WorldWideScience

Sample records for strengthened safeguards system

  1. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

    2001-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  2. Where are we now? The strengthened safeguards system: Origins, aims, features, issues and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schriefer, D.

    1998-01-01

    The present status of the strengthened safeguards system includes the origins, aims, features, issues and future prospects. The areas of emphasis concerning the strengthened safeguards system are: access to information (environmental sampling and improved information analysis), access to sites, rational use of resources (cost analysis of present safeguards, increased cooperation with state systems, cost savings in traditional safeguards activities)

  3. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  4. Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System. ABACC 15 Years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vicens, H.R.; Maceiras, E.; Dominguez, C.A.

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and control of nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendations of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context.

  5. Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vicens, Hugo; Maceiras, Elena; Dominguez, Cristina A.

    2008-01-01

    The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

  6. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  7. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

    2001-01-01

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  8. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  9. The Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loosch, Reinhard

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The following main points will be dealt with and underlined by illustrative examples: 0. A preliminary clarification: Contrary to the title's short-hand language, it is of course, not the Additional Protocols entered into by the Agency and States and other Parties to Safeguards Agreements since 1997 nor the Model Additional Protocol adopted by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference in 1997 that are, by themselves, an important tool for the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. They are, however, the necessary legal prerequisite as well as a strong political and moral boost for enabling the Agency to develop and apply additional tools in order to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime more effective and, therefore, more reassuring and at the same time, more efficient and therefore, more widely accepted. 1. The importance of the new tools cannot be assessed yet. Hopefully, it will grow quickly and consistently. This will depend primarily on two factors: - The extent to which Additional Protocols are entered into force and at what speed this is achieved, and the extent to which these Protocols cover all important peaceful nuclear activities and resources, whether these exist in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements or not; - The extent to which the Agency succeeds in merging the new measures with those applicable before into an optimized, integrated toolbox. 2. The first factor tends to increase effectiveness by permitting the collection of safeguards- relevant data provided not only in reports from countries in which such activities are conducted or such resources exist but also in information coming from other sources such as publications in. or intelligence made available by, other countries. Cross-checking all those data against each other may, in the best case, reinforce their credibility or, in the worst case, reveal gaps and inconsistencies, but will at any rate, in one way or other, help

  10. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system (Programme 93+2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tani, Hiroshi

    1999-01-01

    Present safeguards systems against nuclear proliferation as well as their improvement activities for more effective results are reviewed. First, the mechanism of the NPT Safeguards System is explained, which is the grasp of inventories of nuclear materials through change and transfer booking starting with actual investigation. Then, other various safeguards systems are described, including TLATELOCO (Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America), VO (Voluntary Offer), OCA (Other Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), PA (Project Agreement), US (Unilateral Submission), and OSA (Other Safeguards Agreement). Thirdly, the present status and problems of the nuclear proliferation prevention in the world are described, including competitive nuclear weapon development in India and Pakistan, and Iraq and North Korea problems. Lastly, the 93 + 2 plan to improve the present system is explained. (M.M.)

  11. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  12. Achievements to date in strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    There is substantial progress in developing and implementing measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Safeguards System. The measures comprise those to be implemented pursuant to the Agency's legal authority conferred by existing safeguards agreements as well as those to be implemented under the complementary legal authority conferred by Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of Document INFCIRC/540(Corrected). Activities on implementing measures under existing legal authority, particularly with respect to the evaluation of States' nuclear programmes, environmental sampling and the use of remote monitoring for safeguards purposes had been carried continuously ion the recent post. In 1998, additional protocols entered into force with four States (the Holy See, Jordan, New Zealand and Uzbekistan). Additional protocols with a further 27 States were approved by the Board and were awaiting ratification by the respective States. The additional protocol with Australia, which entered into force in December 1997, was being implemented following receipt of its Article 2 declaration. Agency consultations on concluding additional protocols take place with a number of States on a regular basis. As of 1 October 1999, Additional Protocols had been concluded and approved by the Board of Governors with a total of 45 States. Of these, Additional Protocols with 44 States had been signed and five had entered into force. (author)

  13. Safeguards implementation and strengthening in Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sudakou, I.; Piotukh, O.

    2001-01-01

    transportation of nuclear materials is carried out by Promatomnadzor. Promatomnadzor also issues permits on movement of nuclear materials across the borders of Belarus. State Customs Committee is responsible for detection of unauthorised imports and exports of nuclear and other radioactive materials at the customs border of the Republic of Belarus. They report each case to other responsible authorities. Belarus is a transport corridor between the East and West, and the issues relating to regulation of export and import, exercising control over export, import of nuclear materials, prevention of smuggling of nuclear materials and maintaining of international co-operation are very important for us. Further development of the safeguards system - It should be noted that control over use of nuclear materials and facilities, which is still of crucial importance can not ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear activities as required. The IAEA has developed the strengthened safeguards system (INFIRC/590) the essence of which is to expand control over relevant technologies, dual use commodities and services. Of course, the implementation of the system provides for more effective and efficient safeguards. Co-operation with the IAEA and other international organisations is regarded as one of the conditions of further improvement of reliability and efficiency of the safeguards. In conclusion I would like to express my profound gratitude to the IAEA and donor countries, in particular Japan, USA and Sweden, for their assistance aimed at strengthening safeguards in Belarus. (author)

  14. Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

    2001-01-01

    The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

  15. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  16. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  17. Croatian Support for Strengthening International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, Ankica; Novosel, Nevenka

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear science and technology has the potential to contribute to health and prosperity. However, it is also the basis for the development of nuclear weapons. The acceptance and implementation of IAEA safeguards therefore serve as important confidence building measures, through which a State can demonstrate, and other States can be assured, that nuclear energy is being used only for peaceful purpose. Practically, all countries around the world use nuclear techniques for a variety of peaceful purposes, including food and water security, energy, industrial application and human health. Only a few of these activities involve the type of nuclear material that could potentially be diverted to make nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. And here the safeguards are on duty. The safeguards system aims at detecting the diversion of nuclear material. In this paper will be presented international conventions and bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear safety as well as the Croatian cooperation with international organizations and associations in the nuclear area, such as Nuclear Supplier Group, Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Arrangement, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban treaty Organization, Euratom and civil expert groups of NATO. (author)

  18. National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

    1999-01-01

    This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

  19. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  20. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  1. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  2. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  3. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  4. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  5. Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2007-01-01

    The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

  6. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  7. Strengthening IAEA safeguards using high-resolution commercial satellite imagery

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Hui

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol to improve its ability to detect the undeclared production of fissile material. This new strengthened safeguards system has opened the door for the IAEA to use of all types of information, including the potential use of commercial satellite imagery. We have therefore been investigating the feasibility of strengthening IAEA safeguards using commercial satellite imagery. Based on our analysis on a number of one-meter resolution IKONOS satellite images of military nuclear production facilities at nuclear states including Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel, we found that the new high-resolution commercial satellite imagery would play a new and valuable role in strengthening IAEA safeguards. Since 1999, images with a resolution of one meter have been available commercially from Space Imaging's IKONOS satellite. One-meter images from other companies are expected to enter the market soon. Although still an order of magnitude less capable than military imaging satellites, the capabilities of these new high-resolution commercial satellites are good enough to detect and identify the major visible characteristics of nuclear production facilities and sites. Unlike the classified spy satellite photos limited to few countries, the commercial satellite imagery is commercially available to anyone who wants to purchase it. Therefore, the new commercial satellite open a new chance that each state, international organizations, and non-governmental groups could use the commercial images to play a more proactive role in monitoring the nuclear activities in related countries and verifying the compliance of non-proliferation agreements. This could help galvanize support for intensified efforts to slow the pace of nuclear proliferation. To produce fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons, a country would operate dedicated plutonium-production reactors and the

  8. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  9. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  10. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  11. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  12. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

    2001-01-01

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  13. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  14. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Brasilia, 16 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in Brasilia on 16 December 1998. After a short presentation of Brazil's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: verification and the strengthened safeguards system (including future prospects of verification), technology transfer (mainly through the Technical Co-operation Programme), and nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects

  15. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Santiago, 9 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA national seminar on 'Nuclear Development and its Implications for Chilean International Policy' in Santiago, Chile, on 9 December 1998. After a short presentation of Chile's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: technology transfer with emphasis on Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme, nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects, and the strengthened safeguards system, including future prospects of verification

  16. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Buenos Aires, 15 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the meeting of the Council for International Relations in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 15 December 1998. After a short presentation of Argentina's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects, verification and the strengthened safeguards system (including future prospects of verification), and technology transfer with emphasis on Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme

  17. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  18. Strengthening Performance Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villiers, V. Z. de

    2015-01-01

    This paper will describe an initiative to develop a management support tool to improve performance management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The envisaged mechanism should enable the Department to (a) plan, assess and report on the achievement of its objectives and (b) to improve its performance on a continuous basis. The performance management tool should be aligned with related processes in the Department and the IAEA as a whole such as strategic planning, programming and budget, the result-based management approach and various reporting mechanisms. It should be integrated with existing and planned information and other management systems. The initially, departmental working group that was established for this initiative focussed on two aspects: confirmation of the overall and specific objectives to be achieved by the Department of Safeguards, and compiling an inventory of indicators of activities, outputs and outcomes that were being used in the Department. This exercise confirmed that alignment and prioritization of activities relating to assessment of, and reporting on, performance could be improved. A value creation map was subsequently developed to assist in focussing the performance management tool to identified needs of stakeholders. Other activities of the working group included the determination of the desired characteristics of a hierarchy of performance indicators to be used to drive desired behaviour across organizational levels. Complexities to be handled included the following: · reflecting the appropriate component of the results chain (such as activities, outputs, outcomes and impact); · maintaining the linkages between objectives and performance indicators across organizational levels; · developing a balanced set of performance indicators (e.g. reflecting in-field and Headquarters activities, incorporating all main components of Departmental processes and balanced scorecard perspectives, measurable vs qualitative indicators); and

  19. Prospects for regional safeguards systems - State-level Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peixoto, O.J.M.

    2013-01-01

    The increased co-operation with Regional Safeguard's System (RSAC) is a relevant tool for strengthening effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the international safeguard. The new safeguards system that emerges from the application of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the full use of State-level Concept is a challenge and an opportunity for effectively incorporate RSAC into the international safeguards scheme. The challenge is to determine how the co-operation and coordination will be implemented on this new safeguards scheme. This paper presents some discussions and prospects on the issues to be faced by RSAC and IAEA during the implementation of State-level Approach (SLA) using all information available. It is also discussed how different levels of co-operation could be achieved when SLA is applied by IAEA safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  20. Additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuley, N.

    1999-01-01

    For States with additional protocols, the Agency may request complementary access for any of the following reasons: (a) to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at sites of facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs) or at other locations declared under Article 2 as containing nuclear material (Article 4.a.i); (b) to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information (Article 4.a.ii); and (c) to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the State's declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or of a LOF where nuclear material was used (Article 4.a.iii). Under additional protocols, the activities that the Agency may carry out in a State include visual observation, environmental sampling and non-destructive measurement. Agency guidelines for complementary access are being developed. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, new technologies became available enabling the IAEA to detect even minute trace indicators of various types of nuclear activities. This technique which is known as environmental sampling, contributes to the confirmation of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities. Collection of environmental samples at or near a nuclear site combined with ultra-sensitive analytical techniques can reveal signatures of post and current activities in locations where nuclear material is being handled. Another important new technology is remote monitoring which makes use of unattended safeguards instrument systems and ships off-site the data gathered from those instruments to IAEA Headquarters. Cost effectiveness is a prime justification for adding this feature to unattended monitoring systems such as optical surveillance and advanced optical seals. (author)

  1. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  2. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  3. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  4. MACSSA (Macintosh Safeguards Systems Analyzer)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Kohl, M.

    1986-01-01

    This paper discusses MACSSA a fully interactive menu-driven software system for accountancy of nuclear safeguards systems written for Apple Macintosh. Plant inventory and inventory change records can be entered interactively or can be downloaded from a mainframe database. Measurement procedures and instrument parameters can be defined. Partial or total statistics on propagated errors is performed and shown in tabular or graphic form

  5. Establishment of Accurate Calibration Curve for National Verification at a Large Scale Input Accountability Tank in RRP - For Strengthening State System for Meeting Safeguards Obligation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goto, Y.; Kato, T.; Nidaira, K.

    2010-01-01

    Tanks are installed in a reprocessing plant for spent fuel in order to account solution of nuclear material. The careful measurement of volume in tanks is crucial to implement accurate accounting of nuclear material. The calibration curve related with the volume and level of solution needs to be constructed, where the level is determined by differential pressure of dip tubes in tanks. More than one calibration curves depending on the height are commonly applied for each tank, but it's not explicitly decided how many segments are used, where to select segment, or what order of polynomial curve. Here we present the rational construction technique of giving optimum calibration curves and their characteristics. The tank calibration work has been conducted in the course of contract with Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) about safeguards information treatment. (author)

  6. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  7. The processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    The framework of safeguard activities of the IAEA from the viewpoint of informanagement is described. As methodology, major sources of information are, member state supplied information, information obtained by the Agency through its verification activity, and open source information. Software tools are provided to retrieve and to filter information for storage. Organizational structure of the Agency's information activities, and the changing roles of the inspectors are also described. (Yamamoto, A.)

  8. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  9. Strengthened International Nuclear Safeguards; burdens and Effects on Nuclear Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2000-01-01

    The present paper deals with the recent direction of strengthening the international nuclear safeguards and the effects on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful applications. The new basic principles for strengthening the international nuclear control in the direction of undeclared nuclear activities are elaborated, and the national obligations are indicated. The burdens on the development of nuclear technology are discussed. Approaches are proposed in this work for coping with the present and future situations

  10. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  11. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  12. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  13. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.; Boozer, D.D.; Chapman, L.D.; Daniel, S.L.; Engi, D.; Hulme, B.L.; Varnado, G.B.

    1976-01-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. The overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  14. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.; Varnado, G.B.; Bennett, H.A.; Chapman, L.D.; Engi, D.

    1976-09-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  15. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.; Boozer, D.D.; Chapman, L.D.; Daniel, S.L.; Engi, D.; Hulme, B.L.; Varnado, G.B.

    1976-01-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  16. Light water reactor safeguards system evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.

    1978-01-01

    A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of safeguards systems was developed in this study and was applied to a typical light water reactor plant. The relative importance of detection systems, barriers, response forces and other safeguards system components was examined in extensive parameter variation studies. (author)

  17. Safeguards sealing systems for Zebra

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingram, G.; Jamieson, G.R.

    1983-01-01

    A relatively simple design has been produced for safeguards seals to be applied throughout the fuel containing areas at Zebra. It is based on the use of wire seals and regular Inspector surveillance. The application of the system would allow an Inspector to establish to a high degree of confidence that significant quantities of fuel had not been diverted during an intensive experimental programme. It would add about 5% to the time required for experiments, and careful planning would reduce this value. The inspection effort required to witness element movements during the experimental programme would average about 2 hours per day, with a further 2 hours spent each week on NDA of the fuel exposed. The Safeguards Inspector would require to spend about 25% of his time in the reactor area and would have ample time to deal with the relatively small number of fuel movements taking place in the storage area and with his duties elsewhere in the plant. During a core change, full-time inspection effort would be required for about 6 weeks each year. (author)

  18. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

    2007-01-01

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  19. A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

    1995-03-01

    In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

  20. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  1. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; Begovich, John M [ORNL; Ferrada, Juan J [ORNL

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  2. The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

    1987-01-01

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

  3. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1980-01-01

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  4. Health Systems Strengthening

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hanlin, Rebecca; Andersen, Margrethe Holm

    The Global Network for the Economics of Learning, Innovation, and Competence Building Systems (Globelics) is an open and diverse community of scholars working on innovation and competence building in the context of economic development. The major purpose of the network is to contribute to buildin...

  5. The international safeguards system and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1990-02-01

    The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

  6. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  7. National safeguard systems - Inspector formation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1986-01-01

    The safeguards' inspector profile, in consequence of the tasks to be performed is described. An activities'hierarchy which will lead, to the structure and content of an introductory course's curriculum is established. The auditing activity as well as the material verification are described in details. Complementary resources for the upgrading the inspector's knowledge and skills are analised and the paper concludes presenting the training period, its dinamics as well as the recrutment criterium for the candidates. (Author) [pt

  8. Overview of simulation applications in safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.

    1976-01-01

    The objective of society relative to the utilization of the nuclear fuel cycle is to maximize the benefits of the high quality energy which is available and to minimize the total ''costs'' associated with acquiring these benefits. The comparison of the resulting ''benefits'' to the ''costs'' must be sufficiently attractive for society to accept nuclear energy. In this paper a representation of the structure determined by the ''costs'' (economic, socio-political, institutional, environmental, and legal) associated with adversary action against the nuclear industry and with the measures implemented to deter, prevent, or recover from adversary actions (safeguards) is used to illustrate a broad view of a dynamic safeguards system. This system representation is then used to describe the subsystem areas to which simulation techniques are currently being applied and to suggest other areas in which various simulation applications may benefit the safeguards decision process

  9. Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

    1978-01-01

    The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

  10. State system experience with safeguarding power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roehnsch, W.

    1982-01-01

    This session describes the development and operation of the State System of Accountancy and Control in the German Democratic Republic, and summarizes operating experience with safeguards at power reactor facilities. Overall organization and responsibilities, containment and surveillance measures, materials accounting, and inspection procedures will be outlined. Cooperation between the IAEA, State system, facility, and supplier authorities will also be addressed

  11. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, Deborah A.

    2003-01-01

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  12. Containment and surveillance systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.

    1978-01-01

    Important criteria in measuring the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards include timeliness of detection of diversion, timeliness of reporting such detections, and confidence in determining the amount of material diverted. Optimum use of IAEA inspectors, combined with adequate instrumentation, can provide a practical means for achieving these criteria. System studies are being carried out for different types of facilities that may come under IAEA safeguards to determine the proper balance between inspector's efforts and the use of safeguards instrumentation. A description of a typical study is presented. Based on the results of these studies, the program undertaken to develop those containment and surveillance subsystems for which the technical feasibility and operational acceptability need to be established is described

  13. Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

  14. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  15. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  16. The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1989-01-01

    Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

  17. The IAEA`s safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century; Le systeme de garanties de l`AIEA au seuil du 21e siecle; El sistema de salvaguardias del OIEA a punto para el siglo 21; Sistema garantij magateh gotova vstupleniyu v 21-j vek

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-10-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA`s safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  18. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-07-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

  19. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-01-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

  20. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  1. Next Generation Germanium Systems for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreyer, J.; Burks, M.; Hull, E.

    2015-01-01

    We are developing the latest generation of highly portable, mechanically cooled germanium systems for safeguard applications. In collaboration with our industrial partner, Ph.D.s Co, we have developed the Germanium Gamma Ray Imager (GeGI), an imager with a 2π field of view. This instrument has been thoroughly field tested in a wide range of environments and have performed reliably even in the harshest conditions. The imaging capability of GeGI complements existing safeguards techniques by allowing for the spatial detection, identification, and characterization of nuclear material. Additionally, imaging can be used in design information verification activities to address potential material diversions. Measurements conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant highlight the advantages this instrument offers in the identification and localization of LEU, HEU and Pu holdup. GeGI has also been deployed to the Savannah River Site for the measurement of radioactive waste canisters, providing information valuable for waste characterization and inventory accountancy. Measuring 30 x 15 x 23 cm and weighing approximately 15 kg, this instrument is the first portable germanium-based imager. GeGI offers high reliability with the convenience of mechanical cooling, making this instrument ideal for the next generation of safeguards instrumentation. (author)

  2. Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

    1983-01-01

    A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

  3. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

  4. The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1985-04-01

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) was developed by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to perform material control and accountability on all the nuclear material under WHC's jurisdiction. SARIS has been in operation for four and one-half years. It has reduced physical inventory plant shutdown time from several days to a few hours. The user-friendly interface has proven successful, as the training time for a new operator is only two to three hours; also errors have been dramatically reduced. The modeling features of SARIS have reduced the reported inventory difference and provide better information for measurement of scrap and waste. The audit files have been usefull in resolving data entry errors and the backup features have averted several potential problems. SARIS as a computerized accountability system has replaced manual record keeping with a consequent increase in productivity. 4 refs

  5. Strengthening Governance in Health Systems for Reproductive ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    Home · What we do ... As a result, Pakistan's health system has suffered and health service delivery has worsened. ... This four-year project aims to strengthen health systems governance for reproductive health and rights in Pakistan.

  6. Development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; So, Dong Sup; Kwack, Eun Ho [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-04-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described. 3 tabs. (Author)

  7. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    During the past decade, IAEA inspectors, national inspectors, and facility operators have used neutron coincidence counters and gamma-ray isotopics measurements extensively to measure the plutonium content of various forms of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle. Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector''s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector''s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained form unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA. The standardized containers and robot-controlled fuel movements in automated facilities enable more accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements than are possible in conventional nonautomated facilities. The NDA instrumentation can be custom designed and optimized for the particular measurement goal in the automated facility

  8. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector's oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector's workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA

  9. Aggregated systems model for nuclear safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    This report summarizes a general analytical tool designed to assist nuclear safeguards decision-makers. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for evaluating complex decision alternatives with uncertain outcomes. The report describes the general analytical approach in the context of safeguards decisions at a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

  10. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S.

    2003-01-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection

  11. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

  12. Nuclear facility safeguards systems modeling using discrete event simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.

    1977-01-01

    The threat of theft or dispersal of special nuclear material at a nuclear facility is treated by studying the temporal relationships between adversaries having authorized access to the facility (insiders) and safeguards system events by using a GASP IV discrete event simulation. The safeguards system events--detection, assessment, delay, communications, and neutralization--are modeled for the general insider adversary strategy which includes degradation of the safeguards system elements followed by an attempt to steal or disperse special nuclear material. The performance measure used in the analysis is the estimated probability of safeguards system success in countering the adversary based upon a predetermined set of adversary actions. An exemplary problem which includes generated results is presented for a hypothetical nuclear facility. The results illustrate representative information that could be utilized by safeguards decision-makers

  13. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  14. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  15. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  16. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  17. Goals of measurement systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Weinstock, E.V.

    1979-01-01

    The safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency are based on technical performance goals and criteria that have been developed, but not officially adopted by the Agency. The goals derive in part from the external consequences that safeguards are intended to prevent and in some cases on internal considerations of feasibility. To the extent that these goals may not be attainable, as may be the case with large-throughput bulk reprocessing plants, the Agency is placed in a difficult position. In this paper safeguards goals and criteria and their underlying rationales are critically examined. Suggestions for a more rational and workable structure of performance goals are offered

  18. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

  19. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

  20. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

  1. Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

  2. Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Standley, V.; Boeck, H.; Villa, M.

    2001-01-01

    Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

  3. Distribution network strengthens sales systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janoska, J.

    2003-01-01

    Liberalisation of the electricity market pushes Slovak distribution companies to upgrade their sale technologies. The first one to invest into a complex electronic sales system will be Stredoslovenska energetika, a.s., Zilina. The system worth 200 million Sk (4,83 million Euro) will be supplied by Polish software company Winuel. The company should also supply a software that would allow forecasting and planning of sales. The system should be fully operational by 2006. TREND has not managed to obtain information regarding plans Zapadoslovenska energetika - the largest and most active distribution company - might have in this area. In eastern Slovakia distribution company Vychodoslovenska energetika, a.s., Kosice has also started addressing this issue. (Author)

  4. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

  5. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  6. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  7. Evaluating National Nuclear Safeguards System Implementation in the Republic of Moldova

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mursa, E.; Sidorencu, A.; Vasilieva, N.; Sirbu, I.

    2015-01-01

    Strengthening the multilateral system of Nuclear Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), imposed by the increasing cross-border illicit trafficking of nuclear material and redirecting for military purposes has led Republic of Moldova to ratify on 1 June 2012 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/690) to the Agreement of Nuclear Safeguards in relation with the NPT. This was followed by the adoption in the Parliament on 8 June 2012, of the new Law no. 132 of 08.06.2012 on the safe conduct of nuclear and radiological activities, which extends the power of the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) and details the measures to strengthen the Nuclear Safeguards in the country. The NARNRA implements safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials by: – normative acts development; – establishing a system for inspecting of nuclear material; – implementing inventory-taking and reporting procedures for quantities of nuclear material; – implementing authorisation and monitoring procedures for the movements of nuclear material; – implementing procedures for reporting quantities of nuclear material to the IAEA; – maintaining and updating the national register of nuclear materials. A very important role to achieve results is the cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, was developed and agreed the Joint Action Plan for implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which is an essential aid in fulfilling the country’s international obligations. In this respect have been obtained some good practices: – Routinely performed national inspections; – On-line information provision from the Customs check points; – Developed special form for nuclear material in the National Register; – Systematic interaction with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and authorisation holders; – Annual and quarterly presentation to the IAEA of the reports on SQP and the

  8. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  9. Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albert, M.-G.

    2001-01-01

    keep the objective of global cost neutrality in the long term. However, another principle that cannot be compromised is the fundamental objective of strengthening safeguards. In that perspective, the following points will be essential elements to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of Integrated Safeguards. The implementation of Integrated Safeguards should not be mechanistic, not only in order to comply with the Additional Protocol, but also because the systematic and uniform application of undifferentiated measures would not allow to achieve the significant improvements expected from the new system, nor to keep costs under control. On the contrary, implementation details should be adapted to the specificity of individual situations and to the Agency's evaluation of each State's situation. The Agency should in particular adjust its verification effort and choose, among the set of available measures, to apply those which are the most relevant to specific situations and provide maximum effectiveness. It should thus concentrate its efforts on situations where it cannot meet satisfactorily its objective of reaching conclusions and providing credible assurance. In addition to adjusting its verification activities to specific situations, the Agency should also update its criteria to account for the additional information available and the general evolution of the system. In particular, it should perform a broad review of material categorisation and timeliness factors to avoid maintaining previous specific technical goals if Integrated Safeguards make them obsolete. The will and capability of a State to achieve transparency on its nuclear activities contribute to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards and to the enhancement of the cost/effectiveness ratio of the Agency's activities. They make it easier for the Agency to reach its conclusions and improve their credibility. As such, transparency should be an important element for the Agency to take into account in its

  10. Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

    2007-01-01

    The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

  11. Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

    1978-11-01

    The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

  12. Safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

    1977-09-01

    The report describes the development of system concepts for the safeguarding of special strategic nuclear materials (SNM) against malevolent adversary action during the interfacility transport of the SNM. The methodology used includes techniques for defining, classifying, and analyzing adversary action sequences; defining safeguards system components; assessing the vulnerability of various safeguards systems and their component parts to the potential adversary action sequences, and conceptualizing system design requirements. The method of analysis is based primarily on a comparison of adversary actions with safeguards measures, to estimate vulnerability. Because of the paucity of the data available for assessing vulnerability, the Delphi approach was used to generate data: values were estimated in a structured exercise by a panel of experts in the safeguards and terrorist fields. It is concluded that the probability of successful attack against a truck/escort convoy manned by well-trained, well-armed personnel is low enough to discourage all but the strongest adversaries. Secrecy of operations and careful screening of personnel are very important. No reliance should be placed on current capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The recommendation of the study is the use of road transport in the near future and air transport at a later time when the number of shipments reaches a level to justify it, and when present safety problems are resolved

  13. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neufing, C.; Tschritter, C.; Meylemans, P.; Vandaele, R.; Heppleston, M.; Chare, P.; Kloeckner, W.

    2001-01-01

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

  14. Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pabian, Frank V [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote 'all-source synergy.' As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the 'Digital Virtual Globes' (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to: (1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness; (2) Pre-inspection planning; (3) Onsite orientation and navigation; (4) Post-inspection reporting; (5) Site monitoring over time for changes; (6) Verification of states site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports; and (7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States). Additionally, as an 'open-source', such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities - either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a 'free' cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: 'crowdsourcing'), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant

  15. 44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding systems of... maintained. (b) Personnel information contained in both manual and automated systems of records shall be... alternative storage system providing that it furnished an equivalent degree of physical security as storage in...

  16. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1978-06-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  17. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1976-01-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  18. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol; O Brasil e o fortalecimento do sistema de salvaguardas da Agencia Internacional de Energia Atomica: do acordo quadripartite ao protocolo adicional

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

    2001-07-01

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  19. Establishing a national safeguards system at the State level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopez Lizana, Fernando

    2001-01-01

    This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides an opportunity to address the requirements for the organization that has to carry out the system functions at the State level in a country having a research reactor and ancillary laboratories

  20. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems

  1. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems.

  2. National safeguards system operations at a bulk-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The presentation centers on the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for bulk-handling facilities in the licenses sector of the US nuclear community. Details of those material control and accounting measures dealing with the national safeguards program are discussed in Session 6a. The concept and role of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan are discussed with the participants. In Session 6b, the lecture focusses on the international safeguards program of the US SSAC. The relationship of the national and international requirements is discussed as they relate to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 document. The purpose of this session is to enable participants to: (1) understand the basic MC and A elements in an SSAC; (2) understand which MC and A elements serve the country's national interests and those that serve IAEA safeguards

  3. A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Yuan

    1994-09-01

    Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA

  4. A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yuan, Wu [Beijing Inst. of Nuclear Engineering (China)

    1994-09-01

    Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA.

  5. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-01-01

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials

  6. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  7. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  8. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  9. Health-system strengthening and tuberculosis control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Atun, Rifat; Weil, Diana E C; Eang, Mao Tan; Mwakyusa, David

    2010-06-19

    Weak health systems are hindering global efforts for tuberculosis care and control, but little evidence is available on effective interventions to address system bottlenecks. This report examines published evidence, programme reviews, and case studies to identify innovations in system design and tuberculosis control to resolve these bottlenecks. We outline system bottlenecks in relation to governance, financing, supply chain management, human resources, health-information systems, and service delivery; and adverse effects from rapid introduction of suboptimum system designs. This report also documents innovative solutions for disease control and system design. Solutions pursued in individual countries are specific to the nature of the tuberculosis epidemic, the underlying national health system, and the contributors engaged: no one size fits all. Findings from countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Tanzania, Thailand, and Vietnam, suggest that advances in disease control and system strengthening are complementary. Tuberculosis care and control are essential elements of health systems, and simultaneous efforts to innovate systems and disease response are mutually reinforcing. Highly varied and context-specific responses to tuberculosis show that solutions need to be documented and compared to develop evidence-based policies and practice. Copyright 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. Strengthening Injury Surveillance System in Iran

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Motevalian Seyed Abbas

    2012-02-01

    Full Text Available 【Abstract】Objective: To strengthen the current Injury Surveillance System (IS System in order to better monitor injury conditions, improve protection ways and promote safety. Methods: At first we carried out a study to evaluate the frameworks of IS System in the developed countries. Then all the available documents from World Health Organization, Eastern Mediterranean Regional Organization, as well as Minister of Health and Medical Education concerning Iran were reviewed. Later a national stakeholder抯 consultation was held to collect opinions and views. A national workshop was also intended for provincial representatives from 41 universities to identify the barriers and limitations of the existing program and further to strengthen injury surveillance. Results: The evaluation of the current IS System revealed many problems, mainly presented as lack of accurate pre- and post-hospital death registry, need of precise injury data registry in outpatient medical centers, incomplete injury data registry in hospitals and lack of accuracy in definition of variables in injury registry. The five main characteristics of current IS System including flexibility, acceptability, simplicity, usefulness and timeliness were evaluated as moderate by experts. Conclusions: Major revisions must be considered in the current IS System in Iran. The following elements should be added to the questionnaire: identifier, manner of arrival to the hospital, situation of the injured patient, consumption of alcohol and opioids, other involved participants in the accident, intention, severity and site of injury, side effects of surgery and medication, as well as one month follow-up results. Data should be collected from 10% of all hospitals in Iran and analyzed every 3 months. Simultaneously data should be online to be retrieved by researches. Key words: Wounds and injuries; Population surveillance; Registries; Iran

  11. Strengthening Injury Surveillance System in Iran

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Seyed Abbas Motevalian; Mashyaneh Haddadi; Hesam Akbari; Reza Khorramirouz; Soheil Saadat; Arash Tehrani; Vafa Rahimi-Movaghar

    2011-01-01

    Objective:To strengthen the current Injury Surveillance System (IS System) in order to better monitor injury conditions,improve protection ways and promote safety.Methods:At first we carried out a study to evaluate the frameworks of IS System in the developed countries.Then all the available documents from World Health OrganizationEastern Mediterranean Regional Organization,as well as Minister of Health and Medical Education concerning Iran were reviewed.Later a national stakeholder's consultation was held to collect opinions and views.A national workshop was also intended for provincial representatives from 41 universities to identify the barriers and limitations of the existing program and further to strengthen injury surveillance.Results:The evaluation of the current IS System revealed many problems,mainly presented as lack of accurate pre- and post-hospital death registry,need of precise injury data registry in outpatient medical centers,incomplete injury data registry in hospitals and lack of accuracy in definition of variables in injury registry.The five main characteristics of current IS System including flexibility,acceptability,simplicity,usefulness and timeliness were evaluated as moderate by experts.Contusions:Major revisions must be considered in the current IS System in Iran.The following elements should be added to the questionnaire:identifier,manner of arrival to the hospital,situation of the injured patient,consumption of alcohol and opioids,other involved participants in the accident,intention,severity and site of injury,side effects of surgery and medication,as well as one month follow-up results.Data should be collected from 10% of all hospitals in Iran and analyzed every 3 months.Simultaneously data should be online to be retrieved by researches.

  12. Unattended digital video surveillance: A system prototype for EURATOM safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Goerten, J.; Wagner, H.; Rodriguez, C.; Brown, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    Ever increasing capabilities in video and computer technology have changed the face of video surveillance. From yesterday's film and analog video tape-based systems, we now emerge into the digital era with surveillance systems capable of digital image processing, image analysis, decision control logic, and random data access features -- all of which provide greater versatility with the potential for increased effectiveness in video surveillance. Digital systems also offer other advantages such as the ability to ''compress'' data, providing increased storage capacities and the potential for allowing longer surveillance Periods. Remote surveillance and system to system communications are also a benefit that can be derived from digital surveillance systems. All of these features are extremely important in today's climate Of increasing safeguards activity and decreasing budgets -- Los Alamos National Laboratory's Safeguards Systems Group and the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate have teamed to design and implement a period surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance and data review. In this Paper we will familiarize you with system components and features and report on progress in developmental areas such as image compression and region of interest processing

  13. DYMAC - The first stab at large safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Augustson, R.H.

    1987-01-01

    This article discussed the evolution of the Los Alamos Safeguards Program that led to the concept of dynamic materials accountability and control (DYMAC). A plant specific DYMAC system was installed at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, TA-55, in 1978. This system was turned over to the plant management and is still operational today. Systems like DYMAC/TA-55 provide necessary and realistic data on the workability of near-real-time accountability in nuclear material processing facilities

  14. Strengthening the Canadian alcohol advertising regulatory system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heung, Carly M; Rempel, Benjamin; Krank, Marvin

    2012-05-24

    Research evidence points to harmful effects from alcohol advertising among children and youth. In particular, exposure to alcohol advertising has been associated with adolescents drinking both earlier and heavier. Although current federal and provincial guidelines have addressed advertising practices to prevent underage drinking, practice has not been supported by existing policy. While protective measures such as social marketing campaigns have the potential for counteracting the effects from alcohol advertising, the effectiveness of such measures can be easily drowned out with increasing advertising activities from the alcohol industry, especially without effective regulation. Research reviewed by the European Focus on Alcohol Safe Environment (FASE) Project has identified a set of key elements that are necessary to make alcohol advertising policy measures effective at protecting children and youth from the harmful effects of alcohol marketing. Using these key elements as an evaluation framework, there are critical components in the Canadian alcohol advertising regulatory system that clearly require strengthening. To protect impressionable children and youth against the harmful effects of alcohol advertising, 13 recommendations to strengthen current alcohol advertising regulations in Canada are provided for Canadian policy-makers, advertising standard agencies, and public health groups.

  15. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  16. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; Sunshine, Alexander; Matthews, Caroline; Frazer, Sarah; Matthews, Carrie

    2010-01-01

    The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to

  17. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  18. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  19. The development and function of the IAEA's safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dell'Acqua, F.; Gmelin, W.; Issaev, L.; Hough, G.; Nardi, J.

    1981-01-01

    The history of the creation and development of ISIS (International Safeguards Information System), a system for processing information received from Safeguards inspectors about both NPT and non-NPT states, is described. The main procedures for the evaluation of information received from inspectors are also described. ISIS was created on the basis of a commercially available Adaptable DAta-BAse Management System (ADABAS). At the outset, the main efforts of ISIS were devoted to processing the information reported by individual states themselves. The processing of this information fell into three stages: the putting of the information into an intermediate file, then loading the data into logical files, and the quality control of the information. The purpose and motives behind the creation of the new system GULUS (Generalized User Load and Update System) are described, together with its main characteristics. This system is an additional tool for the processing of information provided by inspectors and available even to the not very qualified user. The quick growth of the volume of Safeguards information required more computer power and motivated the buying of a new computer (IBM 3033) which permits the further development of ISIS

  20. Safeguards research: assessing material control and accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maimoni, A.

    1977-01-01

    The Laboratory is working for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to improve the safeguarding of special nuclear material at nuclear fuel processing facilities, to provide a basis for improved regulations for material control and accounting systems, and to develop an assessment procedure for verifying compliance with these regulations. Early work included setting up a hierarchy of safeguard objectives and a set of measurable parameters with which systems performance to meet those objectives can be measured. Present work has focused on developing a computerized assessment procedure. We have also completed a test bed (based on a plutonium nitrate storage area) to identify and correct problems in the procedure and to show how this procedure can be used to evaluate the performance of an applicant's material control and accounting system

  1. Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2000-01-01

    In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

  2. Safeguards system testing WSRC Insider Exercise Program (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robichaux, J.J.

    1991-01-01

    One of the major concerns related to the control and accountability of nuclear material located at DOE facilities is the theft or diversion of material by an insider. Many complex safeguards and security systems have been installed to provide timely detection and prevention of the removal of nuclear materials. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company's (WSRC) Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) section has implemented an insider exercise program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of these safeguards systems. Exercises consist of limited scope performance test. This paper describes the structure and controls for the insider exercise program at the Savannah River Site, the lessons learned over the past several years, and methods being utilized to improve the program

  3. Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

    1991-01-01

    During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

  4. Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-04-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given

  5. Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-04-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given.

  6. Unattended video surveillance systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.S.

    1979-01-01

    The use of unattended video surveillance systems places some unique requirements on the systems and their hardware. The systems have the traditional requirements of video imaging, video storage, and video playback but also have some special requirements such as tamper safing. The technology available to meet these requirements and how it is being applied to unattended video surveillance systems are discussed in this paper

  7. Moving Toward a Regional Safeguards System in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Griggs, James R.

    2001-01-01

    In addressing the nuclear nonproliferation challenges of South Asia, it is useful to examine the similar past nonproliferation problems in South America. The nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil involved several developments in progression. We conclude that two developments are particularly applicable to the India/Pakistan problem: technical cooperation and a regional safeguards system. This paper reviews the history of Argentina/Brazil rapprochement, discusses application to India/Pakistan, and proposes specific actions to move South Asia toward regional stability.

  8. A quadrupole mass spectrometer system for nuclear safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, P.J.

    1987-12-01

    An on-line enrichment monitor for nuclear safeguards-related surveillance of a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant is described. This monitor utilises a quadrupole mass spectrometer to measure the isotopic composition of UF 6 in the feed and product gas streams. Details of the design and construction are given, and several difficulties are identified and discussed. Finally, the performance of this system is illustrated with typical results

  9. A functional integrated data evaluation system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.; De Grandi, G.F.; Franklin, M.; Muller, K.; Rota, A.

    1983-01-01

    The quantitative assurance provided by the safeguards of nuclear material is based on the analysis of a very large amount of data of different origins and quality. They are generated by operators on a regular basis, or provided during discussions of facility attachments or declaration of production schedules. They are also generated by inspectors during their verification activities which are related to accountancy data, auditing, independent measurements, sealing, surveillance, etc. The Joint Research Centre and Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities are studying a Functional Integrated Data Evaluation System (FIDES) for safeguards. A preliminary outline of such a system was presented at the 3rd ESARDA symposium at Karlsruhe. This paper first emphasises the decisional thread which underlies the ESARDA activities and, second, gives a progress report on JRC work which is designed to give effect to these ideas. This progess, reported below, covers two activities. The first is the automatic co-ordination of the operator's measurement system information with the operator's accounting declaration. The second element is the development of a functional structure for NDA data generation evaluation and transmission. (author)

  10. Unique computer system for safeguards use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuckertz, T.H.; Pratt, J.C.

    1981-01-01

    Microprocessors have been used to implement specialized scientific data processing systems since 1976. One such system, the LeCroy 3500, is presently being used by the Detection and Verification Group of the Energy Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory for a large variety of tasks involving measurement of various nuclear parameters associated with radioactive materials. The system is unique because it can do not only sophisticated pulse height and multi-scale analyses but also other analyses that are limited only by the availability fo CAMAC modules that would acquire data from exotic experiments. The system is also field portable which extends the range of experiments that it can control. Four applications of this system are described in this paper: (1) plutonium storage vault monitoring, (2) coded aperture image reconstruction, (3) spatial distribution of gamma radiation, and (4) nuclear waste management. 7 figures

  11. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  12. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  13. Human as a component of a nuclear material safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, D.E.; Schechter, R.S.

    1978-01-01

    Many human vigilance experiments are summarized and principles are extracted which should be useful in designing and evaluating a nuclear material safeguard system. A human is a poor observer and is not a dependable part of any man-machine system when required to function as an observer. There are a few techniques which improve his performance by providing feedback. A conceptual model is presented which is helpful in design and evaluation of systems. There is some slight experimental support for the model. Finally, some techniques of time study and statistical control charting will be useful as a means of detecting nuclear diversion attempts

  14. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  15. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  16. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

    1991-05-01

    The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

  17. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

  18. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  19. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galdoz, Erwin G.; Pinkalla, Mark

    2010-01-01

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  20. Risk evaluation system for facility safeguards and security planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Udell, C.J.; Carlson, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    The Risk Evaluation System (RES) is an integrated approach to determining safeguards and security effectiveness and risk. RES combines the planning and technical analysis into a format that promotes an orderly development of protection strategies, planing assumptions, facility targets, vulnerability and risk determination, enhancement planning, and implementation. In addition, the RES computer database program enhances the capability of the analyst to perform a risk evaluation of the facility. The computer database is menu driven using data input screens and contains an algorithm for determining the probability of adversary defeat and risk. Also, base case and adjusted risk data records can be maintained and accessed easily

  1. Operational facility-integrated computer system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armento, W.J.; Brooksbank, R.E.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system for safeguards in an active, remotely operated, nuclear fuel processing pilot plant has been developed. This sytem maintains (1) comprehensive records of special nuclear materials, (2) automatically updated book inventory files, (3) material transfer catalogs, (4) timely inventory estimations, (5) sample transactions, (6) automatic, on-line volume balances and alarmings, and (7) terminal access and applications software monitoring and logging. Future development will include near-real-time SNM mass balancing as both a static, in-tank summation and a dynamic, in-line determination. It is planned to incorporate aspects of site security and physical protection into the computer monitoring

  2. Risk evaluation system for facility safeguards and security planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Udell, C.J.; Carlson, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    The Risk Evaluation System (RES) is an integrated approach to determining safeguards and security effectiveness and risk. RES combines the planning and technical analysis into a format that promotes an orderly development of protection strategies, planning assumptions, facility targets, vulnerability and risk determination, enhancement planning, and implementation. In addition, the RES computer database program enhances the capability of the analyst to perform a risk evaluation of the facility. The computer database is menu driven using data input screens and contains an algorithm for determining the probability of adversary defeat and risk. Also, base case and adjusted risk data records can be maintained and accessed easily

  3. Expert system characteristics and potential applications in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.

    1986-01-01

    The general growth of expert, knowledge-based (KB) or rule based systems will significantly increase in the next three to five years. Improvements in computer hardware (speed, reduced size, power) and software (rule based, data based, user interfaces) in recent years are providing the foundations for the growth of expert systems. A byproduct of this growth will undoubtedly be the application of expert systems to various safeguards problems. Characteristics of these expert systems will involve 1) multiple rules governing an outcome, 2) confidence factors on individual variables and rule sets, 3) priority, cost, and risk based rule sets, and 4) the reasoning behind the advice or decision given by the expert system. This paper presents characteristics, structures, and examples of simple rule based systems. Potential application areas for these expert systems may include training, operations, management, designs, evaluations, and specific hardware operation

  4. Safeguarding the functions and performance of instrumentation and control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koehler, M.; Schoerner, O.

    1996-01-01

    Based on an analysis of the existing nuclear power plant control technology, the necessity of providing in the medium-term advanced and future-oriented, digital control system, both for normal operation and for safety-relevant tasks of the reactor and safety control systems. Siemens KWU has been promoting the development, review and marketing of the digital instrumentation and control systems called TELEPERM XS and TELEPERM XP in addition to the measures taken for safeguarding the functions of existing, wired systems. The paper briefly explains the performance and advantages of digital systems and the progress in approval and pioneering of the TELEPERM XS safety control system. Many examples discussed show the diversity of applications of the systems both in new reactor plants and as retrofitting measures, for KWU power plants and those of other manufacturers. (orig.) [de

  5. The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liester, N.A.

    1995-01-01

    The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

  6. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  7. Improvements for optical surveillance systems in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gaertner, K.J.; Whichello, J.N.

    1988-01-01

    Within the next few years, a transition from film camera systems to video surveillance systems will take place in international safeguards. In order to maintain the indispensable requirements of reliability and authentication, development and tests continued under the Federal Republic of Germany Support Programme of video components for IAEA safeguards applications. The prototype of a tamper resistant TV-link was developed under Task D.12/4/. A field test of the TV-link is in preparation using a production model suitable for multiplexed TV applications. The test will utilize an Agency owned, multiplexed TV system. An evaluation of the tamper resistant TV-link is given. After a successful field trial of the prototype Solid State Video Memory (SSVM-516) under task D.14 a production model has been developed under Task D.17. Several operating modes are envisaged, depending on whether it will be used in an on-site video surveillance system or in a video review station. The concept and technical features, including an explanation of the function of the video memory, are discussed

  8. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  9. Dynamic material accountancy in an integrated safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murrell, J.S.

    1979-01-01

    The nuclear material safeguards system at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is currently being improved. A new material control system will provide computerized monitoring and accountability, and a new physical protection system will provide upgraded perimeter and portal entry monitoring. The control system incorporates remote computer terminals at all processing, transfer and storage areas throughout the plant. Terminal equipment is interfaced to a computer through teletype equipment. A typical terminal transaction would require verification that the particular activity (material movement or process operation) is authorized, identifying the container involved, weighing the container, and then verifying the enrichment with non-destructive assay instrumentation. The system, when fully operational, will provide near real-time accountability for each eight-hour work shift for all items in process. (author)

  10. Safeguard system of IPEN-CNEN/Sao Paulo - Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, Jose Adroaldo de; Enokihara, Cyro Teiti; Nakamura, Aparecida Tiyo O.

    1999-01-01

    The history, requirements, organization, and operation of the State System of Accounting and Control from the institute for Energetic and Nuclear Research (IPEN-CNEN/SP) are described. The implementation system at the institution take into consideration the national and international safeguards requirements. It has started by the nuclear material (U, Pu and Th) physical inventory taking, including their provenance and transformation. The earlier computerized accounting system used for control has been replaced by a new one developed by the National Authority (CNEN/SESAL). The optimized system has more flexibility, giving a more effective answer to any occurred change on Material Balance Area. The actual system make use of an effective methodology. (author)

  11. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-09-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A&R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S&S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S&S into the design of future A&R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S&S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics.

  12. Master planning for successful safeguard/security systems engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruckner, D.G.

    1987-01-01

    The development and phased implementation of an overall master plan for weapons systems and facilities engaged in the complexities of high technology provides a logical road map for system accomplishment. An essential factor in such a comprehensive plan is development of an integrated systems security engineering plan. Some DOD programs use new military regulations and policy directives to mandate consideration of the safeguard/security disciplines be considered for weapons systems and facilities during the entire life cycle of the program. The emphasis is to make certain the weapon system and applicable facilities have complementary security features. Together they must meet the needs of the operational mission and, at the same time, provide the security forces practical solutions to their requirements. This paper discusses the process of meshing the safe- guards/security requirements with an overall the master plan and the challenges attendant to this activity

  13. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A ampersand R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S ampersand S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S ampersand S into the design of future A ampersand R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S ampersand S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics

  14. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A ampersand R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S ampersand S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S ampersand S into the design of future A ampersand R systems. Towards this, we first examined existing A ampersand R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions to these problems. We then were able to develop generalized S ampersand S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics

  15. Dynamic material accountancy in an integrated safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murrell, J.S.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear material safeguards system at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is currently being improved. A new material control system will provide computerized monitoring and accountability, and a new physical protection system will provide upgraded perimeter and portal entry monitoring. The control system incorporates remote computer terminals at all processing, transfer, and storage areas throughout the plant. Terminal equipment is interfaced to a computer through teletype equipment. A typical terminal transaction would require verification that the particular activity (material movement or process operation) is authorized, identifying the container involved, weighing the container, and then verifying the enrichment with non-destructive assay instrumentation. The system, when fully operational, will provide near real-time accountability for each eight-hour work shift for all items in process

  16. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1978-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  17. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1979-02-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  18. Using Evidence to Strengthen Health Systems in Africa and the ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    The project is timely for Lebanon, a country that is working to strengthen its primary health care system to respond to current priorities such as the emerging crisis of Syrian refugees. Timely access to information The project will strengthen institutional and individual abilities to conduct and use systematic and rapid reviews to ...

  19. 77 FR 51496 - Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-24

    ... Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems AGENCY: Department of... Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to add a new subpart and contract clause for the basic safeguarding of contractor... information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information systems. DATES: Interested...

  20. Proposal of a national system to supervise nuclear installations out of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosa, L.P.

    1990-01-01

    It is proposed a national system to safeguard, supervise and inspect nuclear facilities in Brazil, apart from international safeguards. It discusses also the military nuclear activities and the uranium enrichment plants. The system should be controlled by Brazilian CNEN. (A.C.A.S.)

  1. Some technological aspects of an evaluation and visualisation component for the safeguards integrated information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Belenki, A.; Nishiwaki, Y.; Matsuoka, H.; Fedoseeva, I.

    2001-01-01

    According to Safeguards strengthening measures which include both Measures under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Measures under Model Additional Protocol, the Agency receives much more information than some years before. It seems reasonable to develop an integrated information system (IIS) because information evaluation and review are important parts of Safeguards assessments. An integrated information system can include the following components: information search, primary messages selection, evaluation of received information, data storage, visualisation and evaluation of State's nuclear programme (SNP) and elaboration of management decisions. Hereby, IIS is a human-computer system where all components listed above are implemented. Within the framework of SNP a human factor plays an important role. SNP has a number of special properties such as uniqueness, multi-dimensions, subjectivity of its state evaluation, time variation, incompleteness of its description and the mentioned above human factor. For realistic simulation of SNP development it is necessary to reduce usage of quantitative methods and apply methods which are closer to perception of the outward things by a human being. This task requires to convert all available information, both qualitative and quantitative, into a special format. The format requires methods which are being developed on the basis of pragmatic, visual and Zadeh's linguistic variables which define corresponding scales. A pragmatic scale is defined on a basic metric scale taking into account a particular pragmatic cut of SNP. In other words pragmatic scale maps a pragmatic cut of the problem which is important from the point of view of IIS goal. By using pragmatic scales it is possible, for example, to estimate the speed of development of processes existing within the framework of SNP. The visual variable allows to solve the following engineering tasks: input of the expert's evaluations in the system and interpretations of its

  2. Study on the development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, B. D.; Song, D. Y.; So, D. S.; Kwak, E. H. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this paper, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described.

  3. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1997-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  4. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A

    1998-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  5. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forland, A.

    1997-01-01

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

  6. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

  7. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  8. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Nordquist, Heather A.; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  9. Performance results from the first integrated NDA VXI safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bot, D.; Messner, R.

    1999-01-01

    The VIFM system is the first integrated safeguard system to be developed and deployed by the IAEA. The system is also noteworthy in that it is the most versatile of any NDA system thus far deployed. Due to the high level of functionality, the VIFM is probably the most 'tested' of all IAEA systems. This paper discusses the results obtained from detailed in field and laboratory testing of a variety of VIFM configurations ranging from simple single systems to highly integrated system implementations. A total of 4 sites have had VIFM equipment installed. Data collected from these sites have been of very high quality and consistency despite the failure of commercial hard disk drive equipment. The systematic failure of these drives have been corrected using a variety of methods and performance since those corrections have been excellent with no equipment failures. The tests carried out also included the test of a twisted pair to coaxial cable interface. This interface was required in order to allow installation even with a significant facility cabling limitation. The performance obtained from the system utilizing this device showed no degradation as compared to that of systems utilizing direct coaxial cable connections. To conclude, the VIFM system, has been reliable even after partial failure of commercial off-the-shelf components which required the systems to operate on full fail-safe backup. These tests have thus shown both the reliable operation of the VIFM in normal operating conditions as well as the most adverse

  10. Exchange of pressurizer safeguarding system at Biblis nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, D.; Hofbeck, W.

    1991-01-01

    Valves and piping of the pressurizer safeguarding system are exchanged and reset in such a way that they are suitable not only for discharging steam, but also for discharging a water-steam mixture and hot pressurized water; for the emergency measure of primary depressurization by hand (bleed) in the event of failure of the entire feedwater supply and station black-out, and in the event of operational transients with supposed failure of the reactor scram (ATWS). To achieve this, in addition to the requirements of the pressurizer discharging station, changes have to be made to the valve drive to dominate the water loads. During the 1990 inspection this exchange of the pressurizer discharging station was performed at the Biblis A unit as the first German plant. (orig.) [de

  11. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.; Kim, Y.S.; Ye, S.H.

    2015-01-01

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  12. Design of an engineered safeguards system for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winblad, A.E.; McKnight, R.P.; Fienning, W.C.; Fenchel, B.R.

    1977-06-01

    Several Engineered Safeguards System concepts and designs are described that provide increased protection against a wide spectrum of adversary threats. An adversary sequence diagram that outlines all possible adversary paths through the safeguards elements in a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is shown. An example of a critical adversary path is given

  13. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  14. EMCAS: An evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities. 3 figs., 5 tabs

  15. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities

  16. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1998-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  17. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1999-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  18. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  19. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2008-03-01

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  20. Effectiveness evaluation of alternative fixed-site safeguard security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.

    1976-01-01

    An evaluation of a fixed-site physical protection system must consider the interrelationships of barriers, alarms, on-site and off-site guards, and their effectiveness against a forcible adversary attack intent on creating an act of sabotage of theft. A computer model, Forcible Entry Safeguard Effectiveness Model (FESEM), was developed for the evaluation of alternative fixed-site protection systems. It was written in the GASP IV simulation language. A hypothetical fixed-state protection system is defined and relative evaluations from a cost-effectiveness point of view are presented in order to demonstrate how the model can be used. Trade-offs involving on-site and off-site response forces and response times, perimeter system alarms, barrier configurations, and varying levels of threat are analyzed. The computer model provides a framework for performing inexpensive experiments on fixed-site security systems, for testing alternative decisions, and for determining the relative cost effectiveness associated with these decision policies

  1. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

    1987-01-01

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  2. SNAP/SOS: a package for simulating and analyzing safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Polito, J.; Sabuda, J.

    1983-01-01

    The effective analysis of safeguards systems at nuclear facilities requires significant effort. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) and the SNAP Operating System (SOS) reduce that effort to a manageable level. SNAP provides a detailed analysis of site safeguards for tactical evaluation. SOS helps the analyst organize and manage the SNAP effort effectively. SOS provides a database for model storage, automatic model generation, and computer graphics. The SOS/SNAP combination is a working example of a simulation system including executive-level control, database system, and facilities for model creation, editing, and output analysis

  3. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aparo, M.; Barnes, B.; Lewis, W.; Hsiung, Sue

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

  4. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  5. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  6. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  7. Safeguarding the functioning of I and C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koehler, M.; Schoerner, O.

    1997-01-01

    On the basis of an analysis of instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in nuclear power plants the need is outlined to design digital instrumentation and control systems with forward looking technical features to serve both for plant operations management under normal conditions and for safety related problems in reactor and safety I and C. Siemens KWU not only took measures to safeguard the availability of existing permanently wired I and C systems, but also advanced the development, evaluation by experts, and commercialization of the Teleperm XS and Teleperm XP digital I and C systems. The working principle and the advantages of digital I and C systems are outlined briefly. A report is presented of the status of the licensing procedure and commercialization of the Teleperm XS safety I and C system. A number of examples are cited to explain the various possible uses of the systems discussed for new plants and for backfitting purposes, both in nuclear power plants by KWU and in facilities by other vendors. Siemens KWU remains a partner for in-plant and safety related I and C technology in nuclear power plants. This strategy is based on the principle of maintaining the availability of existing systems by adequate spare parts strategies as long as possible, and on the thorough innovation of I and C technology by the use of the forward looking Teleperm XS and Teleperm XP digital I and C systems. The Teleperm XS system is currently being introduced into the market and will be used on a broad basis in Germany and abroad in 1997/98. (orig.) [de

  8. Strengthening health system to improve immunization for migrants in China.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fang, Hai; Yang, Li; Zhang, Huyang; Li, Chenyang; Wen, Liankui; Sun, Li; Hanson, Kara; Meng, Qingyue

    2017-07-01

    Immunization is the most cost-effective method to prevent and control vaccine-preventable diseases. Migrant population in China has been rising rapidly, and their immunization status is poor. China has tried various strategies to strengthen its health system, which has significantly improved immunization for migrants. This study applied a qualitative retrospective review method aiming to collect, analyze and synthesize health system strengthening experiences and practices about improving immunizations for migrants in China. A conceptual framework of Theory of Change was used to extract the searched literatures. 11 searched literatures and 4 national laws and policies related to immunizations for migrant children were carefully studied. China mainly employed 3 health system strengthening strategies to significantly improve immunization for migrant population: stop charging immunization fees or immunization insurance, manage immunization certificates well, and pay extra attentions on immunization for special children including migrant children. These health system strengthening strategies were very effective, and searched literatures show that up-to-date and age-appropriate immunization rates were significantly improved for migrant children. Economic development led to higher migrant population in China, but immunization for migrants, particularly migrant children, were poor. Fortunately various health system strengthening strategies were employed to improve immunization for migrants in China and they were rather successful. The experiences and lessons of immunization for migrant population in China might be helpful for other developing countries with a large number of migrant population.

  9. Anomaly detection in an automated safeguards system using neural networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whiteson, R.; Howell, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An automated safeguards system must be able to detect an anomalous event, identify the nature of the event, and recommend a corrective action. Neural networks represent a new way of thinking about basic computational mechanisms for intelligent information processing. In this paper, we discuss the issues involved in applying a neural network model to the first step of this process: anomaly detection in materials accounting systems. We extend our previous model to a 3-tank problem and compare different neural network architectures and algorithms. We evaluate the computational difficulties in training neural networks and explore how certain design principles affect the problems. The issues involved in building a neural network architecture include how the information flows, how the network is trained, how the neurons in a network are connected, how the neurons process information, and how the connections between neurons are modified. Our approach is based on the demonstrated ability of neural networks to model complex, nonlinear, real-time processes. By modeling the normal behavior of the processes, we can predict how a system should be behaving and, therefore, detect when an abnormality occurs

  10. Study On Safeguard Measures for Implementing Overall Planning of Land Use

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    Based on minutely analysing the main problems existing in safeguard measures for implementing a new round of overall planning of land use,this paper constructs implementation security system of overall planning of land use,and puts forward the principles and basis of formulating safeguard measures for implementing overall planning of land use.Finally,this paper establishes the content system of safeguard measures:effectively strengthen social supervision;strengthen administrative management of land use planning;strengthen economic management of land use planning;reinforce the legal status of planning;establish incentive and constraint mechanism for reinforcing implementation;improve support system of planning.

  11. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

  12. Strengthening Health Systems Governance in Latin American ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    This project seeks to improve the governance of health systems by designing and ... of the data (locally elected officials, health authorities, civil society groups), the ... In partnership with UNESCO's Organization for Women in Science for the ...

  13. Strengthening Health Systems Research Capacity in Mozambique ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    Mozambique's health sector is dealing with system-wide challenges. ... the Ministry's work on national health accounts, resource allocation, and national health ... a combined INS-FIOCRUS program, and the master's in public health and field ...

  14. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  15. 78 FR 38053 - Regulatory Systems Strengthening

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-25

    ... current state of medical product regulation globally, including challenges, risks, and emerging trends... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0010... product regulation; generation and analysis of evidence of regulatory systems performance; and provision...

  16. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  17. An improved safeguards system and its application to large backend facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The evaluation criteria, which are commonly applicable to both Material Accountancy (MA) and Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and applicable to a large backend facilities, are discussed. It is analyzed that substantial increase of the proliferation resistance can be expected by improving the presently existing safeguards systems. The improved safeguards system described in this paper is expected to be applicable to large-scaled backend facilities without giving unnecessary economical and technical burdens. The main purpose of this approach is to move away from the present trend of too much reliance on MA and to develop the synthetical safeguards effects by harmonizing C/S and continuing MA effectively

  18. GOLD NETTING TO STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahamed Kameel Mydin Meera

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available Economic and financial crises seem to occur with increased frequency. Indeed now most countries, including several advanced economies like the US, Europe and Japan, are in serious economic recession. Employment and business opportunities have been much dampened. Inflation seems to be soaring globally and nations are witnessing widening gaps in income and wealth distribution. Many of these advanced economies are also facing shrinking population sizes that translate into aging problems and labor shortages. On top of those, there are environmental issues, including global warming. All these, in turn, have caused regional and global political conflicts and turmoil. The Arab Spring and the sovereign debt problems faced by some European countries like Greece are examples of this. Sustainability of economics and environment is thus of paramount concern of today. This paper considers those problems and suggests Interest-free Gold-based Electronic Netting System (IGENS as an effective way of injecting liquidity into the economy, practically free, that can spur business and employment while bringing about structural stability, inflation checked with both economic and environmental sustainability. Netting or muqassah is a transaction allowed in shari’ah and is practiced worldwide in different forms. Examples include the highly successful WIR Bank of Switzerland, various Local Exchange Trading Schemes (LETS and Bilateral and Multilateral Payment Arrangements between central banks.   Keywords:  Global crisis, Payment system, Gold, Netting, Muqassah, Liquidity, Sustainability, Financial system stability JEL Classification: E40, E42, E51

  19. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  20. Quality assurance procedures for the IAEA Department of Safeguards Twin Minolta Camera Surveillance System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geoffrion, R.R.; Bussolini, P.L.; Stark, W.A.; Ahlquist, A.J.; Sanders, K.E.; Rubinstein, G.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations are complying with nuclear safeguards treaties. In one aspect of the program, the Department of Safeguards has developed a twin Minolta camera photo surveillance systems program to assure itself and the international community that material handling is accomplished according to safeguards treaty regulations. The camera systems are positioned in strategic locations in facilities such that objective evidence can be obtained for material transactions. The films are then processed, reviewed, and used to substantiate the conclusions that nuclear material has not been diverted. Procedures have been developed to document and aid in: 1) the performance of activities involved in positioning of the camera system; 2) installation of the systems; 3) review and use of the film taken from the cameras

  1. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  2. Development of an engineered safeguards system concept for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; de Montmollin, J.M.; Deveney, J.E.; Fienning, W.C.; Hickman, J.W.; Watkins, L.D.; Winblad, A.E.

    1976-08-01

    An initial concept of an Engineered Safeguards System for a representative commercial mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is presented. Computer simulation techniques for evaluation and further development of the concept are described. An outline of future activity is included

  3. Development of a safeguards system for the THTR pebble bed reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engelhardt, H.

    1978-08-01

    This report provides a survey of the technical possibilities of safeguarding the THTR-300 pebble bed reactor in accordance with the NPT. Description of the reactor system, the operational mode, and the operator's material control system are presented in Sections 2, 3 and 4. A suggested safeguards approach which is based on an item counting of pebble elements with containment and surveillance as a supplementary measure is described in the Sections 5 and 6

  4. Strengthening Health Information Systems to Support Post-Disaster ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    Strengthening Health Information Systems to Support Post-Disaster Healthcare in Haiti. The occurrence of a natural disaster may seem to carry repercussions that are indiscriminate in nature; however, it is the vulnerable populations that suffer most during such events, and in the days, months and years that follow. In Haiti ...

  5. Strengthening local seed systems within the bean value chain ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Strengthening local seed systems within the bean value chain: Experience of agricultural innovation platforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo. ... associations, local grain/seed traders, private and public extension agents, researchers, finance and credit cooperatives and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

  6. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  7. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  8. Role of materials accounting in integrated safeguards systems for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.

    1981-01-01

    Integration of materials accounting and containment/surveillance techniques for international safeguards requires careful examination and definition of suitable inspector activities for verification of operator's materials accounting data. The inspector's verification procedures are designed to protect against data falsification and/or the use of measurement uncertainties to conceal missing material. Materials accounting activities are developed to provide an effective international safeguards system when combined with containment/surveillance activities described in a companion paper

  9. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  10. Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Danker, W.J.; Floyd, W.

    1993-01-01

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

  11. Improving the use of health data for health system strengthening

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tara Nutley

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available Background: Good quality and timely data from health information systems are the foundation of all health systems. However, too often data sit in reports, on shelves or in databases and are not sufficiently utilised in policy and program development, improvement, strategic planning and advocacy. Without specific interventions aimed at improving the use of data produced by information systems, health systems will never fully be able to meet the needs of the populations they serve. Objective: To employ a logic model to describe a pathway of how specific activities and interventions can strengthen the use of health data in decision making to ultimately strengthen the health system. Design: A logic model was developed to provide a practical strategy for developing, monitoring and evaluating interventions to strengthen the use of data in decision making. The model draws on the collective strengths and similarities of previous work and adds to those previous works by making specific recommendations about interventions and activities that are most proximate to affect the use of data in decision making. The model provides an organizing framework for how interventions and activities work to strengthen the systematic demand, synthesis, review, and use of data. Results: The logic model and guidance are presented to facilitate its widespread use and to enable improved data-informed decision making in program review and planning, advocacy, policy development. Real world examples from the literature support the feasible application of the activities outlined in the model. Conclusions: The logic model provides specific and comprehensive guidance to improve data demand and use. It can be used to design, monitor and evaluate interventions, and to improve demand for, and use of, data in decision making. As more interventions are implemented to improve use of health data, those efforts need to be evaluated.

  12. Preliminary Performance Analysis Program Development for Safety System with Safeguard Vessel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Han-Ok; Lee, Jun; Park, Cheon-Tae; Yoon, Ju-Hyeon; Park, Keun-Bae

    2007-01-01

    SMART is an advanced modular integral type pressurized water reactor for a seawater desalination and an electricity production. Major components of the reactor coolant system such as the pressurizer, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP), and steam generators are located inside the reactor vessel. The SMART can fundamentally eliminate the possibility of large break loss of coolant accidents (LBLOCAs), improve the natural circulation capability, and better accommodate and thus enhance a resistance to a wide range of transients and accidents. The safety goals of the SMART are enhanced through highly reliable safety systems such as the passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) and the safeguard vessel coupled with the passive safety injection feature. The safeguard vessel is a steel-made, leak-tight pressure vessel housing the RPV, SIT, and the associated valves and pipelines. A primary function of the safeguard vessel is to confine any radioactive release from the primary circuit within the vessel under DBAs related to loss of the integrity of the primary system. A preliminary performance analysis program for a safety system using the safeguard vessel is developed in this study. The developed program is composed of several subroutines for the reactor coolant system, passive safety injection system, safeguard vessel including the pressure suppression pool, and PRHRS. A small break loss of coolant accident at the upper part of a reactor is analyzed and the results are discussed

  13. Nanoscale strengthening mechanisms in metallic thin film systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schoeppner, Rachel Lynn

    Nano-scale strengthening mechanisms for thin films were investigated for systems governed by two different strengthening techniques: nano-laminate strengthening and oxide dispersion strengthening. Films were tested under elevated temperature conditions to investigate changes in deformation mechanisms at different operating temperatures, and the structural stability. Both systems exhibit remarkable stability after annealing and thus long-term reliability. Nano-scale metallic multilayers with smaller layer thicknesses show a greater relative resistance to decreasing strength at higher temperature testing conditions than those with larger layer thicknesses. This is seen in both Cu/Ni/Nb multilayers as well as a similar tri-component bi-layer system (Cu-Ni/Nb), which removed the coherent interface from the film. Both nanoindentation and micro-pillar compression tests investigated the strain-hardening ability of these two systems to determine what role the coherent interface plays in this mechanism. Tri-layer films showed a higher strain-hardening ability as the layer thickness decreased and a higher strain-hardening exponent than the bi-layer system: verifying the presence of a coherent interface increases the strain-hardening ability of these multilayer systems. Both systems exhibited hardening of the room temperature strength after annealing, suggesting a change in microstructure has occurred, unlike that seen in other multilayer systems. Oxide dispersion strengthened Au films showed a marked increase in hardness and wear resistance with the addition of ZnO particles. The threshold for stress-induced grain-refinement as opposed to grain growth is seen at concentrations of at least 0.5 vol%. These systems exhibited stable microstructures during thermal cycling in films containing at least 1.0%ZnO. Nanoindentation experiments show the drop in hardness following annealing is almost completely attributed to the resulting grain growth. Four-point probe resistivity

  14. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  15. Overview of IAEA guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: objectives, diversion of nuclear material, and the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1984-01-01

    Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification

  16. Experience on the application of safeguard systems to the Italian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzocchi, A.; Venchiarutti, R.; Gatti, S.; Bertini, A.; Zaffiro, B.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguard systems applied in Italy to the various fuel cycle phases, including nuclear power stations, are presented in this paper in view of the present situation resulting from the Rome Treaty obligations and from the obligations to be defined in relation to the ratification of TNP by Italy. This short survey concerns not only the systems usually applied, but also the research and development aspects of new systems that facilitate the attainment of the aims specified in the Treaties. Moreover this paper illustrates the philosophy of nuclear material physical security, aiming at supplementing the efficiency of the safeguard systems [fr

  17. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  18. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  19. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  20. [Framework for the strengthening of health information systems in Peru].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Curioso, Walter H; Espinoza-Portilla, Elizabeth

    2015-01-01

    In this article we present the essential components and policies that are most relevant regarding the conceptual framework to strengthen the health information systems in Peru. The article also presents the main policies, actions and strategies made in the field of electronic health in Peru that are most significant. The health information systems in Peru play a key role and are expected to achieve an integrated and interoperable information system. This will allow health information to be complete, efficient, of good quality and available in a timely manner to achieve better quality of life for people and allow meaningful modernization of public health in the context of health reform in Peru.

  1. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Lafleur, Adrienne M.

    2009-01-01

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of 241 Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased (α,n) production in oxide fuels from the 241 Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of 241 Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of 241 Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of 241 Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  2. Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, John

    1998-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

  3. Research on seal control systems for international nuclear safeguard and the vulnerability assessment on the seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Hongjian; Liu Tianshu; Cao Fangfang; Xu Chunyan

    2014-01-01

    Safeguard seals, also called Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), are widely used to detect tampering or unauthorized entry in the international safeguard and security systems, Seal control systems consist of seal implementing plan, seal development and the vulnerability assessment on tbe seals, effective implementing procedures and methods of the seals. The vulnerability assessment contents of safeguard seals, thermo-shrinked film seals being as an example, and seals control systems in the implementation program are researched. The seal control systems discuss task assignment, seals management flow and seals program data flow to promote applying effectively seals. The vulnerability assessment program of seals studies assurance level to some different tampering techniques and measures. The researches must promote utilizing seals effectively for nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, radioactive waste management, and the nuclear material accounting and control. (authors)

  4. Executive summary of safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

    1977-09-01

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracted with System Development Corporation to develop integrated system concepts for the safeguard of special strategic nuclear materials (SSNM), which include plutonium, uranium 233 and uranium 235 of at least 20 percent enrichment, against malevolent action during interfacility transport. This executive summary outlines the conduct and findings of the project. The study was divided into three major subtasks: (1) The development of adversary action sequences; (2) The assessment of the vulnerability of the transport of nuclear materials to adversary action; (3) The development of conceptual safeguards system design requirements to reduce vulnerabilities

  5. A video imaging system and related control hardware for nuclear safeguards surveillance applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whichello, J.V.

    1987-03-01

    A novel video surveillance system has been developed for safeguards applications in nuclear installations. The hardware was tested at a small experimental enrichment facility located at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The system uses digital video techniques to store, encode and transmit still television pictures over the public telephone network to a receiver located in the Australian Safeguards Office at Kings Cross, Sydney. A decoded, reconstructed picture is then obtained using a second video frame store. A computer-controlled video cassette recorder is used automatically to archive the surveillance pictures. The design of the surveillance system is described with examples of its operation

  6. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards information systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.M.

    1999-01-01

    The year-2000 (Y2K) problem affects both information systems and equipment systems. This paper describes the work which has been done, and is currently underway, to make the information systems of the Department of Safeguards year-2000 compliant. (author)

  7. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  8. Strengthening Performance Management System Implementation in South African Municipalities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Malefetsane Mofolo

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available Adoption of a performance management system in municipalities presented a serious challenge for its implementation. This scenario is implicitly manifesting itself in the reports of the Auditor-General on the financial statements and performance of municipalities, as well as in the state of local government in South Africa overview report (2009. These reports called for the conceptualisation of a model that to strengthen the implementation in municipalities of a performance management system that is efficient and effective. And most importantly, this model could be beneficial for growth, development and effective service delivery.

  9. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  10. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  11. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  12. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  13. Applying principles of health system strengthening to eye care

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Karl Blanchet

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Understanding Health systems have now become the priority focus of researchers and policy makers, who have progressively moved away from a project-centred perspectives. The new tendency is to facilitate a convergence between health system developers and disease-specific programme managers in terms of both thinking and action, and to reconcile both approaches: one focusing on integrated health systems and improving the health status of the population and the other aiming at improving access to health care. Eye care interventions particularly in developing countries have generally been vertically implemented (e.g. trachoma, cataract surgeries often with parallel organizational structures or specialised disease specific services. With the emergence of health system strengthening in health strategies and in the service delivery of interventions there is a need to clarify and examine inputs in terms governance, financing and management. This present paper aims to clarify key concepts in health system strengthening and describe the various components of the framework as applied in eye care interventions.

  14. Objectives and techniques of an advanced safeguards system for the CANDU reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.M.; Zarecki, C.W.; Head, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    In 1975, Canada began to actively assist the IAEA with manpower and research and development efforts to meet this requirement for CANDU reactors. This paper describes various aspects of the CANDU safeguards scheme, including the containment and surveillance equipment that has been developed. It includes consideration of the following: objectives of the safeguards system, role of equipment in meeting system objectives, cost and maintenance of equipment, capabilities and limitations of equipment, and effectiveness of the scheme and equipment in providing assurance of diversion detection. 11 refs

  15. Selected nondestructive assay instrumentation for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Baker, M.P.; Strittmatter, R.; Jain, M.; Evans, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A selected set of nondestructive assay instruments for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants is currently under development. These instruments are of three types: in-line enrichment meters for feed, product, and tails streams; area radiation monitors for direct detection of high-enriched uranium production, and an enrichment meter for spent alumina trap material. The current status of the development of each of these instruments is discussed, with supporting data, as well as the role each would play in a total international safeguards system. 5 figures

  16. Safeguards organizational system at Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear/CNEN-Br

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, Cleber Lopes de; Stasiulevicius, Roberto

    1996-01-01

    Since 1960, the CDTN is working according to a safeguards system, which has been updated in 1992, after the quadripartite agreement involving the government of Brazil and Argentina and the organizations IAEA and ABACC. In this work is presented the SS-CDTN and the acquired experience with the implantation of this system. (author)

  17. Scripting Quality of Security Service (QoSS) Safeguard Measures for the Suggested INFOCON System

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Guild, Jennifer

    2004-01-01

    .... The focus will be on the security of the DOD information infrastructure and the accomplishment of the mission, as well as the usability and the standardization of the INFOCON warning system. The end result is a prototype that is a set of predefined escalation scripts for the evolved INFOCON system's safeguard measures.

  18. Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corynen, G.C.

    1979-01-01

    An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework

  19. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  20. Simulation enabled safeguards assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Larson, Tom

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wire-frame construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed. (authors)

  1. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed

  2. Use of Equipment Information System (EQUIS) to determine priority for purchasing safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silberberg, S.

    1988-01-01

    To manage its large world-wide inventory of safeguards equipment, the IAEA Safeguards department uses a computerized Equipment Information System (EQUIS). EQUIS data have been analyzed using Queueing Theory to determine if inventory is adequate to meet inspector demands and in those cases where it is inadequate, to indicate how many additional units should be procured. Results are tabulated for various types of non-destructive analysis (NDA) equipment. For equipment where there is a high turnover and hence a large amount of data, the analysis provides a powerful tool for assisting procurement decisions

  3. Contribution of the Member State Support Programmes to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortakov, V.; Gardiner, D.; Rautjaervi, J.

    1999-01-01

    Over the last twenty years, Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have provided invaluable technical support to IAEA Safeguards. This support has covered practically all aspects of traditional safeguards activities and also those activities recently proposed and introduced for strengthening the safeguards system. As of August 1997, there were fourteen Member States, plus EURATOM, with active programmes in support of IAEA safeguards and the activities conducted under these Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) are currently valued at an annual twenty million dollars of extra-budgetary contribution to the IAEA. The overall administration in the IAEA of the support programmes is the responsibility of Support Programmes Administration (SPA) in the Safeguards Division of Technical Services. This paper describes the roles and the contributions of the MSSPs, the functions of the MSSP administration activities, and the vital importance the IAEA attaches to the MSSPs. (author)

  4. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  5. International safeguards data management system. System description: Version 1.1.; Release PLI 82

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, T.; Casilli, T.; Costantini, L.; Dondi, M.G.; Franklin, M.

    1982-01-01

    This document describes a nuclear material accountancy system which has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. Throughout the report, the data base system is referred to as ''ISADAM'', i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System. The system provides tools for a safeguards authority to decide whether an operators MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can be accounted for as an accumulation of operator measurement errors. The principle objective of the applications programs described here is to provide a variance analysis of MUF in which the variance of MUF is computed as a function of the accounting declarations and the error characteristics of the operator measurement system. A overview of ISADAM is presented; then, a detailed description of the processing applied by the system is given. A description of the parameter information required by the four autonomous programs ISADAM is presented. In developing ISADAM, one of the prime factors taken into consideration was the ease with which it could be used

  6. Engineered safeguards system activities at Sandia Laboratories for back-end fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sellers, T.A.; Fienning, W.C.; Winblad, A.E.

    1978-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories have been developing concepts for safeguards systems to protect facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle against potential threats of sabotage and theft of special nuclear material (SNM). Conceptual designs for Engineered Safeguards Systems (ESSs) have been developed for a Fuel Reprocessing Facility (including chemical separations, plutonium conversion, and waste solidification), a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and a Plutonium Transport Vehicle. Performance criteria for the various elements of these systems and a candidate systematic design approach have been defined. In addition, a conceptual layout for a large-scale Fuel-Cycle Plutonium Storage Facility has been completed. Work is continuing to develop safeguards systems for spent fuel facilities, light-water reactors, alternative fuel cycles, and improved transportation systems. Additional emphasis will be placed on the problems associated with national diversion of special nuclear material. The impact on safeguards element performance criteria for surveillance and containment to protect against national diversion in various alternative fuel cycle complexes is also being investigated

  7. Safeguards evolution towards unattended c/s (containment and surveillance) systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentino, Lucia I.; Saavedra, Analia D.; Castro, Laura B.; Maceiras, Elena; Llacer, Carlos D.; Vicens, Hugo E.; Mairal, Maria L.; Fernandez Moreno, Sonia

    2000-01-01

    This paper shows the development and evolution of safeguards towards the use of different containment and surveillance (C/S) systems, which involve the possibility of working unattended. They are designed to transmit safeguards relevant data remotely. It is believed that they would increase safeguards efficiency while maintaining or even enhancing their effectiveness. At present, unattended C/S systems with or without remote transmission are in place at several installations. In addition, some other possible applications are being tested. One of these is the Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) field trial at Embalse nuclear power plant to cover the transfers of spent fuel from the ponds to the dry storage. Some of the matters to be addressed are of general nature (i.e. applicable to any unattended/remote system) while others depend on the specific application in a nuclear installation. Among others, the following are particularly important: -) Sharing of data with the SSAC; -) Impact of a failure of the RMS on the operator, IAEA and the SSAC; -) Provision of relevant operational and accounting information; -) Review of the current safeguard approach for the selected installation; -) RMS cost-effectiveness assessment. This paper describes the status of the RMS field trial as well as the current C/S system in place at Embalse nuclear power plant. (authors)

  8. Strengthening Child Protection Systems for Unaccompanied Migrant Children in Mozambique

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Verdasco Martinez, Andrea

    children. By identifying children’s reasons for migrating, it identifies the main risks they encounter once they start living and working in Ressano Garcia. These include: lack of access to educational opportunities, exposure to child labour exploitation, trafficking and smuggling. This paper argues......This research sets out to understand the why, how and with whom of rural-urban internal migration of children to Ressano Garcia, a border town between Mozambique and South Africa. It addresses the overarching research question of how to strengthen child protection systems for unaccompanied migrant...... that child protection systems must respond to the unique situation of migrant children’s needs. Child protection and migration policies need to strike a balance between discouraging unsafe migration, which has the potential to expose children to violence, and ensuring that systems are in place for safe...

  9. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  10. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

    2015-01-01

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  11. Executive summary of the special safeguards study on material control and accounting systems. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    This report assesses the feasibility of real-time systems applied to mixed-oxide fuel rod fabrication. Their interaction with other material control and accounting measures are considered. Economics, effectiveness, and acceptance factors are discussed. A cost-benefit evaluation is made and recommendations given for safeguards improvements

  12. Use of ISEM in studying the impact of guard tactics on facility safeguards system effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Boozer, D.D.

    1977-07-01

    The Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM) is a stochastic, discrete event, Monte-Carlo Simulation Model used to assess the effectiveness of physical protection systems for facilities which store, process, or use SNM. ISEM simulates the interaction of a group of insiders. The sensor control and alarm locations are correlated with the authorized access areas of the insider(s) and, if the insider has the appropriate access, the probability of an insider successfully defeating a sensor control or alarm is computed based upon the surveillance subsystems and the insider's attributes. Following an alarm and an assessment, actions are initiated by the safeguards system. These actions typically involve dispatching guards to specific locations within the facility. Since the specific guard responses must be predetermined, a safeguards system should be evolved from a consideration of a wide spectrum of feasible adversary strategies. The sensitivity of safeguards system effectiveness to a variety of guard tactics is explored in this paper. The evolution of comprehensive guard tactics for protecting a hypothetical facility is demonstrated. Attention is focused on the potential threat posed by insiders and the necessity of well conceived guard tactics in dealing with this threat

  13. Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment ampersand Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  14. Advanced-safeguards systems development for chemical-processing plants. Final report for FY 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1981-04-01

    The program is installing a computer system to test and evaluate process monitoring as a new Safeguards function to supplement the usual physical security and accountability functions. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) provide information via a data acquisition system to a Safeguards analysis computer. The monitoring function can significantly enhance current material control (accountability) and containment surveillance capabilities for domestic and international Safeguards uses. Installation of sensors and instruments in the ICPP was more than 75% complete in FY-1980. Installation work was halted at the request of ICPP operations near the end of the year to eliminate possible conflict with instrument calibrations prior to plant startup. Some improvements to the computer hardware were made during FY-1980. Sensor and instrument development during FY-1980 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications. Pressure transducers, pressure switches, a bubble flowmeter, and load cells were tested; an ultrasonic liquid-in-line sensor was developed and tested. Work on the portable, isotope-ratio mass spectrometer led to the comparison of the HP quadrupole instrument with a small magnetic instrument and to the selection of the quadrupole

  15. The ‘Landscape’ of Nuclear Safeguards: A Comparative Analysis of the International and Regional Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colussi, I.A.

    2015-01-01

    The notion of “nuclear non-proliferation” is twofold. It refers to: (a) reduction of the number of existing arsenals (vertical non-proliferation), and (b) containment of the number of States that possess nuclear weapons, or control of non-state actors (horizontal non-proliferation). At the international law level, as vertical non-proliferation, there are bilateral or multilateral agreements that ban weapons of mass destruction in certain areas (e.g.: Nuclear–Weapon– Free Zones treaties). With respect to horizontal non-proliferation, beyond the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones approach, the main legal text for addressing the issue is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For the implementation of the principles contained in the NPT, a “nuclear safeguards” system has been created, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the role of the nuclear “watchdog” for the NPT. However, along with this international system of safeguards, there are regional safeguards bodies: (a) the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) model is the cornerstone of non-proliferation in the EU, while (b) the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) controls nuclear activities in Brazil and Argentina. Moreover, the existing nuclear weapons free-zone treaties contain safeguards provisions that are additional or complementary to IAEA safeguards. For instance, (a) the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) works for the implementation of Tlatelolco Treaty, (b) the African Commission on Nuclear Energy relates to Pelindaba Treaty, and (c) a Consultative Committee of the Parties is appointed in the context of Raratonga Treaty. The paper aims at critically analysing the different safeguards systems adopted at the international and regional level, through the adoption of a comparative approach. (author)

  16. Laboratory system strengthening and quality improvement in Ethiopia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tilahun M. Hiwotu

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: In 2010, a National Laboratory Strategic Plan was set forth in Ethiopia to strengthen laboratory quality systems and set the stage for laboratory accreditation. As a result, the Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (SLMTA programme was initiated in 45 Ethiopian laboratories. Objectives: This article discusses the implementation of the programme, the findings from the evaluation process and key challenges. Methods: The 45 laboratories were divided into two consecutive cohorts and staff from each laboratory participated in SLMTA training and improvement projects. The average amount of supportive supervision conducted in the laboratories was 68 hours for cohort I and two hoursfor cohort II. Baseline and exit audits were conducted in 44 of the laboratories and percent compliance was determined using a checklist with scores divided into zero- to five-star ratinglevels. Results: Improvements, ranging from < 1 to 51 percentage points, were noted in 42 laboratories, whilst decreases were recorded in two. The average scores at the baseline and exit audits were 40% and 58% for cohort I (p < 0.01; and 42% and 53% for cohort II (p < 0.01,respectively. The p-value for difference between cohorts was 0.07. At the exit audit, 61% ofthe first and 48% of the second cohort laboratories achieved an increase in star rating. Poor awareness, lack of harmonisation with other facility activities and the absence of a quality manual were challenges identified. Conclusion: Improvements resulting from SLMTA implementation are encouraging. Continuous advocacy at all levels of the health system is needed to ensure involvement of stakeholders and integration with other improvement initiatives and routine activities.

  17. The remote monitoring systems LOVER and RECOVER for international safeguards technical, economic and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lauppe, W.D.; Stein, G.; Rezniczek, A.; Stienen, U.

    1983-12-01

    The electronic remote monitoring systems RECOVER and LOVER were developed to comply with the IAEA's tasks concerning international nuclear materials safeguards with the aim of reducing the inspection expenditure and enhancing control effectiveness. The present study on the technical, economic and legal aspects of an application of these systems is intended to show possible implications and provide argumentation aids for discussions on the application of these systems. RECOVER and LOVER offer the possibility of establishing a direct communication path between containment and surveillance system (c/s), instruments at the site of application and a central monitoring station. The demonstration versions of both systems have shown that remote interrogation of data under safeguards-specific boundary conditions (e.g. requirement of tamper safety) will be technically feasible. (orig./HP)

  18. Tightening the Reins. Towards a strengthened international nuclear safeguards system. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.; Stein, G.

    1999-12-01

    This book has grown out of a research project dealing with political and technical challenges to international nuclear material and technology controls. The project, which was carried out in the period 1997-1999, was made possible through financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology and, after reorganization of the German Government following the September 1998 elections, from the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Our research project was a co-operative effort linked to a joint Working Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation, sponsored by the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP, Berlin) in collaboration with the Research Centre Juelich (FZJ, Juelich). The working group, a long-standing institution under the chairmenship of Professors Wolf Haefele and Karl Kaiser, is a unique undertaking for the purpose of continuous information exchange, intellectual debate and political consensus formation on all aspects of German nuclear nonproliferation policy. Members of the group comprise leading experts and decision-makers from government and politics, the natural and social sciences, engineering and nuclear industrial enterprises, as well as mass media and the specialized press. Many among them have shaped and executed the Federal Republic's nuclear policies in a variety of responsible positions. (orig.)

  19. Technical Review of Operator's Destructive Analyses at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Strengthening the Transparency of the Operator's Measurement System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, N.; Katchi, T.; Niitsu, Y.; Duhamel, G.; Decaillon, J.-G.; Toervenyi, A.; Sayama, H.; Hara, S.

    2015-01-01

    The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is a large-scale nuclear facility in Japan. For the purposes of process control, product management and nuclear material accountancy for safeguards purposes, the laboratory of the facility operator analyzes thousands of samples from various process streams and with a multitude of matrices. Transparency of operational procedures, quality control measures and sample analytical results among the facility operator and state and international safeguards authorities are required to assess the facility operator's measurement system, and thus to assure a credible safeguards approach. The facility operator, Japan Nuclear Fuel, Limited (JNFL), is engaged in continuous improvement of its nuclear material analyzes. For the declarations to the inspectorates, it is important that JNFL and the safeguards authorities be able to confirm that the analytical methods used by JNFL are reliable and meet the latest version of the International Target Values. Since 2012 JNFL, the IAEA and the SSAC have carried out several technical reviews of the destructive analysis (DA) processes as a means of strengthening the transparency of the DA measurement systems. The goal of the DA technical reviews is to (1) assess past commitments of the JNFL plan for analytical improvement, (2) review the JNFL Quality System by means of documentation reviews and in-field demonstrations, and (3) review the analytical performance of the JNFL lab through its own results or from inter-laboratory comparison exercises. Throughout this process, subject-matter experts from all organizations met with JNFL laboratory staff and discussed analytical concerns and solutions. The outcome of these technical reviews was a series of recommendations to JNFL for strengthening its plan for continuous improvement. This paper presents the methodology of the DA technical reviews, the communication scheme and some examples of the outcome for JNFL to improve its DA methods and analytical

  20. Health system strengthening in the context of CMAM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Israel, Anne-Dominique; Gallagher, Maureen

    2014-01-01

    pertinently tackle those constrains/ barriers. AM specialists need to join efforts with health specialists to achieve the reduction of the barriers identified as “common”. In order to strengthen coverage, the approach to health systems strengthening has to be two-fold – to increase availability and access as part of the health system. Taking on a more horizontal approach with AM integrated to basic package of health services can support improved availability. In turn, to increase access for AM, there is a need to identify barriers that are specific to SAM/ MAM management within that package. These barriers could be what the “Acute malnutrition champions” could focus on while strengthening the capacity of health actors to mainstream acute malnutrition management in their activities. Efforts have to be coordinated with the health system in order to ensure that the various barriers are addressed nonetheless. (author)

  1. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  2. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  3. The continuing role of item-specific agreements in the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeFrancia, Cristian

    2012-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 'safeguards system' serves as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, under which the IAEA acts as an auditor, monitor and inspector of state-administered nuclear energy programmes. The system consists of agreements and practices that enable the IAEA to gain a clear picture of a state's nuclear activities in order to provide credible assurances that nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes

  4. Computerized real-time materials accountability system for safeguards material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spencer, W.F.; Affel, R.G.; Austin, H.C.; Nichols, J.P.; Stoutt, B.H.; Wachter, J.W.

    1975-01-01

    A real-time, computer-based system is described which provides safeguards material control at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Originally installed in 1972 to provide computerized real-time fissile materials accountability for criticality control purposes, the system has been expanded to provide accountability of all source and nuclear materials (SNM) and to utilize the on-line inventory files in support of the Laboratory physical protection and surveillance procedures. (auth)

  5. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  6. Separation review program for reactor protection system and engineered safeguard systems in a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamb, F.J.; Walrod, B.E.

    1980-01-01

    This review program is utilized during the design of a nuclear power plant to insure separation between interdiscipline design for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safeguard Systems (ESS). Color coded transparent drawings of the RPS and ESS are produced by each discipline. The separation is then reviewed by overlaying drawings of different disciplines on a light table. When this inspection shows that RPS or ESS elements have less than the established minimum separation, an analysis is performed to determine what, if any, design revision is necessary to insure proper separation. ''Hazard'' drawings are also made for determination of each type of potential hazard in each area of the plant. The review is a continuing process as the design progresses and is revised by any discipline. 5 refs

  7. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  8. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  9. Industrial Control System Cyber Security: Questions And Answers Relevant To Nuclear Facilities, Safeguards And Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, Robert S.; Schanfein, Mark; Bjornard, Trond; Moskowitz, Paul

    2011-01-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  10. Advanced safeguards systems development for chemical processing plants. Final report for Fiscal Year 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system is being installed by INEL to test and evaluate safeguards monitoring concepts in an operating nuclear fuel processing plant. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the ICPP provide plant information to a computer data acquisition and analysis system. Objective of the system is to collect data from process and safeguards sensors and show how this data can be analyzed to detect diversion operations or improper plant operation, and to test the performance of the monitoring devices. Approximately one-third of the installation designs and one-eighth of the installations were completed in FY 1979. The ICPP processing schedule for FY 1980 permits installation of the remaining monitoring devices before process startup in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. All computer hardware was delivered and checked out in FY 1979. Computer software system designs were completed with the majority of the programming scheduled for FY 1980. Sensor and instrument development in FY 1979 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications

  11. Development of safeguards information treatment system at facility level in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    So, D.S.; Lee, B.D.; Song, D.Y.

    2001-01-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System (SITS) at Facility level was developed to implement efficiently the obligations under IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bilateral nuclear cooperation Agreements with other countries and domestic law, and to manage efficiently the information related to safeguards implementation at facility level in Korea. Nuclear facilities in Korea are categorized into 8 types based on its accounting characteristics as follows: (1) Item counting facility or bulk handling facility; (2) Batch follow-up facility or not; (3) MUF (Material Unaccounted For) occurrence or not; (4) Nuclear production facility or not; (5) Operation status of facility; (6) Information management of nuclear material transfer status between KMPs or not; (7) Indication of inventory KMP on the inventory change of nuclear material is required or not. Hardware and Software for SITS can be loaded on a personal computer under operation system of Window 2000 or Window NT. MS SQL server 7 and MS Internet Information Server were adopted for database management system and Web server, respectively. Network environment of SITS was designed to include nuclear research institute, nuclear power plants of PWR and CANDU, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and other facilities. SITS can be operated standalone or under the client-server system if intranet exists. More detailed contents of SITS are described elsewhere. Each module of SITS will be tested during incorporation of existing data into SITS and SITS will be distributed to nuclear facilities in Korea

  12. Functional safeguards for computers for protection systems for Savannah River reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kritz, W.R.

    1977-06-01

    Reactors at the Savannah River Plant have recently been equipped with a ''safety computer'' system. This system utilizes dual digital computers in a primary protection system that monitors individual fuel assembly coolant flow and temperature. The design basis for the (SRP safety) computer systems allowed for eventual failure of any input sensor or any computer component. These systems are routinely used by reactor operators with a minimum of training in computer technology. The hardware configuration and software design therefore contain safeguards so that both hardware and human failures do not cause significant loss of reactor protection. The performance of the system to date is described

  13. An improved safeguards system and its application to large back-end facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The paper suggests that the safeguards problems of large plants could be solved by a combination of containment and surveillance, and material accountancy. The paper places considerable importance on the installation of 'anomaly detectors' at various points. These would detect movements through the containment and unusual changes in the process itself. The importance of the quantification, the contribution of accountancy and containment and surveillance system is emphasised and a mathematical approach is outlined

  14. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-01-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  15. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  16. Function allocation in distributed safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barlich, G.L.

    1991-01-01

    Computerized distributed systems are being used to collect and manage data for activities such as nuclear materials accounting, process control, laboratory coordination, and security. Poor choices made in allocating functions to individual processors can make a system unusable by burdening machines with excessive network retrievals and updates. During system design phases, data allocation algorithms based on operation frequencies, field sizes, security information, and reliability requirements can be applied in sensitivity studies to mathematically ensure processor efficiency. The Los Alamos Network Design System (NDS) implements such an allocation algorithm. The authors analyzed a large, existing distributed system to test the cost functions and to compare actual network problems with NDS results. Several common configurations were also designed and studied using the software. From these studies, some basic principles for allocating functions emerged. In this paper recommendations for function allocation in generic systems and related design options are discussed

  17. 40 CFR 141.551 - What strengthened combined filter effluent turbidity limits must my system meet?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... effluent turbidity limits must my system meet? 141.551 Section 141.551 Protection of Environment... Effluent Requirements § 141.551 What strengthened combined filter effluent turbidity limits must my system meet? Your system must meet two strengthened combined filter effluent turbidity limits. (a) The first...

  18. The Safeguards analysis applied to the RRP. Automatic sampling authentication system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ono, Sawako; Nakashima, Shinichi; Iwamoto, Tomonori

    2004-01-01

    The sampling for analysis from vessels and columns at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) is performed mostly by the automatic sampling system. The safeguards sample for the verification also will be taken using these sampling systems and transfer to the OSL though the pneumatic transfer network owned and controlled by operator. In order to maintaining sample integrity and continuity of knowledge (CoK) for throughout the sample processing. It is essential to develop and establish the authentication measures for the automatic sampling system including transfer network. We have developed the Automatic Sampling Authentication System (ASAS) under consultation by IAEA. This paper describes structure, function and concept of ASAS. (author)

  19. Optimizing the design of international safeguards inspection systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of international inspections for verifying the operation of a nuclear facility requires that available resources be allocated among inspection activities to maximize detection of misoperation. This report describes a design and evaluation method for selecting an inspection system that is optimal for accomplishing inspection objectives. The discussion includes methods for identifying system objectives, defining performance measures, and choosing between candidate systems. Optimization theory is applied in selecting the most preferred inspection design for a single nuclear facility, and an extension to optimal allocation of inspection resources among States containing multiple facilities is outlined. 3 figures, 5 tables

  20. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  1. Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, W.C.

    1995-01-01

    The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

  2. Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-09-01

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

  3. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  4. Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  5. The nuclear materials control system: Safeguards - circa 1957

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, C.C. Jr.

    1992-01-01

    In the late 1950s, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation undertook a nuclear materials control study for the Division of International Affairs of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The objective of the study was to develop a Nuclear Materials Control System (NMCS) that could be used under the US bilateral agreements or by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Phase I was a system study to determine the requirements for an NMCS for an assumed nuclear fuel complex. This paper summarizes aspects of Phase I studies addressing facility types, measurement points, and instrumentation needs and Phase II studies covering chemistry/chemical engineering, nuclear, special devices, and security devices and techniques. 1 fig

  6. Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopatin, S.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

  7. A data transmission system for the centrifuge enrichment plant safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hesse, E.W.

    1987-04-01

    A novel data transmission system was developed to enable the Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) in Sydney to monitor remotely the running of an experimental enrichment facility at the Lucas Heights Reserch Laboratories, using Telecom telephone lines. The system allowed ASO to monitor the enrichment, flows and activity in sensitive areas of the plant by means of a master computer at ASO and a slave computer at Lucas Heights. The slave computer sent requested data and scanned video pictures to determine intrusive changes to the plant. Detailed descriptions of the transmission system and method of operation are given, together with an outline of experience obtained during a three-month surveillance of the facility

  8. Modeling and simulation in the design and evaluation of conceptual safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Smith, D.B.

    1977-01-01

    Recent work in modeling nuclear fuel-cycle processes and the materials measurement and accountability portion of integrated safeguards systems is summarized. Process variability, especially in the levels of in-process holdup and in scrap and waste sidestreams, impacts significantly on the design of dynamic materials accounting and control systems. In the absence of operating data from modern facilities, detailed dynamic models of process operation are required in order to evaluate systems design concepts. Numerical data are presented from the simulated operation of major portions of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion, and mixed-oxide fuel-fabrication processes

  9. Evaluations of the commercial spectrometer systems for safeguards applications using the germanium detectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vo, D.T.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards applications require the best spectrometer systems with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all the situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be ease to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with both the planar and coaxial germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscopy may be the future of gamma-ray spectroscopy

  10. Safeguarding the provision of ecosystem services in catchment systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Everard, Mark

    2013-04-01

    A narrow technocentric focus on a few favored ecosystem services (generally provisioning services) has led to ecosystem degradation globally, including catchment systems and their capacities to support human well-being. Increasing recognition of the multiple benefits provided by ecosystems is slowly being translated into policy and some areas of practice, although there remains a significant shortfall in the incorporation of a systemic perspective into operation management and decision-making tools. Nevertheless, a range of ecosystem-based solutions to issues as diverse as flooding and green space provision in the urban environment offers hope for improving habitat and optimization of beneficial services. The value of catchment ecosystem processes and their associated services is also being increasingly recognized and internalized by the water industry, improving water quality and quantity through catchment land management rather than at greater expense in the treatment costs of contaminated water abstracted lower in catchments. Parallel recognition of the value of working with natural processes, rather than "defending" built assets when catchment hydrology is adversely affected by unsympathetic upstream development, is being progressively incorporated into flood risk management policy. This focus on wider catchment processes also yields a range of cobenefits for fishery, wildlife, amenity, flood risk, and other interests, which may be optimized if multiple stakeholders and their diverse value systems are included in decision-making processes. Ecosystem services, particularly implemented as a central element of the ecosystem approach, provide an integrated framework for building in these different perspectives and values, many of them formerly excluded, into commercial and resource management decision-making processes, thereby making tractable the integrative aspirations of sustainable development. This can help redress deeply entrenched inherited assumptions

  11. A removable optical sealing system for application to international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, R.E.

    1985-06-01

    A removable, optically verifiable sealing system for CANDU spent fuel storage facilities has been developed. The seal is based on the use of unique crystal patterns formed in a pure metal identity/integrity element and has been designed for easy installation and removal using simple tooling. Since the seal is optically verified, a wide range of commercial instruments, including those in use by the IAEA, can be used to verify it. Futhermore, optical verification allows the level of scrutiny to be matched with the degree of confidence required to be confident that spent fuel has not been diverted

  12. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  13. The challenges of integrating multiple safeguards systems in a large nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavietes, A.; Liguori, C.; Pickrell, M.; Plenteda, R.; Sweet, M.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: Implementing safeguards in a cost-effective manner in large nuclear facilities such as fuel conditioning, fuel reprocessing, and fuel fabrication plants requires the extensive use of instrumentation that is operated in unattended mode. The collected data is then periodically reviewed by the inspectors either on-site at a central location in the facility or remotely in the IAEA offices. A wide variety of instruments are deployed in large facilities, including video surveillance cameras, electronic sealing devices, non-destructive assay systems based on gamma ray and neutron detection, load cells for mass measurement, ID-readers, and other process-specific monitors. The challenge to integrate these different measurement instruments into an efficient, reliable, and secure system requires implementing standardization at various levels throughout the design process. This standardization includes the data generator behaviour and interface, networking solutions, and data security approaches. This standardization will provide a wide range of savings, including reduced training for inspectors and technicians, reduced periodic technical maintenance, reduced spare parts inventory, increased system robustness, and more predictive system behaviour. The development of standard building blocks will reduce the number of data generators required and allow implementation of simplified architectures that do not require local collection computers but rather utilize transmission of the acquired data directly to a central server via Ethernet connectivity. This approach will result in fewer system components and therefore reduced maintenance efforts and improved reliability. This paper discusses in detail the challenges and the subsequent solutions in the various areas that the IAEA Department of Safeguards has committed to pursue as the best sustainable way of maintaining the ability to implement reliable safeguards systems. (author)

  14. ASEA-ATOM's URANUS system for production control, economic control and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattson, J.C.

    1983-01-01

    ASEA-ATOM needs a system for production and economic control because: (1) the uranium is the valuable property of the customer; (2) short delivery times are a prime means of competition; (3) the manufacture of fuel necessitates frequent enrichment changes and much enrichment blending; (4) minimizing uranium stock reduces interest costs. A system which meets the above needs will with minor modifications meet safeguard requirements. URANUS is an integrated man/computer system with manual input and automatic data treatment and reporting of information. The man/computer interface is monitored by the automatic checking for plausibility of all input. An item is a quantity of material which is treated as a unit in production. Each item receives a unique identification number which may be used only once. If the qualitative properties of an item are changed a new item number is issued. Items are reported on forms and fed into URANUS by authorized personnel using personal passwords or are directly reported by terminal from certain operations. Pertinent information is entered for each project. The URANUS computer system consists of terminal activated on-line and batch modules which are briefly described. Output is information for planning, economic control and safeguards. Safeguards information consists of the following. For flow and blending control: delivery information; change of nominal enrichment; enrichment blending; internal transactions that change an enrichment/origin account; material status report (MSR); item inventory per MBA; general ledger. For physical inventory: material balance report (MBR); book item inventory per MBA; physical item inventory per MBA; uranium balance per origin and enrichment

  15. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  16. The NINO [No Inspector, No Operator system] cask-loading safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiarman, S.

    1987-01-01

    It is, in general difficult to determine by means of camera-surveillance techniques what is loaded into spent-fuel casks being prepared for shipment from light-water reactors to other reactors, reprocessing facilities, or long-term storage. Furthermore, the expected high frequency of cask loadings in the coming years would place too great a burden on the IAEA and Euratom inspectorates if each had to be observed by an inspector. For the case of shipment to other reactors and reprocessing facilities, the casks are soon opened and, in principle, their contents could be ascertained by direct inspection. In the case of long-term-storage facilities, the casks would stay sealed for years, thereby requiring the IAEA to know positively how many spent-fuel assemblies were loaded at the reactor and to have a continuity of knowledge of the cask's contents. It has been proposed instead that the facility operator place the cask seal on the cask within the field of view of a surveillance system linked to the cask seal. This solution, however, may not provide enough credibility for acceptance by the safeguards community. This paper presents an alternative to both inspector presence at cask loading and operator assistance in applying seals; this alternative is called the No Inspector, No Operator system (NINO)

  17. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

    2000-01-01

    With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

  18. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  19. The present status and development of the state's system of safeguards in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.; Haginoya, T.; Natsume, H.; Hirata, M.

    1977-01-01

    This paper summarizes developmental activities aiming at improving, the status of the Japan's System of safeguards. The integral tests are described which are now being implemented by the Japanese Government to check the effectiveness of the State's System, which must be maintained by the Government under the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified by Japan in June 1976. A joint experiment has been now implemented by the Nuclear Safety Bureau and the NMCC for knowing and improving the precision and accuracy of analytical measurements used at the bulk-facilities. JAERI, is conducting various R and D work on its own, and through cooperation with NMCC, NSB etc. The authors describe the results of non-destructive γ-spectrometry for the development of isotopic correlation techniques, as well as for the identification, and also refer briefly to measurement methods using the Fast Critical Assembly in JAERI. Measurement methods used in the Pu-fabrication facility of the PNC, and the problem of spent fuels application of safeguards for the reprocessing plant are discussed. The accounting reports coming from Japanese facilities are processed by the computer at the NMCC, and converted into (a) the State's material balance, and (b) the formats to be sent to IAEA. The authors discuss the experience of such data-processing as well as the developmental works for analysing MUF. As a part of the integral test, the experiences concerning planning and performance of inspection are discussed. The present status and future plans of the system of national analytical laboratories are described

  20. The CANDU irradiated fuel safeguards sealing system at the threshold of implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stirling, A.J.; Kupca, S.; Martin, R.E.; West, R.J.; Aikens, A.E.; Cox, C.A.; White, B.F.; Smith, M.T.; Payne, W.E.

    1985-07-01

    The development of a safeguards containment and surveillance system for the irradiated fuel discharged from CANDU nuclear generating stations has inspired the development of three different sealing technologies. Each seal type utilizes a random seal identity of different design. The AECL Random Coil (ARC) Seal combines the identity and integrity elements in the ultrasonic signature of a wire coil. Two variants of an optical seal have been developed which features identity elements of crystalline zirconium and aluminum. The sealed cap-seal uses a conventional IAEA 'Type X Seal' (wire seal). The essential features and relative merits of each seal design are described

  1. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  2. Japanese Quality Assurance System Regarding the Provision of Material Accounting Reports and the Safeguards Relevant Information to the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goto, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Kumekawa, H.; Usui, A.; Sano, K.

    2015-01-01

    The provision of the safeguards relevant reports and information in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the additional protocol (AP) is the basis for the IAEA safeguards. The government of Japan (Japan Safeguards Office, JSGO) has believed that the correct reports contribute to effective and efficient safeguards therefore the domestic quality assurance system for the reporting to the IAEA was already established at the time of the accession of the CSA in 1977. It consists of Code 10 interpretation (including the seminars for operators in Japan), SSAC's checks for syntax error, code and internal consistency (computer based consistency check between facilities) and the discussion with the IAEA on the facilities' measurement system for bulk-handling facilities, which contributes to the more accurate reports from operators. This spirit has been maintained for the entry into force of the AP. For example, questions and amplification from the IAEA will be taken into account the review of the AP declaration before sending to the IAEA and the open source information such as news article and scientific literature in Japanese is collected and translated into English, and the translated information is provided to the IAEA as the supplementary information, which may contribute to broadening the IAEA information source and to their comprehensive evaluation. The other safeguards relevant information, such as the mail-box information for SNRI at LEU fuel fabrication plants, is also checked by the JSGO's QC software before posting. The software was developed by JSGO and it checks data format, batch IDs, birth/death date, shipper/receiver information and material description code. This paper explains the history of the development of the Japanese quality assurance system regarding the reports and the safeguards relevant information to the IAEA. (author)

  3. Proliferation resistance characteristics of advanced nuclear energy systems: a safeguard ability point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevini, F.; Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Renda, G.

    2008-01-01

    Among the international community there is a renewed interest in nuclear power systems as a major source for energy production in the near to mid future. This is mainly due to concerns connected with future availability of conventional energy resources, and with the environmental impact of fossil fuels. International initiatives have been set up like the Generation 4. International Forum (GIF), the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-INPRO), and, partially, the US driven Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aimed at defining and evaluating the characteristics, in which future innovative nuclear energy systems (INS) will have to excel. Among the identified characteristics, Proliferation Resistance plays an important role for being able to widely deploy nuclear technology worldwide in a secure way. Studies having the objective to assess Proliferation Resistance of nuclear fuel cycles have been carried out since the nineteen seventies, e.g., the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the Non-proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) initiatives, and all agree in stating that absolute intrinsic proliferation resistance, although desirable, is not achievable in the foreseeable future. The above finding is still valid; as a consequence, every INS will have to comply with agreements related to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will require safeguards measures, implemented through extrinsic measures. This consideration led to a renewed interest in the Safeguard ability concept which can be seen as a bridge between intrinsic features and extrinsic features and measures.

  4. A Safeguard System for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell-Derived Rejuvenated T Cell Therapy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Miki Ando

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available The discovery of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs has created promising new avenues for therapies in regenerative medicine. However, the tumorigenic potential of undifferentiated iPSCs is a major safety concern for clinical translation. To address this issue, we demonstrated the efficacy of suicide gene therapy by introducing inducible caspase-9 (iC9 into iPSCs. Activation of iC9 with a specific chemical inducer of dimerization (CID initiates a caspase cascade that eliminates iPSCs and tumors originated from iPSCs. We introduced this iC9/CID safeguard system into a previously reported iPSC-derived, rejuvenated cytotoxic T lymphocyte (rejCTL therapy model and confirmed that we can generate rejCTLs from iPSCs expressing high levels of iC9 without disturbing antigen-specific killing activity. iC9-expressing rejCTLs exert antitumor effects in vivo. The system efficiently and safely induces apoptosis in these rejCTLs. These results unite to suggest that the iC9/CID safeguard system is a promising tool for future iPSC-mediated approaches to clinical therapy.

  5. Automated 741 document preparation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Automated Safeguards Information System (OASIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Austin, H.C.; Gray, L.M.

    1982-01-01

    OASIS has been providing for Oak Ridge National Laboratory's total safeguards needs since being place on line in April 1980. The system supports near real-time nuclear materials safeguards and accountability control. The original design of OASIS called for an automated facsimile of a 741 document to be prepared as a functional by-product of updating the inventory. An attempt was made to utilize, intact, DOE-Albuquerque's automated 741 system to generate the facsimile; however, the five page document produced proved too cumbersome. Albuquerque's programs were modified to print an original 741 document utilizing standard DOE/NRC 741 forms. It is felt that the best features of both the automated and manually generated 741 documents have been incorporated. Automation of the source data for 741 shipping documents produces greater efficiency while reducing possible errors. Through utilization of the standard DOE/NRC form, continuity within the NMMSS system is maintained, thus minimizing the confusion and redundancy associated with facsimiles. OASIS now fulfills the original concept of near real-time accountability by furnishing a viable 741 document as a function of updating the inventory

  6. Twenty Years of Regional Safeguards: the ABACC System and the Synergy with the National Nuclear Material Control Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dias, Fabio C.; Palhares, Lilia C.; De Mello, Luiz A.; Vicens, Hugo E.; Maceiras, Elena; Terigi, Gabriel

    2011-01-01

    As result of the nuclear integration between Brazil and Argentina, in July 1991 the Agreement for Peaceful Uses of the Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) was signed and the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) was created [1]. The main role assigned to ABACC was the implementation and administration of the regional control system and the coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil. In December 1991 the IAEA, ABACC, Argentina and Brazil signed the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435) [2]. The agreement establishes obligations similar to those established by model INFCIRC/153 comprehensive agreements. The Bilateral Agreement establishes that the Parties should make available financial and technical capabilities to support ABACC activities. In order to accomplish this challenge, the National Systems had to improve their structure and capabilities. Through the close interaction with the IAEA and ABACC, the national systems have been enriched by adopting new methodologies, implementing innovative safeguards approaches and providing specialized training to the regional inspectors. All of this also resulted in relevant technical improvements to the regional system as a whole. The approach of both neighborhoods controlling each other increased the confidence between the partners and permitted a better knowledge of their potentialities. The recognized performance of the regional system in the implementation of innovative, efficient and credible safeguards measures increased the confidence of the international community on the implementation of nuclear safeguards in Argentina and Brazil. In this paper, after twenty years of the creation of the ABACC System, the view of the Brazilian and Argentine National Authorities is presented. (authors)

  7. Experience with an ultrasonic sealing system for nuclear safeguards in irradiated fuel bay demonstrations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, B.F.; Smith, M.T.

    1985-07-01

    The development of the irradiated fuel safeguards containment assembly for CANDU nuclear generating stations has stimulated the development of the AECL Random Coil Sealing System. The ARC seal combines the identity and integrity elements in an ultrasonically-determined signature. This is verified in situ, in real time with the seal reading system. The maturation of this technology has been facilitated with demonstration trials in the NRU and NPD irradiated fuel bays. The NPD demonstration includes operation of the systems tooling by Ontario Hydro staff. It provides the opportunity for IAEA inspectors from Toronto and Vienna to direct the operational procedures and to perform the data acquisition. The procedures and systems developed in these trials are reviewed. The estimation of the system performance characteristics from the observations is presented. A minimum frequency of reading for individual seals is recommended to be once per annum following initial deployment

  8. Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M. [Craig Everton, Russell Leslie, Stephan Bayer, Michael East, Australia (Australia)

    2011-12-15

    In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

  9. Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M.

    2011-01-01

    In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

  10. Self-Monitoring Strengthening System Based on Carbon Fiber Laminate

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rafal Krzywon

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Externally bonded composites reinforced with high-strength fibers are increasingly popular in construction, especially in structures’ strengthening, where the best possible mechanical properties are required. At the same time the ability to autodetect threats is one of the most desirable features of contemporary structures. The authors of the paper have developed an intelligent fabric, wherein the carbon fibers play the role of not only tensile reinforcement but also strain sensor. The idea is based on the construction of the strain gauge, where the thread of carbon fibers arranged in zig-zag pattern works as electrical conductor and is insulated by parallel thread of glass or acrylic fibers. Preliminary laboratory tests were designed to create effective measurement techniques and assess the effectiveness of the strengthening of selected building structures, as reinforced concrete and timber beams. Presented in the paper, selected results of these studies are very promising, although there were some noted problems to be considered in next steps. The main problem here is the control of the cross section of the fibers tow, affecting the total resistance of the fabric. One of the main deficiencies of the proposed solution is also sensitivity to moisture.

  11. Global health initiative investments and health systems strengthening: a content analysis of global fund investments

    OpenAIRE

    Warren, Ashley E; Wyss, Kaspar; Shakarishvili, George; Atun, Rifat; de Savigny, Don

    2013-01-01

    Background: Millions of dollars are invested annually under the umbrella of national health systems strengthening. Global health initiatives provide funding for low- and middle-income countries through disease-oriented programmes while maintaining that the interventions simultaneously strengthen systems. However, it is as yet unclear which, and to what extent, system-level interventions are being funded by these initiatives, nor is it clear how much funding they allocate to disease-specific a...

  12. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  13. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  14. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

  15. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

  16. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  17. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  18. Measurement system for nuclear safeguards based on bismuth-germanate scintillators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moss, C.E.; Dowdy, E.J.; Evans, A.E.; Hamm, M.E.; Lucas, M.C.; Shunk, E.R.

    1983-01-01

    To determine gamma-ray flux spectra, with high efficiency as the foremost objective, we constructed a system that uses bismuth-germanage scintillators as sensors. The system, consisting of eight scintillators and a LeCroy 3500 data acquisition system, has been calibrated and characterized from 0.06 to 8.29 MeV. By fitting the calibration spectra with a function containing 17 parameters, we were able to construct theoretical response functions, which we then used to obtain the gamma-ray flux spectra at multiple space points resulting from a variety of radioactive objects of interest in nuclear safeguards. The results of our procedure agree with calculated values to within less than 10%. 6 figures

  19. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

    1980-01-01

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  20. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  1. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  2. Development and application of a safeguards system in a fabrication plant for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuypers, M.; Stricht, E. van der

    1979-01-01

    This paper gives a general view of the safeguards activities performed at the Nukem Fabrication plant (Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany) during the last seven years. The main safeguards-relevant features of the plant are given and discussed. The importance is stressed of a good working relationship between the three principal partners, viz. the operator, the safeguards authority and the latter's technical support service. The definition, implementation and improvement of safeguards equipment and activities are outlined. The paper describes the internal organization established by the operator to fulfil his responsibilities, the safeguards philosophy, the Non-Destructive Assay equipment permanently installed by Euratom Safeguards, the results obtained, and the evaluation of the material balances. Conclusions are drawn (and specific comments made throughout the paper) from the experience gained over this period of seven years. (author)

  3. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  4. Two low-level gamma spectrometry systems of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parus, J L [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Raab, W [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Donohue, D [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Jansta, V [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Kierzek, J [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria)

    1997-03-01

    A gamma spectrometry system designed for the measurement of samples with low and medium radioactivity (activity from a few to about 10{sup 4} Bq in the energy range from 25 to 2700 keV) has been installed at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. The system consists of 3 low level detectors: (1) n-type coaxial Ge with 42.4% relative efficiency, 1.85 keV FWHM at 1.33 MeV (2) planar Ge with 2000 mm{sup 2} area and 20 mm thickness, 562 eV FWHM at 122 keV (3) NaI(Tl) annulus of 25.4 cm diameter and 25.4 cm height, hole diameter 90 mm. (orig./DG)

  5. VISA-2 - a general, vulnerability-oriented method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards/security systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs

  6. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    ; qualitative and quantitative measurements of nuclear material; familiarity and access to sensitive technologies related to detection, unattended verification systems, containment/surveillance and sensors; examination and verification of design information of large and complex facilities; theoretical and practical aspects of technologies relevant to verification objectives; analysis of inspection findings and evaluation of their mutual consistency; negotiations on technical issues with facility operators and State authorities. This experience is reflected in the IAEA Safeguards Manual which sets out the policies and procedures to be followed in the inspection process as well as in the Safeguards Criteria which provide guidance for verification, evaluation and analysis of the inspection findings. The IAEA infrastructure and its experience with verification permitted in 1991 the organization to respond immediately and successfully to the tasks required by the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) for Iraq as well as to the tasks related to the verification of completeness and correctness of the initial declarations in the cases of the DPRK. and of S. Africa. In the case of Iraq the discovery of its undeclared programs was made possible through the existing verification system enhanced by additional access rights, information and application of modern detection technology. Such discoveries made it evident that there was a need for an intensive development effort to strengthen the safeguards system to develop a capability to detect undeclared activities. For this purpose it was recognized that there was need for additional and extended a) access to information, b) access to locations. It was also obvious that access to the Security Council, to bring the IAEA closer to the body responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, would be a requirement for reporting periodically on non-proliferation and the results of the IAEA's verification activities. While the case

  7. An application of the controllable unit approach (CUA) to the analysis of safeguards measurement systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seabaugh, P.W.; Rogers, D.R.; Woltermann, H.A.; Fushimi, F.C.; Ciramella, A.F.

    1979-01-01

    The controllable unit approach (CUA) is a material control and accountability methodology that takes into account the system logic and statistical characteristics of a plant process through the formulation of closure equations. The methodology is adaptable to plant processes of varying degrees of design and operational complexity. No alteration or modification of a process is required to apply the methodology. Cost/benefits of refinements in, or changes to, the proposed measurement system are obtained as incremental cost. To encourage improved safeguards accountability, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been considering the use of performance-oriented regulations to supplement those currently used. The study, sponsored by NRC/Office of Standards Development, evaluated CUA methodology to meet performance-oriented regulations. For this study, the criterion is defined as the detection of a material loss of two kilograms of SNM with 97.5% confidence. Specifically investigated were the timeliness of detection, the ability to localize material loss, process coverage, cost/benefits, and compatibility with other safeguards techniques such as diversion path analysis and data filtering. The feasibility of performance-oriented regulations is demonstrated. To use the system of closure equations fully, a procedure was developed to integrate formally the effect of both short-term and long-term closure equations into an overall systems criterion of performance. Both single and multiple diversion strategies are examined in order to show how the CUA method can protect against either strategy. Quantitative results show that combined closure equations improve the detection sensitivity to material loss, and that multiple diversions provide only diminishing returns. (author)

  8. Computerization of the nuclear material accounting system for safeguards purposes at nuclear power plants with WWER-440 reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Antonov, V.P.; Konnov, Yu.I.; Semenets, A.N.

    1983-01-01

    The paper sets forth the basic principles underlying nuclear material accounting at nuclear power plants with WWER-440 reactors. It briefly describes the general structure and individual units in a program for computerized accounting. The use of this program is illustrated by the actual accounting data from the fifth unit of the Novovoronezh nuclear power station. The NUMIS program seems to be of interest both for the purposes of IAEA safeguards and for nuclear power plant operators in countries where power plants with WWER-440 reactors subject to IAEA safeguards are either in operation or under construction. The research in question was conducted initially under an IAEA research contract; the system is now being developed further and tested under the IAEA-USSR technical and scientific co-operation programme on safeguards. (author)

  9. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  10. Planning of Medium- and Long-Term Strategy for the Safeguards Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Dong Hoon; Ahn, Gil Hoon; Choi, Kwan Gyu

    2009-01-01

    In Rep. of Korea, active safeguards technology development suitable to phase of a nuclear advanced country is necessary because of below reasons. First reasons are '6th ranked position in the nuclear energy generation all over the world', 'continuously increased outcomes in the various nuclear fields such as research or patent', 'strengthened intention of the new government for nuclear industries', and 'weakness of the R and D foundation related to the safeguards technology'. Second reasons are optimization necessity of the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards according to enlargement of the SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control) role. The reason of the enlargement of the SSAC is IAEA IS (Integrated Safeguards) application for Korea. Third reasons are necessity for the systematic national development plan considering the Korea R and D level and the degree of the difficulty of technology. This is to say, there is necessity of the system construction of safeguards technology development connected to the NuTRM(Nuclear Technology Road Map), integrated national nuclear energy promotion plans because of necessity for concentration of the technology level and development abilities which are spread in the industry fields, the academic world and research fields. So, in this study, the foundation of the advanced safeguards technology is provided through determining the priority of the individual technology of National Safeguards, establishing development strategy for the middle or long term of Safeguards technology, based on domestic and foreign status

  11. FE Modelling of the Seismic Behavior of Wide Beam-Column Joints Strengthened with CFRP Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Giuseppe Santarsiero

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available A large share of reinforced concrete (RC framed buildings is provided with wide beams being a type of beam allowing greater freedom in the architectural arrangement of interiors, beyond further advantage due to fewer formworks needed during the construction. Nevertheless, little attention has been devoted to the seismic vulnerability of this kind of framed RC buildings as well as to the study of strengthening systems purposely developed for wide beams and wide beam-column connections. Under these premises, this paper proposes simple strengthening solutions made by Fibre Reinforced Polymers (FRP systems able to effectively improve seismic capacity through feasible arrangement suitable in case a wide beam is present. On the basis of wide beam-column joints previously tested without strengthening system, detailed nonlinear finite element models were calibrated. Then, an FRP strengthening intervention based on a brand new arrangement was modeled in order to perform additional simulations under seismic actions. This way, the effectiveness of the strengthening intervention was assessed finding out that significant strength and ductility increments were achieved with a relatively simple and cheap strengthening arrangement. Additional research would be desirable in the form of experimental tests on the simulated wide beam-column joints.

  12. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  13. [eHealth in Peru: implementation of policies to strengthen health information systems].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Curioso, Walter H

    2014-01-01

    Health information systems play a key role in enabling high quality, complete health information to be available in a timely fashion for operational and strategic decision-making that makes it possible to save lives and improve the health and quality of life of the population. In many countries, health information systems are weak, incomplete, and fragmented. However, there is broad consensus in the literature of the need to strengthen health information systems in countries around the world. The objective of this paper is to present the essential components of the conceptual framework to strengthen health information systems in Peru. It describes the principal actions and strategies of the Ministry of Health of Peru during the process of strengthening health information systems. These systems make it possible to orient policies for appropriate decision-making in public health.

  14. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  15. Additional Safeguards for Children Using Biometric Technologies in the European Union Multilevel System from the Perspective of Fundamental Rights Protection

    OpenAIRE

    Sarrión Esteve, Joaquín

    2015-01-01

    I. Motivation. II. Methodology III. The advances of biometric technologies. A particular focus on DNA technology. IV. DNA technology legal framework V. Fundamental rights protection in EU Multilevel System VI. Additional Safeguards for Children Conclusions? I. Motivation. II. Methodology III. The advances of biometric technologies. A particular focus on DNA technology. IV. DNA technology legal framework V. Fundamental rights protection in EU Multileve...

  16. Strengthening health systems through linking research evidence to ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    informed policies. Accordingly, a critical way of addressing these challenges facing health systems in the region is through the linking of health research findings to policy. Keywords: Evidence; Sub-Saharan Africa; Health Policy; Health Systems ...

  17. The entry into force of the Additional Protocol in the European Union: The new dimension of safeguards in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Recio, M. [Deputy Direction General for Nuclear Energy, Direction General for Energy Policy and Mines Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, Paseo de la Castellana, 160 Madrid 28046 (Spain)]. E-mail: MRecio@mityc.es; Prieto, N. [Asesoria Juridica, Direccion de Division Administracion, Enresa, c/Emilio Vargas, 7, Madrid 28043 (Spain)]. E-mail: nprs@enresa.es

    2006-07-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into force on 30 April 2004. This completes the implementation in the EU of what undoubtedly represents the most ambitious project undertaken by the IAEA, designed to reinforce its current safeguards system, a project that the international community considers to be a key component strengthening the fight against one of the most serious threats for world security: nuclear proliferation. (author)

  18. The entry into force of the Additional Protocol in the European Union: The new dimension of safeguards in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recio, M.; Prieto, N.

    2006-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into force on 30 April 2004. This completes the implementation in the EU of what undoubtedly represents the most ambitious project undertaken by the IAEA, designed to reinforce its current safeguards system, a project that the international community considers to be a key component strengthening the fight against one of the most serious threats for world security: nuclear proliferation. (author)

  19. Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonino, Anibal D; Perez, Adrian C; Krimer, Mario J; Teira, Ruben O; Vigile, Rodolfo S; Valentino, Lucia I; Giordano, Luis A; Ferro, Juan M [Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2001-07-01

    In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

  20. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  1. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  2. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  3. Rethinking health systems strengthening: key systems thinking tools and strategies for transformational change.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swanson, R Chad; Cattaneo, Adriano; Bradley, Elizabeth; Chunharas, Somsak; Atun, Rifat; Abbas, Kaja M; Katsaliaki, Korina; Mustafee, Navonil; Mason Meier, Benjamin; Best, Allan

    2012-10-01

    While reaching consensus on future plans to address current global health challenges is far from easy, there is broad agreement that reductionist approaches that suggest a limited set of targeted interventions to improve health around the world are inadequate. We argue that a comprehensive systems perspective should guide health practice, education, research and policy. We propose key 'systems thinking' tools and strategies that have the potential for transformational change in health systems. Three overarching themes span these tools and strategies: collaboration across disciplines, sectors and organizations; ongoing, iterative learning; and transformational leadership. The proposed tools and strategies in this paper can be applied, in varying degrees, to every organization within health systems, from families and communities to national ministries of health. While our categorization is necessarily incomplete, this initial effort will provide a valuable contribution to the health systems strengthening debate, as the need for a more systemic, rigorous perspective in health has never been greater.

  4. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  5. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  6. Strengthening the Security of ESA Ground Data Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Flentge, Felix; Eggleston, James; Garcia Mateos, Marc

    2013-08-01

    A common approach to address information security has been implemented in ESA's Mission Operations (MOI) Infrastructure during the last years. This paper reports on the specific challenges to the Data Systems domain within the MOI and how security can be properly managed with an Information Security Management System (ISMS) according to ISO 27001. Results of an initial security risk assessment are reported and the different types of security controls that are being implemented in order to reduce the risks are briefly described.

  7. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  8. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  9. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  10. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  11. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  12. Strengthening the regulatory system through the implementation and use of a quality management system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Reinhold Eisner

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available ABSTRACT Quality management systems (QMS, based on ISO 9001 requirements, are applicable to government service organizations such as Health Canada’s Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD. This communication presents the process that the BGTD followed since the early 2000s to implement a quality management system and describes how the regulatory system was improved as a result of this project. BGTD undertook the implementation of a quality management system based on ISO 9001 and containing aspects of ISO 17025 with the goal of strengthening the regulatory system through improvements in the people, processes, and services of the organization. We discuss the strategy used by BGTD to implement the QMS and the benefits that were realized from the various stages of implementation. The eight quality principals upon which the QMS standards of the ISO 9000 series are based were used by senior management as a framework to guide QMS implementation.

  13. Strengthening laboratory systems in resource-limited settings.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Olmsted, Stuart S; Moore, Melinda; Meili, Robin C; Duber, Herbert C; Wasserman, Jeffrey; Sama, Preethi; Mundell, Ben; Hilborne, Lee H

    2010-09-01

    Considerable resources have been invested in recent years to improve laboratory systems in resource-limited settings. We reviewed published reports, interviewed major donor organizations, and conducted case studies of laboratory systems in 3 countries to assess how countries and donors have worked together to improve laboratory services. While infrastructure and the provision of services have seen improvement, important opportunities remain for further advancement. Implementation of national laboratory plans is inconsistent, human resources are limited, and quality laboratory services rarely extend to lower tier laboratories (eg, health clinics, district hospitals). Coordination within, between, and among governments and donor organizations is also frequently problematic. Laboratory standardization and quality control are improving but remain challenging, making accreditation a difficult goal. Host country governments and their external funding partners should coordinate their efforts effectively around a host country's own national laboratory plan to advance sustainable capacity development throughout a country's laboratory system.

  14. Health system strengthening and hypertension management in China.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Kehui; Song, Yu Ting; He, Yong Huan; Feng, Xing Lin

    2016-01-01

    Non-communicable diseases are the leading causes of global burden of diseases, and hypertension is one of the most important risk factors. Hypertension prevalence doubled in China in the past decade and affects more than 300 million Chinese people. In the review we systematically searched peer-reviewed publications that link health system level factors with hypertension management in China and provide the current knowledge on how to improve a country's health system to manage the hypertension epidemic. A framework was developed to guide the review. The database of PubMed, CNKI were systematically searched from inception to April 13, 2016. Two authors independently screened the searched results for inclusion, conducted data extraction and appraised the quality of studies. Key findings were described according to the framework. Five hundred seventy-two publications were identified, where 11 articles were left according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The study periods range from 2010 to 2015. All about 11 researches linked health system factors to the outcome of hypertension management. And the outcomes were just focused on the awareness, treatment and control of hypertension but not hypertension incidence. One study is about the role of health system governance, investigating the performance of different organized community health care centers; three studies were about health financing comparing differences in insurance coverage; three studies were about health information practicing the hypertension guidelines of China or the WHO, and the rest three about mechanisms of health service delivery. No researches were identified about physical resources for health and human resources for health. Hypertension prevalence has been rising rapidly in China and the management of hypertension in China is a detection problem rather than treatment problem. Limited evidence shows the positive effect of health system factors on hypertension management and joint efforts

  15. Reverse innovation: an opportunity for strengthening health systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Snowdon, Anne W; Bassi, Harpreet; Scarffe, Andrew D; Smith, Alexander D

    2015-02-07

    Canada, when compared to other OECD countries, ranks poorly with respect to innovation and innovation adoption while struggling with increasing health system costs. As a result of its failure to innovate, the Canadian health system will struggle to meet the needs and demands of both current and future populations. The purpose of this initiative was to explore if a competition-based reverse innovation challenge could mobilize and stimulate current and future leaders to identify and lead potential reverse innovation projects that address health system challenges in Canada. An open call for applications took place over a 4-month period. Applicants were enticed to submit to the competition with a $50,000 prize for the top submission to finance their project. Leaders from a wide cross-section of sectors collectively developed evaluation criteria and graded the submissions. The criteria evaluated: proof of concept, potential value, financial impact, feasibility, and scalability as well as the use of prize money and innovation team. The competition received 12 submissions from across Canada that identified potential reverse innovations from 18 unique geographical locations that were considered developing and/or emerging markets. The various submissions addressed health system challenges relating to education, mobile health, aboriginal health, immigrant health, seniors health and women's health and wellness. Of the original 12 submissions, 5 finalists were chosen and publically profiled, and 1 was chosen to receive the top prize. The results of this initiative demonstrate that a competition that is targeted to reverse innovation does have the potential to mobilize and stimulate leaders to identify reverse innovations that have the potential for system level impact. The competition also provided important insights into the capacity of Canadian students, health care providers, entrepreneurs, and innovators to propose and implement reverse innovation in the context of the

  16. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  17. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    substantially large. Change in social, economic, environmental and other scenarios might demand recovery of nuclear and other material from the repository sometime in the future. To this end, the Department of Safeguards has developed a policy paper to guide the planner, designer and operator to incorporate safeguards related features, as appropriate. In parallel, a programme for the Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was launched to foster technological advancement. The mission of SAGOR has been to ensure that the safeguards systems developed for the final disposal of spent fuel effectively meet the objectives of IAEA safeguards, optimise IAEA resources, and make best use of existing technologies while still meeting the requirements for safety and environmental protection. (author)

  18. Strengthening Procurement Systems in Latin America and the ...

    International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library (Canada)

    ... and the development of MSMEs and electronic commerce. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are key to modernizing public administration systems in general and public procurement in particular. In 2002, national government procurement bodies established the Inter-American Network for Government ...

  19. Full Scale Reinforced Concrete Beam-Column Joints Strengthened with Steel Reinforced Polymer Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alessandro De Vita

    2017-07-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents the results of an experimental campaign performed at the Laboratory of Materials and Structural Testing of the University of Salerno (Italy in order to investigate the seismic performance of reinforced concrete (RC beam-column joints strengthened with steel reinforced polymer (SRP systems. With the aim to represent typical façade frames’ beam-column subassemblies found in existing RC buildings, specimens were provided with two short beam stubs orthogonal to the main beam and were designed with inadequate seismic details. Five members were strengthened by using two different SRP layouts while the remaining ones were used as benchmarks. Once damaged, two specimens were also repaired, retrofitted with SRP, and subjected to cyclic test again. The results of cyclic tests performed on SRP strengthened joints are examined through a comparison with the outcomes of the previous experimental program including companion specimens not provided with transverse beam stubs and strengthened by carbon fiber-reinforced polymer (CFRP systems. In particular, both qualitative and quantitative considerations about the influence of the confining effect provided by the secondary beams on the joint response, the suitability of all the adopted strengthening solutions (SRP/CFRP systems, the performances and the failure modes experienced in the several cases studied are provided.

  20. Full Scale RC Beam-Column Joints Strengthened with Steel Reinforced Polymer Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Vita, Alessandro; Napoli, Annalisa; Realfonzo, Roberto

    2017-07-01

    This paper presents the results of an experimental campaign performed at the Laboratory of Materials and Structural Testing of the University of Salerno (Italy) in order to investigate the seismic performance of RC beam-column joints strengthened with Steel Reinforced Polymer (SRP) systems. With the aim to represent typical façade frames’ beam-column subassemblies found in existing RC buildings, specimens were provided with two short beam stubs orthogonal to the main beam and were designed with inadequate seismic details. Five members were strengthened by using two different SRP layouts while the remaining ones were used as benchmarks. Once damaged, two specimens were also repaired, retrofitted with SRP and subjected to cyclic test again. The results of cyclic tests performed on SRP strengthened joints are examined through a comparison with the outcomes of the previous experimental program including companion specimens not provided with transverse beam stubs and strengthened by Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) systems. In particular, both qualitative and quantitative considerations about the influence of the confining effect provided by the secondary beams on the joint response, the suitability of all the adopted strengthening solutions (SRP/CFRP systems), the performances and the failure modes experienced in the several cases studied are provided.

  1. An integrated chronic disease management model: a diagonal approach to health system strengthening in South Africa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mahomed, Ozayr Haroon; Asmall, Shaidah; Freeman, Melvyn

    2014-11-01

    The integrated chronic disease management model provides a systematic framework for creating a fundamental change in the orientation of the health system. This model adopts a diagonal approach to health system strengthening by establishing a service-linked base to training, supervision, and the opportunity to try out, assess, and implement integrated interventions.

  2. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-01-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework

  3. Active Time-Domain Reflectometry for Unattended Safeguards Systems FY15 Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Smith, Leon E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Moore, David E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sheen, David M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Conrad, Ryan C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gavric, Gordan [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-09-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s FY15 progress in the viability study including: an overview of the TDR methods under investigation; description of the testing configurations and mock tampering scenarios; results from a preliminary sensitivity comparison of the two TDR methods; demonstration of a quantitative metric for estimating field performance that acknowledges the need for high detection probability while minimizing false alarms. FY15 progress reported here sets the stage for a rigorous comparison of the candidate TDR methods, over a range of deployment scenarios and perturbing effects typical of IAEA unattended monitoring systems.

  4. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  5. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

    2010-10-01

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  6. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  7. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  8. Complementarities Between Nuclear Security, Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear security deals with prevention against theft and diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage against nuclear materials or installations. It is based on provisions of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities complemented by: - Provisions for accounting for and control to prevent and, where appropriate, detect loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials; - The nuclear safety provisions to protect nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. Safeguards are based on the statements and accounting controls in the facilities. The respective aim of EURATOM and IAEA controls is to verify afterwards the respect for the declared use of materials or political commitments undertaken by States under the non-proliferation purpose. However, EURATOM and IAEA controls are not exercised at all facilities (including those working for defence purposes) or in respect of all nuclear materials subject to the French national control. In addition, these international safeguards do not deal with physical protection of nuclear materials which is the sole responsibility of the State. The state control, implemented in France, is positioned upstream to the international controls. It aims to prevent, deter and detect the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials in installations or during transport. It places the responsibility of a possible diversion at the operator level. It is made of different components that complement each other and form a coherent whole. This includes: - physical protection; - accounting for and control; - inspections. The physical protection system has to protect nuclear materials against a malicious act. Malicious act means a theft or diversion of nuclear material or an act of sabotage affecting nuclear materials or facilities which could lead to radiological releases into the environment. The accounting for and control system of nuclear materials has to allow the continuous and accurate knowledge of the quantity, quality and location

  9. Application of the Controllable Unit Approach (CUA) to analyzing safeguards measurement systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seabaugh, P.W.; Rogers, D.R.; Woltermann, H.A.; Fushimi, F.C.; Ciramella, A.F.

    1978-01-01

    CUA is a material control and accountability methodology that takes into account the system logic and statistical characteristics of a plant process through the formulation of closure equations. The study evaluated CUA methodology to meet performance oriented regulations. The criterion is defined as the detection of a material loss of two kilograms of SNM with 97.5% confidence. Specifically investigated were the timeliness of detection, the ability to localize material loss, process coverage, cost/benefits, and compatibility with other safeguards techniques such as diversion path analysis and data filtering. The feasibility of performance-oriented regulations is demonstrated. To fully use the system of closure equations, a procedure was developed to formally integrate the effect of both short-term and long-term closure equations into an overall systems criterion of performance. Both single and multiple diversion strategies are examined in order to show how the CUA method can protect against either strategy. Quantitative results show that combined closure equations improve the detection sensitivity to material loss, and that multiple diversions provide only diminishing returns

  10. An approach to health system strengthening in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grundy, John; Moodie, Rob

    2009-01-01

    The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), undertook the development of a Health System Strengthening (HSS) proposal through the support of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The aim of this paper is to outline the approach to the development of the HSS strategy in DPRK, and describe opportunities and challenges associated with its development and future implementation. Sources of information for this review have included national programme plans, in country social sector reviews, information generated through HSS proposal developments and the international literature. Updated assessments in DPRK indicate some recent improvements in the health situation for women and children, but there remain ongoing concerns regarding health management, human resource and physical infrastructure barriers to health services access. In response to this situation, the DPRK developed a health system strengthening strategy, the main elements of which are the strengthening of health management and service delivery systems at the implementing agency levels of county (district) and Ri (sub district). Three success factors were associated with the reaching of consensus on HSS strategy in DPRK. These were partnerships formed between system planners and programme planners, the identification of an overall health sector strategic framework, and high-level leadership of the MOPH. Although DPRK is in the very early stages of health system reconstruction, there are significant and new opportunities to alleviate the health conditions of women and children in DPRK, through implementation of health system strengthening strategies that are nationally coordinated and internationally supported.

  11. Strengthening flood warning systems: the benefits of encouraging social preparedness

    Science.gov (United States)

    Girons Lopez, Marc; Di Baldassarre, Giuliano; Seibert, Jan

    2017-04-01

    Flood warning and response have normally been focused on the technical aspects and disregarded the connections and feedbacks between the hydrological and social dimensions. An increasing body of research, however, points at the importance of considering socio-hydrological aspects to improve flood damage mitigation. One of the key factors is the preparedness of the public and first responders during flood situations, which is influenced by many behavioural traits such as perceived benefits, risk awareness, or denial. In this study, we investigate the impact of social preparedness on the efficiency of flood early warning systems by using the recency of flood experience as a proxy for social preparedness. To this end, we developed a stylised model and a synthetic data-set to perform a hypothetical analysis. The main findings point to the importance of social preparedness for flood loss mitigation, especially when the technical forecasting and warning capabilities are limited. More specifically, efforts to promote and preserve social preparedness may help to reduce disaster-induced losses by almost one half. The findings from this study provide insights into the importance of considering social preparedness in decision-making for disaster risk reduction.

  12. Global health initiative investments and health systems strengthening: a content analysis of global fund investments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warren, Ashley E; Wyss, Kaspar; Shakarishvili, George; Atun, Rifat; de Savigny, Don

    2013-07-26

    Millions of dollars are invested annually under the umbrella of national health systems strengthening. Global health initiatives provide funding for low- and middle-income countries through disease-oriented programmes while maintaining that the interventions simultaneously strengthen systems. However, it is as yet unclear which, and to what extent, system-level interventions are being funded by these initiatives, nor is it clear how much funding they allocate to disease-specific activities - through conventional 'vertical-programming' approach. Such funding can be channelled to one or more of the health system building blocks while targeting disease(s) or explicitly to system-wide activities. We operationalized the World Health Organization health system framework of the six building blocks to conduct a detailed assessment of Global Fund health system investments. Our application of this framework framework provides a comprehensive quantification of system-level interventions. We applied this systematically to a random subset of 52 of the 139 grants funded in Round 8 of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (totalling approximately US$1 billion). According to the analysis, 37% (US$ 362 million) of the Global Fund Round 8 funding was allocated to health systems strengthening. Of that, 38% (US$ 139 million) was for generic system-level interventions, rather than disease-specific system support. Around 82% of health systems strengthening funding (US$ 296 million) was allocated to service delivery, human resources, and medicines & technology, and within each of these to two to three interventions. Governance, financing, and information building blocks received relatively low funding. This study shows that a substantial portion of Global Fund's Round 8 funds was devoted to health systems strengthening. Dramatic skewing among the health system building blocks suggests opportunities for more balanced investments with regard to governance, financing, and

  13. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  14. Self-monitoring fiber reinforced polymer strengthening system for civil engineering infrastructures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jiang, Guoliang; Dawood, Mina; Peters, Kara; Rizkalla, Sami

    2008-03-01

    Fiber reinforced polymer (FRP) materials are currently used for strengthening civil engineering infrastructures. The strengthening system is dependant on the bond characteristics of the FRP to the external surface of the structure to be effective in resisting the applied loads. This paper presents an innovative self-monitoring FRP strengthening system. The system consists of two components which can be embedded in FRP materials to monitor the global and local behavior of the strengthened structure respectively. The first component of the system is designed to evaluate the applied load acting on a structure based on elongation of the FRP layer along the entire span of the structure. Success of the global system has been demonstrated using a full-scale prestressed concrete bridge girder which was loaded up to failure. The test results indicate that this type of sensor can be used to accurately determine the load prior to failure within 15 percent of the measured value. The second sensor component consists of fiber Bragg grating sensors. The sensors were used to monitor the behavior of steel double-lap shear splices tested under tensile loading up to failure. The measurements were used to identify abnormal structural behavior such as epoxy cracking and FRP debonding. Test results were also compared to numerical values obtained from a three dimensional shear-lag model which was developed to predict the sensor response.

  15. Scaling up antiretroviral therapy in Uganda: using supply chain management to appraise health systems strengthening.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Windisch, Ricarda; Waiswa, Peter; Neuhann, Florian; Scheibe, Florian; de Savigny, Don

    2011-08-01

    Strengthened national health systems are necessary for effective and sustained expansion of antiretroviral therapy (ART). ART and its supply chain management in Uganda are largely based on parallel and externally supported efforts. The question arises whether systems are being strengthened to sustain access to ART. This study applies systems thinking to assess supply chain management, the role of external support and whether investments create the needed synergies to strengthen health systems. This study uses the WHO health systems framework and examines the issues of governance, financing, information, human resources and service delivery in relation to supply chain management of medicines and the technologies. It looks at links and causal chains between supply chain management for ART and the national supply system for essential drugs. It combines data from the literature and key informant interviews with observations at health service delivery level in a study district. Current drug supply chain management in Uganda is characterized by parallel processes and information systems that result in poor quality and inefficiencies. Less than expected health system performance, stock outs and other shortages affect ART and primary care in general. Poor performance of supply chain management is amplified by weak conditions at all levels of the health system, including the areas of financing, governance, human resources and information. Governance issues include the lack to follow up initial policy intentions and a focus on narrow, short-term approaches. The opportunity and need to use ART investments for an essential supply chain management and strengthened health system has not been exploited. By applying a systems perspective this work indicates the seriousness of missing system prerequisites. The findings suggest that root causes and capacities across the system have to be addressed synergistically to enable systems that can match and accommodate investments in

  16. 3D FE Analysis of RC Beams Externally Strengthened with SRG/SRP Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Francesco Bencardino

    2016-05-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this study is to evaluate, through a nonlinear Finite Element (FE analysis, the structural behavior of Reinforced Concrete (RC beams externally strengthened by using Steel Reinforced Grout (SRG and Steel Reinforced Polymer (SRP systems. The parameters taken into account were the external strengthening configuration, with or without U-wrap end anchorages, as well as the strengthening materials. The numerical simulations were carried out by using a three-dimensional (3D FE model. The linear and nonlinear behavior of all materials was modeled by appropriate constitutive laws and the connection between concrete substrate and external reinforcing layer was simulated by means of cohesive surfaces with appropriate bond-slip laws. In order to overcome convergence difficulties, to simulate the quasi-static response of the strengthened RC beams, a dynamic approach was adopted. The numerical results in terms of load-displacement curves, failure modes, and load and strain values at critical stages were validated against some experimental data. As a result, the proposed 3D FE model can be used to predict the structural behavior up to ultimate stage of similar strengthened beams without carrying out experimental tests.

  17. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  18. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  19. All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

    2010-01-01

    All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

  20. Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2017-02-07

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

  1. Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

    2002-01-01

    At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements

  2. Strengthening financial management, providing financial safeguard mechanism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Wumei

    2010-01-01

    This article reviewed the history of Zhong He Shanxi Uranium Enrichment Company, summarizing an efficient and systematical financial management method during both construction period and operational period of the company. It related to fundamental financial management structure building, integrated budgeting, fund management, cost management, asset management, tax planning and HR management. of financial staffs. (author)

  3. Evaluation of a health system strengthening initiative in the Zambian prison system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sharma, Anjali; Moonga, Clement N; Chileshe, Chisele; Magwende, George; Henostroza, German

    2018-01-01

    Introduction In 2013, the Zambian Correctional Service (ZCS) partnered with the Centre for Infectious Disease Research in Zambia on the Zambian Prisons Health System Strengthening project, seeking to tackle structural, organisational and cultural weaknesses within the prison health system. We present findings from a nested evaluation of the project impact on high, mid-level and facility-level health governance and health service arrangements in the Zambian Correctional Service. Methods Mixed methods were used, including document review, indepth interviews with ministry (11) and prison facility (6) officials, focus group discussions (12) with male and female inmates in six of the eleven intervention prisons, and participant observation during project workshops and meetings. Ethical clearance and verbal informed consent were obtained for all activities. Analysis incorporated deductive and iterative inductive coding. Results Outcomes: Improved knowledge of the prison health system strengthened political and bureaucratic will to materially address prison health needs. This found expression in a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Community Development, and in the appointment of a permanent liaison between MOH and ZCS. Capacity-building workshops for ZCS Command resulted in strengthened health planning and management outcomes, including doubling ZCS health professional workforce (from 37 to78 between 2014 and 2016), new preservice basic health training for incoming ZCS officers and formation of facility-based prison health committees with a mandate for health promotion and protection. Mechanisms: continuous and facilitated communication among major stakeholders and the emergence of interorganisational trust were critical. Enabling contextual factors included a permissive political environment, a shift within ZCS from a ‘punitive’ to ‘correctional’ organisational culture, and

  4. Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leffer, T.N.

    2013-01-01

    The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

  5. VISA: a method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, H.; Fullwood, R.; Glancy, J.

    1977-06-01

    This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3

  6. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  7. A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

  8. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  9. The role of health system governance in strengthening the rural health insurance system in China.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuan, Beibei; Jian, Weiyan; He, Li; Wang, Bingyu; Balabanova, Dina

    2017-05-23

    Systems of governance play a key role in the operation and performance of health systems. In the past six decades, China has made great advances in strengthening its health system, most notably in establishing a health insurance system that enables residents of rural areas to achieve access to essential services. Although there have been several studies of rural health insurance schemes, these have focused on coverage and service utilization, while much less attention has been given to the role of governance in designing and implementing these schemes. Information from publications and policy documents relevant to the development of two rural health insurance policies in China was obtained, analysed, and synthesise. 92 documents on CMS (Cooperative Medical Scheme) or NCMS (New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme) from four databases searched were included. Data extraction and synthesis of the information were guided by a framework that drew on that developed by the WHO to describe health system governance and leadership. We identified a series of governance practices that were supportive of progress, including the prioritisation by the central government of health system development and certain health policies within overall national development; strong government commitment combined with a hierarchal administrative system; clear policy goals coupled with the ability for local government to adopt policy measures that take account of local conditions; and the accumulation and use of the evidence generated from local practices. However these good practices were not seen in all governance domains. For example, poor collaboration between different government departments was shown to be a considerable challenge that undermined the operation of the insurance schemes. China's success in achieving scale up of CMS and NCMS has attracted considerable interest in many low and middle income countries (LMICs), especially with regard to the schemes' designs, coverage, and funding

  10. Estimating the behavior of RC beams strengthened with NSM system using artificial neural networks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Seyed Rohollah Hosseini Vaez

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available In the last decade, conventional materials such as steel and concrete are being replaced by fiber reinforced polymer (FRP materials for the strengthening of concrete structures. Among the strengthening techniques based on Fiber Reinforced Polymer composites, the use of near-surface mounted (NSM FRP rods is emerging as a promising technology for increasing flexural and shear strength of deficient concrete, masonry and timber members. An artificial neural network is an information processing tool that is inspired by the way biological nervous systems (such as the brain process the information. The key element of this tool is the novel structure of the information processing system. In engineering applications, a neural network can be a vector mapper which maps an input vector to an output one. In the present study, a new approach is developed to predict the behavior of strengthened concrete beam using a large number of experimental data by applying artificial neural networks. Having parameters used as input nodes in ANN modeling such as elastic modulus of the FRP reinforcement, the ratio of the steel longitudinal reinforcement, dimensions of the beam section, the ratio of the NSM-FRP reinforcement and characteristics of concrete, the output node was the flexural strength of beams. The idealized neural network was employed to generate empirical charts and equations to be used in design. The aim of this study is to investigate the behavior of strengthened RC beam using artificial neural networks.

  11. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-01-01

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  12. Strengthening the Global Refugee Protection System: Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kevin Appleby

    2017-12-01

    • the adoption of coherent strategies, involving all sectors, to address large movements of refugees. This paper draws heavily, albeit not exclusively, from a series of papers published as a special collection in the Journal on Migration and Human Security[1] on strengthening the global system of refugee protection. [1] Rethinking the Global Refugee Protection System, Journal on Migration and Human Security, Center for Migration Studies, 2016-2017. See http://cmsny.org/cms_research/refugeeproject/.

  13. Review of effectiveness-evaluation methodologies for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dowdy, E.J.; Mangan, D.L.

    1982-06-01

    We discuss the factors that influence the effectiveness of safeguards and security measures and the characteristics required of effectiveness evaluation methodologies. Within this context and from a utility standpoint, we review those effectiveness evaluation methodologies that have been developed. Our principal recommendation concerns the application and concomitant validation of existing methodologies. This recommendation derives from our conclusion that there has been a gross imbalance between the effort spent on methodology development and the application of those methodologies. Only for those safeguards measures that do not seem to be covered by existing methodologies or that seem to be inadequately covered do we suggest development. 44 references

  14. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  15. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  16. Strengthening systems for integrated early childhood development services: a cross-national analysis of governance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Britto, Pia Rebello; Yoshikawa, Hirokazu; van Ravens, Jan; Ponguta, Liliana Angelica; Reyes, Maria; Oh, Soojin; Dimaya, Roland; Nieto, Ana María; Seder, Richard

    2014-01-01

    While there has been substantial growth in early childhood development (ECD) services in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), there is considerable inequity in their distribution and quality. Evidence-based governance strategies are necessary, but currently they are insufficient for widespread, quality implementation. In particular, there is a limited understanding of the use of systems approaches for the analysis of ECD services as they go to scale. The aim of this paper is to present findings from four countries, using a cross-national case study approach to explore governance mechanisms required to strengthen national systems of ECD services. While different sets of governance strategies and challenges were identified in each country, overarching themes also emerged with implications for systems strengthening. Study results focus on local, mid-level and central governance, with recommendations for effective coordination and the integration of ECD services in LMICs. © 2014 New York Academy of Sciences.

  17. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  18. Contribution of the Japan International Cooperation Agency health-related projects to health system strengthening.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuasa, Motoyuki; Yamaguchi, Yoshie; Imada, Mihoko

    2013-09-22

    The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has focused its attention on appraising health development assistance projects and redirecting efforts towards health system strengthening. This study aimed to describe the type of project and targets of interest, and assess the contribution of JICA health-related projects to strengthening health systems worldwide. We collected a web-based Project Design Matrix (PDM) of 105 JICA projects implemented between January 2005 and December 2009. We developed an analytical matrix based on the World Health Organization (WHO) health system framework to examine the PDM data and thereby assess the projects' contributions to health system strengthening. The majority of JICA projects had prioritized workforce development, and improvements in governance and service delivery. Conversely, there was little assistance for finance or medical product development. The vast majority (87.6%) of JICA projects addressed public health issues, for example programs to improve maternal and child health, and the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Nearly 90% of JICA technical healthcare assistance directly focused on improving governance as the most critical means of accomplishing its goals. Our study confirmed that JICA projects met the goals of bilateral cooperation by developing workforce capacity and governance. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that JICA assistance could be used to support financial aspects of healthcare systems, which is an area of increasing concern. We also showed that the analytical matrix methodology is an effective means of examining the component of health system strengthening to which the activity and output of a project contributes. This may help policy makers and practitioners focus future projects on priority areas.

  19. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  20. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  1. Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

    2001-01-01

    Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

  2. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  3. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  4. Public Health Perspectives of Preeclampsia in Developing Countries: Implication for Health System Strengthening

    OpenAIRE

    Kayode O. Osungbade; Olusimbo K. Ige

    2011-01-01

    Objectives. Review of public health perspectives of preeclampsia in developing countries and implications for health system strengthening. Methods. Literature from Pubmed (MEDLINE), AJOL, Google Scholar, and Cochrane database were reviewed. Results. The prevalence of preeclampsia in developing countries ranges from 1.8% to 16.7%. Many challenges exist in the prediction, prevention, and management of preeclampsia. Promising prophylactic measures like low-dose aspirin and calcium supplem...

  5. Strengthening Laboratory Capacity for Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) in Indonesia

    OpenAIRE

    Kandel, Nirmal; Hapsari, Ratna Budi; Riana, Dyah Armi; Setiawaty, Vivi; Larasati, Wita; Wulandari, Endang; Purwanto, Edy

    2017-01-01

    Background: Establishment of Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) in Indonesia was initiated since 2009 in few selected provinces and government was planning to roll out in other provinces. Before initiating this roll out the assessment of performance of EWARS in 2012 was conducted. The aim of the assessment is to strengthen laboratory for supporting to EWARS for alerts testing. Methods: Laboratory capacity mapping tool and laboratory algorithm for twenty two priority diseases of ...

  6. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  7. Scaling up antiretroviral therapy in Uganda: using supply chain management to appraise health systems strengthening

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Neuhann Florian

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Strengthened national health systems are necessary for effective and sustained expansion of antiretroviral therapy (ART. ART and its supply chain management in Uganda are largely based on parallel and externally supported efforts. The question arises whether systems are being strengthened to sustain access to ART. This study applies systems thinking to assess supply chain management, the role of external support and whether investments create the needed synergies to strengthen health systems. Methods This study uses the WHO health systems framework and examines the issues of governance, financing, information, human resources and service delivery in relation to supply chain management of medicines and the technologies. It looks at links and causal chains between supply chain management for ART and the national supply system for essential drugs. It combines data from the literature and key informant interviews with observations at health service delivery level in a study district. Results Current drug supply chain management in Uganda is characterized by parallel processes and information systems that result in poor quality and inefficiencies. Less than expected health system performance, stock outs and other shortages affect ART and primary care in general. Poor performance of supply chain management is amplified by weak conditions at all levels of the health system, including the areas of financing, governance, human resources and information. Governance issues include the lack to follow up initial policy intentions and a focus on narrow, short-term approaches. Conclusion The opportunity and need to use ART investments for an essential supply chain management and strengthened health system has not been exploited. By applying a systems perspective this work indicates the seriousness of missing system prerequisites. The findings suggest that root causes and capacities across the system have to be addressed synergistically to

  8. Flexural Strengthening of RC Slabs with Prestressed CFRP Strips Using Different Anchorage Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    José Sena-Cruz

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available Externally Bonded Reinforcement (EBR technique has been widely used for flexural strengthening of concrete structures by using carbon fiber-reinforced polymers (CFRP. EBR technique offers several structural advantages when the CFRP material is prestressed. This paper presents an experimental and numerical study on reinforced (RC slabs strengthened in flexure with prestressed CFRP strips as a structural strengthening system. The strips are applied as an externally bonded reinforcement (EBR and anchored with either a mechanical or a gradient anchorage. The former foresees metallic anchorage plates fixed to the concrete substrate, while the latter is based on an accelerated epoxy resin curing followed by a segment-wise prestress force decrease at the strip ends. Both anchorage systems, in combination with different CFRP strip geometries, were subjected to static loading tests. It could be demonstrated that the composite strip’s performance is better exploited when prestressing is used, with slightly higher overall load carrying capacities for mechanical anchorages than for the gradient anchorage. The performed investigations by means of a cross-section analysis supported the experimental observation that in case a mechanical anchorage is used, progressive strip debonding changes the fully bonded configuration to an unbonded end-anchored system. The inclusion of defined debonding criteria for both the anchorage zones and free length between the anchorage regions allowed to precisely capture the ultimate loading forces.

  9. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  10. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  11. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  12. Laboratory equipment maintenance: a critical bottleneck for strengthening health systems in sub-Saharan Africa?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fonjungo, Peter N; Kebede, Yenew; Messele, Tsehaynesh; Ayana, Gonfa; Tibesso, Gudeta; Abebe, Almaz; Nkengasong, John N; Kenyon, Thomas

    2012-02-01

    Properly functioning laboratory equipment is a critical component for strengthening health systems in developing countries. The laboratory can be an entry point to improve population health and care of individuals for targeted diseases - prevention, care, and treatment of TB, HIV/AIDS, and malaria, plus maternal and neonatal health - as well as those lacking specific attention and funding. We review the benefits and persistent challenges associated with sustaining laboratory equipment maintenance. We propose equipment management policies as well as a comprehensive equipment maintenance strategy that would involve equipment manufacturers and strengthen local capacity through pre-service training of biomedical engineers. Strong country leadership and commitment are needed to assure development and sustained implementation of policies and strategies for standardization of equipment, and regulation of its procurement, donation, disposal, and replacement.

  13. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  14. Management Matters: A Leverage Point for Health Systems Strengthening in Global Health

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elizabeth H. Bradley

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available Despite a renewed focus in the field of global health on strengthening health systems, inadequate attention has been directed to a key ingredient of high-performing health systems: management. We aimed to develop the argument that management – defined here as the process of achieving predetermined objectives through human, financial, and technical resources – is a cross-cutting function necessary for success in all World Health Organization (WHO building blocks of health systems strengthening. Management within health systems is particularly critical in low-income settings where the efficient use of scarce resources is paramount to attaining health goals. More generally, investments in management capacity may be viewed as a key leverage point in grand strategy, as strong management enables the achievement of large ends with limited means. We also sought to delineate a set of core competencies and identify key roles to be targeted for management capacity building efforts. Several effective examples of management interventions have been described in the research literature. Together, the existing evidence underscores the importance of country ownership of management capacity building efforts, which often challenge the status quo and thus need country leadership to sustain despite inevitable friction. The literature also recognizes that management capacity efforts, as a key ingredient of effective systems change, take time to embed, as new protocols and ways of working become habitual and integrated as standard operating procedures. Despite these challenges, the field of health management as part of global health system strengthening efforts holds promise as a fundamental leverage point for achieving health system performance goals with existing human, technical, and financial resources. The evidence base consistently supports the role of management in performance improvement but would benefit from additional research with improved

  15. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

    2002-09-01

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  16. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  17. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  18. Flexural Strengthening of RC Slabs Using a Hybrid FRP-UHPC System Including Shear Connector

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jiho Moon

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available A polymeric hybrid composite system made of UHPC and CFRP was proposed as a retrofit system to enhance flexural strength and ductility of RC slabs. While the effectiveness of the proposed system was confirmed previously through testing three full-scale one-way slabs having two continuous spans, the slabs retrofitted with the hybrid system failed in shear. This sudden shear failure would stem from the excessive enhancement of the flexural strength over the shear strength. In this study, shear connectors were installed between the hybrid system and a RC slab. Using simple beam, only positive moment section was examined. Two full-scale RC slabs were cast and tested to failure: the first as a control and the second using this new strengthening technique. The proposed strengthening system increased the ultimate load carrying capacity of the slab by 70%, the stiffness by 60%, and toughness by 128%. The efficiency of shear connectors on ductile behavior of the retrofitted slab was also confirmed. After the UHPC top is separated from the slab, the shear connector transfer shear load and the slab system were in force equilibrium by compression in UHPC and tension in CFRP.

  19. J. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

  20. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1991-01-01

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  1. Comparison between TRM and FRP strengthening systems at preventing buckling failure of brick masonry walls

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bernat-Maso, E.

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Fibre Reinforced Polymer (FRP and Textile Reinforced Mortar (TRM have been studied, compared and applied to strengthen brick masonry walls. The comparison of their performance against second order bending effects is addressed in this paper for the first time. Experimental and analytical data from previous researches and new analytical data for TRM cases are summarised, ordered and systematically compared to analyse the structural response of strengthened brick masonry walls. The results show a similar performance for both systems in terms of load bearing capacity and in-plane response. However, TRM strengthened cases showed greater lateral deformation than FRP ones.Materiales tipo Fibre Reinforced Polymer (FRP y Textile Reinforced Mortar (TRM han sido estudiados, comparados y aplicados para reforzar muros de fábrica de ladrillo. La comparación de su comportamiento frente a efectos de flexión de segundo orden se abordada en este artículo por primera vez. Datos experimentales y analíticos de investigaciones previas y nuevos datos analíticos para los casos de TRM son resumidos, ordenados y sistemáticamente comparados para analizar la respuesta estructural de los muros de fábrica de ladrillo reforzados. Los resultados muestran un comportamiento similar de los dos sistemas respecto su capacidad de carga y su respuesta en el plano. Los casos reforzados con TRM mostraron desplazamientos laterales superiores a los reforzados con FRP.

  2. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  3. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  4. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  5. Health information system strengthening and malaria elimination in Papua New Guinea.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rosewell, Alexander; Makita, Leo; Muscatello, David; John, Lucy Ninmongo; Bieb, Sibauk; Hutton, Ross; Ramamurthy, Sundar; Shearman, Phil

    2017-07-05

    The objective of the study was to describe an m-health initiative to strengthen malaria surveillance in a 184-health facility, multi-province, project aimed at strengthening the National Health Information System (NHIS) in a country with fragmented malaria surveillance, striving towards enhanced control, pre-elimination. A remote-loading mobile application and secure online platform for health professionals was created to interface with the new system (eNHIS). A case-based malaria testing register was developed and integrated geo-coded households, villages and health facilities. A malaria programme management dashboard was created, with village-level malaria mapping tools, and statistical algorithms to identify malaria outbreaks. Since its inception in 2015, 160,750 malaria testing records, including village of residence, have been reported to the eNHIS. These case-based, geo-coded malaria data are 100% complete, with a median data entry delay of 9 days from the date of testing. The system maps malaria to the village level in near real-time as well as the availability of treatment and diagnostics to health facility level. Data aggregation, analysis, outbreak detection, and reporting are automated. The study demonstrates that using mobile technologies and GIS in the capture and reporting of NHIS data in Papua New Guinea provides timely, high quality, geo-coded, case-based malaria data required for malaria elimination. The health systems strengthening approach of integrating malaria information management into the eNHIS optimizes sustainability and provides enormous flexibility to cater for future malaria programme needs.

  6. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The 1990s saw significant non-proliferation related developments in the world, resulting in a new period of safeguards development. Over several years an assessment was made of how to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In May 1997 this culminated in the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements which significantly broadens the role of IAEA safeguards. As a consequence, the IAEA safeguards system entered a new era. In 1997 the IAEA began to publish a new series of booklets on safeguards, called the International Nuclear Verification Series (NVS). The objective of these booklets was to help in explaining IAEA safeguards, especially the new developments in safeguards, particularly for facility operators and government officers involved with these topics. The current booklet, which is a revision and update of IAEA/NVS/1, is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. A completely new section on data security has been added to describe the specific features that are included in installed equipment systems in order to ensure the authenticity and confidentiality of information. As new verification measures continue to be developed the material in this booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. The basic verification measure used by the IAEA is nuclear material accountancy. In applying nuclear material accountancy, IAEA safeguards inspectors make independent measurements to verify quantitatively the amount of nuclear material presented in the State's accounts. For this purpose, inspectors count items (e.g. fuel assemblies, bundles or rods, or containers of powdered compounds of uranium or plutonium) and measure attributes of these items during their inspections using non

  7. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  8. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  9. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

  10. Strengthening global health security by embedding the International Health Regulations requirements into national health systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kluge, Hans; Martín-Moreno, Jose Maria; Emiroglu, Nedret; Rodier, Guenael; Kelley, Edward; Vujnovic, Melitta; Permanand, Govin

    2018-01-01

    The International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005, as the overarching instrument for global health security, are designed to prevent and cope with major international public health threats. But poor implementation in countries hampers their effectiveness. In the wake of a number of major international health crises, such as the 2014 Ebola and 2016 Zika outbreaks, and the findings of a number of high-level assessments of the global response to these crises, it has become clear that there is a need for more joined-up thinking between health system strengthening activities and health security efforts for prevention, alert and response. WHO is working directly with its Member States to promote this approach, more specifically around how to better embed the IHR (2005) core capacities into the main health system functions. This paper looks at how and where the intersections between the IHR and the health system can be best leveraged towards developing greater health system resilience. This merging of approaches is a key component in pursuit of Universal Health Coverage and strengthened global health security as two mutually reinforcing agendas.

  11. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968); Le Systeme de Garanties de l'Agence (1965, provisoirement etendu en 1966 et 1968)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1968-09-24

    The Agency's safeguards system, as approved by the Board of Governors in 1965, and provisionally extended in 1966, is set forth in this document for the Information of all Members [French] Le Systeme de garanties de l'Agence, approuve par le Conseil des gouverneurs en 1965 et provisoirement etendu en 1966 et 1968, est reproduit dans le present document pour l'information de tous les Membres.

  12. Security Safeguards on E-Payment Systems in Malaysia: Analysis on the Payment Systems Act 2003

    OpenAIRE

    Zulhuda, Sonny; Azmi, Ida Madieha bt. Abdul Ghani

    2011-01-01

    Central to the infrastructure of electronic commerce activities is the electronic payment system. This encompasses not only the issues of technical sophistication but also legal readiness. In the context of electronic commerce environment in Malaysia, this paper seeks to highlight and examine the Malaysian legal readiness in the aspect of electronic payment system, focusing on its Payment Systems Act 2003. The discussion is limited to the issue of electronic security measures embodied in the ...

  13. Perspective and investments in health system strengthening of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance: a content analysis of health system strengthening-specific funding.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsai, Feng-Jen; Lee, Howard; Fan, Victoria Y

    2016-07-01

    This paper aimed to compare the health systems strengthening (HSS) framework of Gavi and WHO and to analyze resource allocation in HSS by Gavi. Among 76 countries which received HSS funding from Gavi from 2006 to 2013, summary reports of 44 countries and approved proposals of 10 countries were collected. After comparing the HSS framework of WHO and Gavi, each activity described in documents was categorized according to Gavi's framework and funding allocation was analyzed. Compared with WHO's HSS framework, Gavi's has a distinctive function within the building block 'Drugs, Equipment, Supplies, Facilities' and a distinctive function of 'providing incentive and bonuses' under the building block 'Human Resource/Performance Management'. Gavi has steadily invested 10% of their total budget on HSS, but 47% were allocated in these categories, whereas 78% were for activities arguably not covered by WHO's HSS framework. In Africa, 70% of Gavi's budget fell under 'Drugs, Equipment, Supplies, Facilities' and 92.8% were for activities arguably not deemed as HSS by WHO. Gavi's HSS support emphasized inputs with short-term measurable outcomes. Harmonization of the concept of HSS and collaboration between Gavi and multilateral international agencies, such as World Bank and WHO, are needed. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  14. Exploring pathways for building trust in vaccination and strengthening health system resilience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sachiko Ozawa

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Trust is critical to generate and maintain demand for vaccines in low and middle income countries. However, there is little documentation on how health system insufficiencies affect trust in vaccination and the process of re-building trust once it has been compromised. We reflect on how disruptions to immunizations systems can affect trust in vaccination and can compromise vaccine utilization. We then explore key pathways for overcoming system vulnerabilities in order to restore trust, to strengthen the resilience of health systems and communities, and to promote vaccine utilization. Methods Utilizing secondary data and a review of the literature, we developed a causal loop diagram (CLD to map the determinants of building trust in immunizations. Using the CLD, we devised three scenarios to illustrate common vulnerabilities that compromise trust and pathways to strengthen trust and utilization of vaccines, specifically looking at weak health systems, harmful communication channels, and role of social capital. Spill-over effects, interactions and other dynamics in the CLD were then examined to assess leverage points to counter these vulnerabilities. Results Trust in vaccination arises from the interactions among experiences with the health system, the various forms of communication and social capital – both external and internal to communities. When experiencing system-wide shocks such as the case in Ebola-affected countries, distrust is reinforced by feedback between the health and immunization systems where distrust often lingers even after systems are restored and spills over beyond vaccination in the broader health system. Vaccine myths or anti-vaccine movements reinforce distrust. Social capital – the collective value of social networks of community members – plays a central role in increasing levels of trust. Conclusions Trust is important, yet underexplored, in the context of vaccine utilization. Using a CLD to

  15. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  16. Integrating Information and Communication Technology for Health Information System Strengthening: A Policy Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marzuki, Nuraidah; Ismail, Saimy; Al-Sadat, Nabilla; Ehsan, Fauziah Z; Chan, Chee-Khoon; Ng, Chiu-Wan

    2015-11-01

    Despite the high costs involved and the lack of definitive evidence of sustained effectiveness, many low- and middle-income countries had begun to strengthen their health information system using information and communication technology in the past few decades. Following this international trend, the Malaysian Ministry of Health had been incorporating Telehealth (National Telehealth initiatives) into national health policies since the 1990s. Employing qualitative approaches, including key informant interviews and document review, this study examines the agenda-setting processes of the Telehealth policy using Kingdon's framework. The findings suggested that Telehealth policies emerged through actions of policy entrepreneurs within the Ministry of Health, who took advantage of several simultaneously occurring opportunities--official recognition of problems within the existing health information system, availability of information and communication technology to strengthen health information system and political interests surrounding the national Multimedia Super Corridor initiative being developed at the time. The last was achieved by the inclusion of Telehealth as a component of the Multimedia Super Corridor. © 2015 APJPH.

  17. Review and evaluation of the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Volume 3. Analysis of NMMSS capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    This section describes the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) and discusses, briefly, its theoretical capabilities. Despite the number of other documents that describe NMMSS, this section is included to describe the way that data are entered, stored, and processed by application programs within NMMSS to produce reports. Previous NMMSS descriptions have either been so general that they do not explain the operation of the system in sufficient detail to provide a solid understanding of its capabilities and limitations, or they have been so microscopic that the discussion of edit checks and authority file elements tended to obscure the major facets of system operation. This description is intended to fill this void by presenting a brief overview followed by a discussion of system operation and capabilities that is adequate for an overall understanding of NMMSS uncluttered by minutiae

  18. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  19. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  20. Regional Innovation System Strengthening Program (SIDa as an Exit Strategy National Community Development Program (PNPM

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Teguh Narutomo

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this study was to evaluate the PNPM program and follow the program with SIDA Strengthening Program. The research method used is a qualitative method approach of this research through the evaluation research design that builds on the CIPP evaluation model (Context-Input-Process-Product. Since the failure of theories and models of development are too glorifies growth, makes many people turn to focus on people development, which includes requiring optimization of local resources, participation, and empowerment. Since then, "empowerment" which was introduced in Indonesia has been anesthetized and made many hopes among many parties. In 2007 started the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM which continue Kecamatan Development Program (KDP. PNPM 2014 which is part of the United Indonesia Cabinet Volume 2 is going to end. For that we need to look for an exit strategy program that can maintain sustainability of PNPM. Regional Innovation Systems Strengthening Program (SIDA is a program of the whole process in one system to foster innovation made between government institutions, local governments, research institutions, educational institutions, innovation support institutions, businesses, and communities in areas that have been implemented since the 2012 SIDA program is an empowerment program as well, both to the public and even empowering to all elements such as academia, private industry, government and society.

  1. Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

    1979-08-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  2. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  3. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapir, J.L.

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer

  4. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  5. INTER-PHASE CONTACTS IN BITUMEN-MINERAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR STRENGTHENING

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ya. N. Kovalev

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Presently bitumen-mineral materials (including asphalt-concrete comprise nearly 98 % for construction of expensive road pavement. Large resources of local minerals (quartz sand and industrial wastes in the form of used molding sand (foundry by-product are widely applied for reduction of their cost. Such approach is economically and ecologically reasonable but it requires its justification because an adhesion interaction in the bitumen-quartz substrate system (with SiO2 more than 95 % is rather poor in natural state and due to water action it is still more decreasing. In this connection an objective necessity arises to modify significantly technology of bitumen-mineral compositions for ensuring reliability of road pavements while using silicon components.All the ideas pertaining to strengthening of adhesion bonds in the “quartz mineral substrate - bitumen” system are traditionally of physical and chemical nature and they presuppose mainly usage of colloidal chemistry methods. The paper considers the matter on the basis of molecular kinetic theory of matter taking into account the fact that there is absence of generally accepted calculations for intermolecular interactions of components in the SiO2 - organic matrix material system.As a theoretical supposition the following well-known regulatory principle in physics is used: as every atom or molecular have its own electromagnetic field then action of external electromagnetic fields initiates their interaction that leads to excitement of electrons, deformations and rupture of chemical bonds. Literature analysis shows that the existing electric bonds between components of the SiO2 - organic matrix material system provide the possibility to apply various electro-physical methods having an effect on these components with the purpose to strengthen their adhesion interaction.The paper investigates matters for determination of bond energy during physical adsorption and adhesion in the SiO2 - organic

  6. Interventions geared towards strengthening the health system of Namibia through the integration of palliative care.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Freeman, Rachel; Luyirika, Emmanuel Bk; Namisango, Eve; Kiyange, Fatia

    2016-01-01

    The high burden of non-communicable diseases and communicable diseases in Africa characterised by late presentation and diagnosis makes the need for palliative care a priority from the point of diagnosis to death and through bereavement. Palliative care is an intervention that requires a multidisciplinary team to address the multifaceted needs of the patient and family. Thus, its development takes a broad approach that involves engaging all key stakeholders ranging from policy makers, care providers, educators, the public, patients, and families. The main focus of stakeholder engagement should address some core interventions geared towards improving knowledge and awareness, strengthening skills and attitudes about palliative care. These interventions include educating health and allied healthcare professionals on the palliative care-related problems of patients and best practices for care, explaining palliative care as a clinical and holistic discipline and demonstrating its effectiveness, the need to include palliative care into national policies, strategic plans, training curriculums of healthcare professionals and the engagement of patients, families, and communities. Interventions from a five-year programme that was aimed at strengthening the health system of Namibia through the integration of palliative care for people living with HIV and AIDS and cancer in Namibia are shared. This article illustrates how a country can implement the World Health Organisation's public health strategy for developing palliative care services, which recommends four pillars: government policy, education, drug availability, and implementation.

  7. Application of ICT in strengthening health information systems in developing countries in the wake of globalisation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simba, Daudi O; Mwangu, Mughwira

    2004-12-01

    Information Communication Technology (ICT) revolution brought opportunities and challenges to developing countries in their efforts to strengthen the Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). In the wake of globalisation, developing countries have no choice but to take advantage of the opportunities and face the challenges. The last decades saw developing countries taking action to strengthen and modernise their HMIS using the existing ICT. Due to poor economic and communication infrastructure, the process has been limited to national and provincial/region levels leaving behind majority of health workers living in remote/rural areas. Even those with access do not get maximum benefit from ICT advancements due to inadequacies in data quality and lack of data utilisation. Therefore, developing countries need to make deliberate efforts to address constraints threatening to increase technology gap between urban minority and rural majority by setting up favourable policies and appropriate strategies. Concurrently, strategies to improve data quality and utilisation should be instituted to ensure that HMIS has positive impact on people's health. Potential strength from private sector and opportunities for sharing experiences among developing countries should be utilised. Short of this, advancement in ICT will continue to marginalise health workers in developing countries especially those living in remote areas.

  8. Strengthening biosecurity in Iraq: Development of a national biorisk management system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gregory D Koblentz

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available Since 2004, the Republic of Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort to comply with all of its international obligations to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN weapons. A centerpiece of this effort is Iraq’s development of a national biorisk management system to prevent, prepare for, and respond to naturally occurring and deliberate biological threats. The Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA, which is responsible for CBRN security and nonproliferation in Iraq, has played a key role in establishing this system. This article provides an overview of Iraq’s international nonproliferation commitments, describes the legal and organizational steps it has taken to implement these commitments, and examines current initiatives to strengthen Iraq’s biosecurity.

  9. Experience in ensuring authenticity of information from safeguards systems installed in facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Thiele, R.; Wagner, W.; Whichello, J.

    1991-01-01

    The increasing sophistication of non-destructive assay instruments, containment and surveillance devices and ancillary computer facilities used for safeguards purposes has resulted in a growing requirement for means to ensure the authenticity of information and thus preserve for the IAEA its capability to draw independent conclusions. The achievements of the last few years, particularly with regard to the development of new instruments, one of a kind instrumentation, conceptually new approaches such as the use of near-real-time accounting, and joint use arrangements, are largely the result of cooperation between the IAEA, state authorities, plant operators and certain national laboratories. It is anticipated that demands for various authentication features will further expand as growth in sophistication of equipment and automation of nuclear facilities continues, and that increasing reliance on in-line, unattended use instrumentation will become in future years the approach of choice. 8 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

  10. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  11. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, A.J.

    1984-12-01

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context

  12. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2011-01-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  13. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  14. Strengthening mental health systems in low- and middle-income countries: the Emerald programme.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Semrau, Maya; Evans-Lacko, Sara; Alem, Atalay; Ayuso-Mateos, Jose Luis; Chisholm, Dan; Gureje, Oye; Hanlon, Charlotte; Jordans, Mark; Kigozi, Fred; Lempp, Heidi; Lund, Crick; Petersen, Inge; Shidhaye, Rahul; Thornicroft, Graham

    2015-04-10

    There is a large treatment gap for mental health care in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with the majority of people with mental, neurological, and substance use (MNS) disorders receiving no or inadequate care. Health system factors are known to play a crucial role in determining the coverage and effectiveness of health service interventions, but the study of mental health systems in LMICs has been neglected. The 'Emerging mental health systems in LMICs' (Emerald) programme aims to improve outcomes of people with MNS disorders in six LMICs (Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda) by generating evidence and capacity to enhance health system performance in delivering mental health care. A mixed-methods approach is being applied to generate evidence on: adequate, fair, and sustainable resourcing for mental health (health system inputs); integrated provision of mental health services (health system processes); and improved coverage and goal attainment in mental health (health system outputs). Emerald has a strong focus on capacity-building of researchers, policymakers, and planners, and on increasing service user and caregiver involvement to support mental health systems strengthening. Emerald also addresses stigma and discrimination as one of the key barriers for access to and successful delivery of mental health services.

  15. The importance of gender analysis in research for health systems strengthening.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Theobald, Sally; Morgan, Rosemary; Hawkins, Kate; Ssali, Sarah; George, Asha; Molyneux, Sassy

    2017-12-01

    This editorial discusses a collection of papers examining gender across a range of health policy and systems contexts, from access to services, governance, health financing, and human resources for health. The papers interrogate differing health issues and core health systems functions using a gender lens. Together they produce new knowledge on the multiple impacts of gender on health experiences and demonstrate the importance of gender analyses and gender sensitive interventions for promoting well-being and health systems strengthening. The findings from these papers collectively show how gender intersects with other axes of inequity within specific contexts to shape experiences of health and health seeking within households, communities and health systems; illustrate how gender power relations affect access to important resources; and demonstrate that gender norms, poverty and patriarchy interplay to limit women's choices and chances both within household interactions and within the health sector. Health systems researchers have a responsibility to promote the incorporation of gender analyses into their studies in order to inform more strategic, effective and equitable health systems interventions, programmes, and policies. Responding to gender inequitable systems, institutions, and services in this sector requires an 'all hands-on deck' approach. We cannot claim to take a 'people-centred approach' to health systems if the status quo continues. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

  16. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  17. Sharing regulatory data as tools for strengthening health systems in the Region of the Americas

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Varley Dias Sousa

    Full Text Available ABSTRACT Regulatory transparency is an imperative characteristic of a reliable National Regulatory Authority. In the region of the Americas, the process of building an open government is still fragile and fragmented across various Health Regulatory Agencies (HRAs and Regional Reference Authorities (RRAs. This study assessed the transparency status of RRAs, focusing on various medicine life-cycle documents (the Medicine Dossier, Clinical Trial Report, and Inspection Report as tools for strengthening health systems. Based on a narrative (nonsystematic review of RRA regulatory transparency, transparency status was classified as one of two types: public disclosure of information (intra-agency data and data- and work-sharing (inter-agency data. The risks/benefits of public disclosure of medicine-related information were assessed, taking into account 1 the involvement and roles of multiple stakeholders (health care professionals, regulators, industry, community, and academics and 2 the protection of commercial and personal confidential data. Inter-agency data- and work-sharing was evaluated in the context of harmonization and cooperation projects that focus on regulatory convergence. Technical and practical steps for establishing an openness directive for the pharmaceutical regulatory environment are proposed to improve and strengthen health systems in the Americas. Addressing these challenges requires leadership from entities such as the Pan American Health Organization to steer and support collaborative regional alliances that advance the development and establishment of a trustworthy regulatory environment and a sustainable public health system in the Americas, using international successful initiatives as reference and taking into account the domestic characteristics and experiences of each individual country.

  18. Sharing regulatory data as tools for strengthening health systems in the Region of the Americas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sousa, Varley Dias; Ramalho, Pedro I; Silveira, Dâmaris

    2016-05-01

    Regulatory transparency is an imperative characteristic of a reliable National Regulatory Authority. In the region of the Americas, the process of building an open government is still fragile and fragmented across various Health Regulatory Agencies (HRAs) and Regional Reference Authorities (RRAs). This study assessed the transparency status of RRAs, focusing on various medicine life-cycle documents (the Medicine Dossier, Clinical Trial Report, and Inspection Report) as tools for strengthening health systems. Based on a narrative (nonsystematic) review of RRA regulatory transparency, transparency status was classified as one of two types: public disclosure of information (intra-agency data) and data- and work-sharing (inter-agency data). The risks/benefits of public disclosure of medicine-related information were assessed, taking into account 1) the involvement and roles of multiple stakeholders (health care professionals, regulators, industry, community, and academics) and 2) the protection of commercial and personal confidential data. Inter-agency data- and work-sharing was evaluated in the context of harmonization and cooperation projects that focus on regulatory convergence. Technical and practical steps for establishing an openness directive for the pharmaceutical regulatory environment are proposed to improve and strengthen health systems in the Americas. Addressing these challenges requires leadership from entities such as the Pan American Health Organization to steer and support collaborative regional alliances that advance the development and establishment of a trustworthy regulatory environment and a sustainable public health system in the Americas, using international successful initiatives as reference and taking into account the domestic characteristics and experiences of each individual country.

  19. Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI) contribution in strengthening public health laboratories systems in the African region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gumede, Nicksy; Coulibaly, Sheick Oumar; Yahaya, Ali Ahmed; Ndihokubwayo, Jean-Bosco; Nsubuga, Peter; Okeibunor, Joseph; Dosseh, Annick; Salla, Mbaye; Mihigo, Richard; Mkanda, Pascal; Byabamazima, Charles

    2016-10-10

    The laboratory has always played a very critical role in diagnosis of the diseases. The success of any disease programme is based on a functional laboratory network. Health laboratory services are an integral component of the health system. Efficiency and effectiveness of both clinical and public health functions including surveillance, diagnosis, prevention, treatment, research and health promotion are influenced by reliable laboratory services. The establishment of the African Regional polio laboratory for the Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI) has contributed in supporting countries in their efforts to strengthen laboratory capacity. On the eve of the closing of the program, we have shown through this article, examples of this contribution in two countries of the African region: Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Descriptive studies were carried out in Côte d'Ivoire (RCI) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from October to December 2014. Questionnaires and self-administered and in-depth interviews and group discussions as well as records and observation were used to collect information during laboratory visits and assessments. The PEI financial support allows to maintain the majority of the 14 (DRC) and 12 (RCI) staff involved in the polio laboratory as full or in part time members. Through laboratory technical staff training supported by the PEI, skills and knowledge were gained to reinforce laboratories capacity and performance in quality laboratory functioning, processes and techniques such as cell culture. In the same way, infrastructure was improved and equipment provided. General laboratory quality standards, including the entire laboratory key elements was improved through the PEI accreditation process. The Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI) is a good example of contribution in strengthening public health laboratories systems in the African region. It has established strong Polio Laboratory network that contributed to the

  20. How can health systems be strengthened to control and prevent an Ebola outbreak? A narrative review

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Krishna Regmi

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases are now more than ever considered threats to public health systems. There have been over 20 outbreaks of Ebola in the past 40 years. Only recently, the World Health Organization has declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC in West Africa, with a projected estimate of 1.2 million deaths expected in the next 6 months. Ebola virus is a highly virulent pathogen, often fatal in humans and non-human primates. Ebola is now a great priority for global health security and often becomes fatal if left untreated. This study employed a narrative review. Three major databases – MEDLINE, EMBASE, and Global Health – were searched using both ‘text-words’ and ‘thesaurus terms’. Evidence shows that low- and middle-income countries (LMICs are not coping well with the current challenges of Ebola, not only because they have poor and fragile systems but also because there are poor infectious disease surveillance and response systems in place. The identification of potential cases is problematic, particularly in the aspects of contact tracing, infection control, and prevention, prior to the diagnosis of the case. This review therefore aims to examine whether LMICs’ health systems would be able to control and manage Ebola in future and identifies two key elements of health systems strengthening that are needed to ensure the robustness of the health system to respond effectively.

  1. Fish welfare assurance system: initial steps to set up an effective tool to safeguard and monitor farmed fish welfare at a company level

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Vis, van de J.W.; Poelman, M.; Lambooij, E.; Bégout, M.L.; Pilarczyk, M.

    2012-01-01

    The objective was to take a first step in the development of a process-oriented quality assurance (QA) system for monitoring and safeguarding of fish welfare at a company level. A process-oriented approach is focused on preventing hazards and involves establishment of critical steps in a process

  2. Empowering communities and strengthening systems to improve transgender health: outcomes from the Pehchan programme in India.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shaikh, Simran; Mburu, Gitau; Arumugam, Viswanathan; Mattipalli, Naveen; Aher, Abhina; Mehta, Sonal; Robertson, James

    2016-01-01

    Transgender populations face inequalities in access to HIV, health and social services. In addition, there is limited documentation of models for providing appropriately tailored services and social support for transgender populations in low- and middle-income countries. This paper presents outcomes of the Global Fund-supported Pehchan programme, which aimed to strengthen community systems and provide HIV, health, legal and social services to transgender communities across 18 Indian states through a rights-based empowerment approach. We used a pre- and post-intervention cross-sectional survey design with retrospective analysis of programmatic data. Using stratified sampling, we identified 268 transgender participants in six Indian states from a total of 48,280 transgender people served by Pehchan through 186 community-based organizations. We quantified the impact of interventions by comparing baseline and end line indicators of accessed health social and legal services. We also assessed end line self-efficacy and collective action with regard to social support networks. There were significant increases in community-based demand and use of tailored health, legal, social and psychological services over the time of the Pehchan programme. We report significant increases in access to condoms (12.5%, pgender-affirming approaches significantly improved both demand and access to tailored HIV, health and social services for transgender individuals across India. Furthermore, the Pehchan programme successfully fostered both self-efficacy and collective identity and served as a model for addressing the unique health needs of transgender communities. Continued strengthening of health, social and community systems to better respond to the unique needs of transgender communities is needed in order to sustain these gains.

  3. Empowering communities and strengthening systems to improve transgender health: outcomes from the Pehchan programme in India

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shaikh, Simran; Mburu, Gitau; Arumugam, Viswanathan; Mattipalli, Naveen; Aher, Abhina; Mehta, Sonal; Robertson, James

    2016-01-01

    Introduction Transgender populations face inequalities in access to HIV, health and social services. In addition, there is limited documentation of models for providing appropriately tailored services and social support for transgender populations in low- and middle-income countries. This paper presents outcomes of the Global Fund-supported Pehchan programme, which aimed to strengthen community systems and provide HIV, health, legal and social services to transgender communities across 18 Indian states through a rights-based empowerment approach. Methods We used a pre- and post-intervention cross-sectional survey design with retrospective analysis of programmatic data. Using stratified sampling, we identified 268 transgender participants in six Indian states from a total of 48,280 transgender people served by Pehchan through 186 community-based organizations. We quantified the impact of interventions by comparing baseline and end line indicators of accessed health social and legal services. We also assessed end line self-efficacy and collective action with regard to social support networks. Results There were significant increases in community-based demand and use of tailored health, legal, social and psychological services over the time of the Pehchan programme. We report significant increases in access to condoms (12.5%, pgender-affirming approaches significantly improved both demand and access to tailored HIV, health and social services for transgender individuals across India. Furthermore, the Pehchan programme successfully fostered both self-efficacy and collective identity and served as a model for addressing the unique health needs of transgender communities. Continued strengthening of health, social and community systems to better respond to the unique needs of transgender communities is needed in order to sustain these gains. PMID:27431474

  4. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  5. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  6. A model to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Amato, Eduardo; Llacer, Carlos; Vicens, Hugo

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The main purpose of our current studies is to analyse the measures to be adopted tending to integrate the traditional safeguard measures to the ones stated in the Additional Protocol (AP). A simplified nuclear fuel cycle model is considered to draw some conclusions on the application of integrated safeguard measures. This paper includes a briefing, describing the historical review that gave birth to the A.P. and proposes a model to help the control bodies in the making decision process. In May 1997, the Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol (MAP) which aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguard measures. For States under a comprehensive safeguard agreement the measures adopted provide credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In September 1999, the governments of Argentina and Brazil formally announced in the Board of Governors that both countries would start preliminary consultations on one adapted MAP applied to the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (Quatripartite Agreement/INFCIRC 435). In December 1999, a first draft of the above mentioned document was provided as a starting point of discussion. During the year 2000 some modifications to the original draft took place. These were the initial steps in the process aiming at reaching the adequate conditions to adhere to the A.P. in each country in a future Having in mind the future AP implementation, the safeguards officers of the Regulatory Body of Argentina (ARN) began to think about the future simultaneous application of the two types of safeguards measures, the traditional and the non traditional ones, what should converge in an integrated system. By traditional safeguards it is understood quantitative

  7. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krichinsky, Alan M.; Bates, Bruce E.; Chesser, Joel B.; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2009-01-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F and W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F and W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F and W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F and W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF 6 F and W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF 6 . The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under

  8. Comprehensive and integrated district health systems strengthening: the Rwanda Population Health Implementation and Training (PHIT) Partnership.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drobac, Peter C; Basinga, Paulin; Condo, Jeanine; Farmer, Paul E; Finnegan, Karen E; Hamon, Jessie K; Amoroso, Cheryl; Hirschhorn, Lisa R; Kakoma, Jean Baptise; Lu, Chunling; Murangwa, Yusuf; Murray, Megan; Ngabo, Fidele; Rich, Michael; Thomson, Dana; Binagwaho, Agnes

    2013-01-01

    Nationally, health in Rwanda has been improving since 2000, with considerable improvement since 2005. Despite improvements, rural areas continue to lag behind urban sectors with regard to key health outcomes. Partners In Health (PIH) has been supporting the Rwanda Ministry of Health (MOH) in two rural districts in Rwanda since 2005. Since 2009, the MOH and PIH have spearheaded a health systems strengthening (HSS) intervention in these districts as part of the Rwanda Population Health Implementation and Training (PHIT) Partnership. The partnership is guided by the belief that HSS interventions should be comprehensive, integrated, responsive to local conditions, and address health care access, cost, and quality. The PHIT Partnership represents a collaboration between the MOH and PIH, with support from the National University of Rwanda School of Public Health, the National Institute of Statistics, Harvard Medical School, and Brigham and Women's Hospital. The PHIT Partnership's health systems support aligns with the World Health Organization's six health systems building blocks. HSS activities focus across all levels of the health system - community, health center, hospital, and district leadership - to improve health care access, quality, delivery, and health outcomes. Interventions are concentrated on three main areas: targeted support for health facilities, quality improvement initiatives, and a strengthened network of community health workers. The impact of activities will be assessed using population-level outcomes data collected through oversampling of the demographic and health survey (DHS) in the intervention districts. The overall impact evaluation is complemented by an analysis of trends in facility health care utilization. A comprehensive costing project captures the total expenditures and financial inputs of the health care system to determine the cost of systems improvement. Targeted evaluations and operational research pieces focus on specific

  9. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

  10. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

  11. Data Collection Guidelines for Consistent Evaluation of Data from Verification and Monitoring Safeguard Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Castleberry, K.; Lenarduzzi, R.; Whitaker, M.

    1999-01-01

    One of the several activities the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors perform in the verification process of Safeguard operations is the review and correlation of data from different sources. This process is often complex due to the different forms in which the data is presented. This paper describes some of the elements that are necessary to create a ''standardized'' structure for the verification of data. When properly collected and formatted, data can be analyzed with off-the shelf software applications using customized macros to automate the commands for the desired analysis. The standardized-data collection methodology is based on instrumentation guidelines as well as data structure elements, such as verifiable timing of data entry, automated data logging, identification codes, and others. The identification codes are used to associate data items with their sources and to correlate them with items from other data logging activities. The addition of predefined parameter ranges allows automated evaluation with the capability to provide a data summary, a cross-index of all data related to a specific event. Instances of actual databases are used as examples. The data collection guidelines described in this paper facilitate the use of data from a variety of instrumentation platforms and also allow the instrumentation itself to be more easily applied in subsequent monitoring applications

  12. Developing a customised approach for strengthening tuberculosis laboratory quality management systems toward accreditation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Heidi Albert

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Background: Quality-assured tuberculosis laboratory services are critical to achieve global and national goals for tuberculosis prevention and care. Implementation of a quality management system (QMS in laboratories leads to improved quality of diagnostic tests and better patient care. The Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (SLMTA programme has led to measurable improvements in the QMS of clinical laboratories. However, progress in tuberculosis laboratories has been slower, which may be attributed to the need for a structured tuberculosis-specific approach to implementing QMS. We describe the development and early implementation of the Strengthening Tuberculosis Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (TB SLMTA programme. Development: The TB SLMTA curriculum was developed by customizing the SLMTA curriculum to include specific tools, job aids and supplementary materials specific to the tuberculosis laboratory. The TB SLMTA Harmonized Checklist was developed from the World Health Organisation Regional Office for Africa Stepwise Laboratory Quality Improvement Process Towards Accreditation checklist, and incorporated tuberculosis-specific requirements from the Global Laboratory Initiative Stepwise Process Towards Tuberculosis Laboratory Accreditation online tool. Implementation: Four regional training-of-trainers workshops have been conducted since 2013. The TB SLMTA programme has been rolled out in 37 tuberculosis laboratories in 10 countries using the Workshop approach in 32 laboratories in five countries and the Facility based approach in five tuberculosis laboratories in five countries. Conclusion: Lessons learnt from early implementation of TB SLMTA suggest that a structured training and mentoring programme can build a foundation towards further quality improvement in tuberculosis laboratories. Structured mentoring, and institutionalisation of QMS into country programmes, is needed to support tuberculosis laboratories

  13. Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    2011-01-01

    Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having 'aggressors' as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests 'SSN' which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called 'SSST' in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate these policy tools. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more

  14. Health system strengthening in Myanmar during political reforms: perspectives from international agencies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Risso-Gill, Isabelle; McKee, Martin; Coker, Richard; Piot, Peter; Legido-Quigley, Helena

    2014-07-01

    Myanmar has undergone a remarkable political transformation in the last 2 years, with its leadership voluntarily transitioning from an isolated military regime to a quasi-civilian government intent on re-engaging with the international community. Decades of underinvestment have left the country underdeveloped with a fragile health system and poor health outcomes. International aid agencies have found engagement with the Myanmar government difficult but this is changing rapidly and it is opportune to consider how Myanmar can engage with the global health system strengthening (HSS) agenda. Nineteen semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with representatives from international agencies working in Myanmar to capture their perspectives on HSS following political reform. They explored their perceptions of HSS and the opportunities for implementation. Participants reported challenges in engaging with government, reflecting the disharmony between actors, economic sanctions and barriers to service delivery due to health system weaknesses and bureaucracy. Weaknesses included human resources, data and medical products/infrastructure and logistical challenges. Agencies had mixed views of health system finance and governance, identifying problems and also some positive aspects. There is little consensus on how HSS should be approached in Myanmar, but much interest in collaborating to achieve it. Despite myriad challenges and concerns, participants were generally positive about the recent political changes, and remain optimistic as they engage in HSS activities with the government.

  15. People-centred science: strengthening the practice of health policy and systems research

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-01-01

    Health policy and systems research (HPSR) is a transdisciplinary field of global importance, with its own emerging standards for creating, evaluating, and utilizing knowledge, and distinguished by a particular orientation towards influencing policy and wider action to strengthen health systems. In this commentary, we argue that the ability of the HPSR field to influence real world change hinges on its becoming more people-centred. We see people-centredness as recognizing the field of enquiry as one of social construction, requiring those conducting HPSR to locate their own position in the system, and conduct and publish research in a manner that foregrounds human agency attributes and values, and is acutely attentive to policy context. Change occurs at many layers of a health system, shaped by social, political, and economic forces, and brought about by different groups of people who make up the system, including service users and communities. The seeds of transformative practice in HPSR lie in amplifying the breadth and depth of dialogue across health system actors in the conduct of research – recognizing that these actors are all generators, sources, and users of knowledge about the system. While building such a dialogic practice, those conducting HPSR must strive to protect the autonomy and integrity of their ideas and actions, and also clearly explain their own positions and the value-basis of their work. We conclude with a set of