method makes it possible to determine the 236 Pu/ 238 Pu ratio by comparing the areas of the α peaks of uranium-232 and uranium-234, which are the decay products of the two plutonium isotopes respectively. The uranium in the source, also deposited by electrolysis, is separated from a 1 mg amount of plutonium either by a T.L.A. extraction, or by the use of ion-exchange resins. The report ends with a discussion of the results obtained with plutonium of two different origins. (authors) [fr

  20. Phase composition of murataite ceramics for excess weapons plutonium immobilization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sobolev, I. A.; Stefanovsky, S. V.; Myasoedov, B. F.; Kullako, Y. M.; Yudintsev, S. V.

    2000-07-01

    Among the host phases for actinides immobilization, murataite (cubic, space group Fm3m) with the general formula A4B2C7O22-x (A=Ca, Mn, Na, Ln, An; B=Mn, Ti, Zr, AnIV; C=Ti, Al, Fe; 0ceramics in detail has shown occurrence of several murataite varieties with three-, five-, and eight-fold fluorite unit cells. [1-3] The goal of the present step of work is to study an effect of waste elements on phase composition of murataite ceramic and isomorphic capacity of waste elements.

  1. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 2: Hanford working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    In a memorandum dated January 24, 1994, the Secretary of Energy initiated a department-wide assessment of current plutonium-related safety and environmental vulnerabilities at Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. In a March 15, 1994 memorandum, the Secretary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) to take the lead in coordinating this assessment, which will help to establish the plutonium portion of the foundation for decision making related to the ES ampersand H aspects of national surplus fissile material disposition efforts. This DOE-wide plutonium vulnerability assessment is intended to provide the information base needed to identify and prioritize interim corrective actions for the safe management of these materials

  2. Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2002-05-01

    The Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs fell over Japan. The assignment to look into the new weapon of mass destruction went to the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Admittedly, the main aim of the research initiated at that time was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset FOA was interested in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AB Atomenergi (AE), which was created in 1947 in order to be responsible for the industrial development of civilian nuclear energy, was initiated. AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. The first purpose of this report is therefore to investigate how this co-operation emerged and what consequences it had for the project to produce basic information for the Swedish manufacture of nuclear weapons. In general terms, the finding of this report is that FOA was responsible for the overall nuclear weapons research. For this reason, FOA was in charge of the construction of the nuclear device and the studies of its effects. Additionally, AE should deliver basic information of a possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of a production or a procurement of inspection-free heavy water (i.e. without inspections by the supplying country). AE should also build a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that both FOA and AE conducted plutonium research. The reason why FOA conducted this research was that the plutonium had to be in metallic form in order to be used in a nuclear weapons device. Therefore, FOA carried out research with the purpose of producing

  3. Materials control and accountability challenges associated with plutonium inventories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1996-01-01

    There are currently many initiatives underway within the Department of Energy (DOE) to safely and securely manage large plutonium inventories arising from weapons dismantlement, changing missions and facility operations. Plutonium inventory information is increasingly accessible to the public as a result of the secretary of energy's openness initiative. As a result, knowledge of these inventories and levels to which the department has accounted for and controlled these inventories, will be under increased scrutiny from a variety of interest groups. The quality of this accountability data and what this data means will greatly influence the public's perception of how the US is protecting its plutonium inventories. In addition, the department's safeguards program provides an essential basis for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards that, in addition to possibly other international control regimes, will be in place over a large portion of these future inventories. The capability and functionality of the department's nuclear safeguards program will be important contributors to the success of US programs for the responsible stewardship of these vast plutonium inventories. This paper discusses some of the challenges, in terms of specific issues relating to one part of the department's safeguards program--materials control and accountability (MC and A)--to meet the growing domestic and international requirements and expectations associated with these plutonium inventories

  4. Materials control and accountability challenges associated with plutonium inventories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crawford, D.W. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-07-01

    There are currently many initiatives underway within the Department of Energy (DOE) to safely and securely manage large plutonium inventories arising from weapons dismantlement, changing missions and facility operations. Plutonium inventory information is increasingly accessible to the public as a result of the secretary of energy`s openness initiative. As a result, knowledge of these inventories and levels to which the department has accounted for and controlled these inventories, will be under increased scrutiny from a variety of interest groups. The quality of this accountability data and what this data means will greatly influence the public`s perception of how the US is protecting its plutonium inventories. In addition, the department`s safeguards program provides an essential basis for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards that, in addition to possibly other international control regimes, will be in place over a large portion of these future inventories. The capability and functionality of the department`s nuclear safeguards program will be important contributors to the success of US programs for the responsible stewardship of these vast plutonium inventories. This paper discusses some of the challenges, in terms of specific issues relating to one part of the department`s safeguards program--materials control and accountability (MC and A)--to meet the growing domestic and international requirements and expectations associated with these plutonium inventories.

  5. Antineutrino monitoring of burning mixed oxide plutonium fuels

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hayes, A. C.; Trellue, H. R.; Nieto, Michael Martin; Wilson, W. B.

    2012-02-01

    Background: Antineutrino monitoring of reactors is an enhanced nuclear safeguard that is being explored by several international groups. A key question is whether such a scheme could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium loaded in a reactor as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.Purpose: To explore the effectiveness of antineutrino monitoring for the purposes of nuclear accountability and safeguarding of MOX plutonium, we examine the magnitude and temporal variation in the antineutrino signals expected for different loadings of MOX fuels.Methods: Reactor burn simulations are carried out for four different MOX fuel loadings and the antineutrino signals as a function of fuel burnup are computed and compared.Results: The antineutrino signals from reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX are shown to be distinct from those from burning low enriched uranium, and this signal difference increases as the MOX plutonium fraction of the reactor core increases.Conclusion: Antineutrino monitoring could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium in reactors, although verifying the grade of the plutonium being burned is found to be more challenging.

  6. Decommissioning of eight surplus production reactors at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    The first section of this volume summarizes the content of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) and this Addendum, which together constitute the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) prepared on the decommissioning of eight surplus plutonium production reactors at Hanford. The FEIS consists of two volumes. The first volume is the DEIS as written. The second volume (this Addendum) consists of a summary; Chapter 9, which contains comments on the DEIS and provides DOE's responses to the comments; Appendix F, which provides additional health effects information; Appendix K, which contains costs of decommissioning in 1990 dollars; Appendix L, which contains additional graphite leaching data; Appendix M, which contains a discussion of accident scenarios; Appendix N, which contains errata; and Appendix 0, which contains reproductions of the letters, transcripts, and exhibits that constitute the record for the public comment period

  7. Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide upper level guidance for the program that will downblend surplus highly enriched uranium for use as commercial nuclear reactor fuel or low-level radioactive waste. The intent of this document is to outline the overall mission and program objectives. The document is also intended to provide a general basis for integration of disposition efforts among all applicable sites. This plan provides background information, establishes the scope of disposition activities, provides an approach to the mission and objectives, identifies programmatic assumptions, defines major roles, provides summary level schedules and milestones, and addresses budget requirements

  8. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option

  9. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-02-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

  10. METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.

    1959-12-15

    A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.

  11. History and stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex, Hanford Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S., Fluor Daniel Hanford

    1997-02-18

    The 231-Z Isolation Building or Plutonium Metallurgy Building is located in the Hanford Site`s 200 West Area, approximately 300 yards north of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (234-5 Building). When the Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) built it in 1944 to contain the final step for processing plutonium, it was called the Isolation Building. At that time, HEW used a bismuth phosphate radiochemical separations process to make `AT solution,` which was then dried and shipped to Los Alamos, New Mexico. (AT solution is a code name used during World War II for the final HEW product.) The process was carried out first in T Plant and the 224-T Bulk Reduction Building and B Plant and the 224-B Bulk Reduction Building. The 224-T and -B processes produced a concentrated plutonium nitrate stream, which then was sent in 8-gallon batches to the 231-Z Building for final purification. In the 231-Z Building, the plutonium nitrate solution underwent peroxide `strikes` (additions of hydrogen peroxide to further separate the plutonium from its carrier solutions), to form the AT solution. The AT solution was dried and shipped to the Los Alamos Site, where it was made into metallic plutonium and then into weapons hemispheres.` The 231-Z Building began `hot` operations (operations using radioactive materials) with regular runs of plutonium nitrate on January 16, 1945.

  12. Identification of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  13. A Note on Realistic Dividends in Actuarial Surplus Models

    OpenAIRE

    Benjamin Avanzi; Vincent Tu; Bernard Wong

    2016-01-01

    Because of the profitable nature of risk businesses in the long term, de Finetti suggested that surplus models should allow for cash leakages, as otherwise the surplus would unrealistically grow (on average) to infinity. These leakages were interpreted as 'dividends'. Subsequent literature on actuarial surplus models with dividend distribution has mainly focussed on dividend strategies that either maximise the expected present value of dividends until ruin or lead to a probability of ruin tha...

  14. Savannah River Site Surplus Facilities Available for Reuse

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clarke, R.M.; Owens, M.B.; Lentz, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a current, centralized list of Savannah River Site facilities, which are surplus and available for reuse. These surplus facilities may be made available for other DOE site missions, commercial economic development reuse, or other governmental reuse. SRS procedures also require that before new construction can be approved, available surplus facilities are screened for possible reuse in lieu of the proposed new construction

  15. Recycling of plutonium and uranium in water reactor fuel. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-05-01

    The Technical Committee Meeting on Recycling of Plutonium and Uranium in Water Reactor Fuel was recommended by the International Working Group on Fuel Performance and Technology (IWGFPT). Its aim was to obtain an overall picture of MOX fabrication capacity and technology, actual performance of this kind of fuel, and ways explored to dispose of the weapons grade plutonium. The subject of this meeting had been reviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency every 5 to 6 years and for the first time the problem of weapons grade plutonium disposal was included. The papers presented provide a summary of experience on MOX fuel and ongoing research in this field in the participating countries. The meeting was hosted by British Nuclear Fuels plc, at Newby Bridge, United Kingdom, from 3 to 7 July 1995. Fifty-six participants from twelve countries or international organizations took part. Refs, figs, tabs

  16. Security with nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karp, R.C.

    1991-01-01

    Recent improvements in East-West relations and the process of dramatic political change in Europe may result in unprecedented opportunities to reduce the global arsenal of nuclear weapons. Despite these welcome developments, the prospects for effectively controlling the spread of nuclear capability in the Third World have remained much less encouraging. The possibility of large reductions in nuclear weapons poses fundamental questions about their purpose. Why have some states chosen to acquire nuclear weapons? How and why have these decisions been maintained over time? Why have some states elected to approach, but not cross, the nuclear threshold? This book examines the commonalities and differences in political approaches to nuclear weapons both within and between three groups of states: nuclear, non-nuclear and threshold. The chapters explore the evolution of thinking about nuclear weapons and the role these weapons play in national security planning, and question the official security rationales offered by the nuclear weapon states for the maintenance of nuclear capabilities. For the non-nuclear weapon states, the book presents an analysis of alternative ways of assuring security and foreign policy effectiveness. For the threshold states, it examines the regional contexts within which these states maintain their threshold status. This book transcends traditional East-West approaches to analysis of nuclear issues by giving equal prominence to the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-nuclearism. The book also provides a comprehensive analysis of how current approaches to nuclear weapons have evolved both within and among the groups of countries under study

  17. Precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and calcination to plutonium oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Greco, L.; Adelfang, P.

    1989-01-01

    The plutonium based fuel fabrication requires the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution from nuclear fuel reprocessing into pure PuO2. The conversion method based on the precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and subsequent calcination has been studied in detail. In this procedure, plutonium (III) oxalate is precipitated, at room temperature, by the slow addition of 1M oxalic acid to the feed solution, containing from 5-100 g/l of plutonium in 1M nitric acid. Before precipitation, the plutonium is adjusted to trivalent state by addition of 1M ascorbic acid in the presence of an oxidation inhibitor such as hydrazine. Finally, the precipitate is calcinated at 700 deg C to obtain PuO2. A flowsheet is proposed in this paper including: a) A study about the conditions to adjust the plutonium valence. b) Solubility data of plutonium (III) oxalate and measurements of plutonium losses to the filtrate and wash solution. c) Characterization of the obtained products. Plutonium (III) oxalate has several potential advantages over similar conversion processes. These include: 1) Formation of small particle sizes powder with good pellets fabrication characteristics. 2) The process is rather insensitive to most process variables, except nitric acid concentration. 3) Ambient temperature operations. 4) The losses of plutonium to the filtrate are less than in other conversion processes. (Author) [es

  18. Plutonium and transplutonian biology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafuma, Jacques

    1975-01-01

    The present state of knowledge in the field of plutonium and transplutonian biology is reviewed. The physico-chemical properties of these substances, the conditions in which they can contaminate human beings, their behaviour on mammals, their toxic effects and the correlative contamination treatment technique are analyzed successively. Plutonium and transplutonians, although relatively toxic, have as yet never caused severe injuries to humans. They cannot be transmitted to man through alimentary chains and constitute a hazard only for those who handle them. In this last case, the existing protection techniques offer such a high degree of efficiency that virtually all risk of contamination is eliminated [fr

  19. Plutonium microstructures. Part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cramer, E.M.; Bergin, J.B.

    1981-09-01

    This report is the first of three parts in which Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory metallographers exhibit a consolidated set of illustrations of inclusions that are seen in plutonium metal as a consequence of inherent and tramp impurities, alloy additions, and thermal or mechanical treatments. This part includes illustrations of nonmetallic and intermetallic inclusions characteristic of major impurity elements as an aid to identifying unknowns. It also describes historical aspects of the increased purity of laboratory plutonium samples, and it gives the composition of the etchant solutions and describes the etching procedure used in the preparation of each illustrated sample. 25 figures

  20. Plutonium isotopes in the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holm, E.

    1977-12-01

    Determination of plutonium and americium by ion exchange and alpha-spectrometry. Deposition of global fall-out and accumulated area-content of 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 240 Pu, 241 Pu, 242 Pu and 241 Am in central Sweden (62.3 deg N, 12.4 deg E), by using the lichen species Cladonia alpestris as bioindicator. Retention and distribution of plutonium in carpets of lichen and soil. Transfer of plutonium from lichen to reindeer and man. Absorbed dose in reindeer and man from plutonium. Basic studies of plutonium and americium in the western Mediterranean surface waters, with emphases on particulate form of the transuranics. (author)

  1. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  2. Developments in plutonium waste assay at AWE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, T J

    2009-01-01

    In 2002 a paper was presented at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) on the assay of low level plutonium (Pu) in soft drummed waste (Miller 2002 INMM Ann. Meeting (Orlando, FL, 23-27 July 2002)). The technique described enabled the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), at Aldermaston in the UK, to meet the stringent Low Level Waste Repository at Drigg (LLWRD) conditions for acceptance for the first time. However, it was initially applied to only low density waste streams because it relied on measuring the relatively low energy (60 keV) photon yield from Am-241 during growth. This paper reviews the results achieved when using the technique to assay over 10 000 waste packages and presents the case for extending the range of application to denser waste streams.

  3. Plutonium safety training course

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moe, H. J.

    1976-03-01

    This course seeks to achieve two objectives: to provide initial safety training for people just beginning work with plutonium, and to serve as a review and reference source for those already engaged in such work. Numerous references have been included to provide information sources for those wishing to pursue certain topics more fully. The first part of the course content deals with the general safety approach used in dealing with hazardous materials. Following is a discussion of the four properties of plutonium that lead to potential hazards: radioactivity, toxicity, nuclear properties, and spontaneous ignition. Next, the various hazards arising from these properties are treated. The relative hazards of both internal and external radiation sources are discussed, as well as the specific hazards when plutonium is the source. Similarly, the general hazards involved in a criticality, fire, or explosion are treated. Comments are made concerning the specific hazards when plutonium is involved. A brief summary comparison between the hazards of the transplutonium nuclides relative to /sup 239/Pu follows. The final portion deals with control procedures with respect to contamination, internal and external exposure, nuclear safety, and fire protection. The philosophy and approach to emergency planning are also discussed.

  4. Plutonium: An introduction

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Condit, R.H.

    1993-10-01

    This report is a summary of the history and properties of plutonium. It presents information on the atoms, comparing chemical and nuclear properties. It looks at the history of the atom, including its discovery and production methods. It summarizes the metallurgy and chemistry of the element. It also describes means of detecting and measuring the presence and quantity of the element.

  5. Plutonium: An introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Condit, R.H.

    1993-10-01

    This report is a summary of the history and properties of plutonium. It presents information on the atoms, comparing chemical and nuclear properties. It looks at the history of the atom, including its discovery and production methods. It summarizes the metallurgy and chemistry of the element. It also describes means of detecting and measuring the presence and quantity of the element

  6. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    As any other fissile material, the plutonium raises several utilization problems, particularly as far as diversion by sub-national groups or proliferation are concerned. The purpose of this paper is to show that these problems can be given reasonable solutions avoiding over penalties on energy production

  7. Atomic spectrum of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blaise, J.; Fred, M.; Gutmacher, R.G.

    1984-08-01

    This report contains plutonium wavelengths, energy level classifications, and other spectroscopic data accumulated over the past twenty years at Laboratoire Aime Cotton (LAC) Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary purpose was term analysis: deriving the energy levels in terms of quantum numbers and electron configurations, and evaluating the Slater-Condon and other parameters from the levels

  8. Transport of plutonium nitrate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    This leaflet discusses the subject under the headings: why do we need plutonium; why must we transport it; what action is carried out; how is it moved; what are the risks. The transport of the material in specially designed containers, from Dounreay in Caithness by road and sea to Sellafield in Cumbria, is described. (U.K.)

  9. Plutonium and textbooks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2008-01-01

    Chemical equilibrium is not characterized by equilibrium constants alone. At least one conservation principle is necessary. Textbook descriptions of plutonium chemistry that are based on two-reaction-product disproportionation equations, or do not recognize the conservation principles, are incomplete and potentially misleading. (author)

  10. Plutonium safety training course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moe, H.J.

    1976-03-01

    This course seeks to achieve two objectives: to provide initial safety training for people just beginning work with plutonium, and to serve as a review and reference source for those already engaged in such work. Numerous references have been included to provide information sources for those wishing to pursue certain topics more fully. The first part of the course content deals with the general safety approach used in dealing with hazardous materials. Following is a discussion of the four properties of plutonium that lead to potential hazards: radioactivity, toxicity, nuclear properties, and spontaneous ignition. Next, the various hazards arising from these properties are treated. The relative hazards of both internal and external radiation sources are discussed, as well as the specific hazards when plutonium is the source. Similarly, the general hazards involved in a criticality, fire, or explosion are treated. Comments are made concerning the specific hazards when plutonium is involved. A brief summary comparison between the hazards of the transplutonium nuclides relative to 239 Pu follows. The final portion deals with control procedures with respect to contamination, internal and external exposure, nuclear safety, and fire protection. The philosophy and approach to emergency planning are also discussed

  11. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 10: Sandia National Laboratories - New Mexico working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The Secretary of Energy's memorandum of March 15, 1994, established an initiative for a Department-wide assessment of the vulnerabilities of the inventory of plutonium in storage. Plutonium in intact nuclear weapons and spent fuel were excluded from this study. The DOE Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group, which was formed for this purpose and produced the Project and Assessment Plans, will also manage the open-quote snap-shot close-quote assessments and produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The Project Plan and Assessment Plan to accomplish this study, and which established responsibilities for personnel essential to the study, were issued on April 25, 1994

  12. Rapid, autonomous analysis of HPGe gamma-ray spectra III: Plutonium identification and characterization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gosnell, Thomas B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Wong, James L. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-02-11

    RadID is a gamma-ray spectrum analysis program originally written to assist in the detection of the illicit movement of nuclear material. It is specific to the rapid analysis of HPGe gamma-ray data to reveal the radionuclide signatures of interest that may be present in the spectra. It is an autonomous, rule-based heuristic system that can identify well over 200 radioactive sources in about one second. RadID does not require knowledge of the detector efficiency, the source-todetector distance, or the geometry of the inspected radiation source—including any shielding. In this third of a three-document series we discuss how RadID detects the presence of plutonium isotopes and determines a number of its characteristics, most notably: the spectral characteristics of weapons-grade plutonium, reactor-grade plutonium, and heat-source plutonium used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators.

  13. 50 CFR 30.2 - Disposition of surplus range animals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Disposition of surplus range animals. 30.2... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM RANGE AND FERAL ANIMAL MANAGEMENT Range Animals § 30.2 Disposition of surplus range animals. Disposition shall be made only during regularly scheduled disposal...

  14. 50 CFR 30.1 - Surplus range animals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Surplus range animals. 30.1 Section 30.1... NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM RANGE AND FERAL ANIMAL MANAGEMENT Range Animals § 30.1 Surplus range animals. Range animals on fenced wildlife refuge areas, including buffalo and longhorn cattle, determined...

  15. The Appropriate Disposal of Retirement Fund Surpluses | Asher ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    This paper attempts to clarify the different paradigms from which defined benefit funds are viewed, and the financial nature of the contracts implicit in their rules. Suggestions are made as to the principles that trustees might follow in applying the surpluses for the benefit of stakeholders. KEYWORDS: Pension funds; surpluses ...

  16. Use of plutonium for power production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    The panel reviewed available information on various aspects of plutonium utilization, such as physics of plutonium, technology of plutonium fuels in thermal and fast reactors, behaviour of plutonium fuel under reactor irradiation, technological and economic aspects of plutonium fuel cycle. Refs, figs and tabs

  17. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 11: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton has directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, has directed that a Department of Energy project be initiated to develop options and recommendations for the safe storage of these materials in the interim. A step in the process is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of facilities throughout the Department. The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group was formed to produce the Project and Assessment Plans, to manage the assessments and to produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The plans established the approach and methodology for the assessment. The Project Plan specifies a Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) to examine each of the twelve DOE sites with significant holdings of plutonium. The Assessment Plan describes the methodology that the Site Assessment Team (SAT) used to report on the plutonium holdings for each specific site.This report provides results of the assessment of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

  18. Assessment of plutonium in the Savannah River Site environment. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carlton, W.H.; Evans, A.G.; Geary, L.A.; Murphy, C.E. Jr.; Pinder, J.E.; Strom, R.N.

    1992-12-31

    Plutonium in the Savannah River Site Environment is published as a part of the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP). It is the fifth in a series of eight documents on individual radioisotopes released to the environment as a result of Savannah River Site (SRS) operations. These are living documents, each to be revised and updated on a two-year schedule. This document describes the sources of plutonium in the environment, its release from SRS, environmental transport and ecological concentration of plutonium, and the radiological impact of SRS releases to the environment. Plutonium exists in the environment as a result of above-ground nuclear weapons tests, the Chernobyl accident, the destruction of satellite SNAP 9-A, plane crashes involving nuclear weapons, and small releases from reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium has been produced at SRS during the operation of five production reactors and released in small quantities during the processing of fuel and targets in chemical separations facilities. Approximately 0.6 Ci of plutonium was released into streams and about 12 Ci was released to seepage basins, where it was tightly bound by clay in the soil. A smaller quantity, about 3.8 Ci, was released to the atmosphere. Virtually all releases have occurred in F- and H-Area separation facilities. Plutonium concentration and transport mechanisms for the atmosphere, surface water, and ground water releases have been extensively studied by Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) and ecological mechanisms have been studied by Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). The overall radiological impact of SRS releases to the offsite maximum individual can be characterized by a total dose of 15 mrem (atmospheric) and 0.18 mrem (liquid), compared with the dose of 12,960 mrem from non-SRS sources during the same period of time (1954--1989). Plutonium releases from SRS facilities have resulted in a negligible impact to the environment and the population it supports.

  19. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Nass, R. [Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (United States)

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

  20. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage

  1. Nuclear weapons free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, K.

    1990-01-01

    The article analyses the concept and problems of the two nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America and in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. So far the nuclear weapons states except China have refused to sign the additional protocols of the Treaties or have signed them only with considerable provisos. Therefore they don't fully recognize the nuclear weapons free status of those zones, or they don't recognize it at all. Both Treaties contain no provisions to regulate the transit of nuclear weapons through the zones. This allows de facto the stationing of nuclear weapons in the military bases of the US which are located within the nuclear weapons free zone of Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains also the right of the states, party to the Treaty, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Since peaceful and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished technically, this right could also undermine the nuclear weapons free status of the region. Important nuclear threshold countries like Argentina and Brazil have furthermore refrained from putting the Treaty into force. (orig.) [de

  2. Estimation of environmental transfer of plutonium and the dose to man

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-09-01

    The need to examine the behaviour of individual radionuclides in the environment is stressed. Sometimes unique pathways of exposure exist and more specialized methods of dose estimation could be considered. The toxicity of the alpha emitting plutonium isotopes is of concern and their long half-lives lead to persistence in the environment and long-term potential for exposing man. Some formulas are therefore presented for making preliminary estimates of environmental transfer and dose for the radioisotopes of the element plutonium. Exposure of man to plutonium in the environment may occur by inhalation or ingestion - the inhalation and ingestion intake rates for which specific pathways have been considered are listed. The primary pathway to man is the inhalation intake; the most important ingestion intake is the consumption of plant foods due to the greater concentration achieved and the higher consumption rates of these foods. Also discussed is plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, the release of plutonium from current nuclear installations, the occurrence of plutonium from weapons fallout, airborne releases of plutonium (concentration in the air, deposition rate, resuspension, transfer to plants - foliar and root uptake - transfer to milk, etc.), liquid release (concentration in water, transfer to drinking water, to fish, to plants by irrigation, to milk, to meat). The importance of the release situation and local environment conditions including land and water utilization, population factors and habits for any further investigation is pointed out

  3. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-07-31

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

  4. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro's Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel

  5. Plutonium recycling and the problem of nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, David; Feiveson, H.A.

    1992-01-01

    After chemical separation from the radioactive fission products and other components of the spent reactor fuel, the 250 kg of plutonium produced each year in a typical one gigawatt LWR reactor could be used in recycled fuel, to replace a similar quantity of U-235 in a power reactor or, in a bomb assembly, to provide the fissile material for over 25 nuclear warheads. In contrast to separated plutonium, neither of the fuels used in today's nuclear reactors - natural uranium (which is 0.71 per cent U-235, the fissile isotope of natural uranium) or low enriched uranium (typically, 2-5 per cent U-235) - can be used for weapons without very substantial isotopic separation, which is still a difficult and time-consuming enterprise. Therefore the commercial separation of plutonium and the introduction of fuel cycles using recycled plutonium, which are now impending in several countries, force one to balance the probable increased risks of nuclear proliferation due to these activities against economic and other motives. An assessment of this balancing is undertaken. (author)

  6. Global strike hypersonic weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Mark J.

    2017-11-01

    Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

  7. PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

    2009-06-01

    Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

  8. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The need to distinguish between diversion by sub-national groups and by governments is clearly stated. The paper identifies the international safeguards measures which already exist for the handling of plutonium. It proposes that the implementation of Article XII A5 of the IAEA statute concerning the international storage of plutonium could be an important additional measure. The paper also mentions the concept of using confinement as a complimentary safeguards measure and identifies the PIPEX concept. In addition, greater use is proposed of containment and surveillance procedures. The multiplication of small reprocessing plants spread over many countries is perceived as a proliferation risk. Other means such as co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are relevant to diversion by sub-national groups

  9. Chemistry of plutonium revealed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connick, R.E.

    1992-01-01

    In 1941 one goal of the Manhattan Project was to unravel the chemistry of the synthetic element plutonium as rapidly as possible. In this paper the work carried out at Berkeley from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945 is described briefly. The aqueous chemistry of plutonium is quite remarkable. Important insights were obtained from tracer experiments, but the full complexity was not revealed until macroscopic amounts (milligrams) became available. Because processes for separation from fission products were based on aqueous solutions, such solution chemistry was emphasized, particularly precipitation and oxidation-reduction behavior. The latter turned out to be unusually intricate when it was discovered that two more oxidation states existed in aqueous solution than had previously been suspected. Further, an equilibrium was rapidly established among the four aqueous oxidation states, while at the same time any three were not in equilibrium. These and other observations made while doing a crash study of a previously unknown element are reported

  10. The social surplus of broadband initiatives in compulsory education

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Peter Parsons

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available In 2010, the New Zealand government embarked upon an ambitious programme of broadband infrastructure investment, a process that will continue until at least 2019. Part of this investment is specifically targeted at compulsory education, with initiatives that include bringing fibre connections to the school gate, supporting on-site network upgrades (including wireless and providing teaching, learning and support services delivered through these networks. Such investments are not made without some projections of the likely rate of return, but calculating return on investment (ROI in educational broadband is complex, as it encompasses a range of factors. This article reports on an interview-based study engaging a range of stakeholders in educational broadband provision. The study utilises a research model that considers the various elements of social surplus, namely; producer surplus (savings, producer surplus (profit and consumer surplus (perceived value over and above cost, to explore the elements of social surplus that have been used to define educational broadband ROI calculations and justify the scale of investment. The results indicate that all three components of social surplus are relevant, though the concept of profit can only be seen in the broader context of long term contributions to the economy. A note of caution is that projections of ROI based only on positive returns fail to acknowledge the potential for some innovations to actually increase costs. Further, purely quantitative models do not properly take into account qualitative components of consumer surplus.

  11. Manufacturing of Plutonium Tensile Specimens

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Knapp, Cameron M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-01

    Details workflow conducted to manufacture high density alpha Plutonium tensile specimens to support Los Alamos National Laboratory's science campaigns. Introduces topics including the metallurgical challenge of Plutonium and the use of high performance super-computing to drive design. Addresses the utilization of Abaqus finite element analysis, programmable computer numerical controlled (CNC) machining, as well as glove box ergonomics and safety in order to design a process that will yield high quality Plutonium tensile specimens.

  12. Strategies for the plutonium utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zouain, D.M.; Lima, J.O.V.; Sakamoto, L.H.

    1981-11-01

    A review of the activities involving plutonium (its recycle, utilization and technological status and perspectives) is done. These informations are useful for an economic viability study for the plutonium utilization in thermal reactors (recycling) and in fast breeders reactor (FBR), trying to collect the major number of informations about these subjects. The initial phase describes the present status and projections of plutonium accumulation and requirements. Then, the technological process are described and some strategies are analyzed. (E.G.) [pt

  13. Comparative safety assessment of surface versus submarine plutonium shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knepper, D.S.; Feltus, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    The recent shipment of plutonium from France to Japan aboard the freighter Akatsuki Maru touched off protests from environmental and antinuclear organizations. These protests arose from the fear of an accidental sinking of the vessel that would release its cargo to the sea, as well as the threat of a terrorist nation highjacking the ship for its cargo to produce atomic weapons. The sinking of a merchant ship is not uncommon, as illustrated by the famous losses of the tankers Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez. The highjacking of a lightly armed freighter such as the Akatsuki Maru is possible and would not be unduly difficult for a well-equipped terrorist nation. The combined threats of weapons proliferation and environmental damage arising from the diversion or destruction of a sea vessel carrying plutonium will continue to abound as the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel increases. An alternate method for the transportation with reduced risks of both diversion and destruction needs to be developed. The shipment aboard the Akatsuki Maru was originally proposed to be flown from France to Japan over the continental United States. This proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration in 1988. A third alternative to the current ideas of air transport and surface transport is subsurface transport. This research project investigates the transportation of plutonium by submarine and compares it to the current method of transportation by freighter. This analysis involves a study of the military threat to a submarine by a terrorist nation and comparable threat to a surface vessel. To study the nonmilitary aspects of plutonium shipping, a fault-tree evaluation is performed for transportation by submarine and compared with the current risk analysis performed for surface vessels

  14. F. Biological hazards of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Plutonium is an unavoidable result of present nuclear power programmes. Its predominant isotopes are extremely long-lived and very toxic if absorbed in the body. In view of the increasing potential for plutonium and man to come into contact, the consequences of any plutonium release into the environment should be scientifically examined. This report is an attempt to place in one document a fully referenced account of the on-going work in many areas. There are three sections. Part 1 deals with the amounts of plutonium available in the fuel cycle, its properties and the probability of routine or accidental release. Part 2 examines the ways in which plutonium can reach man, in particular through food chains or inhalation. Part 3 details the biological effects of plutonium once it is absorbed into the body, assesses the amounts likely to be harmful and discusses the adequacy of present standards for plutonium burdens. There are two appendices. The likely differences between Pu-239, the most studied isotope, and other plutonium isotopes or transuranic nuclides are outlined in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a fuller account of the ways in which the fate of ingested or inhaled plutonium have been determined

  15. Pakistans Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-12

    nuclear energy, or 400 MWe and electricity consumption in Pakistan is increasing. Islamabad plans to increase nuclear energy production to 8,800 MWe by...Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin Specialist in Nonproliferation February 12, 2016...Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34248 Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Congressional Research Service Summary Pakistan’s nuclear

  16. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-21

    vulnerability, and its view that the threats to its security were increasing, also stemmed from the debates over NATO enlargement . Russia has feared the...weapons because Russia sees NATO as a threat to its security. Russian analysts and officials have argued that NATO enlargement —with the possible...the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas

  17. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  18. Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Egge, R.G.

    1996-02-01

    This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI). The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility. Questions concerning the currency of this information should be directed to the building administrator (as listed in BHI-FS-01, Field Support Administration, Section 1.1, ''Access Control for ERC Surplus Facilities'')

  19. Plutonium oxides and uranium and plutonium mixed oxides. Carbon determination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    Determination of carbon in plutonium oxides and uranium plutonium mixed oxides, suitable for a carbon content between 20 to 3000 ppm. The sample is roasted in oxygen at 1200 0 C, the carbon dioxide produced by combustion is neutralized by barium hydroxide generated automatically by coulometry [fr

  20. Waste minimization and the goal of an environmentally benign plutonium processing facility: A strategic plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1994-02-01

    To maintain capabilities in nuclear weapons technologies, the Department of Energy (DOE) has to maintain a plutonium processing facility that meets all the current and emerging standards of environmental regulations. A strategic goal to transform the Plutonium Processing Facility at Los Alamos into an environmentally benign operation is identified. A variety of technologies and systems necessary to meet this goal are identified. Two initiatives now in early stages of implementation are described in some detail. A highly motivated and trained work force and a systems approach to waste minimization and pollution prevention are necessary to maintain technical capabilities, to comply with regulations, and to meet the strategic goal

  1. Strategies for the disposition of high explosives resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pruneda, C.; Humphrey, J.

    1993-03-01

    Many thousands of pounds of high quality main-charge explosives will result as surplus from the dismantlement of returns from the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The method most often employed for dealing with this surplus explosive is destruction by open burning. However, open burning as a means of treating excess explosives is losing favor because of environmental concerns associated with such an uncontrolled thermal destruction process. Thus, alternative processes for treatment of excess explosives from weapon dismantlement is discussed. These alternatives include: reformulation, crystalline component recovery, chemical conversion of the crystalline component to higher value products which may have civilian or military applications and, when necessary, treatment as waste in an environmentally benign fashion.

  2. Strategies for the disposition of high explosives resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pruneda, C.; Humphrey, J.

    1993-03-01

    Many thousands of pounds of high quality main-charge explosives will result as surplus from the dismantlement of returns from the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The method most often employed for dealing with this surplus explosive is destruction by open burning. However, open burning as a means of treating excess explosives is losing favor because of environmental concerns associated with such an uncontrolled thermal destruction process. Thus, alternative processes for treatment of excess explosives from weapon dismantlement is discussed. These alternatives include: reformulation, crystalline component recovery, chemical conversion of the crystalline component to higher value products which may have civilian or military applications and, when necessary, treatment as waste in an environmentally benign fashion

  3. METHOD FOR OBTAINING PLUTONIUM METAL AND ALLOYS OF PLUTONIUM FROM PLUTONIUM TRICHLORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Maraman, W.J.

    1962-11-13

    A process is given for both reducing plutonium trichloride to plutonium metal using cerium as the reductant and simultaneously alloying such plutonium metal with an excess of cerium or cerium and cobalt sufficient to yield the desired nuclear reactor fuel composition. The process is conducted at a temperature from about 550 to 775 deg C, at atmospheric pressure, without the use of booster reactants, and a substantial decontamination is effected in the product alloy of any rare earths which may be associated with the source of the plutonium. (AEC)

  4. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M.; Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included

  5. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M. Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included.

  6. UK surplus source disposal programme - 16097

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John, Gordon H.; Reeves, Nigel; Nisbet, Amy C.; Garnett, Andrew; Williams, Clive R.

    2009-01-01

    The UK Surplus Source Disposal Programme (SSDP), managed by the Environment Agency, was designed to remove redundant radioactive sources from the public domain. The UK Government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) was concerned that disused sources were being retained by hospitals, universities and businesses, posing a risk to public health and the environment. AMEC provided a range of technical and administrative services to support the SSDP. A questionnaire was issued to registered source holders and the submitted returns compiled to assess the scale of the project. A member of AMEC staff was seconded to the Environment Agency to provide technical support and liaise directly with source holders during funding applications, which would cover disposal costs. Funding for disposal of different sources was partially based on a sliding scale of risk as determined by the IAEA hazard categorisation system. This funding was also sector dependent. The SSDP was subsequently expanded to include the disposal of luminised aircraft instruments from aviation museums across the UK. These museums often hold significant radiological inventories, with many items being unused and in a poor state of repair. These instruments were fully characterised on site by assessing surface dose rate, dimensions, source integrity and potential contamination issues. Calculations using the Microshield computer code allowed gamma radiation measurements to be converted into total activity estimates for each source. More than 11,000 sources were disposed of under the programme from across the medical, industrial, museum and academic sectors. The total activity disposed of was more than 8.5 E+14 Bq, and the project was delivered under budget. (authors)

  7. Application of surplus and waste materials in roads pavement making

    OpenAIRE

    Mousavi, S. M.; Fazli, A. H.; Rouzmehr, F.

    2011-01-01

    Nowadays there are a lot of problems about surpluses and debris made by humans all around the world. Lots of these surpluses seriously harm our natural environment. Reuse of this kind of materials in other processes like building constructions or pavement help our natural environment in every aspect. Asphalt concrete is the main part of pavements in most parts of the world with an increasing rate of production in need of more ways and roads. In this paper we will provide...

  8. Transfert de risques et création de surplus

    OpenAIRE

    Courtault, Jean-Michel; Gayant, Jean-Pascal

    1997-01-01

    In this paper, we use the certain benefit function of Luenberger, which is a generalization of the notion of distributable surplus by Allais, to characterize the classical notions of willingness to pay and willingness to accept. These concepts allow us to study the transfer of one or several risks between two agents or more. Specifically, we determine the conditions under which the maximization of the total distributable surplus leads to a Pareto efficient allocation of risks.; Dans cet artic...

  9. The economics of plutonium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, R.A.

    1977-11-01

    The individual cost components and the total fuel cycle costs for natural uranium and uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel cycles for CANDU-PHW reactors are discussed. A calculation is performed to establish the economic conditions under which plutonium recycle would be economically attractive. (auth)

  10. Determination of plutonium in environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakanoue, Masanobu

    1978-01-01

    Past and present methods of determining the amount of plutonium in the environment are summarized. Determination of the amount of plutonium in uranium ore began in 1941. Plutonium present in polluted environments due to nuclear explosions, nuclear power stations, etc. was measured in soil and sand in Nagasaki in 1951 and in ash in Bikini in 1954. Analytical methods of measuring the least amount of plutonium in the environment were developed twenty years later. Many studies on and reviews of these methods have been reported all over the world, and a standard analytical procedure has been adopted. A basic analytical method of measurement was drafted in Japan in 1976. The yield, treatment of samples, dissolution, separation, control of measurable ray sources determination by α spectrometry, cross-check determination, and treatment of samples containing hardly soluble plutonium were examined. At present, the amount of plutonium can be determined by all of these methods. The presence of plutonium was studied further, and the usefulness of determination of the plutonium isotope ratio is discussed. (Kumagai, S.)

  11. METHOD OF REDUCING PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johns, I.B.

    1958-06-01

    A method is described for reducing plutonium compounds in aqueous solution from a higher to a lower valence state. This reduction of valence is achieved by treating the aqueous solution of higher valence plutonium compounds with hydrogen in contact with an activated platinum catalyst.

  12. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  13. Cycle downstream: the plutonium question

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zask, G.; Rome, M.; Delpech, M.

    1998-01-01

    This day, organized by the SFEN, took place at Paris the 4 june 1998. Nine papers were presented. They take stock on the plutonium physics and its utilization as a nuclear fuel. This day tried to bring information to answer the following questions: do people have to keep the plutonium in the UOX fuel or in the MOX fuel in order to use it for future fast reactors? Do people have to continue obstinately the plutonium reprocessing in the MOX for the PWR type reactors? Will it be realized a underground disposal? Can it be technically developed plutonium incinerators and is it economically interesting? The plutonium physics, the experimental programs and the possible solutions are presented. (A.L.B.)

  14. Making weapons, talking peace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, H.F.

    1987-01-01

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961, the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle

  15. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.; Dootz, B.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  16. Wounds and weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de; Dootz, B. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  17. Plutonium storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This Spanish study gives a more detailed analysis of a possible store for plutonium oxide. The capacity of the store is assumed to be 30 t Pu and the minimum storage time 2 years. The study includes a general description of the store and its design philosophy; comments on the quality and properties of the material stored; a detailed criticality study and comments on gas and heat generation and shielding requirements; and a brief cost evaluation. Costs are estimated to be about $110/kg PuO 2 /year

  18. Gastrointestinal absorption of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larsen, R.P.; Oldham, R.D.; Bhattacharyya, M.H.; Moretti, E.S.; Austin, D.J.

    1981-01-01

    An investigation has been made of the effect of the oxidation state of plutonium on its absorption from the gastrointestinal tract. For mice and rats that have been starved prior to gastrointestinal administration, there is no significant difference between the absorption factors for Pu(IV) and Pu(VI). The value obtained for Pu(VI) is an order of magnitude lower than that reported previously. The value obtained for Pu(IV) is two orders of magnitude higher than those reported previously for nitrate solutions and the same as those reported for citrate solutions

  19. Influence of cow urine in the bioavailability of plutonium oxide particles in Palomares soils

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Espinosa, A.; Aragon, A.; De La Cruz, B.; Gutierrez, J. [CIEMAT, DIAE, Madrid (Spain)

    2004-07-01

    The nuclear accident that occurred in Palomares in 1966 caused the release of plutonium weapon grade particles into a Mediterranean ecosystem, and consequently, urban and farming areas were contaminated with this material. Several studies focussed on the characterization and behaviour of trans-uranides have been carried out in the area. In this work, the solubility evolution of plutonium is analysed for a period of more than 30 years, as well as the influence that the incorporation of cow urine into organic fertilizers has on the solubility of the mentioned element. The average value of the plutonium solubility in water determined in five samples was 0.008% in 1986. However, determinations carried out in samples taken in 1999 and 2000 indicated an increase of the plutonium solubility of 22 to 96 times higher. In order to check the influence of organic fertilizers on the solubility of plutonium, a solubility test was carried out using cow urine as extracting solution. The results show that the solubility of plutonium can reach a value equal to 14%, which is similar to the one obtained with sodium pyrophosphate acting as extracting solution. Thus, these results are a clear warning of what might happen if organic fertilizers are used in transuranic-contaminated soils. (author)

  20. Influence of cow urine in the bioavailability of plutonium oxide particles in Palomares soils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Espinosa, A.; Aragon, A.; De La Cruz, B.; Gutierrez, J.

    2004-01-01

    The nuclear accident that occurred in Palomares in 1966 caused the release of plutonium weapon grade particles into a Mediterranean ecosystem, and consequently, urban and farming areas were contaminated with this material. Several studies focussed on the characterization and behaviour of trans-uranides have been carried out in the area. In this work, the solubility evolution of plutonium is analysed for a period of more than 30 years, as well as the influence that the incorporation of cow urine into organic fertilizers has on the solubility of the mentioned element. The average value of the plutonium solubility in water determined in five samples was 0.008% in 1986. However, determinations carried out in samples taken in 1999 and 2000 indicated an increase of the plutonium solubility of 22 to 96 times higher. In order to check the influence of organic fertilizers on the solubility of plutonium, a solubility test was carried out using cow urine as extracting solution. The results show that the solubility of plutonium can reach a value equal to 14%, which is similar to the one obtained with sodium pyrophosphate acting as extracting solution. Thus, these results are a clear warning of what might happen if organic fertilizers are used in transuranic-contaminated soils. (author)

  1. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  2. Review of John W. Gofman's reports on health hazards from inhaled plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1976-02-01

    This document is a review of two reports prepared in 1975 by John W. Gofman on the subject of plutonium toxicity. Because Gofman's estimates of the calculated health effects from inhaled plutonium are significantly higher than those obtained from other analyses (including the risk estimates calculated by the National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation), it was decided to critically review Gofman's papers and supporting arguments. This review concludes that Gofman's predictions of large numbers of plutonium-induced lung cancers from nuclear weapons testing are derived mainly from his incorrect assumptions about the effects of cigarette smoking on the retention of plutonium particulates in the tracheobronchial region of the lungs. It appears that Gofman's assumptions are considerably overstated and cannot be substantiated by currently available information. Also, Gofman's attempt to equate a given number of lung cancer deaths to a pound of plutonium tends to obfuscate rather than clarify attempts to derive risk estimates for inhaled plutonium

  3. Living with nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carnesale, A.; Doty, P.; Hoffmann, S.; Huntington, S.P.; Nye, J.S. Jr.; Sagan, S.D.

    1983-01-01

    At Harvard President Derek Bok's request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding and appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)

  4. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierre, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    In this introduction to ''Nuclear Weapons in Europe'', the author summarized the views of two Americans and two Europeans, whose articles make up the volume. The introduction explains the different assumptions of the four authors before discussing their views on the military and political rationales for a nuclear force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the debate over battlefield nuclear weapons, conventional defense, and arms control proposals and talks. The four contributors whose views are analyzed are William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freeman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karstan D. Voight. The introduction notes that the agreements and differences do not fall strictly on American versus European dividing lines

  5. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinlan, M.

    2001-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  6. Decommissioning of eight surplus production reactors at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. Addendum (Final Environmental Impact Statement)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The first section of this volume summarizes the content of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) and this Addendum, which together constitute the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) prepared on the decommissioning of eight surplus plutonium production reactors at Hanford. The FEIS consists of two volumes. The first volume is the DEIS as written. The second volume (this Addendum) consists of a summary; Chapter 9, which contains comments on the DEIS and provides DOE`s responses to the comments; Appendix F, which provides additional health effects information; Appendix K, which contains costs of decommissioning in 1990 dollars; Appendix L, which contains additional graphite leaching data; Appendix M, which contains a discussion of accident scenarios; Appendix N, which contains errata; and Appendix 0, which contains reproductions of the letters, transcripts, and exhibits that constitute the record for the public comment period.

  7. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  8. Hazards of plutonium and fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1978-01-01

    Apart from the possibility that civil plutonium may be diverted to military use the main argument against the introduction of a plutonium economy seems to be the supposedly unmanageable biological risk attached to plutonium itself. The author points out weaknesses in many of the opponents' arguments against the increased use of plutonium and argues that current safety practices are more than adequate in handling plutonium and other radioactive materials

  9. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-09-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 7 figs., 4 tabs

  10. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-01-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 2 figs., 5 tabs

  11. Probing phonons in plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, Joe; Krisch, M.; Farber, D.; Occelli, F.; Schwartz, A.; Chiang, T.C.; Wall, M.; Boro, C.; Xu, Ruqing

    2010-01-01

    Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: α → β → γ → (delta) → (delta)(prime) → (var e psilon) → liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature ∼640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts, (Figure 1). Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimenta l data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter -atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single -grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc d-Pu-Ga alloy using the high resolution inelastic x-ray scattering (HRIXS

  12. Probing phonons in plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wong, Joe; Krisch, M.; Farber, D.; Occelli, F.; Schwartz, A.; Chiang, T.C.; Wall, M.; Boro, C.; Xu, Ruqing (UIUC); (LLNL); (ESRF); (LANL)

    2010-11-16

    Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: {alpha} {yields} {beta} {yields} {gamma} {yields} {delta} {yields} {delta}{prime} {yields} {var_epsilon} {yields} liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature {approx}640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts, (Figure 1). Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimenta l data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter -atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single -grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc d-Pu-Ga alloy using the

  13. Plutonium contaminated materials research programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, S.G.

    1986-01-01

    The paper is a progress report for 1985 from the Plutonium Contaminated Materials Working Party (PCMWP). The PCMWP co-ordinates research and development on a national basis in the areas of management, treatment and immobilisation of plutonium contaminated materials, for the purpose of waste management. The progress report contains a review of the development work carried out in eight areas, including: reduction of arisings, plutonium measurement, sorting and packaging, washing of shredded combustible PCM, decommissioning and non-combustible PCM treatment, PCM immobilisation, treatment of alpha bearing liquid wastes, and engineering objectives. (UK)

  14. SOLVENT EXTRACTION PROCESS FOR PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seaborg, G.T.

    1959-04-14

    The separation of plutonium from aqueous inorganic acid solutions by the use of a water immiscible organic extractant liquid is described. The plutonium must be in the oxidized state, and the solvents covered by the patent include nitromethane, nitroethane, nitropropane, and nitrobenzene. The use of a salting out agents such as ammonium nitrate in the case of an aqueous nitric acid solution is advantageous. After contacting the aqueous solution with the organic extractant, the resulting extract and raffinate phases are separated. The plutonium may be recovered by any suitable method.

  15. Learning more about plutonium; En savoir plus sur le plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    This digest brochure explains what plutonium is, where it comes from, how it is used, its recycling into Mox fuel, its half life, historical discovery, its presence in the environment, toxicity and radioactivity. (J.S.)

  16. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  17. Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-06-01

    This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

  18. Control of civilian plutonium inventories using burning in a non-fertile fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oversby, V.M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McPheeters, C.C. [Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL 60439-4837 (United States); Degueldre, C. [Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland); Paratte, J.M. [Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland)

    1997-05-01

    The increasing inventories of plutonium generated by commercial nuclear power production represent a potential source for proliferation of nuclear weapons. To address this threat we propose separating the plutonium from the other constituents of commercial reactor spent fuel and burning it in a non-fertile fuel based on a zirconium dioxide matrix. The separation can be performed by the Purex process currently in use, but we recommend development of a more compact separation technology that would produce less secondary waste than currently used technology and would allow for more stringent accounting of plutonium inventories. The non-fertile fuel is designed for use in conventional light water power reactors and does not require development of new reactor technology. (orig.).

  19. Control of civilian plutonium inventories using burning in a non-fertile fuel

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oversby, V. M.; McPheeters, C. C.; Degueldre, C.; Paratte, J. M.

    1997-05-01

    The increasing inventories of plutonium generated by commercial nuclear power production represent a potential source for proliferation of nuclear weapons. To address this threat we propose separating the plutonium from the other constituents of commercial reactor spent fuel and burning it in a non-fertile fuel based on a zirconium dioxide matrix. The separation can be performed by the Purex process currently in use, but we recommend development of a more compact separation technology that would produce less secondary waste than currently used technology and would allow for more stringent accounting of plutonium inventories. The non-fertile fuel is designed for use in conventional light water power reactors and does not require development of new reactor technology.

  20. Plutonium as a tracer of soil and sediment movement in the Herbert River, Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tims, S.G.; Everett, S.E.; Fifield, L.K.; Hancock, G.J.; Bartley, R.

    2010-01-01

    Plutonium fallout from atmospheric nuclear-weapons testing in the 1950s and 1960s constitutes an artificial tracer suitable for the study of recent soil erosion and sediment accumulation rates. Traditionally 137 Cs has been the fallout isotope of choice for such studies, but the plutonium isotopes confer a number of advantages, which can be realised using the ultra-sensitive detection technique of Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS). As a first application of plutonium to a whole-of-basin study, Pu has been measured in both soil and sediment across the catchment of the Herbert River, which is one of the major rivers draining into Australia's Great Barrier Reef Lagoon. Its catchment includes undisturbed areas as well as regions of pasture and sugar cultivation. The Pu measurements allow the relative contributions of surface and gully erosion from the different land use areas to be determined, and permit the discharged material to be apportioned between the relevant sources.

  1. Status of plutonium ceramic immobilization processes and immobilization forms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Vance, E.R.; Jostsons, A.

    1996-01-01

    Immobilization in a ceramic followed by permanent emplacement in a repository or borehole is one of the alternatives currently being considered by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program for the ultimate disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium. To make Pu recovery more difficult, radioactive cesium may also be incorporated into the immobilization form. Valuable data are already available for ceramics form R ampersand D efforts to immobilize high-level and mixed wastes. Ceramics have a high capacity for actinides, cesium, and some neutron absorbers. A unique characteristic of ceramics is the existence of mineral analogues found in nature that have demonstrated actinide immobilization over geologic time periods. The ceramic form currently being considered for plutonium disposition is a synthetic rock (SYNROC) material composed primarily of zirconolite (CaZrTi 2 O 7 ), the desired actinide host phase, with lesser amounts of hollandite (BaAl 2 Ti 6 O 16 ) and rutile (TiO 2 ). Alternative actinide host phases are also being considered. These include pyrochlore (Gd 2 Ti 2 O 7 ), zircon (ZrSiO 4 ), and monazite (CePO 4 ), to name a few of the most promising. R ampersand D activities to address important technical issues are discussed. Primarily these include moderate scale hot press fabrications with plutonium, direct loading of PuO 2 powder, cold press and sinter fabrication methods, and immobilization form formulation issues

  2. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  3. Microdistribution and Long-Term Retention of 239Pu (NO3)4 in the Respiratory Tracts of an Acutely Exposed Plutonium Worker and Experimental Beagle Dogs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nielsen, Christopher E.; Wilson, Dulaney A.; Brooks, Antone L.; McCord, Stacey; Dagle, Gerald E.; James, Anthony C.; Tolmachev, Sergei Y.; Thrall, Brian D.; Morgan, William F.

    2012-11-01

    The long-term retention of inhaled soluble forms of plutonium raises concerns as to the potential health effects in persons working in nuclear energy or the nuclear weapons program. The distributions of long-term retained inhaled plutonium-nitrate [239Pu (NO3)4] deposited in the lungs of an accidentally exposed nuclear worker (Human Case 0269) and in the lungs of experimentally exposed beagle dogs with varying initial lung depositions were determined via autoradiographs of selected histological lung, lymph node, trachea, and nasal turbinate tissue sections. These studies showed that both the human and dogs had a non-uniform distribution of plutonium throughout the lung tissue. Fibrotic scar tissue effectively encapsulated a portion of the plutonium and prevented its clearance from the body or translocation to other tissues and diminished dose to organ parenchyma. Alpha radiation activity from deposited plutonium in Human Case 0269 was observed primarily along the sub-pleural regions while no alpha activity was seen in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of this individual. However, relatively high activity levels in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of the beagles indicated the lymphatic system was effective in clearing deposited plutonium from the lung tissues. In both the human case and beagle dogs, the appearance of retained plutonium within the respiratory tract was inconsistent with current biokinetic models of clearance for soluble forms of plutonium. Bound plutonium can have a marked effect on the dose to the lungs and subsequent radiation exposure has the potential increase in cancer risk.

  4. Technological alternatives for plutonium transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This paper considers alternative transport modes (air, sea, road, rail) for moving (1) plutonium from a reprocessing plant to a store or a fuel fabrication facility, and (2) MOX fuel from the latter to a reactor. These transport modes and differing forms of plutonium are considered in terms of: their proliferation resistance and safeguards; environmental and safety aspects; and economic aspects. It is tentatively proposed that the transport of plutonium could continue by air or sea where long distances are involved and by road or rail over shorter distances; this would be acceptable from the non-proliferation, environmental impact and economic aspects - there may be advantages in protection if plutonium is transported in the form of mixed oxide

  5. The treatment and packaging of waste plutonium and waste actinides for disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, R.F.

    1988-07-01

    The objectives of this work have been to review the current state of knowledge on the treatment and packaging of unusable or surplus plutonium and other waste actinides for disposal and to identify any gaps in data essential for the development of a preferred route. The exercise was based on published data which said the quantity currently to be disposed of was 50 tonnes in oxide form. A literature review over the period 1978 to 1988 was carried out and a computerised database specific to the exercise was created. From this it is concluded that there are no insuperable problems to the formulation of a disposal route although there is none currently proven. The preferred wasteform would be a glass or synthetic rock. The major complication lies in the fissile nature of plutonium which dictates limits to the package size and places restrictions on the production and disposal routes. Additional work necessary to permit a final decision is listed. (author)

  6. A Note on Realistic Dividends in Actuarial Surplus Models

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Benjamin Avanzi

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Because of the profitable nature of risk businesses in the long term, de Finetti suggested that surplus models should allow for cash leakages, as otherwise the surplus would unrealistically grow (on average to infinity. These leakages were interpreted as ‘dividends’. Subsequent literature on actuarial surplus models with dividend distribution has mainly focussed on dividend strategies that either maximise the expected present value of dividends until ruin or lead to a probability of ruin that is less than one (see Albrecher and Thonhauser, Avanzi for reviews. An increasing number of papers are directly interested in modelling dividend policies that are consistent with actual practice in financial markets. In this short note, we review the corporate finance literature with the specific aim of fleshing out properties that dividend strategies should ideally satisfy, if one wants to model behaviour that is consistent with practice.

  7. A stochastic surplus production model in continuous time

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pedersen, Martin Wæver; Berg, Casper Willestofte

    2017-01-01

    surplus production model in continuous time (SPiCT), which in addition to stock dynamics also models the dynamics of the fisheries. This enables error in the catch process to be reflected in the uncertainty of estimated model parameters and management quantities. Benefits of the continuous-time state......Surplus production modelling has a long history as a method for managing data-limited fish stocks. Recent advancements have cast surplus production models as state-space models that separate random variability of stock dynamics from error in observed indices of biomass. We present a stochastic...... and improve estimation of reference points relative to discrete-time analysis of aggregated annual data. Finally, subannual data from five North Sea stocks are analysed with particular focus on using residual analysis to diagnose model insufficiencies and identify necessary model extensions such as robust...

  8. Plutonium contamination in italian population

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cave-Bondi, G.; Merli, S.; Rogo, M.; Sgarbazzini, M.; Clemente, G.F.; Mancini, L.; Santori, G.; Tardella, Q.

    1983-01-01

    The literature data concerning the biological and the chemical physical characteristics of plutonium are summarized in the first part of the paper. The experimental results of the plutonium concentration in complete diets, single food items and some human autopsy tissues, regarding the Italian situation, are then presented and discussed. Our experimental data are in good agreement with similar data reported in several studies carried out in some countries of the north emisphere

  9. Plutonium: real and false problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bemden, E. van den

    1981-01-01

    This paper deals with technical and technological state of the possibilities of using plutonium as fuel in the thermal and fast reactors. It also describes the political blockage restraining its use and the reasons for it. The accent is put on some fundamental lacks of international coordination and on some problems of commercial policy, which impede, in a certain way, the industrial use of plutonium as a fuel. (author)

  10. Monitoring the risks of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holliday, B.

    1978-01-01

    The difficulties in monitoring the environment in work areas where plutonium is handled are identified and both continuous and personal air sampling techniques considered. Methods of estimating the amounts of plutonium retained in the body are: (1) Direct external counting over the chest of the 'soft' low energy X-rays and gamma rays emitted by the plutonium deposited in the lungs. (2) Measuring plutonium excreted in urine. (3) Analysing faeces soon after a suspected contamination. Limitation of these techniques are discussed and it is shown that estimating the amount of plutonium in the body, or a specific organ, is extremely difficult, both because of the lack of sensitivity of the measuring techniques (especially chest scanning) and because of the problems in interpreting data, stemming from a lack of knowledge of crucial characteristics of the inhaled plutonium (such as particle size and solubility). Nevertheless it is felt that the judicious integration of all the options creates a level of certainty that no individual technique can possibly inspire. (U.K.)

  11. Plutonium volumetric titration after reduction on a Jones' column

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Description of a plutonium analysis method, in hydrochloric or sulfuric solution, for plutonium content over 2 mg, by reduction from plutonium IV to plutonium III in a Jones' column. Volumetic titration by ceric sulfate with ferrous orthophenanthroline [fr

  12. US develops electromagnetic weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1986-01-01

    The principles of electromagnetic weapons (EMWs) which accumulate and switch energy have been known for over 50 years, but the US has made significant progress in recent years in the development of single-pole generators. A design which eliminates the breaker and pulse generator and increases reliability of the EMWs is undergoing tests in the US. There will be significant advantages for the EMW used for air and antimissile defense. In addition to weapons of varying purpose and basing, the EMW can be effective as launchers, as an alternative to rocket engines. The EMW is an area in which the US is trying to achieve superiority, and is a violation of the 1972 Antimissile Defense Treaty. 4 figures.

  13. Modular weapon control unit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boccabella, M.F.; McGovney, G.N.

    1997-01-01

    The goal of the Modular Weapon Control Unit (MWCU) program was to design and develop a reconfigurable weapon controller (programmer/sequencer) that can be adapted to different weapon systems based on the particular requirements for that system. Programmers from previous systems are conceptually the same and perform similar tasks. Because of this commonality and the amount of re-engineering necessary with the advent of every new design, the idea of a modular, adaptable system has emerged. Also, the controller can be used in more than one application for a specific weapon system. Functionality has been divided into a Processor Module (PM) and an Input/Output Module (IOM). The PM will handle all operations that require calculations, memory, and timing. The IOM will handle interfaces to the rest of the system, input level shifting, output drive capability, and detection of interrupt conditions. Configuration flexibility is achieved in two ways. First, the operation of the PM is determined by a surface mount Read-Only Memory (ROM). Other surface-mount components can be added or neglected as necessary for functionality. Second, IOMs consist of configurable input buffers, configurable output drivers, and configurable interrupt generation. Further, these modules can be added singly or in groups to a Processor Module to achieve the required I/O configuration. The culmination of this LDRD was the building of both Processor Module and Input/Output Module. The MWCU was chosen as a test system to evaluate Low-Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) technology, desirable for high component density and good thermal characteristics.

  14. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-01-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  15. Improving Efficiency with 3-D Imaging: Technology Essential in Removing Plutonium Processing Equipment from Plutonium Finishing Plant Gloveboxes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crow, Stephen H.; Kyle, Richard N.; Minette, Michael J.

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant at Hanford, Washington began operations in 1949 to process plutonium and plutonium products. Its primary mission was to produce plutonium metal, fabricate weapons parts, and stabilize reactive materials. These operations, and subsequent activities, were performed in remote production lines, consisting primarily of hundreds of gloveboxes. Over the years these gloveboxes and processes have been continuously modified. The plant is currently inactive and Fluor Hanford has been tasked to clean out contaminated equipment and gloveboxes from the facility so it can be demolished in the near future. Approximately 100 gloveboxes at PFP have been cleaned out in the past four years and about 90 gloveboxes remain to be cleaned out. Because specific commitment dates for this work have been established with the State of Washington and other entities, it is important to adopt work practices that increase the safety and speed of this effort. The most recent work practice to be adopted by Fluor Hanford D and D workers is the use of 3-D models to improve the efficiency of cleaning out radioactive gloveboxes at the plant. The use of 3-D models has significantly improved the work planning process by providing workers with a clear image of glovebox construction and composition, which is then used to determine cleanout methods and work sequences. The 3-D visual products enhance safety by enabling workers to more easily identify hazards and implement controls. In addition, the ability to identify and target the removal of radiological materials early in the D and D process provides substantial dose reduction for the workers

  16. Radiological analysis of plutonium glass batches with natural/enriched boron

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainisch, R.

    2000-01-01

    The disposition of surplus plutonium inventories by the US Department of Energy (DOE) includes the immobilization of certain plutonium materials in a borosilicate glass matrix, also referred to as vitrification. This paper addresses source terms of plutonium masses immobilized in a borosilicate glass matrix where the glass components include both natural boron and enriched boron. The calculated source terms pertain to neutron and gamma source strength (particles per second), and source spectrum changes. The calculated source terms corresponding to natural boron and enriched boron are compared to determine the benefits (decrease in radiation source terms) for to the use of enriched boron. The analysis of plutonium glass source terms shows that a large component of the neutron source terms is due to (a, n) reactions. The Americium-241 and plutonium present in the glass emit alpha particles (a). These alpha particles interact with low-Z nuclides like B-11, B-10, and O-17 in the glass to produce neutrons. The low-Z nuclides are referred to as target particles. The reference glass contains 9.4 wt percent B 2 O 3 . Boron-11 was found to strongly support the (a, n) reactions in the glass matrix. B-11 has a natural abundance of over 80 percent. The (a, n) reaction rates for B-10 are lower than for B-11 and the analysis shows that the plutonium glass neutron source terms can be reduced by artificially enriching natural boron with B-10. The natural abundance of B-10 is 19.9 percent. Boron enriched to 96-wt percent B-10 or above can be obtained commercially. Since lower source terms imply lower dose rates to radiation workers handling the plutonium glass materials, it is important to know the achievable decrease in source terms as a result of boron enrichment. Plutonium materials are normally handled in glove boxes with shielded glass windows and the work entails both extremity and whole-body exposures. Lowering the source terms of the plutonium batches will make the handling

  17. Synroc for plutonium disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnston, A.; Vance, E.R.

    1999-01-01

    A pyrochlore-rich titanate ceramic has been chosen by the US DOE for excess weapons Pu immobilisation in the USA. The development of this wasteform was based on the Synroc strategy which aims to immobilise radioactive waste in durable multiphase titanate ceramics with phases chosen to he similar to titanate minerals that exist in nature and have immobilised U and Th for billions of years. The evolution of the pyrochlore-rich ceramic for Pu immobilisation from earlier Synroc variants is described and the choice of process steps is discussed. Leaching studies demonstrate that the release rate of Pu from the wasteforms in aqueous media is very low and similar to those of U and the neutron absorbers Gd and Hf that will ensure avoidance of nuclear criticality in repository environments

  18. Determinants of rural household marketed surplus for cereal crops ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ... and supply of cereal crops to the market (market surplus). The study utilized cross sectional data obtained through multistage random sampling method. Ordinary least square method was used for the analysis. Finding revealed that the quantity of food crops reserved for home consumption by households increased their ...

  19. Analysis of yam marketable surplus in Imo state, Nigeria | Onyenobi ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    This study was conducted in Imo State in the southeastern agricultural zone of Nigeria, to determine socio-economic characteristics of farmers; cost and return of farmers and factors that determine the marketable surplus of farmers. Among the farm enterprises in the state, yam has high- income elasticity of demand by ...

  20. The Democratic Surplus that Constitutionalised the European Union

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Harste, Gorm

    2015-01-01

    This article questions the very foundation of the doctrine of a so-called “democratic deficit” in the EU. Yet in order to argue beyond nationalist myths, clear-cut concepts are necessary. Speaking about democracy in the EU, the article exposes four dimensions that constitute a “democratic surplus...

  1. The PRISM reactor as a possible option to deal with the british civilian plutonium stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fichtlscherer, Christopher [IANUS, TU Darmstadt (Germany); Friess, Friederike [IANUS, TU Darmstadt (Germany); ISR, Universitaet fuer Bodenkultur Wien (Boku) (Austria)

    2017-07-01

    Dealing with stocks of separated weapon-usable plutonium is a big challenge for our modern society. This work focuses on the British civil plutonium stockpiles, which amount to 103.3 tons. One option is seen in irradiating the plutonium in a fast reactor under development, namely the GE PRISM reactor. The PRISM reactor is a small modular, fast reactor which has a thermal power of 840 MW and an electrical output of 311 MW. It is intended to use MOX fuel and proponents claim, that it thus would be possible to produce clean energy, while making the plutonium proliferation resistant. A MCNP model of the reactor is built and depletion calculations with different target burnups of the fuel were conducted to check whether the burned material would fulfil the Spent-Fuel Standard. Particularly it was checked whether the spent fuel is self protecting, meaning that the dose rate does not fall below a limit of 1 Sv/h in 1 meter distance after a cooling period of 30 years. Based on the reactor model calculations the irradiation time to fulfill this limit for the spent fuel is calculated. Based on the needed target burnup, it can be verified, whether it is possible for the PRISM reactor to render the civil plutonium proliferation resistant in only 20 years as is is claimed by its proponents.

  2. Plutonium focus area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure

  3. Plutonium solution analyzer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded)

  4. Plutonium oxide shipment report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    While following procedures for unloading shipping containers containing plutonium oxide, SRP personnel experienced problems. While using a pipe cutter to cut through the wall of the inner container, the pipe section fell to the floor. Three empty food cans in the bottom of the inner canister also fell to the floor and a puff of smoke was observed. Personnel were evacuated and contamination was detected in the room. As a result of the investigations conducted by Westinghouse and SRP, thermal effects, food can coatings, and fuel volatiles were eliminated as the cause of the problem. Helium used to leak test the RL070 shipping container seals entered the inner canister through two weld defects resulting in a pressurization of the contents. When the end cap was removed, the inner canister vented rapidly, the food cans did not, thus creating a differential pressure across the food cans. This caused the food cans to swell. It was recommended that a dye penetrant test of all inner container welds be added. Additional unloading procedures were also recommended

  5. Plutonium focus area

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure.

  6. Plutonium solution analyzer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded).

  7. Surplus from and storage of electricity generated by intermittent sources

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wagner, Friedrich

    2016-12-01

    Data from the German electricity system for the years 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015 are used and scaled up to a 100% supply by intermittent renewable energy sources (iRES). In the average, 330GW wind and PV power are required to meet this 100% target. A back-up system is necessary with the power of 89% of peak load. Surplus electricity accrues at high power levels. Curtailing surplus power to a large extent is found to be uneconomic. Demand-side management will suffer from the strong day-to-day variation of available surplus energy. A day storage is ineffective because of the day-night correlation of surplus power during winter. A seasonal storage loses its character when transformation losses are considered because it can contribute only after periods with excessive surplus production. The option of an oversized iRES system to feed the storage is also not effective because, in this case, energy can be taken directly from the large iRES supply, making storage superfluous. The capacities to be installed stress the difficulty to base heat supply and mobility also on iRES generated electricity in the future. As the German energy transition replaces one CO2-free electricity supply system by another one, no major reduction in CO2 emission can be expected till 2022, when the last nuclear reactor will be switched off. By 2022, an extremely oversized power supply system has to be created, which can be expected to continue running down spot-market electricity prices. The continuation of the economic response -to replace expensive gas fuel by cheap lignite- causes an overall increase in CO2 emission. The German GHG emission targets for 2020 and beyond are therefore in jeopardy.

  8. Breeding and plutonium characterization analysis on actinides closed water-cooled thorium reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Permana, Sidik; Sekimoto, Hiroshi; Takaki, Naoyuki

    2009-01-01

    Higher difficulties (barrier) or more complex design of nuclear weapon, material fabrication and handling and isotopic enrichment can be achieved by a higher isotopic barrier. The isotopic material barrier includes critical mass, heat-generation rate, spontaneous neutron generation and radiation. Those isotopic barriers in case of plutonium isotope is strongly depend on the even mass number of plutonium isotope such as 238 Pu, 240 Pu and 242 Pu and for 233 U of thorium cycle depends on 232 U. In this present study, fuel sustainability as fuel breeding capability and plutonium characterization as main focus of proliferation resistance analysis have been analyzed. Minor actinide (MA) is used as doping material to be loaded into the reactors with thorium fuel. Basic design parameters are based on actinide closed-cycle reactor cooled by heavy water. The evaluation use equilibrium burnup analysis coupled with cell calculation of SRAC and nuclear data library is JENDL.32. Parametrical survey has been done to analyze the effect of MA doping rate, different moderation ratio for several equilibrium burnup cases. Plutonium characterization which based on plutonium isotope composition is strongly depending on MA doping concentration and different moderation conditions. Breeding condition can be achieved and high proliferation resistance level can be obtained by the present reactor systems. Higher isotopic plutonium composition of Pu-238 (more than 40%) can be obtained compared with other plutonium isotopes. In addition, higher moderation ratio gives the isotope composition of 238 Pu increases, however, it obtains lower composition when MA doping is increased and it slightly lower composition for higher burnup. Meanwhile, higher 240 Pu composition can be achieved by higher MA doping rate as well as for obtaining higher breeding capability. (author)

  9. Plutonium and americium separation from salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagan, P.G.; Miner, F.J.

    1976-01-01

    Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution

  10. Recovery studies for plutonium machining oil coolant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Navratil, J.D.; Baldwin, C.E.

    1977-01-01

    Lathe coolant oil, contaminated with plutonium and having a carbon tetrachloride diluent, is generated in plutonium machining areas at Rocky Flats. A research program was initiated to determine the nature of plutonium in this mixture of oil and carbon tetrachloride. Appropriate methods then could be developed to remove the plutonium and to recycle the oil and carbon tetrachloride. Studies showed that the mixtures of spent oil and carbon tetrachloride contained particulate plutonium and plutonium species that are soluble in water or in oil and carbon tetrachloride. The particulate plutonium was removed by filtration; the nonfilterable plutonium was removed by adsorption on various materials. Laboratory-scale tests indicated the lathe-coolant oil mixture could be separated by distilling the carbon tetrachloride to yield recyclable products

  11. Plutonium in depleted uranium penetrators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, J.P.; Leon-Vintro, L.; Smith, K.; Mitchell, P.I.; Zunic, Z.S.

    2002-01-01

    Depleted Uranium (DU) penetrators used in the recent Balkan conflicts have been found to be contaminated with trace amounts of transuranic materials such as plutonium. This contamination is usually a consequence of DU fabrication being carried out in facilities also using uranium recycled from spent military and civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Specific activities of 239+240 Plutonium generally in the range 1 to 12 Bq/kg have been found to be present in DU penetrators recovered from the attack sites of the 1999 NATO bombardment of Kosovo. A DU penetrator recovered from a May 1999 attack site at Bratoselce in southern Serbia and analysed by University College Dublin was found to contain 43.7 +/- 1.9 Bq/kg of 239+240 Plutonium. This analysis is described. An account is also given of the general population radiation dose implications arising from both the DU itself and from the presence of plutonium in the penetrators. According to current dosimetric models, in all scenarios considered likely ,the dose from the plutonium is estimated to be much smaller than that due to the uranium isotopes present in the penetrators. (author)

  12. Plutonium determination by isotope dilution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lucas, M.

    1980-01-01

    The principle is to add to a known amount of the analysed solution a known amount of a spike solution consisting of plutonium 242. The isotopic composition of the resulting mixture is then determined by surface ionization mass spectrometry, and the plutonium concentration in the solution is deduced, from this measurement. For irradiated fuels neutronic studies or for fissile materials balance measurements, requiring the knowledge of the ratio U/Pu or of concentration both uranium and plutonium, it is better to use the double spike isotope dilution method, with a spike solution of known 233 U- 242 Pu ratio. Using this method, the ratio of uranium to plutonium concentration in the irradiated fuel solution can be determined without any accurate measurement of the mixed amounts of sample and spike solutions. For fissile material balance measurements, the uranium concentration is determined by using single isotope dilution, and the plutonium concentration is deduced from the ratio Pu/U and U concentration. The main advantages of isotope dilution are its selectivity, accuracy and very high sensitivity. The recent improvements made to surface ionization mass spectrometers have considerably increased the precision of the measurements; a relative precision of about 0.2% to 0.3% is obtained currently, but it could be reduced to 0.1%, in the future, with a careful control of the experimental procedures. The detection limite is around 0.1 ppb [fr

  13. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  14. [On the temporary surplus population in the elementary stage of socialism in China].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Y; Chen, L

    1988-07-01

    The causes and patterns of China's surplus population are analyzed for the period 1951-1980. The authors view the surplus population as a temporary phenomenon that is advantageous to social development.

  15. Investigation of environmental samples from Fukushima with respect to uranium and plutonium by AMS; Untersuchung von Umweltproben aus Fukushima in Bezug auf Plutonium und Uran mittels AMS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, Stephanie

    2017-02-01

    In March 2011, the nuclear power plant Fukushima Dai-ichi was seriously damaged by a tsunami caused by an earthquake. During the accident large quantities of radionuclides, mainly of the volatile elements cesium and iodine, were released to the environment. In small amounts refractory elements such as plutonium and uranium have also been released. Plutonium and the uraniumisotope {sup 236}U have primarily been delivered by human activities in the environment. Large amounts were released during the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Additional sources are accidents in nuclear facilities, like Chernobyl. Every source has its own characteristic isotopic composition. It is therefore possible to determine the origin of the contamination by measuring the isotopic ratios of {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu and {sup 236}U/{sup 238}U. These ratios can be determined by using accelerator mass spectrometry. Due to its high sensitivity, it is possible to measure even small amounts of plutonium and especially of {sup 236}U. These measurements were performed using the compact 500 kV facility ''TANDY'' of ETH Zurich. In 2013 and 2015 vegetation, litter and soil drill core samples were taken in the contaminated area in Fukushima prefecture. In 2015 samples were taken as close to the sampling locations of the 2013 campaign as possible. After isolation of plutonium and uranium by chemical extraction, separate targets were prepared for the measurement. The {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios indicate global fallout as the plutonium source for most samples. The plutonium of the reactors of Fukushima Dai-ichi is located in the upper layers like in vegetation or litter. From the uranium ratios alone the reactors could not unambigously be identified as the source of {sup 236}U. However, this is plausible in the cases were reactor plutonium was detected. None of the samples contained higher plutonium activity concentrations than in the rest of Japan, caused by global fallout. This

  16. Production of Plutonium Metal from Aqueous Solutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orth, D.A.

    2003-01-16

    The primary separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium by the Purex solvent extraction process at the Savannah River Plant produces a dilute plutonium solution containing residual fission products and uranium. A cation exchange process is used for concentration and further decontamination of the plutonium, as the first step in the final preparation of metal. This paper discusses the production of plutonium metal from the aqueous solutions.

  17. Political accountability and autonomous weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James Igoe Walsh

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Autonomous weapons would have the capacity to select and attack targets without direct human input. One important objection to the introduction of such weapons is that they will make it more difficult to identify and hold accountable those responsible for undesirable outcomes such as mission failures and civilian casualties. I hypothesize that individuals can modify their attribution of responsibility in predicable ways to accommodate this new technology. The results of a survey experiment are consistent with this; subjects continue to find responsible and hold accountable political and military leaders when autonomous weapons are used, but also attribute responsibility to the designers and programmers of such weapons.

  18. Computation of Weapons Systems Effectiveness

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-01

    41 2. Results of CCIP Program ..................................................................42 D. UNGUIDED BOC ...42 1. BOC Module in MATLAB...44 2. Results of BOC Program ...................................................................46 E. LASER GUIDED WEAPONS

  19. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pollack, J.D.

    2010-01-01

    This essay assesses North Korea's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons; alternative strategies for inhibiting Pyongyang's weapons development; and the potential implications for regional security and nonproliferation should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retain and enhance its weapons programs. North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has long provoked heated debate among policy makers and research analysts about the purposes of engagement with the North, reflecting the repeated frustrations in efforts to negotiate Korean denuclearization. These debates reflect widely divergent views of the North Korean regime; its sustainability as an autonomous political, economic, and military system; and the potential consequences of continued nuclear development in this isolated, highly idiosyncratic state. These questions assume additional salience as North Korea approaches a leadership succession for only the second time in its six-decade history. The effort to inhibit North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is among the longest running and least successful sagas in international security and non-proliferation policy of the past quarter century. In early 2010, Pyongyang claims a rudimentary nuclear capability by possession of weaponized plutonium, the conduct of two nuclear tests, and advances in the production of enriched uranium as an alternative means of fissile material production, though the latter step is nominally justified as a source for reactor fuel. North Korea defends its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent to counter what Pyongyang deems existential threats posed by the United States.Despite the resumption of high-level diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang in late 2009, realization of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula remains a very remote prospect. The DPRK insists that a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea and hence the cessation of 'hostile DPRK-U.S. relations' are necessary before any consideration of

  20. Tabulated Neutron Emission Rates for Plutonium Oxide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shores, Erik Frederick [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-07-24

    This work tabulates neutron emission rates for 80 plutonium oxide samples as reported in the literature. Plutonium-­238 and plutonium-­239 oxides are included and such emission rates are useful for scaling tallies from Monte Carlo simulations and estimating dose rates for health physics applications.

  1. Civil plutonium amounts in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naudet, G.

    1994-01-01

    The experience of plutonium reprocessing in water reactors is positive and today the use of this nuclear fuel is at industrial level. Plutonium quantities in spent fuel go on increasing, plutonium stock coming from reprocessing can be controlled: according to conjuncture, it will evolve by stabilization or decreasing at the beginning of next century

  2. Plutonium Oxide Process Capability Work Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, David E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Tingey, Joel M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-28

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been tasked to develop a Pilot-scale Plutonium-oxide Processing Unit (P3U) providing a flexible capability to produce 200g (Pu basis) samples of plutonium oxide using different chemical processes for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. Materials produced can also be used as exercise and reference materials.

  3. The use of calorimetry for plutonium assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mason, J.A.

    1982-12-01

    Calorimetry is a technique for measuring the thermal power of heat-producing substances. The technique may be applied to the measurement of plutonium-bearing materials which evolve heat as a result of alpha and beta decay. A calorimetric measurement of the thermal power of a plutonium sample, combined with a knowledge or measurement of the plutonium isotopic mass ratios of the sample provides a convenient and accurate, non-destructive measure of the total plutonium mass of the sample. The present report provides a description, and an assessment of the calorimetry technique applied to the assay of plutonium-bearing materials. Types and characteristics of plutonium calorimeters are considered, as well as calibration and operating procedures. The instrumentation used with plutonium calorimeters is described and the use of computer control for calorimeter automation is discussed. A critical review and assessment of plutonium calorimetry literature since 1970 is presented. Both fuel element and plutonium-bearing material calorimeters are considered. The different types of plutonium calorimeters are evaluated and their relative merits are discussed. A combined calorimeter and gamma-ray measurement assay system is considered. The design principles of plutonium assay calorimeters are considered. An automatic, computer-based calorimeter control system is proposed in conjunction with a general plutonium assay calorimeter design. (author)

  4. Nuclear weapons industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertsch, K.A.; Shaw, L.S.

    1984-01-01

    This unique study was written specifically as a reference source for institutional investors concerned about the threat posed to their stock portfolios by the debate over nuclear arms production. The authors focus their analysis on the 26 leading companies in the field. The perspective is neutral and refreshing. Background information on strategic policy, arms control and disarmament, and the influence of the industry on defense policy and the economy is presented rationally. The study also discusses the economic significance of both the conversion from military to civilian production and nuclear freeze initiatives. An appendix contains a fact-filled guide to nuclear weapon systems

  5. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through (a) process modifications, (b) use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, (c) acid recycling, and (d) judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor, not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future

  6. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through process modifications, use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, acid recycling, and judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor , not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future. (author) 12 refs.; 2 figs

  7. Plutonium-238 Decision Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, Mike; Lechel, David J.; Leigh, C.D.

    1999-01-01

    Five transuranic (TRU) waste sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, collectively, have more than 2,100 cubic meters of Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) TRU waste that exceed the wattage restrictions of the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-11). The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being developed by the DOE as a repository for TRU waste. With the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opening in 1999, these sites are faced with a need to develop waste management practices that will enable the transportation of Pu-238 TRU waste to WIPP for disposal. This paper describes a decision analysis that provided a logical framework for addressing the Pu-238 TRU waste issue. The insights that can be gained by performing a formalized decision analysis are multifold. First and foremost, the very process. of formulating a decision tree forces the decision maker into structured, logical thinking where alternatives can be evaluated one against the other using a uniform set of criteria. In the process of developing the decision tree for transportation of Pu-238 TRU waste, several alternatives were eliminated and the logical order for decision making was discovered. Moreover, the key areas of uncertainty for proposed alternatives were identified and quantified. The decision analysis showed that the DOE can employ a combination approach where they will (1) use headspace gas analyses to show that a fraction of the Pu-238 TRU waste drums are no longer generating hydrogen gas and can be shipped to WIPP ''as-is'', (2) use drums and bags with advanced filter systems to repackage Pu-238 TRU waste drums that are still generating hydrogen, and (3) add hydrogen getter materials to the inner containment vessel of the TRUPACT-11to relieve the build-up of hydrogen gas during transportation of the Pu-238 TRU waste drums

  8. 50 CFR 31.2 - Methods of surplus wildlife population control and disposal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... Surplus Wildlife § 31.2 Methods of surplus wildlife population control and disposal. Upon a determination... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Methods of surplus wildlife population control and disposal. 31.2 Section 31.2 Wildlife and Fisheries UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE...

  9. Is plutonium really necessary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, V.

    1976-01-01

    Not all activities associated with nuclear power contribute equally to proliferation potential, but some fuel-cycle activities (i.e., reprocessing) are considered too dangerous to be permitted in non-weapons countries. This paper assesses the feasibility of keeping Pu out of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is pointed out that there is no technical necessity of using Pu as nuclear fuel so long as 235 U is available. Analysis of the economics of recycling spent fuel products in LWRs in the U.S. shows that the net economic benefit of recycle is uncertain and might even be negative; it will have an insignificant effect on the cost of nuclear power. It is argued that reprocessing of spent fuel be deferred until recycle in LWRs can be shown to yield economic benefits sufficiently large to compensate for the risks, or the viability of the breeder as an important commercial source of power has been demonstrated. According to the low estimate of U requirements, the world would have enough U resources well into the 21st century, although if the high estimate is used, the world would exhaust its reserves by the year 2000. Evidence indicates that nuclear power will grow more slowly than the forecasts of the nuclear advocates. Thus, there may be no need for an early decision to undertake recycling, and research on breeder development can proceed at a slower rate

  10. Disposal of fissionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, J.J.

    1991-01-01

    The reduction in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has improved the prospects for nuclear disarmament, making it more likely that significant numbers of nuclear warheads will be dismantled by the United States and USSR in the foreseeable future. Thus, the question becomes more urgent as to the disposition of the weapons materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium. It is timely, therefore, to develop specific plans for such disposal. The overall process for disposal of weapons materials by the burnup option involves the following steps: (1) removing the weapons material from the warheads, (2) converting the material to a fuel form suitable for power reactors, (3) burning it up as a power reactor fuel, and (4) removing the spent fuel and placing it in a permanent repository. This paper examines these four steps with the purpose of answering the following questions. What facilities would be appropriate for the disposal process? Do they need to be dedicated facilities, or could industrial facilities be used? What is the present projection of the economics of the burnup process, both the capital investment and the operating costs? How does one assure that fissionable materials will not be diverted to military use during the disposal process? Is the spent fuel remaining from the burnup process proliferation resistant? Would the disposal of spent fuel add an additional burden to the spent fuel permanent repository? The suggested answers are those of the author and do not represent a position by the Electric Power Research Institute

  11. Review of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives including certain features pertaining to weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, D.C.; Rosenstroch, B.

    1978-01-01

    Largely as a result of concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. program to develop and commercialize the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has been slowed down; interest in alternative fuel cycles has increased. The report offers an informal review of the various nuclear fuel cycle options including some aspects relevant to weapon proliferation, although no complete review of the latter subject is attempted. Basic principles governing breeding, reactor safety, and efficient utilization of fission energy resources (thorium and uranium) are discussed. The controversial problems of weapon proliferation and its relation to fuel reprocessing (which is essential for efficient fuel cycles) are reviewed and a number of proposed approaches to reducing proliferation risks are noted. Some representative specific reactor concepts are described, with emphasis on their development status, their potentials for resource utilization, and their implications for proliferation

  12. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  13. Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

    1995-10-30

    The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

  14. Determination of plutonium-238 in plutonium by alpha spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aggarwal, S.K.; Jain, H.C.; Mathews, C.K.; Ramaniah, M.V.

    1975-01-01

    A method is presented for the determination of 238 Pu in plutonium samples by alpha spectrometry. Various factors attributing towards the energy degradation, a problem usually encountered in alpha spectrometry, are discussed. A computer programme is given for the evaluation of peak areas when the alpha spectrum is degraded. The results are compared with those obtained by mass spectrometry. (author)

  15. Share-of-Surplus Product Line Optimisation with Price Levels

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    X. G. Luo

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Kraus and Yano (2003 established the share-of-surplus product line optimisation model and developed a heuristic procedure for this nonlinear mixed-integer optimisation model. In their model, price of a product is defined as a continuous decision variable. However, because product line optimisation is a planning process in the early stage of product development, pricing decisions usually are not very precise. In this research, a nonlinear integer programming share-of-surplus product line optimization model that allows the selection of candidate price levels for products is established. The model is further transformed into an equivalent linear mixed-integer optimisation model by applying linearisation techniques. Experimental results in different market scenarios show that the computation time of the transformed model is much less than that of the original model.

  16. Defense Surplus Equipment Disposal, Including the Law Enforcement 1033 Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-09-05

    Liquidity Services, Inc. a contract to be the primary manager for the receipt, storage, marketing , and disposition of virtually all usable defense surplus...Secretary of the Army’s authority to loan or donate small firearms, determined to be excess, for use during funerals and other ceremonial purposes;29...the Army to loan or donate excess small arms for funeral and other ceremonial purposes. H.R. 4310, Subtitle G., Miscellaneous Authorities and

  17. Current Account Surpluses and the Interest Rate Island in Switzerland

    OpenAIRE

    Paolo Mauro

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes some long-run aspects of the Swiss balance of payments, highlighting two macroeconomic phenomena that make Switzerland stand out among other countries: first, it has had a persistent current account surplus and the largest ratio of net foreign assets to GDP in the world; second, its real interest rates have been significantly lower than those of most other industrialized countries, earning it the label “interest rate island”. These two distinctive features may be related,...

  18. Plutonium extraction from impure and radioactive solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muller, J.P.; Blachere, J.; Riviere, J.; Josien, J.P.

    1980-01-01

    Presently, the accurate determination of plutonium content (accuracy better than 0.1%) in pure solutions or in plutonium oxide is performed currently. This method can be used for the determination of plutonium content in dissolutions of irradiated fuels after quantitative extraction of plutonium (better than 99.9%) by ion-exchange. The method used strictly in glove box for synthetic solutions of dissolution of irradiated fuels with or without simulated fission products is described. The ratio concentrations of uranium and plutonium varies from 10 to 250. The reported results are obtained for the precise determination of plutonium content after plutonium extraction. The first results obtained in hot cells for synthetic or true solutions of Phenix fuels dissolutions are reported [fr

  19. Understanding and overcoming the “positive profits with negative surplus-value” paradox

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    GUSTAVO DAOU LUCAS

    Full Text Available ABSTRACT This paper explains the “positive profits with negative surplus-value” example of Steedman (1975 and shows that while in joint production systems individual labour values can be negative, the claim that the total labour embodied in the surplus product of the economy (surplus-value can also be negative is based on assumptions that have no economic meaning (such as negative activity levels.The paper also provides a way to measure the surplus-value of joint production systems which overcomes the problems of the traditional concept and restates the proposition that a positive amount of surplus labour is a necessary condition for positive profits.

  20. In situ remediation of plutonium from glovebox exhaust ducts at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugdale, J.S.; Humiston, T.J.; Omer, G.E.

    1993-01-01

    Plutonium and other miscellaneous hold-up materials have been accumulating in the glovebox exhaust ducts at the Rocky Flats Plant over the 40 years of weapons production at the site. The Duct Remediation Project was undertaken to assess the safety impacts of this material, and to remove it from the ductwork. The project necessitated the development of specialized tools, equipment and methods to remediate the material from continuously operating ventilation systems. Special engineered access locations were also required to provide access to the ductwork, and to ensure that safety and system operability were not degraded as a result of the remediation efforts. Operations personnel underwent significant training and development, and became an important asset to the success of the project. In total, the project succeeded in removing over 40 kilograms of plutonium-bearing material from one of the major weapons production buildings at the plant

  1. The ORNL Surplus Facilities Management Program Long Range Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Myrick, T.E.

    1984-09-01

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. This program was established to provide for the management of DOE surplus radioactively contaminated facilities from the end of their operating life until final facility disposition is completed. As part of this program, the ORNL SFMP oversees some 76 individual surplus facilities, ranging in complexity from abandoned waste storage tanks to large experimental reactors. The ORNL SFMP has prepared this Long Range Plan to outline the long-term management strategy for those facilities included in the program. The primary objective of this plan are to: (1) develop a base of information for each ORNL SFMP facility, (2) conduct preliminary decommissioning analyses to identify feasible alternatives, (3) assess the current and future risk of each facility, (4) establish a priority list for the decommissioning projects, and (5) integrate the individual project costs and schedules into an overall program schedule and cost estimate for the ORNL site. The Long Range Plan also provides an overview of the ORNL SFMP management structure, specifies the decommissioning criteria to be employed, and identifies special technical problems, research and development needs, and special facilities and equipment that may be required for decommissioning operations.

  2. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

  3. The first weighing of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    The following text, transcribed from the remarks of those scientists who gathered at the University of Chicago on September 10, 1967, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first weighing of plutonium, tells an important part of the story of this fascinating new element that is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the future of man

  4. Design of plutonium processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Derbyshire, W.; Sills, R.J.

    1982-01-01

    Five considerations for the design of plutonium processing facilities are identified. These are: Toxicity, Radiation, Criticality, Containment and Remote Operation. They are examined with reference to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and application is detailed both for liquid and dry processes. (author)

  5. Spectrographic analysis of plutonium (1960)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Artaud, J.; Chaput, M.; Robichet, J.

    1960-01-01

    Various possibilities for the spectrographic determination of impurities in plutonium are considered. The application of the 'copper spark' method, of sparking on graphite and of fractional distillation in the arc are described and discussed in some detail (apparatus, accessories, results obtained). (author) [fr

  6. The first weighing of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1967-09-10

    The following text, transcribed from the remarks of those scientists who gathered at the University of Chicago on September 10, 1967, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first weighing of plutonium, tells an important part of the story of this fascinating new element that is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the future of man.

  7. Plutonium waste incineration using pyrohydrolysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meyer, M.L.

    1991-12-31

    Waste generated by Savannah River Site (SRS) plutonium operations includes a contaminated organic waste stream. A conventional method for disposing of the organic waste stream and recovering the nuclear material is by incineration. When the organic material is burned, the plutonium remains in the incinerator ash. Plutonium recovery from incinerator ash is highly dependent on the maximum temperature to which the oxide is exposed. Recovery via acid leaching is reduced for a high fired ash (>800{degree}C), while plutonium oxides fired at lower decomposition temperatures (400--800{degrees}C) are more soluble at any given acid concentration. To determine the feasibility of using a lower temperature process, tests were conducted using an electrically heated, controlled-air incinerator. Nine nonradioactive, solid, waste materials were batch-fed and processed in a top-heated cylindrical furnace. Waste material processing was completed using a 19-liter batch over a nominal 8-hour cycle. A processing cycle consisted of 1 hour for heating, 4 hours for reacting, and 3 hours for chamber cooling. The water gas shift reaction was used to hydrolyze waste materials in an atmosphere of 336% steam and 4.4% oxygen. Throughput ranged from 0.14 to 0.27 kg/hr depending on the variability in the waste material composition and density.

  8. Plutonium waste incineration using pyrohydrolysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meyer, M.L.

    1991-01-01

    Waste generated by Savannah River Site (SRS) plutonium operations includes a contaminated organic waste stream. A conventional method for disposing of the organic waste stream and recovering the nuclear material is by incineration. When the organic material is burned, the plutonium remains in the incinerator ash. Plutonium recovery from incinerator ash is highly dependent on the maximum temperature to which the oxide is exposed. Recovery via acid leaching is reduced for a high fired ash (>800{degree}C), while plutonium oxides fired at lower decomposition temperatures (400--800{degrees}C) are more soluble at any given acid concentration. To determine the feasibility of using a lower temperature process, tests were conducted using an electrically heated, controlled-air incinerator. Nine nonradioactive, solid, waste materials were batch-fed and processed in a top-heated cylindrical furnace. Waste material processing was completed using a 19-liter batch over a nominal 8-hour cycle. A processing cycle consisted of 1 hour for heating, 4 hours for reacting, and 3 hours for chamber cooling. The water gas shift reaction was used to hydrolyze waste materials in an atmosphere of 336% steam and 4.4% oxygen. Throughput ranged from 0.14 to 0.27 kg/hr depending on the variability in the waste material composition and density.

  9. Plutonium waste incineration using pyrohydrolysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyer, M.L.

    1991-01-01

    Waste generated by Savannah River Site (SRS) plutonium operations includes a contaminated organic waste stream. A conventional method for disposing of the organic waste stream and recovering the nuclear material is by incineration. When the organic material is burned, the plutonium remains in the incinerator ash. Plutonium recovery from incinerator ash is highly dependent on the maximum temperature to which the oxide is exposed. Recovery via acid leaching is reduced for a high fired ash (>800 degree C), while plutonium oxides fired at lower decomposition temperatures (400--800 degrees C) are more soluble at any given acid concentration. To determine the feasibility of using a lower temperature process, tests were conducted using an electrically heated, controlled-air incinerator. Nine nonradioactive, solid, waste materials were batch-fed and processed in a top-heated cylindrical furnace. Waste material processing was completed using a 19-liter batch over a nominal 8-hour cycle. A processing cycle consisted of 1 hour for heating, 4 hours for reacting, and 3 hours for chamber cooling. The water gas shift reaction was used to hydrolyze waste materials in an atmosphere of 336% steam and 4.4% oxygen. Throughput ranged from 0.14 to 0.27 kg/hr depending on the variability in the waste material composition and density

  10. Rays as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vogel, H

    2007-08-01

    Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100Mio degrees C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 degrees C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage individuals. The

  11. Rays as weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  12. Addiction surplus: the add-on margin that makes addictive consumptions difficult to contain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Peter J; Livingstone, Charles

    2015-01-01

    Addictive consumptions generate financial surpluses over-and-above non-addictive consumptions because of the excessive consumption of addicted consumers. This add-on margin or 'addiction surplus' provides a powerful incentive for beneficiaries to protect their income by ensuring addicted consumers keep consuming. Not only that, addiction surplus provides the financial base that enables producers to sponsor activities which aim to prevent public health initiatives from reducing consumption. This paper examines the potency of addiction surplus to engage industry, governments and communities in an on-going reliance on addiction surplus. It then explores how neo-liberal constructions of a rational consumer disguise the ethical and exploitative dynamics of addiction surplus by examining ways in which addictive consumptions fail to conform to notions of autonomy and rationality. Four measures are identified to contain the distorting effects of addiction surplus. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  13. The Optimum Plutonium Inert Matrix Fuel Form for Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Wang, J.; Acosta, C.

    2004-01-01

    The University of Florida has underway an ongoing research program to validate the economic, operational and performance benefits of developing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) for the disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) and for the recycle of reprocessed Pu. The current fuel form of choice for Pu disposition for the Department of Energy is as a mixed oxide (MOX) (PuO2/UO2). We will show analyses that demonstrate that a Silicon Carbide (SiC) IMF offers improved performance capabilities as a fuel form for Pu recycle and disposition. The reason that UF is reviewing various materials to serve as an inert matrix fuel is that an IMF fuel form can offer greatly reduced Pu and transuranic isotope (TRU) production and also improved thermal performance characteristics. Our studies showed that the Pu content is reduced by an order of magnitude while centerline fuel temperatures are reduced approximately 380 degrees centigrade compared to MOX. These reduced temperatures result in reduced stored heat and thermal stresses in the pellet. The reduced stored heat reduces the consequences of the loss of coolant accident, while the reduced temperatures and thermal stresses yield greatly improved fuel performance. Silicon Carbide is not new to the nuclear industry, being a basic fuel material in gas cooled reactors

  14. What do weapons secure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, G.

    1982-04-01

    The iron triangle of the Defense Department, Congressional hawks, and the defense industry will fight any efforts to reduce President Reagan's plan to rearm America and will dominate any debate over national security and weapons procurement as they have done since 1945. American attitudes are changing, however, and pressing for a re-evaluation of this closed policy apparatus. The first step to be taken is a re-examination of global and national realities to see if current policy is appropriate. Reagan has reversed the trend toward arms control to more strategic arms competition which, by creating waste and distrust, will reduce security. It also narrows policy considerations to East-West rivalry and ignores the North-South changes that are taking place. US failures in Vietnam and Watergate and a negative response to US involvement in Central America are signs that the public is increasingly skeptical of the iron triangle. (DCK)

  15. Preparation of plutonium-bearing ceramics via mechanically activated precursor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chizhevskaya, S. V.; Stefanovsky, S. V.

    2000-07-01

    The problem of excess weapons plutonium disposition is suggested to be solved by means of its incorporation in stable ceramics with high chemical durability and radiation resistivity. The most promising host phases for plutonium as well as uranium and neutron poisons (gadolinium, hafnium) are zirconolite, pyrochlore, zircon, zirconia [1,2], and murataite [3]. Their production requires high temperatures and a fine-grained homogeneous precursor to reach final waste form with high quality and low leachability. Currently various routes to homogeneous products preparation such as sol-gel technology, wet-milling, and grinding in a ball or planetary mill are used. The best result demonstrates sol-gel technology but this route is very complicated. An alternative technology for preparation of ceramic precursors is the treatment of the oxide batch with high mechanical energy [4]. Such a treatment produces combination of mechanical (fine milling with formation of various defects, homogenization) and chemical (split bonds with formation of active centers—free radicals, ion-radicals, etc.) effects resulting in higher reactivity of the activated batch.

  16. Plutonium metal exchange program : current status and statistical analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tandon, L. (Lav); Eglin, J. L. (Judith Lynn); Michalak, S. E. (Sarah E.); Picard, R. R.; Temer, D. J. (Donald J.)

    2004-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Plutonium (Pu) Metal Sample Exchange program was conducted to insure the quality and intercomparability of measurements such as Pu assay, Pu isotopics, and impurity analyses. The Rocky Flats program was discontinued in 1989 after more than 30 years. In 2001, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) reestablished the Pu Metal Exchange program. In addition to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, six Department of Energy (DOE) facilities Argonne East, Argonne West, Livermore, Los Alamos, New Brunswick Laboratory, and Savannah River are currently participating in the program. Plutonium metal samples are prepared and distributed to the sites for destructive measurements to determine elemental concentration, isotopic abundance, and both metallic and nonmetallic impurity levels. The program provides independent verification of analytical measurement capabilies for each participating facility and allows problems in analytical methods to be identified. The current status of the program will be discussed with emphasis on the unique statistical analysis and modeling of the data developed for the program. The discussion includes the definition of the consensus values for each analyte (in the presence and absence of anomalous values and/or censored values), and interesting features of the data and the results.

  17. Modelling the dispersion and scavenging of plutonium in marine systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakano, Masanao

    2003-01-01

    An Oceanic General Circulation Model (OGCM) has been developed for modelling the dispersion of plutonium (Pu) and other non-conservative tracers in the marine system. A plutonium scavenging model as well as an advection-diffusion model has been incorporated into the OGCM. It appears that the best way to validate a numerical model for the dispersion of non-conservative tracers in the global ocean would be to calculate radionuclide concentrations in the ocean from atmospheric nuclear tests (global and local fallout) and to compare them with observations. This paper concentrates on predictions of the distributions and vertical profiles of 239,240 Pu in the water column of the Pacific Ocean, both from global fallout as well as from local fallout from nuclear weapons tests at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The water profile concentrations, water and sediment inventories of 239,240 Pu have shown generally good agreement between calculated and observed data. Nevertheless, the present model cannot calculate the water profiles in the north North Pacific or the west coast of the American continent very well, mainly because of the underestimation of the effect of biological productivity on Pu scavenging and its removal from the water column in these regions. (author)

  18. Microwave calcination for plutonium immobilization and residue stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, M.J.; Rising, T.L.; Roushey, W.J.; Sprenger, G.S.

    1995-01-01

    In the late 1980's development was begun on a process using microwave energy to vitrify low level mixed waste sludge and transuranic mixed waste sludge generated in Building 374 at Rocky Flats. This process was shown to produce a dense, highly durable waste form. With the cessation of weapons production at Rocky Flats, the emphasis has changed from treatment of low level and TRU wastes to stabilizaiton of plutonium oxide and residues. This equipment is versatile and can be used as a heat source to calcine, react or vitrify many types of residues and oxides. It has natural economies in that it heats only the material to be treated, significantly reducing cycle times over conventional furnaces. It is inexpensive to operate in that most of the working components remain outside of any necessary contamination enclosure and therefore can easily be maintained. Limited testing has been successfully performed on cerium oxide (as a surrogate for plutonium oxide), surrogate electrorefining salts, surrogate residue sludge and residue ash. Future plans also include tests on ion exchange resins. In an attempt to further the usefullness of this technology, a mobile, self-contained microwave melting system is currently under development and expected to be operational at Rocky Flats Enviromental Technology Site by the 4th quarter of FY96

  19. Prospects for the establishment of plutonium recycle in thermal reactors in the Foratom countries. Status and assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chamberlain, A.; Melches, C.

    1977-01-01

    The paper reviews the technical status of plutonium recycle in thermal reactors in the Foratom countries and assesses the prospect for it becoming established in the future with the implicit assumptions that uranium oxide reprocessing capacity will be installed commensurate with the projected programmes for thermal reactor installation and that there will be no insuperable environmental, security or safeguards obstacles to the use of plutonium as a fuel. It is argued that the feasibility of using plutonium as an alternative to 235 U as the fuel for thermal reactors, particularly LWRs, has been extensively demonstrated by a number of Foratom countries and the main problem areas are fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing. Mixed-oxide fuel fabrication has been well established on the prototype plant scale using low-irradiation plutonium, but it is recognized that the future design of production-scale plants will need to cater for the significantly higher radiation levels from high burnup plutonium and meet stricter environmental requirements on operator dosage and waste arisings. The main constraint on the establishment of recycle up to now has been the lack of available plutonium owing to the absence of significant uranium-oxide fuel reprocessing capacity. An assessment of the plutonium arisings in Europe, based on the projected uranium-oxide reprocessing capacity, shows that by 1990 plutonium, surplus to FBR requirements, should be accumulating by about 10t/a, sufficient to fuel about 8000MW(e) of LWRs. A further constraint would then be the availability and technical problems of mixed-oxide reprocessing, which is one of the areas identified for international collaboration. It is concluded that whilst there is unlikely to be substantial recycle of plutonium in thermal reactors in the Foratom countries before the early 1990s, an incentive could possibly arise about that time. The strength of this incentive will depend on a number of factors including the status of

  20. Use of an Eductor to Reliably Dilute a Plutonium Solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steimke, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina is dissolving Pu239 scrap, which is a legacy from the production of nuclear weapons materials, and will later convert it into oxide form to stabilize it. An eductor has been used to both dilute and transfer a plutonium containing solution between tanks. Eductors have the advantages of simplicity and no moving parts. Reliable control of dilution is important because the geometry of the receiving tank could potentially allow a nuclear criticality. Dilution factor was to have been controlled by the appropriate choice of flow restrictor in the line between the plutonium solution tank and the eductor. However, dilution factors measured for liquid transfers with different flow restrictors showed unexpected trends, causing concern that the process was not well understood. As a result, the performance of the eductor and associated piping were analyzed using a mathematical model. The one dimensional, two phase model accounted for eductor performance and for air and vapor coming out of solution at low pressures. The unexpected trends were shown to be the result of variations in viscosities and densities of both the plutonium solution and the nitric acid solution used as both the motive fluid and diluent. The model agreed well with existing data and was then used to make pre-test predictions of flows for four solution transfers with good agreement. This provided confidence that the eductor system was a reliable method for obtaining specified dilution factors. Based on model results, recommendations were made and implemented for the operation of the eductor transfer system. One unexpected result of the analysis was the observation that slow corrosion inside the eductor is increasing the dilution factor, which is a conservative trend

  1. Destruction of plutonium using non-uranium fuels in pressurized water reactor peripheral assemblies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chodak, III, Paul [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of conventional three batch UO2 assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery. Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400 reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies essentially destroys 100% of the 239Pu and ≥90% {sub total}Pu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products.

  2. Destruction of plutonium using non-uranium fuels in pressurized water reactor peripheral assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chodak, P. III

    1996-05-01

    This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of conventional three batch UO 2 assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery. Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400 reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies essentially destroys 100% of the 239 Pu and ≥90% total Pu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products

  3. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  4. Nuclear weapons proliferation as a world order problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Falk, R.

    1977-01-01

    World-order concerns have intensified recently in light of mounting evidence that a weapons capability will soon be within easy reach of more and more governments and of certain nongovernmental groupings as well. One reliable source estimates that by 1985 as many as fifty countries could ''produce enough plutonium each year for at least several dozen nuclear explosives.'' In an even more immediate sense, ''economic competition among nuclear suppliers today could soon lead to a world in which twenty or more nations are but a few months from a nuclear weapons force.'' Three developments have created this ''world order'' sense of concern: (1) increased pace of civilian nuclear power deployment globally as a consequence of rising oil prices, unreliability of oil supplies, and reality of dwindling oil reserves in any case; (2) actuality of India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 which demonstrated vividly how any state that pursues a ''civilian'' program can also develop its own weapons capability; and (3) the intensification of competition for international nuclear sales which makes it increasingly evident that nonproliferation goals are no longer compatible with the pursuit of national commercial advantage; essentially, this reality has emerged from a break in the American monopoly over civilian nuclear technology and the willingness of French and German suppliers to provide all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities,to any nation that feels it can afford to buy them; the German-Brazilian deal (worth at least $4 billion) has proven to be the equivalent in the commercial realm of India's ''peaceful'' nuclear explosion. Such developments disclose the alarming prospect that easier access to nuclear technology will make it relatively simple and thus more likely for a beleaguered government or a desperate political actor of any sort to acquire and possibly use nuclear weapons

  5. Military laser weapons: current controversies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seet, B; Wong, T Y

    2001-09-01

    Military laser weapons systems are becoming indispensable in most modern armies. These lasers have undergone many stages of development, and have outpaced research on eye protection measures, which continue to have inherent limitations. Eye injuries caused by military lasers are increasingly reported, leading to speculation that these would become an important cause of blinding in modern conflicts. As part of the effort to ban inhumane weapons, international laws have been passed to restrict the proliferation of such blinding weapons. However, there are controversies concerning the interpretation, implementation and effectiveness of these laws. The ophthalmic community can play a greater role in highlighting ocular morbidity from military lasers, and in preventing their further proliferation.

  6. Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

    1998-05-01

    The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

  7. 77 FR 1920 - Second Amended Notice of Intent To Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-12

    ..., regardless of its origins, to feed for the MFFF is to use some combination of facilities at TA-55 at LANL, K... programmatic, engineering, facility safety, cost, and schedule information, and on the environmental impact...

  8. Transport and deposition of plutonium-contaminated sediments by fluvial processes, Los Alamos Canyon, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graf, W.L.

    1996-01-01

    Between 1945 and 1952 the development of nuclear weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, resulted in the disposal of plutonium into the alluvium of nearby Acid and (to a lesser degree) DP Canyons. The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between the disposal sites and the main river, a 20 km link formed by the fluvial system of Acid, Pueblo, DP, and Los Alamos Canyons. Empirical data from 15 yr of annual sediment sampling throughout the canyon system has produced 458 observations of plutonium concentration in fluvial sediments. These data show that, overall, mean plutonium concentrations in fluvial sediment decline from 10,000 fCi/g near the disposal area to 100 fCi/g at the confluence of the canyon system and the Rio Grande. Simulations using a computer model for water, sediment, and plutonium routing in the canyon system show that discharges as large as the 25 yr event would fail to develop enough transport capacity to completely remove the contaminated sediments from Pueblo Canyon. Lesser flows would move some materials to the Rio Grande by remobilization of stored sediments. The simulations also show that the deposits and their contaminants have a predictable geography because they occur where stream power is low, hydraulic resistance is high, and the geologic and/or geomorphic conditions provide enough space for storage. 38 refs., 13 figs., 1 tab

  9. Economic assumptions for evaluating reactor-related options for managing plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rothwell, G.

    1996-01-01

    This paper discusses the economic assumptions in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences' report, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (1995). It reviews the Net Present Value approach for discounting and comparing the costs and benefits of reactor-related options. It argues that because risks associated with the returns to plutonium management are unlikely to be constant over time, it is preferable to use a real risk-free rate to discount cash flows and explicitly describe the probability distributions for costs and benefits, allowing decision makers to determine the risk premium of each option. As a baseline for comparison, it assumes that one economic benefit of changing the current plutonium management system is a reduction in on-going Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M) costs. This reduction in the present value of S and M costs can be compared with the discounted costs of each option. These costs include direct construction costs, indirect costs, operating costs minus revenues, and decontamination and decommissioning expenses. The paper also discusses how to conduct an uncertainty analysis. It finishes by summarizing conclusions and recommendations and discusses how these recommendations might apply to the evaluation of Russian plutonium management options. (author)

  10. Bibliography on plutonium and its compounds; Bibliographie sur le plutonium et ses composes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dirian, J.; Choquet, J. [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1958-07-01

    Collection of bibliographical references on plutonium and its principal compounds from 1942 to end of 1957. (author) [French] Compilation de references bibliographiques sur le plutonium et ses principaux composes de 1942 a fin 1957. (auteur)

  11. Performance Assessment and Sensitivity Analyses of Disposal of Plutonium as Can-in-Canister Ceramic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainer Senger

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether there is a justification for using high-level waste (HLW) as a surrogate for plutonium disposal in can-in-canister ceramic in the total-system performance assessment (TSPA) model for the Site Recommendation (SR). In the TSPA-SR model, the immobilized plutonium waste form is not explicitly represented, but is implicitly represented as an equal number of canisters of HLW. There are about 50 metric tons of plutonium in the U. S. Department of Energy inventory of surplus fissile material that could be disposed. Approximately 17 tons of this material contain significant quantities of impurities and are considered unsuitable for mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel. This material has been designated for direct disposal by immobilization in a ceramic waste form and encapsulating this waste form in high-level waste (HLW). The remaining plutonium is suitable for incorporation into MOX fuel assemblies for commercial reactors (Shaw 1999, Section 2). In this analysis, two cases of immobilized plutonium disposal are analyzed, the 17-ton case and the 13-ton case (Shaw et al. 2001, Section 2.2). The MOX spent-fuel disposal is not analyzed in this report. In the TSPA-VA (CRWMS M and O 1998a, Appendix B, Section B-4), the calculated dose release from immobilized plutonium waste form (can-in-canister ceramic) did not exceed that from an equivalent amount of HLW glass. This indicates that the HLW could be used as a surrogate for the plutonium can-in-canister ceramic. Representation of can-in-canister ceramic as a surrogate is necessary to reduce the number of waste forms in the TSPA model. This reduction reduces the complexity and running time of the TSPA model and makes the analyses tractable. This document was developed under a Technical Work Plan (CRWMS M and O 2000a), and is compliant with that plan. The application of the Quality Assurance (QA) program to the development of that plan (CRWMS M and O 2000a) and of this Analysis is

  12. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 6: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary directed the Department of Energy to develop options and plans for the interim safe storage of these materials. One step in this direction is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of DOE facilities by a open-quotes Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group.close quotes In this effort, the working group developed a Project Plan and an Assessment Plan which basically laid out the approach and methodology for the assessments. The plans were issued on April 25, 1994. The Project Plan specifies a WGAT for each site with significant holdings of plutonium. Also, the plan requires that each site form a Site Assessment Team (SAT) to provide the self assessment for the project. Additionally, the working group was tasked with managing the assessments at each site, and providing the results in a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994

  13. Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bunker, Robert

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to promote an understanding of and research into a new category of weapons, designated nonlethal by military services, and less than lethal or less lethal by law enforcement agencies...

  14. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Weilacher, Lester A

    2003-01-01

    Little more than a month after terrorists took control of four passenger aircraft in the United States and unleashed the horror of 9/11, 50 Chechen terrorists armed with automatic weapons and carrying...

  15. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  16. 2007-2008 Weapon Systems

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2007-01-01

    The weapon systems and equipment described in this reference book represent an essential aspect of our commitment to the security of the nation, the preparedness of the Soldier, and the readiness of the Army...

  17. The first milligrams of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1997-01-01

    A historical review of the development of the very first quantities of plutonium produced during World War II in the United States and in Canada, as remembered by the French nuclear chemist, Mr Goldschmidt, who participated to the various programs which were involved in the development of the atomic bomb, and to the first steps of the French atomic program after the war. Mr Goldschmidt worked especially on organic solvent extraction, with the selection, in 1945, of non volatile tri glycol dichloride, and the development of the Chalk River plant. In 1949, at the Bouchet plant, his team has isolated the first milligrams of French plutonium from uranium oxide; and in 1952, the PUREX process was developed

  18. The chemistry of plutonium revealed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connick, R.E.

    1990-01-01

    In 1941 one goal of the Manhattan Project was to unravel the chemistry of the synthetic element plutonium as rapidly as possible. Important insights were obtained from tracer experiments, but the full complexity of plutonium chemistry was not revealed until macroscopic amounts (milligrams) became available. Because processes for separation from fission products were aqueous solution based, such solution chemistry was emphasized, particularly precipitation and oxidation-reduction behavior. The latter turned out to be unusually intricate when it was discovered that two more oxidation states existed in aqueous solution than had previously been suspected. Further, it was found that an equilibrium was rapidly established among the four aqueous oxidation states while at the same time any three were not in equilibrium. These and other observations made while doing a crash study of a previously unknown element will be reported

  19. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.; Ward, C.; Stokes, M.; Randall, B.; Steed, J.; Jones, R.; Hamilton, L.; Rogers, L.; Fiscus, J.; Dyches, G.

    1998-05-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses five can loading conceptual designs and the lists the advantages and disadvantages for each concept. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas. The can loading welder and cutter are very similar to the existing Savannah River Site (SRS) FB-Line bagless transfer welder and cutter and thus they are a low priority development item

  20. TEORI SURPLUS BERSIH: VALUASI PERUSAHAAN BERDASARKAN DATA AKUNTANSI

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    DEWA GEDE WIRAMA

    2008-07-01

    Full Text Available Fundamental accounting research under measurement perspective regained researchers’ consideration following the publications of Ohlson (1995 and Feltham and Ohlson (1995 valuation models. While fundamental researches before Ball and Brown (1968 were mostly focusing on the determination of the “correct” income number in economic sense, current fundamental researches are more about firm valuation based on accounting numbers.Ohlson (1995 and Feltham and Ohlson (1995 valuation models are based on clean surplus theory. The theory considers accounting as a wealth creation and distribution recording system, and thus provides the base of the relation between firm value and accounting numbers. Based on neoclassical concept of value, clean surplus theory states that a firm value is equal to its book value plus the present value of expected abnormal earnings, termed as goodwill. Based on that relation, Ohlson (1995 formulated a closed-form valuation model that explain firm value based only on current and one period ahead book value and earnings. Feltham and Ohlson (1995 is an attempt to generalized Ohlson (1995 for accounting conservatism and growth.Clean surplus theory is now used as an alternative to CAPM in estimating cost of capital and risk. While Feltham and Ohlson (1995 model seems to have a misspecification for conservatism, the empirical validity of Ohslon (1995 model has been tested with relatively satisfactory results. The model is deemed to be valid as it explains stock prices. The test results, however, also suggest that there is plenty of room to make further contribution in refining the theory. Further research suggestion includes, among others, examination of factors affecting abnormal earnings and the validity of the theory in general, more accurate specification of LID, and enhancement of Feltham and Ohlson (1995 model in dealing with accounting conservatism and growth.

  1. A Mystery of the Global Surplus and its Ramification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Malović Marko

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available This paper deals with phenomenon of the increasingly indicative global imbalances and lagging genesis of balance of payments (BoP accounting in an attempt to accommodate the ongoing mutation of international trade and finance. Namely, although BoP of the world as a whole should be zero since international trade in goods, services and financial assets ought to be a zero-sum game, our planet apparently runs a non-negligible and rising BoP surplus, projected to reach 1% of global GDP by 2015! To make the puzzle more bizarre, IMF statistics up until 2004 had recorded a persistent BoP deficit for the entire globe, which P. Krugman dubbed “The Mystery of the missing Surplus”. Well, surplus is back with the vengeance – while this paper tries to make sense of the phenomenon and pinpoint both its determinants and likely economic consequences. In conclusion, it appears that 1 during international financial crises quality and accuracy of the BoP statistics worsens worldwide, 2 net global imbalances may still be much smaller than we commonly believe, 3 true culprits may not be our usual suspects, 4 gross trade exhibits stark differences once confronted with decomposed value-added net exports and imports free of double counted processed exports and indirect exporting, 5 also, deliberate misreporting of cross-border investment proceeds as well as MNE’s transfer pricing practices may account for a relevant portion of registered global imbalances, and finally, 6 even the latest 6th edition of the IMF’s BoP and IIP Manual explicitly tackles but a few of the factors behind the returning surplus mystery.

  2. A Mystery of the Global Surplus and its Ramification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marko G Malovic

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available This paper deals with phenomenon of the increasingly indicative global imbalances and lagging genesis of balance of payments (BoP accounting in an attempt to accommodate the ongoing mutation of international trade and finance. Namely, although BoP of the world as a whole should be zero since international trade in goods, services and financial assets ought to be a zero-sum game, our planet apparently runs a non-negligible and rising BoP surplus, projected to reach 1% of global GDP by 2015! To make the puzzle more bizarre, IMF statistics up until 2004 had recorded a persistent BoP deficit for the entire globe, which P. Krugman dubbed “The Mystery of the missing Surplus”. Well, surplus is back with the vengeance – while this paper tries to make sense of the phenomenon and pinpoint both its determinants and likely economic consequences. In conclusion, it appears that 1 during international financial crises quality and accuracy of the BoP statistics worsens worldwide, 2 net global imbalances may still be much smaller than we commonly believe, 3 true culprits may not be our usual suspects, 4 gross trade exhibits stark differences once confronted with decomposed value-added net exports and imports free of double counted processed exports and indirect exporting, 5 also, deliberate misreporting of cross-border investment proceeds as well as MNE’s transfer pricing practices may account for a relevant portion of registered global imbalances, and finally, 6 even the latest 6th edition of the IMF’s BoP and IIP Manual explicitly tackles but a few of the factors behind the returning surplus mystery. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE

  3. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  4. Plutonium recycle. In-core fuel management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vincent, F.; Berthet, A.; Le Bars, M.

    1985-01-01

    Plutonium recycle in France will concern a dozen of PWR 900 MWe controlled in gray mode till 1995. This paper presents the main characteristics of fuel management with plutonium recycle. The organization of management studies will be copied from this developed for classical management studies. Up these studies, a ''feasibility report'' aims at establishing at each stage of the fuel cycle, the impact of the utilization of fuel containing plutonium [fr

  5. PROCESS FOR THE RECOVERY OF PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Potratz, H.A.

    1958-12-16

    A process for the separation of plutonium from uranlum and other associated radioactlve fission products ls descrlbed conslstlng of contacting an acid solution containing plutonium in the tetravalent state and uranium in the hexavalent state with enough ammonium carbonate to form an alkaline solution, adding cupferron to selectlvely form plutonlum cupferrlde, then recoverlng the plutonium cupferride by extraction with a water lmmiscible organic solvent such as chloroform.

  6. Plutonium-induced lymphadenitis in beagles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dagle, G.E.; Park, J.F.

    1976-01-01

    Plutonium oxide particles accumulate in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of beagles exposed by inhalation and in the popliteal lymph nodes after subcutaneous injection in the hind paws. The sequence of histopathologic changes after phagocytosis of particles included necrosis, increased numbers of macrophages, and fibroplasia. Scar tissue eventually replaced the normal architecture of the lymph nodes and sequestered the plutonium particles from surrounding parenchyma. Electron microscopy showed that plutonium particles were aggregated in phagolysosomes of macrophages

  7. Safe handling of plutonium in research laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The training film illustrates the main basic requirements for the safe handling of small amounts of plutonium. The film is intended not only for people setting up plutonium research laboratories but also for all those who work in existing plutonium research laboratories. It was awarded the first prize in the category ''Protection of Workers'' at the international film festival organized by the 4th World Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) in Paris in April 1977

  8. How electroshock weapons kill!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  9. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Oil (called by some black gold has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and seven major transnational oil companies decided the amount of oil that will be produced. Meanwhile the world region with the largest oil exports were more strongly expressed nationalism and decolonization. Result, it was so in the late 60s in the region occur independent states. They have created an organization aim of this resource to their advantage - OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus since 1973 there have been changes in the international regime governing oil field, namely producing countries were fixed production rate and price. After this time the oil weapon has become increasingly important in the management of international relations. Oil influenced the great powers to Middle East conflicts that occurred in the last century, but their attitude about the emergence of new sources of oil outside OPEC. In the late 90's, Russia has become a major supplier of oil to the West.

  10. Habit Formation, Surplus Consumption and Return Predictability: International Evidence

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Engsted, Tom; Hyde, Stuart; Møller, Stig V.

    On an international post World War II dataset, we use an iterated GMM pro- cedure to estimate and test the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) habit formation model. In addition, we analyze the predictive power of the surplus consumption ratio for future asset returns. We find that, although...... there are important cross-country differences, for the majority of countries in our sample the model gets empirical support in a variety of diffrent dimensions, including reasonable estimates of risk- free rates, and the model dominates the time-separable power utility model in terms of pricing errors. Further...

  11. Westinghouse Hanford Company risk management strategy for retired surplus facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, W.E.; Coles, G.A.; Shultz, M.V.; Egge, R.G.

    1993-09-01

    This paper describes an approach that facilitates management of personnel safety and environmental release risk from retired, surplus Westinghouse Hanford Company-managed facilities during the predemolition time frame. These facilities are located in the 100 and 200 Areas of the 1,450-km 2 (570-mi 2 ) Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The production reactors are located in the 100 Area and the chemical separation facilities are located in the 200 Area. This paper also includes a description of the risk evaluation process, shows applicable results, and includes a description of comparison costs for different risk reduction options

  12. R&D Subsidies and the Surplus Appropriability Problem

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sørensen, Anders

    2005-01-01

    It may be optimal from a welfare perspective to use R&D subsidies when the source of R&D distortions originates from the surplus appropriability problem and technological spillovers in the form of knowledge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication externalities are absent. Hence, R...... or unwilling to use the level of spending required to implement the optimum policy. The argument is developed in a semi-endogenous growth model where the only distortion is monopoly pricing of intermediate goods.Keywords: R&D, policy instruments, welfare, market powerJEL: O38, O41...

  13. Two ways to handle a pension plan surplus.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beautyman, M J

    1991-01-01

    A healthcare organization wanting to tap into its pension plan surplus may be reluctant to do so for fear of Medicare recapture. By following a recent court decision and a reasonable interpretation of Medicare regulations, however, a facility may terminate an existing pension plan, purchase a group annuity contract, and reduce Medicare recapture. Two methods for treating termination of a plan are in line with Medicare rules. A facility considering termination should analyze the effects of both and use the method likely to produce a better financial result.

  14. Plutonium in a grassland ecosystem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, C.A.

    1976-08-01

    A study was made of plutonium contamination of grassland at the Rocky Flats plant northwest of Denver, Colorado. Of interest were: the definition of major plutonium-containing ecosystem compartments; the relative amounts in those compartments; how those values related to studies done in other geographical areas; whether or not the predominant isotopes, 238 Pu and 239 Pu, behaved differently; and what mechanisms might have allowed for the observed patterns of contamination. Samples of soil, litter, vegetation, arthropods, and small mammals were collected for Pu analysis and mass determination from each of two macroplots. Small aliquots (5 g or less) were analyzed by a rapid liquid scintillation technique and by alpha spectrometry. Of the compartments sampled, greater than 99 percent of the total plutonium was contained in the soil and the concentrations were significantly inversely correlated with distance from the contamination source, depth of the sample, and particle size of the sieved soil samples. The soil data suggested that the distribution of contamination largely resulted from physical transport processes

  15. Zone refining of plutonium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blau, M.S.

    1994-08-01

    The zone refining process was applied to Pu metal containing known amounts of impurities. Rod specimens of plutonium metal were melted into and contained in tantalum boats, each of which was passed horizontally through a three-turn, high-frequency coil in such a manner as to cause a narrow molten zone to pass through the Pu metal rod 10 times. The impurity elements Co, Cr, Fe, Ni, Np, U were found to move in the same direction as the molten zone as predicted by binary phase diagrams. The elements Al, Am, and Ga moved in the opposite direction of the molten zone as predicted by binary phase diagrams. As the impurity alloy was zone refined, δ-phase plutonium metal crystals were produced. The first few zone refining passes were more effective than each later pass because an oxide layer formed on the rod surface. There was no clear evidence of better impurity movement at the slower zone refining speed. Also, constant or variable coil power appeared to have no effect on impurity movement during a single run (10 passes). This experiment was the first step to developing a zone refining process for plutonium metal

  16. The Vapour Pressure of Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulford, R.N.R.

    1966-01-01

    The vapour pressure of liquid plutonium has been determined over the temperature range 1100 to 1800°K by the Knudsen effusion method. The least-squares equation which fits the data is log 10 p(atm) = -17 420/T(°K) + 4.913. The standard deviation corresponds to about ±10% in the pressures calculated from this equation. The heat of vaporization computed from the temperature dependence of the experimental data is ΔH 0 298 = 82.3 kcal/g-at. The heat computed by combining independent entropy and heat capacity data with the present measurements is ΔH 0 298 = 82.1 kcal/g-at. Effects of oxygen upon the volatility of liquid plutonium were sought by comparing the vapour pressures observed with the liquid in contact with tantalum, tantalum carbide, magnesia, and plutonium sesquioxide. No differences were found. In addition, the vapour pressure was measured with different degrees of vacuum in the system. No effect was found here either, except that in very poor vacuums a surface film of oxide apparently formed and reduced the volatility by about a factor of 2. (author) [fr

  17. NON-AQUEOUS DISSOLUTION OF MASSIVE PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Walsh, K.A.

    1959-05-12

    A method is presented for obtaining non-aqueous solutions or plutonium from massive forms of the metal. In the present invention massive plutonium is added to a salt melt consisting of 10 to 40 weight per cent of sodium chloride and the balance zinc chloride. The plutonium reacts at about 800 deg C with the zinc chloride to form a salt bath of plutonium trichloride, sodium chloride, and metallic zinc. The zinc is separated from the salt melt by forcing the molten mixture through a Pyrex filter.

  18. Biological pathways and toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metivier, H.

    1982-01-01

    After a brief description of the sources of plutonium in the environment and its physical and chemical characteristics, the following topics were studied: 1) biological pathway of plutonium leading to man by ingestion of contaminated food, by inhalation, by skin absorption and wounds in case of occupational exposure, and finally transport in organism and tissue distribution; 2) toxicity of plutonium; 3) treatment of internal contamination; 4) human exposure and its consequences including population exposure and personnel exposure, health risk. Limits on plutonium intake are discussed in the light of ICRP recommendations. (117 references) [fr

  19. Assay of low-level plutonium effluents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hsue, S.T.; Hsue, F.; Bowersox, D.F.

    1981-01-01

    In the plutonium recovery section at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, an effluent solution is generated that contains low plutonium concentration and relatively high americium concentration. Nondestructive assay of this solution is demonstrated by measuring the passive L x-rays following alpha decay. Preliminary results indicate that an average deviation of 30% between L x-ray and alpha counting can be achieved for plutonium concentrations above 10 mg/L and Am/Pu ratios of up to 3; for plutonium concentrations less than 10 mg/L, the average deviation is 40%. The sensitivity of the L x-ray assay is approx. 1 mg Pu/L

  20. An Improved Plutonium Trifluoride Precipitation Flowsheet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harmon, H.D.

    2001-06-26

    This report discusses results of the plutonium trifluoride two-stage precipitation study. A series of precipitation experiments was used to identify the significant process variables affecting precipitation performance. A mathematical model of the precipitation process was developed which is based on the formation of plutonium fluoride complexes. The precipitation model relates all process variables, in a single equation, to a single parameter which can be used to control the performance of the plutonium trifluoride precipitation process. Recommendations have been made which will optimize the FB-Line plutonium trifluoride precipitation process.