WorldWideScience

Sample records for shipment accident lessons

  1. Low level waste shipment accident lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rast, D.M.; Rowe, J.G.; Reichel, C.W.

    1995-01-01

    On October 1, 1994 a shipment of low-level waste from the Fernald Environmental Management Project, Fernald, Ohio, was involved in an accident near Rolla, Missouri. The accident did not result in the release of any radioactive material. The accident did generate important lessons learned primarily in the areas of driver and emergency response communications. The shipment was comprised of an International Standards Organization (ISO) container on a standard flatbed trailer. The accident caused the low-level waste package to separate from the trailer and come to rest on its top in the median. The impact of the container with the pavement and median inflicted relatively minor damage to the container. The damage was not substantial enough to cause failure of container integrity. The success of the package is attributable to the container design and the packaging procedures used at the Fernald Environmental Management Project for low-level waste shipments. Although the container survived the initial wreck, is was nearly breached when the first responders attempted to open the ISO container. Even though the container was clearly marked and the shipment documentation was technically correct, this information did not identify that the ISO container was the primary containment for the waste. The lessons learned from this accident have DOE complex wide applicability. This paper is intended to describe the accident, subsequent emergency response operations, and the lessons learned from this incident

  2. Lessons learned from accidents investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zuniga-Bello, P. [Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT), Mexico City (Mexico); Croft, J. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Glenn, J

    1997-12-31

    Accidents from three main practices: medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the described accidents are approached by subjects covering: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  3. Lessons learned from accident investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zuniga-Bello, P.; Croft, J.R.; Glenn, J.

    1998-01-01

    Accidents in three main practices - medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators - are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned from them. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the accidents described are approached bearing in mind: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  4. Lessons of the radiological accident in Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alves, R.N.; Xavier, A.M.; Heilbron, P.F.L.

    1998-01-01

    On the basis of the lessons teamed from the radiological accident of Goiania, actions are described which a nuclear regulatory body should undertake while responding to an accident of this nature. (author)

  5. Lessons learned from MONJU sodium leak accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakai, Ryodai; Ito, Kazumoto; Nagata, Takashi

    2000-01-01

    MONJU sodium leak accident was a small accident with a large public impact. There was no injures or exposure to radiation, nor was there any loss of safety function such as reactor shutdown or reactor cooling. On the contrary a social impact is considerably large, whereby the plant remains shutdown. This paper describes the lessons learned from the accident, i.e. the impact of the accident and its cause, and the features on risk management in view of social aspect as well as technical aspect. (author)

  6. Lessons learned from early criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1996-01-01

    Four accidents involving the approach to criticality occurred during the period July, 1945, through May, 1996. These have been described in the format of the OPERATING EXPERIENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY which is distributed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety. Although the lessons learned have been incorporated in standards, codes, and formal procedures during the last fifty years, this is their first presentation in this format. It is particularly appropriate that they be presented in the forum of the Nuclear Criticality Technology Safety Project Workshop closest to the fiftieth anniversary of the last of the four accidents, and that which was most instrumental in demonstrating the need to incorporate lessons learned

  7. Lessons learned from the West Valley spent nuclear fuel shipment within the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyacke, M.J.; Anderson, T.

    2004-01-01

    This paper describes the lessons learned from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) transportation of 125 DOE-owned commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies by railroad from the West Valley Demonstration Project to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). On July 17, 2003, DOE made the largest single shipment of commercial SNF in the history of the United States. This was a highly visible and political shipment that used two specially designed Type B transportation and storage casks. This paper describes the background and history of the shipment. It discusses the technical challenges for licensing Type B packages for hauling large quantities of SNF, including the unique design features, testing and analysis. This paper also discusses the preshipment planning, preparations, coordination, route evaluation and selection, carrier selection and negotiations, security, inspections, tracking, and interim storage at the INEEL

  8. Extension of ship accident analysis to multiple-package shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.

    1997-11-01

    Severe ship accidents and the probability of radioactive material release from spent reactor fuel casks were investigated previously. Other forms of RAM, e.g., plutonium oxide powder, may be shipped in large numbers of packagings rather than in one to a few casks. These smaller, more numerous packagings are typically placed in ISO containers for ease of handling, and several ISO containers may be placed in one of several holds of a cargo ship. In such cases, the size of a radioactive release resulting from a severe collision with another ship is determined not by the likelihood of compromising a single, robust package but by the probability that a certain fraction of 10's or 100's of individual packagings is compromised. The previous analysis involved a statistical estimation of the frequency of accidents which would result in damage to a cask located in one of seven cargo holds in a collision with another ship. The results were obtained in the form of probabilities (frequencies) of accidents of increasing severity and of release fractions for each level of severity. This paper describes an extension of the same general method in which the multiple packages are assumed to be compacted by an intruding ship's bow until there is no free space in the hold. At such a point, the remaining energy of the colliding ship is assumed to be dissipated by progressively crushing the RAM packagings and the probability of a particular fraction of package failures is estimated by adaptation of the statistical method used previously. The parameters of a common, well characterized packaging, the 6M with 2R inner containment vessel, were employed as an illustrative example of this analysis method. However, the method is readily applicable to other packagings for which crush strengths have been measured or can be estimated with satisfactory confidence

  9. Extension of ship accident analysis to multiple-package shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.

    1998-01-01

    Severe ship accidents and the probability of radioactive material release from spent reactor fuel casks were investigated previously (Spring, 1995). Other forms of RAM, e.g., plutonium oxide powder, may be shipped in large numbers of packagings rather than in one to a few casks. These smaller, more numerous packagings are typically placed in ISO containers for ease of handling, and several ISO containers may be placed in one of several holds of a cargo ship. In such cases, the size of a radioactive release resulting from a severe collision with another ship is determined not by the likelihood of compromising a single, robust package but by the probability that a certain fraction of 10's or 100's of individual packagings is compromised. The previous analysis (Spring, 1995) involved a statistical estimation of the frequency of accidents which would result in damage to a cask located in one of seven cargo holds in a collision with another ship. The results were obtained in the form of probabilities (frequencies) of accidents of increasing severity and of release fractions for each level of severity. This paper describes an extension of the same general method in which the multiple packages are assumed to be compacted by an intruding ship's bow until there is no free space in the hold. At such a point, the remaining energy of the colliding ship is assumed to be dissipated by progressively crushing the RAM packagings and the probability of a particular fraction of package failures is estimated by adaptation of the statistical method used previously. The parameters of a common, well-characterized packaging, the 6M with 2R inner containment vessel, were employed as an illustrative example of this analysis method. However, the method is readily applicable to other packagings for which crush strengths have been measured or can be estimated with satisfactory confidence. (authors)

  10. Lessons taught by the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2002-01-01

    On nuclear development, it is natural that safety is the most important condition. However, when occurring an accident in spite of earnest efforts on safety pursuit, it is essential for a technical developer to absorb some lessons from its contents as much as possible and show an attitude to use thereafter. The Chernobyl accident brought extraordinarily large damage in the history of nuclear technology development. Therefore, the edition group of the Japan Society of Atomic Energy introduced opinions of three groups of the Society (that is, groups on reactor physics, nuclear power generation, and human-machine system research) with some description on cause analysis of the accident and its result and effect. And, here was also shown four basic difference on design between RMBK type reactor in Chernobyl and LWR type reactor supplied in Japan. (G.K.)

  11. Assessment of the radiological risks of road transport accidents involving type A package shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, F.; Fett, H.J.; Schwarz, G.; Raffestin, D.; Schneider, T.; Gelder, R.; Hughes, J.S.; Shaw, K.B.; Hedberg, B.; Simenstad, P.; Svahn, B.; Hienen, J.F.A.; Jansma, R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper is an account of work performed within a multi-lateral research project on the radiological risks associated with the transportation of Type A packaged radioactive material. The research project has been performed on behalf of the European Commission and various national agencies of the participating countries and involved organizations and institutes of five EU Member States, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. The main objectives of the research project were the assessment and appraisal of the potential radiological risks of road transport accidents involving Type A package shipments in participating EU Member States. Data were collected and include harmonized sets information related to the type, quantity and characteristics of Type A package shipments by road. Such databases were basically non-existent until recently. The results are expected to be valuable to both national agencies and international organizations, with responsibilities for the safe transport of radioactive materials by providing some insight in the carriage of radioactive materials by road making up a major fraction of radioactive material transports. Similarly, a wide body of information has been collected and compiled on road transport accidents in terms of the frequency of occurrence and the severity of accidental impact loads potentially experienced by a Type A package.In addition, the results will facilitate judgement of the adequacy of the IAEA Transport Regulations as far as Type A packages are concerned. (O.M.)

  12. Keynote on lessons from major radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.; Oresegun, M.; Wheatley, J.

    2000-01-01

    Generic lessons have been learned from a relatively large number of accidents in the most relevant practices (a set of analysis have been made on about 90 radiotherapy events, 43 industrial radiography and nine from industrial irradiations); more specific lessons have been drawn from in-depth investigations of individual accidents. The body of knowledge is grouped as follows: a) radiotherapy is very unique in that humans (patients) are purposely given very high radiation doses (20-75 Gy) by placing them in the radiation beam or by placing radioactive sources in contact with tissues. Intended deterministic effects are the essence of the normal radiotherapy practice and relatively small deviation from the intended doses, i.e,, slightly higher or lower than intended may cause increased rate of severe complication or reduce probability of cure. Consequences of major accidents have been devastating, affecting tens, even hundreds of patients and causing death (directly or indirectly) to a large number of them; b) accidents involving industrial radiography are the most frequent cause of overexposure to workers (radiographers); c) accidents with industrial irradiators have lower probability of occurrence, however, they are deemed to be fatal, especially when whole body exposure to panoramic gamma irradiators occur; partial body irradiation from industrial or research accelerator beams has led to amputation of hands and legs; d) when control of sources was relinquished ('orphan' sources) this has resulted in severe injuries, in some cases death and widespread contamination of the environment. A tool for further dissemination of lessons will be an international reporting system of unusual radiation events (RADEV), being introduced world-wide. Accidents were rarely due to a single human error or isolated equipment failure. In most cases there was a combination of elements such as: a) unawareness of the potential for an accident, b) poor education, which usually did not

  13. Lessons from the Fukushima nuclear power accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatamura, Yotaro

    2013-01-01

    Through the investigation of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident as the chairman of the related Government's Committee, many things had been considered. Essence of the accident could be not only what occurred in the Fukushima nuclear power station, but also dispersed radioactive materials forced many residents to move and not to be returned. Such events as indication errors of water level meter occurring in severe accident could no be thought and remote mechanical operation of valves under high radiation environment were not prepared. Contamination by radioactive clouds caused the evacuation of residents for a long period. Lessons learned from the accident were described such as; (1) the verification of the road to failure connecting selected accident sequence and road to success with another supposed choice, (2) considering what might occur and then what should be needed on the contrary, (3) nuclear power, if should be continued, should be used with the premise of its hazards, and (4) advise to nuclear engineer for adequate information dissemination and technical explanation to the public and keeping nuclear technologies alive. (T. Tanaka)

  14. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F.; Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events

  15. Alternative routes for highway shipments of radioactive materials and lessons learned from state designations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-07-01

    Pursuant to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), the Department of Transportation (DOT) has promulgated a comprehensive set of regulations regarding the highway transportation of high-level radioactive materials. These regulations, under docket numbers HM-164 and HM-164A, establish interstate highways as the preferred routes for the transportation of radioactive materials within and through the states. The regulations also provide a methodology by which a state may select altemative routes. First, the state must establish a ''state routing agency'', defined as an entity authorized to use the state legal process to impose routing requirements on carriers of radioactive material (49 CFR 171.8). Once identified, the state routing agency must select routes in accordance with DOTs Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway Routes for Large Quantity Shipments of Radioactive Materials or an equivalent routing analysis. Adjoining states and localities should be consulted on the impact of proposed alternative routes as a prerequisite of final route selection. Lastly, the states must provide written notice to DOT of any alternative route designation before the routes are deemed effective. The purpose of this report is to discuss the ''lessons learned'' by the five states within the southern region that have designated alternative or preferred routes under the regulations of the Department of Transportation (DOT) established for the transportation of radioactive materials. The document was prepared by reviewing applicable federal laws and regulations, examining state reports and documents and contacting state officials and routing agencies involved in making routing decisions. In undertaking this project, the Southern States Energy Board hopes to reveal the process used by states that have designated alternative routes and thereby share their experiences (i.e., lessons learned) with other southern states that have yet to make designations

  16. Chernobyl NPP accident. Overcoming experience. Acquired lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    This book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of accident on the Chernobyl NPP unit 4. History of construction, causes of the accident and its consequences, actions for its mitigation are described. Modern situation with Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and transferring of 'Ukryttya' shelter into ecologically safe system are mentioned. The future of Chernobyl site and exclusion zone was discussed

  17. Our reflections and lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Takeshi; Sawada, Takashi; Yagawa, Genki

    2017-01-01

    In order to investigate the cause of the accident that began on March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Science Council of Japan set an investigation committee, the 'Sub-Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident (SCFNA)' under the Comprehensive Synthetic Engineering Committee. The committee has published a record entitled 'Reflections and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, (1st report)'. There are still many items about the accident for which the details are not clear. It is important to discuss the reasons why the severe accident could not be prevented and the possibilities that there might have been other proper operations and accident management to prevent or lessen the severity of the accident than those adopted at the time. SCFNA decided to continue its investigation by setting up our working group called the 'Working Group on Fukushima Nuclear Accident'. Our working group have published 'Reflection and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident (2nd Report)'. We investigated the issues of specific units. Unit 1 were validity of the operation of the isolation condenser, whether or not a loss of coolant accident occurred due to a failure of the cooling piping system by the seismic ground motion, and the cause of the loss of the emergency AC power supply, Unit 2 was the reason why a large amount of radioactive materials was emitted to the environment although the reactor building did not explode, Unit 3 was the reasons why the operator stopped running the high pressure coolant injection system, and Units 1 to 3 was validity of the venting operation. These items were considered to be the key issues in these units that would have prevented progression to the severe accident. (author)

  18. Learning lessons from Natech accidents - the eNATECH accident database

    Science.gov (United States)

    Krausmann, Elisabeth; Girgin, Serkan

    2016-04-01

    When natural hazards impact industrial facilities that house or process hazardous materials, fires, explosions and toxic releases can occur. This type of accident is commonly referred to as Natech accident. In order to prevent the recurrence of accidents or to better mitigate their consequences, lessons-learned type studies using available accident data are usually carried out. Through post-accident analysis, conclusions can be drawn on the most common damage and failure modes and hazmat release paths, particularly vulnerable storage and process equipment, and the hazardous materials most commonly involved in these types of accidents. These analyses also lend themselves to identifying technical and organisational risk-reduction measures that require improvement or are missing. Industrial accident databases are commonly used for retrieving sets of Natech accident case histories for further analysis. These databases contain accident data from the open literature, government authorities or in-company sources. The quality of reported information is not uniform and exhibits different levels of detail and accuracy. This is due to the difficulty of finding qualified information sources, especially in situations where accident reporting by the industry or by authorities is not compulsory, e.g. when spill quantities are below the reporting threshold. Data collection has then to rely on voluntary record keeping often by non-experts. The level of detail is particularly non-uniform for Natech accident data depending on whether the consequences of the Natech event were major or minor, and whether comprehensive information was available for reporting. In addition to the reporting bias towards high-consequence events, industrial accident databases frequently lack information on the severity of the triggering natural hazard, as well as on failure modes that led to the hazmat release. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident and renders the development of

  19. Lessons from Chernobyl post-accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, T.

    2012-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident has shown that the long-term management of its consequences is not straightforward. The management of the consequences has revealed the complexity of the situation to deal with. The long-term contamination of the environment has affected all the dimensions of the daily life of the inhabitants living in affected territories: health, environment, social life, education, work, distribution of foodstuffs and commodities... The experience from the Chernobyl accident shows 4 key issues that may be beneficial for the populations living in territories affected by the Fukushima accident: 1) the direct involvement of the inhabitants in their own protection, 2) the radiation monitoring system and health surveillance at the local level, 3) to develop a practical radiation protection culture among the population, and 4) the setting up of economic measures to favour the local development. (A.C.)

  20. Lessons drawn from serious accidents in nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosciusko-Morizet, F.; Tanguy, P.

    1981-01-01

    Taking a number of serious accidents considered to be particularly representative (Windscale, Enrico Fermi, Lucens, Browns Ferry, Three Mile Island and Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux), the paper analyses the conclusions reached in subsequent enquiries and the lessons drawn from them by the responsible authorities. While design problems sometimes come to light, it is much more generally operational safety - problems related to instructions, the training of operators, the man/machine relationship - which appears to be inadequate. The organization of relations between the different partners - builders, operators and safety bodies - likewise gives rise to some observations. Certain measures should be pursued on a broader scale in order to improve our ability to prevent serious accidents: (i) incidents important from the standpoint of safety must be identified; (ii) these incidents must be brought to the knowledge of all partners concerned, in all interested countries; (iii) the lessons drawn from them must be exchanged and compared; and (iv) the lessons must be made generally available in a directly usable form (i.e. as design modifications, changes in instructions and so on). Particular attention must be given to the problems of countries which are embarking on nuclear programmes and which, with a small number of installations, need direct and permanent access to all the lessons drawn from the operation of a large power station park, and must be able to call upon the assistance of teams from outside in the event of an accident. (author)

  1. Lesson from a 60Co source radiation accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo Yong; Zhang Wenzhong

    2002-01-01

    A serious radiation accident happened an a 60 Co irradiation facility in Shanghai. 7 workers were uniformly exposed acutely. An investigation was done after the accident and a conclusion was achieved that the irregular operation was the direct reason for the accident. The operation of these workers did not comply with the requirements specified in the national standards-- 60 irradiation facility>> which demands that the examination should be done every day before operation, and the irradiation facility does not stop running when the auto-lock safety system on that facility has been removed. Some lessons should be drawn from the accident: popularizing the culture of safety, enhancing the law of safety, and ensuring the operation of radiation devices within the demands of safety

  2. Outline of Fukushima nuclear accident and future action. Lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, Toshihiko

    2012-01-01

    Fukushima nuclear accident was caused by loss of all AC power sources (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake. This article reviewed outline of Fukushima nuclear accident progression when on year had passed since and referred to lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan to prevent severe accident in SBO and LUHS events by earthquake and tsunami as future action. This countermeasure would be taken to (1) prevent serious flooding in case a tsunami overwhelms the breakwater, with improving water tightness of rooms for emergency diesel generator, batteries and power centers, (2) enhance emergency power supply and cooling function with mobile electricity generator, high pressure fire pump car and alternate water supply source, (3) mitigate environmental effects caused by core damage with installing containment filtered venting, and (4) enforce emergency preparedness in case of severe accident. Definite countermeasure plan for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPPs was enumerated. (T. Tanaka)

  3. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-02-01

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  4. Chernobyl accident: lessons learned for radiation protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenigsberg, Jacov

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The long-term nature of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which was a major technological catastrophe in terms of its scope and complexity and created humanitarian, environmental, social, economic and health consequences. After more than twenty years we can conclude that Chernobyl accident was requested the big efforts of the national governments and international organisations for improvement new approaches to radiation safety, radiation protection, health care, emergency preparedness and response. During first years after accident some response actions did more harm than good because not based on international radiation protection principles, based on criteria developed during emergency and associated with mistrust, emotions, political pressure. As a result was inappropriate government reaction: unjustified relocation and decontamination - loss jobs, homes, billions of $ cost; unjustified compensation (high portion of annual national budgets). Non-radiological (e.g. detrimental economic, social and psychological) consequences was worse than direct radiological consequences. Psychological effects do not correlate with real exposure but with perception of risk. The affected people believe in threat to their health, doubt what has been reported about accident and resulted doses, got modification in life style, have somatic complains, got substance abuse (alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping pills). The lack of accurate information and misperception of real radiation risk is believed also to have lead to change in behavior of some affected people. Possible long-term health effect due to the accidental exposure remains an issue. There is no doubt that excess thyroid cancer incidence results from exposure to radioactive iodines, mainly by iodine-131. Radiation induced thyroid cancer could easily be prevented by timely warning, effective thyroid blocking, timely restriction of consumption for contaminated food. The

  5. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A.

    2004-01-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  6. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P.; Haywood, J.

    1996-01-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient's chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref

  7. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria). Div. of Nuclear Safety; Novotny, J [University Hospital St. Rafael, Leuven (Belgium); Haywood, J [South Cleveland Hospital (United Kingdom). Cleveland Medical Physics Unit

    1996-08-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient`s chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref.

  8. Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Use of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry and research for technical development continues to increase throughout the world. One application with a high growth rate is irradiation suing high energy gamma photons and electron beams. There are currently more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation in almost all IAEA Member States. The most common uses of these facilities are to sterilize medical and pharmaceutical products, to preserve foodstuffs, to synthesize polymers and to eradicate insects. Although this industry has a good safety record, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences to human health because of the high dose rates produced by these sources. Fatal accidents have occurred at installations in both developed and developing countries. Such accidents have prompted a review of several accidents, including five with fatalities, by a team of manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations. Having looked closely at the circumstances of each accident and the apparent deficiencies in design, safety and regulatory systems and personnel performance, the team made a number of recommendations on the ways in which the safety of irradiators can be improved. The findings of extensive research pertaining to the lessons that can be learned from irradiator accidents are presented. This publication is intended for manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations dealing with industrial irradiators. It was drafted by J.E. Glen, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States of America, and P. Zuniga-Bello, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia, Mexico

  9. Radiological accident and incident in Thailand: Lesson to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ya-anant, N.; Tiyapun, K.; Saiyut, K.

    2011-01-01

    Radioactive materials in Thailand have been used in medicine, research and industry for more than 50 y. Several radiological accident and incidents happened in the past 10 y. A serious one was the radiological accident that occurred in Samut Prakan (Thailand) in 2000. The serious radiological accident occurred when the 60 Co head was partially dismantled, taken from that storage to sell as scrap metal. Three victims died and 10 people received high dose from the source. The lesson learned from the radiological accident in Samut Prakan was to improve in many subjects, such as efficiency in Ministerial Regulations and Atomic Energy Act, emergency response and etc. In addition to the serious accident, there are also some small incidents that occurred, such as detection of contaminated scrap metals from the re-cycling of scrap metals from steel factories. Therefore, the radiation protection infrastructure was established after the accident. Laws and regulations of radiation safety and the relevant regulatory procedures must be revised. (authors)

  10. Ecological lessons from the Chernobyl accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bell, J N B; Shaw, G

    2005-08-01

    The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 not only caused serious ecological problems in both the Ukraine and Belarus, which continue to the present day, but also contaminated a large part of the higher latitudes of the northern hemisphere. In this paper an overview is given of the latter problems in upland UK, where ecological problems still remain some 17 years after initial contamination. Following deposition of radiocaesium and radioiodine in May 1986, measurements of radioactivity in grass and soil indicated a rapidly declining problem as the radioiodine decayed and the radiocaesium became immobilised by attachment to clay particles. However, these studies, as well as the advice received by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, were based on lowland agricultural soils, with high clay and low organic matter contents. The behaviour of radiocaesium in upland UK turned out to be dominated by high and persistent levels of mobility and bioavailability. This resulted in the free passage of radiocaesium through the food chain and into sheep. Consequently the Ministry banned the sale and movement of sheep over large areas of upland Britain, with bans remaining on some farms to the present day. Present day predictions suggest that these bans will continue in some cases for some years to come. The causes of radiocaesium mobility in upland areas have subsequently been the subject of intense investigation centred around vegetation and, in particular, soil characteristics. Soil types were identified which were particularly vulnerable in this respect and, where these coincided with high levels of deposition, sheep bans tended to be imposed. While much of the earlier work suggested that a low clay content was the main reason for continuing mobility, a very high organic matter content is now also believed to play a major role, this being a characteristic of wet and acidic upland UK soils. The overall message from this affair is the importance of a fundamental

  11. Lessons Learnt from Past Incidents and Accidents in Radiation Oncology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knöös, T

    2017-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to review and compile what have been and can be learnt from incidents and accidents in radiation oncology, especially in external beam and brachytherapy. Some major accidents from the last 20 years will be discussed. The relationship between major events and minor or so-called near misses is mentioned, leading to the next topic of exploring the knowledge hidden among them. The main lessons learnt from the discussion here and elsewhere are that a well-functioning and safe radiotherapy department should help staff to work with awareness and alertness and that documentation and procedures should be in place and known by everyone. It also requires that trained and educated staff with the required competences are in place and, finally, functions and responsibilities are defined and well known. Copyright © 2017 The Royal College of Radiologists. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  12. Psychological and social impacts of post-accident situations: lessons from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lochard, J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper presents the main features, from the psychological and social points of view, of the post-accident situation in the contaminated areas around Chernobyl. This is based on a series of surveys performed in the concerned territories of the CIS republics. The high level of stress affecting a large segment of the population is related to the perception of the situation by those living in a durably contaminated environment but also to the side-effects of some of the countermeasures adopted to mitigate the radiological consequences or to compensate the affected population. The distinction between the accident and the post-accident phase is enlarged to take into account the various phases characterizing the dynamics of the social response. Although the size of the catastrophe as well as the economic and political conditions that were prevailing at the time and after the accident have resulted in a maximal intensity of the reactions of the population, many lessons can be drawn for the management of potential post-accident situations. (author)

  13. Overview of Fukushima accident and the lessons learned from it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Dacha Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1a resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPC focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipment and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2 and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3 and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposed the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately

  14. Lessons learned from our accident at Fukushima nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1F resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPCO focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipments and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2, and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3, and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposes the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately. (authors)

  15. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy. An IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.

    1998-01-01

    Radiotherapy is a very special application from the view point of protection because humans are deliberately exposed to high doses of radiation, and no physical barrier can be placed between the source and the patient. It deserves, therefore, special considerations from the point of view of potential exposure. An IAEA's Safety Report (in preparation) reviews a large collection of accident information, their initiating events and contributing factors, followed by a set of lessons learned and measures for prevention. The most important causes were: deficiencies in education and training, lack of procedures and protocols for essential tasks (such as commissioning, calibration, commissioning and treatment delivery), deficient communication and information transfer, absence of defence in depth and deficiencies in design, manufacture, testing and maintenance of equipment. Often a combination of more than one of these causes was present in an accident, thus pointing to a problem of management. Arrangements for a comprehensive quality assurance and accident prevention should be required by regulations and compliance be monitored by a Regulatory Authority. (author)

  16. Lessons of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, M.; Klug, J.; Alzbutas, R.; Burgazzi, L.; Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.; Ivanov, I.; Bogdanov, D.; Hashimoto, K.; Hirata, K.; La Rovere, S.; Sevbo, O.; Vitazkova, J.; Hustak, S.; Wielenberg, A.; Raimond, E.

    2016-01-01

    The objective of this document is to identify some lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA. Based on the public information on the causes that have led to major radioactive release during the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (initiating events, material and human response), the authors, ASAMPSA-E WP30 members have performed a review to examine the gaps/insufficiencies/incompleteness in the existing Level 1 and Level 2 PSAs. This is the aim of this report which is one of WP30 deliverables i.e. D30.2. The consideration of external initiating events for the different levels of defense-in-depth is one of the focal points in this review. Recommendations in the way of developing the different elements of PSAs have been proposed by the authors and were completed later during the ASAMPSA-E project. Moreover, first recommendations on the use of PSA information in decision making have been included as well. (authors)

  17. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tokuhiro, A., E-mail: tokuhio@uidaho.edu [Univ. of Idaho, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-07-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  18. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokuhiro, A.

    2014-01-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  19. Summary of the Current Status of Lessons Learned From Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pasamehmetoglu, Kemal

    2013-01-01

    This presentation introduced the current status of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and in particular, the recommendations released by a NRC Near-term Task Force to enhance reactor safety in the 21. century. The near-term recommendations are focused on emergency power and emergency cooling availability during station blackout accidents

  20. Applicability of health physics lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bevelacqua, J J

    2012-02-01

    The TMI-2 and Fukushima Daiichi accidents appear to be dissimilar because they involve different reactor types. However, the health physics related lessons learned from TMI-2 are applicable, and can enhance the Fukushima Daiichi recovery effort. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  1. Main lessons based on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident liquidation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Nosovskij, A.V.

    2006-01-01

    The authors review the main lessons of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the liquidation of its consequences in the area of the nuclear reactors safety operation, any major accident management, liquidation accident consequences criteria, emergency procedures, preventative measures and treatment irradiated victims, the monitoring methods etc. The special emphasis is put on the questions of the emergency response and the antiaccidental measures planning in frame of international cooperation program

  2. Medical management of radiological accidents in non-specialized clinics: mistakes and lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jikia, D.

    2009-01-01

    In 1996-2002 three radiological accidents were developed in Georgia. There were some people injured in those accidents. During medical management of the injured some mistakes and errors were revealed both in diagnostics and scheme of the treatment. The goal of this article is to summarize medical management of the mentioned radiological accidents, to estimate reasons of mistakes and errors, to present the lessons drawn in result of Georgia radiological accidents. There was no clinic with specialized profile and experience. Accordingly due to having no relevant experience late diagnosis can be considered as the main error. It had direct influence on the patients' health and results of treatment. Lessons to be drawn after analyzing Georgian radiological accidents: 1. informing medical staff about radiological injuries (pathogenesis, types, symptoms, clinical course, principles of treatment and etc.); 2. organization of training and meetings in non-specialized clinics or medical institutions for medical staff; 3. preparation of informational booklets and guidelines.(author)

  3. Accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, F.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Mirhabibi, N.

    1986-01-01

    On March 28, 1979, the TMI, unit 2 nuclear power plant experienced a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which has had a major impact among the others, upon the safety of nuclear power plants. Although a small part of the reactor core melted in this accident, but due to well performance of the vital safety equipment, there was no serious radioactivity release to the environment, and the accident has had no impact on the basic safety goals. A brief scenario of the accident, its consequences and the lessons learned are discussed

  4. Shipments of nuclear fuel and waste: are they really safe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-08-01

    This paper presents a summarized status report on the potential hazards of shipping nuclear materials. Principles of nuclear shipment safety, government regulations, shipment information, quality assurance, types of radioactive wastes, package integrity, packaging materials, number of shipments, accidents, and accident risk are considered

  5. Learning Lessons from TMI to Fukushima and Other Industrial Accidents: Keys for Assessing Safety Management Practices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.-M.; Dien, Y.; Montmayeul, R.; Llory, M.

    2016-01-01

    The main objective of the paper is to discuss and to argue about transfer, from an industrial sector to another industrial sector, of lessons learnt from accidents. It will be achieved through the discussion of some theoretical foundations and through the illustration of examples of application cases in assessment of safety management practices in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The nuclear energy production industry has faced three big ones in 30 years (TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima) involving three different reactor technologies operated in three quite different cultural, organizational and regulatory contexts. Each of those accident has been the origin of questions, but also generator of lessons, some changing the worldview (see Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 1998) of what does cause an accident in addition to the engineering view about the importance of technical failures (human error, safety culture, sociotechnical interactions). Some of their main lessons were implemented such as improvements of human-machine interfaces ergonomics, recast of some emergency operating procedures, severe accident mitigation strategies and crisis management. Some lessons did not really provide deep changes. It is the case for organizational lessons such as, organizational complexity, management of production pressures, regulatory capture, and failure to learn, etc.

  6. BWR severe accident sequence analyses at ORNL - some lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hodge, S.A.

    1983-01-01

    Boiling water reactor severe accident sequence studies are being carried out using Browns Ferry Unit 1 as the model plant. Four accident studies were completed, resulting in recommendations for improvements in system design, emergency procedures, and operator training. Computer code improvements were an important by-product

  7. Immediate medical consequences of nuclear accidents: lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gale, R.P.

    1987-01-01

    The immediate medical response to the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station involved containment of the radioactivity and evacuation of the nearby population. The next step consisted of assessment of the radiation dose received by individuals, based on biological dosimetry, and treatment of those exposed. Medical care involved treatment of skin burns; measures to support bone marrow failure, gastrointestinal tract injury, and other organ damage (i.e., infection prophylaxis and transfusions) for those with lower radiation dose exposure; and bone marrow transplantation for those exposed to a high dose of radiation. At Chernobyl, two victims died immediately and 29 died of radiation or thermal injuries in the next three months. The remaining victims of the accident are currently well. A nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere. Prevention and cooperation in response to these accidents are essential goals

  8. Lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in NRA regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuketa, Toyoshi

    2014-01-01

    The author would like to present significant lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in regulatory requirements developed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority for power-producing light water reactors. The presentation will cover prevention of structures, systems and components failures, measures to prevent common cause failures, prevention of core damage, mitigation of severe accidents, emergency preparedness, continuous improvement of safety, use of probabilistic risk assessment, and post-accident regulation on the Fukushima Dai-ichi. (author)

  9. Goiania radiation accident: activities carried out and lessons learned based on personal experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    Goiânia Radiological Accident, on September 13, 1987, with a radioactive source of cesium-137 with 50.9 TBq, used in radiotherapy, is one of the most important accidents in the scientific area, representing a milestone for all workers in the areas of radiation protection and radiological emergency that worked during the event. A personal view of the Goiânia Radiological Accident is presented, showing some activities carried out in contaminated areas and lessons learned based on own experience during the event

  10. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hirano Masashi

    2017-01-01

    This paper briefly presents the outline of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and summarizes the major lessons learned having been drawn and safety enhancements having been done in Japan for the purpose of giving inputs to the discussions to be taken place in the Special Invited Session “Fukushima, 5 years after”.

  11. Accidents in industrial radiography and lessons to be learned. A review of IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Modupe, M.S.; Oresegun, O.

    1998-01-01

    This IAEA Safety Report Series publication is the result of a review of a large selection of accidents in industrial radiography which Regulatory Authorities, professional associations and scientific journals have reported. The review's objective was to draw lessons from the initiating events of the accidents, contributing factors and the consequences. A small, representative selection of accident descriptions is used to illustrate the primary causes of radiography accidents and a set of recommendations to prevent recurrence of such accidents or to mitigate the consequences of those that do occur is provided. By far the most common primary cause of over-exposure was 'Failure to follow operational procedures' and specifically failure to perform radiation monitoring to locate the position of the source. The information in the Safety Report is intended for use by Regulatory Authorities, operating organizations, workers manufacturers and client organizations having responsibilities for radiation protection and safety in industrial radiography. (author)

  12. Safety Requirements / Design Criteria for SFR. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2013-01-01

    After the Fukushima event (March 2011) the IAEA has started an action to review and revise, if necessary, all Safety Standards to take into consideration the lessons learned from the accident. The Safety Standards that need to be revised have been identified. A Prioritization Approach has been established: The first priority is to review safety guides applicable for NPPs and spent fuel storage with focus on the measures for the prevention and mitigation of severe accident due to external hazards - ● Regulatory framework, Safety assessment, Management system, Radiation protection and Emergency Preparedness and response; ● Sitting, Design, Operation of NPPs ● Decommissioning and Waste Management. Original sources for lessons learned: IAE fact Finding Mission, Japan´s report to the Ministerial Conference, INSAG Report, etc. Later, other lesson sources considered

  13. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-04-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with by plant owners and the regulatory authority. (author)

  14. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with the plant owners and the regulatory authority

  15. Cesium-137 accident lessons in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-11-01

    This document relates the experience obtained by several professionals which had an important role in the cesium-137 accident occurred in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil in September, 1987. It's divided into chapters, according to the action area - medical, nursing, social assistance, odontological and psychological. At first, some notions of radioprotection are explained, followed by the accident history and by the doctors and nurses action during the emergency phase and the medical, odontological, social and psychological assistance to the victims. The social assistance report shows some statistical data about the economic, occupational and social conditions of the accident victims. It is shown some information about the health institutions and the sanitary care in the ionizing radiation and about the occupational radiological protection in Goiania

  16. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations of TEPCO. Outline and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. (author)

  17. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nagasaki, S., E-mail: nagasas@mcmaster.ca [McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, (Canada)

    2015-07-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  18. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nagasaki, S.

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  19. Significance of campaigned spent fuel shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doman, J.W.; Tehan, T.E.

    1993-01-01

    Operational experience associated with spent fuel or irradiated hardware shipments to or from the General Electric Morris Facility is presented. The following specific areas are addressed: Problems and difficulties associated with meeting security and safeguard requirements of 10 CFR Part 73; problems associated with routing via railroad; problems associated with scheduling and impact on affected parties when a shipment is delayed or cancelled; and impact on training when shipments spread over many years. The lessons learned from these experiences indicate that spent fuel shipments are best conducted in dedicated open-quotes campaignsclose quotes that concentrate as much consecutive shipping activity as possible into one continuous time frame

  20. Chemical and nuclear emergencies: Interchanging lessons learned from planning and accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, V.; Sorensen, J.H.; Rogers, G.O.

    1989-01-01

    Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs

  1. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fesenko, S V [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Alexakhin, R M [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Balonov, M I [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Bogdevich, I M [Research Institute for Soil Science and Agrochemistry, Minsk (Belarus); Howard, B J [Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, Lancaster Environment Centre, Library Avenue, Bailrigg, Lancaster LAI 4AP (United Kingdom); Kashparov, V A [Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Radiology (UIAR), Mashinostroiteley Street 7, Chabany, Kiev Region 08162 (Ukraine); Sanzharova, N I [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Panov, A V [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Voigt, G [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Zhuchenka, Yu M [Research Institute of Radiology, 246000 Gomel (Belarus)

    2006-12-15

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  2. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fesenko, S V; Alexakhin, R M; Balonov, M I; Bogdevich, I M; Howard, B J; Kashparov, V A; Sanzharova, N I; Panov, A V; Voigt, G; Zhuchenka, Yu M

    2006-01-01

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  3. Introduction of new terms and lessons for radiological protection after Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Vishwanath P.; Managanvi, S.S.; Bhat, H.R.

    2012-01-01

    The nuclear accidents in the world are very few among various types of operating facilities. However when an accident happened, we have learnt a lot to improve the philosophy, term, definitions, document preparation, equipment's requirement, supporting systems, awareness program and restriction etc. After Fukushima Dai-ichi we have learnt a lot, in this view this paper has been prepared to discuss for radiological protection aspects. Discussion: The probability of nuclear accidents is negligible but when happens, it opens new doors of lessons for radiological protection practices for occupational workers, emergency workers for damage control to prevent catastrophic situation/rescue to life saving actions and the member of the public. The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents have provided a lot experiences for management of emergency situations, documentation, radiation emergency preparedness, emergency equipment's, concept of defense-in-depth, emergency planning zone (EPZ), accidental dose limits, estimation of source term and public dose, intervention levels, decision supporting system, remedial actions in public domain; decontamination of person, houses/building and land and etc. Recent Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in Japan was managed in appreciable manner but still new definitions and lessons for radiological protection have been emerged out. The present paper discusses difficulties w. r. t. the radiological aspects observed/faced by Japanese during nuclear crises. The accident introduced new terms as Natural Dose Rate Unit (NDRU), voluntary evacuation, deliberate evacuation area, restricted area and difference between evacuation zone and EPZ. The Fukushima accident has enforced worldwide regulators and operators to review the individual dose limit and amendment for raise in the dose limit during accident, availability of efficient/adequate quantities of personal dosimeter in public domain, collection arrangement of bulk amount of radioactive wastes

  4. Nuclear Security Summit and Workshop 2015: Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    Workshop 2015 "Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents"--lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima Distribution Statement...by the factor to get the U.S. customary unit. “Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents” – lessons learned from Chernobyl ...and Fukushima NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT & WORKSHOP 2015 2 Background The 1986 Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima accidents provoked world-wide concern

  5. Risk communication in the case of the Fukushima accident: Impact of communication and lessons to be learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perko, Tanja

    2016-10-01

    Risk communication about the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011 was often not transparent, timely, clear, nor factually correct. However, lessons related to risk communication have been identified and some of them are already addressed in national and international communication programmes and strategies. The Fukushima accident may be seen as a practice scenario for risk communication with important lessons to be learned. As a result of risk communication failures during the accident, the world is now better prepared for communication related to nuclear emergencies than it was 5 years ago The present study discusses the impact of communication, as applied during the Fukushima accident, and the main lessons learned. It then identifies pathways for transparent, timely, clear and factually correct communication to be developed, practiced and applied in nuclear emergency communication before, during, and after nuclear accidents. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:683-686. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  6. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J.

    1997-01-01

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented

  7. Safety of HLW shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The third shipment back to Japan of vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) produced through reprocessing in France is scheduled to take place in early 1998. A consignment last March drew protest from interest groups and countries along the shipping route. Requirements governing the shipment of cargoes of this type and concerns raised by Greenpeace that were assessed by an international expert group, were examined in a previous article. A further report prepared on behalf of Greenpeace Pacific has been released. The paper: Transportation accident of a ship carrying vitrified high-level radioactive waste, Part 1 Impact on the Federated States of Micronesia by Resnikoff and Champion, is dated 31 July 1997. A considerable section of the report is given over to discussion of the economic situation of the Federated Statess of Micronesia, and lifestyle and dietary factors which would influence radiation doses arising from a release. It postulates a worst case accident scenario of a collision between the HLW transport ship and an oil tanker 1 km off Pohnpei with the wind in precisely the direction to result in maximum population exposure, and attempts to assess the consequences. In summary, the report postulates accident and exposure scenarios which are conceivable but not credible. It combines a series of worst case scenarios and attempts to evaluate the consequences. Both the combined scenario and consequences have probabilities of occurrence which are negligible. The shipment carried by the 'Pacific Swan' left Cherbourgon 21 January 1998 and comprised 30 tonnes of reprocessed vitrified waste in 60 stainless steel canisters loaded into three shipping casks. (author)

  8. Comparative analysis of the countermeasures taken to mitigate exposure of the public to radioiodine following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents: lessons from both accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uyba, Vladimir; Samoylov, Alexander; Shinkarev, Sergey

    2018-04-01

    In the case of a severe radiation accident at a nuclear power station, the most important radiation hazard for the public is internal exposure of the thyroid to radioiodine. The purposes of this paper were (i) to compare countermeasures conducted (following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents) aimed at mitigation of exposure to the thyroid for the public, (ii) to present comparative estimates of doses to the thyroid and (iii) to derive lessons from the two accidents. The scale and time of countermeasures applied in the early phase of the accidents (sheltering, evacuation, and intake of stable iodine to block the thyroid) and at a later time (control of 131I concentration in foodstuffs) have been described. After the Chernobyl accident, the estimation of the thyroid doses for the public was mainly based on direct thyroid measurements of ~400 000 residents carried out within the first 2 months. The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children reached 50 Gy. After the Fukushima accident, the estimation of thyroid doses was based on radioecological models due to a lack of direct thyroid measurements (only slightly more than 1000 residents were measured). The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children were a few hundred mGy. Following the Chernobyl accident, ingestion of 131I through cows' milk was the dominant pathway. Following the Fukushima accident, it appears that inhalation of contaminated air was the dominant pathway. Some lessons learned following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have been presented in this paper.

  9. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung, E-mail: whwu1127@aec.gov.tw [Atomic Energy Council, 2F., No. 80, Sec.1, Chenggong Rd., Yonghe Dist., New Taipei City 234, Taiwan (China); Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science, National Tsing Hua University, No. 101, Sec. 2, Guangfu Rd., Hsinchu City 300, Taiwan (China); Liao, Lih-Yih, E-mail: lyliao@iner.gov.tw [Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Atomic Energy Council, No. 1000, Wenhua Rd., Jiaan Village, Longtan Township, Taoyuan County 325, Taiwan (China)

    2016-12-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  10. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung; Liao, Lih-Yih

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  11. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    OpenAIRE

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety o...

  12. Lessons Learned after Nuclear Power Plants and Hydropower Plants Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moskalenko, A., E-mail: gce@gce.ru [GCE Group, Saint Petersburg (Russian Federation)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: The World is becoming more open and free for communication. However, the experience (positive or negative) is still badly cross over sectorial borders. I would like to illustrate the point with the examples, even with several unexpected ones. I would like to start with a few words regarding the Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant accident and the factors that caused it. Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant is a unique Hydro Power Plant with efficiency factor of 96 %. Nevertheless, the efficiency factor, in particular, caused a series of restrictions: hydro-electric units vibration amplitude must not exceed 4 micron!!! (Slide 1: Vibration amplitude dependence on output capacity) As it is clearly seen, there is a so called “prohibited area”, which the hydro-electric unit must pass over. Operations in the area are prohibited in accordance with the regulatory documents. However, due to the changes that occurred in Russian power supply industry, the hydro-electric unit passed through the prohibited area more than 12 times, if we take into account only the day of the accident. The bolts keeping the turbine cover, keeping water apart from the machinery hall, were too much released. The mentioned above reasons led to the hydro-electric unit disruption and the machinery hall flooding. Water inflow was possible to stop by putting down the regulating valves. However, the regulating valves control console was in the flooded machinery hall. There was standby emergency control console, but it was in the machinery hall, as well. The machinery hall was flooded, consequently, main and standby systems were destroyed. Moreover, the machinery hall, where all the units were disposed, was a huge hall without dividing walls, etc. (Photo) Take a look at the next slide. (Photo – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant machinery hall). Take note of Fukushima–1 Nuclear Power Plant: standby power supply source was situated in the same place and destroyed by water. All the

  13. Post-facta Analyses of Fukushima Accident and Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanabe, Fumiya [Sociotechnical Systems Safety Research Institute, Ichige (Japan)

    2014-08-15

    Independent analyses have been performed of the core melt behavior of the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on 11-15 March 2011. The analyses are based on a phenomenological methodology with measured data investigation and a simple physical model calculation. Estimated are time variation of core water level, core material temperature and hydrogen generation rate. The analyses have revealed characteristics of accident process of each reactor. In the case of Unit 2 reactor, the calculated result suggests little hydrogen generation because of no steam generation in the core for zirconium-steam reaction during fuel damage process. It could be the reason of no hydrogen explosion in the Unit 2 reactor building. Analyses have been performed also on the core material behavior in another chaotic period of 19-31 March 2011, and it resulted in a re-melt hypothesis that core material in each reactor should have melted again due to shortage of cooling water. The hypothesis is consistent with many observed features of radioactive materials dispersion into the environment.

  14. Sustaining Shipments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonnardel-Azzarelli, Betty [World Nuclear Transport Institute, Remo House, 4th Floor, 310-312 Regent Street, London, London W1B 3AX (United Kingdom)

    2009-06-15

    Transport plays an essential role in bringing the benefits of the atom to people the world over. Each day thousands of shipments of radioactive materials are transported on national and international routes. These consignments are essential to many aspects of modern life, from the generation of electricity, to medicine and health, scientific research and agriculture. Maintaining safe, cost-effective transport is essential to support them. Despite an outstanding safety record spanning over 45 years, the transport of radioactive materials cannot and must not be taken for granted. In an era of nuclear expansion, with increased transports required to more destinations, a worrisome trend for global supply is that some shipping companies, air carriers, ports and terminals, have instituted policies of not accepting radioactive materials. Experience has shown that the reasons for delays and denials of shipments are manifold and often have their origin in mis-perceptions about the nature of the materials and the requirements for their safe handling and carriage. There is growing recognition internationally of the problems created by shipment delays and denials and they now are being addressed in a more proactive way by such organisations as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The rapidly changing supply-demand equation for fuel cycle services: substantial new nuclear build planned or underway in several countries, twenty-first century 'gold rush' fever in uranium exploration and mining, proposed new mechanisms to assure fuel supply to more countries while minimising proliferation risks. But, can supply to meet demand be assured, unless and until transport can be assured? And is it reasonable to expect that transport can be assured to meet the emerging demand-side of the fuel cycle equation when industry already is facing increased instances of shipment delays and denials? It is a worrisome trend for global supply of Class 7 radioactive materials that

  15. Risk Communication Strategies: Lessons Learned from Previous Disasters with a Focus on the Fukushima Radiation Accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Svendsen, Erik R; Yamaguchi, Ichiro; Tsuda, Toshihide; Guimaraes, Jean Remy Davee; Tondel, Martin

    2016-12-01

    It has been difficult to both mitigate the health consequences and effectively provide health risk information to the public affected by the Fukushima radiological disaster. Often, there are contrasting public health ethics within these activities which complicate risk communication. Although no risk communication strategy is perfect in such disasters, the ethical principles of risk communication provide good practical guidance. These discussions will be made in the context of similar lessons learned after radiation exposures in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987; the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Ukraine, in 1986; and the attack at the World Trade Center, New York, USA, in 2001. Neither of the two strategies is perfect nor fatally flawed. Yet, this discussion and lessons from prior events should assist decision makers with navigating difficult risk communication strategies in similar environmental health disasters.

  16. Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magwood, William D. IV; Niel, Jean-Christophe; Fuketa, Toyoshi; Sheron, Brian; Boyd, Michael; McGarry, Ann; Dussart-Desart, Roland; Reig, Javier; Hah, Yeonhee; Nieh, Ho; Vasquez-Maignan, Ximena; Salgado, Nancy; White, Andrew; Lazo, Edward; Creswell, Len; Leeds, Eric; Gannon-Picot, Cynthia; Griffiths, Janice

    2016-01-01

    Countries around the world continue to implement safety improvements and corrective actions based on lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This report provides a high-level summary and update on these activities, and outlines further lessons learnt and challenges identified for future consideration. It focuses on actions taken by NEA committees and NEA member countries, and as such is complementary to reports produced by other international organisations. It is in a spirit of openness and transparency that NEA member countries share this information to illustrate that appropriate actions are being taken to maintain and enhance the level of safety at their nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants are safer today because of these actions. High-priority follow-on items identified by NEA committees are provided to assist countries in continuously benchmarking and improving their nuclear safety practices. (authors)

  17. Our consistent countermeasure following up with lesson from Fukushima NPPs accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae Rok [Korea Academy of Nuclear Safety, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Ro, Seung Gy [Sung woo E and T, Kyeonggi (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Si Hwan [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Nam, Jang Soo [Korean Nuclear Society, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Yoo, Guk Hee [Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Soong Pyung [Chosun Univ., Gwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    Fukushima NPPs accident has not only resulted in driving out the nuclear Renaissance which is about to revive after several lean years, but also given humankind a very rigorous lessons in nuclear safety. Recently administrative systems were reorganized for stepping up further nuclear safety. Nuclear Safety and Security Commission(NSSC) as a governmental organization, directly under the jurisdiction of the president, which is responsible for a nuclear safety mission separated from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. A beef up work of 50 safety related items for Korean NPPs identified after Fukushima NPPs accident has been implemented under the supervision of the commission. It has also been emphasized that sincere communications between the nuclear society and the people at large are essential for obtaining public acceptance of nuclear energy by ensuring the credibility of nuclear safety. The main points of lecture materials presented in the nuclear senior members' forum have been reviewed to derive invaluable guidelines.

  18. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hirano, Masashi

    2017-09-01

    Abstract. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunamis off the Pacific coastline of Japan's Tohoku region caused widespread devastation in Japan. As of June 10, 2016, it is reported that a total of 15,894 people lost their lives and 2,558 people are still unaccounted for. In Fukushima Prefecture, approximately 100,000 people are still obliged to live away from their homes due to the earthquake and tsunami as well as the Fukushima Daiichi accident. On the day, the earthquake and tsunami caused severe damages to the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS). All the units in operation, namely Units 1 to 3, were automatically shut down on seismic reactor protection system trips but the earthquake led to the loss of all off-site electrical power supplies to that site. The subsequent tsunami inundated the site up to 4 to 5 m above its ground level and caused, in the end, the loss of core cooling function in Units 1 to 3, resulting in severe core damages and containment vessel failures in these three units. Hydrogen was released from the containment vessels, leading to explosions in the reactor buildings of Units 1, 3 and 4. Radioactive materials were released to the atmosphere and were deposited on the land and in the ocean. One of the most important lessons learned is an importance to prevent such large scale common cause failures due to extreme natural events. This leads to a conclusion that application of the defense-in-depth philosophy be enhanced because the defense-in-depth philosophy has been and continues to be an effective way to account for uncertainties associated with risks. From the human and organizational viewpoints, the final report from the Investigation Committee of the Government pointed out so-called "safety myth" that existed among nuclear operators including TEPCO as well as the government, that serious severe accidents could never occur in nuclear power plants in Japan. After the accident, the

  19. Strengthening Regulatory Effectiveness in India – Lessons Learnt from Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.

    2016-01-01

    Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, one of the most important lessons learnt, among other things, was the issue of strengthening the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies. Immediately after the Fukushima accident, National level safety audits were conducted on all operating NPPs in India to review safety of NPPs in India. A national action plan has been prepared to implement the identified short term, midterm and long term measures. The assessment indicates that national response to the Fukushima Accident for safety assessment of NPPs and subsequent actions and initiatives taken for safety enhancement of the NPPs in India are in-line with the objectives of the IAEA Action plan. This paper highlights the actions taken by India in the light of Fukushima Daiichi accident in order to strengthen the regulatory effectiveness through improvements in the existing core processes, challenges faced, Insights gained from the recent initiatives on safety performance indicators and assessment of safety culture, relevant observations of IRRS mission report and Indian perspectives on the further cooperation among the member states for enhancing the regulatory effectiveness for nuclear oversight of regulated organizations. (author)

  20. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J. [Research Clinical Inst. of Radiation Medicine and Endocrinology, Minsk (Belarus)

    1997-12-31

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented 9 refs.

  1. Radiation protection lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urabe, Itsumasa; Hattori, Takatoshi; Iimoto, Takeshi; Yokoyama, Sumi

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident are discussed from the viewpoint of radiation protection in the situation of nuclear emergency. It became clear from the discussion that the protective measures should be practiced by taking into account the time profiles of the radiological disaster after the nuclear accident and that the land and coastal sea areas monitoring had to be practiced immediately after the nuclear accident and the communication methods to tell the public about the radiation information and the meaning of protective measures should be developed for mitigation of the sociological aspects of disaster impacts. And it was pointed out from the view point of practicing countermeasures that application of the reference levels, above which it was judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposure to occur, played an important role for practicing protective measures in an optimized way and that the quantities and units used for quantifying radiation exposure of individuals in terms of radiation doses have caused considerable communication problems. Finally, the occupational exposures and the public exposures that have been reported so far are shown, and it is concluded that there is no conclusive evidence on low dose exposures that would justify a modification of the radiation risk recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. (author)

  2. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  3. Learning lessons from accidents with a human and organisational factors perspective: deficiencies and failures of operating experience feedback systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.M.; Jeffroy, F.

    2012-01-01

    This paper aims at reminding the failures of operating experience feedback (OEF) systems through the lessons of accidents and provides a framework for improving the efficiency of OEF processes. The risk is for example to miss lessons from other companies and industrial sectors, or to miss the implementation of adequate corrective actions with the risk to repeat accidents. Most of major accidents have been caused by a learning failure or other organisational factors as a contributing cause among several root causes. Some of the recurring organisational factors are: -) poor recognition of critical components, of critical activities or deficiency in anticipation and detection of errors, -) excessive production pressure, -) deficiency of communication or lack of quality of dialogue, -) Excessive formalism, -) organisational complexity, -) learning deficiencies (OEF, closing feedback loops, lack of listening of whistle-blowers). Some major accidents occurred in the nuclear industry. Although the Three Mile Island accident has multiple causes, in particular, an inappropriate design of the man-machine interface, it is a striking example of the loss of external lessons from incidents. As for Fukushima it is too early to have established evidence on learning failures. The systematic study and organisational analysis of OEF failures in industrial accidents whatever their sector has enabled us to provide a framework for OEF improvements. Five key OEF issues to improve in priority: 1) human and organisational factors analysis of the root causes of the events, 2) listening to the field staff, dissenting voices and whistle-blowers, 3) monitoring of the external events that provide generic lessons, 4) building an alive memory through a culture of accidents with people who become experiences pillars, and 5) the setting of external audit or organisational analysis of the OEF system by independent experts. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  4. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings; L'accident de Fukushima: consequences radiologiques et premiers enseignements. Recueil des presentations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-02-15

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  5. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Actions Taken and Challenges Ahead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Y.

    2016-01-01

    On 19 September, 2012, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established in light of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident of 11 March 2011, to ensure that such accidents never happen again, to restore public trust in regulator both in Japan and abroad and to rebuild and foster a genuine safety culture by placing the highest priority on public safety. The NRA, an independent administrative commission of the Ministry of the Environment, is organized to separate the regulatory functions from the promotional functions of the use of nuclear energy within the government, and to independently implement its duties from the perspectives of neutrality and fairness based on its expertise. Having learned the lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and with reference to IAEA safety standards, since its establishment, the NRA has endeavored to strengthen the regulatory requirements, in particular, for hazards such as tsunamis and earthquakes which may lead to common cause failures, and countermeasures against severe accidents. Under the new regulatory scheme, a back-fitting system was introduced. Emergency preparedness and response measures for nuclear facilities were also enhanced. As of end of March 2016, five reactors received NRA’s permission for changing their reactor installations based on the new regulatory requirements, and two nuclear power reactors have restarted their operations. In January 2016, at the request of Japan, the IAEA sent the IRRS mission team to Japan to assess the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. Through the self-assessment prior to the mission, the NRA has developed 22 action plans, including a) improvement of regulatory inspection, b) capacity building, and c) strengthening of safety research capability. The mission team has found that Japan’s nuclear regulator has demonstrated independence and transparency since it was set up in 2012. The team also noted that the NRA needs to improve the inspection

  6. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    research programmes designed to improve understanding of how the accident progressed as well as to obtain safety-related information during the decommissioning and dismantling of the damaged facilities. This report outlines international efforts to strengthen nuclear regulation, safety, research and radiological protection in the post-Fukushima context. It also highlights key messages and lessons learnt, notably as related to assurance of safety, shared responsibilities, human and organisational factors, defence-in-depth, stakeholder engagement, crisis communication and emergency preparedness

  7. Shipment of radioactive materials by the US Department of Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This brochure provides notification of, and information on, the general types of radioactive material shipments being transported for or on behalf of DOE in commerce across state and other jurisdictional boundaries. This brochure addresses: packaging and material types, shipment identification, modes of transport/materials shipped, DOE policy for routing and oversize/overweight shipments, DOE policy for notification and cargo security, training, emergency assistance, compensation for nuclear accidents, safety record, and principal DOE contact

  8. Generation IV reactors and the ASTRID prototype: lessons from the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauche, F.

    2012-01-01

    In France, the ASTRID prototype is an industrial demonstrator of a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR), fulfilling the criteria for Generation IV reactors. ASTRID will meet safety requirements as stringent as for third generation reactors, and it takes into account lessons from the Fukushima accident. The objectives are to reinforce the robustness of the safety demonstration for all safety functions. ASTRID will feature an innovative core with a negative sodium void coefficient, it will take advantage of the large thermal inertia of SFR for decay heat removal, and will provide for a design either eliminating the sodium-water reaction, or guaranteeing no consequences for safety in case such reaction would take place. (author)

  9. Overseas shipments of 48Y cylinders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanaka, R.T.; Furlan, A.S. [Cameco Corp., Port Hope, Ontario (Canada)

    1991-12-31

    This paper describes experiences with two incidents of overseas shipments of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders. The first incident involved nine empty UF{sub 6} cylinders in enclosed sea containers. Three UF{sub 6} cylinders broke free from their tie-downs and damaged and contaminated several sea containers. This paper describes briefly how decontamination was carried out. The second incident involved a shipment of 14 full UF{sub 6} cylinders. Although the incident did not cause an accident, the potential hazard was significant. The investigation of the cause of the near accident is recounted. Recommendations to alleviate future similar incidents for both cases are presented.

  10. Lessons Learned for Space Safety from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nogami, Manami; Miki, Masami; Mitsui, Masami; Kawada, Ysuhiro; Takeuchi, Nobuo

    2013-09-01

    On March 11 2011, Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake hit Japan and caused the devastating damage. The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) was also severely damaged.The Japanese NPSs are designed based on the detailed safety requirements and have multiple-folds of hazard controls to the catastrophic hazards as in space system. However, according to the initial information from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government, the larger-than-expected tsunami and subsequent events lost the all hazard controls to the release of radioactive materials.At the 5th IAASS, Lessons Learned from this disaster was reported [1] mainly based on the "Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety" [2] published by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in June 2011, three months after the earthquake.Up to 2012 summer, the major investigation boards, including the Japanese Diet, the Japanese Cabinet and TEPCO, published their final reports, in which detailed causes of this accident and several recommendations are assessed from each perspective.In this paper, the authors examine to introduce the lessons learned to be applied to the space safety as findings from these reports.

  11. Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident to improve the performance of the national nuclear preparedness system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewi Apriliani

    2013-01-01

    A study of emergency response failure in the early phase of a nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan has conducted. This study aimed to obtain lesson learned from the problems and constraints that exist at the time of the Fukushima emergency response. This lesson learned will be adjusted to the situation, conditions and problems in nuclear preparedness systems in Indonesia, so that it can obtain the necessary recommendations to improve the performance of SKNN (National Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System). Recommendations include: improvements in coordination and information systems, including early warning systems and dissemination of information; improvements in the preparation of emergency plans/contingency plan, which includes an integrated disaster management; improvement in the development of disaster management practice/field exercise, by extending the scenario and integrate it with nuclear disaster, chemical, biological, and acts of terrorism; and improvement in public education of nuclear emergency preparedness and also improvement in management for dissemination of information to the public and the mass media. These improvements need to be done as part of efforts in preparing a reliable nuclear emergency preparedness in order to support nuclear power plant development plan. (author)

  12. Learning non-technical skill lessons from testimony given in the investigation of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hikono, Masaru; Sakuda, Hiroshi; Matsui, Yuko; Goto, Manabu; Kanayama, Masaki

    2016-01-01

    The Government Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations interviewed individuals concerned. The hearing records, published in 2014, are considered to have valuable lessons for power station managers who encounter severe accidents. In this study, descriptions from the hearing records were extracted as lessons for managers. The extractions were classified by the subject (for whom the lessons are intended), and the category of the non-technical skills. The results showed the possibility of pointing out the lessons in accordance with responsibilities. (author)

  13. Lessons learned from the CEOG generic accident management guidelines confirmation (validation) exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khalil, Y.F.; Schneider, R.E.; Greene, M.A.

    1996-01-01

    In July 1995, the CE Owner's Group completed and issued Revision 0 of the Generic Accident Management Guidelines (AMG's) to the owners group task participants. This guidance provides a structured mechanism for the plant staff at CE utilities to respond to accidents that beyond the plant design basis and, possibly, the Emergency Operating Procedures. Prior to final issue of the generic AMGs, the CEOG conducted an AMG Confirmation Exercise to establish the ability of the AMGs to fulfill this important role. The specific objectives of the AMG Confirmation Exercise were to (1) clarify the interactions and transitions between the AMG/Technical Support Center (TSC) and the EOPS/Operations Personnel (2) validate the adequacy of the AMG data collection and plant condition diagnostic evaluation process and (3) assess the feasibility of the mechanical material and recommendations contained in the AMG's. The purpose of paper is to provide a detailed description of the AMG Confirmation Exercise as well as important lessons learned during the planning and implementation of the exercise. In addition, a discussion will be presented pertaining to the relationship between the AMG's (incumbent to the Technical Support Center) and the plants Emergency Operating Procedures (incumbent to the Control Room Operations Staff)

  14. Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants. Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Miller, Douglass; Rzentkowski, Greg; Lahtinen, Nina; Valtonen, Keijo; Foucher, Laurent; Harikumar, Shri S.; Yamada, Tomoho; Sharafutdinov, Rashet; Kuznetsov, Mark; Carlsson, Lennart; Hanberg, Jan; Theiss, Klaus; Holahan, Gary; Williams, Donna; Nuenighoff, Kay; Wattelle, Emmanuel; Lazo, Edward; White, Andrew; Reig, Javier; Salgado, Nancy; Weightman, Mike

    2016-01-01

    Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident raised many questions and gave unique insight into nuclear safety issues, including DiD. In June 2013, the NEA held a Joint Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to DiD in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (NEA, 2014), organised by the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). It was noted at the time that further work would be beneficial to enhance nuclear safety worldwide, especially with regard to the implementation of DiD. Accordingly, a senior-level task group (STG) was set up to produce a regulatory guidance booklet that would assist member countries in the use of DiD, taking into account lessons learnt from the 2011 accident. This regulatory guidance booklet builds on the work of this NEA workshop, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and of other members of the STG. It uses as its basis the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety study (INSAG-10) (IAEA, 1996). The booklet provides insights into the implementation of DiD by regulators and emergency management authorities after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, aiming to enhance global harmonisation by providing guidance on: - the background to the DiD concept; - the need for independent effectiveness among the safety provisions for the various DiD levels, to the extent practicable; - the need for greater attention to reinforce prevention and mitigation at the various levels; - the vital importance of ensuring that common cause and common mode failures, especially external events acting in combination, do not lead to breaches of safety provisions at several DiD levels, taking note of the

  15. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    Science.gov (United States)

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. PMID:23138450

  16. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239; Lecciones aprendidas en el accidente de contaminacion con Pu-239

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A. [ININ, 52045 Estado de Mexico (Mexico)]. e-mail: gm@nuclear.inin.mx

    2004-07-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  17. Lessons drawn from the accidents occurred in the framework of conventional external radiotherapy;Lecons tirees des accidents survenus dans le cadre de la radiotherapie externe conventionnelle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Holmberg, O. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Section Securite et Controle, Vienna (Austria); Czarwinski, R. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Vienna (Austria)

    2009-12-15

    This study examines some radiation accidents occurred in the past. This information has been systematically assessed to get global lessons. The experience feedback shows that the most of accidents happened in certain conditions. These conditions can be distributed in four categories: 1- perception and vigilance in occupation: accidental exposure happened by lack of vigilance in details and lack of vigilance and perception; 2- procedures: accidental exposure happened following a lack of procedures or control that were not enough complete, not enough documented or not completely implemented; 3- training and understanding: accidental exposures happened because the personnel was not enough qualified and educated, did not get the general training nor the the necessary specialized training; 4- liabilities: accidental exposures happened following lacks and ambiguity in the definition of functions of the personnel and in the hierarchy liabilities. In these precise cases the safety tasks have not been enough covered. (N.C.)

  18. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G.; Lochard, J.; Bataille, C.; Ollagnon, H.; Baude, St.

    2008-01-01

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  19. Considering lessons learned about safety culture and their reflection to activity. After Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obu, Etsuji; Hamada, Jun; Fukano, Takuya

    2011-01-01

    Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident forced neighboring residents to evacuate for a long time and gave Public anxieties greatly and significant effects to social activities in Japan. Public trust of nuclear power was lost by not preventing the accident and future of nuclear power became reconsidered, which nuclear industry people regretted deeply. Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) had conducted activities enhancing safety culture in nuclear industry. It would be necessary to consider improvements of accident prevention and mitigation measures after evaluating the accident in a viewpoint of 'safety culture'. Based on published information and knowledge accumulated by activities of JANTI, the accident was examined taking account of greatness of nuclear accident and its effects from the side of safety culture. Lessons learned about safety culture were pointed out as; (1) reconfirmation of specialty of nuclear technology. (2) reinforcement of questioning and learning attitudes and (3) improvement of evaluation capability of nuclear safety and safety assurance against external event. These were reflected in activities such as; (1) reconsideration of safety culture assessment, (2) strengthening further support to improve safety culture consciousness and (3) improvement of peer review activity. (T. Tanaka)

  20. Experience and lessons learned from emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear power station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu Xiegu; Zhen Bei; Yang Xiaoming; Chen Xiaohua

    2012-01-01

    After Fukushima nuclear accident, we visited the related medical aid agencies for nuclear accidents and conducted investigations in disaster-affected areas in Japan. This article summarizes the problems with emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear accident while disclosing problems should be solved during the emergency force construction for nuclear accidents. (authors)

  1. Analysis on the nitrogen drilling accident of Well Qionglai 1 (II: Restoration of the accident process and lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yingfeng Meng

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available All the important events of the accident of nitrogen drilling of Well Qionglai 1 have been speculated and analyzed in the paper I. In this paper II, based on the investigating information, the well log data and some calculating and simulating results, according to the analysis method of the fault tree of safe engineering, the every possible compositions, their possibilities and time schedule of the events of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 have been analyzed, the implications of the logging data have been revealed, the process of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 has been restored. Some important understandings have been obtained: the objective causes of the accident is the rock burst and the induced events form rock burst, the subjective cause of the accident is that the blooie pipe could not bear the flow burden of the clasts from rock burst and was blocked by the clasts. The blocking of blooie pipe caused high pressure in wellhead, the high pressure made the blooie pipe burst, natural gas came out and flared fire. This paper also thinks that the rock burst in gas drilling in fractured tight sandstone gas zone is objective and not avoidable, but the accidents induced from rock burst can be avoidable by improving the performance of the blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and drilling tool accessories aiming at the downhole rock burst.

  2. Considerations on Fail Safe Design for Design Basis Accident (DBA) vs. Design Extension Condition (DEC): Lesson Learnt from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jun Su; Kim, Sungyeop

    2014-01-01

    The fail safety design is referred to as an inherently safe design concept where the failure of an SSC (System, Structure or Component) leads directly to a safe condition. Usually the fail safe design has been devised based on the design basis accident (DBAs), because the nuclear safety has been assured by securing the capability to safely cope with DBAs. Currently regards have been paid to the DEC (Design Extension Condition) as an extended design consideration. Hence additional attention should be paid to the concept of the fail safe design in order to consider the DEC, accordingly. In this study, a case chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC standpoints. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well. One of the lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident should include considerations on the fail-safe design in a changing regulatory framework. Currently the design extension condition (DEC) including severe accidents should be considered during designing and licensing NPPs. Hence concepts on the fail safe design need to be changed to be based on not only the DBA but also the DEC. In this study, a case on a fail-safe design chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC conditions. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well

  3. Summary of the foreign countries reports on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants accident, on the lessons learnt and recommendation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2017-01-01

    This paper focused on the lessons and recommendations from the accident investigation reports prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), IAEA, and OECD/NEA on the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake. (1) As for the causes of the accident, the IAEA report pointed out as a technical factor that Japan's scientists did not think that the earthquake occurrence probability of the magnitude 9 as an external event was high. As for tsunami countermeasures, it reported that accident countermeasures would have been easier if only seawater pump flood protection and the high-elevation positioning of emergency power supply etc. were prepared. As for human organizational factor, it pointed out that nuclear regulations were performed by many divided organizations, and responsibility and authority were not clear. The NAS report pointed out that the regulatory agency and nuclear promotion agency were not functionally separated, and that the regulatory agency was not independent as a result of the relationship between the Japanese government agency and companies, and the agency became a captive of regulations. The following items were also reported; (2) safety measures and emergency preparedness, (3) off-site response during emergency, (4) radiation effects, (5) restoration after the accident, (6) international issues, and (7) issues of the spent fuel storage pool of NAS. Japan established the Nuclear Regulation Authority by integrating related organizations, but how to create a regulatory agency with advanced expertise is the future task. (A.O.)

  4. Lessons learned from accident simulation exercises and their implications for operation of the IPSN Centre Technique de Crise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manesse, D.; Ney, J.; Crabol, B.; Ginot, P.

    1990-01-01

    The Centre Technique de Crise (CTC) of the Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire (IPSN) has an important role to play in the event of an accident at a nuclear installation of Electricite de France (EdF) concerning diagnosis of the situation and forecasting its evolution. For this purpose the CTS is organized into various groups; only that responsible for the evaluation of the radiological consequences is considered in the present paper. Since the beginning of the eighties numerous simulations of nuclear accidents have been organized both by the public authorities and by the nuclear operators. These exercises, of growing complexity, are distinguished according to the type of installation concerned, the scenario (with and without a simulator), the equipment involved, the participants (local and national officials), the accident phase used (at the time of the accident or post-accident), the use of actual or pre-determined meteorological conditions etc.. Different combinations are imposed as a function of the specific aims of each exercise. Numerous lessons have been drawn progressively from these very varied exercises for the operation of the CTC and, in particular, of the Radiological Consequences Group. The principal Lessons concern: development of calculation and mapping tools, specific liaison with the national meteorological services, modification of the centre's facilities, composition of the team and definition of the role of each of its members, improved liaison with the Site Evaluation Group and the provision of appropriate documentation. The need for continuous training of duty teams in the form of presentations and exercises has also been confirmed

  5. Covering techniques for severe burn treatment: lessons for radiological burn accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carsin, H.; Stephanazzi, J.; Lambert, F.; Curet, P.M.; Gourmelon, P.

    2002-01-01

    Covering techniques for severe burn treatment: lessons for radiological burn accidents. After a severe burn, the injured person is weakened by a risk of infection and a general inflammation. The necrotic tissues have to be removed because they are toxic for the organism. The injured person also needs to be covered by a cutaneous envelope, which has to be done by a treatment centre for burned people. The different techniques are the following: - auto grafts on limited burned areas; - cutaneous substitutes to cover temporary extended burned areas. Among them: natural substitutes like xenografts (pork skin, sheep skin,..) or allografts (human skin), - treated natural substitutes which only maintain the extracellular matrix. Artificial skins belong to this category and allow the development of high quality scars, - cell cultures in the laboratory: multiplying the individual cells and grafting them onto the patient. This technique is not common but allows one to heal severely injured patients. X-ray burns are still a problem. Their characteristics are analysed: intensive, permanent, antalgic resistant pain. They are difficult to compare with heat burns. In spite of a small number of known cases, we can give some comments and guidance on radio necrosis cures: the importance of the patients comfort, of ending the pain, of preventing infection, and nutritional balance. At the level of epidermic inflammation and phlyctena (skin blisters), the treatment may be completed by the use of growth factors. At the level of necrosis, after a temporary cover, an auto graft can be considered only if a healthy basis is guaranteed. The use of cellular cultures in order to obtain harmonious growth factors can be argued. (author)

  6. Lessons of the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veksler, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    Measures taken in the USA for improving safety of NPPs after the accident at ''Three Mile Island'' nuclear power plant are considered. Activities, related to elimination of accident consequences are analyzed. Perspectives of resuming the NPP operation are discussed

  7. Post-processing activities after Chernobyl accident in Ukraine and lesson learned to the response Fukushima Dai-ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujii, Yuzo

    2012-01-01

    After the accident of Chernobyl NPP no.4 1986, various activities including the construction of the shelter, prevention of the release of radioactive dust and liquid from the shelter, monitoring the condition of the damaged core, and disposal of radioactive waste have been implemented in the Chernobyl site for mitigating the nuclear and radioactive risks of damaged nuclear facilities, and the reducing radiation dose of working personnel. The construction of new shelter started for the decommissioning of the damaged unit no.4. facility. For reducing the radiation dose to the inhabitants from the contaminated land and feedstuff, the countermeasures including the set of the exclusive zone and permissible level of radionuclide in the foodstuff have been conducted for the countrywide. These activities include many valuable information about how to recover the condition of the site and maintain the social activities after the severe accident of NPP, and it would be important to learn the above activities in conducting the post-processing activities on the Fukushima-Daiichi accident successfully. (author)

  8. Radiation accidents: occurrence, types, consequences, medical management, and the lessons to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turai, I.; Veress, K.

    2001-01-01

    The paper reviews the frequency, causes and occurrence of radiation accidents with some significant exposure to human. More detailed information is provided in tabulated form on the health consequences of those twenty severe radiation accidents that occurred in 1986-2000, world-wide. Reference is given to the very low cumulative incidence of significant radiation accidents, as during the last 57 years there were, in average, seven registered accidents annually in all countries of the world. Thus, the chance for most of the physicians to meet a patient with symptoms of acute radiation injury during their professional career is very low

  9. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.

    1990-07-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  10. Lessons learned from major accidents relating to ageing of chemical plants

    OpenAIRE

    GYENES ZSUZSANNA; WOOD Maureen

    2016-01-01

    Major industrial accidents that occurred in the past and even recently, such as the Flixborough, UK in 1974, the ConocoPhillips, UK in 2001 and the Chevron, US in 2012 show that ageing is still a disturbing phenomenon present in chemical process industries. Further to these cases, it is estimated that 30 % of the major accidents reported in the eMARS accident database run by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission are connected to at least one ageing phenomenon. It is som...

  11. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cigna, A [ENEA - Area Energia, Ambiente e Salute, Centro Ricerche Energia, Saluggia, Vercelli (Italy)

    1990-07-15

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  12. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.A.

    1990-01-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accidents is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the Commission of the European Communities for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different groups of radionuclides in foodstuffs is reviewed. The different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are also reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized

  13. How to manage forest environments after a nuclear accident? Lessons learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    Based on several published studies, this report proposes a synthetic overview of observations made on the fate of radionuclides in contaminated forests, like in forest environments which represent a great part of highly contaminated areas about Chernobyl and Fukushima. It appears that the main characteristics of forest ecosystems impacted by radioactive fallouts are different (there is no 'red' (dead) forest around Fukushima), that processes governing the fate of radionuclides in forest ecosystems imply a high remanence of radioactive contamination in these environments. It also appears that the interception of radioactive fallouts by the canopy and radionuclide transfers towards the litter and the soil are the most important processes during the early phase and during the first months after the accident. Thus, the soil becomes the main reservoir in which radio-caesium can be found. Some studies outline that the management of contaminated forest ecosystems after the Fukushima accident differs from that applied in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Others notice that the fire risk is higher in the Chernobyl exclusion zone

  14. A summary of the Three Mile Island accident: from zero hour to lessons for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, L.F.S. de; Oliveira Barroso, A.C. de

    The accident that occured at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, unit 2 (TMI-2) in March 1979 is analysed. The main events that occured during the accident are described in detail. The main project features of TMI-2 and Angra-1 nuclear power plant, Brazil are compared and analysed. (L.F.S.) [pt

  15. The lessons from the radiation accidents in China over the past 40 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang, Y.; Ma, J.; Yang, J.

    1998-01-01

    A brief introduction and analysis of the radiological accidents in China during the past 40 years have been made in this paper. Statistical data provided by the competent authority show that a number of cases of radiological accidents and events happened in China from 1954 to 1994. Quite a few persons received abnormal exposure. Some serious accidents resulted in death of 8 victims. The reasons of these accidents are analyzed and some recommendations for reduction of potential exposure and accidents involving radiation sources and equipment generating ionization radiation have been given, such as perfecting and improving radiation safety infrastructure and system for the control of radiation sources. It is suggested that safety culture shall be fostered, each individual must be suitably trained and qualified and the management of spent sources should be strengthened. (author)

  16. Analysis of Surface Water Pollution Accidents in China: Characteristics and Lessons for Risk Management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yao, Hong; Zhang, Tongzhu; Liu, Bo; Lu, Feng; Fang, Shurong; You, Zhen

    2016-04-01

    Understanding historical accidents is important for accident prevention and risk mitigation; however, there are no public databases of pollution accidents in China, and no detailed information regarding such incidents is readily available. Thus, 653 representative cases of surface water pollution accidents in China were identified and described as a function of time, location, materials involved, origin, and causes. The severity and other features of the accidents, frequency and quantities of chemicals involved, frequency and number of people poisoned, frequency and number of people affected, frequency and time for which pollution lasted, and frequency and length of pollution zone were effectively used to value and estimate the accumulated probabilities. The probabilities of occurrences of various types based on origin and causes were also summarized based on these observations. The following conclusions can be drawn from these analyses: (1) There was a high proportion of accidents involving multi-district boundary regions and drinking water crises, indicating that more attention should be paid to environmental risk prevention and the mitigation of such incidents. (2) A high proportion of accidents originated from small-sized chemical plants, indicating that these types of enterprises should be considered during policy making. (3) The most common cause (49.8 % of the total) was intentional acts (illegal discharge); accordingly, efforts to increase environmental consciousness in China should be enhanced.

  17. Analysis of Surface Water Pollution Accidents in China: Characteristics and Lessons for Risk Management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yao, Hong; Zhang, Tongzhu; Liu, Bo; Lu, Feng; Fang, Shurong; You, Zhen

    2016-04-01

    Understanding historical accidents is important for accident prevention and risk mitigation; however, there are no public databases of pollution accidents in China, and no detailed information regarding such incidents is readily available. Thus, 653 representative cases of surface water pollution accidents in China were identified and described as a function of time, location, materials involved, origin, and causes. The severity and other features of the accidents, frequency and quantities of chemicals involved, frequency and number of people poisoned, frequency and number of people affected, frequency and time for which pollution lasted, and frequency and length of pollution zone were effectively used to value and estimate the accumulated probabilities. The probabilities of occurrences of various types based on origin and causes were also summarized based on these observations. The following conclusions can be drawn from these analyses: (1) There was a high proportion of accidents involving multi-district boundary regions and drinking water crises, indicating that more attention should be paid to environmental risk prevention and the mitigation of such incidents. (2) A high proportion of accidents originated from small-sized chemical plants, indicating that these types of enterprises should be considered during policy making. (3) The most common cause (49.8% of the total) was intentional acts (illegal discharge); accordingly, efforts to increase environmental consciousness in China should be enhanced.

  18. Thirty years after the Chernobyl accident: What lessons have we learnt?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beresford, N.A.; Fesenko, S.; Konoplev, A.; Skuterud, L.; Smith, J.T.; Voigt, G.

    2016-01-01

    April 2016 sees the 30 th anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As a consequence of the accident populations were relocated in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine and remedial measures were put in place to reduce the entry of contaminants (primarily 134+137 Cs) into the human food chain in a number of countries throughout Europe. Remedial measures are still today in place in a number of countries, and areas of the former Soviet Union remain abandoned. The Chernobyl accident led to a large resurgence in radioecological studies both to aid remediation and to be able to make future predictions on the post-accident situation, but, also in recognition that more knowledge was required to cope with future accidents. In this paper we discuss, what in the authors' opinions, were the advances made in radioecology as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. The areas we identified as being significantly advanced following Chernobyl were: the importance of semi-natural ecosystems in human dose formation; the characterisation and environmental behaviour of ‘hot particles'; the development and application of countermeasures; the “fixation” and long term bioavailability of radiocaesium and; the effects of radiation on plants and animals. - Highlights: • A review of 30 years of radioecological studies following the 1986 Chernobyl accident. • Key contributions to radioecology from post-Chernobyl research are discussed.

  19. Accident on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Getting over the consequences and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    The book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of the accident on the 4th Power Unit of the Chernobyl NPP. The power plant construction history, accident reasons, its consequences, the measures on its liquidation are represented. The current state of activity on the Chernobyl power unit decommission, the 'Shelter' object conversion into the ecologically safe system is described. The future of the Chernobyl NPP site and disposal zone is discussed

  20. FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE ACTIONS FROM THE RISK PERSPECTIVES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    JOON-EON YANG

    2014-02-01

    Full Text Available The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  1. Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident: Lessons Learned and Future Actions from the Risk Perspectives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Jooneon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-02-15

    The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  2. Thirty years after the Chernobyl accident: What lessons have we learnt?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beresford, N A; Fesenko, S; Konoplev, A; Skuterud, L; Smith, J T; Voigt, G

    2016-06-01

    April 2016 sees the 30(th) anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As a consequence of the accident populations were relocated in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine and remedial measures were put in place to reduce the entry of contaminants (primarily (134+137)Cs) into the human food chain in a number of countries throughout Europe. Remedial measures are still today in place in a number of countries, and areas of the former Soviet Union remain abandoned. The Chernobyl accident led to a large resurgence in radioecological studies both to aid remediation and to be able to make future predictions on the post-accident situation, but, also in recognition that more knowledge was required to cope with future accidents. In this paper we discuss, what in the authors' opinions, were the advances made in radioecology as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. The areas we identified as being significantly advanced following Chernobyl were: the importance of semi-natural ecosystems in human dose formation; the characterisation and environmental behaviour of 'hot particles'; the development and application of countermeasures; the "fixation" and long term bioavailability of radiocaesium and; the effects of radiation on plants and animals. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  3. Severe Accident Management Guidance: Lessons Still to be Learned after Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vayssier, G.

    2016-01-01

    After the accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl, many countries decided to develop and implement guidelines specifically directed to mitigate accidents with core damage, so-called severe accidents. The guidelines are usually named Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). In the USA, all operating plants had these guidelines in place at the end of 1998. Most other countries followed later, but today, it can be said that many nuclear power plants in the world have such guidelines in place. Typically, however, the guidelines were constructed under the assumption that many plant systems still will be available, i.e. there will be DC to feed the instruments, AC to feed equipment and water to restore cooling to the core. Typically, this was basically the situation at TMI: most equipment was functional, only the insight of what had happened had been lost and operators did not know how to respond. At Fukushima-Daiichi, a Site Disruptive Accident (SDA) occurred and it appeared that the situation was much more complex: much of the needed supportive equipment needed was unavailable, which greatly complicated the handling of the event. In this paper, the major shortcomings of the present existing SAMG are discussed, both from a technical, and an organisational viewpoint. It is concluded that, where proper regulation still is missing, the development of an industrial standard is recommended to define adequate tools and guidelines to mitigate severe accidents, including SDAs. (author).

  4. Supply Chain Shipment Pricing Data

    Data.gov (United States)

    US Agency for International Development — This data set provides supply chain health commodity shipment and pricing data. Specifically, the data set identifies Antiretroviral (ARV) and HIV lab shipments to...

  5. Shipment security update - 2003

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patterson, John; Anne, Catherine

    2003-01-01

    At the 2002 RERTR, NAC reported on the interim measures taken by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enhance the security afforded to shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Since that time, there have been a number of additional actions focused on shipment security including training programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Electric Power Research Council, investigation by the Government Accounting Office, and individual measures taken by shippers and transportation agents. The paper will present a status update regarding this dynamic set of events and provide an objective assessment of the cost, schedule and technical implications of the changing security landscape. (author)

  6. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-12-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  7. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-01-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme

  8. Emergency planning lessons learned from a review of past major radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephan, J.G.; Selby, J.M.; Martin, J.B.; Moeller, D.W.; Vallario, E.J.

    1988-01-01

    In examining a range of nuclear accidents from the 1950s to the present that were reported in the literature, the authors have identified a number of contributing factors which affected human judgement during these events. One common thread found in a large number of accidents is the time of occurrence; a second is the adequacy of emergency training. The data show that events, whether severe accidents or operational incidents, appear to occur more frequently during off-normal hours such as the early morning shift, weekends, or holidays. Accidents seldom occur during the day shift when the full management team and senior operations personnel are present. As a result, those facility employees most expert in coping with the situation may not be available, and the normal chain of command may be disrupted. At several nuclear power plants, it was also observed that new or less experienced technicians are often assigned to night shifts. The lack of experienced human resources and the pressure of an accident situation can have an adverse impact on individuals who are faced with making important decisions

  9. 10 years from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident: consequences and lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Published jointly by the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety and the Czech National Radiation Protection Institute, the publication gives a succinct account of the cause of the Chernobyl accident and its impact on the former Soviet Union, and concentrates on the effects of the accident on the Czech Republic. The topics dealt with in this respect include, among others: radionuclide contents of foods with particular emphasis on milk products for babies, assessment of surface contamination of the Czech Republic due to the accident, internal contamination of the population as determined by whole-body measurements, assessment of the effective dose equivalents from external irradiation and effective dose equivalent commitments from internal irradiation, cesium radioisotopes in natural ecosystems, and the use of post-Chernobyl monitoring to test radionuclide migration models within the IAEA VAMP programme. (P.A.). 12 tabs., 30 figs., 64 refs

  10. Design Safety Considerations for Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors Incorporating Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    The global future deployment of advanced nuclear reactors for electricity generation depends primarily on the ability of nuclear industries, utilities and regulatory authorities to further enhance their reliability and economic competitiveness while satisfying stringent safety requirements. The IAEA has a project to help coordinate Member States efforts in the development and deployment of small and medium sized or small modular reactor (SMR) technology. This project aims simultaneously to facilitate SMR technology developers and potential SMR uses, particularly States embarking on a nuclear power programme, in identifying key enabling technologies and enhancing capacity building by resolving issues relevant to deployment, including nuclear reactor safety. The objective of this publication is to explore common practices for Member States, which will be an essential resource for future development and deployment of SMR technology. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was caused by an unprecedented combination of natural events: a strong earthquake, beyond the design basis, followed by a series of tsunamis of heights exceeding the design basis tsunami considered in the flood analysis for the site. Consequently, all the operating nuclear power plants and advanced reactors under development, including SMRs, have been incorporating lessons learned from the accident to assure and enhance the performance of the engineered safety features in coping with such external events

  11. Internal dose assessment due to large area contamination: Main lessons drawn from the Chernobyl accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrasi, A [KFKI Atomic Energy Research Inst., Budapest (Hungary)

    1997-03-01

    The reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 beside its serious and tragic consequences provided also an excellent opportunity to check, test and validate all kind of environmental models and calculation tools which were available in the emergency preparedness systems of different countries. Assessment of internal and external doses due to the accident has been carried out for the population all over Europe using different methods. Dose predictions based on environmental model calculation considering various pathways have been compared with those obtained by more direct monitoring methods. One study from Hungary and one from the TAEA is presented shortly. (orig./DG)

  12. Lessons of TEPCO's Fukushima accident from human and organizational aspects and challenge for nuclear safety reform

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, Akira

    2013-01-01

    The author participated in international experts' meeting held by IAEA on May 21, 2013 and presented the paper focusing on human and organizational aspects of the Fukushima nuclear accident. It clarified TEPCO's basic recognition: 'The cause of the accident should not be treated merely as a natural disaster due to an enormous tsunami being something difficult to anticipate and we believe it is necessary to seriously acknowledge the result that TEPCO failed to avoid an accident which might have been avoided if ample preparations had been made in advance with thorough use of human intellect' and then reconsidered the Fukushima nuclear accident: 'could we predict an enormous tsunami and take whatever countermeasures?' and 'could we respond to the accident better?' for the worldwide operators to avoid such an accident, which moved meeting's participants deeply. Presentation's contents followed 'Reassessment of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Nuclear Safety Reform Plan' published by TEPCO on March 29. This article described outline of the presentation. Though the only way to explore the possibility to save Unit 1 was that operators could bravely go up to the 4th floor of reactor building and open the isolation valves to start IC, it was given up without any clear communication among key decision makers for confirming the IC operational status. As for Unit 3, operators could not achieve thorough focus on ensuring core cooling such that proactive transfer from RCIC/HPCI to low pressure water injection was not challenged, mainly because of low trust on Diesel/Driven Fire Protection Pump (DDFP). During the design stage and afterward, ample consideration was not given to common cause failures originating in external events, which led to a severe situation where almost all the power supplies and safety system functions were lost. Continuous efforts to reduce risks were not ample, including the collection, analysis and utilization of information on safety enhancement

  13. Internal dose assessment due to large area contamination: Main lessons drawn from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrasi, A.

    1997-01-01

    The reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 beside its serious and tragic consequences provided also an excellent opportunity to check, test and validate all kind of environmental models and calculation tools which were available in the emergency preparedness systems of different countries. Assessment of internal and external doses due to the accident has been carried out for the population all over Europe using different methods. Dose predictions based on environmental model calculation considering various pathways have been compared with those obtained by more direct monitoring methods. One study from Hungary and one from the TAEA is presented shortly. (orig./DG)

  14. Media coverage of Fukushima accident in the Russian press. Lessons for radiation emergency risk communication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melikhova, E.; Arutyunyan, R.

    2014-01-01

    The paper reviews recent results of content analysis of the Russian press and data of all-Russia public opinion polls on the subject of the Fukushima accident and discusses them in the wider context of challenges in communication of 'no risk' messages to the public in the case of a nuclear accident. Radiation risk regulation base in the low dose range is proposed to be one of the main obstacles for the communication and a new approach to emergency risk communication is proposed. (author)

  15. Key regulatory and safety issues emerging NEA activities. Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Accident - Key Regulatory and Safety Issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakoski, John

    2013-01-01

    A presentation was provided on the key safety and regulatory issues and an update of activities undertaken by the NEA and its members in response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power stations (NPS) on 11 March 2011. An overview of the accident sequence and the consequences was provided that identified the safety functions that were lost (electrical power, core cooling, and primary containment) that lead to units 1, 2, and 3 being in severe accident conditions with large off-site releases. Key areas identified for which activities of the NEA and member countries are in progress include accident management; defence-in-depth; crisis communication; initiating events; operating experience; deterministic and probabilistic assessments; regulatory infrastructure; radiological protection and public health; and decontamination and recovery. For each of these areas, a brief description of the on-going and planned NEA activities was provided within the three standing technical committees of the NEA with safety and regulatory mandates (the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities - CNRA, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations - CSNI, and the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health - CRPPH). On-going activities of CNRA include a review of enhancement being made to the regulatory aspects for the oversight of on-site accident management strategies and processes in light of the lessons learned from the accident; providing guidance to regulators on crisis communication; and supporting the peer review of the safety assessments of risk-significant research reactor facilities in light of the accident. Within the scope of the CSNI mandate, activities are being undertaken to better understand accident progression; characteristics of new fuel designs; and a benchmarking study of fast-running software for estimating source term under severe accident conditions to support protective measure recommendations. CSNI also has ongoing work in human

  16. JANSI’s Activities for Reflecting Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kugo, Akihide

    2014-01-01

    Conclusion: JANSI will continue to lay the groundwork for preventing an accident like the Fukushima Daiichi from ever happening again. JANSI will develop the system to provide an opportunity of “awareness” for operators to enhance nuclear safety and to follow-up their efforts continuously

  17. Lessons learnt from clean-up of urban area after Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zlobenko, Borys

    2008-01-01

    The accident at Chernobyl NPP showed that huge territories including densely populated areas can be exposed to contamination as a result of unforeseen circumstances. The Chernobyl accident forced reconsidering of many regulations in the field of population protection and was a powerful incentive to development of many applied sciences. In 1992-1996, an international team of scientists carried out investigations on ECP-4 project 'Strategies of Decontamination'. Including of an independent sub-project 'Urban environment and countermeasures' into the project of French-German initiative on Chernobyl 'Radioecology' was the extension of work on study of urban environment contamination. The aim of the projects ware to synthesize the large body of experimental data received during elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and in the course of special studies carried out in former USSR and later in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, and prediction on this basis of radionuclide behavior in the urban environment. In 2003 the EMRAS (Environmental Modelling for Radiation Safety) project was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Urban Remediation Working Group of the EMRAS has focused on the assessment of the effectiveness of countermeasures employed in urban settings after releases of radioactivity. This review considers results of principally Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarus researchers who worked on these projects. Over the 20-year period a number of publications have reviewed the effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly those used after the Chernobyl accident. The general principles of radiological protection are based on radiation doses, intervention levels and effective countermeasures. Decontamination of densely built-up cities constructed of various building materials with total surface area significantly exceeding the administrative city area is an extremely difficult task. In the Late-Phase Response, 'classical' radiological

  18. Ethical aspects of the effects of the Chernobyl accident: lessons and problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishatkina, T.V.; Mel'nov, S.B.; Sarana, Yu.V.

    2011-01-01

    The different aspects of observing of eco- and bioethics principles and requirements upon the attitude to human in the situations of emergency are discussed basing on the tragic lessons of the Chernobyl catastrophe. They are attitude to population located in the region influenced by the catastrophe, attitude to the liquidators, and attitude to the subjects of biomedical researches. The characteristics of the moral and psychological factors of radioecological stress are given. Ethical issues of estimation of low dose radiation effects are analyzed

  19. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L.

    2006-01-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  20. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  1. Retrospective dosimetry of populations exposed to reactor accident: Chernobyl example, lesson for Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chumak, Vadim V.

    2013-01-01

    Follow-up of the Chernobyl accident had included a good deal of retrospective dosimetry and dose reconstruction. Comparison of Chernobyl and Fukushima shows that despite some differences in course and scale of the two accidents, main elements are present in both situations and Chernobyl experience could be quite educative for better understanding and more optimal handling of Fukushima Dai-ichi accident consequences. This paper contains review of dose reconstruction efforts done to date and extensively published in scientific journals and reports. Specifically the following cases are considered: (i) evaluation of individual doses to evacuees; (ii) validation of ecological dosimetric models and ruling out unconfirmed dose rate measurements; dosimetric support of (iii) case–control study of leukemia among Chernobyl clean-up workers (liquidators), and (iv) cohort study of cataracts among liquidators. Due to limited size of this paper the given application cases are rather outlined while more detailed descriptions could be found in relevant publications. Each considered Chernobyl case is commented with respect to possible application to Fukushima Dai-ichi situation. The presented methodological findings and approaches could be used for retrospective assessment of human exposures in Fukushima. -- Highlights: ► Retrospective dosimetry in Chernobyl was applied for evaluation of individual doses to evacuees. ► Retrospective dosimetry in Chernobyl was applied for validation of ecological dosimetric models, rejection dubious dose rate records. ► Retrospective dosimetry in Chernobyl was applied for risk assessment of leukemia among Chernobyl clean-up workers (liquidators). ► Retrospective dosimetry in Chernobyl was applied for study of cataracts among liquidators. ► Experience of dose reconstruction in Chernobyl could be used for retrospective assessment of exposures in Fukushima

  2. Residents call for greater openness, accountability and involvement: Lessons learned from the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taniguchi, Taketoshi; Tsuchiya, Tomoko; Kosugi, Motoko

    2000-01-01

    This paper discusses the JCO (Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.) criticality accident from social viewpoints based on the detailed examination of the survey data and experience of participation into Tokai village office's surveys. We focus the mechanisms of amplifying anxieties of the local residents and clarify the key factors affected in the social amplification process. And we discuss the importance of communicating and deliberating among the lay people, public officials and professionals about health, safety and environmental risks associated with nuclear energy, referring to the public opinions about what kinds of information and actions are needed. (J.P.N.)

  3. International Conference 'Fifteen Years after the Chornobyl Accident. Lessons Learned'. Abstracts Learning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon

    2001-01-01

    The main aims of the conference are: for the scientific community in the most affected countries, to develop a common vision with the international scientific community with regard to the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster (in ecological, medical, social and other areas 15 years post-Chornobyl); to drawing conclusions and providing recommendations to allow decision makers at both national and international level to take further steps to mitigate the effects of the disaster. For the results of the Conference, to represent a common international understanding of the current situation resulting from the accident and the future initiatives which will be necessary to counter its effects

  4. Some lessons on radiological protection learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kai, M

    2012-01-01

    The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant released a large quantity of radioactive iodine and caesium into the environment. In terms of radiological protection, the evacuation and food restrictions that were adopted in a timely manner by the authorities effectively reduced the dose received by people living in the affected area. Since late March, the transition from an emergency to an existing exposure situation has been in progress. In selecting the reference exposure levels in some areas under an existing exposure situation, the authorities tried to follow the situation-based approach recommended by the ICRP. However, a mixture of emergency and post-emergency approaches confused the people living in the contaminated areas because the reactor conditions continued to be not completely stable. In deriving the criteria in an existing exposure situation, the regulatory authority selected 20 mSv y −1 . The mothers in the affected area believed that a dose of 20 mSv y −1 was unacceptably high for children since 1 mSv y −1 is the dose limit for the public under normal conditions. Internet information accelerated concern about the internal exposure to children and the related health effects. From some experiences after the accident the following lessons could be learned. The selection of reference doses in existing exposure situations after an accident must be openly communicated with the public using a risk-informed approach. The detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficient was misused for calculating the hypothetical number of cancer deaths by some non-radiation experts. It would not be possible to resolve this problem unless the ICRP addressed an alternative risk assessment to convey the meaning and associated uncertainty of the risk to an exposed population. A situation-based approach in addition to a risk-informed approach needs to be disseminated properly in order to select the level of protection that would be the best possible under the

  5. Best Practices and Lessons Learned In LANL Approaches to Transportation Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Drypolcher, Katherine Carr [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-24

    Presentation includes slides on Physical Protection of Material in Transit; Graded Approach for Implementation Controls; Security Requirements; LANL Lessons Learned; Shipping Violation; Unmonitored Shipment; Foreign shipment; and the Conclusion.

  6. Strengthening safety of nuclear power by learning lessons from the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2011-01-01

    The paper first discusses ongoing onsite stabilization activities at Fukushima-Daiichi NPP and a plan for onsite and offsite remedial actions including decontamination and defueling. Four key lessons learned (LL) are raised; safety regulation and safety culture, workable/executable severe accident management procedure, crisis management and design. Global actions for strengthening safety in post-Fukushima era would be built around the IAEA action plan, under recognition of national responsibility. For specific country and plant, a combination of the following may help; a) overall assessment of safety and reflection of Fukushima LL in the light of principles in INSAG-12, b) specific plant assessment of risks from internal, external and security-related events for identifying vulnerabilities and continuous safety improvement, and c) international peer review for comprehensiveness, objectivity and confidence building. In this context, the followings could be worth receiving attention; a) to revisit defense-in-depth, while utilizing risk information, for its completeness and effectiveness (especially, strengthened defense against environmental contamination by effective combination of provisions and management as well as attentiveness and careful attitude towards uncertainties across all layers of defense-in-depth), b) to restore public confidence, c) to cooperate for safety infrastructure in newcomers, d) to build internationally harmonized and cooperative scheme for liability. (author)

  7. Protective action guides: theory and application lessons from the Three Mile Island Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shleien, B.

    1980-01-01

    Protective action guides define the projected dose commitment to individuals in the general population that warrants protective action following the release of radioactive materials. Protective action would be warranted if the expected individual dose reduction is not offset by negative social, economic or health effects. Proposed or recommended protective action guides are available for the accidental radioactive contamination of human food and animal feeds, contamination of drinking water, evacuation and shelter, and administration of thyroid-blocking agents in a radiation emergency. This presentation discusses 1) the bases and status of the guides, 2) their interpretation and use, and 3) problems that were encountered in their interpretation. The available protective action guides proved effective during a nuclear accident emergency in protecting the public's health, in preventing unnecessary economic loss, and in diminishing social disruption. (author)

  8. 23. CLI national conference: the first lessons learned from the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lacoste, Andre-Claude; Niel, Jean-Christophe; Mourlon, Sophie; Dumont, Jean Jacques; Delalonde, Jean-Claude; Revol, Henri; Birraux, Claude; Miraucourt, Jean-Marc; Compagnat, Gilles; Pouleur, Yvan; Real, Juliette; Champion, Didier; Boilley, David; Chaumontet, Gerard; Giusti, Charles; Kessler, Emmanuel

    2011-12-01

    This document gathers contributions presented during a conference held in December 2011. After introduction speeches, a focus of some updates and an assessment of ANCCLI (the national association of CLIs) activities, this conference comprised two round tables. The first one addressed the INB safety assessment and the taking of the return on experience of Fukushima into account. Participants are members of the ASN, of the Parliamentary Office of assessment of scientific and technological choices, of EDF, of the HCTISN (the High committee for transparency and information on nuclear safety), of the Belgium agency for nuclear control (AFCN), and of a CLI. The second round table addressed the information and protection of populations in case of a nuclear accident in France or abroad. It gathers representatives of the ASN, of the IRSN, of an association for the control of radioactivity (ACRO), of a CLI, and of the Ministry of Home Affairs (for crisis planning and management)

  9. Advances in global development and deployment of small modular reactors and incorporating lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hadid Subki, M.; )

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA has been facilitating the Member States in incorporating the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors, including small modular reactors. An extended assessment is required to address challenges for advancing reactor safety in the new evolving generation of SMR plants to preserve the historic lessons in safety, through: assuring the diversity in emergency core cooling systems following loss of onsite AC power; ensuring diversity in reactor depressurization following a transient or accident; confirming independence in reactor trip and safety systems for sensors, power supplies and actuation systems, and finally diversity in maintaining containment integrity following a severe accident

  10. Analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sangkyu; Yune, Young Gill; Ahn, Hyungjoon; Kim, Byungjik; Lee, Jinho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    On September 30, 2011, the Task Force completed its review and presented the public with the findings and recommendations in the CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report. The Task Force made 13 recommendations to further enhance the safety of nuclear power plants in Canada. After that, the CNSC established the CNSC Staffs Action Plan based on the Fukushima Task Force's recommendations. In Canada, 19 nuclear power reactor units are currently producing electric power, and all of them are pressurized heavy water-reactor (PHWR) types. Also, considering 2 power reactor units in Korea, Wolsung unit 1 and 2, are the same reactor type, the analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan will be of benefit to determining recommendations of Korea to address lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Therefore, the CNSC Staffs Action Plan was introduced and analyzed in this study. From the results of the above analysis, it is recognized that the strengthening of defense in depth, emergency preparedness and the regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants in Canada were emphasized and much similar to practices of other countries. Public consultation process establishing the CNSC Staffs action plan has been carried out several times, in order to ensure regulatory transparency, by the CNSC staffs, and this is comparable with other countries. It is expected that the detail analysis results of the above plan will be helpful to enhance the safety of domestic operating nuclear power plants.

  11. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy; Lições aprendidas com acidentes radiológicos nas exposições médicas em radioterapia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F. [Faculdade Casa Branca, SP (Brazil); Lima, C.M.A. [MAXIM Cursos, Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Silva, F.C.A. da, E-mail: franciscodasilva13uk@gmail.com [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events.

  12. Design requirements for innovative homogeneous reactor, lesson learned from Fukushima accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arbie, Bakri; Pinem, Suryan; Sembiring, Tagor; Subki, Iyos

    2012-06-01

    The Fukushima disaster is the largest nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, but it is more complex as multiple reactors and spent fuel pools are involved. The severity of the nuclear accident is rated 7 in the International Nuclear Events Scale. Expert said that "Fukushima is the biggest industrial catastrophe in the history of mankind". According to Mitsuru Obe, in The Wall Street Journal, May 16th of 2011, TEPCO estimates the nuclear fuel was exposed to the air less than five hours after the earthquake struck. Fuel rods melted away rapidly as the temperatures inside the core reached 2800 C within six hours. In less than 16 hours, the reactor core melted and dropped to the bottom of the pressure vessel. The information should be evaluated in detail. In Germany several nuclear power plant were shutdown, Italy postponed it's nuclear power program and China reviewed their nuclear power program. Different news come from Britain, in October 11, 2011, the Safety Committee said all clear for nuclear power in Britain, because there are no risk of strong earthquake and tsunami in the region. Due to this severe fact, many nuclear scientists and engineer from all over the world are looking for a new approach, such as homogeneous reactor which was developed in Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1960-ies, during Dr. Alvin Weinberg tenure as the Director of ORNL. The paper will describe the design requirement that will be used as the basis for innovative homogeneous reactor. Innovative Homogeneous Reactor is expected to reduce core melt by two decades (4), since the fuel is intermix homogeneously with coolant and secondly we eliminate the used fuel rod which need to be cooled for a long period of time. In order to be successful for its implementation of the innovative system, testing and validation, three phases of development will be introduced. The first phase is Low Level Goals is really the proof of concept;the Medium Level Goal is Technical Goalsand the High

  13. The French TSO and public communication during crisis: lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. First results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fassert, C.

    2012-01-01

    This paper presents the feedback experience of the TCC (Technical Crisis Centre) experts during the Fukushima accident. An important aspect of the job was answering questions coming from the public. It appeared that a majority of the calling persons had first read the information they asked during the call, but wanted to be told the information, as if the status of information was quite different when delivered by a human being. Another aspect is the trust in the information given by experts, the Chernobyl syndrome with 'the radioactive cloud stopped at the frontier' is still there: the general idea is 'the experts lied to us once why would they tell us the truth now?' A significant number of calls related to planned visits to Japan or stays in Japan and the information about health hazards and risks was not sufficient to the callers, they wanted a more 'digested' information, in fact they expected a decision: to go or not to go, to stay or to fly back. Another aspect is the vocabulary used by experts, it must be appropriate, simple and creative and must draw in the caller's mind a right picture of the situation concerning the aspects arisen by the caller's question. To have all the experts answering in the same room helped to have exchanges between them. (A.C.)

  14. Linguistic Diversity and Traffic Accidents: Lessons from Statistical Studies of Cultural Traits

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roberts, Seán; Winters, James

    2013-01-01

    The recent proliferation of digital databases of cultural and linguistic data, together with new statistical techniques becoming available has lead to a rise in so-called nomothetic studies [1]–[8]. These seek relationships between demographic variables and cultural traits from large, cross-cultural datasets. The insights from these studies are important for understanding how cultural traits evolve. While these studies are fascinating and are good at generating testable hypotheses, they may underestimate the probability of finding spurious correlations between cultural traits. Here we show that this kind of approach can find links between such unlikely cultural traits as traffic accidents, levels of extra-martial sex, political collectivism and linguistic diversity. This suggests that spurious correlations, due to historical descent, geographic diffusion or increased noise-to-signal ratios in large datasets, are much more likely than some studies admit. We suggest some criteria for the evaluation of nomothetic studies and some practical solutions to the problems. Since some of these studies are receiving media attention without a widespread understanding of the complexities of the issue, there is a risk that poorly controlled studies could affect policy. We hope to contribute towards a general skepticism for correlational studies by demonstrating the ease of finding apparently rigorous correlations between cultural traits. Despite this, we see well-controlled nomothetic studies as useful tools for the development of theories. PMID:23967132

  15. Linguistic diversity and traffic accidents: lessons from statistical studies of cultural traits.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Seán Roberts

    Full Text Available The recent proliferation of digital databases of cultural and linguistic data, together with new statistical techniques becoming available has lead to a rise in so-called nomothetic studies [1]-[8]. These seek relationships between demographic variables and cultural traits from large, cross-cultural datasets. The insights from these studies are important for understanding how cultural traits evolve. While these studies are fascinating and are good at generating testable hypotheses, they may underestimate the probability of finding spurious correlations between cultural traits. Here we show that this kind of approach can find links between such unlikely cultural traits as traffic accidents, levels of extra-martial sex, political collectivism and linguistic diversity. This suggests that spurious correlations, due to historical descent, geographic diffusion or increased noise-to-signal ratios in large datasets, are much more likely than some studies admit. We suggest some criteria for the evaluation of nomothetic studies and some practical solutions to the problems. Since some of these studies are receiving media attention without a widespread understanding of the complexities of the issue, there is a risk that poorly controlled studies could affect policy. We hope to contribute towards a general skepticism for correlational studies by demonstrating the ease of finding apparently rigorous correlations between cultural traits. Despite this, we see well-controlled nomothetic studies as useful tools for the development of theories.

  16. Linguistic diversity and traffic accidents: lessons from statistical studies of cultural traits.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roberts, Seán; Winters, James

    2013-01-01

    The recent proliferation of digital databases of cultural and linguistic data, together with new statistical techniques becoming available has lead to a rise in so-called nomothetic studies [1]-[8]. These seek relationships between demographic variables and cultural traits from large, cross-cultural datasets. The insights from these studies are important for understanding how cultural traits evolve. While these studies are fascinating and are good at generating testable hypotheses, they may underestimate the probability of finding spurious correlations between cultural traits. Here we show that this kind of approach can find links between such unlikely cultural traits as traffic accidents, levels of extra-martial sex, political collectivism and linguistic diversity. This suggests that spurious correlations, due to historical descent, geographic diffusion or increased noise-to-signal ratios in large datasets, are much more likely than some studies admit. We suggest some criteria for the evaluation of nomothetic studies and some practical solutions to the problems. Since some of these studies are receiving media attention without a widespread understanding of the complexities of the issue, there is a risk that poorly controlled studies could affect policy. We hope to contribute towards a general skepticism for correlational studies by demonstrating the ease of finding apparently rigorous correlations between cultural traits. Despite this, we see well-controlled nomothetic studies as useful tools for the development of theories.

  17. Atomic bomb suffering and Chernobyl accident lessons learnt from international medical aid programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamashita, Shunichi

    2005-01-01

    The cooperative medical projects between Nagasaki University and countries of the former USSR have had being performed in mainly two regions: Chernobyl and Semipalatinsk since 1990 and 1995, respectively. The 21 st Center of Excellence (COE) program of ''International Consortium for Medical Care of Hibakusha and Radiation Life Science'' recently established in Nagasaki University can now serve our knowledge and experience much more directly. Its activity can be further extended to the radiocontaminated areas around the world, and based on the lessons of the past, it can indeed contribute to the future planning of the Network of Excellence (NOE) for Radiation Education Program as well as Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance under the auspices of the WHO-REMPAN. Within the frame of International Consortium of Radiation Research, a molecular epidemiology of thyroid diseases are now conducted in our departments in addition to international medical assistance. The clue of radiation-associated thyroid carcinogenesis may give us a new concept on experimental and epidemiological approaches to low dose radiation effects on human health, including those of internal radiation exposure. Concerning the role and responsibility of our work to the public, to avoid unnecessary radiophobia and to correctly understand radiation hazard and safety, we must build a bridge between basic research and widely open public education. Therefore, it is of high necessity to continuously work on clarification of the effects of ionizing radiation on human beings worldwide and to contribute the development of general guideline of radiation safety and radiation hazard, and to strive for the creation of substantiated radiation protection programs. (author)

  18. Atomic bomb suffering and Chernobyl accident lessons learnt from international medical aid programs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yamashita, Shunichi [Nagasaki Univ. Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Atomic Bomb Disease Inst., Dept. of Molecular Medicine, Nagasaki (Japan)

    2005-03-01

    The cooperative medical projects between Nagasaki University and countries of the former USSR have had being performed in mainly two regions: Chernobyl and Semipalatinsk since 1990 and 1995, respectively. The 21{sup st} Center of Excellence (COE) program of ''International Consortium for Medical Care of Hibakusha and Radiation Life Science'' recently established in Nagasaki University can now serve our knowledge and experience much more directly. Its activity can be further extended to the radiocontaminated areas around the world, and based on the lessons of the past, it can indeed contribute to the future planning of the Network of Excellence (NOE) for Radiation Education Program as well as Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance under the auspices of the WHO-REMPAN. Within the frame of International Consortium of Radiation Research, a molecular epidemiology of thyroid diseases are now conducted in our departments in addition to international medical assistance. The clue of radiation-associated thyroid carcinogenesis may give us a new concept on experimental and epidemiological approaches to low dose radiation effects on human health, including those of internal radiation exposure. Concerning the role and responsibility of our work to the public, to avoid unnecessary radiophobia and to correctly understand radiation hazard and safety, we must build a bridge between basic research and widely open public education. Therefore, it is of high necessity to continuously work on clarification of the effects of ionizing radiation on human beings worldwide and to contribute the development of general guideline of radiation safety and radiation hazard, and to strive for the creation of substantiated radiation protection programs. (author)

  19. Spent fuel shipping cask accident evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fields, S.R.

    1975-12-01

    Mathematical models have been developed to simulate the dynamic behavior, following a hypothetical accident and fire, of typical casks designed for the rail shipment of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, and to determine the extent of radioactive releases under postulated conditions. The casks modeled were the IF-300, designed by the General Electric Company for the shipment of spent LWR fuel, and a cask designed by the Aerojet Manufacturing Company for the shipment of spent LMFBR fuel

  20. Health physics aspects of a research reactor fuel shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dodd, B.; Johnson, A.G.; Anderson, T.V.

    1984-01-01

    In June 1982, 92 irradiated fuel elements were shipped from the Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor to Westinghouse Hanford Corporation to be used in the Fuel Materials Examination Facility, This paper describes some of the health physics aspects of the planning, preparation and procedures associated with that shipment. In particular, the lessons learned are described in order that the benefits of the experience gained may be readily available to other small institutions. (author)

  1. Denials of Shipments for Radioactive Material - Indian Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Khaidem Ranjankumar; Hussain, S.A; Panda, G.K.; Singh, T. Dewan; Dinakaran, M.C.

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive material (RAM) needs to be transported for use in public health and industry and for production of nuclear power. In India, transport of RAM is governed by national and international regulations which are based on the IAEA Regulations for the safe transport of RAM. However, recently there were increasing numbers of instances of denials and delays of shipment of RAM, reported by many countries worldwide including India, despite compliance with regulations. In Indian experience, the reasons for denials of shipment of RAM by the carriers are varied in nature. From the feedback received from the participants (airport operators, airlines, courier and cargo service providers, cargo forwarding agents, port authorities and sea carriers) of awareness programmes on safe transport of RAM conducted from year 2008 onwards by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) it became clear that the denials of shipments in India are mainly due to (1) perception of unnecessary fear for transport of RAM (2) lack of confidence and awareness on the procedures for acceptance of shipment of RAM (3) fear of risk during accidents with packages containing RAM (4) policy of the carriers not to accept consignment of dangerous goods (5) poor infrastructure at the major/transit ports (6) problems of transshipments and (7) shippers not having undergone dangerous goods training. In this paper, the Indian experience in dealing with the problems of denial/delay of shipments containing radioactive material and identified possible consequences of such denials including economical impact are discussed in detail. (author)

  2. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-04-01

    This circular has been prepared in response to numerous requests for information regarding routes for the shipment of irradiated reactor (spent) fuel subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC staff approves such routes prior to their use, in accordance with the regulatory provisions of 10 CFR Part 73.37. The objective of the safeguards regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 73.37 is to provide protection against radioactive dispersal caused by malevolent acts by persons. The design and construction of the casks used to ship the spent fuel provide adequate radiological protection of the public health and safety against accidents. Therfore, transporting appropriately packaged spent fuel over existing rail systems and via any highway system is radiologically safe without specific NRC approval of the route. However, to assure adequate planning for protection against actual or attempted acts of radiological sabotage, the NRC requires advance route approval. This approval is given on a shipment-by-shipment or series basis, it is not general approval of the route for subsequent spent fuel shipments. Spent fuel shipment routes, primarily for road transportation, but also including three rail routes, are indicated on reproductions of road maps. Also included are the amounts of material shipped during the approximate 8-year period that safeguards regulations have been effective. This information is current as of September 30, 1987

  3. Some Lessons Learnt From the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, as Regards Defence in Depth and its Implementation in New or Existing Designs – An Industry Example

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    De L’Epinois, B.; Bouteille, F.; Nicaise, N., E-mail: bertrand.delepinois@areva.com [AREVA, Paris (France)

    2014-10-15

    reducing both the severe accident probability and the consequences of a severe accident, should it occur. This paper therefore analyzes, in the light of Fukushima, the DiD approach followed in the design of the EPR and ATMEA reactors in terms of accident prevention, common mode failure prevention and mitigation, protection against natural hazards and severe accident management. Insight is given, from a designer point of view, on the topics on which the Fukushima lessons learnt are implemented. The paper also exposes to what extent and in which fields the approach followed for new reactors can be applied to operating nuclear power plants. (author)

  4. The lessons drawn from accident simulation, consequences for the operation of the Crisis Technical Center of the Nuclear Safety and Protection Institut

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manesse, D.; Ney, J.; Crabol, B.; Ginot, P.

    1989-07-01

    The aim of the work is to summarize the lessons drawn from planning and performing the nuclear accident simulation exercises. The analysis is focused on the simulation and foresight of the radiation effects. The simulation exercises allowed a progressive improvement of the technical survey organization, leading to an improvement of its availability to the authorities. The subjects which need to be taken into account are those related to the intervention actions, in order to obtain realistic situations, the actions related to public organizations, people and communication networks [fr

  5. Safety design criteria for the next generation Sodium-cooled fast reactors based on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakai, Takaaki

    2012-01-01

    In this presentation, architecture of the safety design criteria as requirements for SFR system and the activities on safety research works to establish safety evaluation methods for the next generation SFRs are summarized with the basis on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident. Nuclear safety is a grovel issue which should be achieved by the international cooperation. In respect of the development for the next generation reactor, it is necessary to build the harmonized safety criteria and evaluation methods to establish the next level of safety

  6. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Dae; O' Brien, James [U. S. Department of Energy, Washington (United States)

    2012-03-15

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident.

  7. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Dae; O'Brien, James

    2012-01-01

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident

  8. Report of the Fukushima nuclear accident by the National Academy of Science. Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2014-01-01

    U.S. National Academy of Science investigated the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake for two years and published a draft report in July 24, 2014. Investigation results were summarized in nine new findings and made ten recommendations in a wide horizon; (1) hardware countermeasures against severe accidents and training of operators, (2) upgrade of risk assessment capability for beyond design basis accident, (3) incorporation of new information about hazards in safety regulations, (4) needed improvement of off-site emergency preparedness, and (5) improvements of nuclear safety culture. New information about hazards related with tsunami assessment, new risk assessment for beyond design basis accident, advice of foreigner resident evacuations, regulatory capture, and safety culture and regulator's specialty were discussed as Japanese issues. (T. Tanaka)

  9. Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned and points to be checked from the nuclear accidents in Fukushima; Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned und Pruefpunkte aus den kerntechnischen Unfaellen in Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-10-15

    Since a long time, severe accidents are one of the main areas in the surveillance activities of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). The analysis of events all over the world and the evaluation of their relevance for the Swiss nuclear power plants belong to the permanent obligations of the regulatory authority. In Switzerland, for more than two decades, core melting accidents are studied using probabilistic safety assessment methods. Comprehensive risk analyses were set up for external events like earthquakes, sabotages or airplane crashes. Strategies for the mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents, so-called Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG), were written down by the regulatory authority and made available to the Swiss plant operators. In international comparison the Swiss nuclear power plants have reached a very high standard in the field of severe accidents. Moreover, the safety of the Swiss plants is continuously reviewed by means of permanent supervision and especially through the 10-year periodic safety review. However, the Fukushima accident justifies a renewed evaluation on whether the preparation against severe reactor accidents could be improved and additional measures be taken for the protection of the population. In the present report, ENSI indicates points to be checked, which were considered as important in the course of the analysis of the Fukushima accident, for the future improvement of the nuclear safety and radiation protection in Switzerland. These points were identified from the analysis of the behaviour of the plant staff, techniques and organisation during the accident. The resulting measures concern the plant design, the emergency management, the feed-back from the encountered events, the surveillance, the radiation protection and the safety culture, with a special emphasis on the emergency management in Switzerland. The implementation of the necessary short-term measures was launched by ENSI decrees and

  10. Nuclear material shipment study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shepherd, E.W.

    1980-01-01

    The Radioactive Material Transport Assessment Study is expected to provide a flexible set of capabilities and useful information to the public, industry and government users by using a system design to assure obtaining high quality data from selected industry sources at acceptable cost. It is expected that the shipping record approach coupled with an efficient sampling strategy will accomplish this. The study is also designed to yield analytical capabilities and statistical output to serve public, industry and government users. The information provided by the study will make a valuable contribution to environmental and accident risk assessment, policy development and operational planning and management activities

  11. Lessons learned from on-site safety assessments performed by DOE in response to the Tomsk accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Witmer, F.E.

    1995-01-01

    In response to the accident, in April 1993, at the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant of the Siberian chemical Combine, Tomsk, Russia, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated concurrent efforts to understand the causes for the accident and to review potential vulnerabilities for similar occurrences across the DOE radiochemical complex. Because the accident occurred in the feed adjustment stage of a Purex type process, US facilities which contained significant inventories of TBP, organic diluent and nitric acid were evaluated by expert teams. From accident conditions, prior experience, modeling and experimental programs and confirmatory dialogue with the Russians, enhanced understanding was achieved and vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of safety analysis, organic layering, inadvertent acid addition, use of aromatic diluents, uncertain venting capability, no mitigative/emergency procedures, etc.) were identified and corrected

  12. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Omoto, Akira, E-mail: akira.omoto@mac.com

    2013-12-11

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  13. Shipments of nuclear fuel and waste: are they really safe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-10-01

    The safety aspects of shipping nuclear fuels and radioactive wastes are discussed by considering: US regulations on the shipment of hazardous and radioactive materials, types of radioactive wastes; packaging methods, materials, and specifications; design of shipping containers; evaluation of the risk potential under normal shipping conditions and in accident situations. It is concluded that: the risk of public catastrophe has been eliminated by strict standards, engineering design safety, and operational care; the long-term public burden of not transporting nuclear materials is likely to be higher than the risks of carefully controlled transportation, considering the various options available; and the likelihood of death, injury, or serious property damage from the nuclear aspects of nuclear transportation is thousands of times less than the likelihood of death, injury, or serious property damage from more common hazards, such as automobile accidents, boating accidents, accidental poisoning, gunshot wounds, fires, or even falls

  14. Cesium-137 accident lessons in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil; Licoes do acidente com cesio-137 em Goiania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1990-11-01

    This document relates the experience obtained by several professionals which had an important role in the cesium-137 accident occurred in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil in September, 1987. It`s divided into chapters, according to the action area - medical, nursing, social assistance, odontological and psychological. At first, some notions of radioprotection are explained, followed by the accident history and by the doctors and nurses action during the emergency phase and the medical, odontological, social and psychological assistance to the victims. The social assistance report shows some statistical data about the economic, occupational and social conditions of the accident victims. It is shown some information about the health institutions and the sanitary care in the ionizing radiation and about the occupational radiological protection in Goiania. 38 refs., 8 tabs.

  15. Analysis of the Uniform Accident And Sickness Policy Provision Law: lessons for social work practice, policy, and research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cochran, Gerald

    2010-01-01

    The Uniform Accident and Sickness Policy Provision Law (UPPL) is a state statute that allows insurance companies in 26 states to deny claims for accidents and injuries incurred by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Serious repercussions can result for patients and health care professionals as states enforce this law. To examine differences within the laws that might facilitate amendments or reduce insurance companies' ability to deny claims, a content analysis was carried out of each state's UPPL law. Results showed no meaningful differences between each state's laws. These results indicate patients and health professionals share similar risk related to the UPPL regardless of state.

  16. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Gun Hong [Kyungwon E-C Co., Seongnam (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  17. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan; Kim, Gun Hong

    2014-01-01

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  18. To revisit economics of nuclear technology. Lessons from the learning of a complex technology by major accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, Dominique

    2012-05-01

    The Fukushima accident raises again the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To re-evaluate this viability, we analyse the past process of internalisation of external costs of nuclear energy, which present the specificities to be chanted by accidents and has had a constant effect of complexification. This process has provoked a de-organisation of the classical learning process reflected in constant cost increases and the change of social preferences, to end up by the lack of competitiveness before climate policies. Independent institutions of safety regulation have become essential elements of the social embeddedness of nuclear technology at the expense of technology stability and standardization, condition of its competitiveness. In this perspective, the paper argues that the new sequence of social costs' internalization opened by Fukushima will have limited effects on costs, because of anterior steps of safety improvements. Nuclear technology complexification reaches its asymptote: it is being to overcome the challenge of 'learning by major accidents'. On the other hand nuclear institutions must be re-designed in such a way that it could guarantee maximum safety records and minimum residual risks by going to the other root of the safety issue, the degree of independence and capabilities of the safety authorities in every country, what cannot be decreed. It is nevertheless at this price that could be preserved the global public good of the social acceptance of nuclear technology by limiting drastically chance of new accidents. (author)

  19. Lessoning of radiation exposure. Radiation effect on humans and points to be noticed learned by Fukushima nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omori, Koichi

    2013-01-01

    Described are the process of medical measures taken along with the time after the Accident in the title (Mar. 12, 2011) and the present state (June, 2013) of Fukushima. The author at first presents the fundamental knowledge of radiation like unit, natural/medical doses, and the scale of the Accident compared with Chernobyl Accident (1986) involving observed diseases like thyroid cancer. On the day before the Accident, the Earthquake and Tsunami attacked Fukushima, and the University Hospital built up an anti-disaster medical headquarter. Until 15th, the hospital accepted about 500 persons for their contamination survey and subsequent de-contamination, then played a role for relaying 1,300 patients to other facilities and accepted 125 hospitalizations, during which communication by phone had been scarcely available, leading to complication and confusion. The radioisotope subjected to be noted was radioiodine earlier and then radiocesium. Emergent medical supports were conducted for various evacuation areas involving 20-30 km zone from the Plant by pediatric and infection teams with joint doctors from Thailand. The University had been defined to be the secondary emergent, expertized medical facility since 2001 and began to conduct the long-term project Fukushima Health Management Survey after the Accident for the fundamental and detailed studies of residents. The secondary facility at the emergency was inevitably the center of medicare as the primary hospitals were mostly in the radiological evacuation area and tertiary ones located afar. The University Hospital is now revising the formal manual for medical response to exposure. In Fukushima City, 60 km distant from the Plant, the ambient dose is about 0.5 mc-Sv and external exposure dose is lowering to 2-4 mSv/y. Decrease of medical staff like doctors and nurses is significant in the prefecture. (T.T.)

  20. Shipments/receipts resolution program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, F.B.

    1988-01-01

    Savannah River Plant (SRP) has initiated an aggressive program aimed at improving shipper/receiver (S/R) posture. The site is routinely involved in 800 nuclear material transfers/year. This many transactions between facilities provides many opportunities for resolving S/R differences. Resolution of S/R differences requires considerable effort from both DOE offices and contractors, presents legitimate safeguards concerns if the receiving quantity is less than the quantity shipped, and must be resolved for shipments to continue. This paper discusses the programs in place at SRP to resolve S/R differences. S/R agreements provide a method of communicating between the shipping and receiving facilities and protect both facilities by eliminating misunderstandings. Nondestructive assay (NDA) instrumentation allows the facility to obtain an accountability quality value for receipt before the material is processed. More accurate and precise analytical techniques are in use wherever SRP does not have the capability to measure a shipment or receipt by NDA. S/R values are graphed to identify trends and/or biases that may not have exceeded any error limits. The central Material Control and Accountability (MCandA) division has become more involved in analyzing the data from shipments and receipts including the calculation of limits of error (LOE's), instrument biases, and analyzing trends

  1. Lessons Learned in Protection of the Public for the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Callen, Jessica; Homma, Toshimitsu

    2017-06-01

    What insights can the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant provide in the reality of decision making on actions to protect the public during a severe reactor and spent fuel pool emergency? In order to answer this question, and with the goal of limiting the consequences of any future emergencies at a nuclear power plant due to severe conditions, this paper presents the main actions taken in response to the emergency in the form of a timeline. The focus of this paper is those insights concerning the progression of an accident due to severe conditions at a light water reactor nuclear power plant that must be understood in order to protect the public.

  2. Predicted occurrence rate of severe transportation accidents involving large casks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dennis, A.W.

    1978-01-01

    A summary of the results of an investigation of the severities of highway and railroad accidents as they relate to the shipment of large radioactive materials casks is discussed. The accident environments considered are fire, impact, crash, immersion, and puncture. For each of these environments, the accident severities and their predicted frequencies of occurrence are presented. These accident environments are presented in tabular and graphic form to allow the reader to evaluate the probabilities of occurrence of the accident parameter severities he selects

  3. Lessons learned from the decommissioning process affected by an accident during operation. The case of A1 NPP in Slovakia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daniska, Vladimir; Timulak, Jan; Pekar, Anton; Niznansky, Vojtech; Konecny, Ladislav

    2007-01-01

    Decommissioning of NPP's with standard shutdown is currently well known process. The A1 NPP in Slovakia was shutdown in 1977 after the accident in the core which caused the damage of the fuel and contamination of systems. Long period from 1977 to 2008 was needed to manage issues resulting from affecting the systems and structures of A1 NPP and the environment by the accident. Management of the damaged spent fuel, decontamination of the primary circuit and other processes generated large amounts of alpha bearing waste, mostly liquid, having sludge phases with specific physical-chemical and radiological properties. Up to 1994, the approach for eliminating the consequences of the accident was based on safety priorities. The systematic approach, which includes also the rehabilitation of the affected environment, was implemented in the period 1994-2008. The process includes also establishing of the decommissioning infrastructure, legislative and funding system with the aim to implement the standard decommissioning procedures after 2008. However, the specific aspects, especially the level and radio-nuclide composition of contamination of systems and structures will remain. For final decommissioning 2008-2033, the approach was selected which foresees four licensed phases. This approach enables proper planning and performing of individual decommissioning phases. (authors)

  4. The economics of nuclear energy revisited: lessons from the use of a complex technology subject to major accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2012-01-01

    The Fukushima accident again raises the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To reassess this viability, we analyze the methods used to internalize the external costs of nuclear energy. These have over time become increasingly complex technologically and specifically affected by major accidents. This combination has served to upset the classical learning curve, calling into question nuclear cost base, social acceptance in the face of climate change and profitability for investors. It has become essential to put in place independent institutions to regulate the safety aspect of nuclear technology and these form a hindrance to its standardization, in turn affecting competitiveness. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the new sequence of internalization of external costs triggered by Fukushima will have limited effects on overall costs, because of previous measures already taken to improve safety. The complexity of nuclear technology is reaching its asymptote: the challenge of 'learning from major accidents' will decrease. On the other hand, the independence and competence of nuclear safety authorities in all countries must be revamped to maximize safety and minimize residual risks. This cannot just be done by decree. However, it is the only way to preserve this global public good - the social acceptance of nuclear technology

  5. Lessons learned from early direct measurements at Fukushima Medical University after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miyazaki, Makoto; Ohba, Takashi; Ohtsuru, Akira [Fukushima Medical Univ., Dept. of Radiation Health Management, Fukushima, Fukushima (Japan)

    2012-11-15

    The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) accident resulted in a month-long discharge of radioactive materials into the environment. These radioactive materials were detected at Fukushima Medical University (FMU), which is 57 km northwest of the FDNPS. Significant levels of six nuclides (i.e., {sup 131}I, {sup 132}Te, {sup 132}I, {sup 133}Xe, {sup 134}Cs, and {sup 137}Cs) were detected by a whole body counter (WBC) on March 15, 2011 when the ambient dose rate was suddenly elevated for the first time. This WBC has a dual detector system consisting of two NaI(Tl) detectors and two Ge detectors. We conducted periodical measurements of 32 humans and the background using the WBC. Because the three nuclides {sup 131}I, {sup 134}Cs and {sup 137}Cs were still detected in the background by the WBC a few months after the accident, accurate WBC measurements were difficult. Here we describe the limitations of our measurements conducted in the early stage of the FDNPS accident. (author)

  6. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  7. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2012-06-15

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  8. Special routing of spent fuel shipments. Final report Dec 79-Apr 81

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkowitz, R.L.; Shaver, D.K.; Rudd, T.J.

    1982-05-01

    Special rail routing of spent fuel shipments from commercial nuclear power plants to Away-From-Reactor (AFR) storage and disposal sites has been proposed as one means of reducing the consequences and severity of radioactive materials accidents in areas of high population density. Whether or not special rail routing of spent fuel shipments does indeed decrease radiation exposure levels under normal and accident transportation conditions and at what incremental cost forms the basis of this study funded by the Federal Railroad Administration. The study is divided into five areas: (1) developing analytical models for assessing the risks associated with both the normal and accident transport modes; (2) selecting representative origin to destination routing pairs using the normal transportation and accident risk models; (3) analyzing rail shipment costs for nuclear spent fuel; and (4) performing sensitivity analyses to identify parameters that critically affect the total exposure level. The major findings resulting from this study are: (1) the risk over the seven example routes is relatively small for the normal transport mode; (2) the risk associated with an accident is at least an order of magnitude larger than the normal transport dose in all cases and as such is the overriding contribution to the total expected transport dose; and (3) no beneficial cost versus dose reduction relationship was found for any of the routes studied

  9. Lessons learnt from an international intercomparison of national network systems used to provide early warning of a nuclear accident

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Saez-Vergara, J.C.; Thompson, I.M.G.; Funck, E.

    2003-01-01

    and at the Underground Laboratory for Dosimetry and Spectrometry (UDO) of the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Germany. The network systems are used continuously to monitor radiation levels throughout a country in order to give early warning of nuclear accidents having transboundary implications...... in order to be consistent with the preliminary report. In addition, in some cases the results are also given in terms of the quantity measured by each national network system. The experience gained from this intercomparison is used to help organise a follow-up intercomparison to be held at the PTB...

  10. RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

    2009-07-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  11. Russian-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment From Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor; Allen, Ken; Apostolov, Tihomir; Dimitrov, Ivaylo

    2009-01-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  12. Lessons learnt from an international intercomparison of national network systems used to provide early warning of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saez-Vergara, J.C.; Thompson, I.M.G.; Funck, E.; Andersen, C.E.; Neumaier, S.; Botter-Jensen, L.

    2003-01-01

    As part of the European Research Council's Fourth Framework Programme, the EURADOS Action Group on Monitoring of External Exposures held an intercomparison of national network systems. This took place during May/June 1999 at the Riso Natural Environmental Radiation Measurement Station in Denmark and at the Underground Laboratory for Dosimetry and Spectrometry of the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt in Germany. The network systems are used continuously to monitor radiation levels throughout a country in order to give early warning of nuclear accidents having transboundary implications. The radiation levels measured are used to estimate the radiation risks to people arising from the accident. Seven European countries participated in the intercomparison with detector systems used in their national network systems as well as with detectors being developed for future use. Since different radiation quantities were measured by the systems (namely exposure, air kerma and ambient dose equivalent), the initial analysis of the intercomparison results was made in terms of the quantity air kerma rate. This report completes the analysis of the results and these are given in terms of air kerma rate in order to be consistent with the preliminary report. In addition, in some cases the results are also given in terms of the quantity measured by each national network system. The experience gained from this intercomparison is used to help organise a follow-up intercomparison to be held at the PTB Braunschweig in September 2002 and in which a further seven or eight countries from Europe will participate. (author)

  13. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project; Retour d'experience sur la gestion post-accidentelle de Tchernobyl: le projet Parex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G. [Mutadis Consultants, 75 - Paris (France); Lochard, J.; Bataille, C. [CEPN, 92 - Fontenay aux Roses (France); Ollagnon, H. [AgroParisTech, 75 - Paris (France); Baude, St. [Mutadis, 75 - Paris (France)

    2008-07-15

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  14. Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: efficient education items of radiation safety for general public.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ohno, K; Endo, K

    2015-07-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FNP-1) accident, while as tragic as the tsunami, was a man-made disaster created by the ignorance of the effects of radiation and radioactive materials. Therefore, it is important that all specialists in radiation protection in medicine sympathize with the anxiety of the general public regarding the harmful effects of radiation and advise people accordingly. All questions and answers were collected related to inquiries from the general public that were posted to reliable websites, including those of the government and radiation-related organizations, from March 2011 to November 2012. The questions were summarized and classified by similarity of content. (1) The total number of questions is 372. The content was broadly classified into three categories: inquiries for radiation-related knowledge and about health effects and foods. The questions asked to obtain radiation-related knowledge were the most common, accounting for 38 %. Thirty-six percentage of the questions were related to health effects, and 26 % involved foods, whereas 18 % of the questions were related to children and pregnancy. (2) The change over time was investigated in 290 questions for which the time of inquiry was known. Directly after the earthquake, the questions were primarily from people seeking radiation-related knowledge. Later, questions related to health effects increased. The anxiety experienced by residents following the nuclear accident was caused primarily by insufficient knowledge related to radiation, concerns about health effects and uncertainties about food and water safety. The development of educational materials focusing on such content will be important for risk communication with the general public in countries with nuclear power plants. Physicians and medical physicist should possess the ability to respond to questions such as these and should continue with medical examinations and treatments in a safe and appropriate manner. © The

  15. Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: efficient education items of radiation safety for general public

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohno, K.; Endo, K.

    2015-01-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FNP-1) accident, while as tragic as the tsunami, was a man-made disaster created by the ignorance of the effects of radiation and radioactive materials. Therefore, it is important that all specialists in radiation protection in medicine sympathize with the anxiety of the general public regarding the harmful effects of radiation and advise people accordingly. All questions and answers were collected related to inquiries from the general public that were posted to reliable web sites, including those of the government and radiation-related organizations, from March 2011 to November 2012. The questions were summarized and classified by similarity of content. (1) The total number of questions is 372. The content was broadly classified into three categories: inquiries for radiation-related knowledge and about health effects and foods. The questions asked to obtain radiation-related knowledge were the most common, accounting for 38 %. Thirty-six percentage of the questions were related to health effects, and 26 % involved foods, whereas 18 % of the questions were related to children and pregnancy. (2) The change over time was investigated in 290 questions for which the time of inquiry was known. Directly after the earthquake, the questions were primarily from people seeking radiation-related knowledge. Later, questions related to health effects increased. The anxiety experienced by residents following the nuclear accident was caused primarily by insufficient knowledge related to radiation, concerns about health effects and uncertainties about food and water safety. The development of educational materials focusing on such content will be important for risk communication with the general public in countries with nuclear power plants. Physicians and medical physicist should possess the ability to respond to questions such as these and should continue with medical examinations and treatments in a safe and appropriate manner

  16. Delay and Denial of Shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wright, T. de; Gray, P.; Sobriera, A.C.F.; Xavier, C.C.; Schwela, U.

    2016-01-01

    Despite the strong safety and security record for shipments of Radioactive Material (RAM), Class 7 goods, transportation often continues to provide challenges as many carriers and ports (air and sea) choose not to engage in RAM product transportation. This paper discusses factors impacting the availability of regular air and sea transport routes for RAM, including: negative perception about radiation due to a lack of awareness and information about the industry; concerns about the cost and extent of training required of those who handle radioactive materials; multiplicity and diversity of regulations governing the handling, use and transport of these products; lack of harmonisation between governments in applying international regulations; and, a lack of outreach and public awareness about the needs and applications of radioactive materials. The particular issues involved in sea transport of: relatively small trade volumes; additional requirements or bans on port access, both for transit and trans-shipment; and scheduling difficulties due to commercial carrier routing decisions are also discussed. Initiatives being taken internationally, regionally and nationally to overcome these issues and examples of success are described. (author)

  17. 3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregory, Louis

    2014-01-01

    This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014 in Tables 4 and 5. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report do not include minor volumes of non-radioactive materials that were approved for disposal. Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to differing rounding conventions.

  18. 1st Quarter Transportation Report FY 2015: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gregory, Louis [National Security Technologies, LLC, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2015-02-20

    This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 1st quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report include minor volumes of non-radioactive classified waste/material that were approved for disposal (non-radioactive classified or nonradioactive classified hazardous). Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to rounding conventions for volumetric conversions from cubic meters to cubic feet.

  19. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident; Reperes, le magazine d'information de l'Institut de radioprotection et de surete nucleaire - IRSN, No. 12 - janvier 2012, Special Fukushima - Premieres lecons de l'accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-01-15

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  20. Iodine behaviour under LWR accident conditions: Lessons learnt from analyses of the first two Phebus FP tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Girault, N.; Dickinson, S.; Funke, F.; Auvinen, A.; Herranz, L.; Krausmann, E.

    2006-01-01

    The International Phebus Fission Product programme, initiated in 1988 and performed by the French 'Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire' (IRSN), investigates through a series of in-pile integral experiments, key phenomena involved in light water reactor (LWR) severe accidents. The tests cover fuel rod degradation and the behaviour of fission products released via the primary coolant circuit into the containment building. The results of the first two tests, called FPT0 and Ftp, carried out under low pressure, in a steam rich atmosphere and using fresh fuel for Ftp and fuel burned in a reactor at 23 GWdt -1 for Ftp, were immensely challenging, especially with regard to the iodine radiochemistry. Some of the most important observed phenomena with regard to the chemistry of iodine were indeed neither predicted nor pre-calculated, which clearly shows the interest and the need for carrying out integral experiments to study the complex phenomena governing fission product behaviour in a PWR in accident conditions. The three most unexpected results in the iodine behaviour related to early detection during fuel degradation of a weak but significant fraction of volatile iodine in the containment, the key role played by silver rapidly binding iodine to form insoluble AgI in the containment sump and the importance of painted surfaces in the containment atmosphere for the formation of a large quantity of volatile organic iodides. To support the Phebus test interpretation small-scale analytical experiments and computer code analyses were carried out. The former, helping towards a better understanding of overall iodine behaviour, were used to develop or improve models while the latter mainly aimed at identifying relevant key phenomena and at modelling weaknesses. Specific efforts were devoted to exploring the potential origins of the early-detected volatile iodine in the containment building. If a clear explanation has not yet been found, the non-equilibrium chemical

  1. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erp, J.B. van [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report).

  2. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erp, J.B. van

    1997-01-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report)

  3. Accidents - Chernobyl accident; Accidents - accident de Tchernobyl

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-07-01

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  4. 78 FR 33224 - Safety Zone; Grain-Shipment and Grain-Shipment Assist Vessels, Columbia and Willamette Rivers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-04

    ... 1625-AA00 Safety Zone; Grain-Shipment and Grain-Shipment Assist Vessels, Columbia and Willamette Rivers... Guard is establishing a temporary safety zone around all inbound and outbound grain-shipment and grain-shipment assist vessels involved in commerce with the Columbia Grain facility on the Willamette River in...

  5. 78 FR 57261 - Safety Zone; Grain-Shipment and Grain-Shipment Assist Vessels, Columbia and Willamette Rivers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-18

    ... 1625-AA00 Safety Zone; Grain-Shipment and Grain-Shipment Assist Vessels, Columbia and Willamette Rivers... temporary safety zone around all inbound and outbound grain-shipment and grain-shipment assist vessels involved in commerce with the Columbia Grain facility on the Willamette River in Portland, OR, the United...

  6. Considerations in the selection of transport modes for spent nuclear fuel shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daling, P.M.; McNair, G.W.; Andrews, W.B.

    1985-07-01

    This paper discusses the factors associated with selecting a particular transport mode for spent fuel shipments. These factors include transportation costs, economics of potential transportation accidents, risk/safety of spent fuel transportation, routing alternatives, shipping cask handling capabilities, and shipping cask availability. Data needed to estimate transportation costs and risks are presented and discussed. The remaining factors are discussed qualitatively and can be used as guidance for selecting a particular transport mode. 15 refs., 3 tabs

  7. Experience gained from some incidents related to the shipment of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devillers, C.

    1989-08-01

    The number of accidents occurring during shipment of dangerous materials in France varies between 200 and 250 each year. Those concerning radioactive materials represent one or two events per year. Six incidents or accidents recorded these last few years have been selected as particularly significant; they include not only events on public highways but also events on nuclear sites relevant to transportation safety. These events are summarized together with corrective actions engaged after analysis of the causes of the events. Finally, more general conclusions drawn from these abnormal events are presented from the point of view of emergency preparedness

  8. A radioactive waste transportation package monitoring system for normal transport and accident emergency response conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, G.S.; Cashwell, J.W.; Apple, M.L.

    1991-01-01

    Shipments of radioactive material (RAM) constitute but a small fraction of the total hazardous materials shipped in the United States each year. Public perception, however, of the potential consequences of a release from a transportation package containing RAM has resulted in significant regulation of transport operations, both to ensure the integrity of a package in accident conditions and to place operational constraints on the shipper. Much of this attention has focused on shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high level wastes which, although comprising a very small number of total shipments, constitute a majority of the total curies transported on an annual basis. This report discusses the shipment of these highly radioactive materials

  9. The highway and railroad operating environments for hazardous shipments in the United States - safer in the '90s?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saricks, C.L.; Tompkins, M.M.

    2000-01-01

    This paper seeks to illuminate the status of transportation safety and risk for large-quantity shipments of spent commercial reactor fuel and mixed and hazardous wastes by examining road and rail accident and vehicular travel data from the mid-1990s. Of special interest are the effect of speed limit changes on controlled-access expressways (chiefly the Interstate Highway System) and the possible effect of season-to-season climatic variation on road transport. We found that improvements in railroad technology and infrastructure have created a safer overall operating environment for railroad freight shipments. We also found recent evidence of an increase in accident rates of heavy combination trucks in states that have raised highway speed limits. Finally, cold weather increases road transport risk, while conditions associated with higher ambient temperatures do not. This last finding is in contrast to rail transport, for which the literature associates both hot and cold temperature extremes with higher accident rates

  10. Accidents in chemical industry: are they foreseeable?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sonnemans, P.J.M.; Körvers, P.M.W.

    2006-01-01

    Accidents recur,’ which is what Kletz [Kletz T. (1993). Lessons from disasters, how organisations have no memory and accidents recur. UK: Institution of Chemical Engineers] wrote in 1993. Indeed, despite all measures taken accidents may re-occur, but ‘disruptions’ in a process reoccur much more

  11. Shipment of Taiwanese research reactor spent nuclear fuel (Phase 2): Environmental assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-06-01

    The proposed action is to transport approximately 1100 spent fuel rods from a foreign research reactor in Taiwan by sea to Hampton Roads, Virginia, and then overland by truck to the receiving basin for offsite fuels at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) for reprocessing to recover uranium and plutonium. The analysis of the impacts of the proposed action have been evaluated and shown to have negligible impact on the local environments. The calculations have been completed using the RADTRAN III code. PWR spent fuel was analyzed as a benchmark to link the calculations in this analysis to those in earlier environmental documentation. Cumulative total, maximum annual, and per shipment risks were calculated. The results indicate that the PWR spent fuel shipment risks are somewhat lower than those previously estimated. The cumulative and maximum annual normal, or incident-free, risks associated with the shipment of Taiwanese research reactor spent fuel is a factor of 10 lower than that for PWR fuel, and the cumulative and maximum annual accident radiological risks are a factor of about 2.2 lower than that for PWR spent fuel. As a result, the port risks are about a factor of 10 larger than the risk of overland transport. All of the risks calculated are small. The PWR risk values are similar to those judged by the NRC to be small enough not to warrant increased stringency in regulations. The Taiwanese research reactor spent fuel shipment risk values are smaller yet. 51 refs., 22 tabs

  12. Historical overview of domestic spent fuel shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, R.B.; Wankerl, M.W.; Armstrong, S.; Hamberger, C.; Schmid, S.

    1991-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide available historical data on most commercial and research reactor spent fuel shipments that have been completed in the United States between 1964 and 1989. This information includes data on the sources of spent fuel that has been shipped, the types of shipping casks used, the number of fuel assemblies that have been shipped, and the number of shipments that have been made. The data are updated periodically to keep abreast of changes. Information on shipments is provided for planning purposes; to support program decisions of the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); and to inform interested members of the public, federal, state, and local government, Indian tribes, and the transportation community. 5 refs., 7 figs., 2 tabs

  13. 27 CFR 28.217 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY LIQUORS EXPORTATION OF ALCOHOL Exportation of Wine With Benefit of Drawback § 28.217 Consignment, shipment, and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of wines...

  14. Radiation surveys of radioactive material shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howell, W.P.

    1986-07-01

    Although contractors function under the guidance of the Department of Energy, there is often substantial variation in the methods and techniques utilized in making radiation measurements. When radioactive materials are shipped from one contractor to another, the measurements recorded on the shipping papers may vary significantly from those measured by the receiver and has been a frequent cause of controversy between contractors. Although significant variances occur in both measurements of radiation fields emanating from shipment containers and measurements of residual radioactivity on the surfaces of the containers, the latter have been the most troublesome. This report describes the measurement of contamination on the exterior surfaces of shipment containers

  15. Evaluation of nuclear facility decommissioning projects: Summary status report: Three Mile Island Unit 2 radioactive waste and laundry shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerge, D.H.; Haffner, D.R.

    1988-06-01

    This document summarizes information concerning radioactive waste and laundry shipments from the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 to radioactive waste disposal sites and to protective clothing decontamination facilities (laundries) since the loss of coolant accident experienced on March 28, 1979. Data were collected from radioactive shipment records, summarized, and placed in a computerized data information retrieval/manipulation system which permits extraction of specific information. This report covers the period of April 9, 1979 through April 19, 1987. Included in this report are: waste disposal site locations, dose rates, curie content, waste description, container type and number, volumes and weights. This information is presented in two major categories: protective clothing (laundry) and radioactive waste. Each of the waste shipment reports is in chronological order

  16. Lessons of nuclear robot history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oomichi, Takeo

    2014-01-01

    Severe accidents occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station stirred up people's great expectation of nuclear robot's deployment. However unexpected nuclear disaster, especially rupture of reactor building caused by core meltdown and hydrogen explosion, made it quite difficult to introduce nuclear robot under high radiation environment to cease accidents and dispose damaged reactor. Robotics Society of Japan (RSJ) set up committee to look back upon lessons learned from 50 year's past experience of nuclear robot development and summarized 'Lessons of nuclear robot history', which was shown on the home page website of RSJ. This article outlined it with personal comment. History of nuclear robot developed for inspection and maintenance at normal operation and for specific required response at nuclear accidents was reviewed with many examples at home and abroad for TMI, Chernobyl and JCO accidents. Present state of Fukushima accident response robot's introduction and development was also described with some comments on nuclear robot development from academia based on lessons. (T. Tanaka)

  17. 7 CFR 322.8 - Packaging of shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Packaging of shipments. 322.8 Section 322.8 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION... Packaging of shipments. (a) Adult honeybees. All shipments of adult honeybees imported into the United...

  18. 27 CFR 28.145 - Consignment, shipment and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Consignment, shipment and delivery. 28.145 Section 28.145 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE...-Trade Zone § 28.145 Consignment, shipment and delivery. The consignment, shipment and delivery of beer...

  19. 27 CFR 28.230 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... delivery. 28.230 Section 28.230 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE... Drawback Consignment, Shipment, and Delivery § 28.230 Consignment, shipment, and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of taxpaid beer removed under this subpart shall be made under the provisions of...

  20. 7 CFR 160.84 - Identification of shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Identification of shipments. 160.84 Section 160.84... STANDARDS FOR NAVAL STORES Sales and Shipments § 160.84 Identification of shipments. The invoice or contract of sale of any naval stores in commerce shall identify and describe the article in accordance with...

  1. Lessons from Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nazari Alves, R.

    2000-01-01

    The lessons learned from the radiological accident of Goiania in 1987 derived from the observations from the Regulatory Agency which was in charge of the decontamination tasks may be consolidated into four classes: Preventive Actions, characterised as those that aim to minimise the probability of occurrence of a radiological accident; Minimisation of time between the moment of the accident occurrence and the beginning of intervention, in case a radiological accident does occur, despite all preventive measures; Intervention, which is correlated to the type of installation, its geographical location, the social classes involved and their contamination vectors; and Follow up, for which well established rules to allow continuing monitoring of the victims and rebuilding of homes are necessary. The greatest lesson of all was the need for integration of the professionals involved, from all organizations. (author)

  2. Accidents - Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  3. 7 CFR 35.6 - Shipment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Shipment. 35.6 Section 35.6 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... country regardless of the number of consignees, receivers, or ports of destination in that country. [41 FR...

  4. Present status of JMTR spent fuel shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyazawa, Masataka; Watanabe, Masao; Yokokawa, Makoto; Sato, Hiroshi; Ito, Haruhiko

    2002-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) has been consistently making the enrichment reduction of reactor fuels in cooperation with RERTR Program and FRR SNF Acceptance Program both conducted along with the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy and JMTR, 50 MW test reactor in Oarai Research Establishment, has achieved core conversion, from its initial 93% enriched UAl alloy to 45% enriched uranium-aluminide fuel, and then to the current 19.8% enriched uranium-silicide fuel. In order to return all of JMTR spent fuels, to be discharged from the reactor by May 12, 2006, to the U.S.A. by May 12, 2009, JAERI is planning the transportation schedule based on one shipment per year. The sixth shipment of spent fuels to U.S. was carried out as scheduled this year, where the total number of fuels shipped amounts to 651 elements. All of the UAl alloy elements have so far been shipped and now shipments of 45% enriched uranium-aluminide type fuels are in progress. Thus far the JMTR SFs have been transported on schedule. From 2003 onward are scheduled more then 850 elements to be shipped. In this paper, we describe our activities on the transportation in general and the schedule for the SFs shipments. (author)

  5. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-07-01

    This circular provides information on shipment of spent fuel subject to regulation by US NRC. It provides a brief description of spent fuel shipment safety and safeguards requirement of general interest, a summary of data for 1979-1995 highway and railway shipments, and a listing, by State, of recent highway and railway shipment routes. The enclosed route information reflects specific NRC approvals that have been granted in response to requests for shipments of spent fuel. This publication does not constitute authority for carriers or other persons to use the routes described to ship spent fuel, other categories of nuclear waste, or other materials

  6. Experience in the analysis of accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner-Jones, S.M.; Hughes, J.S.; Shaw, K.B.

    2002-01-01

    Some half a million packages containing radioactive materials are transported to, from and within the UK annually. Accidents and incidents involving these shipments are rare. However, there is always the potential for such an event, which could lead to a release of the contents of a package or an increase in radiation level caused by damaged shielding. These events could result in radiological consequences for transport workers. As transport occurs in the public environment, such events could also lead to radiation exposures of members of the public. The UK Department for Transport (DfT), together with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have supported, for almost 20 years, work to compile, analyse and report on accidents and incidents that occur during the transport of radioactive materials. Annual reports on these events have been produced for twelve years. The details of these events are recorded in the Radioactive Materials Transport Event Database (RAMTED) maintained by the National Radiological Protection Board on behalf of the DfT and HSE. Information on accidents and incidents dates back to 1958. RAMTED currently includes information of 708 accidents and incidents, covering the period 1958 to 2000. This paper presents a summary of the data covering this period, identifying trends and lessons learned together with a discussion of some examples. It was found that, historically, the most significant exposures were received as a result of accidents involving the transport of industrial radiography sources. However, the frequency and severity of these events has decreased considerably in the later years of this study due to improvements in training, awareness and equipment. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, have established the international nuclear event scale (INES), which is described in detail in a users' guide. The INES has been revised to fully include transport events, and the information in RAMTED has been reviewed

  7. Shipment of spent research reactor fuel to US-operators experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krull, W.

    1999-01-01

    To ship 1500 spent fuel elements over more than 30 years to different reprocessing or storage sites a large amount of experience has been gotten. The most important partners for these activities have been US organizations. The development of the US policy for the receipt of foreign spent fuel elements of US origin is described briefly. The experience being made and lessons learned with the on May 13, 1996 renewed receipt program is described in detail, including US organizations, shipment and formal steps. (author)

  8. Postulated accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ullrich, W.

    1980-01-01

    This lecture on 'Postulated Accidents' is the first of a series of lectures on the dynamic and transient behaviour of nuclear power plants, especially pressurized water reactors. The main points covered will be: Reactivity Accidents, Transients (Intact Loop) and Loss of Cooland Accidents (LOCA) including small leak. This lecture will discuss the accident analysis in general, the definition of the various operational phases, the accident classification, and, as an example, an accident sequence analysis on the basis of 'Postulated Accidents'. (orig./RW)

  9. The TMI-2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loureiro, L.A.

    1986-01-01

    A critical study about the technical and man-related facts in order to establish what is considered the worst commercial nuclear power accident until 1986. Radiological consequences and stress to the public are considered in contrast to antinuclear groups. This descriptive and technical study has the purpose to document written and oral opinions obtained abroad and then explain to the public in an easy language terminology. Preliminary study describing safety related systems fails and the accident itself with minute to minute description, conduct to the consequences and then, to learned lessons

  10. Revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Updating requirements based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accidents (3). Fragility evaluation and outline of the updated points

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaguchi, Akira; Nakamura, Susumu; Mihara, Yoshinori

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from Great East Japan earthquake and other new findings had been accumulated on the fragility evaluation of buildings and components. And also new analysis and evaluation method had been proposed with the advancement of recent analysis and evaluation technology. These were reflected in revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Scope of the fragility evaluation were extended to all equipment on the site, severe accident management equipment including portable equipment and earthquake concomitant incident (such as tsunami) countermeasure equipment. This article described outlines of updating points of the fragility evaluation of the AESJ Standard for Seismic PRA; (1) requirements for seismic induced other risk evaluations such as fire, inundation and tsunami, (2) simulation technology based on recent findings such as three dimensional responses of buildings / structures and its effect on equipment, (3) requirements of the fragility evaluation for various failure mode of several equipment such as severe accident management equipment, fine failure mode of buildings / structures, failures of equipment related with earthquake concomitant incidents (embankment and seawall) and spent fuel pool, and (4) requirements for the fragility evaluation of aftershocks and soil deformation due to fault displacement. (T. Tanaka)

  11. Trial intercountry shipment of irradiated spices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saputra, T.S.; Maha, Munsiah; Purwanto, Z.I.

    1984-01-01

    An experiment has been carried out to evaluate the quality of irradiated spices packaged in some indigenous packaging materials. Spices used were whole nutmeg (myristica fragrans) and whole white pepper (piper nigrum). The spice samples were packaged in tin containers with or without oxygen absorber and in woven polypropylene (PP) bags, then irradiated at 5 kGy, and despatched from Jakarta to Wagenigen by sea-freight. The shipment was performed in small and commercial size packages. The results showed that irradiation treatment could effectively disinfest and decontaminate spices without altering their chemical composition and sensory properties. PP bags, particularly the one without inner liner, were unable to withstand rough handling and to prevent reinfestation during shipment. Tin containers were able to withstand rough handling and prevent reinfestation. The oxygen absorber used had no effect on microbial count and other parameters of the spices. (author)

  12. Trial intercountry shipment of irradiated spices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saputra, T S; Maha, Munsiah; Purwanto, Z I; Parkas, J

    1984-10-01

    An experiment has been carried out to evaluate the quality of irradiated spices packaged in some indigenous packaging materials. Spices used were whole nutmeg (myristica fragrans) and whole white pepper (piper nigrum). The spice samples were packaged in tin containers with or without oxygen absorber and in woven polypropylene (PP) bags, then irradiated at 5 kGy, and despatched from Jakarta to Wagenigen by sea-freight. The shipment was performed in small and commercial size packages. The results showed that irradiation treatment could effectively disinfest and decontaminate spices without altering their chemical composition and sensory properties. PP bags, particularly the one without inner liner, were unable to withstand rough handling and to prevent reinfestation during shipment. Tin containers were able to withstand rough handling and prevent reinfestation. The oxygen absorber used had no effect on microbial count and other parameters of the spices. 21 references.

  13. Denial of shipments - myth or reality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charrette, M.A.; McInnes, D.

    2004-01-01

    The global healthcare community depends on shipments of radioisotopes. MDS Nordion manufactures and distributes radioisotopes used in the medical, research and sterilization industries throughout the world. With a growing demand for radiation and radiation technology to prevent, diagnose and treat disease, it is important that the global health care industry have a secure and reliable supply of such important materials. Despite this ever increasing need, shipments of radioisotopes are being increasingly delayed and outright denied. This paper outlines the importance of radioisotopes to global healthcare. It also details examples of shipment denials and how this evolving situation has impeded the efficient transport of radioactive material which risks preventing the delivery of essential radioisotopes to many member states. Denial of shipments was identified as a key issue at the 2003 International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, the 2003 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference and at an IAEA Technical Meeting in January 2004. The outcome is that the IAEA is focused on better documenting the problem and is starting to develop ideas to address it. Moreover, governments, associations and modal organizations are becoming more aware of the matter. As a responsible partner in a unique industry, MDS Nordion encourages all IAEA Member States, commercial carriers, airports and ports to be engaged in this matter and accept the transport of radioactive material without additional requirements. In this respect, the collaboration of all organizations involved in this highly interactive global system of transport is vital to assure the effective transport of radioactive material for global health care

  14. Denial of shipments - myth or reality

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Charrette, M.A.; McInnes, D. [MDS Nordion, Ottawa, ON (Canada)

    2004-07-01

    The global healthcare community depends on shipments of radioisotopes. MDS Nordion manufactures and distributes radioisotopes used in the medical, research and sterilization industries throughout the world. With a growing demand for radiation and radiation technology to prevent, diagnose and treat disease, it is important that the global health care industry have a secure and reliable supply of such important materials. Despite this ever increasing need, shipments of radioisotopes are being increasingly delayed and outright denied. This paper outlines the importance of radioisotopes to global healthcare. It also details examples of shipment denials and how this evolving situation has impeded the efficient transport of radioactive material which risks preventing the delivery of essential radioisotopes to many member states. Denial of shipments was identified as a key issue at the 2003 International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, the 2003 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference and at an IAEA Technical Meeting in January 2004. The outcome is that the IAEA is focused on better documenting the problem and is starting to develop ideas to address it. Moreover, governments, associations and modal organizations are becoming more aware of the matter. As a responsible partner in a unique industry, MDS Nordion encourages all IAEA Member States, commercial carriers, airports and ports to be engaged in this matter and accept the transport of radioactive material without additional requirements. In this respect, the collaboration of all organizations involved in this highly interactive global system of transport is vital to assure the effective transport of radioactive material for global health care.

  15. SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT AND IMPROVEMENTS SUGGESTED

    OpenAIRE

    SONG, JIN HO; KIM, TAE WOON

    2014-01-01

    This paper revisits the Fukushima accident to draw lessons in the aspect of nuclear safety considering the fact that the Fukushima accident resulted in core damage for three nuclear power plants simultaneously and that there is a high possibility of a failure of the integrity of reactor vessel and primary containment vessel. A brief review on the accident progression at Fukushima nuclear power plants is discussed to highlight the nature and characteristic of the event. As the severe accide...

  16. Module 13: Bulk Packaging Shipments by Highway

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Przybylski, J.L.

    1994-07-01

    The Hazardous Materials Modular Training Program provides participating United States Department of Energy (DOE) sites with a basic, yet comprehensive, hazardous materials transportation training program for use onsite. This program may be used to assist individual program entities to satisfy the general awareness, safety training, and function specific training requirements addressed in Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Title 49, Part 172, Subpart H -- ''Training.'' Module 13 -- Bulk Packaging Shipments by Highway is a supplement to the Basic Hazardous Materials Workshop. Module 13 -- Bulk Packaging Shipments by Highway focuses on bulk shipments of hazardous materials by highway mode, which have additional or unique requirements beyond those addressed in the ten module core program. Attendance in this course of instruction should be limited to those individuals with work experience in transporting hazardous materials utilizing bulk packagings and who have completed the Basic Hazardous Materials Workshop or an equivalent. Participants will become familiar with the rules and regulations governing the transportation by highway of hazardous materials in bulk packagings and will demonstrate the application of these requirements through work projects and examination

  17. Summary of lessons learned in Japan from severe accidents: R&D programme for SA-Keisou in Japan. Annex I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Instrumentation systems in a nuclear power plant are very important for monitoring plant conditions for safe operation and shutdown. The severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011 caused several severe situations such as failure of the plant power supply for many monitoring instruments, core damage and hydrogen explosion, among other things. Many of the functions of the instrumentation systems were lost. Monitoring the plant’s conditions then became harder to perform. In the event that an accident similar to the one at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were to occur in the future, measurements of the important variables, such as reactor water level or reactor pressure, are to be ensured. The development of SA-Keisou1 is needed to monitor these important variables, which contribute to preventing the escalation of an event into a severe accident, mitigating the consequences of a severe accident, achieving a safe state for the plant and confirming that the plant continues to be in a safe state over the long term

  18. Following the radiation accident in Fukushima. Consequences for information management; Nach dem Strahlenunfall in Fukushima. Ein Beitrag zur Aufarbeitung der 'Lessons Learnt'

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meineke, Viktor [Universitaet der Bundeswehr, Muenchen (Germany). Inst. fuer Radiobiologie

    2012-07-01

    The differing perceptions of risk in Japan and Germany, the changing psychosocial factors since the Chernobyl event, and the problem of the lacking basic knowledge concerning radiation effects at the general population as well as partially in medical circles are discussed and conclusions are made regarding the information management and the medical management of radiation accidents. (orig.)

  19. Economic models of compensation for damages caused by nuclear accidents: some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faure, Michael G.

    1995-01-01

    Alternative systems of compensation for damages caused by nuclear accidents have been proposed. In respect, the question merits attention to whether these alternative models of compensation discussed in the economic literature could be implemented when discussing the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions. 55 refs., 1 tab

  20. Accident management insights after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Degueldre, Didier; Viktorov, Alexandre; Tuomainen, Minna; Ducamp, Francois; Chevalier, Sophie; Guigueno, Yves; Tasset, Daniel; Heinrich, Marcus; Schneider, Matthias; Funahashi, Toshihiro; Hotta, Akitoshi; Kajimoto, Mitsuhiro; Chung, Dae-Wook; Kuriene, Laima; Kozlova, Nadezhda; Zivko, Tomi; Aleza, Santiago; Jones, John; McHale, Jack; Nieh, Ho; Pascal, Ghislain; ); Nakoski, John; Neretin, Victor; Nezuka, Takayoshi; )

    2014-01-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, that took place on 11 March 2011, initiated a significant number of activities at the national and international levels to reassess the safety of existing NPPs, evaluate the sufficiency of technical means and administrative measures available for emergency response, and develop recommendations for increasing the robustness of NPPs to withstand extreme external events and beyond design basis accidents. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is working closely with its member and partner countries to examine the causes of the accident and to identify lessons learnt with a view to the appropriate follow-up actions to be taken by the nuclear safety community. Accident management is a priority area of work for the NEA to address lessons being learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP following the recommendations of Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), and Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH). Considering the importance of these issues, the CNRA authorised the formation of a task group on accident management (TGAM) in June 2012 to review the regulatory framework for accident management following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The task group was requested to assess the NEA member countries needs and challenges in light of the accident from a regulatory point of view. The general objectives of the TGAM review were to consider: - enhancements of on-site accident management procedures and guidelines based on lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident; - decision-making and guiding principles in emergency situations; - guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies for addressing long-term aspects of accident management; - guidance and implementation when taking extreme measures for accident management. The report is built on the existing bases for capabilities to respond to design basis

  1. Dose estimates in a loss of lead shielding truck accident.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dennis, Matthew L.; Osborn, Douglas M.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Heames, Terence John (Alion Science & Technology Albuquerque, NM)

    2009-08-01

    The radiological transportation risk & consequence program, RADTRAN, has recently added an updated loss of lead shielding (LOS) model to it most recent version, RADTRAN 6.0. The LOS model was used to determine dose estimates to first-responders during a spent nuclear fuel transportation accident. Results varied according to the following: type of accident scenario, percent of lead slump, distance to shipment, and time spent in the area. This document presents a method of creating dose estimates for first-responders using RADTRAN with potential accident scenarios. This may be of particular interest in the event of high speed accidents or fires involving cask punctures.

  2. Use of accident experience in developing criteria for teleoperator equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vallario, E.J.; Selby, J.M.

    1985-10-01

    The 1961 SL-1 reactor accident in Idaho and the Recuplex accident at Hanford are reviewed to identify problems common to emergency situations, lessons learned from accidents, criteria for emergency equipment, and recommendations for using robotics to solve problems during emergencies. Teleoperator equipment could be used to assess the extent of the damage and the condition of the reactor, retrieve dosimeters, evacuate and treat accident victims, clean up debris and decontaminate accident areas. 2 refs., 9 figs

  3. The tracking of high level waste shipments-TRANSCOM system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, P.E.; Joy, D.S.; Pope, R.B.

    1995-01-01

    The TRANSCOM (transportation tracking and communication) system is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) real-time system for tracking shipments of spent fuel, high-level wastes, and other high-visibility shipments of radioactive material. The TRANSCOM system has been operational since 1988. The system was used during FY1993 to track almost 100 shipments within the US.DOE complex, and it is accessed weekly by 10 to 20 users

  4. The tracking of high level waste shipments - TRANSCOM system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, P.E.; Joy, D.S.; Pope, R.B.; Thomas, T.M.; Lester, P.B.

    1994-01-01

    The TRANSCOM (transportation tracking and communication) system is the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) real-time system for tracking shipments of spent fuel, high-level wastes, and other high-visibility shipments of radioactive material. The TRANSCOM system has been operational since 1988. The system was used during FY 1993 to track almost 100 shipments within the US DOE complex, and it is accessed weekly by 10 to 20 users

  5. Chapter 6: Accidents; Capitulo 6: Acidentes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-06-01

    The chapter 6 talks about the accidents with radiators all over the world, specifically, the Stimos, in Italy, 1975, San Salvador, in El Salvador, 1989, Soreq, in Israel, 1990, Nesvizh, in Byelorussian, 1991, in Illinois, US, 1965, in Maryland, US, 1991, Hanoi, Vietnam, 1992, Fleurus, in Belgium, 2006. Comments on the accidents and mainly the learned lessons.

  6. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005; Lecciones aprendidas del accidente radiologico ocurrido en La Ciudadela de El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. Septiembre 2005

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L. [Servicio de Radiofisica Sanitaria (RFS), Unidad de Tecnologia Nuclear, Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificas (IVIC), Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, Carretera Panamericana Km. 11, Altos del Pipe, Caracas (Venezuela)]. e-mail: dlea@ivic.ve

    2006-07-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  7. TEPCO's risk communication activities in Fukushima Prefecture in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sagasaki, Yoshitoyo; Yamamoto, Takashi

    2015-01-01

    This paper introduces the risk communication activities of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in Fukushima Prefecture. It analyzed the organizational cause as the background for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, and concluded that the root cause of the accident is the thought that 'safety has already been secured, and operation rate and the like are important management issues, which incurred the insufficient preparedness for accident.' It has taken six measures as nuclear safety reform plans. One of these is the 'enhancement of risk communication activities.' The nuclear power leader take the initiative to disclose risk under the idea that 'there is no absolute safety (zero risk) in nuclear power,' and promote risk communication for continuously obtaining the understanding of the regional community and society about safety measures, etc. To implement risk communication, 'risk communicators' are installed, and they propose for the management and nuclear leader, about the risk perception and measures associated with public disclosure and its limit, and perform risk communication in accordance with the policy. As the examples of these initiatives, this paper introduces the cases of Fukushima Prefecture, questionnaire study, and evaluations by international organizations. (A.O.)

  8. Accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lutz, R.J.; Monty, B.S.; Liparulo, N.J.; Desaedeleer, G.

    1989-01-01

    The foundation of the framework for a Severe Accident Management Program is the contained in the Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS) or the Individual Plant Evaluations (IPE) for a specific plant. The development of a Severe Accident Management Program at a plant is based on the use of the information, in conjunction with other applicable information. A Severe Accident Management Program must address both accident prevention and accident mitigation. The overall Severe Accident Management framework must address these two facets, as a living program in terms of gathering the evaluating information, the readiness to respond to an event. Significant international experience in the development of severe accident management programs exist which should provide some direction for the development of Severe Accident Management in the U.S. This paper reports that the two most important elements of a Severe Accident Management Program are the Emergency Consultation process and the standards for measuring the effectiveness of individual Severe Accident Management Programs at utilities

  9. Unavoidable Accident

    OpenAIRE

    Grady, Mark F.

    2009-01-01

    In negligence law, "unavoidable accident" is the risk that remains when an actor has used due care. The counterpart of unavoidable accident is "negligent harm." Negligence law makes parties immune for unavoidable accident even when they have used less than due care. Courts have developed a number of methods by which they "sort" accidents to unavoidable accident or to negligent harm, holding parties liable only for the latter. These sorting techniques are interesting in their own right and als...

  10. 75 FR 1235 - Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between OECD...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-08

    ..., Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway... Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between OECD Member Countries, Export Shipments of Spent Lead- Acid Batteries, Submitting Exception Reports for Export Shipments of Hazardous Wastes...

  11. Joint state of Colorado-US Department of Energy WIPP Shipment Exercise Program: TRANSAX '90

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    In July 1990, the United States Secretary of Energy requested the DOE conduct a transportation emergency exercise before the end of CY 1990. The tasking was subsequently directed to the Director of DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) to plan and conduct an exercise, based on a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shipment scenario. The state of Colorado was asked to participate. Colorado, in turn, invited the DOE to integrate the exercise into its own series of WIPP-related tabletop and field exercises for which the state had already begun planning. The result was a joint USDOE/Colorado full-scale (orientation) exercise called Transportation Accident Exercise 1990 (TRANSAX '90). The state of Colorado's exercise program was a follow-on to previously conducted classroom training. The program would serve to identify and resolve outstanding issues concerning inspections of the WIPP shipment transporter as it entered and passed through the state on the designated Interstate 25 transportation corridor; criteria for movement under various adverse weather and road conditions; and emergency response to accidents occurring in an urban or rural environment. The USDOE designed its participation in the exercise program to test selected aspects of the DOE Emergency Management System relating to response to and management of DOE off-site transportation emergencies involving assistance to state and local emergency response personnel. While a number of issues remain under study for ultimate resolution, others have been resolved and will become the basis for emergency operations plans, SOPs, mutual aid agreements, and checklist upgrades. Concurrently, the concentrated efforts at local, state, and federal levels in dealing with WIPP- related activities during this exercise program development have given renewed impetus to all parties as the beginning of actual shipments draws nearer. Three tabletop scenarios are discussed in this report

  12. Sensitivity of radiation monitoring systems in Manila Ports in detecting contamination in foodstuff shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Romallosa, Kristine Marie D.; Caseria, Estrella S.; Piquero, Ronald E.; Agustin, Jan Aldrich A.

    2011-01-01

    During the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, one of the Philippines' measures to protect the public from radiological hazards of the accident is by monitoring agricultural and food imports for radioactive contamination. In this study, the sensitivity of the mobile Radiation Monitoring System (RM) in Manila Ports in detecting contamination in incoming foodstuff shipments was determined. Large volume synthetic 137 Cs reference sources were used to determine the minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of the RMS. The reference sources have radioactivity concentrations that are comparable to the PNRI guidance level of 1000 Bg/kg for 137 Cs that is destined for general consumption. Results of the MDC measurements show that the RMS units are sensitive enough to detect radioactivity levels that are within the guidance levels provided that a) the minimum package lot is approximately 200 kg, b) the package is positioned at the detector side, and c) the alarm setting of RMS is as calibrated. It was therefore established that the RMS can be used to initially screen incoming foodstuff shipments of possible contamination and thereby help minimize potential radiation exposures to the public. (author)

  13. A joint model of mode and shipment size choice using the first generation of Commodity Flow Survey Public Use Microdata

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Monique Stinson

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available A behavior-based supply chain and freight transportation model was developed and implemented for the Maricopa Association of Governments (MAG and Pima Association of Governments (PAG. This innovative, data-driven modeling system simulates commodity flows to, from and within Phoenix and Tucson Megaregion and is used for regional planning purposes. This paper details the logistics choice component of the system and describes the position and functioning of this component in the overall framework. The logistics choice model uses a nested logit formulation to evaluate mode choice and shipment size jointly. Modeling decisions related to integrating this component within the overall framework are discussed. This paper also describes practical insights gained from using the 2012 Commodity Flow Survey Public Use Microdata (released in 2015, which was the principal data source used to estimate the joint shipment size-mode choice nested logit model. Finally, the validation effort and related lessons learned are described.

  14. 19 CFR 148.114 - Shipment of unaccompanied articles.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Shipment of unaccompanied articles. 148.114 Section 148.114 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY... States § 148.114 Shipment of unaccompanied articles. One copy of the validated Customs Form 255 shall be...

  15. 7 CFR 322.24 - Packaging of transit shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Packaging of transit shipments. 322.24 Section 322.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION... Restricted Organisms Through the United States § 322.24 Packaging of transit shipments. (a) Restricted...

  16. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-07-01

    This publication contains basically three kinds of information: routes approved by the Commission for the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel, information regarding any safeguards-significant incidents which have been reported to occur during shipments along such routes, and cumulative amounts of material shipped

  17. 15 CFR 752.7 - Direct shipment to customers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Direct shipment to customers. 752.7... COMPREHENSIVE LICENSE § 752.7 Direct shipment to customers. (a) General authorization. (1) Upon request by a... directly to the requesting consignee's customer in either: (i) The requesting consignee's country; or (ii...

  18. 7 CFR 906.41 - Gift fruit shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Gift fruit shipments. 906.41 Section 906.41... LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 906.41 Gift fruit shipments. The handling to any person of gift packages of fruit individually addressed to such person, in quantities...

  19. 19 CFR 123.41 - Truck shipments transiting Canada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Truck shipments transiting Canada. 123.41 Section... OF THE TREASURY CUSTOMS RELATIONS WITH CANADA AND MEXICO United States and Canada In-Transit Truck Procedures § 123.41 Truck shipments transiting Canada. (a) Manifest required. Trucks with merchandise...

  20. 27 CFR 28.124 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY LIQUORS EXPORTATION OF ALCOHOL Withdrawal of Wine Without Payment of... Bonded Warehouse, or Transportation to a Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse § 28.124 Consignment, shipment, and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of wines withdrawn without payment of tax under...

  1. 27 CFR 28.155 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Consignment, shipment, and delivery. 28.155 Section 28.155 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE..., and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of specially denatured spirits withdrawn free of...

  2. 27 CFR 28.106 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... delivery. 28.106 Section 28.106 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE... Transportation to a Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse § 28.106 Consignment, shipment, and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of distilled spirits withdrawn without payment of tax under this subpart shall be...

  3. 27 CFR 28.196 - Consignment, shipment, and delivery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... delivery. 28.196 Section 28.196 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE... Benefit of Drawback Filing of Notice and Removal § 28.196 Consignment, shipment, and delivery. The consignment, shipment, and delivery of distilled spirits removed under this subpart for export, use on vessels...

  4. Route selection issues for NWPA shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, C.V.; Harrison, I.G.

    1993-01-01

    Questions surrounding the designation of routes for the movement of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) have broad implications. Federal regulations prescribe rules to be applied in the selection of highway routes. In most cases, these rules will lead to a clear selection of one route between an origin and destination point. However, in other cases, strict application of the regulations does not result in a clear choice of a preferred route. The regulations also provide discretion to State governments and carriers to select alternative routes to enhance the safety of the shipment. Railroad shipments of radioactive materials are not subject to Federal routing regulations. Since the railroads operate on private property, it has been assumed that they know the best way to move freight on their system. This discretion, while desirable for addressing unique local safety concerns or for responding to temporary safety concerns such as road problems, weather conditions, or construction areas, leads to significant opportunity for misunderstandings and uneasiness on the part of local residents

  5. Lessons learned from a review of post-accident sampling systems, high range effluent monitors and high concentration particulate iodine samplers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hull, A.P.; Knox, W.H.; White, J.R.

    1987-01-01

    Post-accident sampling systems (PASS), high range gaseous effluent monitors and sampling systems for particulates and iodine in high concentrations have been reviewed at twenty-one licensee sites in Region I of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission which includes fifteen BWR's and fourteen PWR's. Although most of the installed PASS met the criteria, the highest operational readiness was found in on-line systems that were also used for routine sampling and analysis. The detectors used in the gaseous effluent monitors included external ion chambers, GM tubes, organic scintillators and Cd-Te solid state crystals. Although all were found acceptable, each had its own inherent limitations in the conversion of detector output to the time varying concentration of a post-accident mixture of noble gases. None of the installed particulate and iodine samplers fully met all of the criteria. Their principal limitations included a lack of documentation showing that they could obtain a representative sample and that many of them would collect of an excessive amount of activity at the design criteria. 10 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs

  6. Evaluation of nuclear facility decommissioning projects. Three Mile Island Unit 2. Radioactive waste and laundry shipments. Volume 9. Summary status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerge, D.H.; Miller, R.L.; Scotti, K.S.

    1986-05-01

    This document summarizes information concerning radioactive waste and laundry shipments from the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 to radioactive waste disposal sites and to protective clothing decontamination facilities (laundries) since the loss of coolant accident experienced on March 28, 1979. Data were collected from radioactive shipment records, summarized, and placed in a computerized data information retrieval/manipulation system which permits extraction of specific information. This report covers the period of April 9, 1979 to May 5, 1985. Included in this report are: waste disposal site locations, dose rates, curie content, waste description, container type and number, volumes and weights. This information is presented in two major categories: protective clothing (laundry) and radioactive waste. Each of the waste shipment reports is in chronological order

  7. Application of ALARA principles to shipment of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenborg, J.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Murphy, D.W.; Burnett, R.A.; Lewis, J.R.

    1980-05-01

    The public exposure from spent fuel shipment is very low. In view of this low exposure and the perfect safety record for spent fuel shipment, existing systems can be considered satisfactory. On the other hand, occupational exposure reduction merits consideration and technology improvement to decrease dose should concentrate on this exposure. Practices that affect the age of spent fuel in shipment and the number of times the fuel must be shipped prior to disposal have the largest impact. A policy to encourage a 5-year spent fuel cooling period prior to shipment coupled with appropriate cask redesign to accommodate larger loads would be consistent with ALARA and economic principles. And finally, bypassing high population density areas will not in general reduce shipment dose

  8. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This circular has been prepared to provide information on the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) subject to regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It provides a brief description of spent fuel shipment safety and safeguards requirements of general interest, a summary of data for 1979--1989 highway and railway shipments, and a listing, by State, of recent highway and railway shipment routes. The enclosed route information reflects specific NRC approvals that have been granted in response to requests for shipments of spent fuel. This publication does not constitute authority for carriers or other persons to use the routes described to ship spent fuel, other categories of nuclear waste, or other materials. 11 figs., 3 tabs

  9. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-06-01

    The circular has been prepared to provide information on the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) subject to regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It provides a brief description of spent fuel shipment safety and safeguards requirements of general interest, a summary of data for 1979--1991 highway and railway shipments, and a listing, by State, of recent highway and railway shipment routes. The enclosed route information reflects specific NRC approvals that have been granted in response to requests for shipments of spent fuel. This publication does not constitute authority for carriers or other persons to use the routes described to ship spent fuel, other categories of nuclear waste, or other materials

  10. Preventing accidents

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-08-01

    As the most effective strategy for improving safety is to prevent accidents from occurring at all, the Volpe Center applies a broad range of research techniques and capabilities to determine causes and consequences of accidents and to identify, asses...

  11. Trends in state-level freight accident rates: An enhancement of risk factor development for RADTRAN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saricks, C.; Kvitek, T.

    1991-01-01

    Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is concerned with understanding and managing risk as it applies to the shipment of spent commercial nuclear reactor fuel. Understanding risk in relation to mode and geography may provide opportunities to minimize radiological and non-radiological risks of transportation. To enhance such an understanding, a set of state-or waterway-specific accident, fatality, and injury rates (expressed as rates per shipment kilometer) by transportation mode and highway administrative class was developed, using publicly-available data bases. Adjustments made to accommodate miscoded or incomplete information in accident data are described, as well as the procedures for estimating state-level flow data. Results indicate that the shipping conditions under which spent fuel is likely to be transported should be less subject to accidents than the ''average'' shipment within mode. 10 refs., 3 tabs

  12. Physical Protection of Spent Fuel Shipments: Resolution of Stakeholder Concerns Through Rulemaking - 12284

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ballard, James D. [Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge, Northridge, CA 91330 (United States); Halstead, Robert J. [State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects Carson City, NV 89706 (United States); Dilger, Fred [Black Mountain Research, Henderson, NV 81012 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    the majority of the concerns expressed in the petition, additional developments by other regulatory bodies and the change in how the United States sees threats to the homeland - all of these produced a satisfactory resolution through the rulemaking process. While not all of the concerns expressed by Nevada were addressed in the proposed rule and significant challenges face any programmatic shipment campaign in the future, the lesson learned on this occasion is that stakeholder concerns can be resolved through rulemaking. If DOE would engage with stakeholders on its role in transport of SNF and HLW under the NWPA, these concerns would be better addressed. Specifically the attempts by DOE to resist transportation and security regulations now considered necessary by the NRC for the adequate protection of the shipments of highly radioactive materials, these DOE efforts seem ill advised. One clear lesson learned from this successful rulemaking petition process is that the system of stakeholder input can work to better the regulatory environment. (authors)

  13. Offsite Shipment Campaign Readiness Assessment (OSCRA): A tool for offsite shipment campaigns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Michelhaugh, R.D.; Pope, R.B. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Bisaria, A. [Science Applications International Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1995-12-31

    The Offsite Shipment Campaign Readiness Assessment (OSCRA) tool is designed to assist program managers in identifying, implementing, and verifying applicable transportation and disposal regulatory requirements for specific shipment campaigns. OSCRA addresses these issues and provides the program manager with a tool to support planning for safe and compliant transportation of waste and other regulated materials. Waste transportation and disposal requirements must be identified and addressed in the planning phase of a waste management project. In the past, in some cases, transportation and disposal requirements have not been included in overall project plans. These planning deficiencies have led to substantial delays and cost impacts. Additionally, some transportation regulatory requirements have not been properly implemented, resulting in substantial fines and public embarrassment for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). If a material has been processed and packaged for onsite storage (prior to offsite disposal) in a package that does not meet transportation requirements, it must be repackaged in U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)-compliant packaging for transport. This repackaging can result in additional cost, time, and personnel radiation exposure. The original OSCRA concept was developed during the Pond Waste Project at the K-25 Site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The continued development of OSCRA as a user-friendly tool was funded in 1995 by the DOE Office of Environmental Management, Transportation Management Division (TMD). OSCRA is designed to support waste management managers, site remediation managers, and transportation personnel in defining applicable regulatory transportation and disposal requirements for offsite shipment of hazardous waste and other regulated materials. The need for this tool stems from increasing demands imposed on DOE and the need to demonstrate and document safe and compliant packaging and shipment of wastes from various DOE sites.

  14. Shipment of LLW by intercoastal maritime service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbour, D.A.

    1985-01-01

    Transportation costs are a significant element of total waste disposal costs. In 1982, Nuclear Metals, Inc. (NMI) began a series of tests and investigations to examine the feasibility of using alternative modes for its low-level waste (LLW) shipments. NMI's investigations and experience have identified significant problems in transporting LLW by rail. Intercoastal maritime service, however, has been demonstrated as a safe and cost-effective way of transporting LLW from eastern seaboard generation sites to the repository at Beatty, Nevada. Intuition is an unreliable guide in this area. Waste managers need to periodically assess and compare combined transportation and burial costs for all site options to ensure that disposal operations are conducted in the most rational way

  15. Accident management for severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.A.; Pratt, W.T.; Lehner, J.; Leonard, M.; Disalvo, R.; Sheron, B.

    1988-01-01

    The management of severe accidents in light water reactors is receiving much attention in several countries. The reduction of risk by measures and/or actions that would affect the behavior of a severe accident is discussed. The research program that is being conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission focuses on both in-vessel accident management and containment and release accident management. The key issues and approaches taken in this program are summarized. 6 refs

  16. Denials and Delays of Radioactive Material Shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    El-Shinawy, R.M.K.

    2011-01-01

    delays of shipments of radioactive materials forms an important issue today. Radioactive materials need to be transported using all modes of transport for use in different applications such as public health, industry, research and production of nuclear power. The transport of radioactive materials is governed by national and international regulations, which are based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations for safe transport of radioactive materials (TS-R-1). These regulations ensure high standards of safety. Recently there were increasing numbers of instances of denials and delays of shipments of radioactive materials even when complying with the regulations. The denials and delays can result in difficulties to patients and others who rely on products sterilized by radiation. Therefore there is an urgent need for a universally accepted approach to solve this problem. In response, the IAEA has formed an International Steering Committee (ISC) on denials and delays of radioactive materials. Also, it designate the National Focal Points (NFP) representative to help the ISC members and the IAEA by informing about denial operations and how they can help. The Steering Committee developed and adopted an action plan which includes the action to be taken. This plan is based on: Awareness, Training, Communication, Lobbying for marketing, Economic and Harmonization among member states. It is important to work within the mandate of the ISC and in the line of action plan on denials and delays. It identified the following network members such as: National Focal Points, Regional Coordinators, National Committee, National Representative for different modes of transport and similar bodies, Carriers, Producers and Suppliers, Different civil societies, NGO's, Ministry of transport and others.

  17. Status of the TRIGA shipments to the INEEL from Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stump, Robert C.; Mustin, Tracy

    1997-01-01

    During 1999 shipment from 4 European countries, involving the following 4 research reactors was foreseen: ENEA of Italy, ICN of Romania, TRIGA-IJS of Slovenia, and MHH of Germany. The research reactors under consideration are LENA of Italy, IFK and DKFZ of Germany. Unique challenges of this task are: first shipment to the INEEL from the east coast of the United States; Need to identify a transportation route and working with the states, tribes and local governments to ensure that adequate public safety and security planning is done and followed; first shipment to INEEL involving both high-income and less-than-high-income countries in one shipment. There is an opportunity to save a significant amount of money for both DOE and the high-income countries by cooperating and coordinating the shipments together. The First will be the shipment to INEEL of mixed TRIGA SNF and more than one shipping cask type. This shipment will include a mixture of LEU, HEU, aluminum clad, stainless steel clad, and Incoloy clad rods. INEEL will need to prepare the safety documentation, procedures, and make equipment and facility modifications necessary to handle the ifferent fuel and cask types

  18. Historical overview of domestic spent fuel shipments: Update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    This report presents available historic data on most commercial and research reactor spent fuel shipments in the United States from 1964 through 1989. Data include sources of the spent fuel shipped, types of shipping casks used, number of fuel assemblies shipped, and number of shipments made. This report also addresses the shipment of spent research reactor fuel. These shipments have not been documented as well as commercial power reactor spent fuel shipment activity. Available data indicate that the greatest number of research reactor fuel shipments occurred in 1986. The largest campaigns in 1986 were from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Brooklyn, New York, to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) and from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) in Tennessee and the Rockwell International Reactor in California to the Savannah River Plant near Aiken, South Carolina. For all years addressed in this report, DOE facilities in Idaho Falls and Savannah River were the major recipients of research reactor spent fuel. In 1989, 10 shipments were received at the Idaho facilities. These originated from universities in California, Michigan, and Missouri. 9 refs., 12 figs., 7 tabs

  19. An analysis of severe air transport accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClure, J.D.; Luna, R.E.

    1989-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to analyze the severity of aircraft accidents that may involve the air transport of radioactive materials (RAM). One of the basic aims of this paper is to provide a numerical description of the severity of aircraft transport accidents so that the accident severity can be compared with the accident performance standards that are specified in IAEA Safety Series 6, the international packaging standards for the safe movement of RAM. The existing packaging regulations in most countries embrace the packaging standards developed by the IAEA. Historically, the packaging standards for Type B packages have been independent of the transport mode. That is, if the shipment occurs in a certified packaging, then the shipment can take place by any transport mode. In 1975, a legislative action occurred in the US Congress which led to the development of a package designed specifically for the air transport of plutonium. Changes were subsequently made to the US packaging regulations in 10CFR71 to incorporate the plutonium air transport performance standards. These standards were used to certify the air transport package for plutonium which is commonly referred to as PAT-1 (US NRC). The PAT-1 was certified by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in September 1978

  20. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-06-01

    This publication is the third in a proposed series of annual publications issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to public information requests regarding the Commission's regulation of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Subsequent issues in this series will update the information contained herein. This publication contains basically three kinds of information: (1) routes approved by the Commission for the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel, (2) information regarding any safeguards-significant incidents which have been reported to occur during shipments along such routes, and (3) cumulative amounts of material shipped

  1. Radiological consequences of ship collisions that might occur in U.S. Ports during the shipment of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel to the United States in break-bulk freighters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprung, J.L.; Bespalko, S.J.; Massey, C.D.; Yoshimura, R.; Johnson, J.D.; Reardon, P.C.; Ebert, M.W.; Gallagher D.W.

    1996-08-01

    Accident source terms, source term probabilities, consequences, and risks are developed for ship collisions that might occur in U.S. ports during the shipment of spent fuel from foreign research reactors to the United States in break-bulk freighters

  2. TRANSCOM: The US Department of Energy (DOE) system for tracking shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boes, K.S.; Joy, D.S.; Pope, R.B.; Thomas, T.M.; Lester, P.B.

    1994-01-01

    The US Department of energy (DOE) Transportation Management Division (TMD) has developed a system which allows communications with and near real-time tracking of high-visibility shipments of hazardous materials. This system, which is known as TRANSCOM (Transportation Tracking and Communications System), is currently in operation. This paper summarizes the current status of TRANSCOM, its history, the experience associated with its use, and the future plans for its growth and enhancement. during the first half of fiscal year (FY) 1994, 38 shipments were tracked by the TRANSCOM system. These shipments included two Mark-42 spent fuel shipments, one BUSS cask shipment, and one waterway shipment (the Seawolf shipment)

  3. Logistics: DoD International Personal Property Shipment Rates

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2002-01-01

    .... The allegation claimed that under current procedures Code of Service 4 DoD was paying excessive costs for ocean transportation on household goods shipments because a third party company purchased...

  4. Case histories of West Valley spent fuel shipments: Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-01-01

    In 1983, NRC/FC initiated a study on institutional issues related to spent fuel shipments originating at the former spent fuel processing facility in West Valley, New York. FC staff viewed the shipment campaigns as a one-time opportunity to document the institutional issues that may arise with a substantial increase in spent fuel shipping activity. NRC subsequently contracted with the Aerospace Corporation for the West Valley Study. This report contains a detailed description of the events which took place prior to and during the spent fuel shipments. The report also contains a discussion of the shipment issues that arose, and presents general findings. Most of the institutional issues discussed in the report do not fall under NRC's transportation authority. The case histories provide a reference to agencies and other institutions that may be involved in future spent fuel shipping campaigns. 130 refs., 7 figs., 19 tabs.

  5. Case histories of West Valley spent fuel shipments: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    In 1983, NRC/FC initiated a study on institutional issues related to spent fuel shipments originating at the former spent fuel processing facility in West Valley, New York. FC staff viewed the shipment campaigns as a one-time opportunity to document the institutional issues that may arise with a substantial increase in spent fuel shipping activity. NRC subsequently contracted with the Aerospace Corporation for the West Valley Study. This report contains a detailed description of the events which took place prior to and during the spent fuel shipments. The report also contains a discussion of the shipment issues that arose, and presents general findings. Most of the institutional issues discussed in the report do not fall under NRC's transportation authority. The case histories provide a reference to agencies and other institutions that may be involved in future spent fuel shipping campaigns. 130 refs., 7 figs., 19 tabs

  6. 7 CFR 947.54 - Shipments for specified purposes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... shipments of potatoes for the following purposes: (1) Livestock feed; (2) Charity; (3) Export; (4) Seed; (5) Prepeeling; (6) Canning and freezing; (7) Processing into other products, including “other processing...

  7. Nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    On 27 May 1986 the Norwegian government appointed an inter-ministerial committee of senior officials to prepare a report on experiences in connection with the Chernobyl accident. The present second part of the committee's report describes proposals for measures to prevent and deal with similar accidents in the future. The committee's evaluations and proposals are grouped into four main sections: Safety and risk at nuclear power plants; the Norwegian contingency organization for dealing with nuclear accidents; compensation issues; and international cooperation

  8. Chernobyl: lessons of the decade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsaregorodtsev, A.D.

    1996-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident led to a drastic increase the incidents of thyroid cancer in children living at territories contaminated with radionuclides. The incidents of hemoblastoses which are etiologically closely related to radiation did not change after the incident. The lessons of the decade that passed since the accident necessitate measures aimed at alleviation of the medical consequences of the accident which are to be implemented for many years. The program of such measures should be based on a strictly scientific evaluation of each factor, that will be conductive to a most adequate state financing of this work [ru

  9. Operational aspects of TRIGA shipment from South Korea to INEEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shelton, Thomas

    1999-01-01

    A shipment of 299 irradiated TRIGA fuel elements was made from South Korea to the United States in July 1998. The shipment was from two facilities in Korea and was received at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Fuel types shipped included aluminum and stainless steel clad standard fuel elements, instrumented and fuel follower control elements, as well as FLIP elements and failed fuel elements. Modes of transport included truck, rail and ship. (author)

  10. Transportation incidents involving Canadian shipments of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, J.M.

    1979-06-01

    This paper gives a brief statement of the legislation governing the transportation of radioactive materials in Canada, reviews the types of shipments made in Canada in 1977, and surveys the transportation incidents that have been reported to the Atomic Energy Control Board over the period 1947-1978. Some of the more significant incidents are described in detail. A totAl of 135 incidents occurred from 1947 to 1978, during which time there were 644750 shipments of radioactive material in Canada

  11. Pre-Shipment Preparations at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, J.E.

    2000-01-01

    This paper will provide a detailed description of each of the pre-shipment process steps WSRC performs to produce the technical basis for approving the receipt and storage of spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. It is intended to be a guide to reactor operators who plan on returning ''U.S. origin'' SNF and to emphasize the need for accurate and timely completion of pre-shipment activities

  12. Transuranics and fission products release from PWR fuels in severe accident conditions. Lessons learnt from VERCORS RT3 and RT4 tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontillon, Y.; Ducros, G.; Van Winckel, S.; Christiansen, B.; Kissane, M.P.; Dubourg, R.; Dutheillet, Y.; Andreo, F.

    2006-01-01

    Over the last decades, several experimental programs devoted to the source term of fission products (FP) and actinides released from PWR fuel samples in severe accident (SA) conditions have been initiated throughout the world. In France, in this context, the Institute for Radiological Protection and Safety (IRSN) and Electricite de France (EDF) have supported the analytical VERCORS program which was performed by the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA). The VERCORS facility at the LAMA-laboratory (CEA-Grenoble, France) was designed to heat up an irradiated fuel sample - taken from EDF's nuclear power reactors - to fuel relocation, and to capture the fission products released from the fuel and deposited downstream on a series of specific filters (impactors, bead-bed filter). On-line gamma detectors aimed at the fuel position, filters and gas capacity monitored the progress of FP release from the fuel, FP deposition on the filters and the fission gases emitted by the fuel (xenon and krypton). Before and after the test, a longitudinal gamma-scan of the fuel was conducted to measure the initial and final FP inventory in order to evaluate the quantitative fractions of FP emitted by the fuel during the test. All the components of the loop were then gamma-scanned to measure and locate the FPs released during the test and to draw up a mass balance of these FP. 25 annealing tests were performed between 1983 and 2002 on irradiated PWR fuels under various conditions of temperature and atmospheres (oxidising or reducing conditions). The influence of the nature of the fuel (UO 2 versus MOX, burn up) and the fuel morphology (initially intact or fragmented fuel) have also been investigated. This led to an extended data base allowing on the one hand to study mechanisms which promote FP release in SA conditions, and on the other hand to enhance models implemented in SA codes. Because gamma spectrometry is well suited to FP measurement and not to actinides (except neptunium

  13. Return on experience on nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barre, Bertrand

    2015-09-01

    After a presentation of the International Nuclear and radiological Events Scale (INES scale), of its levels and criteria, this article proposes brief recalls of some nuclear accidents which occurred in nuclear reactors: Chalk River in Canada (1952), Windscale in England (1957), the universal Canadian reactor (NRU in 1958), the SL1 reactor of the Idaho National Laboratory in the USA (1961), the Swiss Lucens reactor (1969), Saint-Laurent des Eaux in France (1969 and 1980). More detailed descriptions are then given for the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the Fukushima accident in 2011. The main causes of these accidents are identified: loss of control of chain reaction, cooling defect on a stopped reactor, cooling defect on an operated reactor. Some lessons are drawn from these facts, and some characteristics of the EPR are outlined with respect with problems encountered in these accidents

  14. Licensing Air and Transboundary Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komarov, S.V.; Budu, M.E.; Derganov, D.V.; Savina, O.A.; Bolshinsky, I.M.; Moses, S.D.; Biro, L.

    2016-01-01

    Since 1996 the IAEA TS-R-1 regulation included new requirements applicable to transport of fissile materials by air. The later 2005 and 2009 editions confirmed the validity of those provisions. Despite the fact that the IAEA TS-R-1 allows for air shipments of SNF in Type B and Type C packages, the examples of such shipments are not abundant. Nuclear regulatory bodies and transport safety experts are cautious about air shipments of SNF. Why so? What are the risks? What are the alternatives? In this new regulatory framework, in 2009, two air shipments in Type B packages of Research Reactor (RR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) from Romania and Libya were performed under the U.S. DOE/NNSA RRRFR Program. The first licensing process of such shipment brought up many questions about package and shipment safety from the licensing experts' side and so the scope of analyses exceeded the requirements of IAEA. Under the thorough supervision of Rosatom and witnessed by DOE and CNCAN, all questions were answered by various strength analyses and risk evaluations. But the progress achieved didn't stop here. In 2010-2011, an energy absorption container (EAC) with titanium spheres as absorbers based on the SKODA VPVR/M cask was designed as the first Type C package in the world destined for RR SNF, currently under approval process. At the same time, intense preparations for the safe removal of the Russian-origin damaged RR SNF from Serbia, Vinca were in progress. The big amount of SNF and its rapidly worsening condition imposed as requirements to organize only one shipment as fast as possible, i.e. using at the maximum extent the entire experience available from other SNF shipments. The long route, several transit countries and means of transport, two different casks, new European regulations and many other issues resulted for the Serbian shipment in one of the most complex SNF shipments’ licensing exercise. This paper shows how the international regulatory framework ensures the

  15. Automating Risk Assessments of Hazardous Material Shipments for Transportation Routes and Mode Selection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dolphin, Barbara H.; Richins, William D.; Novascone, Stephen R.

    2010-01-01

    The METEOR project at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) successfully addresses the difficult problem in risk assessment analyses of combining the results from bounding deterministic simulation results with probabilistic (Monte Carlo) risk assessment techniques. This paper describes a software suite designed to perform sensitivity and cost/benefit analyses on selected transportation routes and vehicles to minimize risk associated with the shipment of hazardous materials. METEOR uses Monte Carlo techniques to estimate the probability of an accidental release of a hazardous substance along a proposed transportation route. A METEOR user selects the mode of transportation, origin and destination points, and charts the route using interactive graphics. Inputs to METEOR (many selections built in) include crash rates for the specific aircraft, soil/rock type and population densities over the proposed route, and bounding limits for potential accident types (velocity, temperature, etc.). New vehicle, materials, and location data are added when available. If the risk estimates are unacceptable, the risks associated with alternate transportation modes or routes can be quickly evaluated and compared. Systematic optimizing methods will provide the user with the route and vehicle selection identified with the lowest risk of hazardous material release. The effects of a selected range of potential accidents such as vehicle impact, fire, fuel explosions, excessive containment pressure, flooding, etc. are evaluated primarily using hydrocodes capable of accurately simulating the material response of critical containment components. Bounding conditions that represent credible accidents (i.e; for an impact event, velocity, orientations, and soil conditions) are used as input parameters to the hydrocode models yielding correlation functions relating accident parameters to component damage. The Monte Carlo algorithms use random number generators to make selections at the various decision

  16. Normal accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perrow, C.

    1989-01-01

    The author has chosen numerous concrete examples to illustrate the hazardousness inherent in high-risk technologies. Starting with the TMI reactor accident in 1979, he shows that it is not only the nuclear energy sector that bears the risk of 'normal accidents', but also quite a number of other technologies and industrial sectors, or research fields. The author refers to the petrochemical industry, shipping, air traffic, large dams, mining activities, and genetic engineering, showing that due to the complexity of the systems and their manifold, rapidly interacting processes, accidents happen that cannot be thoroughly calculated, and hence are unavoidable. (orig./HP) [de

  17. Statistical analysis of accident data associated with sea transport (invited paper)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raffestin, D.; Armingaud, F.; Schneider, T.; Delaigue, S.

    1998-01-01

    This analysis, based on Lloyd's database, gives an accurate description of the world fleet and the most severe ship accidents, as well as the frequencies of accident per ship type, accident category and age category. Complementary analyses were achieved using fire accident databases from AEA Technology and the French Bureau Veritas. The results should be used in the perspective of safety assessments of maritime shipments of radioactive material. For this purpose the existence of the regulations of the International Maritime Organisation has to be considered, leading to the introduction of correction factors to these statistical data derived from general cargo-carrying ships. (author)

  18. Evaluation of the safety of vitrified high level waste shipments from the UK to continental Europe by sea. Annex 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, F.; Fett, H.J.; Hoermann, E.; Roewekamp, M.; Cheshire, R.; Elston, B.; Slawson, G.; Raffestin, D.; Schneider, T.; Armingaud, F.; Laurent, B.

    2001-01-01

    The return of vitrified high level waste arising from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at Sellafield to continental Europe, e.g. Germany, will start around the end of the century. The shipment of the specific flasks will include transportation via the Irish Sea, the English Channel and the North Sea with ships of the Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) classified to the INF 3 standard. The assessment approach is to analyse the severity and the frequency of mechanical impacts, fires and explosions with the potential to affect the package. The results show that there is a high safety margin due to the special safety features of the INF 3 ships compared to conventional ships. The remaining accident probability for a trans-port of vitrified high level waste from UK to the continent is very low. No realistic severe accident scenarios that could seriously affect the flasks and could lead to a radioactivity re-lease have been identified. (author)

  19. Review and assessment of package requirements (yellowcake) and emergency response to transportation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-10-01

    As a consequence of an accident involving a truck shipment of yellowcake, a joint NRC--DOT study was undertaken to review and assess the regulations and practices related to package integrity and to emergency response to transportation accidents involving low specific activity radioactive materials. Recommendations are made regarding the responsibilities of state and local agencies, carriers, and shippers, and the DOT and NRC regulations

  20. Accident Statistics

    Data.gov (United States)

    Department of Homeland Security — Accident statistics available on the Coast Guard’s website by state, year, and one variable to obtain tables and/or graphs. Data from reports has been loaded for...

  1. Radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nenot, J.C.

    1996-01-01

    Analysis of radiation accidents over a 50 year period shows that simple cases, where the initiating events were immediately recognised, the source identified and under control, the medical input confined to current handling, were exceptional. In many cases, the accidents were only diagnosed when some injuries presented by the victims suggested the radiological nature of the cause. After large-scale accidents, the situation becomes more complicated, either because of management or medical problems, or both. The review of selected accidents which resulted in severe consequences shows that most of them could have been avoided; lack of regulations, contempt for rules, human failure and insufficient training have been identified as frequent initiating parameters. In addition, the situation was worsened because of unpreparedness, insufficient planning, unadapted resources, and underestimation of psychosociological aspects. (author)

  2. A brief review of the accident at Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corey, G.R.

    1979-01-01

    A question-and-answer format is used to discuss the Three Mile Reactor accident and the lessons learned. The aspects touched upon include the hydrogen bubble, the radiation levels the public was exposed to, and the consequences of the accident to the nuclear power program

  3. Environmental Assessment for the shipment of low enriched uranium billets to the United Kingdom from the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-08-01

    This Environmental Assessment provides the necessary information so that a decision can be made on whether a Finding of No Significant Impact Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared for the proposed action. The proposed action is to transfer 2,592 low enriched uranium billets to the United Kingdom. The billets are currently stored in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The proposed action would consist of two types of activities: loading and transportation. The loading activities would include placing the billets into the appropriate containers for transportation. The transportation activities would include the tasks required to transport the containers 215 miles (344 km) via highway to the Port of Seattle, Washington, and transfer the containers aboard an ocean cargo vessel for transportation to the United Kingdom. The Department of Energy would only be responsible for conducting the loading activities. The United Kingdom would be responsible for conducting the transportation activities in compliance with all applicable United States and international transportation laws. The tasks associated with the proposed action activities have been performed before and are well defined in terms of requirements and consequences. A risk assessment and a nuclear safety evaluation were performed to address safety issues associated with the proposed action. The risk assessment determined the exposure risk from normal operation and from the maximum credible accident that involves a truck or ship collision followed by a fire that engulfs all the billets in the shipment and the release of the radiological contents of the shipment to the environment. The criticality assessment determined the nuclear safety limits for handling, transporting and storing the shipment under incident-free and accident transport conditions

  4. Sports Accidents

    CERN Multimedia

    Kiebel

    1972-01-01

    Le Docteur Kiebel, chirurgien à Genève, est aussi un grand ami de sport et de temps en temps médecin des classes genevoises de ski et également médecin de l'équipe de hockey sur glace de Genève Servette. Il est bien qualifié pour nous parler d'accidents de sport et surtout d'accidents de ski.

  5. Radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poplavskij, K.K.; Smorodintseva, G.I.

    1978-01-01

    On the basis of a critical analysis of the available data on causes and consequences of radiation accidents (RA), a classification of RA by severity (five groups of accidents) according to biomedical consequences and categories of exposed personnel is proposed. A RA is defined and its main characteristics are described. Methods of RA prevention are proposed, as is a plan of specific measures to deal with RA in accordance with the proposed classification

  6. Transportation impact analysis for shipment of irradiated N-reactor fuel and associated materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daling, P.M.; Harris, M.S.

    1994-12-01

    An analysis of the radiological and nonradiological impacts of highway transportation of N-Reactor irradiated fuel (N-fuel) and associated materials is described in this report. N-fuel is proposed to be transported from its present locations in the 105-KE and 105-KW Basins, and possibly the PUREX Facility, to the 327 Building for characterization and testing. Each of these facilities is located on the Hanford Site, which is near Richland, Washington. The projected annual shipping quantity is 500 kgU/yr for 5 years for a total of 2500 kgU. It was assumed the irradiated fuel would be returned to the K- Basins following characterization, so the total amount of fuel shipped was assumed to be 5000 kgU. The shipping campaign may also include the transport and characterization of liquids, gases, and sludges from the storage basins, including fuel assembly and/or canister parts that may also be present in the basins. The impacts of transporting these other materials are bounded by the impacts of transporting 5000 kgU of N-fuel. This report was prepared to support an environmental assessment of the N-fuel characterization program. The RADTRAN 4 and GENII computer codes were used to evaluate the radiological impacts of the proposed shipping campaign. RADTRAN 4 was used to calculate the routine exposures and accident risks to workers and the general public from the N-fuel shipments. The GENII computer code was used to calculate the consequences of the maximum credible accident. The results indicate that the transportation of N-fuel in support of the characterization program should not cause excess radiological-induced latent cancer fatalities or traffic-related nonradiological accident fatalities. The consequences of the maximum credible accident are projected to be small and result in no excess latent cancer fatalities

  7. Status of the TRIGA shipments to the INEEL from Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyacke, M.; George, W.; Petrasek, A.; Stump, R.C.; Patterson, J.

    1997-01-01

    This paper will report on preparations being made for returning Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics (TRIGA) foreign research reactor (FRR) spent fuel from South Korea and Indonesia to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). The roles of US Department of Energy, INEEL, and NAC International in implementing a safe shipment are provided. Special preparations necessitated by making a shipment through a west coast port of the US to the INEEL will be explained. The institutional planning and actions needed to meet the unique political and operational environment for making a shipment from Asia to INEEL will be discussed. Facility preparation at both the INEEL and the FRRs is discussed. Cask analysis needed to properly characterize the various TRIGA configurations, compositions, and enrichments is discussed. Shipping preparations will include an explanation of the integrated team of spent fuel transportation specialists, and shipping resources needed to retrieve the fuel from foreign research reactor sites and deliver it to the INEEL

  8. Accident Prevention: A Workers' Education Manual.

    Science.gov (United States)

    International Labour Office, Geneva (Switzerland).

    Devoted to providing industrial workers with a greater knowledge of precautionary measures undertaken and enforced by industries for the protection of workers, this safety education manual contains 14 lessons ranging from "The Problems of Accidents during Work" to "Trade Unions and Workers and Industrial Safety." Fire protection, safety equipment…

  9. Understanding and managing the movements of hazardous material shipments through Texas population centers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-08-01

    Every day almost a million shipments of hazardous materials move safely and securely along our nations transportation system, via any combination of modes. Only a small fraction of total shipments interrupt their planned journey due to an incident...

  10. Physical protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kasun, D.J.

    1979-05-01

    During May 1979 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved for issuance in effective form new interim regulations for strengthening the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage and diversion. The new regulations will likely continue in force until the completion of an ongoing research program concerning the response of spent fuel to certain forms of sabotage. At that time the regulations may be rescinded, modified, or made permanent, as appropriate. This report discusses the new regulations and provides a basis on which licensees can develop an acceptable interim program for the protection of spent fuel shipments

  11. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-03-01

    This circular has been prepared to provide information on the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and to meet the requirements of Public Law 96--295. The report provides a brief description of NRC authority for certain aspects of transporting spent fuel. It provides descriptive statistics on spent fuel shipments regulated by the NRC from 1979 to 1992. It also lists detailed highway and railway segments used within each state from October 1, 1987 through December 31, 1992

  12. Biomass accident investigations – missed opportunities for learning and accident prevention

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2017-01-01

    The past decade has seen a major increase in the production of energy from biomass. The growth has been mirrored in an increase of serious biomass related accidents involving fires, gas explosions, combustible dust explosions and the release of toxic gasses. There are indications that the number...... of bioenergy related accidents is growing faster than the energy production. This paper argues that biomass accidents, if properly investigated and lessons shared widely, provide ample opportunities for improving general hazard awareness and safety performance of the biomass industry. The paper examines...... selected serious accidents involving biogas and wood pellets in Denmark and argues that such opportunities for learning were missed because accident investigations were superficial, follow-up incomplete and information sharing absent. In one particularly distressing case, a facility saw a repeat accident...

  13. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station - occurrence of the accident, current situation and Future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirose, K.

    2013-01-01

    In this presentation author analyse course of accident on Fukushima Dai-chi NPPs as well as consequences of this disaster. The following parts are presented: (1) Occurrence of the accident; (2) Evacuation of the residential people; (3) Deterioration and protraction of the accident; (4) Impact on society; (5) Situation of decontamination; (6) Long-term steps towards decommissioning; (7) Situation of other nuclear power stations; (8) Conclusions and lessons learned.

  14. Accident investigation: case study and lessons learnt

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Kirsten, T

    2008-11-01

    Full Text Available . The proceedings of the TC were strictly confi dential and therefore this report only provides generic information and insights. User briefi ng The fi rst activity of the TC on the 25 October 2007 was the briefi ng by the SANDF offi cer who had been responsible...

  15. Analysis of Fukushima Daiichi Accident Using HFACS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohamed, Saeed Almheiri

    2013-01-01

    The shadow of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is still too big and will last long. On the other hand, it could still teach us lots of lessons to better design and operate nuclear power plants. In this paper, we will be focusing on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, especially on human organizational factors. We will analyze the accident using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) in order to better understand the organizational climate of TEPCO 1 and NISA 2 that led to Fukushima Daiichi Accident. HFACS was developed for the U. S. aviation industry and has been used at many industries like the rail and mining industries. We found that the HFACS to be greatly beneficial in investigating the latent and organizational causes for the accident. The application results show that the causes of Fukushima Daiichi accident were spread out from sharp end (i.e. Unsafe Act) to blunt end (i. e. Organizational Influences). This means that the corresponding countermeasures should cover from front line staff to management. Thus, we managed to develop a better understanding on how to prevent similar errors or violations. The incident and near-miss have a lot of helpful information because it may show the actual and latent deficiencies of complex systems. We applied the HFACS into Fukushima Daiichi accident to better locate the causes related to both sharp and blunt ends of operation of NPP. In order to derive useful lessons from the accident analysis, the analyst should try to find the similarities not differences from the incident. It is imperative that whatever accident/incident analysis systems we use, we should fully utilize the disastrous Fukushima accident

  16. Analysis of Fukushima Daiichi Accident Using HFACS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mohamed, Saeed Almheiri [Korea Advanced Institue of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    The shadow of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is still too big and will last long. On the other hand, it could still teach us lots of lessons to better design and operate nuclear power plants. In this paper, we will be focusing on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, especially on human organizational factors. We will analyze the accident using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) in order to better understand the organizational climate of TEPCO{sup 1} and NISA{sup 2} that led to Fukushima Daiichi Accident. HFACS was developed for the U. S. aviation industry and has been used at many industries like the rail and mining industries. We found that the HFACS to be greatly beneficial in investigating the latent and organizational causes for the accident. The application results show that the causes of Fukushima Daiichi accident were spread out from sharp end (i.e. Unsafe Act) to blunt end (i. e. Organizational Influences). This means that the corresponding countermeasures should cover from front line staff to management. Thus, we managed to develop a better understanding on how to prevent similar errors or violations. The incident and near-miss have a lot of helpful information because it may show the actual and latent deficiencies of complex systems. We applied the HFACS into Fukushima Daiichi accident to better locate the causes related to both sharp and blunt ends of operation of NPP. In order to derive useful lessons from the accident analysis, the analyst should try to find the similarities not differences from the incident. It is imperative that whatever accident/incident analysis systems we use, we should fully utilize the disastrous Fukushima accident.

  17. 27 CFR 19.396 - Spirits removed for shipment to Puerto Rico.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Spirits removed for shipment to Puerto Rico. 19.396 Section 19.396 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO... § 19.396 Spirits removed for shipment to Puerto Rico. Spirits removed for shipment to Puerto Rico with...

  18. 19 CFR 18.6 - Short shipments; shortages; entry and allowance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Short shipments; shortages; entry and allowance...; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TRANSPORTATION IN BOND AND MERCHANDISE IN TRANSIT General Provisions § 18.6 Short shipments; shortages; entry and allowance. (a) When there has been a short shipment and the short-shipped...

  19. 19 CFR 351.515 - Internal transport and freight charges for export shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... shipments. 351.515 Section 351.515 Customs Duties INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE... Internal transport and freight charges for export shipments. (a) Benefit—(1) In general. In the case of internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, a benefit exists to the extent that the charges...

  20. 27 CFR 28.244a - Shipment to a customs bonded warehouse.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Shipment to a customs... Export Consignment § 28.244a Shipment to a customs bonded warehouse. Distilled spirits and wine withdrawn for shipment to a customs bonded warehouse shall be consigned in care of the customs officer in charge...

  1. Research investigation report on Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-03-01

    This report was issued in February 2012 by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation's Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, which consisted of six members from the private sector in independent positions and with no direct interest in the business of promoting nuclear power. Commission aimed to determine the truth behind the accident by clarifying the various problems and reveal systematic problems behind these issues so as to create a new starting point by identifying clear lessons learned. Report composed of four chapters; (1) progression of Fukushima accident and resulting damage (accident management after Fukushima accident, and effects and countermeasure of radioactive materials discharged into the environment), (2) response against Fukushima accident (emergency response of cabinet office against nuclear disaster, risk communication and on-site response against nuclear disaster), (3) analysis of historical and structural factors (technical philosophy of nuclear safety, problems of nuclear safety regulation of Fukushima accident, safety regulatory governance and social background of 'Safety Myth'), (4) Global Context (implication in nuclear security, Japan in nuclear safety regime, U.S.-Japan relations for response against Fukushima accident, lessons learned from Fukushima accident - aiming at creation of resilience). Report could identify causes of Fukushima accident and factors related to resulting damages, show the realities behind failure to prevent the spread of damage, and analyze the overall structural and historical background behind the accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  2. Criticality accident:

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canavese, Susana I.

    2000-01-01

    A criticality accident occurred at 10:35 on September 30, 1999. It occurred in a precipitation tank in a Conversion Test Building at the JCO Tokai Works site in Tokaimura (Tokai Village) in the Ibaraki Prefecture of Japan. STA provisionally rated this accident a 4 on the seven-level, logarithmic International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The September 30, 1999 criticality accident at the JCO Tokai Works Site in Tokaimura, Japan in described in preliminary, technical detail. Information is based on preliminary presentations to technical groups by Japanese scientists and spokespersons, translations by technical and non-technical persons of technical web postings by various nuclear authorities, and English-language non-technical reports from various news media and nuclear-interest groups. (author)

  3. Spent fuel transportation accident: a state's involvement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neuweg, M.

    1978-01-01

    On February 9, 1978 at 8:20 p.m., the duty officer for the Illinois Radiological Assistance Team was notified that a shipment containing uranium and plutonium was involved in an accident near Gibson City, Illinois on Route 54. It was reported that a pig containing an unknown amount of uranium and plutonium was involved. The Illinois District 6A State Police were called to the scene and secured the area. The duty officer in the meantime learned after numerous telephone calls, approximately 1 hour after the first notice was received, that the pig actually was a 48,000 pound cask containing 6 spent fuel rods and the tractor-trailer had split apart and was blocking one lane of the highway. The shipment had departed from Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois, enroute to Babcox and Wilcox in Lynchburg, Virginia. Initial reports indicated the vehicle had split apart. Actually, the semi-trailer bed had buckled beneath the cask due to apparent excess stress. The cask remained entirely intact and was not damaged, but the state highway was closed to traffic. The State Radiological Assistance Team was dispatched and arrived on the scene at 12:45 a.m. Immediate radiation monitoring revealed a reading of 4 milliroentgen per hour at 10 feet from the cask. No contamination existed nor was anyone exposed to radiation unnecessarily. The cask was transferred to a Tri-State semi-trailer vehicle the following morning at approximately 6:30 a.m. At 9:30 a.m., February 10, the new vehicle was again enroute to its destination. This incident demonstrated typical occurrences involving transportation radiation accident: misinformation and/or lack of information on the initial response notification, inaccuracies of radiation monitorings at the scene of the accident, inconsistencies concerning the occurrences of the accident and unfamiliar terminology utilized by personnel first on the scene, i.e., pig, cask, vehicle split apart, etc

  4. The radiological accident in Cochabamba

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-07-01

    In April 2002 an accident involving an industrial radiography source containing 192 Ir occurred in Cochabamba, Bolivia, some 400 km from the capital, La Paz. A faulty radiography source container had been sent back to the headquarters of the company concerned in La Paz together with other equipment as cargo on a passenger bus. This gave rise to a potential for serious exposure for the bus passengers as well as for the company employees who were using and transporting the source. The Government of Bolivia requested the assistance of the IAEA under the terms of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The IAEA in response assembled and sent to Bolivia a team composed of senior radiation safety experts and radiation pathology experts from Brazil, the United Kingdom and the IAEA to investigate the accident. The IAEA is grateful to the Government of Bolivia for the opportunity to report on this accident in order to disseminate the valuable lessons learned and help prevent similar accidents in the future

  5. 21 CFR 600.15 - Temperatures during shipment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... to maintain a temperature range between 1 to 10 °C during shipment. Yellow Fever Vaccine 0 °C or... Evaluation and Research. [39 FR 39872, Nov. 12, 1974, as amended at 49 FR 23833, June 8, 1984; 50 FR 4133...

  6. Shipment of VINCA Institute's HEU fresh fuel to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, Milan; Sotic, Obrad

    2002-01-01

    This paper shows, for the first time, the basic data related to the recent shipment of the fresh HEU fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to Russia for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gives its contribution to the RERTR program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist action against nuclear material potentially usable for production of nuclear weapons. (author)

  7. 41 CFR 101-26.311 - Frustrated shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Frustrated shipments. 101-26.311 Section 101-26.311 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS SUPPLY AND PROCUREMENT 26-PROCUREMENT SOURCES AND...

  8. Bases for DOT exemption uranyl nitrate solution shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moyer, R.A.

    1982-07-01

    Uranyl nitrate solutions from a Savannah River Plant reprocessing facility have been transported in cargo tank trailers for more than 20 years without incident during transit. The solution is shipped to Oak Ridge for further processing and returned to SRP in a solid metal form for recycle. This solution, called uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) solution in Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, is currently diluted about 2-fold to comply with DOT concentration limits (10% of low specific activity levels) specified for bulk low specific activity (LSA) liquid shipments. Dilution of the process solution increases the number of shipments, the cost of transportation, the cost of shipper preparations, the cost of further reprocessing in the receiving facility to first evaporate the added water, and the total risk to the population along the route of travel. However, the radiological risk remains about the same. Therefore, obtaining an exemption from DOT regulations to permit shipment of undiluted UNH solution, which is normally about two times the present limit, is prudent and more economical. The radiological and nonradiological risks from shipping a unit load of undiluted solution are summarized for the probable route. Data and calculations are presented on a per load or per shipment basis throughout this memorandum to keep it unclassified

  9. 7 CFR 920.54 - Special purpose shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing... (including shipments to facilitate the conduct of marketing research and development projects); or, (3) in... prevent kiwifruit handled under the provisions of this section from entering the channels of trade for...

  10. 7 CFR 925.54 - Special purpose shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Special purpose shipments. 925.54 Section 925.54 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing... entering the channels of trade for other than the specific purposes authorized by this section. Inspection...

  11. 7 CFR 924.54 - Special purpose shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing... shipments to facilitate the conduct of marketing research and development projects established pursuant to... necessary to prevent prunes handled under the provisions of this section from entering the channels of trade...

  12. 31 CFR 361.4 - Preparation of shipment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Preparation of shipment. 361.4 Section 361.4 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL... of accounting controls or otherwise, for the maintenance of basic records which will enable them to...

  13. 7 CFR 932.155 - Special purpose shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... and Regulations § 932.155 Special purpose shipments. (a) The disposition of packaged olives covered by... Service, such packaged olives may be disposed of for use in the production of olive oil or dumped. (2... furnish the committee, upon demand, such evidence of disposition of the packaged olives covered by an...

  14. 49 CFR 173.312 - Requirements for shipment of MEGCs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...-GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND PACKAGINGS Gases; Preparation and Packaging § 173.312 Requirements... MEGC's structural or service equipment may be affected. (4) No person may fill or offer for... requalification due date. (5) Prior to filling and offering a MEGC for transportation, the MEGC's structural and...

  15. Background and planning requirements for spent fuel shipments to DOE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ravenscroft, Norman [Edlow International Company, 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 201, Washington, DC 20009 (United States)

    1996-10-01

    Information is provided on the planning required and the factors that must be included in the planning process for spent fuel shipments to DOE. A summary is also provided on the background concerning renewal of the DOE spent fuel acceptance policy in May 1996. (author)

  16. U.S. Wood Shipments to Puerty Rico

    Science.gov (United States)

    James E. Granskog

    1992-01-01

    Puerto Rico's importance as an offshore market for U.S. wood products is often overlooked. Because of its unique Commonwealth status, trade flows between the United States and Puerto Rico are recorded separately and are not counted in the U.S. foreign trade statistics. In 1991, wood product shipments from the United States to Puerto Rico totaled more than $83...

  17. 27 CFR 44.61 - Removals, withdrawals, and shipments authorized.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... payment of tax, for direct exportation or for delivery for subsequent exportation, in accordance with the... shipments authorized. 44.61 Section 44.61 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND... CIGARETTE PAPERS AND TUBES, WITHOUT PAYMENT OF TAX, OR WITH DRAWBACK OF TAX General § 44.61 Removals...

  18. 48 CFR 252.247-7017 - Erroneous shipments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Erroneous shipments. 252... SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CLAUSES AND FORMS SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES Text of..., articles of personal property inadvertently packed with goods of other than the rightful owner. (2) Ensure...

  19. Highway route controlled quantity shipment routing reports - An overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cashwell, J.W.; Welles, B.W.; Welch, M.J.

    1989-01-01

    US Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations require a postnotification report from the shipper for all shipments of radioactive materials categorized as a Highway Route Controlled Quantity. These postnotification reports, filed in compliance with 49 CFR 172.203(d), have been compiled by the DOT in a database known as the Radioactive Materials Routing Report (RAMRT) since 1982. The data were sorted by each of its elements to establish historical records and trends of Highway Route Controlled Quantity shipments from 1982 through 1987. Approximately 1520 records in the RAMRT database were compiled for this analysis. Approximately half of the shipments reported for the study period were from the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors, with the others being commercial movements. Two DOE installations, EG and G Idaho and Oak Ridge, accounted for nearly half of the DOE activities. Similarly, almost half of the commercial movements were reported by two vendors, Nuclear Assurance Corporation and Transnuclear, Incorporated. Spent fuel from power and research reactors accounted for approximately half of all shipments

  20. TMI-2 lessons have been learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, R.L.

    1994-01-01

    This paper is an introduction to the more detailed papers which are presented in this session titled ''Advanced Light Water Reactors -- 15 Years After TMI.'' Many of the advances in the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants are the direct result of applying lessons learned from the 1979 TMI-2 accident. The authors believe the ''reality awakening'' which occurred following the accident should never be forgotten. Thus, this paper briefly reviews the TMI-2 accident and identifies the broad lessons learned following the accident. Then it describes briefly some indicators which show the very impressive improvements in nuclear power plant performance that have occurred over the past 10-15 years. This sets the stage for Dr. Ransom's paper which shows the continuing need for nuclear power, Dr. Beckjord's paper which describes the ''final'' TMI-2 research project and the subsequent papers which focus on advanced light water reactor developments

  1. Off-site shipment request development and review plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    On May 17, 1991, Department of Energy Headquarters (DOE-HQ) imposed a moratorium on the shipment of all Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) waste to commercial treatment, storage and disposal facilities. The moratorium was imposed after it was discovered that some shipments of RCRA and TSCA waste from Department of Energy (DOE) sites contained small quantities of radioactive and special nuclear material (SNM). The shipment of these wastes has been attributed to inconsistent and possibly erroneous interpretation of DOE Orders and guidance. In an effort to clarify existing DOE Orders and guidance and establish throughout the DOE complex, June 21, 1991, DOE-HQ issued in draft the Performance Objective for Certification of Non-Radioactive Hazardous Waste. This Performance Objective was subsequently approved on November 15, 1991. The Performance Objective contains specific requirements that must be net to allow the shipment of RCRA and TSCA waste for commercial treatment, storage and disposal. On July 16, 1991, based on the initial draft of the Performance Objective, Martin Marietta Energy Systems (MMES) issued a directive which applies the Performance Objective requirements to all wastes and materials. In addition, this MMES directive imposed the requirement for a review by a Central Waste Management (CWM) Readiness Review Board (RRB). Additional DOE and MMES guidance and directives have been issued since May 17, 1991. This plan applies to all waste destined for shipment from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) to off-site commercial treatment, storage and disposal facilities, and to all materials destined for recycle, surplus and salvage

  2. Regulation of spent nuclear fuel shipment: A state perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halstead, R.J.; Sinderbrand, C.; Woodbury, D.

    1987-01-01

    In 1985, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) sought to regulate rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel through the state, because federal regulations did not adequately protect the environmentally sensitive corridor along the route of the shipments. A state interagency working group identified five serious deficiencies in overall federal regulatory scheme: 1) failure to consider the safety or environmental risks associated with selected routes; 2) abscence of route-specific emergency response planning; 3) failure of the NRC to regulate the carrier of spent nuclear fuel or consider its safety record; 4) abscence of requirements for determination of need for, or the propriety of, specific shipments of spent nuclear fuel; and 5) the lack of any opportunity for meaningful public participation with respect to the decision to transport spent nuclear fuel. Pursuant to Wisconsin's hazardous substance statutes, the WDNR issues an order requiring the utility to file a spill prevention and mitigation plan or cease shipping through Wisconsin. A state trial court judge upheld the utility's challenge to Wisconsin's spill plan requirements, based on federal preemption of state authority. The state is now proposing federal legislation which would require: 1) NRC determination of need prior to approval of offsite shipment of spent fuel by the licensees; 2) NRC assessment of the potential environmental impacts of shipments along the proposed route, and comparative evaluation of alternative modes and routes; and 3) NRC approval of a route-specific emergency response and mitigation plan, including local training and periodic exercises. Additionally, the proposed legislation would authorize States and Indian Tribes to establish regulatory programs providing for permits, inspection, contingency plans for monitoring, containments, cleanup and decontamination, surveillance, enforcement and reasonable fees. 15 refs

  3. A Joint Optimal Decision on Shipment Size and Carbon Reduction under Direct Shipment and Peddling Distribution Strategies

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daiki Min

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available Recently, much research has focused on lowering carbon emissions in logistics. This paper attempts to contribute to the literature on the joint shipment size and carbon reduction decisions by developing novel models for distribution systems under direct shipment and peddling distribution strategies. Unlike the literature that has simply investigated the effects of carbon costs on operational decisions, we address how to reduce carbon emissions and logistics costs by adjusting shipment size and making an optimal decision on carbon reduction investment. An optimal decision is made by analyzing the distribution cost including not only logistics and carbon trading costs but also the cost for adjusting carbon emission factors. No research has explicitly considered the two sources of carbon emissions, but we develop a model covering the difference in managing carbon emissions from transportation and storage. Structural analysis guides how to determine an optimal shipment size and emission factors in a closed form. Moreover, we analytically prove the possibility of reducing the distribution cost and carbon emissions at the same time. Numerical analysis follows validation of the results and demonstrates some interesting findings on carbon and distribution cost reduction.

  4. Accidents in radiotherapy: Lack of quality assurance?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novotny, J.

    1997-01-01

    About 150 radiological accidents, involving more than 3000 patients with adverse effects, 15 patient's fatalities and about 5000 staff and public exposures have been collected and analysed. Out of 67 analysed accidents in external beam therapy 22% has been caused by wrong calculation of the exposure time or monitor units, 13% by inadequate review of patient's chart, 12% by mistakes in the anatomical area to be treated. The remaining 35% can be attributed to 17 different causes. The most common mistakes in brachytherapy were wrong activities of sources used for treatment (20%), inadequate procedures for placement of sources applicators (14%), mistakes in calculating the treatment time (12%), etc. The direct and contributing causes of radiological accidents have been deduced from each event, when it was possible and categorized into 9 categories: mistakes in procedures (30%), professional mistakes (17%), communication mistakes (15%), lack of training (8.5%), interpretation mistakes (7%), lack of supervision (6%), mistakes in judgement (6%), hardware failures (5%), software and other mistakes (5.5%). Three types of direct and contributing causes responsible for almost 62% of all accidents are directly connected to the quality assurance of treatment. The lessons learnt from the accidents are related to frequencies of direct and contributing factors and show that most of the accident are caused by lack, non-application of quality assurance (QA) procedures or by underestimating of QA procedures. The international system for collection of accidents and dissemination of lessons learnt from the different accidents, proposed by IAEA, can contribute to better practice in many radiotherapy departments. Most of the accidents could have been avoided, had a comprehensive QA programme been established and properly applied in all radiotherapy departments, whatever the size. (author)

  5. Safety regulations regarding to accident monitoring and accident sampling at Russian NPPs with VVER type reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharafutdinov, Rachet; Lankin, Michail; Kharitonova, Nataliya

    2014-01-01

    The paper describes a tendency by development of regulatory document requirements related to accident monitoring and accident sampling at Russia's NPPs. Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident pointed at the importance and necessary to carry out an additional safety check at Russia's nuclear power plants in the preparedness for management of severe accidents at NPPs. Planned measures for improvement of severe accidents management include development and implementation of the accident instrumentation systems, providing, monitoring, management and storage of information in a severe accident conditions. The draft of Safety Guidelines <accident monitoring system of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors' prepared by Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SEC NRS) established the main criteria for accident monitoring instrumentation that can monitor relevant plant parameters in the reactor and inside containment during and after a severe accident in nuclear power plants. Development of these safety guidelines is in line with the recommendations of IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety in response to the Fukushima Daiichi event and recommendations of the IAEA Nuclear Energy series Report <<Accident Monitoring Systems for Nuclear Power Plants' (Draft V 2.7). The paper presents the principles, which are used as the basis for selection of plant parameters for accident monitoring and for establishing of accident monitoring instrumentation. The recommendations to the accident sampling system capable to obtain the representative reactor coolant and containment air and fluid samples that support accurate analytical results for the parameters of interest are considered. The radiological and chemistry parameters to be monitored for primary coolant and sump and for containment air are specified. (author)

  6. Hazards to nuclear plants from surface traffic accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hornyik, K.

    1975-01-01

    Analytic models have been developed for evaluating hazards to nuclear plants from hazardous-materials accidents in the vicinity of the plant. In particular, these models permit the evaluation of hazards from such accidents occurring on surface traffic routes near the plant. The analysis uses statistical information on accident rates, traffic frequency, and cargo-size distribution along with parameters describing properties of the hazardous cargo, plant design, and atmospheric conditions, to arrive at a conservative estimate of the annual probability of a catastrophic event. Two of the major effects associated with hazardous-materials accidents, explosion and release of toxic vapors, are treated by a common formalism which can be readily applied to any given case by means of a graphic procedure. As an example, for a typical case it is found that railroad shipments of chlorine in 55-ton tank cars constitute a greater hazard to a nearby nuclear plant than equally frequent rail shipments of explosives in amounts of 10 tons. 11 references. (U.S.)

  7. The radiological accident in Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    The report is based on a meeting held in Brazil, 19-27 July 1988. It describes how the accident occurred, examines how it was managed and how its consequences were contained, and sets out observations and recommendations based upon lessons learned. Many people received large doses of radiation, due to both external and internal exposure. Four of the casualties ultimately died and 28 people suffered radiation burns. Residences and public places were contaminated. The decontamination necessitated the demolition of seven residences and various other buildings, and the removal of the topsoil from large areas. In total 3,500 m 3 of radioactive waste was generated. Refs, figs, tabs and photographs

  8. Tchernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-06-01

    First, R.M.B.K type reactors are described. Then, safety problems are dealt with reactor control, behavior during transients, normal loss of power and behavior of the reactor in case of leak. A possible scenario of the accident of Tchernobyl is proposed: events before the explosion, possible initiators, possible scenario and events subsequent to the core meltdown (corium-concrete interaction, interaction with the groundwater table). An estimation of the source term is proposed first from the installation characteristics and the supposed scenario of the accident, and from the measurements in Europe; radiological consequences are also estimated. Radioactivity measurements (Europe, Scandinavia, Western Europe, France) are given in tables (meteorological maps and fallouts in Europe). Finally, a description of the site is given [fr

  9. Accident: Reminder

    CERN Multimedia

    2003-01-01

    There is no left turn to Point 1 from the customs, direction CERN. A terrible accident happened last week on the Route de Meyrin just outside Entrance B because traffic regulations were not respected. You are reminded that when travelling from the customs, direction CERN, turning left to Point 1 is forbidden. Access to Point 1 from the customs is only via entering CERN, going down to the roundabout and coming back up to the traffic lights at Entrance B

  10. Regulatory aspects of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caoui, A.

    1988-01-01

    The legislative systems used in different countries insist on requiring the license of the nuclear installations exploitation and on providing a nuclear safety report. For obtaining this license, the operators have to consider all situations of functioning (normal, incidental and accidental) to make workers and the public secure. The licensing procedures depend on the juridical and administrative systems of the country. Usually, protection of people against ionzing radiation is the responsibility of the ministry of health and the ministry of industry. In general, the regulations avoid to fix a definite technical standards by reason of technological development. An emergency plan is normally designed in the stage of the installation project planification. This plan contains the instructions and advices to give to populations in case of accident. The main lesson learnt from the nuclear accidents that happened is to enlarge the international cooperation in the nuclear safety field. 4 refs. (author)

  11. Overview of Brazilian industrial radiography accidents with cutaneous radiation syndrome

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da, E-mail: dasilva@ird.gov.br [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    It is well documented that industrial radiography is related to radiological accidents, which makes it the highest potential risk for human health. More than 80 radiological accidents happened in the world that includes 6 Brazilian accidents with Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome. Five of them happened with {sup 192}Ir and one with {sup 60}Co radioactive sources. Nineteen members of the public and 8 radiographers were involved. All of them suffered severe hands and fingers injuries. The Brazilian radiological accident happened in 1985 with 16 persons is analyzed showing causes, consequences, radiation doses and lessons learned. (author)

  12. Overview of Brazilian industrial radiography accidents with cutaneous radiation syndrome

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    It is well documented that industrial radiography is related to radiological accidents, which makes it the highest potential risk for human health. More than 80 radiological accidents happened in the world that includes 6 Brazilian accidents with Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome. Five of them happened with 192 Ir and one with 60 Co radioactive sources. Nineteen members of the public and 8 radiographers were involved. All of them suffered severe hands and fingers injuries. The Brazilian radiological accident happened in 1985 with 16 persons is analyzed showing causes, consequences, radiation doses and lessons learned. (author)

  13. JCO criticality accident termination operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanamori, Masashi

    2010-07-01

    In 2001, we summarized the circumstances surrounding termination of the JCO criticality accident based on testimony in the Mito District Court on December 17, 2001. JCO was the company for uranium fuels production in Japan. That document was assembled based on actual testimony in the belief that a description of the work involved in termination of the accident would be useful in some way for preventing nuclear disasters in the future. The description focuses on the witness' own behavior, and what he saw and heard, and thus is written from the perspective of action by one individual. This was done simply because it was easier for the witness to write down his memories as he remembers them. Description of the activities of other organizations and people is provided only as necessary, to ensure that consistency in the descriptive approach is not lost. The essentials of this report were rewritten as a third-person objective description in the summary of the report by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ). Since then, comments have been received from sources such as former members of the Nuclear Safety Commission (Dr. Kenji Sumita and Dr. Akira Kanagawa), concerned parties from the former Science and Technology Agency, and reports from the JCO Criticality Accident Investigation Committee of the AESJ, and thus this report was rewritten to correct incorrect information, and add material where that was felt to be necessary. This year is the tenth year of the JCO criticality accident. To mark this occasion we have decided to translate the record of what occurred at the accident site into English so that more people can draw lessons from this accident. This report is an English version of JAEA-Technology 2009-073. (author)

  14. Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziedelis, S.; Zerger, B.

    2012-01-01

    Operational experience feedback can be a valuable tool for preventing recurrence of similar events at nuclear plants. However, human and organizational factors can significantly hamper accident investigations. (authors)

  15. Hazardous waste shipment data collection from DOE sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Page, L.A.; Kirkpatrick, T.D.; Stevens, L.

    1992-01-01

    Past practices at the US Department of Energy (DOE) sites for offsite release of hazardous waste are being reviewed to determine if radioactively contaminated hazardous wastes were released to commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. Records indicating the presence of radioactivity in waste shipped to and treated at a commercial incineration facility led to a ban on offsite hazardous waste shipments and investigation of past practices for offsite release of hazardous waste from the DOE sites. A House of Representatives Interior and Insular Affairs Committee oversight hearing on potentially contaminated waste shipments to commercial facilities concluded that the main issue was the lack of a uniform national standard to govern disposal of mixed waste

  16. Facilitation of the USHPRR Program MP-1 Shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woolstenhulme, Eric C.

    2017-01-01

    This report describes the activities necessary to support the numerous transportation tasks involved with the successful completion of the mini-plate MP-1 and future MP experiments for the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor HEU to LEU conversion program. It includes information about the general activities necessary to implement equipment, operational processes, and safety basis changes required at the shipping facility and receipt facilities to support the shipments.

  17. Facilitation of the USHPRR Program MP-1 Shipments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woolstenhulme, Eric C. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2017-04-11

    This report describes the activities necessary to support the numerous transportation tasks involved with the successful completion of the mini-plate MP-1 and future MP experiments for the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor HEU to LEU conversion program. It includes information about the general activities necessary to implement equipment, operational processes, and safety basis changes required at the shipping facility and receipt facilities to support the shipments.

  18. Prevention of pedestrian accidents.

    OpenAIRE

    Kendrick, D

    1993-01-01

    Child pedestrian accidents are the most common road traffic accident resulting in injury. Much of the existing work on road traffic accidents is based on analysing clusters of accidents despite evidence that child pedestrian accidents tend to be more dispersed than this. This paper analyses pedestrian accidents in 573 children aged 0-11 years by a locally derived deprivation score for the years 1988-90. The analysis shows a significantly higher accident rate in deprived areas and a dose respo...

  19. Plan for shipment, storage, and examination of TMI-2 fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinn, G.J.; Engen, I.A.; Tyacke, M.J.; Reno, H.W.

    1984-05-01

    This Plan addresses the preparation and shipment of core debris from Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for receipt, storage, and examination. The Manager of the Nuclear Materials Evaluation Programs Division of EG and G Idaho, Inc. will manage two separate but integrated programs, one located at TMI (Part 1) and the other at INEL (Part 2). The Technical Integration Office (at TMI) is responsible for developing and implementing Part 1, TMI-2 Core Shipment Program. That portion of the Plan establishes coordination between TMI and INEL (and others) for shipment of core debris, and it provides the coordination by which handling systems at both locations are designed, constructed, or modified to establish and maintain system compatibility. The Technical Support Branch (at INEL) is responsible for developing and implementing Part 2, Core Activities Program. That portion of the Plan details operational and examination activities at INEL, as well as defines core-related activities planned at other DOE laboratories

  20. Biological and medical consequences of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Latarjet, R.

    1988-01-01

    The study of the medical and biological consequences of the nuclear accidents is a vast program. The Chernobyl accident has caused some thirty deceases: Some of them were rapid and the others occurred after a certain time. The particularity of these deaths was that the irradiation has been associated to burns and traumatisms. The lesson learnt from the Chernobyl accident is to treat the burn and the traumatism before treating the irradiation. Contrary to what the research workers believe, the first wave of deaths has passed between 15 and 35 days and it has not been followed by any others. But the therapeutic lesson drawn from the accident confirm the research workers results; for example: the radioactive doses band that determines where the therapy could be efficacious or not. the medical cares dispensed to the irradiated people in the hospital of Moscow has confirmed that the biochemical equilibrium of proteinic elements of blood has to be maintained, and the transfusion of the purified elements are very important to restore a patient to health, and the sterilization of the medium (room, food, bedding,etc...) of the patient is indispensable. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an international cooperation for providing enough sterilized rooms and specialists in the irradiation treatment. The genetic consequences and cancers from the Chernobyl accident have been discussed. It is impossible to detect these consequences because of their negligible percentages. (author)

  1. Commercial spent nuclear fuel shipments in the United States, 1964--1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-12-01

    This report provides an overview of US commercial light-water reactor spent-fuel shipments that have occurred from January, 1964 through December, 1987. A summary analysis was performed on these historical shipments, showing the amount of fuel that has been shipped to research facilities, reprocessing plants, away-from-reactor (AFR) storage sites, and other reactors. Also presented in this report is a listing of potential spent-fuel shipments to and/or from commercial nuclear plants. Table 1 provides the detailed listing of historical spent-fuel shipments. Table 2 is a summary of these shipments grouped by destination. Section IV discusses utility plans for future spent-fuel shipments. 2 tabs

  2. Spent fuel transportation in the United States: commercial spent fuel shipments through December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-04-01

    This report has been prepared to provide updated transportation information on light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel in the United States. Historical data are presented on the quantities of spent fuel shipped from individual reactors on an annual basis and their shipping destinations. Specifically, a tabulation is provided for each present-fuel shipment that lists utility and plant of origin, destination and number of spent-fuel assemblies shipped. For all annual shipping campaigns between 1980 and 1984, the actual numbers of spent-fuel shipments are defined. The shipments are tabulated by year, and the mode of shipment and the casks utilized in shipment are included. The data consist of the current spent-fuel inventories at each of the operating reactors as of December 31, 1984. This report presents historical data on all commercial spent-fuel transportation shipments have occurred in the United States through December 31, 1984

  3. Radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saenger, E.L.

    1986-01-01

    It is essential that emergency physicians understand ways to manage patients contaminated by radioactive materials and/or exposed to external radiation sources. Contamination accidents require careful surveys to identify the metabolic pathway of the radionuclides to guide prognosis and treatment. The level of treatment required will depend on careful surveys and meticulous decontamination. There is no specific therapy for the acute radiation syndrome. Prophylactic antibodies are desirable. For severely exposed patients treatment is similar to the supportive care given to patients undergoing organ transplantation. For high-dose extremity injury, no methods have been developed to reverse the fibrosing endarteritis that eventually leads to tissue death so frequently found with this type of injury. Although the Three Mile Island episode of March 1979 created tremendous public concern, there were no radiation injuries. The contamination outside the reactor building and the release of radioiodine were negligible. The accidental fuel element meltdown at Chernobyl, USSR, resulted in many cases of acute radiation syndrome. More than 100,000 people were exposed to high levels of radioactive fallout. The general principles outlined here are applicable to accidents of that degree of severity

  4. Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bar'yakhtar, V.G.

    1995-01-01

    The monograph contains the catastrophe's events chronology, the efficiency assessed of those measures assumed for their localization as well as their environmental and socio-economic impact. Among materials of the monograph the results are presented of research on the radioactive contamination field forming as well as those concerning the investigation of biogeochemical properties of Chernobyl radionuclides and their migration process in the environment of the Ukraine. The data dealing with biological effects of the continued combined internal and external radioactive influence on plants, animals and human health under the circumstances of Chernobyl accident are of the special interest. In order to provide the scientific generalizing information on the medical aspects of Chernobyl catastrophe, the great part of the monograph is allotted to appraise those factors affecting the health of different population groups as well as to depict clinic aspects of Chernobyl events and medico-sanitarian help system. The National Programme of Ukraine for the accident consequences elimination and population social protection assuring for the years 1986-1993 and this Programme concept for the period up to the year 2000 with a special regard of the world community participation there

  5. Denials and delays of shipments in the transport of radioactive materials in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sobreira, Ana Celia F.; Bemelmans, Denise

    2007-01-01

    REM Industria e Comercio is a Brazilian private company which has been performing transport of radioactive material in Brazil for more than 15 years and is also experiencing this situation. In Brazil, over 50,000 shipments of radioactive materials are carried out every year, mostly for medical purposes. There are 4 airlines companies operating the domestic routes and only is currently accepting material of Class 7 (radioactive) for transport. When transporting by road, REM uses its own vehicles or hires associated cargo companies. For the sea transport, there is not a certified vessel for this kind of material in Brazil which increases the prices and makes the transport by this mode very expensive and more difficult. Reasons for denials have been identified as misinterpretation of the regulations, lack of harmonization between regulations, fear of indemnity costs for accidents, restrictive rules at ports not allowing storage of radioactive material in transit, frequent changes in modal regulations, lack of education and training of cargo handlers and the misconception of public perception concerning radiation risks. Seeking for local solutions, REM has organized meetings involving medical societies, competent authorities and carriers and has taken part on commissions for revising standards and regulations and trained cargo handling personnel as well. This paper addresses causes for delays and denials and reports identified domestic solutions. (author)

  6. Radiological accidents/incidents with caesium-137 in Estonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinisoo, M.

    1998-01-01

    A report is provided of an accident and an incident involving radioactive sources in Estonia. In the 1994 occurrence, looters of a depository of radioactive waste manipulated a source containing 137 Cs and received dangerous doses of radiation. One of the persons involved died, others suffered minor burns. Another event, which occurred in early 1995, did not have a tragic outcome: an abandoned 137 Cs source was found in the vicinity of the highway linking Tallinn and Narva and was disposed of safely. Both these accidents draw attention to the potential dangers caused by the insufficient survey of the territory, radiation protection structures not yet fully operable, and the lack of equipment and know-how. The lessons to be drawn from these events are considered on the basis of the chronologies and factual data. The report contains concise descriptions of the accidents, a medical overview of the fate of the injured persons and the lessons learned from these accidents. (author)

  7. Severities of transportation accidents involving large packages

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dennis, A.W.; Foley, J.T. Jr.; Hartman, W.F.; Larson, D.W.

    1978-05-01

    The study was undertaken to define in a quantitative nonjudgmental technical manner the abnormal environments to which a large package (total weight over 2 tons) would be subjected as the result of a transportation accident. Because of this package weight, air shipment was not considered as a normal transportation mode and was not included in the study. The abnormal transportation environments for shipment by motor carrier and train were determined and quantified. In all cases the package was assumed to be transported on an open flat-bed truck or an open flat-bed railcar. In an earlier study, SLA-74-0001, the small-package environments were investigated. A third transportation study, related to the abnormal environment involving waterways transportation, is now under way at Sandia Laboratories and should complete the description of abnormal transportation environments. Five abnormal environments were defined and investigated, i.e., fire, impact, crush, immersion, and puncture. The primary interest of the study was directed toward the type of large package used to transport radioactive materials; however, the findings are not limited to this type of package but can be applied to a much larger class of material shipping containers.

  8. Severities of transportation accidents involving large packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dennis, A.W.; Foley, J.T. Jr.; Hartman, W.F.; Larson, D.W.

    1978-05-01

    The study was undertaken to define in a quantitative nonjudgmental technical manner the abnormal environments to which a large package (total weight over 2 tons) would be subjected as the result of a transportation accident. Because of this package weight, air shipment was not considered as a normal transportation mode and was not included in the study. The abnormal transportation environments for shipment by motor carrier and train were determined and quantified. In all cases the package was assumed to be transported on an open flat-bed truck or an open flat-bed railcar. In an earlier study, SLA-74-0001, the small-package environments were investigated. A third transportation study, related to the abnormal environment involving waterways transportation, is now under way at Sandia Laboratories and should complete the description of abnormal transportation environments. Five abnormal environments were defined and investigated, i.e., fire, impact, crush, immersion, and puncture. The primary interest of the study was directed toward the type of large package used to transport radioactive materials; however, the findings are not limited to this type of package but can be applied to a much larger class of material shipping containers

  9. Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capra, D.; Facchini, U.; Gianelle, V.; Ravasini, G.; Bacci, P.

    1988-01-01

    The radioactive cloud released during the Chernobyl accident reached the Padana plain and Lombardy in the night of April 30th 1986; the cloud remained in the northern Italian skies for a few days and then disappeared either dispersed by winds and washed by rains. The evidence in atmosphere of radionuclides as Tellurium, Iodine, Cesium, was promptly observed. The intense rain, in first week of may, washed the radioactivity and fall-out contamined the land, soil, grass. The present work concerns the overall contamination of the Northern Italy territory and in particular the radioactive fall-out in the Lakes region. Samples of soil have been measured at the gamma spectroscope; a correlation is found between the radionuclides concentration in soil samples and the rain intensity, when appropriate deposition models are considered. A number of measurements has been done on the Como'lake ecosystem: sediments, plankton, fishes and the overall fall-out in the area has been investigated

  10. Self-reported accidents

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Møller, Katrine Meltofte; Andersen, Camilla Sloth

    2016-01-01

    The main idea behind the self-reporting of accidents is to ask people about their traffic accidents and gain knowledge on these accidents without relying on the official records kept by police and/or hospitals.......The main idea behind the self-reporting of accidents is to ask people about their traffic accidents and gain knowledge on these accidents without relying on the official records kept by police and/or hospitals....

  11. Accident Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tripputi, Ivo; Lund, Ingemar

    2002-01-01

    There is a general feeling that decommissioning is an activity involving limited risks, compared to NPP operation, and in particular risks involving the general public. This is technically confirmed by licensing analysis and evaluations, where, once the spent fuel has been removed from the plant, the radioactivity inventory available to be released to the environment is very limited. Decommissioning activities performed so far in the world have also confirmed the first assumptions and no specific issue has been identified, in this field, to justify a completely new approach. Commercial interests in international harmonization, which could drive an in-depth discussion about the bases of this approach, are weak at the moment. However, there are several reasons why a discussion in an international framework about the Safety Case for decommissioning (and, in particular, about Accident Assessment) may be considered necessary and important, and why it may show some specific and peculiar aspects. An effort for a comprehensive and systematic D and D accident safety assessment of the decommissioning process is justified. It is necessary also to explore in a holistic way the aspects of industrial safety, and develop tools for the decision-making process optimization. The expected results are the implementation of appropriate and optimized protective measures in any event and of adequate on/off-site emergency plans for optimal public and workers protection. The experience from other decommissioning projects and large-scale industrial activities is essential to balance provisions and an Operating Experience review process (specific for decommissioning) should help to focus on real issues

  12. Japanese Nuclear Accident and U.S. Response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Douet, Randy

    2011-01-01

    U.S. Government response to the Fukushima accident: • Multi-agency task force (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Defense) supporting Japan recovery efforts; • President Obama directed the NRC to perform a comprehensive review of U.S. reactors; • NRC established agency task force to develop lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident to provide short-term and long-term analysis of the events

  13. IRSN-Ancli seminar on the post-accident context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Didier, Damien; Leroyer, Veronique; Gariel, Jean-Christophe; Meier, Christine; Petitfrere, Michael; Meraux-Netillard, Isabelle; Lerouxel, Roland; Gandouen, Gael; Boutin, Dominique; Charre, Jean-Pierre; Noe, Maite; Quenneville, Celine; Farandeau, Sebastien; Mouchet, Chantal; Pineau, Coralie; Rollinger, Francois; GARIEL, Jean-Christophe; Ando, Ryoko; Nishida, Shoshi; Miazaki, Makoto; Hayano, Ryugo; Lheureux, Yves; Lochard, Jacques; Boilley, David; Godet, Jean-Luc

    2014-10-01

    The first session addressed the context of post-accident management: main challenges of radiation protection in case of nuclear accident, management of energy situations (specific intervention plans of nuclear plants), elements of doctrine for the post-accident management of an accident. The second session addressed the preparedness of territories to post-accident management: preparation to post-accident management in the Montbeliard district, emergency and post-accidental situation (preparedness at the district scale, example of Loiret), and return on experience from the post-accident exercise in Cattenom. The third session addressed the action undertaken by the ANCCLI and IRSN for the awareness of post-accidental problematic (experiments in Saclay, Marcoule, Gravelines and Golfech, lessons learned from the pilot phase and perspectives). The last session addressed the post-accidental management of the Fukushima accident: approach of the IRSN to learn lessons from the dialogue initiative in Fukushima, round table on challenges on the long term of post-accidental management, Japanese witnesses

  14. Stable isotope customer list and summary of shipments: FY 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, W.C.

    1975-10-01

    This compilation is published as an aid to those concerned with the separation and sale of stable isotopes. The information is divided into four sections: an alphabetical list of domestic and foreign customers, showing the stable isotopes purchased during the fiscal year; an alphabetical list of isotopes, cross-referenced to customer numbers and divided into domestic and foreign categories; an alphabetical list of states and countries, cross-referenced to customer numbers and indicating geographical concentrations of isotope users; and a tabulation of the shipments, quantities, and dollars for domestic, foreign, and project categories for each isotope, with the totals for loaned isotopes shown at the end of the table. (auth)

  15. Stable isotope customer list and summary of shipments: FY 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tracy, J.G.

    1984-12-01

    This compilation is published as an aid to those concerned with the separation and sale of stable isotopes. The information is divided into four sections: (1) alphabetical list of domestic and foreign customers, showing the stable isotopes purchased during the fiscal year; (2) alphabetical list of isotopes, cross-referenced to customer numbers and divided into domestic and foreign categories; (3) alphabetical list of states and countries, cross-referenced to customer numbers and indicating geographical concentrations of isotope users; and (4) tabulation of the shipments, quantities, and dollars for domestic, foreign, and project categories for each isotope

  16. Stable isotope customer list and summary of shipments - FY 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, W.C.

    1983-12-01

    This compilation is published as an aid to those concerned with the separation and sale of stable isotopes. The information is divided into four sections: (1) alphabetical list of domestic and foreign customers, showing the stable isotopes purchased during the fiscal year; (2) alphabetical list of isotopes, cross-referenced to customer numbers and divided into domestic and foreign categories; (3) alphabetical list of states and countries, cross-referenced to customer numbers and indicating geographical concentrations of isotope users; and (4) tabulation of the shipments, quantities, and dollars for domestic, foreign, and project categories for each isotope

  17. Accident analysis of railway transportation of low-level radioactive and hazardous chemical wastes: Application of the /open quotes/Maximum Credible Accident/close quotes/ concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ricci, E.; McLean, R.B.

    1988-09-01

    The maximum credible accident (MCA) approach to accident analysis places an upper bound on the potential adverse effects of a proposed action by using conservative but simplifying assumptions. It is often used when data are lacking to support a more realistic scenario or when MCA calculations result in acceptable consequences. The MCA approach can also be combined with realistic scenarios to assess potential adverse effects. This report presents a guide for the preparation of transportation accident analyses based on the use of the MCA concept. Rail transportation of contaminated wastes is used as an example. The example is the analysis of the environmental impact of the potential derailment of a train transporting a large shipment of wastes. The shipment is assumed to be contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls and low-level radioactivities of uranium and technetium. The train is assumed to plunge into a river used as a source of drinking water. The conclusions from the example accident analysis are based on the calculation of the number of foreseeable premature cancer deaths the might result as a consequence of this accident. These calculations are presented, and the reference material forming the basis for all assumptions and calculations is also provided.

  18. Accident analysis of railway transportation of low-level radioactive and hazardous chemical wastes: Application of the /open quotes/Maximum Credible Accident/close quotes/ concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ricci, E.; McLean, R.B.

    1988-09-01

    The maximum credible accident (MCA) approach to accident analysis places an upper bound on the potential adverse effects of a proposed action by using conservative but simplifying assumptions. It is often used when data are lacking to support a more realistic scenario or when MCA calculations result in acceptable consequences. The MCA approach can also be combined with realistic scenarios to assess potential adverse effects. This report presents a guide for the preparation of transportation accident analyses based on the use of the MCA concept. Rail transportation of contaminated wastes is used as an example. The example is the analysis of the environmental impact of the potential derailment of a train transporting a large shipment of wastes. The shipment is assumed to be contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls and low-level radioactivities of uranium and technetium. The train is assumed to plunge into a river used as a source of drinking water. The conclusions from the example accident analysis are based on the calculation of the number of foreseeable premature cancer deaths the might result as a consequence of this accident. These calculations are presented, and the reference material forming the basis for all assumptions and calculations is also provided

  19. Lessons from Fukushima - February 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris-Suzuki, Tessa; Boilley, David; McNeill, David; Gundersen, Arnie; Beranek, Jan; Blomme, Brian; Hanaoka, Wakao; Schulz, Nina; Stensil, Shawn-Patrick; Teule, Rianne; Tumer, Aslihan; McCann, Christine; Otani, Nanako; Hirsch, Helmut

    2012-01-01

    It has been almost 12 months since the Fukushima nuclear disaster began. Although the Great East Japan earthquake and the following tsunami triggered it, the key causes of the nuclear accident lie in the institutional failures of political influence and industry-led regulation. It was a failure of human institutions to acknowledge real reactor risks, a failure to establish and enforce appropriate nuclear safety standards and a failure to ultimately protect the public and the environment. This report, commissioned by Greenpeace International, addresses what lessons can be taken away from this catastrophe. The one-year memorial of the Fukushima accident offers a unique opportunity to ask ourselves what the tragedy - which is far from being over for hundreds of thousands of Japanese people - has taught us. And it also raises the question, are we prepared to learn? There are broader issues and essential questions that still deserve our attention: - How it is possible that - despite all assurances - a major nuclear accident on the scale of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 happened again, in one of the world's most industrially advanced countries? - Why did emergency and evacuation plans not work to protect people from excessive exposure to the radioactive fallout and resulting contamination? Why is the government still failing to better protect its citizens from radiation one year later? - Why are the over 100,000 people who suffer the most from the impacts of the nuclear accident still not receiving adequate financial and social support to help them rebuild their homes, lives and communities? These are the fundamental questions that we need to ask to be able to learn from the Fukushima nuclear disaster. This report looks into them and draws some important conclusions: 1. The Fukushima nuclear accident marks the end of the 'nuclear safety' paradigm. 2. The Fukushima nuclear accident exposes the deep and systemic failure of the very institutions that are supposed to

  20. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas P. McLaughlin; Shean P. Monahan; Norman L. Pruvost; Vladimir V. Frolov; Boris G. Ryazanov; Victor I. Sviridov

    2000-05-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report.

  1. Structural aspects of the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murray, R.C.; Cummings, G.E.

    1988-01-01

    On April 26, 1986 the world's worst nuclear power plant accident occurred at the Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the USSR. This paper presents a discussion of the design of the Chernobyl Power Plant, the sequence of events that led to the accident and the damage caused by the resulting explosion. The structural design features that contributed to the accident and resulting damage will be highlighted. Photographs and sketches obtained from various worldwide news agencies will be shown to try and gain a perspective of the extent of the damage. The aftermath, clean-up, and current situation will be discussed and the important lessons learned for the structural engineer will be presented. 15 refs., 10 figs

  2. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, Thomas P.; Monahan, Shean P.; Pruvost, Norman L.; Frolov, Vladimir V.; Ryazanov, Boris G.; Sviridov, Victor I.

    2000-01-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report

  3. Successful completion of a time sensitive MTR and TRIGA Indonesian shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anne, Catherine; Patterson, John; Messick, Chuck

    2005-01-01

    Early this year, a shipment of 109 MTR fuel assemblies was received at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site from the BATAN reactor in Serpong, Indonesia and another of 181 TRIGA fuel assemblies was received at the Idaho National Laboratory from the two BATAN Indonesian TRIGA reactors in Bandung and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. These were the first Other-Than- High-Income Countries shipments under the FRR program since the Spring 2001. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative announced by Secretary Abraham will require expeditious scheduling and extreme sensitivity to shipment security. The subject shipments demonstrated exceptional performance in both respects. Indonesian terrorist acts and 9/11 impacted the security requirements for the spent nuclear fuel shipments. Internal Indonesian security issues and an upcoming Indonesian election led to a request to perform the shipment with a very short schedule. Preliminary site assessments were performed in November 2003. The DOE awarded a task order to NAC for shipment performance just before Christmas 2003. The casks departed the US in January and the fuel elements were delivered at the DOE sites by the end of April 2004. The paper will present how the team completed a successful shipment in a timely manner. (author)

  4. 27 CFR 28.245 - Shipment to foreign-trade zone.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Shipment to foreign-trade zone. 28.245 Section 28.245 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE... Consignment § 28.245 Shipment to foreign-trade zone. Where distilled spirits (including specially denatured...

  5. The selective use of emergency shipments for service-contract differentiation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Alvarez, Elisa; van der Heijden, Matthijs C.; Zijm, Willem H.M.

    2013-01-01

    Suppliers of capital goods increasingly offer performance-based service contracts with customer-specific service levels. We use selective emergency shipments of spare parts to differentiate logistic performance: We apply emergency shipments in out-of-stock situations for combinations of parts and

  6. 76 FR 24713 - Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry Products

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-02

    ... amenable species, such as processing game meat or for busy times in their retail shops around holidays. The... Service 9 CFR Parts 321, 332, and 381 Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and... Shipment of Meat and Poultry Products AGENCY: Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA. ACTION: Final rule...

  7. 49 CFR 375.509 - How must I determine the weight of a shipment?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...—origin weigh. You determine the difference between the tare weight of the vehicle before loading at the origin of the shipment and the gross weight of the same vehicle after loading the shipment. (2) Second... fuel tanks on the vehicle must be full at the time of each weighing, or, in the alternative, when you...

  8. Annual Report - FY 1998, Shipments to and from the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This report summarizes waste shipments to the Nevada Test Site Radioactive Waste Management Sites at Area 3 and Area 5 during fiscal year 1998. In addition this report provides a summary evaluation of each shipping campaign by source (waste generator) which identifies observable incidents, if any, associated with the actual waste shipments

  9. Emergency response to a highway accident in Springfield, Massachusetts, on December 16, 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-06-01

    On December 16, 1991, a truck carrying unirradiated (fresh) nuclear fuel was involved in an accident on US Interstate 91, in Springfield, Massachusetts. This report describes the emergency response measures undertaken by local, State, Federal, and private parties. The report also discusses ''lessons learned'' from the response to the accident and suggests areas where improvements might be made

  10. Argonne National Laboratory, east hazardous waste shipment data validation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casey, C.; Graden, C.; Coveleskie, A.

    1995-09-01

    At the request of EM-331, the Radioactive Waste Technical Support Program (TSP) is conducting an evaluation of data regarding past hazardous waste shipments from DOE sites to commercial TSDFs. The intent of the evaluation is to find out if, from 1984 to 1991, DOE sites could have shipped hazardous waste contaminated with DOE-added radioactivity to commercial TSDFs not licensed to receive radioactive material. A team visited Argonne National Laboratory, East (ANL-E) to find out if any data existed that would help to make such a determination at ANL-E. The team was unable to find any relevant data. The team interviewed personnel who worked in waste management at the time. All stated that ANL-E did not sample and analyze hazardous waste shipments for radioactivity. Waste generators at ANL-E relied on process knowledge to decide that their waste was not radioactive. Also, any item leaving a building where radioisotopes were used was surveyed using hand-held instrumentation. If radioactivity above the criteria in DOE Order 5400.5 was found, the item was considered radioactive. The only documentation still available is the paperwork filled out by the waste generator and initialed by a health physics technician to show no contamination was found. The team concludes that, since all waste shipped offsite was subjected at least once to health physics instrumentation scans, the waste shipped from ANL-E from 1984 to 1991 may be considered clean

  11. First shipment of magnets from CERN to SESAME

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN Bulletin

    2015-01-01

    On Monday, 19 October, CERN will bid a fond farewell to two containers of magnets. Their destination: SESAME, the synchrotron light source under construction in Jordan.   The SESAME magnets, ready for transport. The containers hold 31 sextupoles, produced in Cyprus and France, and 32 quadrupoles, produced in Spain and Turkey. The magnets will rejoin 8 dipoles (from the UK) that are already at SESAME. The quadrupoles and sextupoles were checked and measured at CERN before this shipment, while the dipoles went via the ALBA synchrotron, near Barcelona, where magnetic measurements were carried out. With this shipment, around 50% of the magnets for the SESAME storage ring will have been delivered. The containers are expected to arrive just in time for the upcoming SESAME Council meeting at the end of November. The rest of the magnets – as well as all the power supplies and related control modules – have been produced and will be delivered to SESAME at th...

  12. Full-Scale Cask Testing and Public Acceptance of Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments - 12254

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dilger, Fred [Black Mountain Research, Henderson, NV 81012 (United States); Halstead, Robert J. [State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects Carson City, NV 80906 (United States); Ballard, James D. [Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge Northridge, CA 91330 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Full-scale physical testing of spent fuel shipping casks has been proposed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2006 report on spent nuclear fuel transportation, and by the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2011 draft report. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2005 proposed full-scale testing of a rail cask, and considered 'regulatory limits' testing of both rail and truck casks (SRM SECY-05-0051). The recent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) cancellation of the Yucca Mountain project, NRC evaluation of extended spent fuel storage (possibly beyond 60-120 years) before transportation, nuclear industry adoption of very large dual-purpose canisters for spent fuel storage and transport, and the deliberations of the BRC, will fundamentally change assumptions about the future spent fuel transportation system, and reopen the debate over shipping cask performance in severe accidents and acts of sabotage. This paper examines possible approaches to full-scale testing for enhancing public confidence in risk analyses, perception of risk, and acceptance of spent fuel shipments. The paper reviews the literature on public perception of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste transportation risks. We review and summarize opinion surveys sponsored by the State of Nevada over the past two decades, which show consistent patterns of concern among Nevada residents about health and safety impacts, and socioeconomic impacts such as reduced property values along likely transportation routes. We also review and summarize the large body of public opinion survey research on transportation concerns at regional and national levels. The paper reviews three past cask testing programs, the way in which these cask testing program results were portrayed in films and videos, and examines public and official responses to these three programs: the 1970's impact and fire testing of spent fuel truck casks at Sandia National

  13. Accident information needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanson, D.J.; Arcieri, W.C.; Ward, L.W.

    1992-01-01

    A Five-step methodology has been developed to evaluate information needs for nuclear power plants under accident conditions and the availability of plant instrumentation during severe accidents. Step 1 examines the credible accidents and their relationships to plant safety functions. Step 2 determines the information personnel involved in accident management will need to understand plant behavior. Step 3 determines the capability of the instrumentation to function properly under severe accident conditions. Step 4 determines the conditions expected during the identified severe accidents. Step 5 compares the instrument capabilities and the severe accident conditions to evaluate the availability of the instrumentation to supply needed plant information

  14. Accident information needs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanson, D.J.; Arcieri, W.C.; Ward, L.W.

    1992-12-31

    A Five-step methodology has been developed to evaluate information needs for nuclear power plants under accident conditions and the availability of plant instrumentation during severe accidents. Step 1 examines the credible accidents and their relationships to plant safety functions. Step 2 determines the information personnel involved in accident management will need to understand plant behavior. Step 3 determines the capability of the instrumentation to function properly under severe accident conditions. Step 4 determines the conditions expected during the identified severe accidents. Step 5 compares the instrument capabilities and the severe accident conditions to evaluate the availability of the instrumentation to supply needed plant information.

  15. Accident information needs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanson, D.J.; Arcieri, W.C.; Ward, L.W.

    1992-01-01

    A Five-step methodology has been developed to evaluate information needs for nuclear power plants under accident conditions and the availability of plant instrumentation during severe accidents. Step 1 examines the credible accidents and their relationships to plant safety functions. Step 2 determines the information personnel involved in accident management will need to understand plant behavior. Step 3 determines the capability of the instrumentation to function properly under severe accident conditions. Step 4 determines the conditions expected during the identified severe accidents. Step 5 compares the instrument capabilities and the severe accident conditions to evaluate the availability of the instrumentation to supply needed plant information.

  16. Societal and ethical aspects of the Fukushima accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oughton, Deborah

    2016-10-01

    The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station accident in Japan in 2011 was a poignant reminder that radioactive contamination of the environment has consequences that encompass far more than health risks from exposure to radiation. Both the accident and remediation measures have resulted in serious societal impacts and raise questions about the ethical aspects of risk management. This article presents a brief review of some of these issues and compares similarities and differences with the lessons learned from the 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in Ukraine. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:651-653. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  17. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Revision 12

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    This circular has been prepared to provide information on the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) subject to regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It provides a brief description of spent fuel shipment safety and safeguards requirements of general interest, a summary of data for 1979--1996 highway and railway shipments, and a listing, by State, of recent highway and railway shipment routes. The enclosed route information reflects specific NRC approvals that have been granted in response to requests for shipments of spent fuel. This publication does not constitute authority for carriers or other persons to use the routes described to ship spent fuel, other categories of nuclear waste, or other materials

  18. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Revision 10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-04-01

    This circular has been prepared to provide information on the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) subject to regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It provides a brief description of spent fuel shipment safety and safeguards requirements of general interest, a summary of data for 1979--1994 highway and railway shipments, and a listing, by State, of recent highway and railway shipment routes. The enclosed route information reflects specific NRC approvals that have been granted in response to requests for shipments of spent fuel. This publication does not constitute authority for carriers or other persons to use the routes described to ship spent fuel, other categories of nuclear waste, or other materials

  19. Severe accident phenomena

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jokiniemi, J.; Kilpi, K.; Lindholm, I.; Maekynen, J.; Pekkarinen, E.; Sairanen, R.; Silde, A.

    1995-02-01

    Severe accidents are nuclear reactor accidents in which the reactor core is substantially damaged. The report describes severe reactor accident phenomena and their significance for the safety of nuclear power plants. A comprehensive set of phenomena ranging from accident initiation to containment behaviour and containment integrity questions are covered. The report is based on expertise gained in the severe accident assessment projects conducted at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). (49 refs., 32 figs., 12 tabs.)

  20. Development of on-site accident criteria for waste transfer casks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uldrich, E.D.

    1989-01-01

    Removal of radioactive waste must withstand the scrutiny of the public and various regulatory offices. Currently, there is no standard accident criteria or methodology for intra-site shipments at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Since the radioactive waste transfer casks only carry material within the INEL site boundaries and are not used for normal over-the-road transport, the requirements of 10 CFR 71 Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, do not provide suitable requirements for cask design or safety analyses. The objective is to develop realistically conservative accident scenarios consistent with the limited uses at the INEL for which the cask is approved

  1. Necessity of international cooperation for the prevention from nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hidayatullah, M.

    1988-01-01

    The lessons learnt from nuclear accidents (Chernobyl and T.M.I.) and atomic bombs effects (Hiroshima, Nakasaki) have served to establish international conventions that insist on regional and international cooperation and on protection of workers and the public against the radiological effects. (author)

  2. Runaway reactions. Part 2 Causes of Accidents in selected CSB case histories Part 2

    OpenAIRE

    GYENES ZSUZSANNA; CARSON PHILLIP

    2017-01-01

    Part 1 briefly discussed the basic thermochemistry of reactive chemicals, the statistics of accidents involving runaway reactions, and general control measures to minimise risk and mitigate the consequences. The present paper highlights the main causes of major accidents from runaway reactions with illustrative case histories to link theory and practice. It also discusses lessons learned from these accidents, which are very similar in the cases studied. The main causes are management deficien...

  3. Group unified accident reporting database (GUARD)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koene, W.; Waterfall, K.W.

    1991-01-01

    Significant advances have been made in recent years in enhancing the standard of safety within Shell Companies, such that safety has now been raised to a status equal to other primary business objectives. It is widely accepted that accident prevention is part of good business practice, and that a safe operation is normally an efficient operation. Safety programmes are being widely implemented which involve all employees from top management right down to the workforce including the contract staff, and the benefits are being realized. The effectiveness of any safety programme, however, must be continuously monitored, and in this respect injury and accident statistics play an important role as a prime indicator of safety performance. Statistics form part of the safety management process indicating the success of the safety programmes being implemented, and highlighting areas of weakness. Statistical information relating to the number and frequency of accidents, significant as it is, tells us little about how the accidents occur, or about how to improve the intrinsic safety of the operations. More detailed information on accident causes and lessons derived from the investigation of non-injurious accidents and near-misses is required for this, and for the setting of appropriate remedial actions. This paper concentrates on the feedback from accidents which have already occurred. This feedback plays a vital role as an indicator of safety performance upon which to judge the effectiveness of safety programmes, and also to provide important information relating to the immediate and underlying causes of accidents. To meet these requirements, however, a system for recording analyzing and communicating safety data is essential

  4. Emergency preparedness lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, J.B.

    1987-09-01

    Emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants in the US has been considerably enhanced since the Three Mile Island accident. The Chernobyl accident has provided valuable data that can be used to evaluate the merit of some of these enhancements and to determine the need for additional improvements. For example, the USSR intervention levels of 25 rem and 75 rem for evacuation are contrasted with US Environmental Protection Agency protective action guides. The manner in which 135,000 persons were evacuated from the 30-km zone around Chernobyl is constrasted with typical US evacuation plans. Meteorological conditions and particulate deposition patterns were studied to infer characteristics of the radioactive plume from Chernobyl. Typical plume monitoring techniques are examined in light of lessons learned by the Soviets about plume behavior. This review has indicated a need for additional improvements in utility and government emergency plans, procedures, equipment, and training. 12 refs., 1 fig., 2 tabs

  5. Lessons learned by southern states in transportation of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    This report has been prepared under a cooperative agreement with DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) and is a summary of the lessons learned by southern states regarding the transportation of radioactive materials including High-Level Radioactive Wastes (HLRW) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). Sources used in this publication include interviews of state radiological health and public safety officials that are members of the Southern States Energy Board (SSEB) Advisory Committee on Radioactive Materials Transportation, as well as the Board's Transuranic (TRU) Waste Transportation Working Group. Other sources include letters written by the above mentioned committees concerning various aspects of DOE shipment campaigns

  6. The radiological accident in Yanango

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    (REMPAN) assessed the medical aspects of the accident and provided the diagnosis and treatment of the patients in associated specialized hospitals in France and Germany. The Governments of France and Germany provided financial support for the medical treatment of the injured persons. The Russian Federation also provided medical assistance. The lessons learned from this accident, particularly in the medical management of radiation induced skin lesions, are invaluable. In fact, some of the techniques used to treat the injured Georgian patients are pioneering

  7. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. An overview of the report is provided. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general

  8. Chernobyl accident: Causes, consequences and problems of radiation measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kortov, V.; Ustyantsev, Yu.

    2013-01-01

    General description of Chernobyl accident is given in the review. The accident causes are briefly described. Special attention is paid to radiation situation after the accident and radiation measurements problems. Some data on Chernobyl disaster are compared with the corresponding data on Fukushima accident. It is noted that Chernobyl and Fukushima lessons should be taken into account while developing further measures on raising nuclear industry safety. -- Highlights: ► The short comparative analysis of accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima is given. ► We note the great effect of β-radiation on the radiation situation at Chernobyl. ► We discuss the problems of radiation measurements under these conditions. ► The impact of shelter on the radiation situation near Chernobyl NPS is described

  9. Fukushima Accident: Was it preventable or unavoidable? - A sociological perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Young Sung; Choi, Kwang Sik; Kam, Seong Cheon

    2012-01-01

    Global renaissance of nuclear energy was widely predicted and accepted before the Fukushima accident of March 11, 2011. The prospects for nuclear energy now appear to face a turn-around point. Serious debates about the adequacy of nuclear power utilization and safety regulation are underway in many national and/or international settings. Many investigations and analyses have been and will be conducted to identify the causes and consequences and to seek lessons to be taken into account in their own nuclear power programs. These efforts evidently will contribute to preventing accidents caused by such extreme damage conditions as Fukushima desperately encountered. But, in order to discuss the future of nuclear energy, new approach to the nature of the accident needs to be sought rather than the usual and conventional way of viewing the accidents with the benefit of hindsight. This paper examines institutional and sociological aspects of Fukushima accident to get some clues as to whether it was preventable or unavoidable

  10. Support for Nuclear Explosive Safety Division, Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations. Effects of a postulated uranium transportation accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Just, R.A.

    1997-10-01

    Transportation System Risk Assessments (TSRAs) document the degree of compliance of proposed DOE shipments of nuclear components with applicable federal regulations and the risk associated with the proposed shipments. TSRAs must often evaluate the consequences of possible transportation accidents involving uranium. If a relatively simple bounding analysis can show that the consequences resulting from a worst case scenario are acceptably low, a more time intensive and costly risk analysis can be avoided. A bounding consequence analysis has been prepared for a worst case noncriticality transportation accident involving the shipment of uranium. In the absence of a criticality incident, a fire or explosion are the only plausible mechanisms identified for dispersing significant amounts of solid hazardous material. Therefore, three very conservative bounding accidents are considered: (1) analysis of the postulated direct radiation exposure, (2) the airborne release of uranium due to a fire, and (3) the release of uranium into a waterway and uptake into drinking water. This report provides the equations, assumptions, and reference information used to predict the consequences of possible transportation accidents involving natural, depleted, and highly enriched uranium

  11. Shipping container response to severe highway and railway accident conditions: Main report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, L.E.; Chou, C.K.; Gerhard, M.A.; Kimura, C.Y.; Martin, R.W.; Mensing, R.W.; Mount, M.E.; Witte, M.C.

    1987-02-01

    This report describes a study performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to evaluate the level of safety provided under severe accident conditions during the shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. The evaluation is performed using data from real accident histories and using representative truck and rail cask models that likely meet 10 CFR 71 regulations. The responses of the representative casks are calculated for structural and thermal loads generated by severe highway and railway accident conditions. The cask responses are compared with those responses calculated for the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. By comparing the responses it is determined that most highway and railway accident conditions fall within the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. For those accidents that have higher responses, the probabilities anf potential radiation exposures of the accidents are compared with those identified by the assessments made in the ''Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes,'' NUREG-0170. Based on this comparison, it is concluded that the radiological risks from spent fuel under severe highway and railway accident conditions as derived in this study are less than risks previously estimated in the NUREG-0170 document

  12. The yellow cake accident at the Ezeiza Airport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Puntarulo, L.J.; Canibano, J.A.

    1989-01-01

    In January 1987 several drums containing yellow cake fell from about six meters during the loading operation of a Boeing 747 T-100 cargo aircraft. As a result of the accident, about 50% of the 38 drums involved lost their lids and a fraction of the radioactive content was released on an area of about 200 meters squared. Small amounts of yellow cake were dispersed down wind until about 100 meters from the accident place. The shipment was prepared for transport in standard 200 liter steel drums fulfilling the applicable Transport Regulations and the accident was the consequence of an erroneous operation during the cargo associated with a mechanical failure of the cargo lift. In order to avoid human contamination, immediate action was taken by the airport emergency team and in the meantime, the specialized groups of the National Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Fire Brigades, were convened to take care of the decontamination and radiological evaluation problems. This paper describes the accidental sequences, the accident scenery, the countermeasures taken, the recovery and decontamination actions, and finally, as a conclusion, a brief description of the toxic and radiological aspects of the accident's mode

  13. Stable isotope customer list and summary of shipments:

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tracy, J.G.

    1988-03-01

    This compilation is published as an aid to those concerned with the separation and sale of stable isotopes. The information is divided into four sections: alphabetical lists of domestic and foreign customers;alphabetical lists of isotopes and services;alphabetical lists of states and countries;tabulation of the shipments, quantities, and dollars for each isotope and dollars for services divided into domestic, foreign, and DOE project categories. During FY 1987 sales of stable isotope products and services were made to 272 differnt customers, of whom 159 were domestic and 113 were foreign, representing 18 different foreign countries. The total revenue was $3,785,609 of which 12.3% was from sales to DOE project customers, 60.4% was from sales to other domestic customers, and 27.3% was from sales to foreign customers. this represented sales of 189 different stable isotopes plus associated services and was a 16.5% increase over FY 1986

  14. Waste management (Truck and rail shipments to Hanford)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Donnell, J.P.; Culbertson, R.C.

    1988-01-01

    As part of the physical decommissioning of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, Shippingport, PA, a large volume of Low Specific Activity (LSA) radioactive waste was accumulated. The waste, which consisted primarily of radioactive reactor plant components, piping, contaminated asbestos, tanks, building rubble, sludge and ion exchange resins was packaged and prepared for shipment. The waste was transported by truck and rail from Shippingport, PA, to the Department of Energy burial ground at Hanford, Washington, a journey of 2,329 miles. This presentation will discuss the successful management of over 2,600 packages weighing in excess of 3,600 tons of radioactive waste from the cradle-to-the-grave, that is from the time it was generated during the decommissioning process until its final burial at the Hanford, Washington burial site. 1 tab

  15. Accident tolerant fuel analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Consequently, the ability to better characterize and quantify safety margin holds the key to improved decision making about light water reactor design, operation, and plant life extension. A systematic approach to characterization of safety margins and the subsequent margins management options represents a vital input to the licensee and regulatory analysis and decision making that will be involved. The purpose of the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Pathway research and development (R&D) is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margins management by improving economics and reliability, and sustaining safety, of current NPPs. Goals of the RISMC Pathway are twofold: (1) Develop and demonstrate a risk-assessment method coupled to safety margin quantification that can be used by NPP decision makers as part of their margin recovery strategies. (2) Create an advanced ''RISMC toolkit'' that enables more accurate representation of NPP safety margin. In order to carry out the R&D needed for the Pathway, the Idaho National Laboratory is performing a series of case studies that will explore methods- and tools-development issues, in addition to being of current interest in their own right. One such study is a comparative analysis of safety margins of plants using different fuel cladding types: specifically, a comparison between current-technology Zircaloy cladding and a notional ''accident-tolerant'' (e.g., SiC-based) cladding. The present report begins the process of applying capabilities that are still under development to the problem of assessing new fuel designs. The approach and lessons learned from this case study will be included in future Technical Basis Guides produced by the RISMC Pathway. These guides will be the mechanism for developing the specifications for RISMC tools and for defining how plant

  16. Protocols for dry DNA storage and shipment at room temperature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ivanova, Natalia V; Kuzmina, Masha L

    2013-09-01

    The globalization of DNA barcoding will require core analytical facilities to develop cost-effective, efficient protocols for the shipment and archival storage of DNA extracts and PCR products. We evaluated three dry-state DNA stabilization systems: commercial Biomatrica(®) DNAstable(®) plates, home-made trehalose and polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) plates on 96-well panels of insect DNA stored at 56 °C and at room temperature. Controls included unprotected samples that were stored dry at room temperature and at 56 °C, and diluted samples held at 4 °C and at -20 °C. PCR and selective sequencing were performed over a 4-year interval to test the condition of DNA extracts. Biomatrica(®) provided better protection of DNA at 56 °C and at room temperature than trehalose and PVA, especially for diluted samples. PVA was the second best protectant after Biomatrica(®) at room temperature, whereas trehalose was the second best protectant at 56 °C. In spite of lower PCR success, the DNA stored at -20 °C yielded longer sequence reads and stronger signal, indicating that temperature is a crucial factor for DNA quality which has to be considered especially for long-term storage. Although it is premature to advocate a transition to DNA storage at room temperature, dry storage provides an additional layer of security for frozen samples, protecting them from degradation in the event of freezer failure. All three forms of DNA preservation enable shipment of dry DNA and PCR products between barcoding facilities. © 2013 The Authors. Molecular Ecology Resources published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  17. Comparative safety assessment of surface versus submarine plutonium shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knepper, D.S.; Feltus, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    The recent shipment of plutonium from France to Japan aboard the freighter Akatsuki Maru touched off protests from environmental and antinuclear organizations. These protests arose from the fear of an accidental sinking of the vessel that would release its cargo to the sea, as well as the threat of a terrorist nation highjacking the ship for its cargo to produce atomic weapons. The sinking of a merchant ship is not uncommon, as illustrated by the famous losses of the tankers Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez. The highjacking of a lightly armed freighter such as the Akatsuki Maru is possible and would not be unduly difficult for a well-equipped terrorist nation. The combined threats of weapons proliferation and environmental damage arising from the diversion or destruction of a sea vessel carrying plutonium will continue to abound as the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel increases. An alternate method for the transportation with reduced risks of both diversion and destruction needs to be developed. The shipment aboard the Akatsuki Maru was originally proposed to be flown from France to Japan over the continental United States. This proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration in 1988. A third alternative to the current ideas of air transport and surface transport is subsurface transport. This research project investigates the transportation of plutonium by submarine and compares it to the current method of transportation by freighter. This analysis involves a study of the military threat to a submarine by a terrorist nation and comparable threat to a surface vessel. To study the nonmilitary aspects of plutonium shipping, a fault-tree evaluation is performed for transportation by submarine and compared with the current risk analysis performed for surface vessels

  18. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Revision 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-06-01

    This circular has been prepared in response to numerous requests for information regarding routes used for the shipment of irradiated reactor (spent) fuel subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and to meet the requirements of Public Law 96-295. The NRC staff must approve such routes prior to their first use in accordance with the regulatory provisions of Section 73.37 of 10 CFR Part 73. The information included reflects NRC staff knowledge as of June 1, 1985. Spent fuel shipment routes, primarily for road transportation, but also including one rail route, are indicated on reproductions of DOT road maps. Also included are the amounts of material shipped during the approximate three year period that safeguards regulations for spent fuel shipments have been effective. In addition, the Commission has chosen to provide information in this document regarding the NRC's safety and safeguards regulations for spent fuel shipment as well as safeguards incidents regarding spent fuel shipments (of which none have been reported to date). This additional information is furnished by the Commission in order to convey to the public a more complete picture of NRC regulatory practices concerning the shipment of spent fuel than could be obtained by the publication of the shipment routes and quantities alone

  19. Irradiated test fuel shipment plan for the LWR MOX fuel irradiation test project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.; Dickerson, L.S.; Ludwig, S.B.

    1998-01-01

    This document outlines the responsibilities of DOE, DOE contractors, the commercial carrier, and other organizations participating in a shipping campaign of irradiated test specimen capsules containing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The shipments described here will be conducted according to applicable regulations of the US Department of Transportation (DOT), US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and all applicable DOE Orders. This Irradiated Test Fuel Shipment Plan for the LWR MOX Fuel Irradiation Test Project addresses the shipments of a small number of irradiated test specimen capsules and has been reviewed and agreed to by INEEL and ORNL (as participants in the shipment campaign). Minor refinements to data entries in this plan, such as actual shipment dates, exact quantities and characteristics of materials to be shipped, and final approved shipment routing, will be communicated between the shipper, receiver, and carrier, as needed, using faxes, e-mail, official shipping papers, or other backup documents (e.g., shipment safety evaluations). Any major changes in responsibilities or data beyond refinements of dates and quantities of material will be prepared as additional revisions to this document and will undergo a full review and approval cycle

  20. Lessons learned? Selected public acceptance case studies since Three Mile Island

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blee, D. [NAC International, Atlanta Corporate Headquarters, Atlanta, GA (United States)

    2001-02-01

    This paper will present an overview of the present situation, some recent polling survey information, and then look at lessons learned in terms of selected case studies and some global issues over the 22 years since the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. That is quite an ambitious topic but there are some important lessons we can learn from the post-TMI era. (author)

  1. Nuclear Power Reactor Core Melt Accidents. Current State of Knowledge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bentaib, Ahmed; Bonneville, Herve; Clement, Bernard; Cranga, Michel; Fichot, Florian; Koundy, Vincent; Meignen, Renaud; Corenwinder, Francois; Leteinturier, Denis; Monroig, Frederique; Nahas, Georges; Pichereau, Frederique; Van-Dorsselaere, Jean-Pierre; Cenerino, Gerard; Jacquemain, Didier; Raimond, Emmanuel; Ducros, Gerard; Journeau, Christophe; Magallon, Daniel; Seiler, Jean-Marie; Tourniaire, Bruno

    2013-01-01

    For over thirty years, IPSN and subsequently IRSN has played a major international role in the field of nuclear power reactor core melt accidents through the undertaking of important experimental programmes (the most significant being the Phebus- FP programme), the development of validated simulation tools (the ASTEC code that is today the leading European tool for modelling severe accidents), and the coordination of the SARNET (Severe Accident Research Network) international network of excellence. These accidents are described as 'severe accidents' because they can lead to radioactive releases outside the plant concerned, with serious consequences for the general public and for the environment. This book compiles the sum of the knowledge acquired on this subject and summarises the lessons that have been learnt from severe accidents around the world for the prevention and reduction of the consequences of such accidents, without addressing those from the Fukushima accident, where knowledge of events is still evolving. The knowledge accumulated by the Institute on these subjects enabled it to play an active role in informing public authorities, the media and the public when this accident occurred, and continues to do so to this day

  2. Core fusion accidents in nuclear power reactors. Knowledge review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bentaib, Ahmed; Bonneville, Herve; Clement, Bernard; Cranga, Michel; Fichot, Florian; Koundy, Vincent; Meignen, Renaud; Corenwinder, Francois; Leteinturier, Denis; Monroig, Frederique; Nahas, Georges; Pichereau, Frederique; Van-Dorsselaere, Jean-Pierre; Cenerino, Gerard; Jacquemain, Didier; Raimond, Emmanuel; Ducros, Gerard; Journeau, Christophe; Magallon, Daniel; Seiler, Jean-Marie; Tourniaire, Bruno

    2013-01-01

    This reference document proposes a large and detailed review of severe core fusion accidents occurring in nuclear power reactors. It aims at presenting the scientific aspects of these accidents, a review of knowledge and research perspectives on this issue. After having recalled design and operation principles and safety principles for reactors operating in France, and the main studied and envisaged accident scenarios for the management of severe accidents in French PWRs, the authors describe the physical phenomena occurring during a core fusion accident, in the reactor vessel and in the containment building, their sequence and means to mitigate their effects: development of the accident within the reactor vessel, phenomena able to result in an early failure of the containment building, phenomena able to result in a delayed failure with the corium-concrete interaction, corium retention and cooling in and out of the vessel, release of fission products. They address the behaviour of containment buildings during such an accident (sizing situations, mechanical behaviour, bypasses). They review and discuss lessons learned from accidents (Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and simulation tests (Phebus-PF). A last chapter gives an overview of software and approaches for the numerical simulation of a core fusion accident

  3. Public information circular for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Revision 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-06-01

    This publication is the fifth in a series of annual publications issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to public information requests regarding the Commission's regulation of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. This publication contains basically three kinds of information: (1) routes recently approved (18 months) by the Commission for the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel; (2) information regarding any safeguards-significant incidents that may be (to date none have) reported during shipments along such routes; and (3) cumulative amounts of material shipped

  4. Experience in arranging shipments of spent fuel assemblies of commercial and research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komarov, S.; Barinkov, O.; Eshcherkin, A.; Lozhnikov, V.; Smirnov, A.

    2008-01-01

    At present the key activities of Sosny Company are to inspect physical conditions, handle and arrange shipment of SFA including failed SFA. In 2003 after obtaining the license of Gosatomnadzor (Rostechnadzor now) entitled to handle nuclear materials in the process of their shipment, Sosny Company started preparing certification and arranging SFA shipment on its own. About 40 shipments of SFA were performed with participation of Sosny Company. Experience in handling failed SFA - an example of development of a new technology could be the transport and technological scheme of RBMK-1000 SFA shipment from Leningradskaya NPP that was designed by Sosny Company. TUK-11 cask was selected for this shipment. The example of change of transport and technological scheme is modification of the technology for handling and shipment of WWER-440 SFA from Kola NPP. Experience in arranging transportation - based on the results of development of logistics schemes for shipping SFA of reactor facilities Sosny Company justified and implemented composition of mixed trains containing rail cars of many types that enabled to perform shipment more efficiently in time and cost. Experience in arranging handling and shipment of research reactor SFA - over the past years the activity of Sosny Company was aimed at implementing international Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program. Since equipment of the majority of research centers doesn't allow for the large casks to be accepted and loaded, special casks of less mass and dimensions are used to ship SFA from research reactors. In RRRFR program it is assumed to use different casks for RR SFA such as Russian TUK- 19, TUK-128 and foreign SKODA VPVR/M and NAC-LWT. At present Sosny Company is involved in coordination of the efforts of the affected organizations in creating the type 'C' package for RR SFA in the RF. Conclusion: Under conditions of constant increase of the requirements to shipment safety and complication of regulations of all

  5. Nuclear accident dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The film presents statistical data on criticality accidents. It outlines past IAEA activities on criticality accident dosimetry and the technical documents that resulted from this work. The film furthermore illustrates an international comparison study on nuclear accident dosimetry conducted at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, United Kingdom

  6. Nuclear accident dosimetry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1983-12-31

    The film presents statistical data on criticality accidents. It outlines past IAEA activities on criticality accident dosimetry and the technical documents that resulted from this work. The film furthermore illustrates an international comparison study on nuclear accident dosimetry conducted at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, United Kingdom

  7. Chernobyl lesson

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vajda, G

    1986-01-01

    Structure and major technological parameters of the RBMK-1000 type Chernobylsk reactor, description of different phases of the reactor accident, the causes and consequences of the catastrophe and the measures taken to cease the fire, to stop the chain reaction, to prevent the inhabitants and the environment from radiation exposure and contamination are discussed. Major development projects at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant to support human control activities and to increase the operational safety are listed. (V.N.). 2 refs.

  8. Case examples of chemical plant accidents. What we learn from them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakamura, Masayoshi

    2009-01-01

    Lessons learned from the JCO Nuclear Criticality Accident of 30 September 1999 in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura, Japan, are reviewed by referring some pertinent matters from the official report of this accident to remind of the universal characteristics among possible accidents of chemical plants. The paper discusses the responsibility of the establishment or institution to the demand alternation or request change from the client, how to respond to the proposal arising from the factory floor, and the safety control system of every-day maintenance of the factory which are important to prevent accidents in chemical plants. After explaining a background leading to the JCO accident, the author summarizes the lessons as follows: (1) changeable control system, (2) perfect provision of the manual considering the actual condition, and (3) clarification of the roles each played by the managers and the workers are most necessary and important. (S. Ohno)

  9. Site Specific Analyses of a Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biwer, B. M.; Chen, S. Y.

    2003-01-01

    The number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments is expected to increase significantly during the time period that the United States' inventory of SNF is sent to a final disposal site. Prior work estimated that the highest accident risks of a SNF shipping campaign to the proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain were in the corridor states, such as Illinois. The largest potential human health impacts would be expected to occur in areas with high population densities such as urban settings. Thus, our current study examined the human health impacts from the most plausible severe SNF transportation accidents in the Chicago metropolitan area. The RISKIND 2.0 program was used to model site-specific data for an area where the largest impacts might occur. The results have shown that the radiological human health consequences of a severe SNF rail transportation accident on average might be similar to one year of exposure to natural background radiation for those persons living a nd working in the most affected areas downwind of the actual accident location. For maximally exposed individuals, an exposure similar to about two years of exposure to natural background radiation was estimated. In addition to the accident probabilities being very low (approximately 1 chance in 10,000 or less during the entire shipping campaign), the actual human health impacts are expected to be lower if any of the accidents considered did occur, because the results are dependent on the specific location and weather conditions, such as wind speed and direction, that were selected to maximize the results. Also, comparison of the results of longer duration accident scenarios against U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidelines was made to demonstrate the usefulness of this site-specific analysis for emergency planning purposes

  10. Capabilities of U.S. domestic transportation systems for the shipment of radioactive wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Best, R.E.; Allen, J.H.; Aucoin, P.A.; Ball, G.D.; Hoffman, C.C.; Mason, M.E.; Propes, W.A.; Vizzini, T.A.

    1977-09-01

    This document is a compilation of data and reports that provide an overview of the capabilities of U.S. domestic transportation systems for the shipment of materials that are or may be classified as radioactive wastes

  11. 78 FR 67927 - Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Mandatory Automated Export System Filing for All Shipments...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-13

    ... Internet at [email protected] ). FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nick Orsini, Chief, Foreign Trade Division... 0607-AA50 Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Mandatory Automated Export System Filing for All Shipments... approval of new information collection requirements. [[Page 67928

  12. Shipment Consolidation Policy under Uncertainty of Customer Order for Sustainable Supply Chain Management

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kyunghoon Kang

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available With increasing concern over the environment, shipment consolidation has become one of a main initiative to reduce CO2 emissions and transportation cost among the logistics service providers. Increased delivery time caused by shipment consolidation may lead to customer’s order cancellation. Thus, order cancellation should be considered as a factor in order uncertainty to determine the optimal shipment consolidation policy. We develop mathematical models for quantity-based and time-based policies and obtain optimality properties for the models. Efficient algorithms using optimal properties are provided to compute the optimal parameters for ordering and shipment decisions. To compare the performances of the quantity-based policy with the time-based policy, extensive numerical experiments are conducted, and the total cost is compared.

  13. Safety evaluation for packaging 222-S laboratory cargo tank for onetime type B material shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nguyen, P.M.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) is to evaluate and document the safety of the onetime shipment of bulk radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory cargo tank (222-S cargo tank). The 222-S cargo tank is a US Department of Transportation (DOT) MC-312 specification (DOT 1989) cargo tank, vehicle registration number HO-64-04275, approved for low specific activity (LSA) shipments in accordance with the DOT Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In accordance with the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1A, Chapter III (RL 1988), an equivalent degree of safety shall be provided for onsite shipments as would be afforded by the DOT shipping regulations for a radioactive material package. This document demonstrates that this packaging system meets the onsite transportation safety criteria for a onetime shipment of Type B contents

  14. Processing Discrepancy Reports Against Foreign Military Sales Shipments (Supplementation is Permitted at all Levels)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Tucker, Gary

    1991-01-01

    ...) shipments are processed. It provides for the basic documents required to support adjustment of property and financial inventory accounting records, notification to shippers of the type of discrepancies, required corrective...

  15. Lessons from Fukushima for Improving the Safety of Nuclear Reactors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lyman, Edwin

    2012-02-01

    The March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has revealed serious vulnerabilities in the design, operation and regulation of nuclear power plants. While some aspects of the accident were plant- and site-specific, others have implications that are broadly applicable to the current generation of nuclear plants in operation around the world. Although many of the details of the accident progression and public health consequences are still unclear, there are a number of lessons that can already be drawn. The accident demonstrated the need at nuclear plants for robust, highly reliable backup power sources capable of functioning for many days in the event of a complete loss of primary off-site and on-site electrical power. It highlighted the importance of detailed planning for severe accident management that realistically evaluates the capabilities of personnel to carry out mitigation operations under extremely hazardous conditions. It showed how emergency plans rooted in the assumption that only one reactor at a multi-unit site would be likely to experience a crisis fail miserably in the event of an accident affecting multiple reactor units simultaneously. It revealed that alternate water injection following a severe accident could be needed for weeks or months, generating large volumes of contaminated water that must be contained. And it reinforced the grim lesson of Chernobyl: that a nuclear reactor accident could lead to widespread radioactive contamination with profound implications for public health, the economy and the environment. While many nations have re-examined their policies regarding nuclear power safety in the months following the accident, it remains to be seen to what extent the world will take the lessons of Fukushima seriously and make meaningful changes in time to avert another, and potentially even worse, nuclear catastrophe.

  16. Lesson Learning at JPL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oberhettinger, David

    2011-01-01

    A lessons learned system is a hallmark of a mature engineering organization A formal lessons learned process can help assure that valuable lessons get written and published, that they are well-written, and that the essential information is "infused" into institutional practice. Requires high-level institutional commitment, and everyone's participation in gathering, disseminating, and using the lessons

  17. Lessons Learned from the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant-More than Basic Knowledge: Education and its Effects Improve the Preparedness and Response to Radiation Emergency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hachiya, Misao; Akashi, Makoto

    2016-09-01

    A huge earthquake struck the northeast coast of the main island of Japan on 11 March 2011 triggering an extremely large tsunami to hit the area. The earthquake and tsunami caused serious damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plants (NPPs) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), resulting in large amounts of radioactive materials being released into the environment. The major nuclides released were (131)I, (134)Cs and (137)Cs. The deposition of these radioactive materials on land resulted in a high ambient dose of radiation around the NPPs, especially within a 20-km radius. Dose assessments based on behavior survey and ambient dose rates revealed that external doses to most residents were lower than 5 mSv, with the maximum dose being 25 mSv. It was fortunate that no workers from the NPPs required treatment from the viewpoint of deterministic effects of radiation. However, a lack of exact knowledge of radiation and its effects prevented the system for medical care and transportation of contaminated personnel from functioning. After the accident, demands or requests for training courses have been increasing. We have learned from the response to this disaster that basic knowledge of radiation and its effects is extremely important for not only professionals such as health care providers but also for other professionals including teachers. © World Health Organisation 2016. All rights reserved. The World Health Organization has granted Oxford University Press permission for the reproduction of this article.

  18. Limitation of Liability and Governing Law for Accidents Occurring before Issuance of Bill of Lading

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jung Sun Lee

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this study is to verify the carrier's liability limitation through analyzing two cases. According to the court judgments in the two cases, if the accident occurs during the shipment without issuance of Bill of Lading (B/L, the reverse-side clause of B/L does not apply to the calculation of damage, and the law of the country most closely related to both parties is set as the governing law. The absence of a timely B/L often occurs in transport practice due to the complicated nature of transport practice. So, through analyzing the court judgments in the two cases, this study recommends that transport parties take precautions. First, in order to reduce and settle disputes arising from the absence of evidence of transportation contracts, it is necessary to issue a received B/L bearing in mind the risk of accidents occurring during the shipment process. Second, the use of a Sea Waybill (SWB which can be issued after the receipt of a cargo shipment, can be an alternative, except when a Letter of Credit (L/C requires a B/L. Finally, expanding the function of the Commercial Invoice (C/I to allow it to serve as evidence of the contract of carriage by inserting the contract of carriage phrase into the C/I when the B/L is not issued could be an alternative. Keywords: Limitation of Liability of Carrier, Governing Law, Bill of Lading

  19. Supervisor's accident investigation handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-02-01

    This pamphlet was prepared by the Environmental Health and Safety Department (EH and S) of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) to provide LBL supervisors with a handy reference to LBL's accident investigation program. The publication supplements the Accident and Emergencies section of LBL's Regulations and Procedures Manual, Pub. 201. The present guide discusses only accidents that are to be investigated by the supervisor. These accidents are classified as Type C by the Department of Energy (DOE) and include most occupational injuries and illnesses, government motor-vehicle accidents, and property damages of less than $50,000

  20. Directory of national competent authorities' approval certificates for package design and shipment of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The authorization of packages and shipments of radioactive materials are issued in the form of certificates by the national competent authority of the IAEA Member State in which the package is designed or from which a shipment originates, and may be validated or endorsed by the corresponding authority of other Member States as the need arises. This directory summarizes in tabular form the key information on existing package approval certificates contained in PACKTRAM database. 5 tabs

  1. The juridic control of transboundary shipments of hazardous waste in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juergensmeyer, J.C.

    1989-01-01

    An intergovernmental conflict over location of disposal of hazardous waste is discussed; the several definitions of hazardous waste in the United States are analysed; moreover the American Law Regulating the transport and disposal of hazardous waste as well is put in question; also the restrictions an disposal of waste are examined in light of the Constitution of the United States, finally, transboundary shipments of hazardous waste and international agreements on hazardous waste shipment are considered [pt

  2. The implementation of the IAEA accident response plan in Yugoslav practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlic, M.; Pavlovic, R.; Markovic, S.; Pavlovic, S.

    1996-01-01

    One of the important lessons from the Chernobyl accident is the necessity of existence of operational national emergency response plan. Summarizing consequences and experiences after Chernobyl accident, expert groups from IAEA, ICRP and other international scientific organizations, have been extensively worked on reviewing old ones, and preparing new radiation protection and nuclear safety principals and codes. One of the important issue is national emergency response plan for radiological accident. The nuclear accident response plan in Yugoslavia is presented in this paper. It is essentially based on IAEA model national response plan for radiological accident. This model has to be adjusted to the specificity of member states. The optimum society organization for emergency management in the case of accidents in ionizing radiation sources practices is suggested in this paper. Specific characteriztics of Yugoslav state organization relating to accident response are emphasised. (author)

  3. Radiation Exposures Associated with Shipments of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MASSEY, CHARLES D.; MESSICK, C.E.; MUSTIN, T.

    1999-01-01

    Experience has shown that the analyses of marine transport of spent fuel in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) were conservative. It is anticipated that for most shipments. The external dose rate for the loaded transportation cask will be more in line with recent shipments. At the radiation levels associated with these shipments, we would not expect any personnel to exceed radiation exposure limits for the public. Package dose rates usually well below the regulatory limits and personnel work practices following ALARA principles are keeping human exposures to minimal levels. However, the potential for Mure shipments with external dose rates closer to the exclusive-use regulatory limit suggests that DOE should continue to provide a means to assure that individual crew members do not receive doses in excess of the public dose limits. As a minimum, the program will monitor cask dose rates and continue to implement administrative procedures that will maintain records of the dose rates associated with each shipment, the vessel used, and the crew list for the vessel. DOE will continue to include a clause in the contract for shipment of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel requiring that the Mitigation Action Plan be followed

  4. Post-Fukushima lessons and safety orientations for ASTRID

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carluec, B.; Sauvage, J.F.; Pariteau, Patrick; Lo Pinto, P.

    2013-01-01

    Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident: → Reinforcement of demonstrations of “practical elimination” of situations leading to important radiological releases in the environment. → Reinforcement of consideration of loss of some supplies, the objective is to prevent severe accident: • Loss of all AC power; • Loss of I&C; • Failure of operator action. → Reinforcement of the capability to prevent severe accident by natural behavior: • Favorable neutronic feedback effects; • Natural circulation capability to remove the decay heat

  5. Improvement of the severe accident practice tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawasaki, Ikuo; Takahashi, Shunsuke

    2016-01-01

    We developed the severe accident (SA) practice tool based on lessons learned in the accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. We utilized the developed SA practice tool and carried out the SA training for some employees of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Afterwards, we examined the opinions given by trainees attending the training lecture and improved the SA practice tool to achieve a better educational effect. The main changes we made were improvement of the practice scenario for EAL judgments and addition of functions to the practice tool such as the EAL explanation document indication. As a result of having carried out the SA education using this practice tool, we determined the tool users could make the right EAL judgment and report the communication vote. Finally, we confirmed that the knowledge necessary for SA correspondence could be given satisfactorily by this practice tool. (author)

  6. An analysis on human factor issues in criticality accident at a uranium processing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasou, Kunihide; Goda, Hidenori; Hirotsu, Yuko

    2000-01-01

    This report analyses latent factors of a human behavior directly contributing to the criticality accident. It is pouring some 16 kg-U with an enrichment of 18.8% into the precipitation tank. It is the fact that the direct cause of this accident is the workers' unsafe act. However, the authors find lots of latent factors relating to the production-biased company's policy, the poor climate for safety in the work place, the inadequate safety management and the unsuitable equipment. This accident was caused by many organizational factors. This paper also discusses lessons learned from this accident. (author)

  7. Seismic measures and defence in depth of nuclear power plant. Lessons learned from the great east Japan earthquake

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ochiai, Kanehiro

    2011-01-01

    The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March 11, 2011 brought about severe accident at nuclear power plant, which gave significant lessons to nuclear experts concerned with safety measures. Concepts of defence in depth was basic philosophy to assure safety of nuclear power plant even against uncertainties exceeding design basis. This concept consisted of prevention, monitoring, and action to mitigate consequences of failures such as a series of physical barriers between the reactor core and the environment, which were called multiple safety systems, each with backup and designed to accommodate human error. As for natural disaster, depth of recognition of characteristic of natural phenomena and its effect and engineering judgment was of prime importance. Different waveforms of ground motion at Fukushima and Onagawa at the Great East Japan Earthquake showed that design ground motion should have large uncertainties. To cope with uncertainties of ground motion, robust seismic measures based on experience were such as design of static seismic intensity and rigid structure of natural period less than 0.1 sec. As for tsunami, defence in depth measures were prepared for the cooling of reactor core, spent fuel and related electric generation equipment with taking into account 1) time lag between tsunami generation and arrival, 2) tsunami affected area could be limited by coastal levee or anti-inundation measure, 3) system redundancy could be assured by different locations of equipments and 4) repair works could be done by shipment of replacement equipment from outside due to limitation of affected regional area. Success examples of Onagawa, Tokai unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi unit 6 and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plants could suggest definite tsunami defence in depth measures. Containment vent system as final heat sink and emergency condenser as reactor core cooling at outage should be properly utilized for Fukushima Daiichi unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant. (T. Tanaka)

  8. Sharing Lessons Learned Between Industries in EU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muehleisen, A.; Strucic, M.

    2012-01-01

    Recent events in nuclear industry remind us on importance of continuous sharing of the knowledge and experience gained through evaluations of incidents and accidents. We frequently use experience from our daily life activities to improve our performance and avoid some mistakes or unwanted events. In the similar way we can use other industries experience. These experiences can be applied to improve nuclear safety. For example, Safety Culture, which has a great influence on the level of nuclear power plants safety, is similarly presented in other industries. Mechanisms which led to accidents from weak safety culture in one branch of other industry could be comparable to those in nuclear industry. Some other industries have many more cumulative years of experience than nuclear industry. Aviation and Oil industries are typical representatives. Part of their experience can be used in nuclear industry too. Number of reports from nuclear power plants showed us that not only specific equipment related causes lay behind accidents; there are also other causes and contributors which are more common for all industries. Hence lessons learned in other industry should be assessed and used in nuclear industry too. In the European Union, a regional initiative has been set up in 2008 in support of EU Member State nuclear safety authorities, but also EU technical support organizations, international organizations and the broader nuclear community, to enhance nuclear safety through improvement of the use of lessons learned from operational experience of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The initiative, called ''the EU Clearinghouse on Operational Experience Feedback for NPP'', is organized as a network operated by a centralized office located at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The reduction of occurrence and significance of events in NPPs and their safe operation is its ultimate goal. Among others EU Clearinghouse provides services such as technical and scientific

  9. Characterization of mixed waste for shipment to TSD Facilities Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chandler, K.; Goyal, K.

    1995-01-01

    In compliance with the Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is striving to ship its low-level mixed waste (LLMW) off-site for treatment and disposal. In order to ship LLMW off site to a commercial facility, LANL must request exemption from the DOE Order 5820.2A requirement that LLMW be shipped only to Department of Energy facilities. Because the process of obtaining the required information and approvals for a mixed waste shipment campaign can be very expensive, time consuming, and frustrating, a well-planned program is necessary to ensure that the elements for the exemption request package are completed successfully the first time. LANL has developed such a program, which is cost- effective, quality-driven, and compliance-based. This program encompasses selecting a qualified analytical laboratory, developing a quality project-specific sampling plan, properly sampling liquid and solid wastes, validating analytical data, documenting the waste characterization and decision processes, and maintaining quality records. The products of the program are containers of waste that meet the off-site facility's waste acceptance criteria, a quality exemption request package, documentation supporting waste characterization, and overall quality assurance for the process. The primary goal of the program is to provide an avenue for documenting decisions, procedures, and data pertinent to characterizing waste and preparing it for off-site treatment or disposal

  10. Preparations for the shipment of RA-3 reactor irradiated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Adrian; Novara, Oscar; Lafuente, Jose

    2002-01-01

    During the last quarter of 2000, in the Radioactive Waste Management Area of the Argentine National Commission of Atomic Energy (CNEA), located at Ezeiza Atomic Center (CAE), activities associated to the shipment of 207 MTR spent fuels containing high enrichment uranium were carried out within the Foreign Research Reactor/Domestic Research Reactor Receipt Program launched by the US Department of Energy (DOE). The MTR spent fuel shipped to Savannah River Site (SRS) was fabricated in Argentina with 90% enriched uranium of US origin and it was utilized in the operation of the research and radioisotope production reactor RA-3 from 1968 until 1987. After a cooling period at the reactor, the spent fuel was transferred to the Central Storage Facility (CSF) located in the waste management area of CAE for interim storage. The spent fuel (SF) inventory consisted of 166 standard assemblies (SA) and 41 control assemblies (CA). Basically, the activities performed were the fuel conditioning operations inside the storage facility (remote transference of the assemblies to the operation pool, fuel cropping, fuel re-identification, loading in transport baskets, etc.) conducted by CNEA. The loading of the filled baskets in the transport casks (NAC-LWT) by means of intermediate transfer systems and loaded casks final preparations were conducted by NAC personnel (DOE's contractor) with the support of CNEA personnel. (author)

  11. The first commercial spent fuel shipment in China

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meinert, N.M. [NAC International, Norcross, GA (United States); Xiaoqing Li [Everclean Environmental Engineering Corp., Beijing, BJ (China)

    2004-07-01

    In two and a half years, government regulatory agencies and contractors from three countries worked together to design, license, fabricate, and transport the first commercial spent fuel shipment in China. Their cooperative efforts helped avoid the loss of full core reserve at a nuclear power plant serving two of China's largest cities. In March 2001, Everclean Environmental Engineering Corporation (EEEC) selected NAC International (NAC) to supply two United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) licensed Storable Transport Casks (NACSTC) and technology support, to ensure that qualified Chinese operators would be ready to load the first cask in late 2003. EEEC is a subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which sets nuclear policy in China. EEEC is responsible for implementing nuclear transportation policy set forth from its parent corporation. Timely implementation of EEEC's ambitious plan would avoid loss of full core reserve at Guangdong Nuclear Power Station (Daya Bay) Unit-1, which supplies power to Hong Kong and Schenzen. The spent fuel would be transported to the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex (LNFC), a reprocessing facility, approximately 4,000 kilometers Northwest of Daya Bay.

  12. Rail tiedown tests with heavy casks for radioactive shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petry, S.F.

    1980-08-01

    A rail tiedown test program was conducted at the Savannah River Plant in July and August 1978. For each test, a 40- or 70-ton cask was secured on a railcar. The railcar was pushed to speeds up to 11 mph and allowed to couple to parked railcars simulating ordinary railyard operations. The test car carrying the cask was heavily instrumented to measure the accelerations and forces generated at strategically selected places. Eighteen test runs were made with different combinations of railcars, couplers, casks, speeds, and tiedown configurations. The major objectives of the test program were to (1) provide test data as a basis to develop a tiedown standard for rail cask shipments of radioactive materials and (2) collect dynamic data to support analytical models of the railcar cask tiedown system. The optimum tiedown configuration demonstrated for heavy casks was a combination of welded, fixed stops to secure the cask longitudinally and flexible cables to restrain vertical and lateral cask movement. Cables alone were inadequate to secure a heavy cask to a standard railcar, and bolting was found disadvantageous in several respects. The use of cushioning coupler mechanisms dramatically reduced the tiedown requirements for the rail coupling operation. The test program and general conclusions are discussed

  13. Defining geographic coal markets using price data and shipments data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waarell, Linda

    2005-01-01

    Given the importance of coal in world energy supply an analysis of the relevant geographic market is essential for consumers, producers, as well as for competition policy. The purpose of this paper is to define the relevant economic market for steam and coking coal, and to test the hypothesis of single world markets for these coal products. Methodologically the paper relies on two different tests for defining markets, using both shipments data and price data. The results from both methods point in the same direction. In the case of coking coal the results indicate that the market is essentially global in scope, and also that the market has become more integrated over time. The results for steam coal show that the market is more regional in scope, and there exist no clear tendencies of increased integration over time. One policy implication of the finding that the steam coal market is more regional in scope, and thus that the market boundary is smaller than if the market would have been international, is that a merger and acquisition in this market likely would have been of a more concern for antitrust authorities than the same activity on the coking coal market

  14. Doses to railroad workers from shipments of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fields, D.E.; Cottrell, W.D.

    1988-01-01

    Fissile and high-level radioactive wastes are currently transported over long distances by truck and by rail transportation systems. The primary form of fissile material is spent reactor fuel. Transportation operations within DOE are controlled through the Transportation Operations and Management System. DOE projected increases in the rate of shipments have generated concern by railroad companies that railroad workers may be exposed to levels of radiation sufficiently high that a radiation protection program may need to be implemented. To address railroad company concerns, the Health and Safety Research Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory has estimated doses to railroad workers for two exposure scenarios that were constructed using worker activity data obtained from CSX Transportation for crew and maintenance workers. This characterization of railroad worker activity patterns includes a quantitative evaluation of the duration and rate of exposure. These duration and exposure rate values were evaluated using each of three exposure rate vs. distance models to generate exposure estimates. 14 refs., 1 tab

  15. The first commercial spent fuel shipment in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meinert, N.M.; Xiaoqing Li

    2004-01-01

    In two and a half years, government regulatory agencies and contractors from three countries worked together to design, license, fabricate, and transport the first commercial spent fuel shipment in China. Their cooperative efforts helped avoid the loss of full core reserve at a nuclear power plant serving two of China's largest cities. In March 2001, Everclean Environmental Engineering Corporation (EEEC) selected NAC International (NAC) to supply two United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) licensed Storable Transport Casks (NACSTC) and technology support, to ensure that qualified Chinese operators would be ready to load the first cask in late 2003. EEEC is a subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which sets nuclear policy in China. EEEC is responsible for implementing nuclear transportation policy set forth from its parent corporation. Timely implementation of EEEC's ambitious plan would avoid loss of full core reserve at Guangdong Nuclear Power Station (Daya Bay) Unit-1, which supplies power to Hong Kong and Schenzen. The spent fuel would be transported to the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex (LNFC), a reprocessing facility, approximately 4,000 kilometers Northwest of Daya Bay

  16. The accident at the Harrisburg nuclear reactor - Interim conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yiftah, S.

    1979-07-01

    This work describes the first minutes, first day and first week following the Three Mile Island accident. It shows the failures that occurred and the lessons which should be derived. It is pointed out that the doses of radiation that escaped from the TMI plant were at no time large enough to have had any effect on the 2 million people living on a radius of 80 km from the plant. Although no casualties occurred the Harrisburg accident will create an impulse for a new study and understanding of the nuclear plant safety and might serve as a live safety laboratory. After the TMI accident nuclear plants are already safer, one of the conclusions being that a new planning of the operation room is required, with the operators acquiring a better understanding of what is going on during a nuclear reactor accident. (B.G.)

  17. Scientific aspects of the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Koketsu, Kazuki

    2016-04-01

    We investigated the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the accident of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and assessments conducted beforehand for earthquake and tsunami potential in the Pacific offshore region of the Tohoku District. The results of our investigation show that all the assessments failed to foresee the earthquake and its related tsunami, which was the main cause of the accident. Therefore, the disaster caused by the earthquake, and the accident were scientifically unforeseeable at the time. However, for a zone neighboring the reactors, a 2008 assessment showed tsunamis higher than the plant height. As a lesson learned from the accident, companies operating nuclear power plants should be prepared using even such assessment results for neighboring zones.

  18. Should evacuation conditions after a nuclear accident be revised?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nifenecker, H.

    2011-01-01

    The author proposes to draw lessons from the Fukushima accident, notably in the field of post-accident management. He discusses the definition of an as widely understandable as possible method of description of risks related to irradiations after a nuclear accident. As these irradiations are mainly low dose ones which have a carcinogenic effect, he proposes to assess the average life expectancy loss due to an irradiation. Then, this risk can be easily compared with other risks like air pollution, smoking and passive smoking, and so on. Then, once this risk assessment method is well defined, it is possible to associate the inhabitants of contaminated areas to the post-accident management. They could then decide to go back to their homes or not with full knowledge of the facts

  19. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    In its final report reviewing the Three Mile Island accident, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has suggested change in several fundamental aspects of basic safety policy for nuclear power plants. Changes in nuclear power plant design and operations and in the regulatory process are discussed in terms of general goals. The appendix sets forth specific recommendations for reaching these goals

  20. Agricultural implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakanishi, Tomoko M.; Tanoi, Keitaro

    2013-01-01

    Since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in March 2011, contamination of places and foods has been a matter of concern. Unfortunately, agricultural producers have few sources of information and have had to rely on the lessons from the Chernobyl accident in 1986 or on information obtained from the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, as of this writing, data on the specific consequences of the Fukushima accident on Japanese agriculture remain limited. More than 80% of the land that suffered from the accident was related to agriculture or was in forests and meadows. The in fluence of the accident on agriculture was the most difficult to study because the activity in nature had to be dealt with. For example, when contaminated rice is harvested, scientists working on rice plants and soils and the study of watercourses or mountains have to collaborate to analyze or determine the vehicle by which the radioactivity accumulated and through which it spread in nature. At the request of agriculturists in Fukushima, we at the Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences at The University of Tokyo have been urgently collecting reliable data on the contamination of soil, plants, milk, and crops. Based on our data, we would like to comment on or propose an effective way of resuming agricultural activity. Because obtaining research results based on in situ experiments is time-consuming, we have been periodically holding research report meetings at our university every 3-4 months for lay people, showing them how the contamination situation has changed or what type of effect can be estimated. Although our research is still ongoing, we would like to summarize in this book our observations made during the one and a half years after the accident. (author)

  1. Visualization of Traffic Accidents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Jie; Shen, Yuzhong; Khattak, Asad

    2010-01-01

    Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

  2. The radiological accident in Tammiku

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    course of the accident, the remedial actions taken, and the lessons learnt from the sequence of events. It does not include discussions on theoretical aspects of the use and appropriateness of different methods for dose reconstruction

  3. True information on the late effect of radiation for medical doctors and general public is indispensable for unimpeded development of atomic industry. Lessons learned from psychological aspects of Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wainson, A.A.

    2010-01-01

    The development of atomic industry in Russia and other countries was practically stopped after the Chernobyl accident. The general public opinion was that the potential hazard from atomic energy stations tremendously outbalanced their benefit. Mass media supplied the public with a lot of negative information on the risk of cancer for the exposed persons, making virtually no reference to the dose-effects of cancer induction, and, more frighteningly, of hereditary consequences of the exposure. Importantly, mass media was only a distributor of negative information, which ion fact was generated in scientific and medical circles. Not so many medical doctors performed real epidemiological studies, comparing the incidence of different sickness in the exposed and control groups and thus receiving true information on the health of their patients. On the other hand, many biologists studied the effects of small doses on the cellular level, and a number of statements about the pronounced biological effects of small radiation doses appeared as a result in the literature. For instance, the effects of genetic instability, bystander effect, and the greater death of radioresistant cancer cells after smaller than larger doses can be mentioned. The discovered effects are real, but their direct extrapolation on the state of human health may lead to wrong conclusions. It is also necessary to be cautious in application of non-human data on the hereditary effect of radiation to humans: Such effects are pronounced in Drosophila, well documented in mice but have not practically been registered among the descendants of thousands of persons exposed to doses of several Gy at the Mayak plutonium production/processing factories, or in the settlements downstream Techa river consuming Mayak's sewage waters. It also obligatory for the scientific community to use proper controls while examining the reported cases of the elevated illness among the descendants of the exposed persons to clarify

  4. Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chandler, Michael

    2010-01-01

    As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the

  5. The Chernobyl accident consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-04-01

    Five teen years later, Tchernobyl remains the symbol of the greater industrial nuclear accident. To take stock on this accident, this paper proposes a chronology of the events and presents the opinion of many international and national organizations. It provides also web sites references concerning the environmental and sanitary consequences of the Tchernobyl accident, the economic actions and propositions for the nuclear safety improvement in the East Europe. (A.L.B.)

  6. Radiation, accidents, society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This book is meant to be used as a reference book for information officers at the event of a nuclear accident. The main part is edited in alphabetical order to facilitate use under stress. The book gives a short review of the health risks of radiation, and descriptions of accidents that have occured. The index words that have been chosen for the main part of the book have been selected due to experiences in connection with incidents and accidents. (L.E.)

  7. Analysis of Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    NSAC is conducting a detailed review of this accident and of the lessons to be learned. So far it has concentrated primarily on events during the sixteen hours following initiation of the accident. A sequence of events has been developed and is being verified and annotated by comparing oral and written statements with instrumentation records, data logs, operator logs, and inferences which can be made from these records. This report is being developed with the expectation that, while not completed or fully verified, it may be useful at this time. Supplements may be issued later as the analyses which are still under way are completed

  8. Reactivity insertion accident analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moreira, J.M.L.; Nakata, H.; Yorihaz, H.

    1990-04-01

    The correct prediction of postulated accidents is the fundamental requirement for the reactor licensing procedures. Accident sequences and severity of their consequences depend upon the analysis which rely on analytical tools which must be validated against known experimental results. Present work presents a systematic approach to analyse and estimate the reactivity insertion accident sequences. The methodology is based on the CINETHICA code which solves the point-kinetics/thermohydraulic coupled equations with weighted temperature feedback. Comparison against SPERT experimental results shows good agreement for the step insertion accidents. (author) [pt

  9. Nuclear accidents and epidemiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    A consultation on epidemiology related to the Chernobyl accident was held in Copenhagen in May 1987 as a basis for concerted action. This was followed by a joint IAEA/WHO workshop in Vienna, which reviewed appropriate methodologies for possible long-term effects of radiation following nuclear accidents. The reports of these two meetings are included in this volume, and cover the subjects: 1) Epidemiology related to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 2) Appropriate methodologies for studying possible long-term effects of radiation on individuals exposed in a nuclear accident. Figs and tabs

  10. Accidents (FARS) (National)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Department of Transportation — Accident - (1975-current): This data file (NTAD) contains information about crash characteristics and environmental conditions at the time of the crash. There is one...

  11. 4th Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregory, Louis

    2014-01-01

    This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. There was one shipment of two drums sent for offsite treatment and disposal. This report summarizes the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014.

  12. TRIGA 14 MW spent fuel shipment to USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toma, C.; Barbos, D.; Preda, M.; Covaci, St.; Ciocanescu, M.

    2008-01-01

    Romania has begun to convert Pitesti TRIGA 14 MW reactor having HEU fuel in its first loading and has agreed to complete conversion of the reactor to LEU fuel by May 12, 2006. Thus it became possible to benefit of US policy as set forth in the Record of Decision (ROD) issued by the Department of Energy (DOE ) on May 13 , 1996 directed for acceptance, management and disposition of the Authorized Material which has been discharged from the foreign research reactors. Consequently, United States, DOE Idaho Operations Office and Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti, Romania have mutually agreed the terms and conditions set forth in a contract applicable to the receipt of the Authorized Material. Irradiated and spent nuclear fuel rods from TRIGA reactor containing uranium enriched in the United States that have met the requirements set forth in the Environmental Impact Statement and the ROD have been designated as 'Authorized Material' and transferred to Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL)- USA during the summer of 1999 in a joint shipment. 267 TRIGA spent fuel rods loaded in a Legal Weight Truck Shipping Cask belonging to the NAC International have been transported through an overland truck route from Pitesti, Romania to Koper, Slovenia and from there it was shipped to USA. The paper has the following contents: 1.Introduction; 2.Fuel rods selection; 3.Fuel rods characterization; 4.Evaluation of TRIGA fuel in wet storage; 5.Fuel rods transfer from TRIGA pool to the transport cask; 6.Supporting documentation for transfer approval; 7. Conclusions. In conclusion one is stressed that, on site fuel evaluation process evidenced the existence of very good running and storage conditions in reactor pool during reactor operation and fuel storage. Only one fuel rod had to be packaged prior to placement in the shipping cask because of damaged cladding during negligent handling

  13. Development of Parameter Network for Accident Management Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pak, Sukyoung; Ahemd, Rizwan; Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyung Hee Univ., Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Jung Taek; Park, Soo Yong; Ahn, Kwang Il [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    When a severe accident happens, it is hard to obtain the necessary information to understand of internal status because of the failure or damage of instrumentation and control systems. We learned the lessons from Fukushima accident that internal instrumentation system should be secured and must have ability to react in serious conditions. While there might be a number of methods to reinforce the integrity of instrumentation systems, we focused on the use of redundant behavior of plant parameters without additional hardware installation. Specifically, the objective of this study is to estimate the replaced value which is able to identify internal status by using set of available signals when it is impossible to use instrumentation information in a severe accident, which is the continuation of the paper which was submitted at the last KNS meeting. The concept of the VPN was suggested to improve the quality of parameters particularly to be logged during severe accidents in NPPs using a software based approach, and quantize the importance of each parameter for further maintenance. In the future, we will continue to perform the same analysis to other accident scenarios and extend the spectrum of initial conditions so that we are able to get more sets of VPNs and ANN models to predict the behavior of accident scenarios. The suggested method has the uncertainty underlain in the analysis code for severe accidents. However, In case of failure to the safety critical instrumentation, the information from the VPN would be available to carry out safety management operation.

  14. Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rocha, Rodney

    2011-01-01

    This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

  15. Analysis of time series for postal shipments in Regional VII East Java Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kusrini, DE; Ulama, B. S. S.; Aridinanti, L.

    2018-03-01

    The change of number delivery goods through PT. Pos Regional VII East Java Indonesia indicates that the trend of increasing and decreasing the delivery of documents and non-documents in PT. Pos Regional VII East Java Indonesia is strongly influenced by conditions outside of PT. Pos Regional VII East Java Indonesia so that the prediction the number of document and non-documents requires a model that can accommodate it. Based on the time series plot monthly data fluctuations occur from 2013-2016 then the model is done using ARIMA or seasonal ARIMA and selected the best model based on the smallest AIC value. The results of data analysis about the number of shipments on each product sent through the Sub-Regional Postal Office VII East Java indicates that there are 5 post offices of 26 post offices entering the territory. The largest number of shipments is available on the PPB (Paket Pos Biasa is regular package shipment/non-document ) and SKH (Surat Kilat Khusus is Special Express Mail/document) products. The time series model generated is largely a Random walk model meaning that the number of shipment in the future is influenced by random effects that are difficult to predict. Some are AR and MA models, except for Express shipment products with Malang post office destination which has seasonal ARIMA model on lag 6 and 12. This means that the number of items in the following month is affected by the number of items in the previous 6 months.

  16. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. J. Allen; I. Bolshinsky; L. L. Biro; M. E. Budu; N. V. Zamfir; M. Dragusin

    2010-07-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment.

  17. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, K.J.; Bolshinsky, I.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.

    2010-01-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world's first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3. country under the RRRFR program and the 14. country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment. (authors)

  18. Research reactor preparations for the air shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolshinsky, I.; Allen, K.J.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.; Paunoiu, C.; Ciocanescu, M.

    2010-01-01

    In June 2009 two air shipments transported both unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from two research reactors in Romania to the Russian Federation (RF) for conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU). The Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti (SCN Pitesti) shipped 30.1 kg of HEU fresh fuel pellets to Dimitrovgrad, Russia and the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH) shipped 23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel assemblies from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to Ozersk, Russia. Both HEU shipments were coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), were managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), and were conducted in cooperation with the Russian Federation State Corporation for Atomic Energy Rosatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both shipments were transported by truck to and from respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at secure nuclear facilities in Russia until the material is converted into low enriched uranium. These shipments resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the research reactor preparations and license approvals that were necessary to safely and securely complete these air shipments of nuclear fuel. (author)

  19. Domino effect in chemical accidents: main features and accident sequences

    OpenAIRE

    Casal Fàbrega, Joaquim; Darbra Roman, Rosa Maria

    2010-01-01

    The main features of domino accidents in process/storage plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials were studied through an analysis of 225 accidents involving this effect. Data on these accidents, which occurred after 1961, were taken from several sources. Aspects analyzed included the accident scenario, the type of accident, the materials involved, the causes and consequences and the most common accident sequences. The analysis showed that the most frequent causes a...

  20. Interrogations to Learn from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gisquet, E.; Jeffroy, F.

    2016-01-01

    On March 11, 2011, an earthquake in eastern Japan caused the reactors in operation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) to trip. The emergency generators started and then suddenly failed following the tsunami. The cooling water injection system no longer worked. Suddenly plunged into total darkness, the operators had to manage the accident. Starting from the official reports and testimonies on the Fukushima accident, IRSN has conducted a survey “Human and Organizational Factors Perspective on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.” Four years after the accident, however, as more witness accounts become available, IRSN feels it useful to return to the human and organizational response to the accident inside the NPP itself. To what extent can the participants act and coordinate their actions when faced with such a dramatic situation? To what degree did their actions contribute to the disaster? Rather than looking at the causes of the accident, this study examines the unfolding of the crisis, particularly in the most urgent early stages, and draws lessons for safety culture from the decisions and actions of key actors. The main results would be presented in three key areas: 1. How to make sense of the situation? People had to make sense of what happened and create new indicators. Since instruments and controls, as well as many communication technologies, were knocked out by the tsunami, all the standard means of determining the status of the reactors were impossible. Although they were under normal circumstances almost completely dependent on these indicators, and although (or because) their lives were most directly at risk, the operators managed this uncertainty through various means that will be successively presented. 2. What are the challenges for the emergency structure? The Emergency Response Center (ERC) operations team was responsible for being in contact with the operators in the control rooms and providing them technical support as needed. The ERC

  1. Real and mythical consequences of Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osmachkin, V.S.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation describes the public Unacceptance of Nuclear Power as a consequence of Chernobyl Accident, an accident which was a severest event in the history of the nuclear industry. It was a shock for everybody, who has been involved in nuclear power programs. But nobody could expect that it was also the end romantic page in the nuclear story. The scale of the detriment was a great, and it could be compared with other big technological man-made catastrophes. But immediately after an accident mass media and news agencies started to transmit an information with a great exaggerations of the consequences of the event. In a report on the Seminar T he lessons of the Chernobyl - 1' in 1996 examples of such incorrect information, were cited. Particularly, in the mass media it was declared that consequences of the accident could be compared with a results of the second world war, the number of victims were more than hundred thousand people, more than million of children have the serious health detriments. Such and other cases of the misconstruction have been called as myths. The real consequences of Chernobyl disaster have been summed on the International Conference 'One decade after Chernobyl' - 2, in April 1996. A very important result of the Chernobyl accident was a dissemination of stable unacceptance of the everything connected with 'the atom'. A mystic horror from invisible mortal radiation has been inspired in the masses. And from such public attitude the Nuclear Power Programs in many countries have changed dramatically. A new more pragmatic and more careful atomic era started with a slogan: 'Kernkraftwerk ? Nein, danke'. No doubt, a Chernobyl accident was a serious technical catastrophe in atomic industry. The scale of detriment is connected with a number of involved peoples, not with a number of real victims. In comparison with Bhopal case, earthquakes, crashes of the airplanes, floods, traffic accidents and other risky events of our life - the Chernobyl is

  2. Chernobyl accident and Denmark

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by The Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 2 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  3. Criticality accident in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, A.R. de.

    1984-01-01

    A recent criticality type accident, ocurred in Argetina, is commented. Considerations about the nature of the facility where this accident took place, its genesis, type of operation carried out on the day of the event, and the medical aspects involved are done. (Author) [pt

  4. Chernobyl accident and Danmark

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 1 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  5. Communication and industrial accidents

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    As, Sicco van

    2001-01-01

    This paper deals with the influence of organizational communication on safety. Accidents are actually caused by individual mistakes. However the underlying causes of accidents are often organizational. As a link between these two levels - the organizational failures and mistakes - I suggest the

  6. Chapter 6: Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2018-04-01

    Th chapter 6 presents the accidents of: 1) Stimos (Italy - May, 1975); 2) San Salvador (El Salvador - February 5, 1989); 3) Soreq (Israel - June 21, 1990); 4) Nesvizh (Belarus - October 26, 1991); 5) Illinois (USA - February, 1965); 6)Maryland (EUA - December 11, 1991); 7)Hanoi (Vietnam -November 17, 1992); 8)Fleurus (Belgium - March 11, 2006) and final remarks on accidents.

  7. Radiological Cs-137 accidents/incidents in Estonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinisso, Mark

    1997-01-01

    Two radiological accidents/incidents in Estonia are reported. The first -21 October 1994, three brothers entered the Tammiku repository and stole a radioactive Cs-137 source and received dangerous doses of radiation. The other incident (early 1995) involved an abandoned source - a discarded metal cylinder containing Cs-137. Chronologies and factual data are considered for both events. Concise descriptions of the incidents, a medical overview of the fate of injured people and lessons learned are presented

  8. Radiological Cs-137 accidents/incidents in Estonia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sinisso, Mark [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallin (Estonia)

    1997-12-31

    Two radiological accidents/incidents in Estonia are reported. The first -21 October 1994, three brothers entered the Tammiku repository and stole a radioactive Cs-137 source and received dangerous doses of radiation. The other incident (early 1995) involved an abandoned source - a discarded metal cylinder containing Cs-137. Chronologies and factual data are considered for both events. Concise descriptions of the incidents, a medical overview of the fate of injured people and lessons learned are presented

  9. Human Factors in Accidents Involving Remotely Piloted Aircraft

    Science.gov (United States)

    Merlin, Peter William

    2013-01-01

    This presentation examines human factors that contribute to RPA mishaps and provides analysis of lessons learned. RPA accident data from U.S. military and government agencies were reviewed and analyzed to identify human factors issues. Common contributors to RPA mishaps fell into several major categories: cognitive factors (pilot workload), physiological factors (fatigue and stress), environmental factors (situational awareness), staffing factors (training and crew coordination), and design factors (human machine interface).

  10. Radiological accidents in medical practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cardenas Herrera, Juan

    2012-01-01

    Different radiological accidents that may occur in medical practice are shown. The following topics are focused: accident statistics for medical exposure, accidental medical exposures, radiotherapy accidents and potential accidental scenarios [es

  11. Prevalence, level and distribution of Salmonella in shipments of imported capsicum and sesame seed spice offered for entry to the United States: observations and modeling results.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Doren, Jane M; Blodgett, Robert J; Pouillot, Régis; Westerman, Ann; Kleinmeier, Daria; Ziobro, George C; Ma, Yinqing; Hammack, Thomas S; Gill, Vikas; Muckenfuss, Martin F; Fabbri, Linda

    2013-12-01

    In response to increased concerns about spice safety, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initiated research to characterize the prevalence and levels of Salmonella in imported spices. 299 imported dried capsicum shipments and 233 imported sesame seed shipments offered for entry to the United States were sampled. Observed Salmonella shipment prevalence was 3.3% (1500 g examined; 95% CI 1.6-6.1%) for capsicum and 9.9% (1500 g; 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 6.3-14%) for sesame seed. Within shipment contamination was not inconsistent with a Poisson distribution. Shipment mean Salmonella level estimates among contaminated shipments ranged from 6 × 10(-4) to 0.09 (capsicum) or 6 × 10(-4) to 0.04 (sesame seed) MPN/g. A gamma-Poisson model provided the best fit to observed data for both imported shipments of capsicum and imported shipments of sesame seed sampled in this study among the six parametric models considered. Shipment mean levels of Salmonella vary widely between shipments; many contaminated shipments contain low levels of contamination. Examination of sampling plan efficacy for identifying contaminated spice shipments from these distributions indicates that sample size of spice examined is critical. Sampling protocols examining 25 g samples are predicted to be able to identify a small fraction of contaminated shipments of imported capsicum or sesame seeds. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  12. Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amanda Phelan BNS, MSc, PhD

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available The public health nurses’ scope of practice explicitly includes child protection within their role, which places them in a prime position to identify child protection concerns. This role compliments that of other professions and voluntary agenices who work with children. Public health nurses are in a privileged position as they form a relationship with the child’s parent(s/guardian(s and are able to see the child in its own environment, which many professionals cannot. Child protection in Ireland, while influenced by other countries, has progressed through a distinct pathway that streamlined protocols and procedures. However, despite the above serious failures have occurred in the Irish system, and inquiries over the past 20 years persistently present similar contributing factors, namely, the lack of standardized and comprehensive service responses. Moreover, poor practice is compounded by the lack of recognition of the various interactional processes taking place within and between the different agencies of child protection, leading to psychological barriers in communication. This article will explore the lessons learned for public health nurses practice in safeguarding children in the Republic of Ireland.

  13. Longitudinal review of state-level accident statistics for carriers of interstate freight

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saricks, C.; Kvitek, T.

    1994-03-01

    State-level accident rates by mode of freight transport have been developed and refined for application to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) environmental mitigation program, which may involve large-quantity shipments of hazardous and mixed wastes from DOE facilities. These rates reflect multi-year data for interstate-registered highway earners, American Association of Railroads member carriers, and coastal and internal waterway barge traffic. Adjustments have been made to account for the share of highway combination-truck traffic actually attributable to interstate-registered carriers and for duplicate or otherwise inaccurate entries in the public-use accident data files used. State-to-state variation in rates is discussed, as is the stability of rates over time. Computed highway rates have been verified with actual carriers of high- and low-level nuclear materials, and the most recent truck accident data have been used, to ensure that the results are of the correct order of magnitude. Study conclusions suggest that DOE use the computed rates for the three modes until (1) improved estimation techniques for highway combination-truck miles by state become available; (2) continued evolution of the railroad industry significantly increases the consolidation of interstate rail traffic onto fewer high-capacity trunk lines; or (3) a large-scale off-site waste shipment campaign is imminent

  14. Uranium Yellow Cake accident - Wichita, Kansas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borchert, H.R.

    1987-01-01

    A tractor and semi trailer containing Uranium Yellow Cake, had overturned on I-235, Wichita, Kansas on Thursday, March 22, 1979. The truck driver and passenger were transported, with unknown injuries, to the hospital by ambulance. The shipment consisted of 54 drums of Uranium Ore Concentrate Powder. Half of the drums were damaged or had their lids off. Since it was raining at the time of the accident, plastic was used to cover the barrels and spilled material in an attempt to contain the yellow cake. A bulldozer was used to construct a series of dams in the median and the ditch to contain the run-off water from the contaminated area. Adverse and diverse weather conditions hampered the clean up operations over the next several days. The contaminated water and soil were shipped back to the mine for reintroduction into the milling process. The equipment was decontaminated prior to being released from the site. The clean up personnel wore protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment, if necessary. All individuals were surveyed and decontaminated prior to exiting the area

  15. The Knitting Lesson.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Pamela

    1987-01-01

    Based on Jean-Francois Millet's 1869 painting, "The Knitting Lesson," this lesson's goal is to introduce students in grades seven through nine to genre (everyday life) painting the nineteenth century. The lesson is also designed to show that some aspects of genre may be timeless. (BSR)

  16. Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    protection job coverage during severe accident response. The IAEA defines a 'Severe Accident' as a beyond design basis accident comprising of accident conditions more severe than a design basis accident, involving significant core degradation. Preparation of the report The expert group met several times to share their experience and develop an interim (preliminary) report by the end of 2013. The content of the report is thus based on current reflections and action plans undertaken by the ISOE participating utilities and regulatory authorities to improve the emergency response plans in the event of a severe nuclear accident from the point of view of occupational radiation protection. A specific attention has been given to the analysis of past nuclear accidents (TMI-2, USA-1979; Chernobyl, USSR-1986 and Fukushima Daiichi, Japan-2011) and to the integration of the occupational radiation protection (ORP) lessons learned from these accidents into the various chapters of the report (See synthesis of these lessons learned in Appendix-1). To finalize the report, an international workshop was organized in 2014 to present and discuss the content of the interim version and share national experiences on best occupational RP management practices and protocols for optimum RP job coverage during severe accident, initial response and recovery efforts (see Appendix-2). The workshop notably allowed to improve and complete the report which has then be submitted to the ISOE Management Board for approval. This report comprises five main chapters. Chapter 2 provides essential information on radiation protection management and organisation. Chapter 3 establishes the goal of radiation protection training and exercises related to severe accident management. Chapter 4 discusses facility characteristics that must be considered when planning actions in response to a severe accident. Chapter 5 introduces an overall approach for the protection of workers / responders with its interpretation and

  17. Annual Transportation Report for Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    In February 1997, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nevada Operations Office (now known as the Nevada Site Office) issued the Mitigation Action Plan which addressed potential impacts described in the 'Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada' (DOE/EIS 0243). The U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office committed to several actions, including the preparation of an annual report, which summarizes waste shipments to and from the Nevada Test Site (NTS) Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at Area 5 and Area 3. No shipments were disposed of at Area 3 in fiscal year (FY) 2008. This document satisfies requirements regarding low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) transported to or from the NTS during FY 2008. No transuranic (TRU) waste shipments were made from or to the NTS during FY 2008

  18. Historical overview of domestic spent nuclear fuel shipments in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, R.B.; Wankerl, M.W.; Hamberger, C.R.; Schmid, S.P.

    1992-01-01

    The information in this paper summarizes historical data on spent nuclear fuel shipments in the United States (US) from the period from 1964 to 1991. Information on shipments has been developed to establish a basis for developing a transportation system in the US for initiating shipments of spent nuclear fuel beginning in 1998. The paper shows that approximately 2700 power reactor spent nuclear fuel rail and truck casks have been shipped within the US during the past 28 years. In total, approximately 2000 metric tonnes of uranium (MTU) have been shipped to date, which compares with projected shipping rates of from 3000 to greater than 6000 MM per year when the US Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System is in full operation

  19. Comparison of actual and predicted routes used in the shipment of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joy, D.S.; Johnson, P.E.; Harrison, I.G.

    1985-01-01

    A number of highway controlled shipments of radioactive materials have been made over the past several years. An excellent example showing the variability of actual routes is the transfer of 45 shipments between the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania and Scoville, Idaho in 1982 and 1983. Six different routes varying between 2273 and 2483 miles were used. Approximately 75% of these shipments followed a common route which passed through ten Urbanized Areas, defined by the Census Bureau as having a population exceeding 100,000 people. Other routes, while shorter in distance, passed through as many as 14 Urbanized Areas. Routes predicted by the Oak Ridge routing model did not exactly duplicate actual routes used. However, the analysis shows that the routing model does make a good estimate of transportation routes actually chosen by shippers of radioactive materials. In actual practice, a number of factors (weather, road conditions, driver preference, etc.) influence the actual route taken. 5 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab

  20. Historical overview of domestic spent nuclear fuel shipments in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, R.B.; Wankerl, M.W.; Hamberger, C.R.; Schmid, S.P.

    1993-01-01

    The information in this paper summarized historical data on spent nuclear fuel shipments in the United States (U.S.) from the period from 1964 to 1991. Information on shipments has been developed to establish a basis for developing a transportation system in the U.S. for initiating shipments of spent nuclear fuel beginning in 1988. The paper shows that approximately 2700 power spent nuclear fuel rail and truck casks have been shipped within the U.S. during the past 28 years. In total, approximately 2000 metric tonnes of uranium (MTU) have been shipped to date, which compares with projected shipping rates of from 3000 to greater than 6000 MTU per year when the U.S. Civilian Radiation Waste Management System is in full operation. (author)