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Sample records for surplus plutonium disposition

  1. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  2. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  3. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. Volume 2 contains the appendices to the report and describe the following: Federal Register notices; contractor nondisclosure statement; adjunct melter

  4. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel

  5. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume includes background information; purpose of and need for the proposed action; alternatives for disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium; and

  6. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume has chapters on environmental consequences; environmental regulations, permits, and consultations; a glossary; list of preparers; distribution list

  7. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering and Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone and Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process

  8. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    N/A

    1999-05-14

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested

  9. Multi-attribute evaluation and choice of alternatives for surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition at uncertainty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosterev, V.V.; Bolyatko, V.V.; Khajretdinov, S.I.; Averkin, A.N.

    2014-01-01

    The problem of surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition is formalized as a multi-attribute problem of a choice of alternatives from a set of possible alternatives under fuzzy conditions. Evaluation and ordering of alternatives for the surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition and sensitivity analysis are carried out at uncertainty [ru

  10. Surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. Public scoping meeting: Comment summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S ampersand D PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229) on January 14, 1997. In that Record of Decision, DOE stated its decision to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and irradiating the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing reactors, while reserving the option to immobilize all the surplus weapons plutonium. The Department also decided that the extent to which either or both of these disposition approaches would ultimately be deployed would depend in part upon future National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review for surplus weapons plutonium disposition. On May 22, 1997, DOE published in the Federal Register (62 FR 28013) a Notice of Intent to prepare an environmental impact statement (tiered from the S ampersand D PEIS) on the disposition of United States' surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The purpose of the Notice of Intent was to describe DOE's proposed action, to solicit public input, and to announce the schedule for the public scoping meetings. During the public scoping period (May 22 - July 22, 1997), the public was invited to submit written comments by U.S. mail, fax, or through the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's Website, as well as to provide oral comments by voicemail or by participating in public scoping meetings. Written and oral comments on the scope of the SPD EIS that were submitted during the formal comment period have been uniquely identified and have become part of the official record. This is the case whether the comments were submitted via U.S. mail, fax, website, toll-free telephone number, or through participation at a public scoping meeting

  11. Fuel qualification issues and strategies for reactor-based surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Copeland, G.L.; Moses, D.L.

    1997-08-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed irradiation of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial reactors as a disposition method for surplus plutonium from the weapons program. The burning of MOX fuel in reactors is supported by an extensive technology base; however, the infrastructure required to implement reactor-based plutonium disposition does not exist domestically. This report identifies and examines the actions required to qualify and license weapons-grade (WG) plutonium-based MOX fuels for use in domestic commercial light-water reactors (LWRs)

  12. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required

  13. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  14. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-01-01

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site

  15. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement

  16. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  17. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule

  18. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports (DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively). At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity

  19. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  20. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C.; Edmunds, T.

    1997-01-01

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs

  1. Discussions on JNC roles and issues on management and disposition of surplus plutonium from the dismantlement of nuclear warhead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-04-01

    Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and Russian Federation are now promoting the collaborative project to use the fast breeder reactor of BN-600 for the Russian surplus plutonium under the framework of the bilateral agreement on peaceful use of atomic energy. Based upon this background, JNC organized a study group to survey the world aspect on surplus plutonium resulting in START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The study group, including technical experts and also experts on international affairs, made a report after their survey and gave wide range discussion on various issues. The surplus plutonium of Russian Federation was estimated to be 102 - 136 tones. There were shortages of back end technologies in Russian infrastructures for dismantling, reprocessing and disposition of the surplus plutonium. A supporting leadership of USA to Russian Federation met some difficulties due to the strategic gap between both countries. One of the examples is the temporal evolution of USA attitude toward the CANDU (thermal power reactors of Canadian design characterized by heavy water moderator, pressure tube construction, and on-power refuelling) option to use surplus plutonium as MOX (Mixed OXide) fuels. Additional supports from the G8 (Group of eight) countries except USA and Russian Federation came up to their expectation. For examples, the joint group of French, German and Russian is promoting DEMOX (Demonstration of MOX fuel) project but is on the way to discussion depending on various thoughts about mutual benefits. Many issues remained in joint project with CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), such as safeguard, nonproliferation, energy supply and demand, and environmental impacts. In addition, public opinions will give some impacts to policy makers, especially in USA. This report had analyzed many viewpoints for technical and political issues on surplus plutonium in the world, and pointed out consequences, merits and demerits after possible many

  2. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program

  3. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  4. The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapons plutonium as spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.; Kalashnikov, A.; Pavlovichev, A.

    1997-09-01

    In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years

  5. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO 2 and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program

  6. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program

  7. Disposal of Surplus Weapons Grade Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, H.; Gottlieb, P.

    2000-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of inventories of surplus US weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium as well as providing, technical support for, and ultimate implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian plutonium. On January 4, 2000, the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to dispose of up to 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium using two methods. Up to 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans and embedded in large canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository. Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to fabricate MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel, having less than 5% plutonium-239 as the primary fissile material in a uranium-235 carrier matrix). The MOX fuel will be used to produce electricity in existing domestic commercial nuclear reactors. This paper reports the major waste-package-related, long-term disposal impacts of the two waste forms that would be used to accomplish this mission. Particular emphasis is placed on the possibility of criticality. These results are taken from a summary report published earlier this year

  8. Plutonium Disposition by Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gould, T.; DiSabatino, A.; Mitchell, M.

    2000-01-01

    The ultimate goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize between 17 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials in waste forms that meet the ''spent fuel'' standard and are acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. Using the ceramic can-in-canister technology selected for immobilization, surplus plutonium materials will be chemically combined into ceramic forms which will be encapsulated within large canisters of high level waste (HLW) glass. Deployment of the immobilization capability should occur by 2008 and be completed within 10 years. In support of this goal, the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) is conducting development and testing (D and T) activities at four DOE laboratories under the technical leadership of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Savannah River Site has been selected as the site for the planned Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP). The D and T effort, now in its third year, will establish the technical bases for the design, construction, and operation of the U. S. capability to immobilize surplus plutonium in a suitable and cost-effective manner. Based on the D and T effort and on the development of a conceptual design of the PIP, automation is expected to play a key role in the design and operation of the Immobilization Plant. Automation and remote handling are needed to achieve required dose reduction and to enhance operational efficiency

  9. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  10. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-01-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium

  11. Initial data report in response to the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement data call for the UO2 supply. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, V.S.; Cash, J.M.; Michelhaugh, R.D.

    1997-11-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. This is one of several responses to data calls generated to provide background information on activities associated with the operation of the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. Urania feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility may be either natural or depleted. Natural uranium typically contains 0.0057 wt% 234 U, 0.711 wt% 235 U, and the majority as 238 U. The fissile isotope is 235 U, and uranium is considered depleted if the total 235 U content is less than 0.711 wt% as found in nature. The average composition of 235 U in DOE's total depleted urania inventory is 0.20 wt%. The depleted uranium assay range proposed for use in this program is 0.2500--0.2509 wt%. Approximately 30% more natural uranium would be required than depleted uranium based on the importance of maintaining a specific fissile portion in the MOX fuel blend. If the uranium component constitutes a larger quantity of fissile material, less plutonium can be dispositioned on an annual basis. The percentage composition, referred to as assay, of low-enriched uranium necessary for controlled fission in commercial light-water nuclear power reactors is 1.8--5.0 wt% 235 U. This data report provides information on the schedule, acquisition, impacts, and conversion process for using uranium, derived from depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), as the diluent for the weapons-grade plutonium declared as surplus. The case analyzed is use of depleted UF 6 in storage at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, being transported to a representative UF 6 to uranium dioxide conversion facility (GE Nuclear Energy) for processing, and subsequently transported to the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

  12. Disposition of surplus fissile materials via immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Sutcliffe, W.G.; McKibben, J.M.; Danker, W.

    1995-01-01

    In the Cold War aftermath, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, the USDOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One disposition alternative being considered is immobilization. Immobilization is a process in which surplus Pu would be embedded in a suitable material to produce an appropriate form for ultimate disposal. To arrive at an appropriate form, we first reviewed published information on HLW immobilization technologies to identify forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multi-attribute utility analysis to determine promising technologies for Pu immobilization. We further evaluated the most promising immobilization families to identify and seek solutions for chemical, chemical engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems; these problems remain to be solved before we can make technical decisions about the viability of using the forms for long-term disposition of Pu. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in Summer of 1996

  13. 75 FR 41850 - Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-19

    ... and packaging capabilities, including direct metal oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage..., disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility...

  14. Safe disposal of surplus plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gong, W. L.; Naz, S.; Lutze, W.; Busch, R.; Prinja, A.; Stoll, W.

    2001-06-01

    About 150 tons of weapons grade and weapons usable plutonium (metal, oxide, and in residues) have been declared surplus in the USA and Russia. Both countries plan to convert the metal and oxide into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors. Russia has not yet decided what to do with the residues. The US will convert residues into a ceramic, which will then be over-poured with highly radioactive borosilicate glass. The radioactive glass is meant to provide a deterrent to recovery of plutonium, as required by a US standard. Here we show a waste form for plutonium residues, zirconia/boron carbide (ZrO 2/B 4C), with an unprecedented combination of properties: a single, radiation-resistant, and chemically durable phase contains the residues; billion-year-old natural analogs are available; and criticality safety is given under all conceivable disposal conditions. ZrO 2/B 4C can be disposed of directly, without further processing, making it attractive to all countries facing the task of plutonium disposal. The US standard for protection against recovery can be met by disposal of the waste form together with used reactor fuel.

  15. A methodology for the analysis and selection of alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, April 1, 1995--June 30, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulder, R.

    1995-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is currently involved in the development of a comprehensive approach to the long-term storage and disposition of fissile materials. A major objective of this effort is to provide a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This will entail both the elimination of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and the insurance of the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is supporting an Interagency Working Group that has initiated a comprehensive review of alternatives for plutonium disposition which takes into account non-proliferation, economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. These alternatives were identified by the development of screening criteria as a guide to the selection of alternatives that best achieve the fissile nuclear material long-term storage and disposition goals of the US Government

  16. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-03-05

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

  17. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; McKibben, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    The safe management of surplus weapons plutonium is a very important and urgent task with profound environmental, national and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Police Directive 13 and various analysis by renown scientific, technical and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths forward for the long term disposition of surplus weapons usable plutonium. The central, overarching goal is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons, as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in civilian spent reactor fuel. One disposition alternative considered for surplus Pu is immobilization, in which plutonium would be emplaced in glass, ceramic or glass-bonded zeolite. This option, along with some of the progress over the last year is discussed

  18. Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide upper level guidance for the program that will downblend surplus highly enriched uranium for use as commercial nuclear reactor fuel or low-level radioactive waste. The intent of this document is to outline the overall mission and program objectives. The document is also intended to provide a general basis for integration of disposition efforts among all applicable sites. This plan provides background information, establishes the scope of disposition activities, provides an approach to the mission and objectives, identifies programmatic assumptions, defines major roles, provides summary level schedules and milestones, and addresses budget requirements

  19. Plutonium dispositioning in CANDU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boczar, P.G.; Feinroth, H.; Luxat, J.C.

    1995-07-01

    Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to evaluate salient technical, strategic, schedule, and cost-related parameters of using CANDU reactors for dispositioning of weapons-grade plutonium in the form of Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel. A study team, consisting of key staff from the CANDU reactor designers and researchers (AECL), operators (Ontario Hydro) and fuel suppliers, analyzed all significant factors involved in such application, with the objective of identifying an arrangement that would permit the burning of MOX in CANDU at the earliest date. One of Ontario Hydro's multi-unit stations, Bruce A nuclear generating station (4x769 MW(e)), was chosen as the reference for the study. The assessment showed that no significant modifications of reactor or process systems are necessary to operate with a full MOX core. Plant modifications would be limited to fuel handling and modifications necessary to accommodate enhanced security and safeguards requirements. No safety limitations were identified

  20. Beating swords into plowshares. [Surplus plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon.

    With the end of the Cold War and the consequent dismantling of United States and Russian nuclear weapons, comes the problem of what to do with the plutonium and highly enriched uranium thus produced. This surplus fissile material could pose a national and international security hazard and recent studies have stresses the need for mutual and cooperative monitoring of fissile material stocks. Long term proposals for disposal, such as burning the plutonium in nuclear plants, vitrifying it into high-level waste glass logs and burying it in deep boreholes in the Earth's surface are all considered with respect to safety and economic viability. (UK).

  1. 50 CFR 30.2 - Disposition of surplus range animals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Disposition of surplus range animals. 30.2... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM RANGE AND FERAL ANIMAL MANAGEMENT Range Animals § 30.2 Disposition of surplus range animals. Disposition shall be made only during regularly scheduled disposal...

  2. History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE's record of decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

    1997-04-01

    This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives

  3. Plutonium Disposition Now exclamation point

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.

    1995-01-01

    A means for use of existing processing facilities and reactors for plutonium disposition is described which requires a minimum capital investment and allows rapid implementation. The scenario includes interim storage and processing under IAEA control, and fabrication into MOX fuel in existing or planned facilities in Europe for use in operating reactors in the two home countries. Conceptual studies indicate that existing Westinghouse four-loop designs can safety dispose of 0.94 MT of plutonium per calendar year. Thus, it would be possible to consume the expected US excess stockpile of about 50 MT in two to three units of this type, and it is highly likely that a comparable amount of the FSU excess plutonium could be deposed of in a few VVER-1000's. The only major capital project for this mode of plutonium disposition would be the weapons-grade plutonium processing which could be done in a dedicated international facility or using existing facilities in the US and FSU under IAEA control. This option offers the potential for quick implementation at a very low cost to the governments of the two countries

  4. Waste forms for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.G.; O'Holleran, T.P.; Frank, S.M.; Meyer, M.K.; Hanson, M.; Staples, B.A.; Knecht, D.A.; Kong, P.C.

    1997-01-01

    The field of plutonium disposition is varied and of much importance, since the Department of Energy has decided on the hybrid option for disposing of the weapons materials. This consists of either placing the Pu into mixed oxide fuel for reactors or placing the material into a stable waste form such as glass. The waste form used for Pu disposition should exhibit certain qualities: (1) provide for a suitable deterrent to guard against proliferation; (2) be of minimal volume, i.e., maximize the loading; and (3) be reasonably durable under repository-like conditions. This paper will discuss several Pu waste forms that display promising characteristics

  5. Derivation of plutonium-239 materials disposition categories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brough, W.G.

    1995-01-01

    At this time, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition within the DOE, is assessing alternatives for the disposition of excess fissile materials. To facilitate the assessment, the Plutonium-Bearing Materials Feed Report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program Alternatives report was written. The development of the material categories and the derivation of the inventory quantities associated with those categories is documented in this report

  6. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance

  7. A preliminary analysis of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternative deployment schedules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zurn, R.M.

    1997-09-01

    This paper discusses the preliminary analysis of the implementation schedules of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives. These schedule analyses are a part of a larger process to examine the nine decision criteria used to determine the most appropriate method of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium. The preliminary analysis indicates that the mission durations for the reactor-based alternatives range from eleven years to eighteen years and the initial mission fuel assemblies containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium could be loaded into the reactors between nine and fourteen years after the Record of Decision

  8. Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition: Opportunities, Options, and Issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, S.R.

    1999-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U. S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s, with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s--1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium--and favorable fuel performance was observed--the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modern fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway

  9. Reactor-based plutonium disposition: Opportunities, options, and issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, S.

    2000-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U.S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s-1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium - and favorable fuel performance was observed - the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modem fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway. (author)

  10. Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, K.L.

    1994-01-01

    This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified

  11. Repository and deep borehole disposition of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1996-02-01

    Control and disposition of excess weapons plutonium is a growing issue as both the US and Russia retire a large number of nuclear weapons> A variety of options are under consideration to ultimately dispose of this material. Permanent disposition includes tow broad categories: direct Pu disposal where the material is considered waste and disposed of, and Pu utilization, where the potential energy content of the material is exploited via fissioning. The primary alternative to a high-level radioactive waste repository for the ultimate disposal of plutonium is development of a custom geologic facility. A variety of geologic facility types have been considered, but the concept currently being assessed is the deep borehole

  12. An alternative plutonium disposition method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kueppers, C.

    2002-01-01

    This paper provides a feasibility study on vitrification of plutonium with high active waste concentrate, and fabrication of MOX fuel rods for direct final disposal. These are potential alternatives to the direct use of MOX fuel in a reactor. (author)

  13. Regulatory issues for deep borehole plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1995-03-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. Issues of concern include the regulatory, statutory and policy status of such a facility, the availability of sites with desirable characteristics and the technologies required for drilling deep holes, characterizing them, emplacing excess plutonium and sealing the holes. This white paper discusses the regulatory issues. Regulatory issues concerning construction, operation and decommissioning of the surface facility do not appear to be controversial, with existing regulations providing adequate coverage. It is in the areas of siting, licensing and long term environmental protection that current regulations may be inappropriate. This is because many current regulations are by intent or by default specific to waste forms, facilities or missions significantly different from deep borehole disposition of excess weapons usable fissile material. It is expected that custom regulations can be evolved in the context of this mission

  14. The approaching plutonium surplus: a Japanese/European predicament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkhout, F.; Suzuki, Tatsujiro; Walker, W.

    1990-01-01

    The vision of cheap energy independence through civil nuclear power has faded in the late 1980s as the costs of nuclear programmes have come to light. But present nuclear plans in Japan, France and Britain are set to produce quantities of plutonium in the 1990s which, the authors argue, will be surplus to requirements and very difficult to use. The over-production of plutonium will pose political and security problems - particularly for Japan, which owns large stocks of separated plutonium in Europe that it may not be able to bring back home. Nuclear strategy in Japan and Europe needs to be rethought if serious international problems are to be avoided. (author)

  15. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.

    1995-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, DOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of plutonium (Pu) in keeping with the national policy that Pu must be subjected to the highest standards of safety, security, and accountability. One alternative being considered is immobilization. To arrive at a suitable immobilization form, the authors first reviewed published information on high-level waste (HLW) immobilization technologies in order to identify 72 possible Pu immobilization forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multiattribute analysis to determine the most promising technologies. Promising immobilization families were further evaluated to identify chemical, engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems that remain to be solved prior to making technical decisions as to the viability of using the form for long-term disposition of plutonium. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Project Office to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in the fourth quarter of FY96

  16. Long-term criticality safety concerns associated with surplus fissile material disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, J.S.

    1995-01-01

    A substantial inventory of surplus fissile material would result from ongoing and planned dismantlement of US and Russian nuclear weapons. This surplus fissile material could be dispositioned by irradiation in nuclear reactors, and the resulting spent MOx fuel would be similar in radiation characteristics to regular LWR spent UO2 fuel. The surplus fissile material could also be immobilized into high-level waste forms, such as borosilicate glass, synroc, or metal-alloy matrix. The MOx spent fuel, or the immobilized waste forms, could then be directly disposed of in a geologic repository. Long-term criticality safety concerns arise because the fissile contents (i.e., Pu-239 and its decay daughter U-235) in these waste forms are higher than in LWR spent UO2 fuel. MOx spent fuel could contain 3 to 4 wt% of reactor-grade plutonium, compared to only 0.9 wt% of plutonium in LWR spent UO2 fuel. At some future time (tens of thousand of years), when the waste forms had deteriorated due to intruding groundwater, the water could mix with the long-lived fissile materials to form into a critical system. If the critical system is self-sustaining, somewhat like the natural-occurring reactor in OKLO, fission products produced could readily be available for dissolution and release out to the accessible environment, adversely affecting public health and safety. This paper will address ongoing activities to evaluate long-term criticality safety concerns associated with disposition of fissile material in a geologic setting. Issues to be addressed include the identification of a worst-case water-intrusion scenario and waste-form geometries which present the most concern for long-term criticality safety; and suggests of technical solutions for such concerns

  17. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  18. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S.

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition

  19. Disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium: Draft environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-10-01

    This document assesses the environmental impacts at four potential sites that may result from alternatives for the disposition of United States-origin weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) that has been or may be declared surplus to national defense or defense-related program needs. In addition to the no action alternative, it assesses four alternatives that would eliminate the weapons-usability of HEU by blending it with depleted uranium, natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU) to create low-enriched uranium, either as commercial reactor fuel feedstock or as low-level radioactive waste. The potential blending sites are DOE's Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services Fuel Fabrication Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. Evaluations of impacts on site infrastructure, water resources, air quality and noise, socioeconomic resources, waste management, public and occupational health, and environmental justice for the potential blending sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed. The preferred alternative is to blend down surplus HEU to LEU for maximum commercial use as reactor fuel feed which would likely be done at a combination of DOE and commercial sites

  20. Performance assessment of DOE spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duguid, J.O.; Vallikat, V.; McNeish, J.

    1998-01-01

    Yucca Mountain, in southern Nevada, is under consideration by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as a potential site for the disposal of the nation's radioactive wastes in a geologic repository. The wastes consist of commercial spent fuel, DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF), high level waste (HLW), and surplus plutonium. The DOE was mandated by Congress in the fiscal 1997 Energy and Water Appropriations Act to complete a viability assessment (VA) of the repository in September of 1998. The assessment consists of a preliminary design concept for the critical elements of the repository, a total system performance assessment (TSPA), a plan and cost estimate for completion of the license application, and an estimate of the cost to construct and operate the repository. This paper presents the results of the sensitivity analyses that were conducted to examine the behavior of DOE SNF and plutonium waste forms in the environment of the base case repository that was modeled for the TSPA-VA. Fifteen categories of DOE SNF and two Plutonium waste forms were examined and their contribution to radiation dose to humans was evaluated

  1. U.S. weapons-usable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woods, A.L. [ed.] [Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, TX (United States); Gonzalez, V.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Dept. of Political Science

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

  2. Disposition of PUREX facility tanks D5 and E6 uranium and plutonium solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harty, D.P.

    1993-12-01

    Approximately 9 kilograms of plutonium and 5 metric tons of uranium in a 1 molar nitric acid solution are being stored in two PUREX facility vessels, tanks D5 and E6. The plutonium was accumulated during cleanup activities of the plutonium product area of the PUREX facility. Personnel at PUREX recently completed a formal presentation to the Surplus Materials Peer Panel (SMPP) regarding disposition of the material currently in these tanks. The peer panel is a group of complex-wide experts who have been chartered by EM-64 (Office of Site and Facility Transfer) to provide a third party independent review of disposition decisions. The information presented to the peer panel is provided in the first section of this report. The panel was generally receptive to the information provided at that time and the recommendations which were identified

  3. U.S. weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, A.L.; Gonzalez, V.L.

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective

  4. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    The US Department of Energy office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD) has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted by DOE/MD and its national laboratory contractors. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. A secondary intent of the paper is to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact cost and schedule. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost-estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs

  5. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 1: Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parks, D.L.; Sauerbrun, T.J.

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate dispositioning options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) assisted NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the dispositioning options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. Additionally, the INEL investigated the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing light water reactors and provided a preconceptual analysis for a reactor specifically designed for destruction of weapons-grade plutonium. This four-volume report was prepared for NAS to document the findings of these studies. Volume 2 evaluates 12 plutonium dispositioning options. Volume 3 considers a concept for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power-density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that quickly destroys plutonium without using uranium or thorium. This reactor concept does not produce electricity and has no other mission than the destruction of plutonium. Volume 4 addresses neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and fuel performance and compatibility issues for zirconium-plutonium oxide fuels and aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels. This volumes gives summaries of Volumes 2--4

  6. Decision model for evaluating reactor disposition of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmunds, T.

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy is currently considering a range of technologies for disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Use of plutonium fuel in fission reactors to generate spent fuel is one class of technology options. This report describes the inputs and results of decision analyses conducted to evaluate four evolutionary/advanced and three existing fission reactor designs for plutonium disposition. The evaluation incorporates multiple objectives or decision criteria, and accounts for uncertainty. The purpose of the study is to identify important and discriminating decision criteria, and to identify combinations of value judgments and assumptions that tend to favor one reactor design over another

  7. Surplus weapons-grade plutonium: a resource for exploring and terraforming Mars

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Muscatello, A.C.; Houts, M.G.

    1996-12-31

    With the end of the Cold War, greater than 100 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) have become surplus to defense needs in the United States and the Former Soviet Union. This paper is a proposal for an option for WGPu disposition, i.e., use of the plutonium as a fuel for nuclear reactors for Mars exploration and eventual terraforming. WGPu was used in nuclear weapons because it has a much smaller critical mass than highly enriched uranium, allowing lighter weapons with consequent longer ranges. Similarly, WGPu reactors would also require smaller amounts of fuel to attain a critical mass, making the reactor much lighter overall and resulting in large savings in launch costs. The greater than 100 MT of WGPu would generate about 1000 billion kilowatt hours of heat energy, much of which could be converted into electricity. The waste heat would also be useful to a Martian outpost or colony. A potential way of getting the WGPu reactors into space is a large gas gun like that being developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to orbit materials by achieving high velocity at the surface, greatly reducing launch costs and enhancing reliability. Reactor components would be launched on conventional rockets or space shuttles, the reactor fuel rods would be injected into orbit using the gas gun, and the reactor would be assembled in space. Implementation of this proposal would allow disposition of a serious, expensive problem on earth by removing the WGPu from the planet and simultaneously provide a very large energy resource for Mars exploration and terraforming.

  8. Surplus weapons-grade plutonium: a resource for exploring and terraforming Mars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muscatello, A.C.; Houts, M.G.

    1996-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, greater than 100 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) have become surplus to defense needs in the United States and the Former Soviet Union. This paper is a proposal for an option for WGPu disposition, i.e., use of the plutonium as a fuel for nuclear reactors for Mars exploration and eventual terraforming. WGPu was used in nuclear weapons because it has a much smaller critical mass than highly enriched uranium, allowing lighter weapons with consequent longer ranges. Similarly, WGPu reactors would also require smaller amounts of fuel to attain a critical mass, making the reactor much lighter overall and resulting in large savings in launch costs. The greater than 100 MT of WGPu would generate about 1000 billion kilowatt hours of heat energy, much of which could be converted into electricity. The waste heat would also be useful to a Martian outpost or colony. A potential way of getting the WGPu reactors into space is a large gas gun like that being developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to orbit materials by achieving high velocity at the surface, greatly reducing launch costs and enhancing reliability. Reactor components would be launched on conventional rockets or space shuttles, the reactor fuel rods would be injected into orbit using the gas gun, and the reactor would be assembled in space. Implementation of this proposal would allow disposition of a serious, expensive problem on earth by removing the WGPu from the planet and simultaneously provide a very large energy resource for Mars exploration and terraforming

  9. CANDU - a versatile reactor for plutonium disposition or actinide burning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, P.S.W.; Gagnon, M.J.N.; Boczar, P.G.; Ellis, R.J.; Verrall, R.A.

    1997-10-01

    High neutron economy, on-line refuelling, and a simple fuel-bundle design result in a high degree of versatility in the use of the CANDU reactor for the disposition of weapons-derived plutonium and for the annihilation of long-lived radioactive actinides, such as plutonium, neptunium, and americium isotopes, created in civilian nuclear power reactors. Inherent safety features are incorporated into the design of the bundles carrying the plutonium and actinide fuels. This approach enables existing CANDU reactors to operate with various plutonium-based fuel cycles without requiring major changes to the current reactor design. (author)

  10. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0 2 plant design is discussed here

  11. The disposition of weapon grade plutonium: costs and tradeoffs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weida, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper explores some of the economic issues surrounding a major area of expenditures now facing the nuclear powers: the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium either through 'burning' in nuclear reactors for power generation or by other means. Under the current budgeting philosophy in the United States, programs managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) tend to compete with one another for the total funds assigned to that agency. For example, in the FY1995 DOE budget a tradeoff was made between increased funding for nuclear weapons and reduced funding for site cleanup. No matter which disposition alternative is chosen, if disposition funds are controlled by the DOE in the US or by a government agency in any other country, disposition is likely to compete directly or indirectly with other alternatives for energy funding. And if they are subsidized by any government, research into plutonium as reactor fuel or the operations associated with such use are likely to consume funds that might otherwise be available to support sustainable energy alternatives. When all costs are considered, final waste disposal costs will be incurred whatever disposal option is taken. These costs could potentially be offset by doing something profitable with the plutonium prior to final storage, but this paper has shown that finding a profitable use for plutonium is unlikely. Thus, the more probable case is one where the costs of basic waste storage are increased by whatever costs are associated with the disposition option chosen. The factors most likely to significantly increase costs appear to arise from four areas: (1) The level of subsidization in the 'profitable' parts of the disposition program. (2) Those items (such as reprocessing) that increase the volume of waste and thus, the cost of waste disposal. (3) The cost of security and its direct relationship to the number of times plutonium is handled or moved. (4) The cost of research and development of new and unproven methods of

  12. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO 2 -ZrO 2 -CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO 2 ) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er 2 O 3 ) or europium oxide (Eu 2 O 3 ) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl 4 -Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams

  13. Optimization and implementation study of plutonium disposition using existing CANDU Reactors. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-09-01

    Since early 1994, the Department of Energy has been sponsoring studies aimed at evaluating the merits of disposing of surplus US weapons plutonium as Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water reactors, known as CANDU's. The first report, submitted to DOE in July, 1994 (the 1994 Executive Summary is attached), identified practical and safe options for the consumption of 50 to 100 tons of plutonium in 25 years in some of the existing CANDU reactors operating the Bruce A generating station, on Lake Huron, about 300 km north east of Detroit. By designing the fuel and nuclear performance to operate within existing experience and operating/performance envelope, and by utilizing existing fuel fabrication and transportation facilities and methods, a low cost, low risk method for long term plutonium disposition was developed. In December, 1995, in response to evolving Mission Requirements, the DOE requested a further study of the CANDU option with emphasis on more rapid disposition of the plutonium, and retaining the early start and low risk features of the earlier work. This report is the result of that additional work

  14. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy

  15. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements

  16. PRISM reactor. An option for plutonium disposition?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fehlinger, Sebastian; Friess, Friederike; Kuett, Moritz [IANUS, Technische Universitaet Darmstadt (Germany)

    2015-07-01

    The Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) is sodium cooled fast reactor model. The energy output depends on the core configuration, however with an energy output of approximately 300 MWe, the PRISM reactor belongs to the class of small modular reactors. Beside using the reactor as a breeder reactor or for the transmutation of nuclear waste, it might also be used as a burner reactor for separated plutonium. This includes for example U.S.-American excess weapon-grade plutonium as well as separated reactor-grade plutonium. Recently, there has been an ongoing discussion in GB to use the PRISM reactor to dispose their excess civilian plutonium. Depending on the task, the core configuration varies slightly. We will present different layouts and the matching MCNP models, these models can then be used to conduct depletion calculations. From these results, analysis of the change in the plutonium isotopics in the spent fuel, the amount of fissioned plutonium, and the possible annual plutonium throughputs is possible.

  17. Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Delegard, Calvin H. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jones, Susan A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-05-07

    This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used to recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste–type compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium’s chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers

  18. The Minatom concept of surplus weapons plutonium utilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yegorov, N.N.; Bogdan, V.V.; Kagramanian, V.S.

    1996-01-01

    The fuel cycle industry in Russia has necessary basis and experience to begin solving problems of ensuring safe utilisation of weapons plutonium. Russian concept of plutonium management (both civil and military) is based on the fuel cycle closing in the nuclear power industry to increase the efficiency of the fuel use and decrease the activity of the long lived waste. Short term program of plutonium management in Russia includes safe and reliable storage of weapons and separated civil plutonium until they are used in reactors. Further studies are needed concerning optimal use of MOX fuel in fast BN reactors as well as in WWER type reactors having in mind non-proliferation aspects, nuclear radiation safety, economics and ecology

  19. Disposition of already separated plutonium in Russia: Consideration of short- and long-term options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diakov, A.S.

    1995-01-01

    The plutonium stockpile presents a serious risk to national and international security. However, the utilization of already separated plutonium involves a complex set of political, technical, economical, and environmental problems. How Russia can best deal with all the problems associated with plutonium stockpiles is the subject of this paper. The official Russian concept of plutonium utilization views it as a valuable energy source. This concept entails the following two measures: (1) storage of both surplus weapons and civil plutonium; (2) fabrication of MOX fuel for future use in a different type of reactor: light-water reactors and fast-neutron reactors. To implement this concept, building four 800-Megawatt fast-neutron reactors and completing the construction of MOX plant is proposed. Technical and economical evaluations are being conducted on plutonium utilization in VVER-1000 reactors. When operating, these reactors (four BN-800 and seven VVER-1000) could dispose of about 9 tons of plutonium per year. But given Russia's current chaotic political and economic conditions, it seems unlikely that these plans will be carried out any time soon. Furthermore, the comparative economic analysis conducted for the different types of fuel cycles shows that due to several factors there is no economic motivation for Russia to use plutonium for fuel fabrication in the near future. These observations indicate that the real question that needs to be answered is what priority needs to be placed on short-, medium-, and long-term to identify and choose between different disposition options? This question is easily answered when one considers the currently turbulent political and economic situation in Russia. The priority that makes the most sense is to concentrate efforts on short-term options

  20. Weapons grade plutonium disposition in PWR, CANDU and FR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deplech, M.; Tommasi, J.; Zaetta, A.

    2000-01-01

    In the frame work of the AIDA/MOX phase I/I/ program (1994-1997) between France and Russia, the disposition of plutonium in reactors was studied. The LWR (Light Water Reactor), FR (Fast reactors), CANDU (Heavy Water Reactors), HTR (High Temperature Reactors) options for using excess dismantled weapons plutonium for peaceful commercial nuclear power generating purposes offer some advantages over the remaining options (storage). The AIDA/MOX phase 1 program covers different topics, among which are the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with weapons-grade plutonium. The conclusions are that the weapon plutonium consumption is similar in the different type of reactors. However, the use of inert matrices allows to increase the mass balance for a same denaturing level. The use of Thorium as a matrix or special isotopes to increase the proliferation resistance prove to be insufficient. (author)

  1. Preventive arms control. Case study: plutonium disposition. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    2001-01-01

    Plutonium stored in separated form poses a severe threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. While options for the disposition of military plutonium stockpiles have been studied for several years, similar work has hardly been undertaken for plutonium stockpiles in the civilian sector. In the framework of this project, the various options to dispose of stockpiles of separated plutonium in the civilian sector were to be investigated. The project was embedded in the FONAS-project network on Preventive Arms Control, and the findings of this study were to be considered for the development of a concept of Preventive Arms Control. As a first step, the internationally available information on different options for plutonium disposition (MOX-use, immobilization together with radioactive wastes, elimination) were collected and compiled to allow further assessment of the different options. For some of the options, technical questions were examined in more detail. For this purpose, neutron transport and fuel burnup calculations were performed. In particular, the analysis focused on concepts for the elimination of plutonium by the use of uranium-free fuel in existing light-water reactors, since they are particularly attractive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The calculations were performed for a reference fuel based on yttrium-stabilized zirconia, with parameters like the initial plutonium content or the use of burnable neutron poisons varying. A systematic and complete analysis of the performed calculations, however, could not be undertaken due to project time restrictions. On the basis of assessment criteria for Preventive Arms Control developed by the project network, a specific set of criteria for the assessment of the pros and cons of different plutonium disposition methods has been defined. These criteria may then be used as part of a concept of prospective technology assessment. The project findings present a starting base for a comprehensive assessment of the

  2. Disposition and transportation of surplus radioactive low specific activity nitric acid. Volume 1, Environmental Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-05-01

    DOE is deactivating the PUREX plant at Hanford; this will involve the disposition of about 692,000 liters (183,000 gallons) of surplus nitric acid contaminated with low levels of U and other radionuclides. The nitric acid, designated as low specific activity, is stored in 4 storage tanks at PUREX. Five principal alternatives were evaluated: transfer for reuse (sale to BNF plc), no action, continued storage in Hanford upgraded or new facility, consolidation of DOE surplus acid, and processing the LSA nitric acid as waste. The transfer to BNF plc is the preferred alternative. From the analysis, it is concluded that the proposed disposition and transportation of the acid does not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA; therefore an environmental impact statement is not required

  3. Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B.; Ehinger, M.; McAllister, S.; Chitaykin, V.; Ptashny, V.

    1996-01-01

    In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse

  4. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition including comparison with other nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    DOE has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. Other objectives of the paper are to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact plutonium disposition cost and schedule. Also to compare the economics of a once-through weapons-derived MOX nuclear fuel cycle to other fuel cycles, such as those utilizing spent fuel reprocessing. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs

  5. Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A

  6. Disposition of plutonium as non-fertile fuel for water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Ramsey, K.B.

    1998-01-01

    This is the final report of a three-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The original intent of this project was to investigate the possible use of a new fuel form as a means of dispositioning the declared surplus inventory of weapons-grade plutonium. The focus soon changed, however, to managing the larger and rapidly growing inventories of plutonium arising in commercial spent nuclear fuel through implementation of a new fuel form in existing nuclear reactors. LANL embarked on a parallel path effort to study fuel performance using advanced physics codes, while also demonstrating the ability to fabricate a new fuel form using standard processes in LANL's Plutonium Facility. An evolutionary fuel form was also examined which could provide enhanced performance over standard fuel forms, but which could be implemented in a much shorter time frame than a completely new fuel form. Recent efforts have focused on implementation of results into global energy models and development of follow-on funding to continue this research

  7. Disposition of plutonium-239 via production of fission molybdenum-99

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mushtaq, A., E-mail: muahtaq_a1953@hotmail.co [Isotope Production Division, Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, P.O. Nilore, Islamabad (Pakistan)

    2011-04-15

    A heritage of physical consequences of the U.S.-Soviet arms race has accumulated, the weapons-grade plutonium (WPu), which will become excess as a result of the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons under the arms reduction agreements. Disposition of Pu has been proposed by mixing WPu with high-level radioactive waste with subsequent vitrification into large, highly radioactive glass logs or fabrication into mixed oxide fuel with subsequent irradiation in existing light water reactors. A potential option may be the production of medical isotope molybdenum-99 by using Pu-239 targets.

  8. Fissile material disposition program: Screening of alternate immobilization candidates for disposition of surplus fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    1996-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, the world faces for the first time the need to dismantle vast numbers of ''excess'' nuclear weapons and dispose of the fissile materials they contain, together with fissile residues in the weapons production complex left over from the production of these weapons. If recently agreed US and Russian reductions are fully implemented, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, containing a hundred tons or more of plutonium and hundreds of tonnes* of highly enriched uranium (HEU), will no longer be needed worldwide for military purposes. These two materials are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, and limits on access to them are the primary technical barrier to prospective proliferants who might desire to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Theoretically, several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of HEU, is sufficient to make a nuclear explosive device. Therefore, these materials will continue to be a potential threat to humanity for as long as they exist

  9. Reactor based plutonium disposition - physics and fuel behaviour benchmark studies of an OECD/NEA experts group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Hondt, P.; Gehin, J.; Na, B.C.; Sartori, E.; Wiesenack, W.

    2001-01-01

    One of the options envisaged for disposing of weapons grade plutonium, declared surplus for national defence in the Russian Federation and Usa, is to burn it in nuclear power reactors. The scientific/technical know-how accumulated in the use of MOX as a fuel for electricity generation is of great relevance for the plutonium disposition programmes. An Expert Group of the OECD/Nea is carrying out a series of benchmarks with the aim of facilitating the use of this know-how for meeting this objective. This paper describes the background that led to establishing the Expert Group, and the present status of results from these benchmarks. The benchmark studies cover a theoretical reactor physics benchmark on a VVER-1000 core loaded with MOX, two experimental benchmarks on MOX lattices and a benchmark concerned with MOX fuel behaviour for both solid and hollow pellets. First conclusions are outlined as well as future work. (author)

  10. The US program for disposition of excess weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1997-01-01

    After an exhaustive interagency study, the United States has declared that 52.7 tons of plutonium, over half of its stockpile, is excess to its military needs, and has decided to pursue a dual-track approach to eliminating this excess stockpile, burning some of it once-through as power-reactor fuel, and immobilizing the remainder with intensely radioactive fission products. This effort represents a significant step toward increasing the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions and reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. The United States expects to complete disposition of this material over the next 2-3 decades, at a net discounted present cost of approximately $1.5 billion. Intemational verification and stringent security and accounting for the material are planned for the entire program

  11. A vitrification strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.B.; Simonson, S.A.

    1995-01-01

    Excess weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) presents a complex but welcome challenge to decision makers. High security is a clear priority but a host of concerns will impact US actions. Making disposition decisions based on a rigid set of criteria designed to identify an 'optimum' technology given immediate objectives and available technologies may delay Russian processing and unnecessarily limit US options. Attention should be given to near-term, verifiable options that may not provide an acceptable level of security in the long-term but nonetheless provide a material barrier to direct theft and immediate use, buying time to evaluate potential disposition technologies. Vitrification of WGPu in borosilicate glass was examined as one such alternative. Rare earth diluents were examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the mixture. Increased critical mass complicates weapon design and increases the quantity of material necessarily diverted. Europium was effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,000 yr half-life, reactivity control in the long-term could be an environmental safety issue should the glass be placed in a repository. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (assumed as a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to a standard frit (SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added element's effects on glass durability

  12. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitre, J.; Chan, P.; Dastur, A.

    1995-01-01

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs

  13. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pitre, J; Chan, P; Dastur, A [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    1996-12-31

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs.

  14. The Optimum Plutonium Inert Matrix Fuel Form for Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Wang, J.; Acosta, C.

    2004-01-01

    The University of Florida has underway an ongoing research program to validate the economic, operational and performance benefits of developing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) for the disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) and for the recycle of reprocessed Pu. The current fuel form of choice for Pu disposition for the Department of Energy is as a mixed oxide (MOX) (PuO2/UO2). We will show analyses that demonstrate that a Silicon Carbide (SiC) IMF offers improved performance capabilities as a fuel form for Pu recycle and disposition. The reason that UF is reviewing various materials to serve as an inert matrix fuel is that an IMF fuel form can offer greatly reduced Pu and transuranic isotope (TRU) production and also improved thermal performance characteristics. Our studies showed that the Pu content is reduced by an order of magnitude while centerline fuel temperatures are reduced approximately 380 degrees centigrade compared to MOX. These reduced temperatures result in reduced stored heat and thermal stresses in the pellet. The reduced stored heat reduces the consequences of the loss of coolant accident, while the reduced temperatures and thermal stresses yield greatly improved fuel performance. Silicon Carbide is not new to the nuclear industry, being a basic fuel material in gas cooled reactors

  15. Disposition of TA-33-21, a plutonium contaminated experimental facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, E.J.; Garde, R.; Valentine, A.M.

    1975-01-01

    The report discusses the decontamination, demolition and disposal of a plutonium contaminated experimental physics facility which housed physics experiments with plutonium from 1951 until 1960. The results of preliminary decontamination efforts in 1960 are reported along with health physics, waste management, and environmental aspects of final disposition work accomplished during 1974 and 1975. (auth)

  16. Reactive spark plasma synthesis of CaZrTi2O7 zirconolite ceramics for plutonium disposition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sun, Shi-Kuan; Stennett, Martin C.; Corkhill, Claire L.; Hyatt, Neil C.

    2018-03-01

    Near single phase zirconolite ceramics, prototypically CaZrTi2O7, were fabricated by reactive spark plasma sintering (RSPS), from commercially available CaTiO3, ZrO2 and TiO2 reagents, after processing at 1200 °C for only 1 h. Ceramics were of theoretical density and formed with a controlled mean grain size of 1.9 ± 0.6 μm. The reducing conditions of RSPS afforded the presence of paramagnetic Ti3+, as demonstrated by EPR spectroscopy. Overall, this study demonstrates the potential for RSPS to be a disruptive technology for disposition of surplus separated plutonium stockpiles in ceramic wasteforms, given its inherent advantage of near net shape products and rapid throughput.

  17. Preliminary process simulation and analysis of GMODS: Processing of plutonium surplus materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrada, J.J.; Nehls, J.W. Jr.; Welch, T.D.; Giardina, J.L.; Forsberg, C.W.; Maliyekkel, A.T.

    1996-01-01

    To address growing concerns in the areas of arms control, control of fissile materials, waste management, and environment and health, the US Department of Energy is studying and evaluating various options for the control and disposal of surplus fissile materials (SFMs). One of the options under consideration is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS) which directly converts plutonium-bearing materials such as metals, ceramics, and organics into a durable-high-quality glass for long-term storage or a waste form for disposal. This study undertook the development of a computer simulation of the GMODS process using FLOW. That computer simulation was used to perform an assessment of how GMODS would handle the treatment of plutonium, rich scrap (RS) and lead scrap (LS), and identify critical process parameters. Among the key process parameters affecting the glass formation were processing temperatures, additives, and the effects of varying them on the final product. This assessment looked at the quantity of glass produced, the quality of the final glass form, and the effect of blending different groups of the feed streams on the glass produced. The model also provided a way to study the current process assumptions and determine in which areas more experimental studies are required. The simulation showed that the glass chemistry postulated in the models is workable. It is expected that the glass chemistry assumed during the modeling process can be verified by the results of the laboratory experiments that are currently being conducted relating to the GMODS process.Further waste characterization, especially of the SFM waste streams not studied in this report, will provide more nearly accurate results and give a more detailed evaluation of the GMODS process

  18. Preliminary process simulation and analysis of GMODS: Processing of plutonium surplus materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferrada, J.J.; Nehls, J.W. Jr.; Welch, T.D.; Giardina, J.L.; Forsberg, C.W. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Maliyekkel, A.T. [Oak Ridge Associated Universities, TN (United States)

    1996-01-02

    To address growing concerns in the areas of arms control, control of fissile materials, waste management, and environment and health, the US Department of Energy is studying and evaluating various options for the control and disposal of surplus fissile materials (SFMs). One of the options under consideration is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS) which directly converts plutonium-bearing materials such as metals, ceramics, and organics into a durable-high-quality glass for long-term storage or a waste form for disposal. This study undertook the development of a computer simulation of the GMODS process using FLOW. That computer simulation was used to perform an assessment of how GMODS would handle the treatment of plutonium, rich scrap (RS) and lead scrap (LS), and identify critical process parameters. Among the key process parameters affecting the glass formation were processing temperatures, additives, and the effects of varying them on the final product. This assessment looked at the quantity of glass produced, the quality of the final glass form, and the effect of blending different groups of the feed streams on the glass produced. The model also provided a way to study the current process assumptions and determine in which areas more experimental studies are required. The simulation showed that the glass chemistry postulated in the models is workable. It is expected that the glass chemistry assumed during the modeling process can be verified by the results of the laboratory experiments that are currently being conducted relating to the GMODS process.Further waste characterization, especially of the SFM waste streams not studied in this report, will provide more nearly accurate results and give a more detailed evaluation of the GMODS process.

  19. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sylvester, K.W.B. [Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA (United States)

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements` effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products).

  20. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements' effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products)

  1. Deep borehole disposition of surplus fissile materials-The site selection process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heiken, G.; WoldeGabriel, G.; Morley, R.; Plannerer, H.

    1996-01-01

    One option for disposing of excess weapons plutonium is to place it near the base of deep boreholes in stable crystalline rocks. The technology exists to immediately begin the design of this means of disposition and there are many attractive sites available within the conterminous US. The borehole system utilizes mainly natural barriers to preven migration of Pu and U to the Earth's surface. Careful site selection ensures favorable geologic conditions that provide natural long-lived migration barriers; they include deep, extremely stable rock formations, strongly reducing brines that exhibit increasing salinity with depth, and most importantly, demonstrated isolation or non-communication of deep fluids with the biosphere for millions of years. This isolation is the most important characteristic, with the other conditions mainly being those that will enhance the potential of locating and maintaining the isolated zones. Candidate sites will probably be located on the craton in very old Precambrian crystalline rocks, most likely the center of a granitic pluton. The sites will be located in tectonically stable areas with no recent volcanic or seismic activity, and situated away from tectonic features that might become active in the near geologic future

  2. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

  3. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ''Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs

  4. progress on the U.S.-Russian excess weapons plutonium disposition program. Panel discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feinroth, Herb; Sicard, Bruno; Kudryavtsev, Evgeny; Sprankle, Kenneth A.; Nesbit, Steve; Gadsby, Robert; Aratani, Kiyonori

    2001-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: On September 1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed a historic agreement to each dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium by 2025, or sooner if possible. The agreement was conditional on international financing of the Russian program. The parties are now attempting to establish a specific program for disposition of the Russian plutonium and to secure commitments for international financing of the Russian program. In the United States, efforts are moving forward to design, license, and construct the necessary facilities for its disposition program. With the assistance of France and Germany, efforts are moving forward in Russia to plan and design appropriate reactor modifications as well as the needed facilities for plutonium conversion and mixed-oxide fabrication. Japan and Canada are also participants in the Russian disposition program. This panel session will review the status of actions taken to bring this agreement to fruition. (authors)

  5. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  6. Disposition of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons: Fission options and comparisons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omberg, R.P.; Walter, C.E.

    1993-01-01

    Over the next decade, the United States expects to recover about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium and the Republic of Russia expects to recover a similar amount. Ensuring that these large quantities of high-grade material are not reused in nuclear weapons has drawn considerable attention. In response to this problem, the US Department of Energy (DOE) chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force (PDTF), in the summer of 1992, to assess a range of practical means for disposition of excess US plutonium. This report summarizes and compares the ''Fission Options'' provided to the Fission Working Group Review Committee (the committee) of the PDTF. The review by the committee was based on preliminary information received as of December 4, 1992, and as such the results summarized in this report should also be considered preliminary. The committee concluded that irradiation of excess weapon plutonium in fission reactors in conjunction with the generation of electricity and storing the spent fuel is a fast, cost-effective, and environmentally acceptable method of addressing the safeguards (diversion) issue. When applied appropriately, this method is consistent with current nonproliferation policy. The principal effect of implementing the fission options is at most a moderate addition of plutonium to that existing in commercial spent fuel. The amount of plutonium in commercial spent fuel by the year 2000 is estimated to be 300 Mg. The addition of 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium, in this context, is not a determining factor, moreover, several of the fission options achieve substantial annihilation of plutonium

  7. Disposition of excess weapon grade plutonium: Status of the Russian program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diyakov, Anatoly [Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2015-07-01

    During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and United States produced huge quantities of plutonium for weapons. Substantial cuts in their nuclear arsenals released of huge amounts of weapon grade nuclear materials. This put into the agenda the problem what to do with the excess weapon materials. In 2000 Russia and the United States concluded a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), committing each to eliminate 34 tons of excess weapon plutonium. It was expected that the implementation of the PMDA Agreement will start in the second half of the year 2009 and the disposition programs finalized in 2025. But from the very beginning the practical implementation of the PMDA agreement met with substantial difficulties. After the consultations held in 2006-2007 the PMDA Agreement was modified. In compliance with the modified Agreement each side pledged to start the disposition of 34 tons of excess plutonium (25 tons in the form of metal and 9 tons in dioxide) in 2018 and to finalize the process in 15 years. Both sides were supposed to use the same disposition method through use in the MOX fuel and its subsequent irradiation in civil nuclear reactors: in light reactors for the USA and in fast neutron reactors for Russia. The presentation is going to provide the current status of the disposition program.

  8. Transportation requirements for the disposition of excess weapon plutonium by burning in fission reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovingh, J.; Walter, C.E.

    1996-01-01

    Both the US and Russia are planning to dispose of about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium over a 25-year period. One option is to transfer the plutonium to Advanced Light Water (power) Reactors (ALWRs) for use as fuel. Subsequent disposal would then be considered commercial spent fuel. This disposition option, like others, involves the transportation of plutonium in various material forms as it proceeds through various points in the recovery operation. This paper examines both the disposition option and the issues surrounding the transportation of 50 Mg of excess plutonium within the US under current regulatory and infrastructure constraints. Transportation issues include criticality control, shielding, and containment of the contents. Allowable limits on each of these issues are specified by the applicable (or selected) regulation. The composition and form of the radioactive materials to be transported will determine, in part, the applicable portions of the regulations as well as the packaging design. The regulations and the packaging design, along with safeguard and security issues, will determine the quantity of plutonium or fuel assemblies per package as well as the number of packages per shipment and the type of highway carrier. For the disposition of 50 Mg of weapon plutonium using ALWRs in a 25-year campaign, the annual shipment rates are determined for the various types of carriers

  9. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 2, Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.

  10. The disposition of civil plutonium in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sadnicki, M.J.; Barker, F.

    2001-01-01

    This paper quantifies the likely future stockpile of UK separated plutonium, and reviews current UK policy. The current strategy of storing plutonium oxide powder is shown to be inconsistent with passivity and disposability objectives. Analysis also shows that there is little potential for use on a commercial basis of Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel to reduce the stockpile. Four plutonium immobilisation options are defined, with particular reference to non-proliferation goals. The resource costs of implementing these options are quantified, together with the resource costs of a programme of Government-subsidized MOX use. Immobilisation may offer a more cost-effective solution than a MOX fuel route. (author)

  11. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  12. Options For The Disposition Of UK Civil Plutonium Stocks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, R.G.; Zimmerman, C.H.; Scales, C.; Worrall, A.; Sims, H.E.; Fowler, L. [Nexia Solutions Ltd (United Kingdom)

    2008-07-01

    The UK Civil Pu Disposition project will identify and assess the viability of several technical options for dealing with the UK's civil separated Pu stockpile and the discriminators that will support technology option down-selection decisions. The overall aim will be to deliver feasible technical options and comprehensive information on political, economic, sociological, environmental and technical factors for each strategic option. This paper briefly describes the work completed to date to assess immobilisation and re-use technologies as disposition strategies and on the work that will identify discriminators to support technology down-selection. The Pu disposition project is anticipated to continue for several years while the necessary investigations are made to fully understand the various options. The work planned over this period is discussed. (authors)

  13. Options For The Disposition Of UK Civil Plutonium Stocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, R.G.; Zimmerman, C.H.; Scales, C.; Worrall, A.; Sims, H.E.; Fowler, L.

    2008-01-01

    The UK Civil Pu Disposition project will identify and assess the viability of several technical options for dealing with the UK's civil separated Pu stockpile and the discriminators that will support technology option down-selection decisions. The overall aim will be to deliver feasible technical options and comprehensive information on political, economic, sociological, environmental and technical factors for each strategic option. This paper briefly describes the work completed to date to assess immobilisation and re-use technologies as disposition strategies and on the work that will identify discriminators to support technology down-selection. The Pu disposition project is anticipated to continue for several years while the necessary investigations are made to fully understand the various options. The work planned over this period is discussed. (authors)

  14. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  15. Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-03-01

    Consistent with the Environmental Management`s (EM`s) plan titled, ``Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure``, and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided.

  16. Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-03-01

    Consistent with the Environmental Management's (EM's) plan titled, ''Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure'', and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided

  17. 76 FR 51358 - National Nuclear Security Administration Amended Record of Decision: Disposition of Surplus...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration Amended Record of Decision... National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi- autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of... Manager, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S...

  18. GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marra, J

    2006-11-15

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs

  19. Disposition of plutonium from dismantled warheads: Belgonucleaire's proposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, D.; Vanderborck, Y.; Vandenberg, C.; Vliet, J. van

    1996-01-01

    Set up in 1957 by Union Miniere, Belgonucleaire (BN) has been working since its origin in the field of plutonium and has accumulated extensive experience in the design and fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, as well as in the fuel management and licensing of MOX cores for fast breeder reactors (FBRs), pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and boiling water reactors (BWRs). Although BN's MOX plant first went into operation in 1973 (it was used for FBRs and light water reactor (LWR) demonstration fuel fabrication), industrial production started in 1986. The MOX fuel produced (280 t heavy metal (HM) until the end of 1995) has been loaded in PWRs and BWRs in four countries in Europe: France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium. They propose the development of MOX plants as the means for disposal of plutonium from warhead disassembly

  20. Alternative technical summary report for direct disposition in deep boreholes: Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile Materials Disposition Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23

    This report summarizes and compares the Immobilized and Direct Beep Borehole Disposition Alternatives. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are briefly described, and a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  1. Life cycle costs for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.

    1999-01-01

    Projected constant dollar life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are presented for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition program being managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD). The scope of the LCC estimate includes: design, construction, licensing, operation, and deactivation of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (FFF) that will be used to purify and convert weapons-derived plutonium oxides to MOX fuel pellets and fabricate MOX fuel bundles for use in commercial pressurized-water reactors (PWRs); fuel qualification activities and modification of facilities required for manufacture of lead assemblies that will be used to qualify and license this MOX fuel; and modification, licensing, and operation of commercial PWRs to allow irradiation of a partial core of MOX fuel in combination with low-enriched uranium fuel. The baseline cost elements used for this document are the same as those used for examination of the preferred sites described in the site-specific final environmental impact statement and in the DOE Record of Decision that will follow in late 1999. Cost data are separated by facilities, government accounting categories, contract phases, and expenditures anticipated by the various organizations who will participate in the program over a 20-year period. Total LCCs to DOE/MD are projected at approximately $1.4 billion for a 33-MT plutonium disposition mission

  2. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M.

    1998-03-01

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the open-quotes spent fuel standard.close quotes One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed

  3. Fabrication of zircon for disposition of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, K.C.; Huang, J.Y.; Serrano, P.L.

    1997-01-01

    This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an effort to address the problems of long term storage and nuclear waste minimization, zircon has been proposed as a host medium for plutonium and other actinides recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. The objective of this work is to investigate the feasibility of large scale fabrication of Pu-bearing zircon. Since PuO 2 is thermodynamically less stable than ZrO 2 , it is expected that the process parameters determined for synthesizing ZrSiO 4 (zircon) would be applicable to those for PuSiO 4 (Pu-zircon). Furthermore, since the foremost concern in plutonium processing is the potential for contamination release, this work emphasizes the development of process parameters, using zircon first, to anticipate potential material problems in the containment system for reaction mixtures during processing. Stoichiometric mixtures of ZrO 2 and SiO 2 , in hundred-gram batches, have been subjected to hot isostatic pressing (HIP) at temperatures near 1,500 C and pressures approximately 10,000 psi. The product materials have been analyzed by x-ray powder diffraction, and are found to consist of zircon after approximately two hours of reaction time. From this work, it is clear that the fabrication of large quantities of Pu-zircon is feasible. The most notable result of this work is evidence for the existence of container problems. This result, in turn, suggests potential solutions to these problems. Experiments with the quartz inner container, the glass sealant, a sacrificial metal barrier, and a metal outer container are being investigated to mitigate these potential hazards

  4. GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSHILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marra, J

    2006-11-21

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs

  5. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    Following President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations

  6. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  7. Assessment of the technical viability of reactor options for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T. III.

    1996-01-01

    Various reactor concepts for the disposition of surplus Pu have been proposed by reactor vendors; not all have attained the same level of technical viability. Studies were performed to differentiate between reactor concepts by devising a quantitative index for technical viability. For a quantitative assessment, three issues required resolution: the definition of a technical maturity scale, the treatment of ''subjective'' factors which cannot be easily represented in a quantitative format, and the protocol for producing a single technical viability figure-of-merit for each alternative. Alternatives involving the use of foreign facilities were found to be the most technically viable

  8. A Mixed-Oxide Assembly Design for Rapid Disposition of Weapons Plutonium in Pressurized Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alonso, Gustavo; Adams, Marvin L.

    2002-01-01

    We have created a new mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assembly design for standard pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Design goals were to maximize the plutonium throughput while introducing the lowest perturbation possible to the control and safety systems of the reactor. Our assembly design, which we call MIX-33, offers some advantages for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium; it increases the disposition rate by 8% while increasing the worth of control material, compared to a previous Westinghouse design. The MIX-33 design is based upon two ideas: the use of both uranium and plutonium fuel pins in the same assembly, and the addition of water holes in the assembly. The main result of this paper is that both of these ideas are effective at increasing Pu throughput and increasing the worth of control material. With this new design, according to our analyses, we can transition smoothly from a full low-enriched-uranium (LEU) core to a full MIX-33 core while meeting the operational and safety requirements of a standard PWR. Given an interruption of the MOX supply, we can transition smoothly back to full LEU while meeting safety margins and using standard LEU assemblies with uniform pinwise enrichment distribution. If the MOX supply is interrupted for only one cycle, the transition back to a full MIX-33 core is not as smooth; high peaking could cause power to be derated by a few percent for a few weeks at the beginning of one transition cycle

  9. Transportation and packaging issues involving the disposition of surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in commercial LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Welch, D.E.; Best, R.E.; Schmid, S.P.

    1997-08-01

    This report provides a view of anticipated transportation, packaging, and facility handling operations that are expected to occur at mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and commercial reactor facilities. This information is intended for use by prospective contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who plan to submit proposals to DOE to manufacture and irradiate MOX fuel assemblies in domestic commercial light-water reactors. The report provides data to prospective consortia regarding packaging and pickup of MOX nuclear fuel assemblies at a MOX fuel manufacturing plant and transport and delivery of the MOX assemblies to nuclear power plants. The report also identifies areas where data are incomplete either because of the status of development or lack of sufficient information and specificity regarding the nuclear power plant(s) where deliveries will take place

  10. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made.

  11. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made

  12. MOX fuel: a contribution to disarmament. U.S. utilities' response to DOE's plutonium disposition decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallace, M.

    1997-01-01

    The author is chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute Plutonium Disposition Working Group, which includes 11 nuclear utilities, including Ontario Hydro, and all the European fabricators of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A feasibility study is going on, to see if Russian or other weapons grade plutonium made into MOX fuel can be used in US, Canadian, or other power reactors. The US nuclear power industry is going through a period of change, and its primary responsibility must be the safe, reliable and economic operation of its plants. There is no current US MOX capacity, but the Europeans have have manufactured and burned over 400 tons of MOX fuel since 1963. Canada may be involved, initially through a pilot-scale experiment in NRU reactor

  13. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the IFR closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1994-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the IFR closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode all at a constant heat rating of 840 MWt. For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode, and recycle corns using weapons material only as required for a make-up feed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium feed does not have an adverse impact on IFR core performance characteristics

  14. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the Integral Fast Reactor closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1995-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode, all at a constant heat rating of 840 MW(thermal). For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode and recycle cores using weapons material only as required for a makeup feed. In addition, the impact of alternative feeds (recycled light water reactor or liquid-metal reactor transuranics) on burner core performance is assessed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium does not have an adverse effect on IFR core performance characteristics; also, favorable performance can be maintained for a wide variety of feed materials and fuel cycle strategies

  15. Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1996-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

  16. Disposition of excess plutonium using ''off-spec'' MOX pellets as a sintered ceramic waste form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Jardine, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The authors describe a potential strategy for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium in a way that minimizes (1) technological risks, (2) implementation costs and completion schedules, and (3) requirements for constructing and operating new or duplicative Pu disposition facilities. This is accomplished by an optimized combination of (1) using existing nuclear power reactors to ''burn'' relatively pure excess Pu inventories as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and (2) using the same MOX fuel fabrication facilities to fabricate contaminated or impure excess Pu inventories into an ''off-spec'' MOX solid ceramic waste form for geologic disposition. Diversion protection for the SCWF to meet the ''spent fuel standard'' introduced by the National Academy of Sciences can be achieved in at least three ways. (1) One can utilize the radiation field from defense high-level nuclear waste by first packaging the SCWF pellets in 2- to 4-L cans that are subsequently encapsulated in radioactive glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) glass canisters (a ''can-in-canister'' approach). (2) One can add 137 Cs (recovered from defense wastes at Hanford and currently stored as CsCl in capsules) to an encapsulating matrix such as cement for the SCWF pellets in a small hot-cell facility and thus fabricate large monolithic forms. (3) The SCWF can be fabricated into reactor fuel-like pellets and placed in tubes similar to fuel assemblies, which can then be mixed in sealed repository containers with irradiated spent nuclear fuel for geologic disposition

  17. Plutonium-bearing materials feed report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brough, W.G.; Boerigter, S.T.

    1995-01-01

    This report has identified all plutonium currently excess to DOE Defense Programs under current planning assumptions. A number of material categories win clearly fan within the scope of the MD (Materials Disposition) program, but the fate of the other categories are unknown at the present time. MD planning requires that estimates be made of those materials likely to be considered for disposition actions so that bounding cases for the PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) can be determined and so that processing which may be required can be identified in considering the various alternatives. A systematic analysis of the various alternatives in reachmg the preferred alternative requires an understanding of the possible range of values which may be taken by the various categories of feed materials. One table identifies the current total inventories excess to Defense Program planning needs and represents the bounding total of Pu which may become part of the MD disposition effort for all materials, except site return weapons. The other categories, principally irradiated fuel, rich scrap, and lean scrap, are discussed. Another table summarizes the ranges and expected quantities of Pu which could become the responsibility of the MD program. These values are to be used for assessing the impact of the various alternatives and for scaling operations to assess PEIS impact. Determination of the actual materials to be included in the disposition program will be done later

  18. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  19. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

  20. Development and implementation of attractiveness Level E criteria and the plutonium disposition methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Robinson, M.A.

    1998-03-01

    Historically, the Department of Energy used the Economic Discard Limits (EDLs), those Special Nuclear Material (SNM) concentrations in residue matrices below which production of new SNM was more economic than SNM recovery, as a basis for discard decisions. In 1994, a joint team from DOE Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Management (EM) determined that the EDLs were no longer a valid discriminator and directed that SNM disposition consider instead 12 specific criteria, foremost of which are waste minimization, environmental impacts, safety, proliferation concerns, and cost. In response, the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a technical basis for determining SNM bearing materials unattractive for proliferation purposes and a quantitative method for predicting materials disposition consequences as a basis for decision making called the plutonium disposition methodology. The objective of attractiveness Level E criteria is to insure that waste is unattractive for proliferation or terrorist purposes. Level E criteria is about 0.17 kg Pu per 208 liter drum (requiring diversion of a minimum of 54 drums, assuming 100% recovery efficiency)

  1. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M.; Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included

  2. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M. Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included.

  3. X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy for the elemental analysis of plutonium-bearing materials for the materials disposition program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voit, S.L.; Boerigter, S.T.; Rising, T.L.

    1997-01-01

    The US Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) program will disposition about 50 MT of plutonium in the next century. Both of the alternative technologies for disposition, MOX Fuel and Immobilization require knowledge of the incoming composition to 1--5 wt%. Wavelength Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence (WDXRF) systems, a common elemental analysis technology with a variety of industrial applications and commercial vendors, can readily achieve this level of characterization. Since much of the excess plutonium will be packaged in a long-term storage container as part of the DOE Environmental Management (DOE-EM) program to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials, the characterization system must be implemented during the packaging process. The authors describe a preliminary design for the integration of the WDXRF system into the packaging system to be used at the Rocky Flats site. The Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS), coupled with the WDXRF characterization system will provide MD with stabilized plutonium-bearing excess material that can be more readily fed to an immobilization facility. The overall added expense to the MD program of obtaining analytical information after materials have been packaged in long-term storage containers could far exceed the expense of implementing XRF analysis during the packaging process

  4. Fissile material disposition program final immobilization form assessment and recommendation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, S.G.; Dunlop, W.H.; Edmunds, T.A.; MacLean, L.M.; Gould, T.H.

    1997-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in its role as the lead laboratory for the development of plutonium immobilization technologies for the Department of Energy's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD), has been requested by MD to recommend an immobilization technology for the disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The recommendation and supporting documentation was requested to be provided by September 1, 1997. This report addresses the choice between glass and ceramic technologies for immobilizing plutonium using the can-in-canister approach. Its purpose is to provide a comparative evaluation of the two candidate technologies and to recommend a form based on technical considerations

  5. Towards a single host phase ceramic formulation for UK plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stennett, M. C.; Hyatt, N. C.; Gilbert, M.; Livens, F. R.; Maddrell, E. R.

    2008-01-01

    The UK has a considerable stockpile of separated plutonium; a legacy of over 50 years of civilian nuclear programmes. This material has been considered both as an asset for future energy generation and a liability due to the proliferation threat. A proportion of the PuO 2 stocks may be consumed by nuclear fission, in mixed oxide (MOx) or inert matrix (IMF) fuels but a quantity of waste PuO 2 will remain which is unsuitable for fuel manufacture and will require immobilisation. A research program is currently underway to investigate the potential of various single phase ceramic formulations for the immobilisation of this waste PuO 2 fraction. In this work a number of synthetic mineral systems have been considered including titanate, zirconate, phosphate and silicate based matrices. Although a wealth of information on plutonium disposition in some of the systems exists in the literature, the data is not always directly comparable which hinders comparison between different ceramic hosts. The crux of this research has been to compile a database of information on the proposed hosts to allow impartial comparison of the relative merits and shortcomings in each system. (authors)

  6. SRS vitrification studies in support of the U.S. program for disposition of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wicks, G.G.; McKibben, J.M.; Plodinec, M.J.; Ramsey, W.G.

    1995-01-01

    Many thousands of nuclear weapons are being retired in the U.S. and Russian as a result of nuclear disarmament activities. These efforts are expected to produce a surplus of about 50 MT of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) in each country. In addition to this inventory, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has more than 20 MT of Pu scrap, residue, etc., and Russian is also believed to have at least as much of this type of material. The entire surplus Pu inventories in the U.S. and Russian present a clear and immediate danger to national and international security. It is important that a solution be found to secure and manage this material effectively and that such an effort be implemented as quickly as possible. One option under consideration is vitrification of Pu into a safe, durable, accountable and proliferation-resistant form. As a result of decades to experience within the DOE community involving vitrification of a variety of hazardous and radioactive wastes, this existing technology can now be expanded to include mobilization of large amounts of Pu. This technology can then be implemented rapidly using the many existing resources currently available. An overall strategy to vitrify many different types of Pu will be already developed throughout the waste management community can be used in a staged Pu vitrification effort. This approach uses the flexible vitrification technology already available and can even be made portable so that it may be brought to the source and ultimately, used to produce a consistent and common borosilicate glass composition for the vitrified Pu. The final composition of this product can be made similar to nationally and internationally accepted HLW glasses

  7. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 3: A new reactor concept without uranium or thorium for burning weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Schnitzler, B.G.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1993-06-01

    The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) requested that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) examine concepts that focus only on the destruction of 50,000 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. A concept has been developed by the INEL for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that destroys plutonium quickly without using uranium or thorium. This concept is very safe and could be designed, constructed, and operated in a reasonable time frame. This concept does not produce electricity. Not considering other missions frees the design from the paradigms and constraints used by proponents of other dispositioning concepts. The plutonium destruction design goal is most easily achievable with a large, moderate power reactor that operates at a significantly lower thermal power density than is appropriate for reactors with multiple design goals. This volume presents the assumptions and requirements, a reactor concept overview, and a list of recommendations. The appendices contain detailed discussions on plutonium dispositioning, self-protection, fuel types, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, off-site radiation releases, and economics

  8. Innovative inert matrix-thoria fuels for in-reactor plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vettraino, F.; Padovani, E.; Luzzi, L.; Lombardi, C.; Thoresen, H.; Oberlander, B.; Iversen, G.; Espeland, M.

    1999-01-01

    The present leading option for plutonium disposition, either civilian or weapons Pu, is to burn it in LWRs after having converted it to MOX fuel. However, among the possible types of fuel which can be envisaged to burn plutonium in LWRs, innovative U-free fuels such as inert matrix and thoria fuel are novel concept in view of a more effective and ultimate solution from both security and safety standpoint. Inert matrix fuel is an non-fertile oxide fuel consisting of PuO 2 , either weapon-grade or reactor-grade, diluted in inert oxides such as for ex. stabilized ZrO 2 or MgAl 2 O 4 , its primary advantage consisting in no-production of new plutonium during irradiation, because it does not contain uranium (U-free fuel) whose U-238 isotope is the departure nuclide for breeding Pu-239. Some thoria addition in the matrix (thoria-doped fuel) may be required for coping with reactivity feedback needs. The full thoria-plutonia fuel though still a U-free variant cannot be defined non-fertile any more because the U-233 generation. The advantage of such a fuel option consisting basically on a remarkable already existing technological background and a potential acceleration in getting rid of the Pu stocks. All U-free fuels are envisaged to be operated under a once-through cycle scheme being the spent fuel outlooked to be sent directly to the final disposal in deep geological formations without requiring any further reprocessing treatment, thanks to the quality-poor residual Pu and a very high chemical stability under the current fuel reprocessing techniques. Besides, inert matrix-thoria fuel technology is suitable for in-reactor MAs transmutation. An additional interest in Th containing fuel refers to applicability in ADS, the innovative accelerated driven subcritical systems, specifically aimed at plutonium, minor actnides and long lived fission products transmutation in a Th-fuel cycle scheme which enables to avoid generations of new TRUs. A first common irradiation experiment

  9. Update to the Fissile Materials Disposition program SST/SGT transportation estimation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John Didlake

    1999-01-01

    This report is an update to ''Fissile Materials Disposition Program SST/SGT Transportation Estimation,'' SAND98-8244, June 1998. The Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition requested this update as a basis for providing the public with an updated estimation of the number of transportation loads, load miles, and costs associated with the preferred alternative in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

  10. New glass material oxidation and dissolution system facility: Direct conversion of surplus fissile materials, spent nuclear fuel, and other material to high-level-waste glass. Storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials programmatic environmental impact statement data report: Predecisional draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Elam, K.R.; Reich, W.J.

    1995-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, countries have excess plutonium and other materials from the reductions in inventories of nuclear weapons. It has been recommended that these surplus fissile materials (SFMs) be processed so that they are no more accessible than plutonium in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This SNF standard, if adopted worldwide, would prevent rapid recovery of SFMs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This report provides for the PEIS the necessary input data on a new method for the disposition of SFMs: the simultaneous conversion of SFMs, SNF, and other highly radioactive materials into high-level-waste (HLW) glass. The SFMs include plutonium, neptunium, americium, and 233 U. The primary SFM is plutonium. The preferred SNF is degraded SNF, which may require processing before it can be accepted by a geological repository for disposal. The primary form of this SNF is Hanford-N SNF with preirradiation uranium enrichments between 0.95 and 1.08%. The final product is a plutonium, low-enriched-uranium, HLW, borosilicate glass for disposition in a geological repository. The proposed conversion process is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS), which is a new process. The initial analysis of the GMODS process indicates that a MODS facility for this application would be similar in size and environmental impact to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site. Because of this, the detailed information available on DWPF was used as the basis for much of the GMODS input into the SFMs PEIS

  11. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

  12. Disposition Options for Uranium-233

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

  13. Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

    1999-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant

  14. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in LWRs - a utility perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naughton, W.F.

    1996-01-01

    The optimal alternative for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium (WPu) is to burn it in currently operating light water reactors (LWRs). There are three key aspects associated with the reactor burn option that lead to this conclusion. They are timeliness, acceptable solution, and equity or resource recovery. The National Academy of Sciences report on this subject has thoroughly covered the first two aspects by indicating that there is open-quotes a clear and present dangerclose quotes associated with WPu - the timeliness issue. Also, the report indicates that the spent-fuel standard is the acceptable long-term solution. Both of these aspects are met by the reactor burn option as it exists today; i.e., the reactor option is both timely and obviously meets the spent-fuel standard. The equity or resource recovery aspect is based on the fact that the resources for the development and use of this material as a nuclear deterrent for the past 50 yr was supplied by, in the U.S.'s case, the taxpayers. Only the reactor burn option offers an opportunity for the partial recovery of those resources in the form of electrical energy

  15. R ampersand D plan for immobilization technologies: fissile materials disposition program. Revision 1.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, G.A.

    1996-09-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long- term fissile material management options, the Department of Energy's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) is conducting studies of options for the storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One set of alternatives for disposition involve immobilization. The immobilization alternatives provide for fixing surplus fissile materials in a host matrix in order to create a solid disposal form that is nuclear criticality-safe, proliferation-resistant and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal

  16. OFFGAS GENERATION FROM THE DISPOSITION OF SCRAP PLUTONIUM BY VITRIFICATION SIMULANT TESTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zamecnik, J; Patricia Toole, P; David Best, D; Timothy Jones, T; Donald02 Miller, D; Whitney Thomas, W; Vickie Williams, V

    2008-01-01

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management is supporting R and D for the conceptual design of the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, SC to reduce the attractiveness of plutonium scrap by fabricating a durable plutonium oxide glass form and immobilizing this form within the high-level waste glass prepared in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. A glass formulation was developed that is capable of incorporating large amounts of actinides as well as accommodating many impurities that may be associated with impure Pu feed streams. The basis for the glass formulation was derived from commercial glasses that had high lanthanide loadings. A development effort led to a Lanthanide BoroSilicate (LaBS) glass that accommodated significant quantities of actinides, tolerated impurities associated with the actinide feed streams and could be processed using established melter technologies. A Cylindrical Induction Melter (CIM) was used for vitrification of the Pu LaBS glass. Induction melting for the immobilization of americium and curium (Am/Cm) in a glass matrix was first demonstrated in 1997. The induction melting system was developed to vitrify a non-radioactive Am/Cm simulant combined with a glass frit. Most of the development of the melter itself was completed as part of that work. This same melter system used for Am/Cm was used for the current work. The CIM system used consisted of a 5 inch (12.7 cm) diameter inductively heated platinum-rhodium (Pt-Rh) containment vessel with a control system and offgas characterization. Scrap plutonium can contain numerous impurities including significant amounts of chlorides, fluorides, sodium, potassium, lead, gallium, chromium, and nickel. Smaller amounts of additional elements can also be present. The amount of chlorides present is unusually high for a melter feed. In commercial applications there is no reason to have chloride at such high concentrations. Because the melter operates at

  17. Far-Field Accumulation of Fissile Material From Waste Packages Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J.P. Nicot

    2000-01-01

    The objective of this calculation is to estimate the quantity of fissile material that could accumulate in fractures in the rock beneath plutonium-ceramic (Pu-ceramic) and Mixed-Oxide (MOX) waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. This calculation is to feed another calculation (Ref. 31) computing the probability of criticality in the systems described in Section 6 and then ultimately to a more general report on the impact of plutonium on the performance of the proposed repository (Ref. 32), both developed concurrently to this work. This calculation is done in accordance with the development plan TDP-DDC-MD-000001 (Ref. 9), item 5. The original document described in item 5 has been split into two documents: this calculation and Ref. 4. The scope of the calculation is limited to only very low flow rates because they lead to the most conservative cases for Pu accumulation and more generally are consistent with the way the effluent from the WP (called source term in this calculation) was calculated (Ref. 4). Ref. 4 (''In-Drift Accumulation of Fissile Material from WPs Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Forms'') details the evolution through time (breach time is initial time) of the chemical composition of the solution inside the WP as degradation of the fuel and other materials proceed. It is the chemical solution used as a source term in this calculation. Ref. 4 takes that same source term and reacts it with the invert; this calculation reacts it with the rock. In addition to reactions with the rock minerals (that release Si and Ca), the basic mechanisms for actinide precipitation are dilution and mixing with resident water as explained in Section 2.1.4. No other potential mechanism such as flow through a reducing zone is investigated in this calculation. No attempt was made to use the effluent water from the bottom of the invert instead of using directly the effluent water from the WP. This

  18. Far-Field Accumulation of Fissile Material From Waste Packages Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Form

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J.P. Nicot

    2000-09-29

    The objective of this calculation is to estimate the quantity of fissile material that could accumulate in fractures in the rock beneath plutonium-ceramic (Pu-ceramic) and Mixed-Oxide (MOX) waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. This calculation is to feed another calculation (Ref. 31) computing the probability of criticality in the systems described in Section 6 and then ultimately to a more general report on the impact of plutonium on the performance of the proposed repository (Ref. 32), both developed concurrently to this work. This calculation is done in accordance with the development plan TDP-DDC-MD-000001 (Ref. 9), item 5. The original document described in item 5 has been split into two documents: this calculation and Ref. 4. The scope of the calculation is limited to only very low flow rates because they lead to the most conservative cases for Pu accumulation and more generally are consistent with the way the effluent from the WP (called source term in this calculation) was calculated (Ref. 4). Ref. 4 (''In-Drift Accumulation of Fissile Material from WPs Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Forms'') details the evolution through time (breach time is initial time) of the chemical composition of the solution inside the WP as degradation of the fuel and other materials proceed. It is the chemical solution used as a source term in this calculation. Ref. 4 takes that same source term and reacts it with the invert; this calculation reacts it with the rock. In addition to reactions with the rock minerals (that release Si and Ca), the basic mechanisms for actinide precipitation are dilution and mixing with resident water as explained in Section 2.1.4. No other potential mechanism such as flow through a reducing zone is investigated in this calculation. No attempt was made to use the effluent water from the bottom of the invert instead of using directly the effluent water from the

  19. Potential role of ABC-assisted repositories in U.S. plutonium and high-level waste disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berwald, D.; Favale, A.; Myers, T. [Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Bethpage, NY (United States)] [and others

    1995-10-01

    This paper characterizes the issues involving deep geologic disposal of LWR spent fuel rods, then presents results of an investigation to quantify the potential role of Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) in an integrated national nuclear materials and high level waste disposition strategy. The investigation used the deep geological repository envisioned for Yucca Mt., Nevada as a baseline and considered complementary roles for integrated ABC transmutation systems. The results indicate that although a U.S. geologic waste repository will continue to be required, waste partitioning and accelerator transmutation of plutonium, the minor actinides, and selected long-lived fission products can result in the following substantial benefits: plutonium burndown to near zero levels, a dramatic reduction of the long term hazard associated with geologic repositories, an ability to place several-fold more high level nuclear waste in a single repository, electricity sales to compensate for capital and operating costs.

  20. Alternative technical summary report for immobilized disposition in deep boreholes: Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout without canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile materials disposition program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23

    This paper summarizes and compares the immobilized and direct borehole disposition alternatives previously presented in the alternative technical summary. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are first briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  1. Alternative technical summary report for immobilized disposition in deep boreholes: Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout without canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile materials disposition program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-01-01

    This paper summarizes and compares the immobilized and direct borehole disposition alternatives previously presented in the alternative technical summary. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are first briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition

  2. Sandia Review of High Bridge Associates Report: Comparison of Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: WIPP Diluted Plutonium Storage and MOX Fuel Irradiation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shoemaker, Paul E. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hardin, Ernest [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Park, HeeHo Daniel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Brady, Patrick Vane [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rechard, Robert P. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-08-01

    The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scope of this review.

  3. 77 FR 1920 - Second Amended Notice of Intent To Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-12

    ... essential elements required to provide a pit disassembly and/or conversion capability at one or more of the... as transuranic waste at WIPP, provided that the material would meet the WIPP waste acceptance... activities, including storage of DWPF canisters and transuranic waste pending disposal. Impacts of the...

  4. Beating plutonium swords into electrical plowshares

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ofte, D.

    1993-01-01

    After decades of producing large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, the United States and the Confederation of Independent States are faced with an unanticipated dilemma of a growing surplus of that material. This circumstance could not have been anticipated just a few years ago after living with a weapons program that from its inception in the United States was characterized by a chronic tight supply situation. The rapid drawdown of the nuclear weapons stockpile presents a near-term problem of storage capacity in the system until the United States makes a disposition decision for what may be in excess of 50 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium

  5. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koelzer, W.

    1989-03-01

    This report contains with regard to 'plutonium' statements on chemistry, occurrence and reactions in the environment, handling procedures in the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation protection methods, biokinetics, toxicology and medical treatment to make available reliable data for the public discussion on plutonium especially its use in nuclear power plants and its radiological assessment. (orig.) [de

  6. Evaluation of existing United States' facilities for use as a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Motley, F.E.; Siebe, D.A.

    1995-01-01

    A number of existing US facilities were evaluated for use as a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition. These facilities include the Fuels Material Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, the Washington Power Supply Unit 1 (WNP-1) facility at Hanford, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) at Barnwell, SC, the Fuel Processing Facility (FPF) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the P-reactor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The study consisted of evaluating each facility in terms of available process space, available building support systems (i.e., HVAC, security systems, existing process equipment, etc.), available regional infrastructure (i.e., emergency response teams, protective force teams, available transportation routes, etc.), and ability to integrate the MOX fabrication process into the facility in an operationally-sound manner that requires a minimum amount of structural modifications

  7. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1976-01-01

    Discovery of the neutron made it easy to create elements which do not exist in nature. One of these is plutonium, and its isotope with mass number 239 has nuclear properties which make it both a good fuel for nuclear power reactors and a good explosive for nuclear weapons. Since it was discovered during a war the latter characteristic was put to use, but it is now evident that use of plutonium in a particular kind of nuclear reactor, the fast breeder reactor, will allow the world's resources of uranium to last for millennia as a major source of energy. Plutonium is very radiotoxic, resembling radium in this respect. Therefore the widespread introduction of fast breeder reactors to meet energy demands can be contemplated only after assurances on two points; that adequate control of the radiological hazard resulting from the handling of very large amounts of plutonium can be guaranteed, and that diversion of plutonium to illicit use can be prevented. The problems exist to a lesser degree already, since all types of nuclear reactor produce some plutonium. Some plutonium has already been dispersed in the environment, the bulk of it from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. (author)

  8. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results

  9. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-03-29

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

  10. Unconventional options for plutonium disposition. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Obninsk, Russian Federation, 7-11 November 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-11-01

    This publication summarizes discussions and presents selected papers from a Technical Committee meeting that the IAEA convened in Obninsk, near Moscow, Russia, 7-11 November 1994 at the invitation of the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, and which was hosted by the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The meeting focused on the disposition of plutonium produced from the operation of nuclear power plants in areas related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Plutonium is formed in all existing nuclear power plants and the unconsumed part remaining in spent fuel is a generic by-product of nuclear power generation. Over the next 15 to 20 years, a significant amount of plutonium will be produced in nuclear power stations worldwide, adding to amounts already in storage. Additionally, the world`s plutonium stocks are being affected by decisions concerning the management and utilization of plutonium recovered from nuclear weapons which are being dismantled. In this context, national strategies are directed at reducing the stockpiles of separated plutonium worldwide, and in further developing technologies capable of safely and securely using and handling plutonium. The purpose of the IAEA`s Technical Committee meeting was to consider unconventional approaches for plutonium disposition, both from the points of view of the fuel cycle as a whole and the specific types of nuclear fuel being used. The aims were to obtain technical descriptions of these approaches, engineering judgements on their technological status and development, and reports on national experience in this field. The meeting`s results and conclusions are providing valuable guidance for future activities in this subject area. Refs, figs and tabs.

  11. Unconventional options for plutonium disposition. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Obninsk, Russian Federation, 7-11 November 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    This publication summarizes discussions and presents selected papers from a Technical Committee meeting that the IAEA convened in Obninsk, near Moscow, Russia, 7-11 November 1994 at the invitation of the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, and which was hosted by the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The meeting focused on the disposition of plutonium produced from the operation of nuclear power plants in areas related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Plutonium is formed in all existing nuclear power plants and the unconsumed part remaining in spent fuel is a generic by-product of nuclear power generation. Over the next 15 to 20 years, a significant amount of plutonium will be produced in nuclear power stations worldwide, adding to amounts already in storage. Additionally, the world's plutonium stocks are being affected by decisions concerning the management and utilization of plutonium recovered from nuclear weapons which are being dismantled. In this context, national strategies are directed at reducing the stockpiles of separated plutonium worldwide, and in further developing technologies capable of safely and securely using and handling plutonium. The purpose of the IAEA's Technical Committee meeting was to consider unconventional approaches for plutonium disposition, both from the points of view of the fuel cycle as a whole and the specific types of nuclear fuel being used. The aims were to obtain technical descriptions of these approaches, engineering judgements on their technological status and development, and reports on national experience in this field. The meeting's results and conclusions are providing valuable guidance for future activities in this subject area. Refs, figs and tabs

  12. Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miner, William N

    1964-01-01

    This pamphlet discusses plutonium from discovery to its production, separation, properties, fabrication, handling, and uses, including use as a reactor fuel and use in isotope power generators and neutron sources.

  13. System Definition Document: Reactor Data Necessary for Modeling Plutonium Disposition in Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (USDOE) has contracted with Duke Engineering and Services, Cogema, Inc., and Stone and Webster (DCS) to provide mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services in support of USDOE's mission to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The nuclear station units currently identified as mission reactors for this project are Catawba Units 1 and 2 and McGuire Units 1 and 2. This report is specific to Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, but the details and materials for the McGuire reactors are very similar. The purpose of this document is to present a complete set of data about the reactor materials and components to be used in modeling the Catawba reactors to predict reactor physics parameters for the Catawba site. Except where noted, Duke Power Company or DCS documents are the sources of these data. These data are being used with the ORNL computer code models of the DCS Catawba (and McGuire) pressurized-water reactors

  14. Integrated development and testing plan for the plutonium immobilization project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kan, T.

    1998-01-01

    This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D and T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D and T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D and T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the

  15. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium, which was obtained and identified for the first time in 1941 by chemist Glenn Seaborg - through neutron irradiation of uranium 238 - is closely related to the history of nuclear energy. From the very beginning, because of the high radiotoxicity of plutonium, a tremendous amount of research work has been devoted to the study of the biological effects and the consequences on the environment. It can be said that plutonium is presently one of the elements, whose nuclear and physico-chemical characteristics are the best known. The first part of this issue is a survey of the knowledge acquired on the subject, which emphasizes the sanitary effects and transfer into the environment. Then the properties of plutonium related to energy generation are dealt with. Fissionable, like uranium 235, plutonium has proved a high-performance nuclear fuel. Originally used in breeder reactors, it is now being more and more widely recycled in light water reactors, in MOX fuel. Reprocessing, recycling and manufacturing of these new types of fuel, bound of become more and more widespread, are now part of a self-consistent series of operations, whose technical, economical, industrial and strategical aspects are reviewed. (author)

  16. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller-Christiansen, K.; Wollesen, M.

    1979-01-01

    As emotions and fear of plutonium are neither useful for the non-professionals nor for the political decision makers and the advantages and disadvantages of plutonium can only put against each other under difficulties, the paper wants to present the most essential scientific data of plutonium in a generally understandable way. Each of the individual sections is concluded and they try to give an answer to the most discussed questions. In order to make understanding easier, the scientific facts are only brought at points where it cannot be done without for the correctness of the presentation. Many details were left out knowingly. On the other hand, important details are dealt with several times if it seems necessary for making the presentation correct. The graphical presentations and the figures in many cases contain more than said in the text. They give the interested reader hints to scientific-technical coherences. The total material is to enable the reader to form his own opinion on plutonium problems which are being discussed in public. (orig./HP) [de

  17. High-temperature vacuum distillation separation of plutonium waste salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, E.

    1996-01-01

    In this task, high-temperature vacuum distillation separation is being developed for residue sodium chloride-potassium chloride salts resulting from past pyrochemical processing of plutonium. This process has the potential of providing clean separation of the salt and the actinides with minimal amounts of secondary waste generation. The process could produce chloride salt that could be discarded as low-level waste (LLW) or low actinide content transuranic (TRU) waste, and a concentrated actinide oxide powder that would meet long-term storage standards (DOE-DTD-3013-94) until a final disposition option for all surplus plutonium is chosen

  18. Plutonium, power, and politics: international arrangements for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rochlin, G.I.

    1979-01-01

    In this study, Gene Rochlin, physicist and social scientist, explores the technical, political, and institutional aspects of international nuclear export and fuel-cycle policies. He categorizes existing proposals and suggests ways to develop new ones that better promote both national and international goals. Dr. Rochlin argues neither for nor against the future use of nuclear power or plutonium fuels. Rather, he addresses the question of how international arrangements could be reached that might jointly satisfy the objectives of the several key nations, yet not be too difficult to negotiate. He concludes that a major fault has been the tendency to improvise arrangements for specific technical or industrial operations. As a result, overall social and political goals have become the bargaining points for compromise. Yet, attempts to simultaneously resolve all problems are unlikely to prove fruitful. Dr. Rochlin suggests instead the formation of institutions organized around more-limited social, political, and technical objectives - even at the expense of excluding some nations, or omitting some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Only by so doing, he argues, can immediate agreements be reached that preserve the potential for more-comprehensive future arrangements without sacrificing industrial, environmental, or nonproliferation goals

  19. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O'Dell, C.L.

    1995-01-01

    Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables

  20. Opportunities for mixed oxide fuel testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terry, W.K.; Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.

    1995-08-01

    Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification; (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania; (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition; (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight; (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu; (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu; (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure; (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity; (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products; (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies; and (11) Fuel performance code validation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory possesses many advantages for performing tests to resolve most of the issues identified above. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified. The facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West can meet all potential needs for pre- and post-irradiation examination that might arise in a MOX fuel qualification program

  1. Global plutonium management: A security option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1998-01-01

    The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.hor-ellipsis) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints

  2. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, D.

    1996-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE's stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities

  3. Direct conversion of surplus fissile materials, spent nuclear fuel, and other materials to high-level-waste glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Elam, K.R.

    1995-01-01

    With the end of the cold war the United States, Russia, and other countries have excess plutonium and other materials from the reductions in inventories of nuclear weapons. The United States Academy of Sciences (NAS) has recommended that these surplus fissile materials (SFMs) be processed so they are no more accessible than plutonium in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This spent fuel standard, if adopted worldwide, would prevent rapid recovery of SFMs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The NAS recommended investigation of three sets of options for disposition of SFMs while meeting the spent fuel standard: (1) incorporate SFMs with highly radioactive materials and dispose of as waste, (2) partly burn the SFMs in reactors with conversion of the SFMs to SNF for disposal, and (3) dispose of the SFMs in deep boreholes. The US Government is investigating these options for SFM disposition. A new method for the disposition of SFMs is described herein: the simultaneous conversion of SFMs, SNF, and other highly radioactive materials into high-level-waste (HLW) glass. The SFMs include plutonium, neptinium, americium, and 233 U. The primary SFM is plutonium. The preferred SNF is degraded SNF, which may require processing before it can be accepted by a geological repository for disposal

  4. The US plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zygmunt, S.J.; Mason, C.F.V.; Hahn, W.K.

    2000-01-01

    Progress has been made in Russia towards the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium (w-Pu) into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) suitable for further manufacture into mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. This program was started in 1998 in response to US proliferation concerns and the acknowledged international need to decrease the available weapons-grade Pu. A similar agenda is being followed in the US to address disposition of US surplus weapons-grade Pu. In Russia a conversion process has been selected and a site proposed. This paper discusses the present state of the program in support of this future operating facility that will process up to 5 metric tons of plutonium a year. (authors)

  5. Hanford Surplus Facilities Program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hughes, M.C.; Wahlen, R.K.; Winship, R.A.

    1989-09-01

    The Hanford Surplus Facilities Program is responsible for the safe and cost-effective surveillance, maintenance, and decommissioning of surplus facilities at the Hanford Site. The management of these facilities requires a surveillance and maintenance program to keep them in a safe condition and development of a plan for ultimate disposition. Criteria used to evaluate each factor relative to decommissioning are based on the guidelines presented by the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office, Defense Facilities Decommissioning Program Office, and are consistent with the Westinghouse Hanford Company commitment to decommission the Hanford Site retired facilities in the safest and most cost-effective way achievable. This document outlines the plan for managing these facilities to the end of disposition

  6. Disposition of Uranium -233 (sup 233U) in Plutonium Metal and Oxide at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freiboth, Cameron J.; Gibbs, Frank E.

    2000-01-01

    This report documents the position that the concentration of Uranium-233 ( 233 U) in plutonium metal and oxide currently stored at the DOE Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) is well below the maximum permissible stabilization, packaging, shipping and storage limits. The 233 U stabilization, packaging and storage limit is 0.5 weight percent (wt%), which is also the shipping limit maximum. These two plutonium products (metal and oxide) are scheduled for processing through the Building 371 Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS). This justification is supported by written technical reports, personnel interviews, and nuclear material inventories, as compiled in the ''History of Uranium-233 ( 233 U) Processing at the Rocky Flats Plant In Support of the RFETS Acceptable Knowledge Program'' RS-090-056, April 1, 1999. Relevant data from this report is summarized for application to the PuSPS metal and oxide processing campaigns

  7. Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

    2002-02-27

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

  8. Development of the plutonium oxide vitrification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, K.M.; Marra, J.C.; Coughlin, J.T.; Calloway, T.B.; Schumacher, R.F.; Zamecnik, J.R.; Pareizs, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    Repository disposal of plutonium in a suitable, immobilized form is being considered as one option for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. Accelerated development efforts were completed in 1997 on two potential immobilization forms to facilitate downselection to one form for continued development. The two forms studied were a crystalline ceramic based on Synroc technology and a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. As part of the glass development program, melter design activities and component testing were completed to demonstrate the feasibility of using glass as an immobilization medium. A prototypical melter was designed and built in 1997. The melter vessel and drain tube were constructed of a Pt/Rh alloy. Separate induction systems were used to heat the vessel and drain tube. A Pt/Rh stirrer was incorporated into the design to facilitate homogenization of the melt. Integrated powder feeding and off-gas systems completed the overall design. Concurrent with the design efforts, testing was conducted using a plutonium surrogate LaBS composition in an existing (near-scale) melter to demonstrate the feasibility of processing the LaBS glass on a production scale. Additionally, the drain tube configuration was successfully tested using a plutonium surrogate LaBS glass

  9. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 2: Hanford working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    In a memorandum dated January 24, 1994, the Secretary of Energy initiated a department-wide assessment of current plutonium-related safety and environmental vulnerabilities at Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. In a March 15, 1994 memorandum, the Secretary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) to take the lead in coordinating this assessment, which will help to establish the plutonium portion of the foundation for decision making related to the ES ampersand H aspects of national surplus fissile material disposition efforts. This DOE-wide plutonium vulnerability assessment is intended to provide the information base needed to identify and prioritize interim corrective actions for the safe management of these materials

  10. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  11. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility

  12. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  13. Report by a special panel of the American Nuclear Society: Protection and management of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bengelsdorf, H.

    1996-01-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) established an independent and prestigious panel several months ago to take the matter up where the US National Academy of Science (NAS) left off. The challenge was to look at the broader issue of what to do with civil plutonium, as well as excess weapons material. In terms of approach, the report focused on several short- and long-term issues. The short-term focus was on the disposition of excess weapons plutonium, while the longer-range issue concerned the disposition of the plutonium being produced in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. For the short term, the ANS panel strongly endorsed the concept that all plutonium scheduled for release from the US and Russian weapons stocks should be converted to a form that is intensively radioactive in order to protect the plutonium from theft of seizure (the spent fuel standard). However, since the conversion will at best take several years to complete, the panel has concluded that immediate emphasis should be placed on the assurance that all unconverted materials are protected as securely as when they were part of the active weapon stockpiles. More importantly, the panel also recommended prompt implementation of the so-called reactor option for disposing of surplus US and Russian weapons plutonium. The longer-term issues covered by the panel were those posed by the growing stocks of both separated plutonium and spent fuel generated in the world's civil nuclear power programs. These issues included what fuel cycle policies should be prudently pursued in light of proliferation risks and likely future energy needs, what steps should be taken in regard to the increase in the demand for nuclear power in the future, and how civil plutonium in its various forms should be protected and managed to minimize proliferation. Overall, the panel concluded that plutonium is an energy resource that should be used and not a waste material to be disposed of

  14. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurt, D. [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE`s stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities.

  15. US and Russia face urgent decisions on weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-01-01

    Surplus plutonium poses a ''clear and present danger to national and international security,'' warns a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study released in January, titled ''The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.'' Over the past few years, many different methods of disposing of plutonium have been proposed. They range from shooting it into the Sun with missiles, to deep-seabed disposal, to fissioning it within a new generation of nuclear reactors. The NAS report rejects most of the methods suggested so far, but does recommend pursuing two of the options. One is to incorporate the plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, and use it to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. The other is to mix the plutonium with high-level waste and molten glass and mold the resulting material into large glass logs for eventual geologic disposal. Both are discussed here. The panel that wrote the NAS study is a standing committee called the Committee on International Security ampersand Arms Control. It suggests steps that should be taken now to guard supplies of plutonium removed from weapons. One step is bilateral US-Russian monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Others include setting up secure interim storage for the fissile materials and establishing an international monitoring system to verify the stockpiles and ensure that materials are not withdrawn for use in new weapons. The panel also urges Russia to stop producing fissile weapons materials and both countries to commit a very large fraction of their plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons to nonaggressive uses. The US and Russia have already made initial moves to accomplish these goals but have not fully implemented any of them

  16. Plutonium immobilization in glass and ceramics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knecht, D.A.; Murphy, W.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Materials Research Society Nineteenth Annual Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management was held in Boston on November 27 to December 1, 1995. Over 150 papers were presented at the Symposium dealing with all aspects of nuclear waste management and disposal. Fourteen oral sessions and on poster session included a Plenary session on surplus plutonium dispositioning and waste forms. The proceedings, to be published in April, 1996, will provide a highly respected, referred compilation of the state of scientific development in the field of nuclear waste management. This paper provides a brief overview of the selected Symposium papers that are applicable to plutonium immobilization and plutonium waste form performance. Waste forms that were described at the Symposium cover most of the candidate Pu immobilization options under consideration, including borosilicate glass with a melting temperature of 1150 degrees C, a higher temperature (1450 degrees C) lanthanide glass, single phase ceramics, multi-phase ceramics, and multi-phase crystal-glass composites (glass-ceramics or slags). These Symposium papers selected for this overview provide the current status of the technology in these areas and give references to the relevant literature

  17. Plutonium immobilization in glass and ceramics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Knecht, D.A. [Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies, Idaho Falls (United States); Murphy, W.M. [Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, TX (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Materials Research Society Nineteenth Annual Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management was held in Boston on November 27 to December 1, 1995. Over 150 papers were presented at the Symposium dealing with all aspects of nuclear waste management and disposal. Fourteen oral sessions and on poster session included a Plenary session on surplus plutonium dispositioning and waste forms. The proceedings, to be published in April, 1996, will provide a highly respected, referred compilation of the state of scientific development in the field of nuclear waste management. This paper provides a brief overview of the selected Symposium papers that are applicable to plutonium immobilization and plutonium waste form performance. Waste forms that were described at the Symposium cover most of the candidate Pu immobilization options under consideration, including borosilicate glass with a melting temperature of 1150 {degrees}C, a higher temperature (1450 {degrees}C) lanthanide glass, single phase ceramics, multi-phase ceramics, and multi-phase crystal-glass composites (glass-ceramics or slags). These Symposium papers selected for this overview provide the current status of the technology in these areas and give references to the relevant literature.

  18. Decommissioning of surplus facilities at ORNL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myrick, T.E.; Coobs, J.H.

    1985-01-01

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. This program was established to provide for the management of certain DOE surplus radioactively contaminated facilities from the end of their operating life until final facility disposition is completed. As part of this program, the ORNL SFMP oversees some 75 facilities, ranging in complexity from abandoned waste storage tanks to large experimental reactors. This paper describes the scope of the ORNL program and outlines the decommissioning activities currently underway, including a brief description of the decontamination techniques being utilized. 4 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

  19. Surplus Facilities Management Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coobs, J.H.

    1983-01-01

    This is the second of two programs that are concerned with the management of surplus facilities. The facilities in this program are those related to commercial activities, which include the three surplus experimental and test reactors [(MSRE, HRE-2, and the Low Intensity Test Reactor (LITR)] and seven experimental loops at the ORR. The program is an integral part of the Surplus Facilities Management Program, which is a national program administered for DOE by the Richland Operations Office. Very briefly reported here are routine surveillance and maintenance of surplus radioactively contaminated DOE facilities awaiting decommissioning

  20. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 11: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton has directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, has directed that a Department of Energy project be initiated to develop options and recommendations for the safe storage of these materials in the interim. A step in the process is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of facilities throughout the Department. The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group was formed to produce the Project and Assessment Plans, to manage the assessments and to produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The plans established the approach and methodology for the assessment. The Project Plan specifies a Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) to examine each of the twelve DOE sites with significant holdings of plutonium. The Assessment Plan describes the methodology that the Site Assessment Team (SAT) used to report on the plutonium holdings for each specific site.This report provides results of the assessment of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

  1. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design's capability for plutonium disposition

  2. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design's capability for plutonium disposition

  3. Stop plutonium; Stop plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  4. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 1. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-04-30

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

  5. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-04-30

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

  6. Plutonium again (smuggling and movements)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    A link is discounted between nuclear proliferation and the recently discovered smuggled plutonium from the former Soviet Union at Munich airport and other places in Germany. It is argued that governments wishing to obtain nuclear materials to develop a weapons programme would not arrange to have it smuggled in a suitcase. Instead, it is speculated that a link exists between the plutonium smuggling incidents and the desire to promote the production of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Such incidents, by further raising public anxiety, may be intended to turn public opinion in favour of MOX fuel production as a sensible way of getting rid of surplus plutonium. (UK)

  7. Plutonium production and utilization forecasts in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haijtink, B.

    1976-01-01

    The planned accelerated growth of nuclear energy generation in the near future will lead to a large production of plutonium in the thermal reactors. Therefore, up to 1985, the major part of the available plutonium will be plutonium recovered from spent uranium-metal, particularly in the United Kingdom and in France. Because of the low demand for fuelling the fast breeder reactors within the near future, a surplus of fissile plutonium will be accumulated in Europe. Even if the planned availability of the oxide reprocessing capacity will be delayed with two or three years, a plutonium surplus will still exist in Europe, e.g.; in 1985: 25-20 tons. On longer term, up to 2000, the plutonium production in thermal reactors will be sufficient to meet the estimated demand for fast breeder reactors at their commercial introduction foreseen for the nineties. That means that all the plutonium surplus needs not to be stocked for use in fast breeder reactors later on but could be recycled in thermal reactors. The magnitude of the available fissionable materials give an idea of the importance to promote, on an industrial scale, the plutonium recycling technology

  8. 'Nonprofits' need surplus too.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Young, D W

    1982-01-01

    By definition profit refers to the difference between revenue and expenses. In for-profit organizations profit or surplus gives a return to the owners of the company and serves as a source of financing for capital acquisitions and working capital. Nonprofit organizations, which are not allowed a surplus, don't suffer on the first count because they have no owners. But they do suffer on the second count because, if expected to grow, they need to finance asset replacement and growth. In these days when funds for long-term debt are becoming scarcer, this author asserts, the need for regulators to allow 'nonprofits' to keep a surplus is increasing. In this article, he argues for a surplus and then discusses how managers and regulators can determine how much a nonprofit organization should be allowed. He presents a combination of a modified version of the return-on-asset pricing model used in for-profit organizations and a model for assessing working capital needs associated with growth.

  9. Racism and Surplus Repression.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Howard

    1983-01-01

    Explores the relationship between Herbert Marcuse's theory of "surplus repression" and Freud's theory of the "unconscious" with respect to latent, hidden, covert, or subliminal aspects of racism in the United States. Argues that unconscious racism, manifested in evasion/avoidance, acting out/projection, and attempted…

  10. Neutronics benchmark of a MOX assembly with near-weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Difilippo, F.C.; Fisher, S.E.

    1998-01-01

    One of the proposed ways to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium (Pu) is to irradiate the high-fissile material in light-water reactors in order to reduce the Pu enrichment to the level of spent fuels from commercial reactors. Considerable experience has been accumulated about the behavior of mixed-oxide (MOX) uranium and plutonium fuels for plutonium recycling in commercial reactors, but the experience is related to Pu enrichments typical of spent fuels quite below the values of weapons-grade plutonium. Important decisions related to the kind of reactors to be used for the disposition of the plutonium are going to be based on calculations, so the validation of computational algorithms related to all aspects of the fuel cycle (power distributions, isotopics as function of the burnup, etc.), for weapons-grade isotopics is very important. Analysis of public domain data reveals that the cycle-2 irradiation in the Quad cities boiling-water reactor (BWR) is the most recent US destructive examination. This effort involved the irradiation of five MOX assemblies using 80 and 90% fissile plutonium. These benchmark data were gathered by General Electric under the sponsorship of the Electric Power Research Institute. It is emphasized, however, that global parameters are not the focus of this benchmark, since the five bundles containing MOX fuels did not significantly affect the overall core performance. However, since the primary objective of this work is to compare against measured post-irradiation assembly data, the term benchmark is applied here. One important reason for performing the benchmark on Quad Cities irradiation is that the fissile blends (up to 90%) are higher than reactor-grade and, quite close to, weapons-grade isotopics

  11. Plutonium fires; Incendies de plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mestre, E.

    1959-06-23

    The author reports an information survey on accidents which occurred when handling plutonium. He first addresses accidents reported in documents. He indicates the circumstances and consequences of these accidents (explosion in glove boxes, fires of plutonium chips, plutonium fire followed by filter destruction, explosion during plutonium chip dissolution followed by chip fire). He describes hazards associated with plutonium fires: atmosphere and surface contamination, criticality. The author gives some advices to avoid plutonium fires. These advices concern electric installations, the use of flammable solvents, general cautions associated with plutonium handling, venting and filtration. He finally describes how to fight plutonium fires, and measures to be taken after the fire (staff contamination control, atmosphere control)

  12. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 6: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary directed the Department of Energy to develop options and plans for the interim safe storage of these materials. One step in this direction is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of DOE facilities by a open-quotes Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group.close quotes In this effort, the working group developed a Project Plan and an Assessment Plan which basically laid out the approach and methodology for the assessments. The plans were issued on April 25, 1994. The Project Plan specifies a WGAT for each site with significant holdings of plutonium. Also, the plan requires that each site form a Site Assessment Team (SAT) to provide the self assessment for the project. Additionally, the working group was tasked with managing the assessments at each site, and providing the results in a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994

  13. Dispositional logic

    Science.gov (United States)

    Le Balleur, J. C.

    1988-01-01

    The applicability of conventional mathematical analysis (based on the combination of two-valued logic and probability theory) to problems in which human judgment, perception, or emotions play significant roles is considered theoretically. It is shown that dispositional logic, a branch of fuzzy logic, has particular relevance to the common-sense reasoning typical of human decision-making. The concepts of dispositionality and usuality are defined analytically, and a dispositional conjunctive rule and dispositional modus ponens are derived.

  14. Stop plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  15. Plutonium Proliferation: The Achilles Heel of Disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, Paul

    2001-01-01

    Plutonium is a byproduct of nuclear fission, and it is produced at the rate of about 70 metric tons a year in the world's nuclear power reactors. Concerns about civilian plutonium ran high in the 1970s and prompted enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 to give the United States a veto over separating plutonium from U.S.-supplied uranium fuel. Over the years, however, so-called reactor-grade plutonium has become the orphan issue of nuclear non-proliferation, largely as a consequence of pressures from plutonium-separating countries. The demise of the fast breeder reactor and the reluctance of utilities to introduce plutonium fuel in light-water reactors have resulted in large surpluses of civilian, weapons-usable plutonium, which now approach in size the 250 tons of military plutonium in the world. Yet reprocessing of spent fuel for recovery and use of plutonium proceeds apace outside the United States and threatens to overwhelm safeguards and security measures for keeping this material out of the hands of nations and terrorists for weapons. A number of historical and current developments are reviewed to demonstrate that plutonium commerce is undercutting efforts both to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work toward eliminating existing nuclear arsenals. These developments include the breakdown of U.S. anti-plutonium policy, the production of nuclear weapons by India with Atoms-for-Peace plutonium, the U.S.-Russian plan to introduce excess military plutonium as fuel in civilian power reactors, the failure to include civilian plutonium and bomb-grade uranium in the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and the perception of emerging proliferation threats as the rationale for development of a ballistic missile defense system. Finally, immobilization of separated plutonium in high-level waste is explored as a proliferation-resistant and disarmament-friendly solution for eliminating excess stocks of civilian and military plutonium.

  16. Radiological analysis of plutonium glass batches with natural/enriched boron

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainisch, R.

    2000-01-01

    The disposition of surplus plutonium inventories by the US Department of Energy (DOE) includes the immobilization of certain plutonium materials in a borosilicate glass matrix, also referred to as vitrification. This paper addresses source terms of plutonium masses immobilized in a borosilicate glass matrix where the glass components include both natural boron and enriched boron. The calculated source terms pertain to neutron and gamma source strength (particles per second), and source spectrum changes. The calculated source terms corresponding to natural boron and enriched boron are compared to determine the benefits (decrease in radiation source terms) for to the use of enriched boron. The analysis of plutonium glass source terms shows that a large component of the neutron source terms is due to (a, n) reactions. The Americium-241 and plutonium present in the glass emit alpha particles (a). These alpha particles interact with low-Z nuclides like B-11, B-10, and O-17 in the glass to produce neutrons. The low-Z nuclides are referred to as target particles. The reference glass contains 9.4 wt percent B 2 O 3 . Boron-11 was found to strongly support the (a, n) reactions in the glass matrix. B-11 has a natural abundance of over 80 percent. The (a, n) reaction rates for B-10 are lower than for B-11 and the analysis shows that the plutonium glass neutron source terms can be reduced by artificially enriching natural boron with B-10. The natural abundance of B-10 is 19.9 percent. Boron enriched to 96-wt percent B-10 or above can be obtained commercially. Since lower source terms imply lower dose rates to radiation workers handling the plutonium glass materials, it is important to know the achievable decrease in source terms as a result of boron enrichment. Plutonium materials are normally handled in glove boxes with shielded glass windows and the work entails both extremity and whole-body exposures. Lowering the source terms of the plutonium batches will make the handling

  17. Safety aspects with regard to plutonium vitrification techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.

    1995-01-01

    Substantial inventories of excess plutonium are expected to result from dismantling US and Russian nuclear weapons. Disposition of this material should be a high priority in both countries. Various disposition options are under consideration. One option is to vitrify the plutonium with the addition of 137 Cs or high-level waste to act as a deterrent to proliferation. The primary safety problem associated with vitrification of plutonium is to avoid criticality in form fabrication and in the final repository over geologic time. Recovery should be as difficult (costly) as the recovery of plutonium from spent fuel

  18. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated

  19. Plutonium controversy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated. (ACR)

  20. Foucaults Dispositive

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius T.; Thaning, Morten Sørensen

    2016-01-01

    While Foucault’s work has had a crucial impact on organizational research, the analytical potential of the dispositive has not been sufficiently developed. The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the notion of the dispositive as a key conception in Foucault’s thought, particularly in his...

  1. Disposition of excess fissile materials in deep boreholes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.; Danker, W.; Morley, R.

    1995-09-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. Plutonium utilization options have in common the generation of high-level radioactive waste which will be disposed of in a mined geologic disposal system to be developed for spent reactor fuel and defense high level waste. Other final disposition forms, such as plutonium metal, plutonium oxide and plutonium immobilized without high-level radiation sources may be better suited to placement in a custom facility. This paper discusses a leading candidate for such a facility; deep (several kilometer) borehole disposition. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. The safety argument centers around ancient groundwater indicating lack of migration, and thus no expected communication with the accessible environment until the plutonium has decayed

  2. Representing dispositions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Röhl Johannes

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Dispositions and tendencies feature significantly in the biomedical domain and therefore in representations of knowledge of that domain. They are not only important for specific applications like an infectious disease ontology, but also as part of a general strategy for modelling knowledge about molecular interactions. But the task of representing dispositions in some formal ontological systems is fraught with several problems, which are partly due to the fact that Description Logics can only deal well with binary relations. The paper will discuss some of the results of the philosophical debate about dispositions, in order to see whether the formal relations needed to represent dispositions can be broken down to binary relations. Finally, we will discuss problems arising from the possibility of the absence of realizations, of multi-track or multi-trigger dispositions and offer suggestions on how to deal with them.

  3. US Department of Energy Plutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop, December 12-14, 1995: Final proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    The purpose of the workshop was to foster communication within the technical community on issues surrounding stabilization and immobilization of the Department`s surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated wastes. The workshop`s objectives were to: build a common understanding of the performance, economics and maturity of stabilization and immobilization technologies; provide a system perspective on stabilization and immobilization technology options; and address the technical issues associated with technologies for stabilization and immobilization of surplus plutonium and plutonium- contaminated waste. The papers presented during this workshop have been indexed separately.

  4. Dealing with a dangerous surplus from the cold war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.

    1997-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear materials is a threat to national security and world peace. This threat complicates the safeguarding and management of fissile materials that have become surplus since the end of the Cold War. The dismantling of weapons and the cessation of new nuclear weapons manufacturing, while positive for world peace, have raised a problem: what to do about the fissile materials recovered from the weapons or in inventories that will remain unused. These materials--primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium--are environmental, safety, and health concerns. But of more urgency is the threat they pose to national and international security if they fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. As arms reduction continues and amounts of surplus fissile materials increase, the potential for such security breaches will increase

  5. Future role of plutonium technology in society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Matthews, R.B.; Trapp, T.J.

    1995-01-01

    Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a very clear programmatic use of plutonium: supporting the nuclear deterrent. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, bilateral agreements concerning the cessation of nuclear testing and the dismantlement of large portions of the nuclear weapon stockpiles by the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union have resulted in new requirements concerning the management and disposition of nuclear materials. This report describes current issues pertaining to the requirements for plutonium management

  6. Disposing of the world's excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, J.M.; Bullen, D.B.

    1998-01-01

    The authors undertake three key objectives in addressing the issue of plutonium disposition at the end of the Cold War. First, the authors estimate the total global inventory of plutonium both from weapons dismantlement and civil nuclear power reactors. Second, they review past and current policy toward handling this metal by the US, Russia, and other key countries. Third, they evaluate the feasibility of several options (but especially the vitrification and mixed oxide fuel options announced by the Clinton administration) for disposing of the increasing amounts of plutonium available today. To undertake this analysis, the authors consider both the political and scientific problems confronting policymakers in dealing with this global plutonium issue. Interview data with political and technical officials in Washington and at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, and empirical inventory data on plutonium from a variety of sources form the basis of their analysis

  7. Recycling and surplus chemical programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harper, T.J.

    1993-05-01

    In 1988, 45 years of defense production came to a close at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. The mission of the Hanford Site was formally changed to environmental restoration and remediation. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) is the management and operations (M ampersand O) contractor leading the cleanup. Within the framework of future Site cleanup, Hanford recycling and surplus chemical programs are making a viable contribution today to waste minimization, diversion of materials from the waste stream, and setting a standard for future operations. This paper focuses on two successful efforts: paper recycling and surplus chemical sales

  8. The plutonium mountain: preventing diversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pohling-Brown, Pamela.

    1997-01-01

    With continued arms-reduction between the USA and the former Soviet Union, surplus nuclear materials, from dismantled weapons, requires handling. A number of risks are identified including occupational safety for workers involved with handling nuclear materials, and environmental protection. Perhaps the most sinister is the extra security needed to ensure that these materials are not diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups, as materials are handled in a larger number of countries. In particular, the author addresses the problem of plutonium reserves, and discusses the role of reprocessing in preventing diversion. (UK)

  9. Surplus yeast tank failing catastrophically

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2016-01-01

    GOOD REASON FOR CAUTION I A large surplus yeast tank shot into the air leaving the floor plate and the contents behind. Although not designed for overpressure, the tank was kept at “very slight overpressure” to suppress nuisance foaming. The brewery was unaware of the hazards of compressed air...

  10. Social Security's Surpluses: An Update.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dattalo, Patrick

    1992-01-01

    Notes that deliberation over how to manage social security's large trust fund balances is expected to continue. Urges social workers to participate in this debate because surpluses have implications for increasing quality of life of low- and moderate-income families. Continues earlier discussion (Dattalo, 1990) by assessing two recent proposals…

  11. 76 FR 50186 - Surplus Properties

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-12

    ... have been determined surplus to the United States needs in accordance with the Defense Base Closure and... State and local governments and other eligible entities for public benefit purposes. Notices of interest from representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties located in the vicinity of any...

  12. Consumer surplus and CES demand

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    ten Raa, Thijs

    2015-01-01

    This article presents the consumer surplus formula for constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demands. The formula is used to compare the monopoly and optimum provisions of product variety. It is shown that a monopolist under-provides variety. This result is contrasted with Lambertini’s analysis

  13. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gofman, J.W.

    1976-01-01

    If the world chooses to seek a solution to the energy dilemma through nuclear energy, the element plutonium will become an article of commerce to be handled in quantities of thousands of tonnes annually. Plutonium is a uniquely potent inhalation carcinogen, the potential induction of lung cancer dwarfing other possible toxic effects. For reasons to be presented here, it is the author's opinion that plutonium's carcinogenicity has been very seriously underestimated. If one couples the corrected carcinogenicity with the probable degree of industrial containment of the plutonium, it appears that the commercialization of a plutonium-based energy economy is not an acceptable option for society. Sagan's statement that ''the experience of 30 years supports the contention that plutonium can be used safely'' is manifestly indefensible. No meaningful epidemiological study of plutonium-exposed workers for that 30-year period has ever been done. Since thousands of those possibly exposed have left the industry and are not even available to follow-up, it is doubtful that any meaningful study of ''the experience of 30 years'' will ever be accomplished

  14. Plutonium solubilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puigdomnech, I.; Bruno, J.

    1991-02-01

    Thermochemical data has been selected for plutonium oxide, hydroxide, carbonate and phosphate equilibria. Equilibrium constants have been evaluated in the temperature range 0 to 300 degrees C at a pressure of 1 bar to T≤100 degrees C and at the steam saturated pressure at higher temperatures. Measured solubilities of plutonium that are reported in the literature for laboratory experiments have been collected. Solubility data on oxides, hydroxides, carbonates and phosphates have been selected. No solubility data were found at temperatures higher than 60 degrees C. The literature solubility data have been compared with plutonium solubilities calculated with the EQ3/6 geochemical modelling programs, using the selected thermodynamic data for plutonium. (authors)

  15. Plutonium immobilization program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  16. Plutonium Immobilization Program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  17. The plutonium challenge for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper author deal with the weapons-usable plutonium and with the possibilities of their managing. Russia has not disclosed the amount of plutonium produced, but various estimates indicate that the production was about 130 tonnes. Production has been curtailed in Russia; three dual-purpose reactors still produce weapons-grade plutonium - two at Tomsk-7 (renamed Seversk) and one at Krasnoyarsk-26 (renamed Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine). In a 1994 United States-Russian agreement that has yet to enter into force, Russia agreed to close the remaining operating reactors by the year 2000. Treaties between the United States and Russia have already cut the number of nuclear warheads from more than 10,000 to about 6,000 under START 1, which has been ratified, and to about 3,500 under START 2, which still awaits approval. If Russia and the United States conclude START 3, that number could drop to between 2,000 and 2,500. On September 2, 1998, the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed the 'Joint statement of principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium, Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes.' In this joint statement the Presidents affirm the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium and to convert the nuclear weapons programs, and to convert this material so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. These 100 tonne of plutonium must be managed in proper way such that it becomes neither a proliferation for an environmental risk. The United States has proposed that it manage it's 50 tonnes by a dual approach-once through MOX burning of a portion of the plutonium and immobilization in a ceramic matrix followed by en- casement in high level waste glass. Russia has proposed that it manage its full 50 tonnes by burning in a reactor. The MOX program in the United States would bum the cleaner plutonium metal and residues. Weapons components would be converted to plutonium oxide

  18. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1995-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficiently reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  19. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1996-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficient reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  20. CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.

    1957-09-10

    A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.

  1. Plutonium (Pu)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This pedagogical document presents the properties and uses of plutonium: where does it come from, the history of its discovery, its uses and energy content, its recycling and reuse in MOX fuels, its half-life, toxicity and presence in the environment. (J.S.)

  2. The (Surplus) Value of Scientific Communication

    OpenAIRE

    Fröhlich, Gerhard

    1996-01-01

    In research on scientific communication there are above all theory-less and formal/natural scientific models of scientific communication. These are juxtaposed to social-scientific, power-sensitive models (Elias, Bourdieu, Merton). The (surplus) value of scientific communication can be variously understood: either as inherent surplus values in the sense of potential effects of stimulation, synergy, critique, quality control; or as symbolic surplus value in the sense of symbolic capital (Bourdi...

  3. Social surplus approach and heterodox economics

    OpenAIRE

    Lee, Frederic; Jo, Tae-Hee

    2010-01-01

    Given the emphasis on social provisioning in heterodox economics, two of its central theoretical organizing principles are the concepts of the total social product and the social surplus. This appears to link heterodox economics to the social surplus approach associated with the classical economists and currently with Sraffian economists. However, heterodox economics connects agency with the social surplus and the social product, which the Sraffians reject as they take the level and composit...

  4. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W.; Weber, W.J.

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ''logs''; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium

  5. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document offers chemical, metallurgical and economical information on the plutonium, a hard white radioelement. It deals also on the plutonium formation in the earth, the plutonium use in the nuclear industry, the plutonium in the environment and the plutonium toxicity. (A.L.B.)

  6. Plutonium in nature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madic, C.

    1994-01-01

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases

  7. Proliferation resistance criteria for fissile material disposition issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutherford, D.A.; Fearey, B.L.; Markin, J.T.; Close, D.A.; Tolk, K.M.; Mangan, D.L.; Moore, L.

    1995-01-01

    The 1994 National Acdaemy of Sciences study ''Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium'' defined options for reducing the national and international proliferation risks of materials declared excess to the nuclear weapons program. This paper proposes criteria for assessing the proliferation resistance of these options as well defining the ''Standards'' from the report. The criteria are general, encompassing all stages of the disposition process from storage through intermediate processing to final disposition including the facilities, processing technologies and materials, the level of safeguards for these materials, and the national/subnational threat to the materials

  8. Non-proliferation issues with weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper author deals with the plutonium produced in power reactors and with their using. Excess plutonium, mineralized in a ceramic matrix and incised in HLW glass, is a less attractive target for terrorist groups than either aged, irradiated weapons grade MOX fuel, or aged, U oxide spent fuel. This is especially true after the Russian and United States' Pu Disposition Programs have been completed, until the material (spent MOX fuel or the immobilized form) is stored in a sealed, repository. (authors)

  9. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-01-01

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  10. Technical challenges in support of the plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mason, C.F.V.; Zygmunt, S.J.; Hahn, W.K.; James, C.A.; Costa, D.A.; Smith, W.H.; Yarbro, S.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Plutonium Materials Conversion Program for Russia is designed to assist Russia in defining a path for the destruction of weapons grade plutonium. A similar program is currently defining a program for destruction of US weapons grade plutonium. These two sister programs arose from the September 1998 meeting between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, after which they issued a 'Joint statement of principles for management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes'. The US and Russia have each committed to convert 50 metric tons of plutonium from nuclear weapons programs to forms which are unusable for weapons

  11. Patients' Attitudes towards the Surplus Frozen Embryos in China

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xuan Jin

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Background. Assisted reproductive techniques have been used in China for more than 20 years. This study investigates the attitudes of surplus embryo holders towards embryos storage and donation for medical research. Methods. A total of 363 couples who had completed in vitro fertilization (IVF treatment and had already had biological children but who still had frozen embryos in storage were invited to participate. Interviews were conducted by clinics in a narrative style. Results. Family size was the major reason for participants’ (discontinuation of embryo storage; moreover, the moral status of embryos was an important factor for couples choosing embryo storage, while the storage fee was an important factor for couples choosing embryo disposal. Most couples discontinued the storage of their embryos once their children were older than 3 years. In our study, 58.8% of the couples preferred to dispose of surplus embryos rather than donate them to research, citing a lack of information and distrust in science as significant reasons for their decision. Conclusions. Interviews regarding frozen embryos, including patients’ expectations for embryo storage and information to assist them with decisions regarding embryo disposal, are beneficial for policies addressing embryo disposition and embryo donation in China.

  12. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  13. Plutonium uniqueness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1984-01-01

    A standard is suggested against which the putative uniqueness of plutonium may be tested. It is common folklore that plutonium is unique among the chemical elements because its four common oxidation states can coexist in the same solution. Whether this putative uniqueness appears only during transit to equilibrium, or only at equilibrium, or all of the time, is not generally made clear. But while the folklore may contain some truth, it cannot be put to test until some measure of 'uniqueness' is agreed upon so that quantitative comparisons are possible. One way of measuring uniqueness is as the magnitude of the product of the mole fractions of the element at equilibrium. A 'coexistence index' is defined and discussed. (author)

  14. Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Egge, R.G.

    1997-01-01

    This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility

  15. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium quarterly technical progress report, August 1, 1997--October 31, 1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-31

    This report summarizes activities of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium during the quarter. The report describes the Electronic Resource Library; DOE support activities; current and future environmental health and safety programs; pollution prevention and pollution avoidance; communication, education, training, and community involvement programs; and nuclear and other material studies, including plutonium storage and disposition studies.

  16. Plutonium story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seaborg, G.T.

    1981-09-01

    The first nuclear synthesis and identification (i.e., the discovery) of the synthetic transuranium element plutonium (isotope 238 Pu) and the demonstration of its fissionability with slow neutrons (isotope 239 Pu) took place at the University of California, Berkeley, through the use of the 60-inch and 37-inch cyclotrons, in late 1940 and early 1941. This led to the development of industrial scale methods in secret work centered at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and the application of these methods to industrial scale production, at manufacturing plants in Tennessee and Washington, during the World War II years 1942 to 1945. The chemical properties of plutonium, needed to devise the procedures for its industrial scale production, were studied by tracer and ultramicrochemical methods during this period on an extraordinarily urgent basis. This work, and subsequent investigations on a worldwide basis, have made the properties of plutonium very well known. Its well studied electronic structure and chemical properties give it a very interesting position in the actinide series of inner transition elements

  17. Dispositional greed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seuntjens, Terri G; Zeelenberg, Marcel; van de Ven, Niels; Breugelmans, Seger M

    2015-06-01

    Greed is an important motive: it is seen as both productive (a source of ambition; the motor of the economy) and destructive (undermining social relationships; the cause of the late 2000s financial crisis). However, relatively little is known about what greed is and does. This article reports on 5 studies that develop and test the 7-item Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS). Study 1 (including 4 separate samples from 2 different countries, total N = 6092) provides evidence for the construct and discriminant validity of the DGS in terms of positive correlations with maximization, self-interest, envy, materialism, and impulsiveness, and negative correlations with self-control and life satisfaction. Study 2 (N = 290) presents further evidence for discriminant validity, finding that the DGS predicts greedy behavioral tendencies over and above materialism. Furthermore, the DGS predicts economic behavior: greedy people allocate more money to themselves in dictator games (Study 3, N = 300) and ultimatum games (Study 4, N = 603), and take more in a resource dilemma (Study 5, N = 305). These findings shed light on what greed is and does, how people differ in greed, and how greed can be measured. In addition, they show the importance of greed in economic behavior and provide directions for future studies. (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

  18. Guidelines for the responsible management of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agrell, P.H.

    1997-01-01

    Since 1994 an informal group of representatives of States party to the NPT has been trying to develop agreed international guidelines for the responsible management of non-military plutonium. This paper gives a brief description of the outcome. Since the results are still subject to decision by Governments, the description must be in general terms only. The paper describes the background to, and genesis of, the discussions and the general approach taken, which was based on commitment to the NPT, national responsibility for the management of nuclear materials and the fuel cycle, upholding of the IAEA's safeguards system, and a focus on civil material. An indication is given of the development of the Group's thinking, especially the decisions that any guidelines must be capable of accommodating surplus military plutonium, as well as civil, and that the main focus should be on measures to increase transparency. The resulting guidelines are described. Their main features are a re-statement of commitments and standards for the management of non-military plutonium with regard to non-proliferation, safety, and other fields, a commitment to the management of such plutonium according to a consistent national strategy, and a commitment to the publication of information on that strategy, and of annual statistics for holdings of plutonium in a consistent format. Other aspects of the guidelines are also explained. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the possible practical effects of the guidelines if adopted by governments. (author)

  19. Accelerator-driven assembly for plutonium transformation (ADAPT)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tuyle, Greorgy J. Van; Todosow, Michael; Powell, James; Schweitzer, Donald

    1995-01-01

    A particle accelerator-driven spallation target and corresponding blanket region are proposed for the ultimate disposition of weapons-grade plutonium being retired from excess nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. The highly fissle plutonium is contained within .25 to .5 cm diameter silicon-carbide coated graphite beads, which are cooled by helium, within the slightly subcritical blanket region. Major advantages include very high one-pass burnup (over 90%), a high integrity waste form (the coated beads), and operation in a subcritical mode, thereby minimizing the vulnerability to the positive reativity feedbacks often associated with plutonium fuel.

  20. Plutonium research and related activities at the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartley, R.S.; Beard, C.A.; Barnes, D.L.

    1998-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia are reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles. What to do with the materials from thousands of excess nuclear weapons is an important international challenge. How to handle the remaining US stockpile to ensure safe storage and reliability, in light of the aging support infrastructure, is an important national challenge. To help address these challenges and related issues, the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is working on behalf of the State of Texas with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The center directs three major programs that address the key aspects of the plutonium management issue: (1) the Communications, Education, Training and Community Involvement Program, which focuses on informing the public about plutonium and providing technical education at all levels; (2) the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Program, which investigates the key ES and H impacts of activities related to the DOE weapons complex in Texas; and (3) the Nuclear and Other Materials Program, which is aimed at minimizing safety and proliferation risks by helping to develop and advocate safe stewardship, storage, and disposition of nuclear weapons materials. This paper provides an overview of the center's nuclear activities described in four broad categories of international activities, materials safety, plutonium storage, and plutonium disposition

  1. The use of plutonium rapides surregenerateurs aspects techniques et economiques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guillet, H.; Delayre, R.; Mougniot, J.C.; Ferrari, A.

    1977-01-01

    Nuclear energy production utilizing U 235 and U 238 inevitably results in the formation of plutonium. Some of this is directly used by the reactor in power production. Some reactors, e.g. the Candu type, burn most of their plutonium ''in situ''. However the surplus quantity of plutonium produced is increasing, and by 1990 the world stock of plutonium is predicted to be about 1000 tons (300 tons in Europe and 400 in the USA). This represents approximately 0.1 Q of potential power, where Q=10 21 joules. Proposals for dealing with this plutonium include its storage, either as irradiated fuel or as a refined substance (plutonium nitrate or oxide); its use in thermal reactors as a substitute for U 235 ; its use in fast breeder reactors which can act as consumers of plutonium as well as producers and which can therefore regulate the world's plutonium stocks. Leaving aside the question of storage, certain technical conditions must be fulfilled. It is essential that reprocessing plants should be operational and available in adequate numbers. An industry able to make use of plutonium should be developed with large capacity units. There seem to be no problems with plutonium use in reactors: conclusive experiments have proved the accuracy of calculations regarding plutonium recycling in thermal reactors and a number of fast breeders have proved the possibility of using plutonium in them. Experience acquired during the past ten years permits us to deal with the safety and safeguards problem of using plutonium. Many economic questions remain, however, including questions affecting the utilization of plutonium, such as the cost of regenerating irradiated fuel and of making fuel, and questions affecting the strategy of using plutonium in different ways, such as the price at which it should be sold. Also the cost of producing electricity using plutonium is not yet clear. It is unavoidable that plutonium will be used in nuclear power development. The technical and economic problems

  2. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-01-01

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

  3. International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

  4. Plutonium dioxide dissolution in glass

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vienna, J.D.; Alexander, D.L.; Li, Hong [and others

    1996-09-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is charged with providing technical support for evaluation of disposition options for excess fissile materials manufactured for the nation`s defense. One option being considered for the disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) is immobilization by vitrification. The vitrification option entails immobilizing Pu in a host glass and waste package that are criticality-safe (immune to nuclear criticality), proliferation-resistant, and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal. To prove the technical and economic feasibility of candidate vitrification options it is necessary to demonstrate that PuO{sub 2} feedstock can be dissolved in glass in sufficient quantity. The OFMD immobilization program has set a Pu solubility goal of 10 wt% in glass. The life cycle cost of the vitrification options are strongly influenced by the rate at which PUO{sub 2} dissolves in glass. The total number of process lines needed for vitrification of 50 t of Pu in 10 years is directly dependent upon the time required for Pu dissolution in glass. The objective of this joint Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) - Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) study was to demonstrate a high Pu solubility in glass and to identify on a rough scale the time required for Pu dissolution in the glass. This study was conducted using a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass composition designed at the SRTC for the vitrification of actinides.

  5. Plutonium dioxide dissolution in glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vienna, J.D.; Alexander, D.L.; Li, Hong

    1996-09-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is charged with providing technical support for evaluation of disposition options for excess fissile materials manufactured for the nation's defense. One option being considered for the disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) is immobilization by vitrification. The vitrification option entails immobilizing Pu in a host glass and waste package that are criticality-safe (immune to nuclear criticality), proliferation-resistant, and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal. To prove the technical and economic feasibility of candidate vitrification options it is necessary to demonstrate that PuO 2 feedstock can be dissolved in glass in sufficient quantity. The OFMD immobilization program has set a Pu solubility goal of 10 wt% in glass. The life cycle cost of the vitrification options are strongly influenced by the rate at which PUO 2 dissolves in glass. The total number of process lines needed for vitrification of 50 t of Pu in 10 years is directly dependent upon the time required for Pu dissolution in glass. The objective of this joint Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) - Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) study was to demonstrate a high Pu solubility in glass and to identify on a rough scale the time required for Pu dissolution in the glass. This study was conducted using a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass composition designed at the SRTC for the vitrification of actinides

  6. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.

    1961-01-17

    A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.

  7. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

    1959-08-25

    A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

  8. Plutonium Finishing Plant transition project function analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lund, D.P.

    1995-09-01

    The document contains the functions, function definitions, function interfaces, function interface definitions, Input Computer Automated Manufacturing Definition (IDEFO) diagrams, and function hierarchy charts that describe what needs to be performed to deactivate PFP and to continue safe storage, treatment and disposition of Plutonium and High Enriched Uranium

  9. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-07-31

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

  10. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro's Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel

  11. 75 FR 70916 - Surplus Properties; Notice

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-19

    ... (Volunteer Army Ammunition Plant) USARC that was determined surplus to the United States needs in accordance... Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994, Public Law 103-421 and 10 U.S.C. 113. Dated...

  12. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  13. A Program to Stabilize Nuclear Materials as Managed by the Plutonium Focus Area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenley, B.; Scott, B.; Seidel, B.; Knecht, D.; Southworth, F.; Osborne, K.; Chipman, N.; Creque, T.

    1999-01-01

    This paper describes the program to stabilize nuclear materials, consistent with the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (EM) plan, Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure. The program is managed by the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area, which defines and manages technology development programs to stabilize nuclear materials and assure their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area (PFA) activities includes non-weapons plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA provides solutions to site-specific and complex wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. Our paper describes an important programmatic function of the Department of Energy nuclear materials stabilization program, including the tie-in of policy to research needs and funding for the nuclear materials disposition area. The PFA uses a rigorous systems engineering determination of technology needs and gaps, under the guidance of a Technical Advisory Panel, consisting of complex-wide experts. The Research and Development planning provides an example for other waste areas and should be of interest to Research and Development managers. The materials disposition maps developed by the PFA and described in this paper provide an evaluation of research needs, data gaps and subsequent guidance for the development of technologies for nuclear materials disposition. This paper also addresses the PFA prioritization methodology and its ability to forecast actual time to implementation

  14. The Dispositions Improvement Process

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brewer, Robin D.; Lindquist, Cynthia; Altemueller, Lisa

    2011-01-01

    Globally, teacher dispositions along with knowledge and skills continue to be the focal point of teacher education programs. Teachers influence children's development and therefore dispositions are a universal concern. For the past 20 years in the United States, teacher education programs have assessed dispositions. We, however, must now also use…

  15. The contribution of civilian industry to military Pu disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montalembert, J.A. de

    2000-01-01

    Weapon-grade plutonium must be disposed of in a safe and secure manner. Disposition programs should start as soon as possible and be properly monitored to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Finally, for obvious economic and environmental reasons, such programs should make use, as much as possible, of proven processes and technology as well as of available equipment and existing sites. The more advanced - and readily available - solution is the fabrication of plutonium into MOX fuel and its irradiation existing Light Water Reactors. This solution also has the obvious advantage of burning some of the plutonium (30 to 40 %) and degrading the remaining portion of it, while generating electricity. In the longer term, the burning of plutonium new types of dedicated reactors, like High Temperature Reactor or Fast Neutron Reactor, can be envisaged, but the time and costs associated with deploying such reactors and their fuel cycle must be taken to account. (authors)

  16. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  17. Plutonium-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ammerich, Marc; Frot, Patricia; Gambini, Denis-Jean; Gauron, Christine; Moureaux, Patrick; Herbelet, Gilbert; Lahaye, Thierry; Pihet, Pascal; Rannou, Alain

    2014-06-01

    This sheet belongs to a collection which relates to the use of radionuclides essentially in unsealed sources. Its goal is to gather on a single document the most relevant information as well as the best prevention practices to be implemented. These sheets are made for the persons in charge of radiation protection: users, radioprotection-skill persons, labor physicians. Each sheet treats of: 1 - the radio-physical and biological properties; 2 - the main uses; 3 - the dosimetric parameters; 4 - the measurement; 5 - the protection means; 6 - the areas delimitation and monitoring; 7 - the personnel classification, training and monitoring; 8 - the effluents and wastes; 9 - the authorization and declaration administrative procedures; 10 - the transport; and 11 - the right conduct to adopt in case of incident or accident. This sheet deals specifically with Plutonium-239

  18. Options for the disposition of current inventory of Rocky Flats Plant residues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Lychin.

    1994-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, much concern has been directed towards the accumulation of special nuclear material resulting from the dismantlement of a large number of nuclear weapons. This concern has opened up a debate over the final disposition of the large inventory of weapons-capable plutonium. Technologies for the conversion of plutonium into acceptable forms will need to be assessed and evaluated. Candidate strategies for interim and final disposition include a variety of immobilization techniques (vitrification in glass, ceramic, or metal), conversion to reactor fuel, or direct discard as waste. The selected disposition strategy will be chosen based upon a range of decision metric such as expected conversion costs, equipment requirements, and waste generation. To this end, a systems analysis approach is necessary for the evaluation and comparison of the different disposition strategies. Current data on inventory of plutonium, such as that at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP), may be useful for the evaluation and selection of candidate disposition technologies. A preliminary analysis of the residues of scrap at Rocky Flats was performed to establish a foundation for comparison of candidate strategies. About 3 metric tons of plutonium and 270 metric tons of other wastes remain in the inventory at Rocky Flats. Estimates on the equipment, facility, manpower, and cost requirements to process this inventory over a proposed 10-year cleanup campaign will provide a benchmark for comparison and assessment of proposed disposition technologies

  19. Options for the disposition of current inventory of Rocky Flats Plant residues. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, L.

    1994-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, much concern has been directed towards the accumulation of special nuclear material resulting from the dismantlement of a large number of nuclear weapons. This concern has opened up a debate over the final disposition of the large inventory of weapons-capable plutonium. Technologies for the conversion of plutonium into acceptable forms will need to be assessed and evaluated. Candidate strategies for interim and final disposition include a variety of immobilization techniques (vitrification in glass, ceramic, or metal), conversion to reactor fuel, or direct discard as waste. The selected disposition strategy will be chosen based upon a range of decision metrics such as expected conversion costs, equipment requirements, and waste generation. To this end, a systems analysis approach is necessary for the evaluation and comparison of the different disposition strategies. Current data on inventory of plutonium, such as that at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP), may be useful for the evaluation and selection of candidate disposition technologies. A preliminary analysis of the residues of scrap at Rocky Flats was performed to establish a foundation for comparison of candidate strategies. About 3 metric tons of plutonium and 270 metric tons of other wastes remain in the inventory at Rocky Flats. Estimates on the equipment, facility, manpower, and cost requirements to process this inventory over a proposed 10-year cleanup campaign will provide a benchmark for comparison and assessment of proposed disposition technologies

  20. The plutonium fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pigford, T.H.; Ang, K.P.

    1975-01-01

    The quantities of plutonium and other fuel actinides have been calculated for equilibrium fuel cycles for 1000-MW water reactors fueled with slightly enriched uranium, water reactors fueled with plutonium and natural uranium, fast-breder reactors, gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium and highly enriched uranium, and gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium, plutonium and recycled uranium. The radioactivity quantities of plutonium, americium and curium processed yearly in these fuel cycles are greatest for the water reactors fueled with natural uranium and recycled plutonium. The total amount of actinides processed is calculated for the predicted future growth of the U.S. nuclear power industry. For the same total installed nuclear power capacity, the introduction of the plutonium breeder has little effect upon the total amount of plutonium in this century. The estimated amount of plutonium in the low-level process wastes in the plutonium fuel cycles is comparable to the amount of plutonium in the high-level fission product wastes. The amount of plutonium processed in the nuclear fuel cycles can be considerably reduced by using gas-cooled reactors to consume plutonium produced in uranium-fueled water reactors. These, and other reactors dedicated for plutonium utilization, could be co-located with facilities for fuel reprocessing ad fuel fabrication to eliminate the off-site transport of separated plutonium. (author)

  1. 32 CFR 736.5 - Disposition of real and personal property under special statutory authority.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... more than 50,000 must be deferred for 30 days after reporting the proposed transaction to the Armed... (10 U.S.C. 2662). (c) Disposition of strategic materials. Strategic materials may be disposed of by... disasters. Surplus property may also be disposed of to States for sale to small business concerns affected...

  2. Plutonium economy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traube, K.

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved. (orig.) [de

  3. Prospects for plutonium recycling in light-water reactors in the European Communities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haijtink, B.

    1977-01-01

    On the basis of a forecast on nuclear power installation programmes and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capacities in the European Community, an assessment has been made of the developmnt of the plutonium handling industry up to the year 1990. Data on plutonium recovered in the reprocessing plants, requirements for fuelling the fast-breeder reactors and the remaining stockpile have been evaluated. A possible strategy for recycling the plutonium surplus in light-water reactors has been developed and its effects as regards saving on requirements for natural uranium and enrichment services have been estimated

  4. Habit formation, surplus consumption and return predictability

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Engsted, Tom; Hyde, Stuart; Vinther Møller, Stig

    2010-01-01

    On an international post World War II dataset, we use an iterated GMM procedure to estimate and test the Campbell and Cochrane (1999, By force of habit: a consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205–251.) habit formation model with a time......-varying risk-free rate. In addition, we analyze the predictive power of the surplus consumption ratio for future stock and bond returns. We find that, although there are important cross-country differences and economically significant pricing errors, for the majority of countries in our sample the model gets...... significant information about future stock returns, also during the 1990s. In addition, in most countries the surplus consumption ratio is also a powerful predictor of future bond returns. Thus, the surplus consumption ratio captures time-varying expected returns in both stock and bond markets....

  5. Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Plutonium Finishing Plant, also known as PFP, represented the end of the line (the final procedure) associated with plutonium production at Hanford.PFP was also...

  6. Plutonium biokinetics in humans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popplewell, D.; Ham, G.; McCarthy, W.; Lands, C.

    1994-01-01

    By using an 'unusual' isotope it is possible to carry out experiments with plutonium in volunteers at minimal radiation dose levels. Measurements have been made of the gut transfer factor and the urinary excretion of plutonium after intravenous injection. (author)

  7. Plutonium in uranium deposits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curtis, D.; Fabryka-Martin, J.; Aguilar, R.; Attrep, M. Jr.; Roensch, F.

    1992-01-01

    Plutonium-239 (t 1/2 , 24,100 yr) is one of the most persistent radioactive constituents of high-level wastes from nuclear fission power reactors. Effective containment of such a long-lived constituent will rely heavily upon its containment by the geologic environment of a repository. Uranium ore deposits offer a means to evaluate the geochemical properties of plutonium under natural conditions. In this paper, analyses of natural plutonium in several ores are compared to calculated plutonium production rates in order to evaluate the degree of retention of plutonium by the ore. The authors find that current methods for estimating production rates are neither sufficiently accurate nor precise to provide unambiguous measures of plutonium retention. However, alternative methods for evaluating plutonium mobility are being investigated, including its measurement in natural ground waters. Preliminary results are reported and establish the foundation for a comprehensive characterization of plutonium geochemistry in other natural environments

  8. Plutonium metal burning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausburg, D.E.; Leebl, R.G.

    1977-01-01

    A glove-box facility was designed to convert plutonium skull metal or unburned oxide to an oxide acceptable for plutonium recovery and purification. A discussion of the operation, safety aspects, and electrical schematics are included

  9. Plutonium Training Opportunities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Wolkov, Benjamin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-03-26

    This report was created to examine the current state of plutonium training in the United States and to discover ways in which to ensure that the next generation of plutonium workers are fully qualified.

  10. EXAFS and XANES analysis of plutonium and cerium edges from titanate ceramics for fissile materials disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortner, J. A.; Kropf, A. J.; Bakel, A. J.; Hash, M. C.; Aase, S. B.; Buck, E. C.; Chamerlain, D. B.

    1999-01-01

    We report x-ray absorption near edge structure (XANES) and extended x-ray absorption fine structure (EXAFS) spectra from the plutonium L III edge and XANES from the cerium L II edge in prototype titanate ceramic hosts. The titanate ceramics studied are based upon the hafnium-pyrochlore and zirconolite mineral structures and will serve as an immobilization host for surplus fissile materials, containing as much as 10 weight % fissile plutonium and 20 weight % (natural or depleted) uranium. Three ceramic formulations were studied: one employed cerium as a ''surrogate'' element, replacing both plutonium and uranium in the ceramic matrix, another formulation contained plutonium in a ''baseline'' ceramic formulation, and a third contained plutonium in a formulation representing a high-impurity plutonium stream. The cerium XANES from the surrogate ceramic clearly indicates a mixed III-IV oxidation state for the cerium. In contrast, XANES analysis of the two plutonium-bearing ceramics shows that the plutonium is present almost entirely as Pu(IV) and occupies the calcium site in the zirconolite and pyrochlore phases. The plutonium EXAFS real-space structure shows a strong second-shell peak, clearly distinct from that of PuO 2 , with remarkably little difference in the plutonium crystal chemistry indicated between the baseline and high-impurity formulations

  11. Optimization and plutonium equilibrium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1976-01-01

    The sequential simplex method has been used to estimate the extent of disproportionation of tetravalent plutonium in dilute acid. A method for simulating potentiometric titrations is proposed, and this method suggests that the stoichiometric end point and the inflection point may not always correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium. A possible characteristic equation for the nitrite-plutonium reaction is illustrated, and the method of proportional equations is extended to the iron-plutonium reaction

  12. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    Autoradiographic techniques with liquid photographic emulsion and cellulose nitrate track-etch film are being used to investigate the spatial distribution of inhaled plutonium in the lungs of beagle dogs exposed to cigarette smoke or to the plutonium aerosol only. More plutonium than expected was detected on the inner surfaces of bronchi, and particles were observed beneath the bronchial mucosa. 2 figures, 2 tables

  13. Optimizing Plutonium stock management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niquil, Y.; Guillot, J.

    1997-01-01

    Plutonium from spent fuel reprocessing is reused in new MOX assemblies. Since plutonium isotopic composition deteriorates with time, it is necessary to optimize plutonium stock management over a long period, to guarantee safe procurement, and contribute to a nuclear fuel cycle policy at the lowest cost. This optimization is provided by the prototype software POMAR

  14. Treatment of plutonium contaminations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafuma, J.

    1983-01-01

    Three kinds of plutonium contaminations were considered: skin contamination; contaminated wounds; contamination by inhalation. The treatment of these contaminations was studied for insoluble (oxide and metal forms) and soluble plutonium (complexes). The use of DTPA and therapeutic problems encountered with stable plutonium complexes were analyzed. The new possibilities of internal decontamination using Puchel and LICAM were evaluated [fr

  15. Plutonium, nuclear fuel; Le plutonium, combustible nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grison, E [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Fontenay aux Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires, Saclay

    1960-07-01

    A review of the physical properties of metallic plutonium, its preparation, and the alloys which it forms with the main nuclear metals. Appreciation of its future as a nuclear fuel. (author) [French] Apercu sur les proprietes physiques du plutonium metallique, sa preparation, ses alliages avec les principaux metaux nucleaires. Consideration sur son avenir en tant que combustible nucleaire. (auteur)

  16. Plutonium focus area. Technology summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) in October 1995. The PFA open-quotes...provides for peer and technical reviews of research and development in plutonium stabilization activities...close quotes In addition, the PFA identifies and develops relevant research and technology. The purpose of this document is to focus attention on the requirements used to develop research and technology for stabilization, storage, and preparation for disposition of nuclear materials. The PFA Technology Summary presents the approach the PFA uses to identify, recommend, and review research. It lists research requirements, research being conducted, and gaps where research is needed. It also summarizes research performed by the PFA in the traditional research summary format. This document encourages researchers and commercial enterprises to do business with PFA by submitting research proposals or open-quotes white papers.close quotes In addition, it suggests ways to increase the likelihood that PFA will recommend proposed research to the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (NMSTG) of DOE

  17. Plutonium economy. Plutonium-Wirtschaft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Traube, K

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved.

  18. A small firm leads to curious outcomes: Social surplus, consumer surplus

    OpenAIRE

    Matsumura, Toshihiro; Matsushima, Noriaki

    2009-01-01

    This paper investigates an asymmetric duopoly model with a Hotelling line. We find that helping a small (minor) firm can reduce both social and consumer surplus. This makes a sharp contrast to existing works showing that helping minor firms can reduce social surplus but always improves consumer surplus. We also investigate R&D competition. We find that a minor firm may engage in R&D more intensively than a major firm in spite of economies of scale in R&D activities.

  19. The role of troublesome components in plutonium vitrification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Li, Hong; Vienna, J.D.; Peeler, D.K.; Hrma, P.; Schweiger, M.J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    One option for immobilizing surplus plutonium is vitrification in a borosilicate glass. Two advantages of the glass form are (1) high tolerance to feed variability and, (2) high solubility of some impurity components. The types of plutonium-containing materials in the United States inventory include: pits, metals, oxides, residues, scrap, compounds, and fuel. Many of them also contain high concentrations of carbon, chloride, fluoride, phosphate, sulfate, and chromium oxide. To vitrify plutonium-containing scrap and residues, it is critical to understand the impact of each component on glass processing and chemical durability of the final product. This paper addresses glass processing issues associated with these troublesome components. It covers solubility limits of chlorine, fluorine, phosphate, sulfate, and chromium oxide in several borosilicate based glasses, and the effect of each component on vitrification (volatility, phase segregation, crystallization, and melt viscosity). Techniques (formulation, pretreatment, removal, and/or dilution) to mitigate the effect of these troublesome components are suggested.

  20. Safely disposing and controlling the various forms of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.

    1991-01-01

    The growing surplus of plutonium will continue to pose safety, health, and verification problems. Although long term storage and disposal of plutonium seems technically feasible, or at least comparable in technical difficulty to commercial spent fuel disposal, significant political obstacles within the government and the public, may make it difficult to solve this problem. Although options to build verifiable warhead dismantlement facilities or to recycle plutonium in reactors and thus convert separated plutonium into irradiated fuel are straight forward concepts, their realization remains difficult for economic and political reasons. The plutonium recycle option also raises additional proliferation concerns about its impact on civilian nuclear programs. In the absence of a long term solution, the United States can implement various storage or interim disposal options that involve minimal processing, but that ease verification problems and provide adequate safety and protection of public health

  1. Nutrient surpluses on integrated arable farms

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schröder, J.J.; Asperen, van P.; Dongen, van G.J.M.; Wijnands, F.G.

    1996-01-01

    From 1990 to 1993 nutrient fluxes were monitored on 38 private arable farms that had adopted farming strategies aiming at reduced nutrient inputs and substitution of mineral fertilizers by organic fertilizers. The nutrient surplus was defined as the difference between inputs (including inputs

  2. 7 CFR 987.47 - Surplus.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements and... that any producer or handler may dispose of any such surplus dates of his own production within his own... regulations necessary and incidental to administration of this regulation. [27 FR 6818, July 19, 1962, as...

  3. The plutonium society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mez, L.; Richter, M.

    1981-01-01

    The lectures of an institute are reported on, which took place between 25th and 27th January 1980 in Berlin. The subsequent public panel discussion with representations from the political parties is then documentated in a few press-reports. The themes of the 8 lectures are: views and facts on plutonium, plutonium as an energy resource, military aspects of the production of plutonium, economic aspects of the plutonium economy, the position of the trade unions on the industrial reconversion, the alleged inevitability of a plutonium society and the socio-political alternatives and perspectives of nuclear waste disposal. (UA) [de

  4. The use of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1980-01-01

    The use of plutonium as a vital energy source producing maximum economic benefit with minimum proliferation risks is discussed. Having considered the production of plutonium, several possible plutonium fuel cycle options are identified and the economic value to be attached to plutonium for each examined. It is shown how the use of plutonium in fast reactors gives an opportunity for a non-proliferation policy not available when plutonium is used only in thermal reactors. From the technical considerations reviewed concerning plutonium and fast reactors it is shown that an economic regime involving international trade in spent thermal reactor fuel is possible which benefits equally those countries with fast reactors and those without and also assists in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U.K.)

  5. Plutonium in nature; Le plutonium dans la nature

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Madic, C.

    1994-12-31

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases.

  6. EIS Data Call Report: Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  7. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Robotic canister loading

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site (SRS), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). When operational in 2008, the PIP will fulfill the nation's nonproliferation commitment by placing surplus weapons-grade plutonium in a permanently stable ceramic form and making it unattractive for reuse. Since there are significant radiation and security concerns, the program team is developing novel and unique technology to remotely perform plutonium immobilization tasks. The remote task covered in this paper employs a jointed arm robot to load seven 3.5 inch diameter, 135-pound cylinders (magazines) through the 4 inch diameter neck of a stainless steel canister. Working through the narrow canister neck, the robot secures the magazines into a specially designed rack pre-installed in the canister. To provide the deterrent effect, the canisters are filled with a mixture of high-level waste and glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF)

  8. What is to be done with surplus embryos? Attitude formation with ambivalence in German fertility patients.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kufner, K; Tonne, M; Barth, J

    2009-01-01

    Improved pregnancy rates in IVF have led to increasing numbers of surplus embryos which can potentially be used for purposes like donation to another infertile couple or further research. Individuals report high levels of ambivalence concerning the donation of surplus embryos. This study examined which strategies infertile patients use to deal with this ambivalence when asked to evaluate potential dispositions of surplus embryos created during IVF. Guideline-based interviews with fertility patients were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Following the principle of theoretical sampling, eight interviews were analysed by use of Grounded Theory. Analyses focused on processes of individual attitude formation. Strategies for handling ambivalence during attitude formation were identified: the six strategies comprise cognitive and communicative strategies, and were integrated into a model of attitude formation under ambivalence. As ambivalence is a relevant phenomenon in attitude formation within IVF treatment, assessment of ambivalence is strongly recommended in social science studies investigating ethical problems in patient care. In the context of informed consent, there is a need for individual counselling which draws attention to the conflicting values during attitude formation. Counsellors should be aware of the signs of and the strategies to deal with ambivalence.

  9. Fissile materials from nuclear arms reductions: A question of disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1991-01-01

    This Session, 35T-2, of the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was held on February 18, 1991. The papers presented during this session covered a variety of issues and technologies concerning the disposition of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium salvaged from retired nuclear warheads. However, circumstances, including the amount of time available for the session, imposed limitations on the number and breadth of these papers. A comprehensive study of this topic should include a broader range of papers. This session included a paper on molten salt reactors designed to use highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel. Other options for the disposal of plutonium, such as transmutation using accelerators and underground vitrification using nuclear explosions, were not discussed during this session, but need to be considered. Individual papers are indexed separately

  10. The characterization and testing of candidate immobilization forms for the disposal of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakel, A. J.; Buck, E. C.; Chamberlain, D. B.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Fortner, J. A.; Marra, J. C.; Mcgrail, B. P.; Mertz, C. J.; Peeler, D. K.; Shaw, H. F.; Strachan, D. M.; Van Konynenburg, R. A.; Vienna, J. D.; Wolf, S. F.

    1997-01-01

    Candidate immobilization forms for the disposal of surplus weapons-useable are being tested and characterized. The goal of the testing program was to provide sufficient data that, by August 1997, an informed selection of a single immobilization form could be made so that the form development and production R and D could be more narrowly focused. Two forms have been under consideration for the past two years: glass and ceramic. In August, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) selected ceramic for plutonium disposition, halting further work on the glass material. In this paper, we will briefly describe these two waste forms, then describe our characterization techniques and testing methods. The analytical methods used to characterize altered and unaltered samples are the same. A full suite of microscopic techniques is used. Techniques used include optical, scanning electron, and transmission electron microscopies. For both candidate immobilization forms, the analyses are used to characterize the material for the presence of crystalline phases and amorphous material. Crystalline materials, either in the untested immobilization form or in the alteration products from testing, are characterized with respect to morphology, crystal structure, and composition. The goal of these analyses is to provide data on critical issues such as Pu and neutron absorber volubility in the immobilization form, thermal stability, potential separation of absorber and Pu, and the long-term behavior of the materials. Results from these analyses will be discussed in the presentation. Testing methods include MCC-1 tests, product consistency tests (methods A and B), unsaturated ''drip'' tests, vapor hydration tests, single-pass flow-through tests, and pressurized unsaturated flow tests. Both candidate immobilization forms have very low dissolution rates; examples of typical test results will be reported

  11. Properties of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new

  12. Civil plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicard, B.; Zaetta, A.

    2004-01-01

    During 1960 and 1970 the researches on the plutonium recycling in fast neutrons reactors were stimulated by the fear of uranium reserves diminishing. At the beginning of 1980, the plutonium mono-recycling for water cooled reactors is implementing. After 1990 the public opinion concerning the radioactive wastes management and the consequences of the disarmament agreements between Russia and United States, modified the context. This paper presents the today situation and technology associated to the different options and strategical solutions of the plutonium management: the plutonium use in the world, the neutronic characteristics, the plutonium effect on the reactors characteristics, the MOX behavior in the reactors, the MOX fabrication and treatment, the possible improvements to the plutonium use, the concepts performance in a nuclear park. (A.L.B.)

  13. Properties of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of)

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new.

  14. World status report: plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dircks, W.

    1992-01-01

    In a recent speech in Japan, the Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the economic case for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel had been severely eroded. An edited version of the speech is given. The changed prospects for nuclear energy is given as the reason why the demand for plutonium has declined sharply. The oil crisis of the 1970s reduced the demand for electric power and the economic justification for the use of recycled plutonium. The stockpile of isolated plutonium is growing rapidly giving rise to worries about its security. From this point of view, isolated plutonium is best kept in reactor fuel not separated out. In this connection the IAEA has offered to help in the storage of plutonium so that vigorous safety and security requirements are met. In Japan there is a debate about the plutonium which is dependent on the future of the fast breeder reactor programme. (UK)

  15. What is a Dispositive?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius T.; Thaning, Morten Sørensen

    perspective – indeed it forms a lesser known intermediary between these. Foucault’s dispositional analysis articulates a history of connected social technologies that we have constructed to relate to each other. Expounding these points, the article distinguishes various dispositional prototypes and develops...... key ‘socio-ontological’ implications of the analy-sis. Reinstating the proper analytical status of the dispositive contributes to the reception of the important notion; the interpretation of Foucault’s entire oeuvre; and a resourceful approach to the study of contemporary societal problems....

  16. PLUTONIUM-ZIRCONIUM ALLOYS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schonfeld, F.W.; Waber, J.T.

    1960-08-30

    A series of nuclear reactor fuel alloys consisting of from about 5 to about 50 at.% zirconium (or higher zirconium alloys such as Zircaloy), balance plutonium, and having the structural composition of a plutonium are described. Zirconium is a satisfactory diluent because it alloys readily with plutonium and has desirable nuclear properties. Additional advantages are corrosion resistance, excellent fabrication propenties, an isotropie structure, and initial softness.

  17. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1983-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Because cigarette smokers constitute a large fraction of the population, a synergistic effect of plutonium and cigarette smoke might influence estimates of the health risk for plutonium and other transuranics released to the environment

  18. Perspective on plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun, L.S.

    1993-01-01

    This paper is intended as a brief overview on the element plutonium. Plutonium is the first primarily man-made element to play a significant role not only in technological development, but also in the economic growth of many countries. The importance of plutonium centers around its enormous energy making it ideal for wide-scale use in reactors, while the nuclear industry continues to work toward improving safety and efficiency of plutonium as a reactor fuel politicians and the public still debate over the safety and benefits of nuclear power. (30 refs.)

  19. Remote material handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    With the downsizing of the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium in the US are being declared excess and will be disposed of by the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To implement this program, DOE has selected the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the construction and operation of three new facilities: pit disassembly and conversion; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and plutonium immobilization. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize a portion of the excess plutonium in a hybrid ceramic and glass form containing high level waste for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. The PIP is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. Processing technology for the PIP is being developed jointly by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Westinghouse Savannah River Company. This paper will discuss development of the automated unpacking and sorting operations in the conversion area, and the automated puck and tray handling operations in the first stage immobilization area. Due to the high radiation levels and toxicity of the materials to be disposed of, the PIP will utilize automated equipment in a contained (glovebox) facility. Most operations involving plutonium-bearing materials will be performed remotely, separating personnel from the radiation source. Source term materials will be removed from the operations during maintenance. Maintenance will then be performed hands on within the containment using glove ports

  20. Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-11-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects.

  1. Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-11-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects

  2. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The overall objective of this study is to determine whether cigarette smoking increases the probability of plutonium-induced lung cancer. Initial experiments, designed to characterize the effect of chronic cigarette smoke exposure on pulmonary clearance of plutonium aerosols, are described

  3. Plutonium valence state distributions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1974-01-01

    A calculational method for ascertaining equilibrium valence state distributions of plutonium in acid solutions as a function of the plutonium oxidation number and the solution acidity is illustrated with an example. The method may be more practical for manual use than methods based upon polynomial equations. (T.G.)

  4. Application of spent fuel treatment technology to plutonium immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McPheeters, C.C.; Ackerman, J.P.; Gay, E.C., Johnson, G.K.

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of the electrometallurgical treatment technology being developed at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is to convert certain spent nuclear fuels into waste forms that are suitable for disposal in a geological repository for nuclear waste. The spent fuels of interest are those that cannot be safely stored for a long time in their current condition, and those that cannot be qualified for repository disposal. This paper explores the possibility of applying this electrometallurgical treatment technology to immobilization of surplus fissile materials, primarily plutonium. Immobilization of surplus fissile materials by electrometallurgical treatment could be done in the same facilities, at the same time. and in the same equipment as the proposed treatment of the present inventory of spent nuclear fuel. The cost and schedule savings of this simultaneous treatment scheme would be significant

  5. The toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crouse, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    Shipments of plutonium occasionally pass around the Cape coastal waters on its way to Japan from Europe. This invariably leads to a great deal of speculation of the dangers involved and of the extreme toxicity of plutonium, with the media and environmental groups claiming that (a) plutonium is the most toxic substance known to man, and that (b) a few kilograms of plutonium ground finely and dispersed in the atmosphere could kill every human being on earth. Comparisons with other poisons are drawn, e.g. common inorganic chemicals and biological agents. The original scare around the extraordinary toxicity of Pu seems to have started in 1974 with the claims of Tamplin and Cochran's hot particle theory about plutonium lodging in the sensitive portions of the lungs in small concentrated aggregates where they are much more effective in producing cancers. This theory, however, is regarded as thoroughly discredited by the experts in the field of radiotoxicity. 8 refs

  6. Plutonium storage criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, D. [Scientech, Inc., Germantown, MD (United States); Ascanio, X. [Dept. of Energy, Germantown, MD (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy has issued a technical standard for long-term (>50 years) storage and will soon issue a criteria document for interim (<20 years) storage of plutonium materials. The long-term technical standard, {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,{close_quotes} addresses the requirements for storing metals and oxides with greater than 50 wt % plutonium. It calls for a standardized package that meets both off-site transportation requirements, as well as remote handling requirements from future storage facilities. The interim criteria document, {open_quotes}Criteria for Interim Safe Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Solid Materials{close_quotes}, addresses requirements for storing materials with less than 50 wt% plutonium. The interim criteria document assumes the materials will be stored on existing sites, and existing facilities and equipment will be used for repackaging to improve the margin of safety.

  7. Plutonium roundtable discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Penneman, R.A.

    1982-01-01

    The roundtable discussion began with remarks by the chairman who pointed out the complicated nature of plutonium chemistry. Judging from the papers presented at this symposium, he noticed a pattern which indicated to him the result of diminished funding for investigation of basic plutonium chemistry and funding focused on certain problem areas. Dr. G.L. silver pointed to plutonium chemists' erroneous use of a simplified summary equation involving the disproportionation of Pu(EV) and their each of appreciation of alpha coefficients. To his appreciation of alpha coefficients. To his charges, Dr. J.T. Bell spoke in defense of the chemists. This discussion was followed by W.W. Schulz's comments on the need for experimental work to determine solubility data for plutonium in its various oxidation states under geologic repository conditions. Discussion then turned to plutonium pyrachemical process with Dana C. Christensen as the main speaker. This paper presents edited versions of participants' written version

  8. Plutonium storage phenomenology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szempruch, R.

    1995-12-01

    Plutonium has been produced, handled, and stored at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities since the 1940s. Many changes have occurred during the last 40 years in the sources, production demands, and end uses of plutonium. These have resulted in corresponding changes in the isotopic composition as well as the chemical and physical forms of the processed and stored plutonium. Thousands of ordinary food pack tin cans have been used successfully for many years to handle and store plutonium. Other containers have been used with equal success. This paper addressees the exceptions to this satisfactory experience. To aid in understanding the challenges of handling plutonium for storage or immobilization the lessons learned from past storage experience and the necessary countermeasures to improve storage performance are discussed

  9. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. open-quotes Militaryclose quotes refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. open-quotes Excessclose quotes refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC ampersand A), containment and surveillance (C ampersand S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. open-quotes Monitoringclose quotes is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized

  10. Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). NIS Div.

    1996-05-01

    The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium.

  11. Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1996-01-01

    The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium

  12. Heterodox surplus approach: production, prices, and value theory

    OpenAIRE

    Lee, Frederic

    2011-01-01

    In this paper I argue that that there is a heterodox social surplus approach that has its own account of output-employment and prices, and its own value theory which draws upon various heterodox traditions. Starting with the Sraffian technical definition of the social surplus and then working with a Sraffa-Leontief input-output framework, the particular distinguishing feature of the heterodox approach is the role of agency in determining prices, the social surplus, and total social product a...

  13. Savannah River Site Surplus Facilities Available for Reuse

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clarke, R.M.; Owens, M.B.; Lentz, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a current, centralized list of Savannah River Site facilities, which are surplus and available for reuse. These surplus facilities may be made available for other DOE site missions, commercial economic development reuse, or other governmental reuse. SRS procedures also require that before new construction can be approved, available surplus facilities are screened for possible reuse in lieu of the proposed new construction

  14. The environmental assessment of nuclear materials disposition options: A transportation perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, R.K.; Clauss, D.B.; Moyer, J.W.

    1994-01-01

    The US Department of Energy has undertaken a program to evaluate and select options for the long-term storage and disposition of fissile materials declared surplus to defense needs as a result of the end of the Cold War. The transport of surplus fissile material will be an important and highly visible aspect of the environmental impact studies and other planning documents required for implementation of the disposition options. This report defines the roles and requirements for transportation of fissile materials in the program, and discusses an existing methodology for determining the environmental impact in terms of risk. While it will be some time before specific alternatives are chosen that will permit the completion of detailed risk calculations, the analytical models for performing the probabilistic risk assessments already exist with much of the supporting data related to the transportation system. This report summarizes the various types of data required and identifies sources for that data

  15. Decommissioning of eight surplus production reactors at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    The first section of this volume summarizes the content of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) and this Addendum, which together constitute the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) prepared on the decommissioning of eight surplus plutonium production reactors at Hanford. The FEIS consists of two volumes. The first volume is the DEIS as written. The second volume (this Addendum) consists of a summary; Chapter 9, which contains comments on the DEIS and provides DOE's responses to the comments; Appendix F, which provides additional health effects information; Appendix K, which contains costs of decommissioning in 1990 dollars; Appendix L, which contains additional graphite leaching data; Appendix M, which contains a discussion of accident scenarios; Appendix N, which contains errata; and Appendix 0, which contains reproductions of the letters, transcripts, and exhibits that constitute the record for the public comment period

  16. Vitrification of plutonium at Rocky Flats the argument for a pilot plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, L. [Rocky Mountain Peace Center, Boulder, CO (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Current plans for stabilizing and storing the plutonium at Rocky Flats Plant fail to put the material in a form suitable for disposition and resistant to proliferation. Vitrification should be considered as an alternate technology. The vitrification should begin with a small-scale pilot plant.

  17. Toxicology of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bair, W.J.

    1974-01-01

    Data are reviewed from studies on the toxicity of Pu in experimental animals. Of the several plutonium isotopes, only 238 Pu and 239 Pu have been studied well. Sufficient results have been obtained to show that the behavior of 238 Pu in biological systems and the resulting biological effects cannot be precisely predicted from studies of 239 Pu. This probably applies also to other radiologically important plutonium isotopes which have half-lives ranging from 45 days to 10 7 years and decay by β-emission, electron capture, and spontaneous fission, as well as by emission of α-particles. All the biological effects of plutonium described in this review are attributed to alpha-particle radiation emitted by the plutonium. However, since plutonium is a chemically active heavy metal, one cannot ignore the possibility of chemical toxicity of the low-specific-activity isotopes, 239 Pu, 242 Pu, and 244 Pu. The preponderance of our knowledge of plutonium toxicology has come from short-term studies of relatively high dosage levels in several animal species. The consequences of high-level internal exposures can be predicted with confidence in experimental animals and probably also in man. However, considering the care with which plutonium is handled in the nuclear industry, a high-level contamination event is unlikely. Considerably less is known about the long-term effects of low levels of contamination. (250 references) (U.S.)

  18. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-02-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

  19. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option

  20. The plutonium danger

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruiter, W. de

    1983-01-01

    Nobody can ignore the fact that plutonium is potentially very dangerous and the greatest danger concerning it lies in the spreading of nuclear weapons via nuclear energy programmes. The following seven different attitudes towards this problem are presented and discussed: 1) There is no connection between peaceful and military applications; 2) The problem cannot be prevented; 3) A technical solution must be found; 4) plutonium must be totally inaccessible to countries involved in acquiring nuclear weapons; 5) The use of plutonium for energy production should only occur in one multinational centre; 6) Dogmas in the nuclear industry must be enfeebled; 7) All developments in this area should stop. (C.F.)

  1. Automation of plutonium spectrophotometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, J.J.; Boisde, G.; Goujon de Beauvivier, M.; Chevalier, G.; Isaac, M.

    1980-01-01

    Instrumentation was designed and constructed for automatic control of plutonium by molecular absorption spectrophotometry, on behalf of the reprocessing facilities, to meet two objectives: on-line measurement, of the valency state of plutonium, on by-pass, with the measured concentration covering the process concentration range up to a few mg.l -1 ; laboratory measurement of plutonium adjusted to valency VI, with operation carried out using a preparative system meeting the required containment specifications. For this two objectives, the photometer, optical cell connections are made by optical fibers resistant to β, γ radiation. Except this characteristic the devices are different according to the quality required for result [fr

  2. Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy's response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department's Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B

  3. Plutonium Plant, Trombay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yadav, J.S.; Agarwal, K.

    2017-01-01

    The journey of Indian nuclear fuel reprocessing started with the commissioning of Plutonium Plant (PP) at Trombay on 22"n"d January, 1965 with an aim to reprocess the spent fuel from research reactor CIRUS. The basic process chosen for the plant was Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction (PUREX) process. In seventies, the plant was subjected to major design modifications and replacement of hardware, which later met the additional demand from research reactor DHRUVA. The augmented plutonium plant has been operating since 1983. Experience gained from this plant was very much helpful to design future reprocessing plant in the country

  4. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1982-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Progress was made on two fronts during the past year. The autoradiographic technique developed from detection of plutonium on the interior surface of pulmonary airways (Annual Report, 1978) has been adapted to routine use in examining tracheas and bronchi of rats. Also, dogs exposed to cigarette smoke for over a year after inhalation of plutonium were killed and necropsied

  5. Plutonium Immobilization Program cold pour tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovis, G.L.; Stokes, M.W.; Smith, M.E.; Wong, J.W.

    1999-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to carry out the disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. This program uses the can-in-canister (CIC) approach. CIC involves encapsulating plutonium in ceramic forms (or pucks), placing the pucks in sealed stainless steel cans, placing the cans in long cylindrical magazines, latching the magazines to racks inside Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters, and filling the DWPF canisters with high-level waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it attractive for reuse. At present, the DWPF pours glass into empty canisters. In the CIC approach, the addition of a stainless steel rack, magazines, cans, and ceramic pucks to the canisters introduces a new set of design and operational challenges: All of the hardware installed in the canisters must maintain structural integrity at elevated (molten-glass) temperatures. This suggests that a robust design is needed. However, the amount of material added to the DWPF canister must be minimized to prevent premature glass cooling and excessive voiding caused by a large internal thermal mass. High metal temperatures, minimizing thermal mass, and glass flow paths are examples of the types of technical considerations of the equipment design process. To determine the effectiveness of the design in terms of structural integrity and glass-flow characteristics, full-scale testing will be conducted. A cold (nonradioactive) pour test program is planned to assist in the development and verification of a baseline design for the immobilization canister to be used in the PIP process. The baseline design resulting from the cold pour test program and CIC equipment development program will provide input to Title 1 design for second-stage immobilization. The cold pour tests will be conducted in two

  6. The role of accelerator-based systems for optimal elimination of plutonium to minimize global proliferation risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.; Glaser, A.; Pistner, C.

    1997-01-01

    The new proliferation dangers associated with plutonium coming out of the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and the fact that nearly all mixtures of plutonium isotopes are weapon-usable highlight the need for a sustainable disposition option. This paper gives an overview on existing military as well as civilian plutonium stocks worldwide and estimates their future development. An assessment of pros and cons of disposition options discussed so far shows that only the capability of an accelerator-based system to eliminate the plutonium virtually completely makes it attractive from the non-proliferator's point of view. We propose a set of criteria to guide the development of an appropriate system. Special attention is directed on overall proliferation resistance and safety aspects without being compromised by power generation. 17 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab

  7. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  8. ORNL Surplus Facilities Management Program maintenance and surveillance plan for fiscal year 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coobs, J.H.; Myrick, T.E.

    1986-10-01

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. The purpose and objectives of the national program are set forth in the current SFMP Program Plan and include (1) the maintenance and surveillance of facilities awaiting decommissioning, (2) planning for the orderly decommissioning of these facilities, and (3) implementation of a program to accomplish the facility disposition in a safe, cost-effective, and timely manner. As outlined in the national program plan, participating SFMP contractors are required to prepare a formal plan that documents the maintenance and surveillance (M and S) programs established for each site. This report has been prepared to provide this documentation for those facilties included in the ORNL SFMP

  9. Storage of plutonium and nuclear power plant actinide waste in the form of critical-mass-free ceramics containing neutron poisons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nadykto, B.A. [RFNC-VNIIEF, Nizhni Novgorod Region (Russian Federation)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons production has resulted in accumulation of a large quantity of plutonium and uranium highly enriched with uranium-235 isotope (many tons). The work under ISTC Project 332B-97 treated the issues of safe plutonium storage through making critical-mass-free plutonium oxide compositions with neutron poisons. This completely excludes immediate utilization (without chemical reprocessing) of retained plutonium in nuclear devices. It is therewith possible to locate plutonium most compactly in the storage facility, which would allow reduction in required storage areas and costs. The issues of the surplus weapon-grade plutonium management and utilization have been comprehensively studied in the recent decade. The issues are treated in multiple scientific publications, conferences, and seminars. At the same time, issues of nuclear power engineering actinide waste storage are studied no less extensively. The general issues are material radioactivity and energy release and nuclear accident hazards due to critical mass generation. Plutonium accumulated in nuclear power plant spent fuel is more accessible than weapon-grade plutonium and can become of higher and higher interest with time as its activity reduces, including as material for nuclear devices. The urgency of plutonium management is presently related not only to accumulation of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, but also to the fact that it is high time to decide what has to be done regarding reactor plutonium. Presently, the possibility of actinide separation from NPP spent nuclear fuel and compact underground burial separately from other (mainly fragment) activity is being considered. Actinide and neutron poison base critical-mass-free ceramic materials (similar to plutonium ceramics) may be useful for this burial method. (author)

  10. Storage of plutonium and nuclear power plant actinide waste in the form of critical-mass-free ceramics containing neutron poisons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nadykto, B.A.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons production has resulted in accumulation of a large quantity of plutonium and uranium highly enriched with uranium-235 isotope (many tons). The work under ISTC Project 332B-97 treated the issues of safe plutonium storage through making critical-mass-free plutonium oxide compositions with neutron poisons. This completely excludes immediate utilization (without chemical reprocessing) of retained plutonium in nuclear devices. It is therewith possible to locate plutonium most compactly in the storage facility, which would allow reduction in required storage areas and costs. The issues of the surplus weapon-grade plutonium management and utilization have been comprehensively studied in the recent decade. The issues are treated in multiple scientific publications, conferences, and seminars. At the same time, issues of nuclear power engineering actinide waste storage are studied no less extensively. The general issues are material radioactivity and energy release and nuclear accident hazards due to critical mass generation. Plutonium accumulated in nuclear power plant spent fuel is more accessible than weapon-grade plutonium and can become of higher and higher interest with time as its activity reduces, including as material for nuclear devices. The urgency of plutonium management is presently related not only to accumulation of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, but also to the fact that it is high time to decide what has to be done regarding reactor plutonium. Presently, the possibility of actinide separation from NPP spent nuclear fuel and compact underground burial separately from other (mainly fragment) activity is being considered. Actinide and neutron poison base critical-mass-free ceramic materials (similar to plutonium ceramics) may be useful for this burial method. (author)

  11. Plutonium spectrophotometric analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Cassaniti, P.; Orosco, E.H.

    1990-01-01

    Plutonium ions in solution have absorption spectra so different that it is possible to use them for analytical purposes. Detailed studies have been performed in nitric solutions. Some very convenient methods for the determination of plutonium and its oxidation states, especially the ratios Pu(III):Pu(IV) and Pu(IV):Pu(VI) in a mixture of both, have been developed. These methods are described in this paper, including: a) Absorption spectra for plutonium (III), (IV), (VI) and mixtures. b) Relative extinction coefficients for the above mentioned species. c) Dependences of the relative extinction coefficients on the nitric acid concentration and the plutonium VI deviation from the Beer-Lambert law. The developed methods are simple and rapid and then, suitable in process control. Accuracy is improved when relative absorbance measurements are performed or controlled the variables which have effect on the spectra and extinction coefficients. (Author) [es

  12. French plutonium management program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greneche, D.

    2002-01-01

    The French plutonium management program is summarized in this paper. The program considers nuclear generation as a major component of national electric power supply and includes the reprocessing of the spent fuel. (author)

  13. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This digest brochure explains what plutonium is, where it comes from, how it is used, its recycling into Mox fuel, its half life, historical discovery, its presence in the environment, toxicity and radioactivity. (J.S.)

  14. Plutonium safe handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tvehlov, Yu.

    2000-01-01

    The abstract, prepared on the basis of materials of the IAEA new leadership on the plutonium safe handling and its storage (the publication no. 9 in the Safety Reports Series), aimed at presenting internationally acknowledged criteria on the radiation danger evaluation and summarizing the experience in the safe management of great quantities of plutonium, accumulated in the nuclear states, is presented. The data on the weapon-class and civil plutonium, the degree of its danger, the measures for provision of its safety, including the data on accident radiation consequences with the fission number 10 18 , are presented. The recommendations, making it possible to eliminate the super- criticality danger, as well as ignition and explosion, to maintain the tightness of the facility, aimed at excluding the radioactive contamination and the possibility of internal irradiation, to provide for the plutonium security, physical protection and to reduce irradiation are given [ru

  15. Fissile material management, an international approach of the future of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michel, A.; Schryvers, V.; Vanderborck, Y.

    2000-01-01

    Plutonium management is a crucial issue in any discussion on the future of nuclear energy: plutonium is indeed a normal by-product of nuclear electricity generation. As a result of long-term reprocessing strategies and recent decisions on the dismantling of nuclear weapons, separated plutonium stockpiles are increasing. Observing this situation, the Belgian Nuclear Society decided that the turn of the century was the right time to invite all the parties involved in decision making on this question to confront their decisions or the absence of it. As an international program committee was created, interested companies and institutions delegated high level experts to it and a comprehensive program was put together. This program covers: - Prospects for nuclear energy; - Public perception of plutonium; - The civil plutonium cycle; - The management of surplus military plutonium; - Non-proliferation and safeguards; - The reasons to improve the plutonium fuels performance. The conference is not scientific but strategic. It does not cover too many technical aspects but looks at the managerial questions. It is devoted to the reasons why things are done much more than how things are done. It allows to confront opinions with a mind open to all and a desire to make strategies transparent, even to the least informed public. The present paper has been written before the conference takes place in early October 2000 and describes the orientations prepared by the Programme committee. The oral presentation to Atalante 2000 will report in full over the Pu 2000 conference. (authors)

  16. Measuring Teacher Dispositions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Singh, Delar K.; Stoloff, David L.

    2007-01-01

    Teacher quality has become a top priority of our national agenda. There is empirical evidence that suggests that teacher inputs have impact on student outcomes. It is also believed that teacher dispositions are as crucial for student achievement as a teacher's pedagogical and content knowledge/skills. The National Council for Accreditation of…

  17. Determination of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions - Gravimetric method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This International Standard specifies a precise and accurate gravimetric method for determining the concentration of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions and reference solutions, containing between 100 and 300 g of plutonium per litre, in a nitric acid medium. The weighed portion of the plutonium nitrate is treated with sulfuric acid and evaporated to dryness. The plutonium sulfate is decomposed and formed to oxide by heating in air. The oxide is ignited in air at 1200 to 1250 deg. C and weighed as stoichiometric plutonium dioxide, which is stable and non-hygroscopic

  18. Plutonium in coniferous forests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rantavaara, A.; Kostiainen, E.

    2002-01-01

    Our aim was to study the uptake of plutonium by trees, undervegetation and some wild foods. The ratio of 238 Pu/ 239,240 Pu in soil samples was determined for comparisons of the fallout origin. In twelve years the Chernobyl derived plutonium has not reached the mineral soil. This refers to a very slow downward migration in podsolic soil. The study confirmed also the low Pu uptake by vegetation and an insignificant contribution to human doses through wild foods. (au)

  19. The assessment of labour surplus in agricultural farms

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adam Marcysiak

    2009-01-01

    Full Text Available Polish agriculture is characterised by high labour surplus in agricultural farms. The aim of the study is showing the methods used for assessment of labour surplus in agricultural farms. The assessment was made considering two criteria: objective and subjective.

  20. 50 CFR 30.1 - Surplus range animals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Surplus range animals. 30.1 Section 30.1... NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM RANGE AND FERAL ANIMAL MANAGEMENT Range Animals § 30.1 Surplus range animals. Range animals on fenced wildlife refuge areas, including buffalo and longhorn cattle, determined...

  1. 50 CFR 31.1 - Determination of surplus wildlife populations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Determination of surplus wildlife populations. 31.1 Section 31.1 Wildlife and Fisheries UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM WILDLIFE SPECIES MANAGEMENT Surplus...

  2. 12 CFR 615.5330 - Minimum surplus ratios.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Minimum surplus ratios. 615.5330 Section 615.5330 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM FUNDING AND FISCAL AFFAIRS, LOAN POLICIES AND OPERATIONS, AND FUNDING OPERATIONS Surplus and Collateral Requirements § 615.5330 Minimum...

  3. Conversion of plutonium scrap and residue to boroilicate glass using the GMODS process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.; Elam, K.R.; Ferrada, J.J.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium scrap and residue represent major national and international concerns because (1) significant environmental, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) problems have been identified with their storage; (2) all plutonium recovered from the black market in Europe has been from this category; (3) storage costs are high; and (4) safeguards are difficult. It is proposed to address these problems by conversion of plutonium scrap and residue to a CRACHIP (CRiticality, Aerosol, and CHemically Inert Plutonium) glass using the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS). CRACHIP refers to a set of requirements for plutonium storage forms that minimize ES ampersand H concerns. The concept is several decades old. Conversion of plutonium from complex chemical mixtures and variable geometries into a certified, qualified, homogeneous CRACHIP glass creates a stable chemical form that minimizes ES ampersand H risks, simplifies safeguards and security, provides an easy-to-store form, decreases storage costs, and allows for future disposition options. GMODS is a new process to directly convert metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass; oxidize organics with the residue converted to glass; and convert chlorides to borosilicate glass and a secondary sodium chloride stream. Laboratory work has demonstrated the conversion of cerium (a plutonium surrogate), uranium (a plutonium surrogate), Zircaloy, stainless steel, and other materials to glass. GMODS is an enabling technology that creates new options. Conventional glassmaking processes require conversion of feeds to oxide-like forms before final conversion to glass. Such chemical conversion and separation processes are often complex and expensive

  4. Alternatives for the disposition of PUREX organic solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    This Supporting Document submits options and recommendations for final management of Tank 40 Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant organic solution per Tri-Party Agreement Milestorm Number M-80-00-T03. Hanford is deactivating the PUREX Plant for the US DOE. One the key element of this Deactivation is disposition of approximately 81,300 liters (21,500 gallons) of slightly radioactively contaminated organic solution to reduce risk to the environment, reduce cost of long-term storage, and assure regulatory compliance. An announcement in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) on October 14, 1994 has resulted in the submission of proposals from two facilities capabLe of receiving and thermally destroying the solution. Total decomposition by thermal destruction is the recommended option for the disposition of the PUREX organic solution and WHC is evaluating the proposals from the two facilities

  5. Residual load, renewable surplus generation and storage requirements in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schill, Wolf-Peter

    2014-01-01

    I examine the effects of increasing amounts of fluctuating renewable energy on residual load, which is defined as the difference between actual power demand and the feed-in of non-dispatchable and inflexible generators. I draw on policy-relevant scenarios for Germany and make use of extensive sensitivity analyses. Whereas yearly renewable surplus energy is low in most scenarios analyzed, peak surplus power can become very high. Decreasing thermal must-run requirements and increasing biomass flexibility substantially reduce surpluses. I use an optimization model to determine the storage capacities required for taking up renewable surpluses. Allowing curtailment of 1% of the yearly feed-in of non-dispatchable renewables would render storage investments largely obsolete until 2032 under the assumption of a flexible power system. Further restrictions of curtailment as well as lower system flexibility strongly increase storage requirements. By 2050, at least 10 GW of storage are required for surplus integration, of which a sizeable share is seasonal storage. Results suggest that policy makers should work toward avoiding surplus generation, in particular by decreasing the must-run of thermal generators. Concerns about surpluses should not be regarded as an obstacle to further renewable expansion. The findings are also relevant for other countries that shift toward fluctuating renewables. - Highlights: • I examine the effects of fluctuating renewable energy on residual load. • Surplus energies are generally low, but there are high surplus power peaks. • Increasing the flexibility of thermal generators substantially reduces surpluses. • Allowing curtailment of 1% renders storage investments largely obsolete by 2032. • Both storage requirements and the share of seasonal storage increase by 2050

  6. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-01-01

    reactor building. The storage life is projected to be ten years to allow the preparation of APSF. DOE has stipulated that there be no credible release during storage, since there are no design features in place to mitigate a release of plutonium (i.e. HEPA filters, facility containment boundaries, etc.). This mandate has presented most of the significant challenges to the safety analysis team. The shipping packages are designed to withstand certain accidents and conditions, but in order to take credit for these the storage environment must be strictly controlled. Damages to the packages from exposure to fire, dropping, crushing and other impact accidents have been analyzed, and appropriate preventative design features have been incorporated. Other efforts include the extension of the shipping life (roughly two years) to a suitable storage life of ten years. These issues include the effects of internal pressure increases, seal degradation and the presence of impurities. A process known as the Container Qualification Program has been conducted to address these issues. The KAMS project will be ready to receive the first shipment from Rocky Flats in January 2000. No credible design basis scenarios resulting in the release of plutonium exist. This work has been useful in the effort to provide a safer disposition of plutonium, but also the lessons learned and techniques established by the team will help with the analysis of future facility modifications.'

  7. Plutonium-236 traces determination in plutonium-238 by α spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acena, M.L.; Pottier, R.; Berger, R.

    1969-01-01

    Two methods are described in this report for the determination of plutonium-236 traces in plutonium-238 by a spectrometry using semi-conductor detectors. The first method involves a direct comparison of the areas under the peaks of the α spectra of plutonium-236 and plutonium-238. The electrolytic preparation of the sources is carried out after preliminary purification of the plutonium. The second method makes it possible to determine the 236 Pu/ 238 Pu ratio by comparing the areas of the α peaks of uranium-232 and uranium-234, which are the decay products of the two plutonium isotopes respectively. The uranium in the source, also deposited by electrolysis, is separated from a 1 mg amount of plutonium either by a T.L.A. extraction, or by the use of ion-exchange resins. The report ends with a discussion of the results obtained with plutonium of two different origins. (authors) [fr

  8. Status of plutonium ceramic immobilization processes and immobilization forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Van Konynenburg, R.A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Vance, E.R.; Jostsons, A. [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization, Menai (Australia)] [and others

    1996-05-01

    Immobilization in a ceramic followed by permanent emplacement in a repository or borehole is one of the alternatives currently being considered by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program for the ultimate disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium. To make Pu recovery more difficult, radioactive cesium may also be incorporated into the immobilization form. Valuable data are already available for ceramics form R&D efforts to immobilize high-level and mixed wastes. Ceramics have a high capacity for actinides, cesium, and some neutron absorbers. A unique characteristic of ceramics is the existence of mineral analogues found in nature that have demonstrated actinide immobilization over geologic time periods. The ceramic form currently being considered for plutonium disposition is a synthetic rock (SYNROC) material composed primarily of zirconolite (CaZrTi{sub 2}O{sub 7}), the desired actinide host phase, with lesser amounts of hollandite (BaAl{sub 2}Ti{sub 6}O{sub 16}) and rutile (TiO{sub 2}). Alternative actinide host phases are also being considered. These include pyrochlore (Gd{sub 2}Ti{sub 2}O{sub 7}), zircon (ZrSiO{sub 4}), and monazite (CePO{sub 4}), to name a few of the most promising. R&D activities to address important technical issues are discussed. Primarily these include moderate scale hot press fabrications with plutonium, direct loading of PuO{sub 2} powder, cold press and sinter fabrication methods, and immobilization form formulation issues.

  9. Status of plutonium ceramic immobilization processes and immobilization forms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Vance, E.R.; Jostsons, A.

    1996-01-01

    Immobilization in a ceramic followed by permanent emplacement in a repository or borehole is one of the alternatives currently being considered by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program for the ultimate disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium. To make Pu recovery more difficult, radioactive cesium may also be incorporated into the immobilization form. Valuable data are already available for ceramics form R ampersand D efforts to immobilize high-level and mixed wastes. Ceramics have a high capacity for actinides, cesium, and some neutron absorbers. A unique characteristic of ceramics is the existence of mineral analogues found in nature that have demonstrated actinide immobilization over geologic time periods. The ceramic form currently being considered for plutonium disposition is a synthetic rock (SYNROC) material composed primarily of zirconolite (CaZrTi 2 O 7 ), the desired actinide host phase, with lesser amounts of hollandite (BaAl 2 Ti 6 O 16 ) and rutile (TiO 2 ). Alternative actinide host phases are also being considered. These include pyrochlore (Gd 2 Ti 2 O 7 ), zircon (ZrSiO 4 ), and monazite (CePO 4 ), to name a few of the most promising. R ampersand D activities to address important technical issues are discussed. Primarily these include moderate scale hot press fabrications with plutonium, direct loading of PuO 2 powder, cold press and sinter fabrication methods, and immobilization form formulation issues

  10. Conversion of metal plutonium to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Panov, A.V.; Subbotin, V.G. [Russian Federal Nuclear Center, ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Technical Physics, Snezhinsk (Russian Federation); Mashirev, V.P. [ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Chemical Technology, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2000-07-01

    Report contains experimental results on metal plutonium of weapon origin samples conversion to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method. Circuits of processes are described. Their advantages and shortcomings are shown. Parameters of plutonium dioxide powders (phase and fraction compositions, poured density) manufactured by pyrochemical method in RFNC-VNIITF are shown as well. (authors)

  11. Character, attitude and disposition

    OpenAIRE

    Webber, Jonathan

    2015-01-01

    Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation...

  12. The social surplus of broadband initiatives in compulsory education

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Peter Parsons

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available In 2010, the New Zealand government embarked upon an ambitious programme of broadband infrastructure investment, a process that will continue until at least 2019. Part of this investment is specifically targeted at compulsory education, with initiatives that include bringing fibre connections to the school gate, supporting on-site network upgrades (including wireless and providing teaching, learning and support services delivered through these networks. Such investments are not made without some projections of the likely rate of return, but calculating return on investment (ROI in educational broadband is complex, as it encompasses a range of factors. This article reports on an interview-based study engaging a range of stakeholders in educational broadband provision. The study utilises a research model that considers the various elements of social surplus, namely; producer surplus (savings, producer surplus (profit and consumer surplus (perceived value over and above cost, to explore the elements of social surplus that have been used to define educational broadband ROI calculations and justify the scale of investment. The results indicate that all three components of social surplus are relevant, though the concept of profit can only be seen in the broader context of long term contributions to the economy. A note of caution is that projections of ROI based only on positive returns fail to acknowledge the potential for some innovations to actually increase costs. Further, purely quantitative models do not properly take into account qualitative components of consumer surplus.

  13. METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.

    1959-12-15

    A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.

  14. Aqueous Solution Chemistry of Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Clark, David L. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-28

    Things I have learned working with plutonium: Chemistry of plutonium is complex; Redox equilibria make Pu solution chemistry particularly challenging in the absence of complexing ligands; Understanding this behavior is key to successful Pu chemistry experiments; There is no suitable chemical analog for plutonium.

  15. Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Egge, R.G.

    1996-02-01

    This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI). The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility. Questions concerning the currency of this information should be directed to the building administrator (as listed in BHI-FS-01, Field Support Administration, Section 1.1, ''Access Control for ERC Surplus Facilities'')

  16. Physics of plutonium recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The commercial recycling of plutonium as PuO 2 /UO 2 mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel is an established practice in pressurised water reactors (PWRs) in several countries, the main motivation being the consumption of plutonium arising from spent fuel reprocessing. Although the same motivating factors apply in the case of boiling water reactors (BWRs), they have lagged behind PWRs for various reasons, and MOX utilisation in BWRs has been implemented in only a few reactors to date. One of the reasons is that the nuclear design of BWR MOX assemblies (or bundles) is more complex than that of PWR assemblies. Recognizing the need and the timeliness to address this issue at the international level, the OECD/NEA Working Party on the Physics of Plutonium Fuels and Innovative Fuel Cycles (WPPR) conducted a physics code benchmark test for a BWR assembly. This volume reports on the benchmark results and conclusions that can be drawn from it. (authors)

  17. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M.; Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B.; Moore, L.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S ampersand S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S ampersand S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S ampersand S team as well as some specific S ampersand S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S ampersand S requirements, S ampersand S criteria for assessing risk, S ampersand S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards

  18. Plutonium microstructures. Part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cramer, E.M.; Bergin, J.B.

    1981-09-01

    This report is the first of three parts in which Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory metallographers exhibit a consolidated set of illustrations of inclusions that are seen in plutonium metal as a consequence of inherent and tramp impurities, alloy additions, and thermal or mechanical treatments. This part includes illustrations of nonmetallic and intermetallic inclusions characteristic of major impurity elements as an aid to identifying unknowns. It also describes historical aspects of the increased purity of laboratory plutonium samples, and it gives the composition of the etchant solutions and describes the etching procedure used in the preparation of each illustrated sample. 25 figures

  19. Potentiometric titration of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1978-01-01

    In the potentiometric titration of plutonium(III), it has been customary to take the equivalence point as the inflection point on a plot of potential vs. volume of titrant. It have not been, however, demonstrated, that the stoichiometric end point corresponds to the inflection point. Suggestions are made according to which these points may not correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium(III), as these titrations are ordinarily concluded in a period of time which is short compared to the time required for valence state rearrangement through disproportionation. (T.G.)

  20. Precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and calcination to plutonium oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Greco, L.; Adelfang, P.

    1989-01-01

    The plutonium based fuel fabrication requires the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution from nuclear fuel reprocessing into pure PuO2. The conversion method based on the precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and subsequent calcination has been studied in detail. In this procedure, plutonium (III) oxalate is precipitated, at room temperature, by the slow addition of 1M oxalic acid to the feed solution, containing from 5-100 g/l of plutonium in 1M nitric acid. Before precipitation, the plutonium is adjusted to trivalent state by addition of 1M ascorbic acid in the presence of an oxidation inhibitor such as hydrazine. Finally, the precipitate is calcinated at 700 deg C to obtain PuO2. A flowsheet is proposed in this paper including: a) A study about the conditions to adjust the plutonium valence. b) Solubility data of plutonium (III) oxalate and measurements of plutonium losses to the filtrate and wash solution. c) Characterization of the obtained products. Plutonium (III) oxalate has several potential advantages over similar conversion processes. These include: 1) Formation of small particle sizes powder with good pellets fabrication characteristics. 2) The process is rather insensitive to most process variables, except nitric acid concentration. 3) Ambient temperature operations. 4) The losses of plutonium to the filtrate are less than in other conversion processes. (Author) [es

  1. Plutonium isotopes in the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holm, E.

    1977-12-01

    Determination of plutonium and americium by ion exchange and alpha-spectrometry. Deposition of global fall-out and accumulated area-content of 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 240 Pu, 241 Pu, 242 Pu and 241 Am in central Sweden (62.3 deg N, 12.4 deg E), by using the lichen species Cladonia alpestris as bioindicator. Retention and distribution of plutonium in carpets of lichen and soil. Transfer of plutonium from lichen to reindeer and man. Absorbed dose in reindeer and man from plutonium. Basic studies of plutonium and americium in the western Mediterranean surface waters, with emphases on particulate form of the transuranics. (author)

  2. Preparation of plutonium waste forms with ICPP calcined high-level waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Staples, B.A.; Knecht, D.A. [Lockheed Idaho Technologies Co., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); O`Holleran, T.P. [Argonne National Lab.-West, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1997-05-01

    Glass and glass-ceramic forms developed for the immobilization of calcined high-level wastes generated by Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) fuel reprocessing activities have been investigated for ability to immobilize plutonium and to simultaneously incorporate calcined waste as an anti-proliferation barrier. Within the forms investigated, crystallization of host phases result in an increased loading of plutonium as well as its incorporation into potentially more durable phases than the glass. The host phases were initially formed and characterized with cerium (Ce{sup +4}) as a surrogate for plutonium (Pu{sup +4}) and samarium as a neutron absorber for criticality control. Verification of the surrogate testing results were then performed replacing cerium with plutonium. All testing was performed with surrogate calcined high-level waste. The results of these tests indicated that a potentially useful host phase, based on zirconia, can be formed either by devitrification or solid state reaction in the glass studied. This phase incorporates plutonium as well as samarium and the calcined waste becomes part of the matrix. Its ease of formation makes it potentially useful in excess plutonium dispositioning. Other durable host phases for plutonium and samarium, including zirconolite and zircon have been formed from zirconia or alumina calcine through cold press-sintering techniques and hot isostatic pressing. Host phase formation experiments conducted through vitrification or by cold press-sintering techniques are described and the results discussed. Recommendations are given for future work that extends the results of this study.

  3. Preparation of plutonium waste forms with ICPP calcined high-level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staples, B.A.; Knecht, D.A.; O'Holleran, T.P.

    1997-05-01

    Glass and glass-ceramic forms developed for the immobilization of calcined high-level wastes generated by Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) fuel reprocessing activities have been investigated for ability to immobilize plutonium and to simultaneously incorporate calcined waste as an anti-proliferation barrier. Within the forms investigated, crystallization of host phases result in an increased loading of plutonium as well as its incorporation into potentially more durable phases than the glass. The host phases were initially formed and characterized with cerium (Ce +4 ) as a surrogate for plutonium (Pu +4 ) and samarium as a neutron absorber for criticality control. Verification of the surrogate testing results were then performed replacing cerium with plutonium. All testing was performed with surrogate calcined high-level waste. The results of these tests indicated that a potentially useful host phase, based on zirconia, can be formed either by devitrification or solid state reaction in the glass studied. This phase incorporates plutonium as well as samarium and the calcined waste becomes part of the matrix. Its ease of formation makes it potentially useful in excess plutonium dispositioning. Other durable host phases for plutonium and samarium, including zirconolite and zircon have been formed from zirconia or alumina calcine through cold press-sintering techniques and hot isostatic pressing. Host phase formation experiments conducted through vitrification or by cold press-sintering techniques are described and the results discussed. Recommendations are given for future work that extends the results of this study

  4. Application of surplus and waste materials in roads pavement making

    OpenAIRE

    Mousavi, S. M.; Fazli, A. H.; Rouzmehr, F.

    2011-01-01

    Nowadays there are a lot of problems about surpluses and debris made by humans all around the world. Lots of these surpluses seriously harm our natural environment. Reuse of this kind of materials in other processes like building constructions or pavement help our natural environment in every aspect. Asphalt concrete is the main part of pavements in most parts of the world with an increasing rate of production in need of more ways and roads. In this paper we will provide...

  5. UK surplus source disposal programme - 16097

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John, Gordon H.; Reeves, Nigel; Nisbet, Amy C.; Garnett, Andrew; Williams, Clive R.

    2009-01-01

    The UK Surplus Source Disposal Programme (SSDP), managed by the Environment Agency, was designed to remove redundant radioactive sources from the public domain. The UK Government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) was concerned that disused sources were being retained by hospitals, universities and businesses, posing a risk to public health and the environment. AMEC provided a range of technical and administrative services to support the SSDP. A questionnaire was issued to registered source holders and the submitted returns compiled to assess the scale of the project. A member of AMEC staff was seconded to the Environment Agency to provide technical support and liaise directly with source holders during funding applications, which would cover disposal costs. Funding for disposal of different sources was partially based on a sliding scale of risk as determined by the IAEA hazard categorisation system. This funding was also sector dependent. The SSDP was subsequently expanded to include the disposal of luminised aircraft instruments from aviation museums across the UK. These museums often hold significant radiological inventories, with many items being unused and in a poor state of repair. These instruments were fully characterised on site by assessing surface dose rate, dimensions, source integrity and potential contamination issues. Calculations using the Microshield computer code allowed gamma radiation measurements to be converted into total activity estimates for each source. More than 11,000 sources were disposed of under the programme from across the medical, industrial, museum and academic sectors. The total activity disposed of was more than 8.5 E+14 Bq, and the project was delivered under budget. (authors)

  6. Investigation of plutonium (4) hydroxoformates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andryushin, V.G.; Belov, V.A.; Galaktionov, S.V.; Kozhevnikov, P.B.; Matyukha, V.A.; Shmidt, V.S.

    1982-01-01

    Deposition processes of plutonium (4) hydroxoformates in the system Pu(NO 3 ) 4 -HNO 3 -HCoOH-N6 4 OH-H 2 O have been studied in pH range 0.2-10.7 at total plutonium concentration in the system 100 g/l. It is shown that under the conditions plutonium (4) hydrolysis takes place with the formation of hydroxoformates. A local maximum of plutonium (4) hydroxoformate solubility in the range pH=3.8-4.8, which is evidently conditioned by the formation of soluble formate complex of plutonium in the region, is pointed out. The basic plutonium (4) formates of the composition PuOsub(x)(OH)sub(y)(COOH)sub(4-2x-y)xnHsub(2)O, where 1,3 >=x >= 0.7, 1.7 >= y >= 1.0 and n=1.5-7.0, are singled out, their thermal stability being studied. Density of the crystals and plutonium dioxide, formed during their thermal decomposition, is measured. It is established that for plutonium (4) hydroxoformates common regularities of the influence of salt composition (OH - -, CHOO - - and H 2 O-group numbers in the mulecule) on position of temperature decomposition effects and on the density of compounds, which have been previously found during the study of thorium and plutonium hydroxosalts are observed. It is shown that the density of plutonium dioxide decreases with the increase of hydration and hydrolysis degree of the initial plutonium hydroxoformate

  7. The benefits of an advanced fast reactor fuel cycle for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hannum, W.H.; McFarlane, H.F.; Wade, D.C.; Hill, R.N.

    1996-01-01

    The United States has no program to investigate advanced nuclear fuel cycles for the large-scale consumption of plutonium from military and civilian sources. The official U.S. position has been to focus on means to bury spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors and to achieve the spent fuel standard for excess separated plutonium, which is considered by policy makers to be an urgent international priority. Recently, the National Research Council published a long awaited report on its study of potential separation and transmutation technologies (STATS), which concluded that in the nuclear energy phase-out scenario that they evaluated, transmutation of plutonium and long-lived radioisotopes would not be worth the cost. However, at the American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting in June, 1996, the STATS panelists endorsed further study of partitioning to achieve superior waste forms for burial, and suggested that any further consideration of transmutation should be in the context of energy production, not of waste management. 2048 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program for the short-term disposition of excess fissile material and a 'focus area' for safe, secure stabilization, storage and disposition of plutonium, but has no current programs for fast reactor development. Nevertheless, sufficient data exist to identify the potential advantages of an advanced fast reactor metallic fuel cycle for the long-term management of plutonium. Advantages are discussed

  8. Direct conversion of plutonium-containing materials to borosilicate glass for storage or disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.

    1995-01-01

    A new process, the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS), has been invented for the direct conversion of plutonium metal, scrap, and residue into borosilicate glass. The glass should be acceptable for either the long-term storage or disposition of plutonium. Conversion of plutonium from complex chemical mixtures and variable geometries into homogeneous glass (1) simplifies safeguards and security; (2) creates a stable chemical form that meets health, safety, and environmental concerns; (3) provides an easy storage form; (4) may lower storage costs; and (5) allows for future disposition options. In the GMODS process, mixtures of metals, ceramics, organics, and amorphous solids containing plutonium are fed directly into a glass melter where they are directly converted to glass. Conventional glass melters can accept materials only in oxide form; thus, it is its ability to accept materials in multiple chemical forms that makes GMODS a unique glass making process. Initial proof-of-principle experiments have converted cerium (plutonium surrogate), uranium, stainless steel, aluminum, and other materials to glass. Significant technical uncertainties remain because of the early nature of process development

  9. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    As any other fissile material, the plutonium raises several utilization problems, particularly as far as diversion by sub-national groups or proliferation are concerned. The purpose of this paper is to show that these problems can be given reasonable solutions avoiding over penalties on energy production

  10. Plutonium safety training course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moe, H.J.

    1976-03-01

    This course seeks to achieve two objectives: to provide initial safety training for people just beginning work with plutonium, and to serve as a review and reference source for those already engaged in such work. Numerous references have been included to provide information sources for those wishing to pursue certain topics more fully. The first part of the course content deals with the general safety approach used in dealing with hazardous materials. Following is a discussion of the four properties of plutonium that lead to potential hazards: radioactivity, toxicity, nuclear properties, and spontaneous ignition. Next, the various hazards arising from these properties are treated. The relative hazards of both internal and external radiation sources are discussed, as well as the specific hazards when plutonium is the source. Similarly, the general hazards involved in a criticality, fire, or explosion are treated. Comments are made concerning the specific hazards when plutonium is involved. A brief summary comparison between the hazards of the transplutonium nuclides relative to 239 Pu follows. The final portion deals with control procedures with respect to contamination, internal and external exposure, nuclear safety, and fire protection. The philosophy and approach to emergency planning are also discussed

  11. Atomic spectrum of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blaise, J.; Fred, M.; Gutmacher, R.G.

    1984-08-01

    This report contains plutonium wavelengths, energy level classifications, and other spectroscopic data accumulated over the past twenty years at Laboratoire Aime Cotton (LAC) Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary purpose was term analysis: deriving the energy levels in terms of quantum numbers and electron configurations, and evaluating the Slater-Condon and other parameters from the levels

  12. Plutonium: An introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Condit, R.H.

    1993-10-01

    This report is a summary of the history and properties of plutonium. It presents information on the atoms, comparing chemical and nuclear properties. It looks at the history of the atom, including its discovery and production methods. It summarizes the metallurgy and chemistry of the element. It also describes means of detecting and measuring the presence and quantity of the element

  13. Plutonium cores of zenith

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barclay, F R; Cameron, I R; Drageset, A; Freemantle, R G; Wilson, D J

    1965-03-15

    The report describes a series of experiments carried out with plutonium fuel in the heated zero power reactor ZENITH, with the aim of testing current theoretical methods, with particular reference to excess reactivity, temperature coefficients, differential spectrum and reaction rate distributions. Two cores of widely different fissile/moderator atom ratios were loaded in order to test the theory under significantly varied spectrum conditions.

  14. Plutonium and textbooks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2008-01-01

    Chemical equilibrium is not characterized by equilibrium constants alone. At least one conservation principle is necessary. Textbook descriptions of plutonium chemistry that are based on two-reaction-product disproportionation equations, or do not recognize the conservation principles, are incomplete and potentially misleading. (author)

  15. Japan's plutonium economy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hecht, M.M.

    1994-01-01

    Japan's plutonium economy is based on the most efficient use of nuclear energy, as envisioned under the Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s and 1960s. The nuclear pioneers assumed that all nations would want to take full advantage of atomic energy, recycling waste into new fuel to derive as much energy as possible from this resource

  16. Transport of plutonium nitrate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    This leaflet discusses the subject under the headings: why do we need plutonium; why must we transport it; what action is carried out; how is it moved; what are the risks. The transport of the material in specially designed containers, from Dounreay in Caithness by road and sea to Sellafield in Cumbria, is described. (U.K.)

  17. Using existing European MOX fabrication plants for the disposal of plutonium from dismantled Russian warheads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaper, A.

    1995-01-01

    One of the disposition options for excess weapons plutonium which is favored by the study of the American National Academy of Sciences is the fabrication and use as fuel, without reprocessing, in existing or modified nuclear reactors. An important criterion for reducing the proliferation risks is minimizing the time during which the plutonium is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons. The study recommends to either modify an almost completed facility for experimental fast reactors or to construct a new fuel fabrication capability. The estimated time for siting, building, and licensing is a decade or more

  18. Dismantlement and decontamination of a plutonium-238 facility at SRS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.H. Jr.; Hootman, H.E.

    1994-01-01

    There has been very little, documented decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) experience on which to project cleanup costs and schedules for plutonium facilities at SRS and other DOE sites. A portion of the HB-Line, a plutonium-238 processing facility at SRS, has been undergoing D ampersand D intermittently since 1984. Although this cleanup effort was not originally intended to quantify results, some key data have been project has demonstrated effective methods of accumulated, and the performing D ampersand D work, and has demonstrated cleanup equipment and techniques under conditions of high contamination. Plutonium facilities where D ampersand D is already underway provide an opportunity for' timely field testing of characterization, size reduction, and decontamination techniques. Some data are presented here; however, more specific tests and data may be obtained during the remainder of this project. This project has been recommended as a candidate test facility for a DOE planned ''Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration'' managed by EM-50 to develop and demonstrate technology for D ampersand D and surplus facilities deactivation. Both the remainder of this project and the Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration Program can benefit from a joint effort, and the, overall costs should be reduced

  19. Use of plutonium for power production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    The panel reviewed available information on various aspects of plutonium utilization, such as physics of plutonium, technology of plutonium fuels in thermal and fast reactors, behaviour of plutonium fuel under reactor irradiation, technological and economic aspects of plutonium fuel cycle. Refs, figs and tabs

  20. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Nass, R. [Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (United States)

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

  1. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage

  2. Final generic environmental statement on the use of recycle plutonium in mixed oxide fuel in light water cooled reactors. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-08-01

    Information concerning the use of plutonium recycle in water cooled reactors is presented under the following chapter headings: probable adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided; means for mitigating adverse environmental effects; alternative dispositions of plutonium; relationship between local short term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity; irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources; and economic analysis and cost-benefit balancing

  3. Reducing food waste through direct surplus food redistribution : the Norwegian case

    OpenAIRE

    Capodistrias, Paula

    2015-01-01

    Food waste is a global problem with significant economic and environmental consequences. Food waste management approaches include production of biogas, animal feed and compost and surplus food redistribution. From a sustainability point of view, surplus food redistribution is the most favorable approach. Surplus food redistribution can be either direct (between suppliers of surplus food and charity food services) or indirect (Through Food banks). This paper is a case study on direct surplus f...

  4. Chemistry of plutonium revealed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connick, R.E.

    1992-01-01

    In 1941 one goal of the Manhattan Project was to unravel the chemistry of the synthetic element plutonium as rapidly as possible. In this paper the work carried out at Berkeley from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945 is described briefly. The aqueous chemistry of plutonium is quite remarkable. Important insights were obtained from tracer experiments, but the full complexity was not revealed until macroscopic amounts (milligrams) became available. Because processes for separation from fission products were based on aqueous solutions, such solution chemistry was emphasized, particularly precipitation and oxidation-reduction behavior. The latter turned out to be unusually intricate when it was discovered that two more oxidation states existed in aqueous solution than had previously been suspected. Further, an equilibrium was rapidly established among the four aqueous oxidation states, while at the same time any three were not in equilibrium. These and other observations made while doing a crash study of a previously unknown element are reported

  5. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The need to distinguish between diversion by sub-national groups and by governments is clearly stated. The paper identifies the international safeguards measures which already exist for the handling of plutonium. It proposes that the implementation of Article XII A5 of the IAEA statute concerning the international storage of plutonium could be an important additional measure. The paper also mentions the concept of using confinement as a complimentary safeguards measure and identifies the PIPEX concept. In addition, greater use is proposed of containment and surveillance procedures. The multiplication of small reprocessing plants spread over many countries is perceived as a proliferation risk. Other means such as co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are relevant to diversion by sub-national groups

  6. Strategies for the plutonium utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zouain, D.M.; Lima, J.O.V.; Sakamoto, L.H.

    1981-11-01

    A review of the activities involving plutonium (its recycle, utilization and technological status and perspectives) is done. These informations are useful for an economic viability study for the plutonium utilization in thermal reactors (recycling) and in fast breeders reactor (FBR), trying to collect the major number of informations about these subjects. The initial phase describes the present status and projections of plutonium accumulation and requirements. Then, the technological process are described and some strategies are analyzed. (E.G.) [pt

  7. Plutonium in the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kudo, A.

    2001-01-01

    The first volume of the new series, Radioactivity in the Environment, focuses on the environmental occurrence, the speciation, the behaviour, the fate, the applications and the health consequences of that much-feared and much-publicised element, plutonium. Featuring a collection of selected, peer-reviewed, up-to-date papers by leading researchers in the field, this work provides a state-of-the-art description of plutonium in the environment. This title helps to explain where present frontiers are drawn in our continuing efforts to understand the science of environmental plutonium and will help to place widespread concerns into perspective. As a whole this new book series on environmental radioactivity addresses, at academic research level, the key aspects of this socially important and complex interdisciplinary subject. Presented objectively and with the ultimate authority gained from the many contributions by the world's leading experts, the negative and positive consequences of having a radioactive world around us will be documented and given perspective. refs

  8. Decommissioning of eight surplus production reactors at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. Addendum (Final Environmental Impact Statement)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The first section of this volume summarizes the content of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) and this Addendum, which together constitute the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) prepared on the decommissioning of eight surplus plutonium production reactors at Hanford. The FEIS consists of two volumes. The first volume is the DEIS as written. The second volume (this Addendum) consists of a summary; Chapter 9, which contains comments on the DEIS and provides DOE`s responses to the comments; Appendix F, which provides additional health effects information; Appendix K, which contains costs of decommissioning in 1990 dollars; Appendix L, which contains additional graphite leaching data; Appendix M, which contains a discussion of accident scenarios; Appendix N, which contains errata; and Appendix 0, which contains reproductions of the letters, transcripts, and exhibits that constitute the record for the public comment period.

  9. F. Biological hazards of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Plutonium is an unavoidable result of present nuclear power programmes. Its predominant isotopes are extremely long-lived and very toxic if absorbed in the body. In view of the increasing potential for plutonium and man to come into contact, the consequences of any plutonium release into the environment should be scientifically examined. This report is an attempt to place in one document a fully referenced account of the on-going work in many areas. There are three sections. Part 1 deals with the amounts of plutonium available in the fuel cycle, its properties and the probability of routine or accidental release. Part 2 examines the ways in which plutonium can reach man, in particular through food chains or inhalation. Part 3 details the biological effects of plutonium once it is absorbed into the body, assesses the amounts likely to be harmful and discusses the adequacy of present standards for plutonium burdens. There are two appendices. The likely differences between Pu-239, the most studied isotope, and other plutonium isotopes or transuranic nuclides are outlined in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a fuller account of the ways in which the fate of ingested or inhaled plutonium have been determined

  10. Plutonium in the marine environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jarvis, N.V.; Linder, P.W.; Wade, P.W.

    1994-01-01

    The shipping of plutonium from Europe to Japan around the Cape is a contentious issue which has raised public concern that South Africa may be at risk to plutonium exposure should an accident occur. The paper describes the containers in which the plutonium (in the form of plutonium oxide, PuO 2 ) is housed and consequences of the unlikely event of these becoming ruptured. Wind-borne pollution is considered not to be a likely scenario, with the plutonium oxide particles more likely to remain practically insoluble and sediment. Plutonium aqueous and environmental chemistry is briefly discussed. Some computer modelling whereby plutonium oxide is brought into contact with seawater has been performed and the results are presented. The impact on marine organisms is discussed in terms of studies performed at marine dump sites and after the crash of a bomber carrying nuclear warheads in Thule, Greenland in 1968. Various pathways from the sea to land are considered in the light of studies done at Sellafield, a reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. Some recent debates in the popular scientific press, such as that on the leukemia cluster at Sellafield, are described. Plutonium biochemistry and toxicity are discussed as well as medical histories of workers exposed to plutonium. 35 refs., 2 tabs., 1 fig

  11. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norton, S.H.

    2010-01-01

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford

  12. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NORTON SH

    2010-02-23

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford

  13. A stochastic surplus production model in continuous time

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pedersen, Martin Wæver; Berg, Casper Willestofte

    2017-01-01

    surplus production model in continuous time (SPiCT), which in addition to stock dynamics also models the dynamics of the fisheries. This enables error in the catch process to be reflected in the uncertainty of estimated model parameters and management quantities. Benefits of the continuous-time state......Surplus production modelling has a long history as a method for managing data-limited fish stocks. Recent advancements have cast surplus production models as state-space models that separate random variability of stock dynamics from error in observed indices of biomass. We present a stochastic......-space model formulation include the ability to provide estimates of exploitable biomass and fishing mortality at any point in time from data sampled at arbitrary and possibly irregular intervals. We show in a simulation that the ability to analyse subannual data can increase the effective sample size...

  14. THE CLOWER CONSTRAINTS MODEL DARI SURPLUS ATAU DEFISIT FISKAL PEMERINTAH

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jonni Manurung

    2006-01-01

    Full Text Available This study has something as a purpose to building the empirical models and the new hypothesis between the broad money, surpluses or fiscal deficit, the general price index or inflation rate, demand for monetary base and demand for bank deposit. This study also head for optimal interest rate for bank deposit at the given value of broad money, surplus or fiscal deficit, general price index, demand for monetary base, and demand for bank deposit. The model build consist to balance central bank, intertemporal budget constraint at the maximum expected utility for hold monetary base and bank deposit. The evaluation of the surplus or fiscal deficit stabilization is with the alteration of the requirement reserve ratio, Gross Domestic Product, general price index and interest rate. The results of the study show that the requirement reserve ratio, Gross Domestic Product, general price index and interest rate is very respect to surplus or deficit fiscal. The contribution requirement reserve ratio and interest rate for surplus or deficit fiscal are relatively high. This results show that the clower constraint model can explain the necessary of fiscal and monetary coordinate. Fiscal policy still weak and cause the real business cycle slow down, high inflation and interest rate. The other hands, monetary policy is very strong and cause fiscal surplus is relatively high. The prudent of government and monetary authority are needed to build the fiscal and monetary policy for create the dynamic economy, lower inflation, requirement reserve ratio and interest rate, and the monetary and fiscal dynamic equilibrium. Abstract in Bahasa Indonesia : Studi ini bertujuan membuat model empiris dan hipotesis baru tentang faktor-faktor broad money, surplus dan defisit fiskal, tingkat bunga secara umum, atau tingkat inflasi, permintaan uang primer dan deposito. Selain itu studi ini juga mencari tingkat suku bunga deposito optimal pada nilai tertentu dari faktor-faktor tersebut

  15. Investment and protection of the OAPEC surplus: a strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nuwayhid, H.S.

    1981-02-01

    The Arab countries could not absorb the surplus dollars when oil prices rose in the 1970s, nor were they prepared to move into Western financial markets without causing disruptions. A strategy for protecting these surpluses takes into account market realities and the responsibilities of Arab oil-exporting countries toward the Third World. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) strategy mainly applies to those countries that cannot absorb their surpluses for internal development. Emphasizing asset protection rather than investment, the strategy suggests a new oil-pricing method, and a shift toward real assets, especially those in the Arab and Third World. Success will require help from the rest of the world to reform the International Monetary System, east stagflation, and recycle petrodollars. 6 references, 2 tables. (DCK)

  16. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  17. Plutonium oxides and uranium and plutonium mixed oxides. Carbon determination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    Determination of carbon in plutonium oxides and uranium plutonium mixed oxides, suitable for a carbon content between 20 to 3000 ppm. The sample is roasted in oxygen at 1200 0 C, the carbon dioxide produced by combustion is neutralized by barium hydroxide generated automatically by coulometry [fr

  18. FS65 Disposition Option Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wenz, Tracy R. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-09-25

    This report outlines the options for dispositioning the MOX fuel stored in FS65 containers at LANL. Additional discussion regarding the support equipment for loading and unloading the FS65 transport containers is included at the end of the report.

  19. High-temperature enthalpies of plutonium monocarbide and plutonium sesquicarbide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oetting, F.L.

    1979-01-01

    The high-temperature enthalpies of plutonium monocarbide and plutonium sesquicarbide have been determined with a copper-block calorimeter of the isoperibol type. The experimental enthalpy data, which was measured relative to 298 K, covered the temperature range from 400 to 1500 K. The calculation of the temperature rise of the calorimeter takes into account the added heat evolution from the radioactive decay of the plutonium samples. These enthalpy results, combined with the heat capacity and entropy of the respective carbide at 298 K available from the literature, has made it possible to generate tables of thermodynamic functions for the plutonium carbides. The behavior of the heat capacity of both of the plutonium carbides, i.e., a relatively steep increase in the heat capacity as the temperature increases, may be attributed to a premelting effect with the formation of vacancies within the crystal lattice although a theoretical treatment of this phenomenon is not given

  20. Laboratory directed research and development on disposal of plutonium recovered from weapons. FY1994 final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitts, J.H.; Choi, J.S.

    1994-01-01

    This research project was conceived as a multi-year plan to study the use of mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Four areas of investigation were originally proposed: (1) study reactor physics including evaluation of control rod worth and power distribution during normal operation and transients; (2) evaluate accidents focusing upon the reduced control rod worth and reduced physical properties of PuO 2 ; (3) assess the safeguards required during fabrication and use of plutonium bearing fuel assemblies; and (4) study public acceptance issues associated with using material recovered from weapons to fuel a nuclear reactor. First year accomplishments are described. Appendices contain 2 reports entitled: development and validation of advanced computational capability for MOX fueled ALWR assembly designs; and long-term criticality safety concerns associated with weapons plutonium disposition

  1. Advanced PWR Core Design with Siemens High-Plutonium-Content MOX Fuel Assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dieter Porsch; Gerhard Schlosser; Hans-Dieter Berger

    2000-01-01

    The Siemens experience with plutonium recycling dates back to the late 1960s. Over the years, extensive research and development programs were performed for the qualification of mixed-oxide (MOX) technology and design methods. Today's typical reload enrichments for uranium and MOX fuel assemblies and modern core designs have become more demanding with respect to accuracy and reliability of design codes. This paper presents the status of plutonium recycling in operating high-burnup pressurized water reactor (PWR) cores. Based on actual examples, it describes the validation status of the design methods and stresses current and future needs for fuel assembly and core design including those related to the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

  2. Technology survey for real-time monitoring of plutonium in a vitrifier off-gas system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, J.M.; Veirs, D.K.

    1996-01-01

    We surveyed several promising measurement technologies for the real-time monitoring of plutonium in a vitrifier off-gas system. The vitrifier is being developed by Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. and will be used to demonstrate vitrification of plutonium dissolved in nitric acid for fissile material disposition. The risk of developing a criticality hazard in the off-gas processing equipment can be managed by using available measurement technologies. We identified several potential technologies and methods for detecting plutonium that are sensitive enough to detect the accumulation of a mass sufficient to form a criticality hazard. We recommend gross alpha-monitoring technologies as the most promising option for Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. to consider because that option appears to require the least additional development. We also recommend further consideration for several other technologies because they offer specific advantages and because gross alpha-monitoring could prove unsuitable when tested for this specific application

  3. Determination of plutonium in environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakanoue, Masanobu

    1978-01-01

    Past and present methods of determining the amount of plutonium in the environment are summarized. Determination of the amount of plutonium in uranium ore began in 1941. Plutonium present in polluted environments due to nuclear explosions, nuclear power stations, etc. was measured in soil and sand in Nagasaki in 1951 and in ash in Bikini in 1954. Analytical methods of measuring the least amount of plutonium in the environment were developed twenty years later. Many studies on and reviews of these methods have been reported all over the world, and a standard analytical procedure has been adopted. A basic analytical method of measurement was drafted in Japan in 1976. The yield, treatment of samples, dissolution, separation, control of measurable ray sources determination by α spectrometry, cross-check determination, and treatment of samples containing hardly soluble plutonium were examined. At present, the amount of plutonium can be determined by all of these methods. The presence of plutonium was studied further, and the usefulness of determination of the plutonium isotope ratio is discussed. (Kumagai, S.)

  4. Work surface for soluble plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2005-01-01

    A three-dimensional work surface for aqueous plutonium is illustrated. It is constructed by means of estimating work as a function of the ambient pH and redox potential in a plutonium solution. The surface is useful for illustrating the chemistry of disproportionation reactions. Work expressions are easier to use than work integrals. (author)

  5. The economics of plutonium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, R.A.

    1977-11-01

    The individual cost components and the total fuel cycle costs for natural uranium and uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel cycles for CANDU-PHW reactors are discussed. A calculation is performed to establish the economic conditions under which plutonium recycle would be economically attractive. (auth)

  6. Plutonium Round Robin Test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dudder, G.B.; Herbillon, G.H.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The goal of nuclear forensics is to develop a preferred approach to illicit trafficking investigations. This approach must be widely understood and acceptable as credible. The principle objectives of the Round Robin Test are to prioritize the forensic techniques and methods, evaluate attribution capabilities, and examine the utility of database. The Plutonium Round Robin has made a tremendous contribution to fulfilling these goals through a collaborative learning experience that resulted from the outstanding efforts of the six participating international laboratories. A prioritize list of techniques and methods has been developed based on this exercise. Future work will focus on a Highly Enriched Round Robin and extent to which the techniques and methods can be generalized. The Plutonium Round Robin demonstrated a rather high level of capability to determine the important characteristics of the materials and processes using analytical methods. When this capability to was combined with the appropriate knowledge and database, it resulted in a demonstrated capability to attribute the source of the materials to a specific nuclear fuel, reactor, and reprocessing facility. A number of shortfalls were also identified in our current capabilities. These included alternative dating techniques. Light Water Reactor discrimination techniques, and the lack of a comprehensive network of data/knowledge bases. The result of the Round Robin will be used to develop guidelines or a 'recommended protocol' to be made available to the interested authorities and countries to use in real cases. The poster will present a summary of the results of the Plutonium Round Robin and describe the plans the subsequent Highly Enriched Uranium Round Robin Test. (author)

  7. Solvent anode for plutonium purification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowersox, D.F.; Fife, K.W.; Christensen, D.C.

    1986-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to develop a technique to allow complete oxidation of plutonium from the anode during plutonium electrorefining. This will eliminate the generation of a ''spent'' anode heel which requires further treatment for recovery. Our approach is to employ a solvent metal in the anode to provide a liquid anode pool throughout electrorefining. We use molten salts and metals in ceramic crucibles at 700 0 C. Our goal is to produce plutonium metal at 99.9% purity with oxidation and transfer of more than 98% of the impure plutonium feed metal from the anode into the salt and product phases. We have met these criteria in experiments on the 100 to 1000 g scale. We plan to scale our operations to 4 kg of feed plutonium and to optimize the process parameters

  8. Using Biomolecules to Separate Plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gogolski, Jarrod

    Used nuclear fuel has traditionally been treated through chemical separations of the radionuclides for recycle or disposal. This research considers a biological approach to such separations based on a series of complex and interdependent interactions that occur naturally in the human body with plutonium. These biological interactions are mediated by the proteins serum transferrin and the transferrin receptor. Transferrin to plutonium in vivo and can deposit plutonium into cells after interacting with the transferrin receptor protein at the cell surface. Using cerium as a non-radioactive surrogate for plutonium, it was found that cerium(IV) required multiple synergistic anions to bind in the N-lobe of the bilobal transferrin protein, creating a conformation of the cerium-loaded protein that would be unable to interact with the transferrin receptor protein to achieve a separation. The behavior of cerium binding to transferrin has contributed to understanding how plutonium(IV)-transferrin interacts in vivo and in biological separations.

  9. Cycle downstream: the plutonium question

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zask, G.; Rome, M.; Delpech, M.

    1998-01-01

    This day, organized by the SFEN, took place at Paris the 4 june 1998. Nine papers were presented. They take stock on the plutonium physics and its utilization as a nuclear fuel. This day tried to bring information to answer the following questions: do people have to keep the plutonium in the UOX fuel or in the MOX fuel in order to use it for future fast reactors? Do people have to continue obstinately the plutonium reprocessing in the MOX for the PWR type reactors? Will it be realized a underground disposal? Can it be technically developed plutonium incinerators and is it economically interesting? The plutonium physics, the experimental programs and the possible solutions are presented. (A.L.B.)

  10. Plutonium storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This Spanish study gives a more detailed analysis of a possible store for plutonium oxide. The capacity of the store is assumed to be 30 t Pu and the minimum storage time 2 years. The study includes a general description of the store and its design philosophy; comments on the quality and properties of the material stored; a detailed criticality study and comments on gas and heat generation and shielding requirements; and a brief cost evaluation. Costs are estimated to be about $110/kg PuO 2 /year

  11. Destruction of plutonium using non-uranium fuels in pressurized water reactor peripheral assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chodak, P. III

    1996-05-01

    This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of conventional three batch UO 2 assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery. Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400 reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies essentially destroys 100% of the 239 Pu and ≥90% total Pu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products

  12. Destruction of plutonium using non-uranium fuels in pressurized water reactor peripheral assemblies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chodak, III, Paul [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of conventional three batch UO2 assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery. Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400 reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies essentially destroys 100% of the 239Pu and ≥90% {sub total}Pu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products.

  13. Rising above Decline: Some Uses of Surplus Space.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hess, Dale E.

    In many communities new arrangements of surplus school space have been made that facilitate use of the space by the people of the districts, encourage government agencies to anticipate and support social transitions where they are necessary, and allow school districts to improve the quality of their programs. This paper is a survey of some of…

  14. Analysis of yam marketable surplus in Imo state, Nigeria | Onyenobi ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    This study was conducted in Imo State in the southeastern agricultural zone of Nigeria, to determine socio-economic characteristics of farmers; cost and return of farmers and factors that determine the marketable surplus of farmers. Among the farm enterprises in the state, yam has high- income elasticity of demand by ...

  15. Determinants of rural household marketed surplus for cereal crops ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ... and supply of cereal crops to the market (market surplus). The study utilized cross sectional data obtained through multistage random sampling method. Ordinary least square method was used for the analysis. Finding revealed that the quantity of food crops reserved for home consumption by households increased their ...

  16. Preconceptual design for separation of plutonium and gallium by ion exchange

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, S.F.

    1997-01-01

    The disposition of plutonium from decommissioned nuclear weapons, by incorporation into commercial UO 2 -based nuclear reactor fuel, is a viable means to reduce the potential for theft of excess plutonium. This fuel, which would be a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide, is referred to as a mixed oxide (MOX). Following power generation in commercial reactors with this fuel, the remaining plutonium would become mixed with highly radioactive fission products in a spent fuel assembly. The radioactivity, complex chemical composition, and large size of this spent fuel assembly, would make theft difficult with elaborate chemical processing required for plutonium recovery. In fabricating the MOX fuel, it is important to maintain current commercial fuel purity specifications. While impurities from the weapons plutonium may or may not have a detrimental affect on the fuel fabrication or fuel/cladding performance, certifying the effect as insignificant could be more costly than purification. Two primary concerns have been raised with regard to the gallium impurity: (1) gallium vaporization during fuel sintering may adversely affect the MOX fuel fabrication process, and (2) gallium vaporization during reactor operation may adversely affect the fuel cladding performance. Consequently, processes for the separation of plutonium from gallium are currently being developed and/or designed. In particular, two separation processes are being considered: (1) a developmental, potentially lower cost and lower waste, thermal vaporization process following PuO 2 powder preparation, and (2) an off-the-shelf, potentially higher cost and higher waste, aqueous-based ion exchange (IX) process. While it is planned to use the thermal vaporization process should its development prove successful, IX has been recommended as a backup process. This report presents a preconceptual design with material balances for separation of plutonium from gallium by IX

  17. Surplus from and storage of electricity generated by intermittent sources

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wagner, Friedrich

    2016-12-01

    Data from the German electricity system for the years 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015 are used and scaled up to a 100% supply by intermittent renewable energy sources (iRES). In the average, 330GW wind and PV power are required to meet this 100% target. A back-up system is necessary with the power of 89% of peak load. Surplus electricity accrues at high power levels. Curtailing surplus power to a large extent is found to be uneconomic. Demand-side management will suffer from the strong day-to-day variation of available surplus energy. A day storage is ineffective because of the day-night correlation of surplus power during winter. A seasonal storage loses its character when transformation losses are considered because it can contribute only after periods with excessive surplus production. The option of an oversized iRES system to feed the storage is also not effective because, in this case, energy can be taken directly from the large iRES supply, making storage superfluous. The capacities to be installed stress the difficulty to base heat supply and mobility also on iRES generated electricity in the future. As the German energy transition replaces one CO2-free electricity supply system by another one, no major reduction in CO2 emission can be expected till 2022, when the last nuclear reactor will be switched off. By 2022, an extremely oversized power supply system has to be created, which can be expected to continue running down spot-market electricity prices. The continuation of the economic response -to replace expensive gas fuel by cheap lignite- causes an overall increase in CO2 emission. The German GHG emission targets for 2020 and beyond are therefore in jeopardy.

  18. The toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramsden, D.; Johns, T.F.

    1977-01-01

    Reference is made to recent publications concerned with the radiotoxicity of inhaled insoluble Pu compounds. The publications are a paper by Thorne and Vennart (Nature 263:555 (1976)), a report entitled 'The Toxicity of Plutonium', (London (HMSO), 1975), and the 'Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution', (Cmnd. 6618, London (HMSO), 1976). Thorne and Vennart concluded that the previously accepted value for the maximum permissible annual intake (MPAI) of such compounds may be too high by a factor of about five, and a similar conclusion was reached in the other two publications. It is thought by the present authors that the methods which have been used to suggest new values for the MPAI are unduly pessimistic for high-fired PuO 2 ; calculations have been based on the lung model of ICRP Publication 19 'The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and the Other Actinides', (International Commission of Radiological Protection, 1972). This involves concluding that the risks to bone and liver are comparable to those for lung. This is discussed and it is thought that the previously established idea that the lung is the critical organ remains substantially correct for the case of high-fired PuO 2 . (U.K.)

  19. Plutonium oxide dissolution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, J.H.

    1992-01-01

    Several processing options for dissolving plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) from high-fired materials have been studied. The scoping studies performed on these options were focused on PuO 2 typically generated by burning plutonium metal and PuO 2 produced during incineration of alpha contaminated waste. At least two processing options remain applicable for dissolving high-fired PuO 2 in canyon dissolvers. The options involve solid solution formation of PuO 2 With uranium oxide (UO 2 ) and alloying incinerator ash with aluminum. An oxidative dissolution process involving nitric acid solutions containing a strong oxidizing agent, such as cerium (IV), was neither proven nor rejected. This uncertainty was due to difficulty in regenerating cerium (IV) ions during dissolution. However, recent work on silver-catalyzed dissolution of PuO 2 with persulfate has demonstrated that persulfate ions regenerate silver (II). Use of persulfate to regenerate cerium (IV) or bismuth (V) ions during dissolution of PuO 2 materials may warrant further study

  20. [On the temporary surplus population in the elementary stage of socialism in China].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Y; Chen, L

    1988-07-01

    The causes and patterns of China's surplus population are analyzed for the period 1951-1980. The authors view the surplus population as a temporary phenomenon that is advantageous to social development.

  1. NRC comprehensive records disposition schedule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    Title 44 United States Code, ''Public Printing and Documents,'' regulations cited in the General Services Administration's (GSA) ''Federal Information Resources Management Regulations'' (FIRMR), Part 201-9, ''Creation, Maintenance, and Use of Records,'' and regulation issued by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 36 CFR Chapter XII, Subchapter B, ''Records Management,'' require each agency to prepare and issue a comprehensive records disposition schedule that contains the NARA approved records disposition schedules for records unique to the agency and contains the NARA's General Records Schedules for records common to several or all agencies. The approved records disposition schedules specify the appropriate duration of retention and the final disposition for records created or maintained by the NRC. NUREG-0910, Rev. 2, contains ''NRC's Comprehensive Records Disposition Schedule,'' and the original authorized approved citation numbers issued by NARA. Rev. 2 totally reorganizes the records schedules from a functional arrangement to an arrangement by the host office. A subject index and a conversion table have also been developed for the NRC schedules to allow staff to identify the new schedule numbers easily and to improve their ability to locate applicable schedules

  2. Hazards of plutonium and fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1978-01-01

    Apart from the possibility that civil plutonium may be diverted to military use the main argument against the introduction of a plutonium economy seems to be the supposedly unmanageable biological risk attached to plutonium itself. The author points out weaknesses in many of the opponents' arguments against the increased use of plutonium and argues that current safety practices are more than adequate in handling plutonium and other radioactive materials

  3. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-09-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 7 figs., 4 tabs

  4. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-01-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 2 figs., 5 tabs

  5. The treatment and packaging of waste plutonium and waste actinides for disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, R.F.

    1988-07-01

    The objectives of this work have been to review the current state of knowledge on the treatment and packaging of unusable or surplus plutonium and other waste actinides for disposal and to identify any gaps in data essential for the development of a preferred route. The exercise was based on published data which said the quantity currently to be disposed of was 50 tonnes in oxide form. A literature review over the period 1978 to 1988 was carried out and a computerised database specific to the exercise was created. From this it is concluded that there are no insuperable problems to the formulation of a disposal route although there is none currently proven. The preferred wasteform would be a glass or synthetic rock. The major complication lies in the fissile nature of plutonium which dictates limits to the package size and places restrictions on the production and disposal routes. Additional work necessary to permit a final decision is listed. (author)

  6. Probing phonons in plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, Joe; Krisch, M.; Farber, D.; Occelli, F.; Schwartz, A.; Chiang, T.C.; Wall, M.; Boro, C.; Xu, Ruqing

    2010-01-01

    Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: α → β → γ → (delta) → (delta)(prime) → (var e psilon) → liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature ∼640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts, (Figure 1). Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimenta l data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter -atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single -grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc d-Pu-Ga alloy using the high resolution inelastic x-ray scattering (HRIXS

  7. 41 CFR 102-37.40 - What type of surplus property is available for donation?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... property is available for donation? 102-37.40 Section 102-37.40 Public Contracts and Property Management... 37-DONATION OF SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY General Provisions Donation Overview § 102-37.40 What type of surplus property is available for donation? All surplus property (including property held by...

  8. A method for the gravimetric determination of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate concentrate solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mair, M.A.; Savage, D.J.

    1986-12-01

    Plutonium nitrate solution is treated with sulphuric acid before being heated and finally ignited. The stoichiometric plutonium dioxide so formed is weighed and hence the plutonium content is calculated. (author)

  9. Plutonium contaminated materials research programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, S.G.

    1986-01-01

    The paper is a progress report for 1985 from the Plutonium Contaminated Materials Working Party (PCMWP). The PCMWP co-ordinates research and development on a national basis in the areas of management, treatment and immobilisation of plutonium contaminated materials, for the purpose of waste management. The progress report contains a review of the development work carried out in eight areas, including: reduction of arisings, plutonium measurement, sorting and packaging, washing of shredded combustible PCM, decommissioning and non-combustible PCM treatment, PCM immobilisation, treatment of alpha bearing liquid wastes, and engineering objectives. (UK)

  10. From Russian weapons grade plutonium to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, G.; Kudriavtsev, E.G.; Seyve, C.

    1997-01-01

    The April 1996, G7 Moscow Summit on nuclear matters provided a political framework for one of the most current significant challenges: ensuring a consistent answer to the weapons grade fissile material disposition issue resulting from the disarmament effort engaged by both the USA and Russia. International technical assessments have showed that the transformation of Weapons grade Plutonium in MOX fuel is a very efficient, safe, non proliferant and economically effective solution. In this regard, COGEMA and SIEMENS, have set up a consistent technical program properly addressing incineration of weapons grade plutonium in MOX fuels. The leading point of this program would be the construction of a Weapons grade Plutonium dedicated MOX fabrication plant in Russia. Such a plant would be based on the COGEMA-SIEMENS industrial capabilities and experience. This facility would be operated by MINATOM which is the partner for COGEMA-SIEMENS. MINATOM is in charge of coordination of the activity of the Russian research and construction institutes. The project take in account international standards for non-proliferation, safety and waste management. France and Germany officials reasserted this position during their last bilateral summits held in Fribourg in February and in Dijon in June 1996. MINATOM and the whole Russian nuclear community have already expressed their interest to cooperate with COGEMA-SIEMENS in the MOX field. This follows governmental-level agreements signed in 1992 by French, German and Russian officials. For years, Russia has been dealing with research and development on MOX fabrication and utilization. So, the COGEMA-SIEMENS MOX proposal gives a realistic answer to the management of weapons grade plutonium with regard to the technical, industrial, cost and schedule factors. (author)

  11. Learning more about plutonium; En savoir plus sur le plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    This digest brochure explains what plutonium is, where it comes from, how it is used, its recycling into Mox fuel, its half life, historical discovery, its presence in the environment, toxicity and radioactivity. (J.S.)

  12. FAILED FUEL DISPOSITION STUDY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    THIELGES, J.R.

    2004-12-20

    In May 2004 alpha contamination was found on the lid of the pre-filter housing in the Sodium Removal Ion Exchange System during routine filter change. Subsequent investigation determined that the alpha contamination likely came from a fuel pin(s) contained in an Ident-69 (ID-69) type pin storage container serial number 9 (ID-69-9) that was washed in the Sodium Removal System (SRS) in January 2004. Because all evidence indicated that the wash water interacted with the fuel, this ID49 is designated as containing a failed fuel pin with gross cladding defect and was set aside in the Interim Examination and Maintenance (IEM) Cell until it could be determined how to proceed for long term dry storage of the fuel pin container. This ID49 contained fuel pins from the driver fuel assembly (DFA) 16392, which was identified as a Delayed Neutron Monitor (DNM) leaker assembly. However, this DFA was disassembled and the fuel pin that was thought to be the failed pin was encapsulated and was not located in this ID49 container. This failed fuel disposition study discusses two alternatives that could be used to address long term storage for the contents of ID-69-9. The first alternative evaluated utilizes the current method of identifying and storing DNM leaker fuel pin(s) in tubes and thus, verifying that the alpha contamination found in the SRS came from a failed pin in this pin container. This approach will require unloading selected fuel pins from the ID-69, visually examining and possibly weighing suspect fuel pins to identify the failed pin(s), inserting the failed pin(s) in storage tubes, and reloading the fuel pins into ID49 containers. Safety analysis must be performed to revise the 200 Area Interim Storage Area (ISA) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Reference 1) for this fuel configuration. The second alternative considered is to store the failed fuel as-is in the ID-69. This was evaluated to determine if this approach would comply with storage requirements. This

  13. FAILED FUEL DISPOSITION STUDY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    THIELGES, J.R.

    2004-01-01

    In May 2004 alpha contamination was found on the lid of the pre-filter housing in the Sodium Removal Ion Exchange System during routine filter change. Subsequent investigation determined that the alpha contamination likely came from a fuel pin(s) contained in an Ident-69 (ID-69) type pin storage container serial number 9 (ID-69-9) that was washed in the Sodium Removal System (SRS) in January 2004. Because all evidence indicated that the wash water interacted with the fuel, this ID49 is designated as containing a failed fuel pin with gross cladding defect and was set aside in the Interim Examination and Maintenance (IEM) Cell until it could be determined how to proceed for long term dry storage of the fuel pin container. This ID49 contained fuel pins from the driver fuel assembly (DFA) 16392, which was identified as a Delayed Neutron Monitor (DNM) leaker assembly. However, this DFA was disassembled and the fuel pin that was thought to be the failed pin was encapsulated and was not located in this ID49 container. This failed fuel disposition study discusses two alternatives that could be used to address long term storage for the contents of ID-69-9. The first alternative evaluated utilizes the current method of identifying and storing DNM leaker fuel pin(s) in tubes and thus, verifying that the alpha contamination found in the SRS came from a failed pin in this pin container. This approach will require unloading selected fuel pins from the ID-69, visually examining and possibly weighing suspect fuel pins to identify the failed pin(s), inserting the failed pin(s) in storage tubes, and reloading the fuel pins into ID49 containers. Safety analysis must be performed to revise the 200 Area Interim Storage Area (ISA) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Reference 1) for this fuel configuration. The second alternative considered is to store the failed fuel as-is in the ID-69. This was evaluated to determine if this approach would comply with storage requirements. This

  14. Distribution of health-related social surplus in pharmaceuticals: an estimation of consumer and producer surplus in the management of high blood lipids and COPD.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Refoios Camejo, Rodrigo; Camejo, Rodrigo Refoios; McGrath, Clare; Miraldo, Marisa; Rutten, Frans

    2014-05-01

    Following suggestions that developers should be allowed to capture a defined share of the total value generated by their technologies, the amount of surplus accruing to the pharmaceutical industry has become an important concept when discussing policies to encourage innovation in healthcare. Observational clinical and market data spanning over a period of 20 years were applied in order to estimate the social surplus generated by pharmaceuticals used in the management of high cholesterol and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The distribution of social surplus between consumers and producers was also computed and the dynamics of rent extraction examined. Health-related social surplus increased consistently over time for both disease areas, mostly due to the launch of more effective technologies and a greater number of patients being treated for the conditions. However, the growth rate of social surplus differed for each disease and dissimilar patterns of distribution between consumer and producer surplus emerged across the years. For lipid-lowering therapies, yearly consumer surplus reaches 85 % of total health-related social surplus after the loss of exclusivity of major molecules, whilst for COPD it ranges from 54 to 69 %. Average producer surplus is approximately 25 % of total health-related social surplus in the lipid-lowering market between 1990 and 2010, and 37 % for COPD between 2001 and 2010. The share of surplus captured by non-innovative generic producers also varies differently across periods for both markets, reaching 11.12 % in the case of lipid-lowering therapies but just 1.55 % in the case of COPD. A considerable amount of the value may be recouped by consumers only towards the end of the lifecycle. Elements affecting the distribution of social surplus vary across disease areas and include the market pricing structure and the pattern of clinical effectiveness observed over time. The application of a longer-term disease specific perspective

  15. Plutonium waste container identification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmierer, T.J.

    1979-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to define the parameters of a method for identifying plutonium waste containers. This information will form the basis for a permanent committee to develop a complete identification program for use throughout the world. Although a large portion of the information will be on handwritten notebooks and may not be as extensive as is desired, it will all be helpful. The final information will be programmed into computer language and be available to all interested parties as well as a central control committee which will have the expertise to provide each government with advice on the packaging, storage, and measurement of the waste for which it is responsible. As time progresses, this central control committee should develop permanent storage sites and establish a system of records which will last for hundreds of years

  16. Uranium plutonium oxide fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, C.M.; Leggett, R.D.; Weber, E.T.

    1981-01-01

    Uranium plutonium oxide is the principal fuel material for liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBR's) throughout the world. Development of this material has been a reasonably straightforward evolution from the UO 2 used routinely in the light water reactor (LWR's); but, because of the lower neutron capture cross sections and much lower coolant pressures in the sodium cooled LMFBR's, the fuel is operated to much higher discharge exposures than that of a LWR. A typical LMFBR fuel assembly is shown. Depending on the required power output and the configuration of the reactor, some 70 to 400 such fuel assemblies are clustered to form the core. There is a wide variation in cross section and length of the assemblies where the increasing size reflects a chronological increase in plant size and power output as well as considerations of decreasing the net fuel cycle cost. Design and performance characteristics are described

  17. The plutonium ban

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    'Nuclear Power Issues and Choices' is the title of a recent report which has been performed by a study group sponsored by the Ford Foundation and administered by the MITRE Corporation. The main concern of this study is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the reprocessing of spent fuel elements yields among others plutonium of bomb quality, the report of the Ford Foundation comes to the conclusion that the USA should defer the closing of the fuel cycle, defer the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, deposit the spent fuel elemenets as a whole, and defer the breeder which can not run without fuel reprocessing. The German attitude however is that we can not relinquish on reprocessing and recycling of nuclear fuel because we are lacking such rich resources of coal, oil and uranium as the USA have. Furthermore, the deposition of spent fuel elements may be more dangerous than the deposition of the radioactive waste from reprocessing plants. (orig.) [de

  18. NRC comprehensive records disposition schedule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    Effective January 1, 1982, NRC will institute records retention and disposal practices in accordance with the approved Comprehensive Records Disposition Schedule (CRDS). CRDS is comprised of NRC Schedules (NRCS) 1 to 4 which apply to the agency's program or substantive records and General Records Schedules (GRS) 1 to 22 which apply to housekeeping or facilitative records. The schedules are assembled functionally/organizationally to facilitate their use. Preceding the records descriptions and disposition instructions for both NRCS and GRS, there are brief statements on the organizational units which accumulate the records in each functional area, and other information regarding the schedules' applicability

  19. Happiness, Dispositions and the Self

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Klausen, Søren Harnow

    2016-01-01

    I argue that happiness is an exclusively categorical mental state. Daniel Haybron’s inclusion of dispositions into his emotional state theory rests of a confusion of constituents of happiness in the narrow psychological sense with objects of prudential concern, to which obviously belong “mood...... propensities” and other dispositional states. I further argue that while it is probably correct to require of a constituent of happiness that it must in some sense be “deep” and belong to, or directly impact on, a persons’ self, the importance of depth may be overrated by the emotional state theory, which also...

  20. Disposition of nuclear waste using subcritical accelerator-driven systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venneri, F.; Li, N.; Williamson, M.; Houts, M.; Lawrence, G.

    1998-01-01

    Studies have shown that the repository long-term radiological risk is from the long-lived transuranics and the fission products Tc-99 and I-129, thermal loading concerns arise mainly form the short-lived fission products Sr-90 and Cs-137. In relation to the disposition of nuclear waste, ATW is expected to accomplish the following: (1) destroy over 99.9% of the actinides; (2) destroy over 99.9% of the Tc and I; (3) separate Sr and Cs (short half-life isotopes); (4) separate uranium; (5) produce electricity. In the ATW concept, spent fuel would be shipped to a ATW site where the plutonium, other transuranics and selected long-lived fission products would be destroyed by fission or transmutation in their only pass through the facility. This approach contrasts with the present-day reprocessing practices in Europe and Japan, during which high purity plutonium is produced and used in the fabrication of fresh mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) that is shipped off-site for use in light water reactors

  1. A 32-year medical follow-up of Manhattan project plutonium workers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voelz, G.L.; Hempelmann, L.H.; Lawrence, J.N.P.; Moss, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    Twenty-six male subjects who worked with plutonium during World War 2 under extraordinarily crude conditions have been followed medically for a period of 32 yr. Inhalation was the primary mode of plutonium exposure. Current estimates of the systematic plutonium depositions in these individuals range from 7 to 230 nCi. Eleven individuals have dispositions greater than 40 nCi, the current maximum permissible body burden for workers. Two individuals in the group have died: one due to myocardial infarction and the other due to injuries sustained in an automobile-pedestrian accident. This mortality rate is about 50% of expected deaths based on United States white male rates. All 24 living subjects were re-examined in the period of 1975-78. No cases of cancer were diagnosed in the group except for two skin cancers that have no history or basis that relate them to plutonium exposure. The diseases and physical changes noted in the group are characteristic of a male population in their 50s and 60s. This study yields no evidence suggesting that adverse health effects have resulted from the 32 yr of exposure to the internally deposited plutonium. (author)

  2. Los Alamos National Laboratory summary plan to fabricate mixed oxide lead assemblies for the fissile material disposition program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buksa, J.J.; Eaton, S.L.; Trellue, H.R.; Chidester, K.; Bowidowicz, M.; Morley, R.A.; Barr, M.

    1997-12-01

    This report summarizes an approach for using existing Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory) mixed oxide (MOX) fuel-fabrication and plutonium processing capabilities to expedite and assure progress in the MOX/Reactor Plutonium Disposition Program. Lead Assembly MOX fabrication is required to provide prototypic fuel for testing in support of fuel qualification and licensing requirements. It is also required to provide a bridge for the full utilization of the European fabrication experience. In part, this bridge helps establish, for the first time since the early 1980s, a US experience base for meeting the safety, licensing, safeguards, security, and materials control and accountability requirements of the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, a link is needed between the current research and development program and the production of disposition mission fuel. This link would also help provide a knowledge base for US regulators. Early MOX fabrication and irradiation testing in commercial nuclear reactors would provide a positive demonstration to Russia (and to potential vendors, designers, fabricators, and utilities) that the US has serious intent to proceed with plutonium disposition. This report summarizes an approach to fabricating lead assembly MOX fuel using the existing MOX fuel-fabrication infrastructure at the Laboratory.

  3. Los Alamos National Laboratory summary plan to fabricate mixed oxide lead assemblies for the fissile material disposition program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buksa, J.J.; Eaton, S.L.; Trellue, H.R.; Chidester, K.; Bowidowicz, M.; Morley, R.A.; Barr, M.

    1997-12-01

    This report summarizes an approach for using existing Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory) mixed oxide (MOX) fuel-fabrication and plutonium processing capabilities to expedite and assure progress in the MOX/Reactor Plutonium Disposition Program. Lead Assembly MOX fabrication is required to provide prototypic fuel for testing in support of fuel qualification and licensing requirements. It is also required to provide a bridge for the full utilization of the European fabrication experience. In part, this bridge helps establish, for the first time since the early 1980s, a US experience base for meeting the safety, licensing, safeguards, security, and materials control and accountability requirements of the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, a link is needed between the current research and development program and the production of disposition mission fuel. This link would also help provide a knowledge base for US regulators. Early MOX fabrication and irradiation testing in commercial nuclear reactors would provide a positive demonstration to Russia (and to potential vendors, designers, fabricators, and utilities) that the US has serious intent to proceed with plutonium disposition. This report summarizes an approach to fabricating lead assembly MOX fuel using the existing MOX fuel-fabrication infrastructure at the Laboratory

  4. Differential spectrophotometric determination of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lecat, J.

    1980-01-01

    Differential spectrophotometric method is used for determination of plutonium reduced to oxydation state III+ by ascorbic acid, at 560 nm. Concentration of solutions is 4 g/l and accuracy of the method is better than 0,3% [fr

  5. The first milligrams of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1996-01-01

    This paper relates the discovery of the different plutonium chemical extraction processes in their historical context. The first experiments started during the second world war in 1942 with the American ''Metallurgical Laboratory'' project which brought together Arthur Compton, Enrico Fermi and Glenn Seaborg. During the same period, a competitive English-Canadian project, the ''Montreal Project'', was carried out to test different plutonium solvent extraction techniques. The author participated in both projects and joined the CEA in 1946, where he was in charge of the uranium and plutonium chemistry. By the end of 1949, his team could isolate the first milligrams of French plutonium from uranium oxide pellets of the ZOE reactor. In the beginning of 1952 he developed with his team the PUREX process. (J.S.)

  6. Technological alternatives for plutonium transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This paper considers alternative transport modes (air, sea, road, rail) for moving (1) plutonium from a reprocessing plant to a store or a fuel fabrication facility, and (2) MOX fuel from the latter to a reactor. These transport modes and differing forms of plutonium are considered in terms of: their proliferation resistance and safeguards; environmental and safety aspects; and economic aspects. It is tentatively proposed that the transport of plutonium could continue by air or sea where long distances are involved and by road or rail over shorter distances; this would be acceptable from the non-proliferation, environmental impact and economic aspects - there may be advantages in protection if plutonium is transported in the form of mixed oxide

  7. Plutonium helps probe protein, superconductor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    Scientists are finding that plutonium can be a useful research tool that may help them answer important questions in fields as diverse as biochemistry and solid-state physics. This paper reports that U.S. research involving plutonium is confined to the Department of Energy's national laboratories and centers around nuclear weapons technology, waste cleanup and disposal, and health effects. But at Los Alamos National Laboratory, scientists also are using plutonium to probe the biochemical behavior of calmodulin, a key calcium-binding protein that mediates calcium-regulated processes in biological systems. At Argonne National Laboratory, another team is trying to learn how a superconductor's properties are affected by the 5f electrons of an actinide like plutonium

  8. Chloride removal from plutonium alloy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holcomb, H.P.

    1983-01-01

    SRP is evaluating a program to recover plutonium from a metallic alloy that will contain chloride salt impurities. Removal of chloride to sufficiently low levels to prevent damaging corrosion to canyon equipment is feasible as a head-end step following dissolution. Silver nitrate and mercurous nitrate were each successfully used in laboratory tests to remove chloride from simulated alloy dissolver solution containing plutonium. Levels less than 10 ppM chloride were achieved in the supernates over the precipitated and centrifuged insoluble salts. Also, less than 0.05% loss of plutonium in the +3, +4, or +6 oxidation states was incurred via precipitate carrying. These results provide impetus for further study and development of a plant-scale process to recover plutonium from metal alloy at SRP

  9. Share-of-Surplus Product Line Optimisation with Price Levels

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    X. G. Luo

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Kraus and Yano (2003 established the share-of-surplus product line optimisation model and developed a heuristic procedure for this nonlinear mixed-integer optimisation model. In their model, price of a product is defined as a continuous decision variable. However, because product line optimisation is a planning process in the early stage of product development, pricing decisions usually are not very precise. In this research, a nonlinear integer programming share-of-surplus product line optimization model that allows the selection of candidate price levels for products is established. The model is further transformed into an equivalent linear mixed-integer optimisation model by applying linearisation techniques. Experimental results in different market scenarios show that the computation time of the transformed model is much less than that of the original model.

  10. Inhaled plutonium oxide in dogs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This project is concerned with long-term experiments to determine the life-span dose-effect relationships of inhaled 239 PuO 2 and 238 PuO 2 in beagles. The data will be used to estimate the health effects of inhaled transuranics. The tissue distribution of plutonium, radiation effects in the lung and hematologic changes in plutonium-exposed beagles with lung tumors were evaluated

  11. Plutonium contamination in italian population

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cave-Bondi, G.; Merli, S.; Rogo, M.; Sgarbazzini, M.; Clemente, G.F.; Mancini, L.; Santori, G.; Tardella, Q.

    1983-01-01

    The literature data concerning the biological and the chemical physical characteristics of plutonium are summarized in the first part of the paper. The experimental results of the plutonium concentration in complete diets, single food items and some human autopsy tissues, regarding the Italian situation, are then presented and discussed. Our experimental data are in good agreement with similar data reported in several studies carried out in some countries of the north emisphere

  12. Plutonium: real and false problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bemden, E. van den

    1981-01-01

    This paper deals with technical and technological state of the possibilities of using plutonium as fuel in the thermal and fast reactors. It also describes the political blockage restraining its use and the reasons for it. The accent is put on some fundamental lacks of international coordination and on some problems of commercial policy, which impede, in a certain way, the industrial use of plutonium as a fuel. (author)

  13. Understanding and overcoming the “positive profits with negative surplus-value” paradox

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    GUSTAVO DAOU LUCAS

    Full Text Available ABSTRACT This paper explains the “positive profits with negative surplus-value” example of Steedman (1975 and shows that while in joint production systems individual labour values can be negative, the claim that the total labour embodied in the surplus product of the economy (surplus-value can also be negative is based on assumptions that have no economic meaning (such as negative activity levels.The paper also provides a way to measure the surplus-value of joint production systems which overcomes the problems of the traditional concept and restates the proposition that a positive amount of surplus labour is a necessary condition for positive profits.

  14. Current Account Surpluses and the Interest Rate Island in Switzerland

    OpenAIRE

    Paolo Mauro

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes some long-run aspects of the Swiss balance of payments, highlighting two macroeconomic phenomena that make Switzerland stand out among other countries: first, it has had a persistent current account surplus and the largest ratio of net foreign assets to GDP in the world; second, its real interest rates have been significantly lower than those of most other industrialized countries, earning it the label “interest rate island”. These two distinctive features may be related,...

  15. Monitoring the risks of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holliday, B.

    1978-01-01

    The difficulties in monitoring the environment in work areas where plutonium is handled are identified and both continuous and personal air sampling techniques considered. Methods of estimating the amounts of plutonium retained in the body are: (1) Direct external counting over the chest of the 'soft' low energy X-rays and gamma rays emitted by the plutonium deposited in the lungs. (2) Measuring plutonium excreted in urine. (3) Analysing faeces soon after a suspected contamination. Limitation of these techniques are discussed and it is shown that estimating the amount of plutonium in the body, or a specific organ, is extremely difficult, both because of the lack of sensitivity of the measuring techniques (especially chest scanning) and because of the problems in interpreting data, stemming from a lack of knowledge of crucial characteristics of the inhaled plutonium (such as particle size and solubility). Nevertheless it is felt that the judicious integration of all the options creates a level of certainty that no individual technique can possibly inspire. (U.K.)

  16. Atomic energy policy of Japan, especially plutonium utilization policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moriguchi, Y.

    1993-01-01

    The necessity of plutonium use in Japan is discussed. Basic policy regarding plutonium use and future plutonium utilization programme is described including such an aspect as management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons

  17. A disposition of interpolation techniques

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Knotters, M.; Heuvelink, G.B.M.

    2010-01-01

    A large collection of interpolation techniques is available for application in environmental research. To help environmental scientists in choosing an appropriate technique a disposition is made, based on 1) applicability in space, time and space-time, 2) quantification of accuracy of interpolated

  18. Dispositional optimism and stock investments

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Angelini, Viola; Cavapozzi, D.

    This paper analyzes the relationship between dispositional optimism and stock investments, controlling for cognitive skills and personality traits such as trust, social interactions and risk aversion. We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) on investors aged

  19. Addiction surplus: the add-on margin that makes addictive consumptions difficult to contain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Peter J; Livingstone, Charles

    2015-01-01

    Addictive consumptions generate financial surpluses over-and-above non-addictive consumptions because of the excessive consumption of addicted consumers. This add-on margin or 'addiction surplus' provides a powerful incentive for beneficiaries to protect their income by ensuring addicted consumers keep consuming. Not only that, addiction surplus provides the financial base that enables producers to sponsor activities which aim to prevent public health initiatives from reducing consumption. This paper examines the potency of addiction surplus to engage industry, governments and communities in an on-going reliance on addiction surplus. It then explores how neo-liberal constructions of a rational consumer disguise the ethical and exploitative dynamics of addiction surplus by examining ways in which addictive consumptions fail to conform to notions of autonomy and rationality. Four measures are identified to contain the distorting effects of addiction surplus. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  20. Signs, dispositions, and semiotic scaffolding.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fernández, Eliseo

    2015-12-01

    In theoretical work we distinguish living beings from inanimate objects on the basis of some paramount attributes, such as agency and autonomy. These abstract features are not directly accessible to our scrutiny, but we surmise their nature through observation of the purpose-oriented behavior of organisms. I intend to show that organismal purposefulness springs from the intrinsic, constitutive kind of finality that is the hallmark of all semiotic transactions. To this aim I develop a dispositionalist account of organismal causation based on a distinction between two kinds of causal dispositions: fixed (efficient) dispositions and traveling dispositions. Fixed dispositions are rigidly attached to physical structures and processes; these are the dispositions regularly invoked in current discussions of causal explanation. Traveling dispositions are able to move freely from one location to another by becoming embodied into suitable supporting media. I introduce these notions to articulate a view of semiosis I deem best suited to the life sciences, and contend that sign tokens are vehicles of traveling dispositions. This account places the origin of purposive behavior at the interaction of physical and semiotic causation. To properly motivate the discussion I briefly review some recent developments in the philosophy of science concerning various forms of causation invoked by scientists across disciplines to frame explanations and make predictions. The ensuing discussion gives particular prominence to mechanistic (as distinct from mechanicist) explanatory accounts of biological phenomena. This review is followed by a brief characterization of a "nomological machine," a comprehensive schema introduced and developed by Nancy Cartwright with the goal of explaining causal mechanisms in a general setting. By capitalizing on this model's heuristic virtues I seek to formulate a compelling view of the interactions between physical and semiotic causation at play in semiotic

  1. Plutonium re-cycle in HTR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Desoisa, J. A.

    1974-03-15

    The study of plutonium cycles in HTRs using reprocessed plutonium from Magnox and AGR fuel cycles has shown that full core plutonium/uranium loadings are in general not feasible, burn-up is limited due the need for lower loadings of plutonium to meet reload core reactivity limits, on-line refueling is not practicable due to the need for higher burnable poison loadings, and low conversion rates in the plutonium-uranium cycles cannot be mitigated by axial loading schemes so that fissile make-up is needed if HTR plutonium recycle is desired.

  2. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 9: Oak Ridge site site team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    This report provides the input to and results of the Department of Energy (DOE) - Oak Ridge Operations (ORO) DOE Plutonium Environment, Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) Vulnerability Assessment (VA) self-assessment performed by the Site Assessment Team (SAT) for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL or X-10) and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant (Y-12) sites that are managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (MMES). As initiated (March 15, 1994) by the Secretary of Energy, the objective of the VA is to identify and rank-order DOE-ES ampersand H vulnerabilities associated for the purpose of decision making on the interim safe management and ultimate disposition of fissile materials. This assessment is directed at plutonium and other co-located transuranics in various forms

  3. Erosional losses of fallout plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foster, G.R.; Hakonson, T.E.

    1987-01-01

    Plutonium from fallout after atmospheric explosion of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960s is being redistributed over the landscape by soil erosion and carried on sediment by streams to oceans. Erosion rates computed with the Universal Soil Loss Equation for more than 200,000 sample points on nonfederal land across the US were used to estimate plutonium removal rates by soil erosion. On the average, only about 4% of the eroded sediment reaches the outlet of a major river. The remaining sediment is deposited en route, and because deposition is a selective process, the sediment is enriched in fine particles having the highest concentration of plutonium because of the element's strong association with clay and silt-sized sediment. Estimated enrichment ratios, sediment delivery ratios, and erosion rates were used to estimate annual delivery of fallout plutonium. These estimates ranged from 0.002% of the initial fallout plutonium inventory for the Savannah River basin to 0.01% for the Columbia River basin, to 0.02% for the Hudson and Rio Grande River basins, to 0.08% for the Mississippi River basin. If the deposition of plutonium had been uniformly 1 mCi/km 2 , the estimated plutonium activity on suspended sediment would range from about 7 fCi/g of sediment of the Savannah River basin, to 9 fCi/g for the Mississippi River basin, to 12 fCi/g for the Hudson River basin, to 14 fCi/g for the Columbia and Rio Grande River basins. 45 references, 2 figures, 17 tables

  4. Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

    1995-10-30

    The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

  5. Strategy for the future use and disposition of uranium-233: Technical information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bereolos, P.J.; Forsberg, C.W.; Kocher, D.C.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1998-04-01

    This document provides a summary of technical information on the synthetic radioisotope 233 U. It is one of a series of four reports that map out a national strategy for the future use and disposition of 233 U. The technical information on 233 U in this document falls into two main areas. First, material characteristics are presented along with the contrasts of 233 U to the more well known strategic fissile materials, 235 U and plutonium (Pu). Second, information derived from the scientific information, such as safeguards, waste classifications, material form, and packaging, is presented. Throughout, the effects of isotopically diluting 233 U with nonfissile, depleted uranium (DU) are examined

  6. Plutonium focus area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure

  7. Plutonium solution analyzer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded)

  8. Plutonium oxide shipment report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    While following procedures for unloading shipping containers containing plutonium oxide, SRP personnel experienced problems. While using a pipe cutter to cut through the wall of the inner container, the pipe section fell to the floor. Three empty food cans in the bottom of the inner canister also fell to the floor and a puff of smoke was observed. Personnel were evacuated and contamination was detected in the room. As a result of the investigations conducted by Westinghouse and SRP, thermal effects, food can coatings, and fuel volatiles were eliminated as the cause of the problem. Helium used to leak test the RL070 shipping container seals entered the inner canister through two weld defects resulting in a pressurization of the contents. When the end cap was removed, the inner canister vented rapidly, the food cans did not, thus creating a differential pressure across the food cans. This caused the food cans to swell. It was recommended that a dye penetrant test of all inner container welds be added. Additional unloading procedures were also recommended

  9. Plutonium solution analyzer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded).

  10. 41 CFR 102-37.200 - What certifications must a SASP make when requesting surplus property for donation?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... a SASP make when requesting surplus property for donation? 102-37.200 Section 102-37.200 Public... MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 37-DONATION OF SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY State Agency for Surplus... requesting surplus property for donation? When requesting or applying for property, you must certify that: (a...

  11. Long time contamination from plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fueloep, M.; Patzeltova, N.; Ragan, P.; Matel, L.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium isotopes in the organism of the patient (who had participated in the liquidation works after the Chernobyl accident; for three month he had stayed in the epicenter, where he acted as a chauffeur driving a radioactive material to the place of destination) from urine were determined. For determination of the concentration of Pu-239, Pu-240 in urine a modified radiochemical method was used. After mineralization the sample was separated as an anion-nitrate complex with contact by the anion form of the resin in the column. The resin was washed by 8 M HNO 3 , the 8 M HCl with 0.3 M HNO 3 for removing the other radionuclides. The solution 0.36 M HCl with 0.01 M HF was used for the elution of plutonium. Using the lanthanum fluoride technique the sample was filtrated through a membrane filter. The plutonium was detected in the dry sample. The Pu-239 tracer was used for the evaluation of the plutonium separation efficiency. The alpha spectrometric measurements were carried out with a large area silicon detector. The samples were measured and evaluated in the energy region 4.98-5.18 MeV. The detection limit of alpha spectrometry measurements has been 0.01 Bq dm -3 . The concentration of plutonium in the 24-hour urine was determined three times in the quarter year intervals. The results are: 54 mBq, 63.2 mBq, 53 mBq, with average 56,7 mBq. From the results of the analyses of plutonium depositions calculated according to ICRP 54 the intake of this radionuclide for the patient was 56.7 kBq. To estimate a committed effective dose (50 years) from the intake of plutonium was used a conversion factor 6.8.10 -5 Sv.Bq -1 (class W). So the expressed committed effective dose received from the plutonium intake is 3.8 Sv. This number is relatively high and all the effective dose will be higher, because the patient was exposed to the other radionuclides too. For example the determination of the rate radionuclides Am-241/Pu-239,Pu-240 was 32-36 % in the fallout after the Chernobyl

  12. Double shell tanks plutonium inventory assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tusler, L.A.

    1995-01-01

    This report provides an evaluation that establishes plutonium inventory estimates for all DSTs based on known tank history information, the DST plutonium inventory tracking system, tank characterization measurements, tank transfer records, and estimated average concentration values for the various types of waste. These estimates use data through December 31, 1994, and give plutonium estimates as of January 1, 1995. The plutonium inventory values for the DSTs are given in Section 31. The plutonium inventory estimate is 224 kg for the DSTs and 854 kg for the SSTs for a total of 1078 kg. This value compares favorably with the total plutonium inventory value of 981 kg obtained from the total plutonium production minus plutonium recovery analysis estimates

  13. Oxidation-state maxima in plutonium chemistry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2013-01-01

    Maxima in the fractions of the trivalent and hexavalent oxidation states of plutonium are inherent in the algebra of its disproportionation reactions. The maxima do not support overall disproportionation equations as satisfactory representations of aqueous plutonium. (author)

  14. Recovery studies for plutonium machining oil coolant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Navratil, J.D.; Baldwin, C.E.

    1977-01-01

    Lathe coolant oil, contaminated with plutonium and having a carbon tetrachloride diluent, is generated in plutonium machining areas at Rocky Flats. A research program was initiated to determine the nature of plutonium in this mixture of oil and carbon tetrachloride. Appropriate methods then could be developed to remove the plutonium and to recycle the oil and carbon tetrachloride. Studies showed that the mixtures of spent oil and carbon tetrachloride contained particulate plutonium and plutonium species that are soluble in water or in oil and carbon tetrachloride. The particulate plutonium was removed by filtration; the nonfilterable plutonium was removed by adsorption on various materials. Laboratory-scale tests indicated the lathe-coolant oil mixture could be separated by distilling the carbon tetrachloride to yield recyclable products

  15. Plutonium and americium separation from salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagan, P.G.; Miner, F.J.

    1976-01-01

    Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution

  16. Plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 metabolism in dairy cows following ingestion of mixed oxides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patzer, R.G.; Mullen, A.A.; Sutton, W.W.; Potter, G.D.; Mosley, R.E.; Efurd, D.W.; Stalnaker, N.D.

    1985-01-01

    Dairy cows were given oral dosage of plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 dioxide particles in a study to determine the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution of the nuclides. Two cows were given particles in which the two isotopes were homogeneously mixed within the particles. A third cow was given two batches of particles which contained either plutonium-238 or plutonium-239. Results indicate that, when the two isotopes of plutonium are homogeneous within the particles, there is no difference between plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 in the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution

  17. Fuel cycles using adulterated plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooksbank, R.E.; Bigelow, J.E.; Campbell, D.O.; Kitts, F.G.; Lindauer, R.B.

    1978-01-01

    Adjustments in the U-Pu fuel cycle necessitated by decisions made to improve the nonproliferation objectives of the US are examined. The uranium-based fuel cycle, using bred plutonium to provide the fissile enrichment, is the fuel system with the highest degree of commercial development at the present time. However, because purified plutonium can be used in weapons, this fuel cycle is potentially vulnerable to diversion of that plutonium. It does appear that there are technologically sound ways in which the plutonium might be adulterated by admixture with 238 U and/or radioisotopes, and maintained in that state throughout the fuel cycle, so that the likelihood of a successful diversion is small. Adulteration of the plutonium in this manner would have relatively little effect on the operations of existing or planned reactors. Studies now in progress should show within a year or two whether the less expensive coprocessing scheme would provide adequate protection (coupled perhaps with elaborate conventional safeguards procedures) or if the more expensive spiked fuel cycle is needed as in the proposed civex pocess. If the latter is the case, it will be further necessary to determine the optimum spiking level, which could vary as much as a factor of a billion. A very basic question hangs on these determinations: What is to be the nature of the recycle fuel fabrication facilities. If the hot, fully remote fuel fabrication is required, then a great deal of further development work will be required to make the full cycle fully commercial

  18. Selecting a plutonium vitrification process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jouan, A. [Centre d`Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, Bagnols sur Ceze (France)

    1996-05-01

    Vitrification of plutonium is one means of mitigating its potential danger. This option is technically feasible, even if it is not the solution advocated in France. Two situations are possible, depending on whether or not the glass matrix also contains fission products; concentrations of up to 15% should be achievable for plutonium alone, whereas the upper limit is 3% in the presence of fission products. The French continuous vitrification process appears to be particularly suitable for plutonium vitrification: its capacity is compatible with the required throughout, and the compact dimensions of the process equipment prevent a criticality hazard. Preprocessing of plutonium metal, to convert it to PuO{sub 2} or to a nitric acid solution, may prove advantageous or even necessary depending on whether a dry or wet process is adopted. The process may involve a single step (vitrification of Pu or PuO{sub 2} mixed with glass frit) or may include a prior calcination step - notably if the plutonium is to be incorporated into a fission product glass. It is important to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of all the possible options in terms of feasibility, safety and cost-effectiveness.

  19. Plutonium in depleted uranium penetrators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, J.P.; Leon-Vintro, L.; Smith, K.; Mitchell, P.I.; Zunic, Z.S.

    2002-01-01

    Depleted Uranium (DU) penetrators used in the recent Balkan conflicts have been found to be contaminated with trace amounts of transuranic materials such as plutonium. This contamination is usually a consequence of DU fabrication being carried out in facilities also using uranium recycled from spent military and civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Specific activities of 239+240 Plutonium generally in the range 1 to 12 Bq/kg have been found to be present in DU penetrators recovered from the attack sites of the 1999 NATO bombardment of Kosovo. A DU penetrator recovered from a May 1999 attack site at Bratoselce in southern Serbia and analysed by University College Dublin was found to contain 43.7 +/- 1.9 Bq/kg of 239+240 Plutonium. This analysis is described. An account is also given of the general population radiation dose implications arising from both the DU itself and from the presence of plutonium in the penetrators. According to current dosimetric models, in all scenarios considered likely ,the dose from the plutonium is estimated to be much smaller than that due to the uranium isotopes present in the penetrators. (author)

  20. A World made of Plutonium?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broda, E.

    1976-01-01

    This lecture by Engelbert Broda was written for the 26th Pugwash Conference in Mühlhausen, Germany, 26 – 31 August 1976: Public doubts about nuclear energy are generally directed at the problems of routine emissions of radionuclides, of catastrophic accidents, and of terminal waste disposal. Curiously, the most important problem is not being given sufficient attention: The use of plutonium from civilian reactors fpr weapons production. According to current ideas about a nuclear future, 5000 tons (order of magnitude) of plutonium are to be made annually by year 2000, and about 10 000 tons will all the time be in circulation (transport, reprocessing, reproduction of fuel elements, etc.). It is a misconception that plutonium from power reactors is unsuitable as a nuclear explosive. 5000 tons are enough for several hundred thousand (!) of bombs, Nagasaki type. By the year 2000 maybe 40 – 50 countries will have home-made plutonium. Plutonium production and proliferation are the most serious problems in a nuclear world. (author)