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Sample records for seismic safety guide

  1. Seismic Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eagling, D.G.

    1985-01-01

    The Seismic Safety Guide provides facilities managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. Most facilities managers, unfamiliar with earthquake engineering, tend to look for answers in techniques more sophisticated than required to solve the actual problems in earthquake safety. Often the approach to solutions to these problems is so academic, legalistic, and financially overwhelming that mitigation of actual seismic hazards simply does not get done in a timely, cost-effective way. The objective of the Guide is to provide practical advice about earthquake safety so that managers and engineers can get the job done without falling into common pitfalls, prolonged diagnosis, and unnecessary costs. It is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, non-structural elements, life lines, and risk management. 5 references

  2. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  3. Evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to determine the ground motion hazards for a plant at a particular site and the potential for surface faulting, which could affect the feasibility of construction and safe operation of a plant at that site. The guidelines and procedures presented in this Safety Guide can appropriately be used in evaluations of site suitability and seismic hazards for nuclear power plants in any seismotectonic environment. The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis recommended in this Safety Guide also addresses the needs for seismic hazard analysis of external event PSAs conducted for nuclear power plants. Many of the methods and processes described may also be applicable to nuclear facilities other than power plants. Other phenomena of permanent ground displacement (liquefaction, slope instability, subsidence and collapse) as well as the topic of seismically induced flooding are treated in Safety Guides relating to foundation safety and coastal flooding. Recommendations of a general nature are given in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the acquisition of a database containing the information needed to evaluate and address all hazards associated with earthquakes. Section 4 covers the use of this database for construction of a seismotectonic model. Sections 5 and 6 review ground motion hazards and evaluations of the potential for surface faulting, respectively. Section 7 addresses quality assurance in the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants

  4. Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-08-15

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear installations. It supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations. The present publication provides guidance and recommends procedures for the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations. It supersedes Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3 (2002). In this publication, the following was taken into account: the need for seismic hazard curves and ground motion spectra for the probabilistic safety assessment of external events for new and existing nuclear installations; feedback of information from IAEA reviews of seismic safety studies for nuclear installations performed over the previous decade; collective knowledge gained from recent significant earthquakes; and new approaches in methods of analysis, particularly in the areas of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and strong motion simulation. In the evaluation of a site for a nuclear installation, engineering solutions will generally be available to mitigate, by means of certain design features, the potential vibratory effects of earthquakes. However, such solutions cannot always be demonstrated to be adequate for mitigating the effects of phenomena of significant permanent ground displacement such as surface faulting, subsidence, ground collapse or fault creep. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance on evaluating seismic hazards at a nuclear installation site and, in particular, on how to determine: (a) the vibratory ground motion hazards, in order to establish the design basis ground motions and other relevant parameters for both new and existing nuclear installations; and (b) the potential for fault displacement and the rate of fault displacement that could affect the feasibility of the site or the safe operation of the installation at

  5. Seismic Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eagling, D.G.

    1983-09-01

    This guide provides managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. The Guide is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, evaluation and rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, special considerations related to shielding blocks, non-structural elements, lifelines, fire protection and emergency facilities. Management of risk and liabilities is also covered. Nuclear facilities per se are not dealt with specifically. The principles covered also apply generally to nuclear facilities but the design and construction of such structures are subject to special regulations and legal controls

  6. Seismic Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eagling, D.G. (ed.)

    1983-09-01

    This guide provides managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. The Guide is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, evaluation and rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, special considerations related to shielding blocks, non-structural elements, lifelines, fire protection and emergency facilities. Management of risk and liabilities is also covered. Nuclear facilities per se are not dealt with specifically. The principles covered also apply generally to nuclear facilities but the design and construction of such structures are subject to special regulations and legal controls.

  7. Armenia nuclear power plant. Overview of the present situation and its seismic safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Godoy, A.

    1993-01-01

    The presentation covers the problems of seismic safety of the two Armenian WWER type NPPs in the context of the energy situation in Armenia. Since the seismicity of the region is hazardous the upgrading of the seismic level is necessary and is considered feasible. A more complete and systematic approach to this problem is required. In this regard recommendations for seismic and site related safety which should be implemented are cited in the paper and a two phase approach is proposed in view of IAEA Safety Codes and Safety Guides

  8. Technical evaluation of seismic qualification of safety-related equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Yang Hui; Park, Heong Gee; Park, Yeong Seok [Univ. of Incheon, Incheon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-04-15

    This study is purposed to evaluate the technical acceptability of the procedures and techniques of seismic qualifications which were performed for the YGN 3 and 4 safety-related equipment.This study is also targeted to suggest a systematized technical procedure guide for the effective performance and review of the seismic qualification, which reflects the most up-to-date licensing requirements and state-of the-art.

  9. Geotechnical aspects of site evaluation and foundations for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This publication is a revision of the former safety standards of IAEA Safety Series No. 50-SG-S8. The scope has been extended to cover not only foundations but also design questions related to geotechnical science and engineering, such as the bearing capacity of foundations, design of earth structures and design of buried structures. Seismic aspects also play an important role in this field, and consequently the Safety Guide on Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3, which discusses the determination of seismic input motion, is referenced on several occasions. The present Safety Guide provides an interpretation of the Safety Requirements on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations and guidance on how to implement them. It is intended for the use of safety assessors or regulators involved in the licensing process as well as the designers of nuclear power plants, and it provides them with guidance on the methods and procedures for analyses to support the assessment of the geotechnical aspects of the safety of nuclear power plants

  10. Geotechnical aspects of site evaluation and foundations for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This publication is a revision of the former safety standards of IAEA Safety Series No. 50-SG-S8. The scope has been extended to cover not only foundations but also design questions related to geotechnical science and engineering, such as the bearing capacity of foundations, design of earth structures and design of buried structures Seismic aspects also play an important role in this field, and consequently the Safety Guide on Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3, which discusses the determination of seismic input motion, is referenced on several occasions. The present Safety Guide provides an interpretation of the Safety Requirements on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations and guidance on how to implement them. It is intended for the use of safety assessors or regulators involved in the licensing process as well as the designers of nuclear power plants, and it provides them with guidance on the methods and procedures for analyses to support the assessment of the geotechnical aspects of the safety of nuclear power plants

  11. Pickering seismic safety margin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghobarah, A.; Heidebrecht, A.C.; Tso, W.K.

    1992-06-01

    A study was conducted to recommend a methodology for the seismic safety margin review of existing Canadian CANDU nuclear generating stations such as Pickering A. The purpose of the seismic safety margin review is to determine whether the nuclear plant has sufficient seismic safety margin over its design basis to assure plant safety. In this review process, it is possible to identify the weak links which might limit the seismic performance of critical structures, systems and components. The proposed methodology is a modification the EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) approach. The methodology includes: the characterization of the site margin earthquake, the definition of the performance criteria for the elements of a success path, and the determination of the seismic withstand capacity. It is proposed that the margin earthquake be established on the basis of using historical records and the regional seismo-tectonic and site specific evaluations. The ability of the components and systems to withstand the margin earthquake is determined by database comparisons, inspection, analysis or testing. An implementation plan for the application of the methodology to the Pickering A NGS is prepared

  12. Seismic and tsunami safety margin assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    Nuclear Regulation Authority is going to establish new seismic and tsunami safety guidelines to increase the safety of NPPs. The main purpose of this research is testing structures/components important to safety and tsunami resistant structures/components, and evaluating the capacity of them against earthquake and tsunami. Those capacity data will be utilized for the seismic and tsunami back-fit review based on the new seismic and tsunami safety guidelines. The summary of the program in 2012 is as follows. 1. Component seismic capacity test and quantitative seismic capacity evaluation. PWR emergency diesel generator partial-model seismic capacity tests have been conducted and quantitative seismic capacities have been evaluated. 2. Seismic capacity evaluation of switching-station electric equipment. Existing seismic test data investigation, specification survey and seismic response analyses have been conducted. 3. Tsunami capacity evaluation of anti-inundation measure facilities. Tsunami pressure test have been conducted utilizing a small breakwater model and evaluated basic characteristics of tsunami pressure against seawall structure. (author)

  13. Seismic and tsunami safety margin assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear Regulation Authority is going to establish new seismic and tsunami safety guidelines to increase the safety of NPPs. The main purpose of this research is testing structures/components important to safety and tsunami resistant structures/components, and evaluating the capacity of them against earthquake and tsunami. Those capacity data will be utilized for the seismic and tsunami back-fit review based on the new seismic and tsunami safety guidelines. The summary of the program in 2012 is as follows. 1. Component seismic capacity test and quantitative seismic capacity evaluation. PWR emergency diesel generator partial-model seismic capacity tests have been conducted and quantitative seismic capacities have been evaluated. 2. Seismic capacity evaluation of switching-station electric equipment. Existing seismic test data investigation, specification survey and seismic response analyses have been conducted. 3. Tsunami capacity evaluation of anti-inundation measure facilities. Tsunami pressure test have been conducted utilizing a small breakwater model and evaluated basic characteristics of tsunami pressure against seawall structure. (author)

  14. Seismic safety programme at NPP Paks. Propositions for coordinated international activity in seismic safety of the WWER-440 V-213

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents the Paks NPP seismic safety program, highlighting the specifics of the WWER-440/213 type in operation, and the results of work obtained so far. It covers the following scope: establishment of the seismic safety program (original seismic design, current requirements, principles and structure of the seismic safety program); implementation of the seismic safety program (assessing the seismic hazard of the site, development of the new concept of seismic safety for the NPP, assessing the seismic resistance of the building and the technology); realization of the seismic safety of higher level (technical solutions, drawings, realization); ideas and propositions for coordinated international activity

  15. SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    E.N. Lindner

    2004-12-03

    The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

  16. SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    E.N. Lindner

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

  17. Seismic safety of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.

    1993-01-01

    An extensive program is underway at Paks NPP for evaluation of the seismic safety and for development of the necessary safety increasing measures. This program includes the following five measures: investigation of methods, regulations and techniques utilized for reassessment of seismic safety of operating NPPs and promoting safety; investigation of earthquake hazards; development of concepts for creating the seismic safety location of earthquake warning system; determination of dynamic features of systems and facilities determined by the concept, and preliminary evaluation of the seismic safety

  18. Safety design guides for containment extension for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for containment extension describes the containment isolation philosophy and containment extension requirements. The metal extensions and components falling within the scope of ASME Section III are classified in accordance with the CAN/CSA-N285.0 and CAN/CSA-N285.3. The special consideration for the leak monitoring capability, seismic qualification and inspection requirements for containment extensions, etc., are defined in this design guide. In addition, the containment isolation systems are defined and summarized schematically in appendix A. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. (Author) .new

  19. Seismic safety margin assessment program (Annual safety research report, JFY 2010)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Kenichi; Iijima, Toru; Inagaki, Masakatsu; Taoka, Hideto; Hidaka, Shinjiro

    2011-01-01

    Seismic capacity test data, analysis method and evaluation code provided by Seismic Safety Margin Assessment Program have been utilized for the support of seismic back-check evaluation of existing plants. The summary of the program in 2010 is as follows. 1. Component seismic capacity test and quantitative seismic capacity evaluation. Many seismic capacity tests of various snubbers were conducted and quantitative seismic capacities were evaluated. One of the emergency diesel generator partial-model seismic capacity tests was conducted and quantitative seismic capacity was evaluated. Some of the analytical evaluations of piping-system seismic capacities were conducted. 2. Analysis method for minute evaluation of component seismic response. The difference of seismic response of large components such as primary containment vessel and reactor pressure vessel when they were coupled with 3-dimensional FEM building model or 1-dimensional lumped mass building model, was quantitatively evaluated. 3. Evaluation code for quantitative evaluation of seismic safety margin of systems, structures and components. As the example, quantitative evaluation of seismic safety margin of systems, structures and components were conducted for the reference plant. (author)

  20. IAEA establishes International Seismic Safety Centre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The IAEA today officially inaugurated an international centre to coordinate efforts for protecting nuclear installations against the effects of earthquakes. The International Seismic Safety Centre (ISSC), which has been established within the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, will serve as a focal point on seismic safety for nuclear installations worldwide. ISSC will assist countries on the assessment of seismic hazards of nuclear facilities to mitigate the consequences of strong earthquakes. 'With safety as our first priority, it is vital that we pool all expert knowledge available worldwide to assist nuclear operators and regulators to be well prepared for coping with major seismic events,' said Antonio Godoy, Acting Head of the IAEA's Engineering Safety Section and leader of the ISSC. 'The creation of the ISSC represents the culmination of three decades of the IAEA's active and recognized involvement in this matter through the development of an updated set of safety standards and the assistance to Member States for their application.' To further seismic safety at nuclear installations worldwide, the ISSC will: - Promote knowledge sharing among the international community in order to avoid or mitigate the consequences of extreme seismic events on nuclear installations; - Support countries through advisory services and training courses; and - Enhance seismic safety by utilizing experience gained from previous seismic events in member states. The centre is supported by a scientific committee of high-level experts from academic, industrial and nuclear safety authorities that will advise the ISSC on implementation of its programme. Experts have been nominated from seven specialized areas, including geology and tectonics, seismology, seismic hazard, geotechnical engineering, structural engineering, equipment, and seismic risk. Japan and the United States have both contributed initial funds for creation of the centre, which will be based at

  1. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guerpinar, A.; Godoy, A.

    2001-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in Eastern Europe and in particular WWER type nuclear power plants during the past seven years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on 'Benchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants'. These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  2. Seismic safety of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.

    1995-01-01

    This paper contains an overview of the results concerning the following activities: investigation of methods, regulations and techniques for reassessment of seismic safety of operating NPPs and upgrading of safety; investigation of earthquake hazards; development of concept for creation of the seismic safety location of earthquake warning system; determination of dynamic features of systems and facilities determined by the concept and preliminary evaluation of the seismic safety. It is limited on investigation of dynamic features of building structures, the building dynamical experiments and experimental investigation of the equipment

  3. Seismic Safety Of Simple Masonry Buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guadagnuolo, Mariateresa; Faella, Giuseppe

    2008-01-01

    Several masonry buildings comply with the rules for simple buildings provided by seismic codes. For these buildings explicit safety verifications are not compulsory if specific code rules are fulfilled. In fact it is assumed that their fulfilment ensures a suitable seismic behaviour of buildings and thus adequate safety under earthquakes. Italian and European seismic codes differ in the requirements for simple masonry buildings, mostly concerning the building typology, the building geometry and the acceleration at site. Obviously, a wide percentage of buildings assumed simple by codes should satisfy the numerical safety verification, so that no confusion and uncertainty have to be given rise to designers who must use the codes. This paper aims at evaluating the seismic response of some simple unreinforced masonry buildings that comply with the provisions of the new Italian seismic code. Two-story buildings, having different geometry, are analysed and results from nonlinear static analyses performed by varying the acceleration at site are presented and discussed. Indications on the congruence between code rules and results of numerical analyses performed according to the code itself are supplied and, in this context, the obtained result can provide a contribution for improving the seismic code requirements

  4. Role of seismic PRA in seismic safety decisions of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ravindra, M.K.; Kennedy, R.P.; Sues, R.H.

    1985-01-01

    This paper highlights the important roles that seismic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) can play in the seismic safety decisions of nuclear power plants. If a seismic PRA has been performed for a plant, its results can be utilized to evaluate the seismic capability beyond the safe shutdown event (SSE). Seismic fragilities of key structures and equipment, fragilities of dominant plant damage states and the frequencies of occurrence of these plant damage states are reviewed to establish the seismic safety of the plant beyond the SSE level. Guidelines for seismic margin reviews and upgrading may be developed by first identifying the generic classes of structures and equipment that have been shown to be dominant risk contributors in the completed seismic PRAs, studying the underlying causes for their contribution and examining why certain other items (e.g., piping) have not proved to be high-risk-contributors

  5. Seismic safety margins research program overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokarz, F.J.; Smith, P.D.

    1978-01-01

    A multiyear seismic research program has been initiated at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. This program, the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The program is designed to develop a probabilistic systems methodology for determining the seismic safety margins of nuclear power plants. Phase I, extending some 22 months, began in July 1978 at a funding level of approximately $4.3 million. Here we present an overview of the SSMRP. Included are discussions on the program objective, the approach to meet the program goal and objectives, end products, the probabilistic systems methodology, and planned activities for Phase I

  6. Historical development of the seismic requirements for construction of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and worldwide and their current impact on cost and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevenson, J.D.

    2003-01-01

    The following topics are described and discussed: Historical development of NPP seismic design requirements: Peak ground acceleration; Response spectra and damping; Floor or amplified response spectra; Effective high frequency response spectra; Seismic modeling procedures; Impact on cost (site preparation and foundations; site seismic response and generation of site dependent spectra). Potential use of indirect earthquake experience data in design and construction of NPP. Seismic contribution to safety. The following facts are summarized in two Appendices: Seismic intensity scales, and GRS safety codes and guides. (P.A.)

  7. Seismic qualification of multiple interconnected safety-related cabinets in a high seismic zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, M.R.; Chen, W.H.W.; Wang, T.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Certain safety-related multiple, interconnected electrical cabinets and the devices contained therein are required to perform their intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismic event. In general, seismic testing is performed to ensure the structural integrity of the cabinets and the functionality of their associated devices. Constrained by the shake table capacity, seismic testing is usually performed only for a limited number of interconnected cabinets. Also, original shake table tests performed usually did not provide detailed response information at various locations inside the cabinets. For operational and maintenance purposes, doors and panels of some cabinets may need to be opened while the adjacent cabinets are required to remain functional. In addition, in-cabinet response spectra need to be generated for the seismic qualification of new devices and the replacement parts. Consequently, seismic analysis of safety-related multiple, interconnected cabinets is frequently required for configurations which are different from the original tested conditions. This paper presents results of seismic tests of three interconnected safety-related cabinets and finite element analyses performed to compare the analytical results with those obtained from the cabinet seismic tests. Parametric analyses are performed to determine how many panels and doors can be opened while the adjacent cabinets still remain functional. The study indicates that for cabinets located in a high seismic zone, the critical damping of the cabinet is significantly higher than 5% to 7% typically used in qualifying electrical equipment. For devices mounted on the cabinet doors to performed their intended safety function, it requires stiffening of doors and that these doors be properly bolted to the cabinet frame. It also shows that even though doors and panels bolted to the cabinet frame are the primary seismic resistant element of the cabinet, opening of a limited number of them

  8. Seismic safety of building structures of NPP Kozloduy III

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varbanov, G.I.; Kostov, M.K.; Stefanov, D.D.; Kaneva, A.D.

    2005-01-01

    In the proposed paper is presented a general summary of the analyses carried out to evaluate the dynamic behavior and to assess the seismic safety of some safety related building structures of NPP Kozloduy. The design seismic loads for the site of Kozloduy NPP has been reevaluated and increased during and after the construction of investigated Units 5 and 6. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches are applied to assess the seismic vulnerability of the investigated structures, taking into account the newly defined seismic excitations. The presented results show sufficient seismic safety for the studied critical structures and good efficiency of the seismic upgrading. The applicability of the investigated structures at sites with some higher seismic activities is discussed. The presented study is dealing mainly with the civil structures of the Reactor building, Turbine hall, Diesel Generator Station and Water Intake Structure. (authors)

  9. Use of the t-distribution to construct seismic hazard curves for seismic probabilistic safety assessments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yee, Eric [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Dept. of Nuclear Power Plant Engineering, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-03-15

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessments are used to help understand the impact potential seismic events can have on the operation of a nuclear power plant. An important component to seismic probabilistic safety assessment is the seismic hazard curve which shows the frequency of seismic events. However, these hazard curves are estimated assuming a normal distribution of the seismic events. This may not be a strong assumption given the number of recorded events at each source-to-site distance. The use of a normal distribution makes the calculations significantly easier but may underestimate or overestimate the more rare events, which is of concern to nuclear power plants. This paper shows a preliminary exploration into the effect of using a distribution that perhaps more represents the distribution of events, such as the t-distribution to describe data. The integration of a probability distribution with potentially larger tails basically pushes the hazard curves outward, suggesting a different range of frequencies for use in seismic probabilistic safety assessments. Therefore the use of a more realistic distribution results in an increase in the frequency calculations suggesting rare events are less rare than thought in terms of seismic probabilistic safety assessment. However, the opposite was observed with the ground motion prediction equation considered.

  10. Use of the t-distribution to construct seismic hazard curves for seismic probabilistic safety assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yee, Eric

    2017-01-01

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessments are used to help understand the impact potential seismic events can have on the operation of a nuclear power plant. An important component to seismic probabilistic safety assessment is the seismic hazard curve which shows the frequency of seismic events. However, these hazard curves are estimated assuming a normal distribution of the seismic events. This may not be a strong assumption given the number of recorded events at each source-to-site distance. The use of a normal distribution makes the calculations significantly easier but may underestimate or overestimate the more rare events, which is of concern to nuclear power plants. This paper shows a preliminary exploration into the effect of using a distribution that perhaps more represents the distribution of events, such as the t-distribution to describe data. The integration of a probability distribution with potentially larger tails basically pushes the hazard curves outward, suggesting a different range of frequencies for use in seismic probabilistic safety assessments. Therefore the use of a more realistic distribution results in an increase in the frequency calculations suggesting rare events are less rare than thought in terms of seismic probabilistic safety assessment. However, the opposite was observed with the ground motion prediction equation considered

  11. The SISIFO project: Seismic Safety at High Schools

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peruzza, Laura; Barnaba, Carla; Bragato, Pier Luigi; Dusi, Alberto; Grimaz, Stefano; Malisan, Petra; Saraรฒ, Angela; Mucciarelli, Marco

    2014-05-01

    For many years, the Italian scientific community has faced the problem of the reduction of earthquake risk using innovative educational techniques. Recent earthquakes in Italy and around the world have clearly demonstrated that seismic codes alone are not able to guarantee an effective mitigation of risk. After the tragic events of San Giuliano di Puglia (2002), where an earthquake killed 26 school children, special attention was paid in Italy to the seismic safety of schools, but mainly with respect to structural aspects. Little attention has been devoted to the possible and even significant damage to non-structural elements (collapse of ceilings, tipping of cabinets and shelving, obstruction of escape routes, etc..). Students and teachers trained on these aspects may lead to a very effective preventive vigilance. Since 2002, the project EDURISK (www.edurisk.it) proposed educational tools and training programs for schools, at primary and middle levels. More recently, a nationwide campaign aimed to adults (www.iononrischio.it) was launched with the extensive support of civil protection volounteers. There was a gap for high schools, and Project SISIFO was designed to fill this void and in particular for those schools with technical/scientific curricula. SISIFO (https://sites.google.com/site/ogssisifo/) is a multidisciplinary initiative, aimed at the diffusion of scientific culture for achieving seismic safety in schools, replicable and can be structured in training the next several years. The students, helped by their teachers and by experts from scientific institutions, followed a course on specialized training on earthquake safety. The trial began in North-East Italy, with a combination of hands-on activities for the measurement of earthquakes with low-cost instruments and lectures with experts in various disciplines, accompanied by specifically designed teaching materials, both on paper and digital format. We intend to raise teachers and students knowledge of the

  12. 41 CFR 128-1.8004 - Seismic Safety Coordinators.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Coordinators. 128-1.8004 Section 128-1.8004 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  13. Probabilistic safety assessment for seismic events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-10-01

    This Technical Document on Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Seismic Events is mainly associated with the Safety Practice on Treatment of External Hazards in PSA and discusses in detail one specific external hazard, i.e. earthquakes

  14. Collection and accumulation of seismic safety research findings, and considerations for information dissemination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Seismic Safety Division of JNES is collecting and analyzing the findings of seismic safety research, and is developing a system to organize and disseminate the information internally and internationally. These tasks have been conducted in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The overview of the tasks is as follows; 1) Collection of the knowledge and findings from seismic safety research. JNES collects information on seismic safety researches including the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake. The information is analyzed whether it is important for regulation to increase seismic safety of NPP. 2) Constructing database of seismic safety research. JNES collects information based on documents published by committee and constructs database of active faults around NPP sites in order to incorporate in the seismic safety review. 3) Dissemination of information related to seismic safety. JNES disseminates outcomes of own researches internally and internationally. (author)

  15. Collection and accumulation of seismic safety research findings, and considerations for information dissemination

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    Seismic Safety Division of JNES is collecting and analyzing the findings of seismic safety research, and is developing a system to organize and disseminate the information internally and internationally. These tasks have been conducted in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The overview of the tasks is as follows; 1) Collection of the knowledge and findings from seismic safety research. JNES collects information on seismic safety researches including the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake. The information is analyzed whether it is important for regulation to increase seismic safety of NPP. 2) Constructing database of seismic safety research. JNES collects information based on documents published by committee and constructs database of active faults around NPP sites in order to incorporate in the seismic safety review. 3) Dissemination of information related to seismic safety. JNES disseminates outcomes of own researches internally and internationally. (author)

  16. Seismic failure modes and seismic safety of Hardfill dam

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kun Xiong

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available Based on microscopic damage theory and the finite element method, and using the Weibull distribution to characterize the random distribution of the mechanical properties of materials, the seismic response of a typical Hardfill dam was analyzed through numerical simulation during the earthquakes with intensities of 8 degrees and even greater. The seismic failure modes and failure mechanism of the dam were explored as well. Numerical results show that the Hardfill dam remains at a low stress level and undamaged or slightly damaged during an earthquake with an intensity of 8 degrees. During overload earthquakes, tensile cracks occur at the dam surfaces and extend to inside the dam body, and the upstream dam body experiences more serious damage than the downstream dam body. Therefore, under the seismic conditions, the failure pattern of the Hardfill dam is the tensile fracture of the upstream regions and the dam toe. Compared with traditional gravity dams, Hardfill dams have better seismic performance and greater seismic safety.

  17. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Godoy, A.

    1995-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in WWER type nuclear power plants during the past five years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on B enchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants . These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  18. Guided Seismic Waves: Possible Diagnostics for Hot Plumes in the Mantle

    Science.gov (United States)

    Evans, J. R.; Julian, B. R.; Foulger, G. R.

    2005-12-01

    Seismic waves potentially provide by far the highest resolution view of the three-dimensional structure of the mantle, and the hope of detecting wave-speed anomalies caused by hot or compositionally buoyant mantle plumes has been a major incentive to the development of tomographic seismic techniques. Seismic tomography is limited, however, by the uneven geographical distribution of earthquakes and seismometers, which can produce artificial tomographic wave-speed anomalies that are difficult to distinguish from real structures in the mantle. An alternate approach may be possible, because hot plumes and possibly some compositional upwellings would have low seismic-wave speeds and would act as efficient waveguides over great depth ranges in the mantle. Plume-guided waves would be little affected by bends or other geometric complexities in the waveguides (analogously to French horns and fiber-optic cables), and their dispersion would make them distinctive on seismograms and would provide information on the size and structure of the waveguide. The main unanswered question is whether guided waves in plumes could be excited sufficiently to be observable. Earthquakes do not occur in the deep mantle, but at least two other possible sources of excitation can be imagined: (1) shallow earthquakes at or near plume-fed hotspots; and (2) coupling of plume-guided waves to seismic body waves near the bottom of the mantle. In the first case, downward-traveling guided waves transformed to seismic body waves at the bottom of the waveguide would have to be detected at teleseismic distances. In the second case, upward-traveling guided waves generated by teleseismic body waves would be detected on seismometers at hotspots. Qualitative reasoning based on considerations of reciprocity suggests that the signals in these two situations should be similar in size and appearance. The focusing of seismic core phases at caustics would amplify plume waves excited by either mechanism (1) or (2) at

  19. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  20. The reevaluation of seismic safety of existing nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitagawa, Hiroshi; Tominaga, Shohei; Kumagai, Chiyoshi; Koshiba, Koremutsu; Kono, Tomonori; Agawa, Kazuyoshi; Kuwata, Kenichiro

    2003-01-01

    We have carried out additional geological surveys in order to enrich our database on geological faults in the vicinity of Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Prior to additional geological surveys, given the social importance of nuclear power plants, we hypothetically assumed that almost the whole length of an area covered by surveys would be an active fault that must be considered in seismic design, and tried to reevaluate the seismic safety of the NPP by applying an input earthquake ground motion larger than the level at the design stage. As a result, we have confirmed that seismic safety of the NPP can be maintained. This paper describes the method that we employed to reevaluate the seismic safety of Shimane NPP. (author)

  1. 41 CFR 128-1.8009 - Review of Seismic Safety Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Review of Seismic Safety Program. 128-1.8009 Section 128-1.8009 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  2. Current USAEC seismic requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mehta, D.S.

    1975-01-01

    The principal seismic and geologic considerations which guide the USAEC in its evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power plants and plant design bases are set forth as design criteria in the AEC regulatory guides. The basic requirements of seismic design and analysis for seismic Category I structures, components, and systems important to public safety have been established in the USAEC regulatory guides and Code of Federal Regulations. It is pointed out that the current state-of-art techniques, best available technology, and additional studies in the field of earthquake engineering can be utilized to resolve seismic concerns. The seismic design requirements for nuclear plants to withstand postulated earthquakes can be standardized and this will be a significant milestone in the continuation of the Nuclear Standardization Program. (author)

  3. Implementation guidelines for seismic PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coman, Ovidiu; Samaddar, Sujit; Hibino, Kenta; )

    2014-01-01

    The presentation was devoted to development of guidelines for implementation of a seismic PSA. If successful, these guidelines can close an important gap. ASME/ANS PRA standards and the related IAEA Safety Guide (IAEA NS-G-2.13) describe capability requirements for seismic PSA in order to support risk-informed applications. However, practical guidance on how to meet these requirements is limited. Such guidelines could significantly contribute to improving risk-informed safety demonstration, safety management and decision making. Extensions of this effort to further PSA areas, particularly to PSA for other external hazards, can enhance risk-informed applications

  4. Safety review for seismic qualification on nuclear power plant equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fang Qingxian

    1995-01-01

    The standards and requirements for seismic qualification of nuclear power plant's component have been fully addressed, including the scope of seismic qualification, the approach and the method of common seismic qualification, the procedure of the seismic tests, and the criteria for the seismic qualification review. The problems discovered in the safety review and the solution for these problems and some other issues are also discussed

  5. Probabilistic safety analysis procedures guide, Sections 8-12. Volume 2, Rev. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCann, M.; Reed, J.; Ruger, C.; Shiu, K.; Teichmann, T.; Unione, A.; Youngblood, R.

    1985-08-01

    A procedures guide for the performance of probabilistic safety assessment has been prepared for interim use in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs. It will be revised as comments are received, and as experience is gained from its use. The probabilistic safety assessment studies performed are intended to produce probabilistic predictive models that can be used and extended by the utilities and by NRC to sharpen the focus of inquiries into a range of issues affecting reactor safety. The first volume of the guide describes the determination of the probability (per year) of core damage resulting from accident initiators internal to the plant (i.e., intrinsic to plant operation) and from loss of off-site electric power. The scope includes human reliability analysis, a determination of the importance of various core damage accident sequences, and an explicit treatment and display of uncertainties for key accident sequences. This second volume deals with the treatment of the so-called external events including seismic disturbances, fires, floods, etc. Ultimately, the guide will be augmented to include the plant-specific analysis of in-plant processes (i.e., containment performance). This guide provides the structure of a probabilistic safety study to be performed, and indicates what products of the study are valuable for regulatory decision making. For internal events, methodology is treated in the guide only to the extent necessary to indicate the range of methods which is acceptable; ample reference is given to alternative methodologies which may be utilized in the performance of the study. For external events, more explicit guidance is given

  6. Seismic safety in conducting large-scale blasts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mashukov, I. V.; Chaplygin, V. V.; Domanov, V. P.; Semin, A. A.; Klimkin, M. A.

    2017-09-01

    In mining enterprises to prepare hard rocks for excavation a drilling and blasting method is used. With the approach of mining operations to settlements the negative effect of large-scale blasts increases. To assess the level of seismic impact of large-scale blasts the scientific staff of Siberian State Industrial University carried out expertise for coal mines and iron ore enterprises. Determination of the magnitude of surface seismic vibrations caused by mass explosions was performed using seismic receivers, an analog-digital converter with recording on a laptop. The registration results of surface seismic vibrations during production of more than 280 large-scale blasts at 17 mining enterprises in 22 settlements are presented. The maximum velocity values of the Earthโ€™s surface vibrations are determined. The safety evaluation of seismic effect was carried out according to the permissible value of vibration velocity. For cases with exceedance of permissible values recommendations were developed to reduce the level of seismic impact.

  7. Seismic safety in nuclear-waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpenter, D.W.; Towse, D.

    1979-01-01

    Seismic safety is one of the factors that must be considered in the disposal of nuclear waste in deep geologic media. This report reviews the data on damage to underground equipment and structures from earthquakes, the record of associated motions, and the conventional methods of seismic safety-analysis and engineering. Safety considerations may be divided into two classes: those during the operational life of a disposal facility, and those pertinent to the post-decommissioning life of the facility. Operational hazards may be mitigated by conventional construction practices and site selection criteria. Events that would materially affect the long-term integrity of a decommissioned facility appear to be highly unlikely and can be substantially avoided by conservative site selection and facility design. These events include substantial fault movement within the disposal facility and severe ground shaking in an earthquake epicentral region. Techniques need to be developed to address the question of long-term earthquake probability in relatively aseismic regions, and for discriminating between active and extinct faults in regions where earthquake activity does not result in surface ruptures

  8. Seismic safety in nuclear-waste disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carpenter, D.W.; Towse, D.

    1979-04-26

    Seismic safety is one of the factors that must be considered in the disposal of nuclear waste in deep geologic media. This report reviews the data on damage to underground equipment and structures from earthquakes, the record of associated motions, and the conventional methods of seismic safety-analysis and engineering. Safety considerations may be divided into two classes: those during the operational life of a disposal facility, and those pertinent to the post-decommissioning life of the facility. Operational hazards may be mitigated by conventional construction practices and site selection criteria. Events that would materially affect the long-term integrity of a decommissioned facility appear to be highly unlikely and can be substantially avoided by conservative site selection and facility design. These events include substantial fault movement within the disposal facility and severe ground shaking in an earthquake epicentral region. Techniques need to be developed to address the question of long-term earthquake probability in relatively aseismic regions, and for discriminating between active and extinct faults in regions where earthquake activity does not result in surface ruptures.

  9. Seismic site evaluation practice and seismic design guide for NPP in Continent of China

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yuxian, Hu [State Seismological Bureau, Beijing, BJ (China). Inst. of Geophysics

    1997-03-01

    Energy resources, seismicity, NPP and related regulations of the Continent of China are briefly introduced in the beginning and two codes related to the seismic design of NPP, one on siting and another on design, are discussed in some detail. The one on siting is an official code of the State Seismological Bureau, which specifies the seismic safety evaluation requirements of various kinds of structures, from the most critic and important structures such as NPP to ordinary buildings, and including also engineering works in big cities. The one on seismic design of NPP is a draft subjected to publication now, which will be an official national code. The first one is somewhat unique but the second one is quite similar to those in the world. (author)

  10. Seismic site evaluation practice and seismic design guide for NPP in Continent of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hu Yuxian

    1997-01-01

    Energy resources, seismicity, NPP and related regulations of the Continent of China are briefly introduced in the beginning and two codes related to the seismic design of NPP, one on siting and another on design, are discussed in some detail. The one on siting is an official code of the State Seismological Bureau, which specifies the seismic safety evaluation requirements of various kinds of structures, from the most critic and important structures such as NPP to ordinary buildings, and including also engineering works in big cities. The one on seismic design of NPP is a draft subjected to publication now, which will be an official national code. The first one is somewhat unique but the second one is quite similar to those in the world. (author)

  11. School Chemistry Laboratory Safety Guide

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brundage, Patricia; Palassis, John

    2006-01-01

    The guide presents information about ordering, using, storing, and maintaining chemicals in the high school laboratory. The guide also provides information about chemical waste, safety and emergency equipment, assessing chemical hazards, common safety symbols and signs, and fundamental resources relating to chemical safety, such as Materialโ€ฆ

  12. Seismic design and qualification for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This safety guide, which supplements the IAEA Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP); Design (IAEA Safety Series No.50-C-D (Rev.1)), forms part of the Agency's programme, referred to as the NUSS programme, for establishing Codes and Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. The present Guide was originally issued in 1979 as Safety Guide 50-SG-S2 within the series of NUSS guides for the siting of NPP, extending seismic considerations from Safety Guide 50-SG-S1 into the design and verification field. During the revision phase in 1988-1990, this emphasis on design aspects was confirmed and consequently the Guides have been reclassified as a design Guide with the corresponding identification number 50-SG-D15. The general character of the Guide has not been changed an it still relates strongly to 50-SG-S1, which gives guidance on how to determine design basis ground motion for a NPP at a given site

  13. Approaches that use seismic hazard results to address topics of nuclear power plant seismic safety, with application to the Charleston earthquake issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sewell, R.T.; McGuire, R.K.; Toro, G.R.; Stepp, J.C.; Cornell, C.A.

    1990-01-01

    Plant seismic safety indicators include seismic hazard at the SSE (safe shut-down earthquake) acceleration, seismic margin, reliability against core damage, and reliability against offsite consequences. This work examines the key role of hazard analysis in evaluating these indicators and in making rational decisions regarding plant safety. The paper outlines approaches that use seismic hazard results as a basis for plant seismic safety evaluation and applies one of these approaches to the Charleston earthquake issue. This approach compares seismic hazard results that account for the Charleston tectonic interpretation, using the EPRI-Seismicity Owners Group (SOG) methodology, with hazard results that are consistent with historical tectonic interpretations accepted in regulation. Based on hazard results for a set of 21 eastern U.S. nuclear power plant sites, the comparison shows that no systematic 'plant-to-plant' increase in hazard accompanies the Charleston hypothesis; differences in mean hazards for the two interpretations are generally insignificant relative to current uncertainties in seismic hazard. (orig.)

  14. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This publication supports the Safety Requirements on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. This Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of all the relevant publications including the Safety Fundamentals, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, current and ongoing revisions of other Safety Guides, INSAG reports and other publications that have addressed the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide also provides guidance for Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in meeting their obligations under Article 14 on Assessment and Verification of Safety. The Safety Requirements publication entitled Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design states that a comprehensive safety assessment and an independent verification of the safety assessment shall be carried out before the design is submitted to the regulatory body. This publication provides guidance on how this requirement should be met. This Safety Guide provides recommendations to designers for carrying out a safety assessment during the initial design process and design modifications, as well as to the operating organization in carrying out independent verification of the safety assessment of new nuclear power plants with a new or already existing design. The recommendations for performing a safety assessment are suitable also as guidance for the safety review of an existing plant. The objective of reviewing existing plants against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The methods and the recommendations of this Safety Guide can also be used by regulatory bodies for the conduct of the regulatory review and assessment. Although most recommendations of this Safety Guide are general and applicable to all types of nuclear reactors, some specific recommendations and examples apply mostly to water cooled reactors. Terms such as 'safety assessment', 'safety analysis' and 'independent

  15. Safety guides development process in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Butragueno, J.L.; Perello, M.

    1979-01-01

    Safety guides have become a major factor in the licensing process of nuclear power plants and related nuclear facilities of the fuel cycle. As far as the experience corroborates better and better engineering methodologies and procedures, the results of these are settled down in form of standards, guides, and similar issues. This paper presents the actual Spanish experience in nuclear standards and safety guides development. The process to develop a standard or safety guide is shown. Up to date list of issued and on development nuclear safety guides is included and comments on the future role of nuclear standards in the licensing process are made. (author)

  16. International contributions of JNES on seismic safety areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebisawa, Katsumi; Uchiyama, Yuichi; Yamada, Hiroyuki

    2010-01-01

    JNES actively promotes the international cooperation in seismic safety areas, aiming to play a role as the important international hub for it. To meet this purpose, JNES is now mainly focusing on the increased support of the international organizations including IAEA and the technological improvement in the seismic related assessment of Asian countries. This paper summarizes these efforts made by JNES. (author)

  17. Seismic qualification of non-safety class equipment whose failure would damage safety class equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaSalle, F.R.

    1991-01-01

    Both Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, and US Department of Energy Order 6340.1A have requirements to assess the interaction of non-safety and safety class structures and equipment during a seismic event to maintain the safety function. At the Hanford Site, a cost effective program has been developed to perform the evaluation of non-safety class equipment. Seismic qualification is performed by analysis, test, or upgrading of the equipment to ensure the integrity of safety class structures and equipment. This paper gives a brief overview and synopsis that address design analysis guidelines including applied loading, damping values, component anchorage, allowable loads, and stresses. Test qualification of equipment and walkdown acceptance criteria for heating ampersand ventilation (H ampersand V) ducting, conduit, cable tray, missile zone of influence, as well as energy criteria are presented

  18. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program: a concluding look

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummings, G.E.

    1984-01-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was started in 1978 with the goal of developing tools and data bases to compute the probability of earthquake - caused radioactive release from commercial nuclear power plants. These tools and data bases were to help NRC to assess seismic safety at nuclear plants. The methodology to be used was finalized in 1982 and applied to the Zion Nuclear Power Station. The SSMRP will be completed this year with the development of a more simplified method of analysis and a demonstration of its use on Zion. This simplified method is also being applied to a boiling-water-reactor, LaSalle

  19. Nucelar reactor seismic safety analysis techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummings, G.E.; Wells, J.E.; Lewis, L.C.

    1979-04-01

    In order to provide insights into the seismic safety requirements for nuclear power plants, a probabilistic based systems model and computational procedure have been developed. This model and computational procedure will be used to identify where data and modeling uncertainties need to be decreased by studying the effect of these uncertainties on the probability of radioactive release and the probability of failure of various structures, systems, and components. From the estimates of failure and release probabilities and their uncertainties the most sensitive steps in the seismic methodologies can be identified. In addition, the procedure will measure the uncertainty due to random occurrences, e.g. seismic event probabilities, material property variability, etc. The paper discusses the elements of this systems model and computational procedure, the event-tree/fault-tree development, and the statistical techniques to be employed

  20. Safety Information System Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bullock, M.G.

    1977-03-01

    This Guide provides guidelines for the design and evaluation of a working safety information system. For the relatively few safety professionals who have already adopted computer-based programs, this Guide may aid them in the evaluation of their present system. To those who intend to develop an information system, it will, hopefully, inspire new thinking and encourage steps towards systems safety management. For the line manager who is working where the action is, this Guide may provide insight on the importance of accident facts as a tool for moving ideas up the communication ladder where they will be heard and acted upon; where what he has to say will influence beneficial changes among those who plan and control his operations. In the design of a safety information system, it is suggested that the safety manager make friends with a computer expert or someone on the management team who has some feeling for, and understanding of, the art of information storage and retrieval as a new and better means for communication

  1. Japan's international cooperation programs on seismic safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanada, Akira

    1997-01-01

    MITI is promoting many international cooperation programs on nuclear safety area. The seismic safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is a one of most important cooperation areas. Experts from MITI and related organization join the multilateral cooperation programs carried out by international organization such as IAEA, OECD/NEA etc. MITI is also promoting bilateral cooperation programs such as information exchange meetings, training programs and seminars on nuclear safety with several countries. Concerning to the cooperation programs on seismic safety of NPPs such as information exchange and training, MITI shall continue and expand these programs. (J.P.N.)

  2. Probabilistic safety analysis procedures guide. Sections 1-7 and appendices. Volume 1, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.A.; Buslik, A.J.; Cho, N.Z.

    1985-08-01

    A procedures guide for the performance of probabilistic safety assessment has been prepared for interim use in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs. It will be revised as comments are received, and as experience is gained from its use. The probabilistic safety assessment studies performed are intended to produce probabilistic predictive models that can be used and extended by the utilities and by NRC to sharpen the focus of inquiries into a range of issues affecting reactor safety. This first volume of the guide describes the determination of the probability (per year) of core damage resulting from accident initiators internal to the plant (i.e., intrinsic to plant operation) and from loss of off-site electric power. The scope includes human reliability analysis, a determination of the importance of various core damage accident sequences, and an explicit treatment and display of uncertainties for key accident sequences. The second volume deals with the treatment of the so-called external events including seismic disturbances, fires, floods, etc. Ultimately, the guide will be augmented to include the plant-specific analysis of in-plant processes (i.e., containment performance). This guide provides the structure of a probabilistic safety study to be performed, and indicates what products of the study are valuable for regulatory decision making. For internal events, methodology is treated in the guide only to the extent necessary to indicate the range of methods which is acceptable; ample reference is given to alternative methodologies which may be utilized in the performance of the study. For external events, more explicit guidance is given

  3. The roles of the seismic safety and monitoring systems in the PEC fast reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masoni, P.; Di Tullio, E.M.; Massa, B.; Martelli, A.; Sano, T.

    1988-01-01

    Two different seismic systems are foreseen in the case of PEC: the seismic safety system, that provides the automatic scram, and the seismic monitoring system. During earthquake, three triaxial seismic switches are triggered if a threshold value of the ground acceleration is exceeded. In this case, the signals from the seismic switches are processed by the safety system (with a 2/3 logic) and the shutdown system is triggered. Peak acceleration is the parameter used by the safety system to quantify the seismic event. This way, however, no information is obtained with regard to earthquake frequency content. Thus, reactor safety is guaranteed by adopting a threshold considerably lower than the Z.P.A. of the Design Basis Earthquake. Furthermore, in the case of significant earthquakes, the seismic motion is measured by about 20 triaxial accelerometers, located both in the free field and on the plant's structures. Data are digitazed and recordered by the seismic monitoring system. This system also elaborates the recordered time-histories providing floor response spectra and compares such spectra to the design values. The above-mentioned elaborations and comparisons are performed in short time for two triaxial measuring positions, thus allowing the Operator to immediately get a more complete information on the seismic event. The complete set of data recorded by the seismic monitoring system also allows the actual dynamic response of the plant to be determined and compared to the design values. On the basis of this comparison the necessary safety analysis can be carried out to verify whether the design limits of the plant were respected: in the positive case the reactor can be restarted. (author)

  4. Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The IAEA nuclear safety standards publications address the site evaluation and the design of new nuclear power plants (NPPs), including seismic hazard assessment and safe seismic design, at the level of the Safety Requirements as well as at the level of dedicated Safety Guides. It rapidly became apparent that the existing nuclear safety standards documents were not adequate for handling specific issues in the seismic evaluation of existing NPPs, and that a dedicated document was necessary. This is the purpose of this Safety Report, which is written in the spirit of the nuclear safety standards and can be regarded as guidance for the interpretation of their intent. Worldwide experience shows that an assessment of the seismic capacity of an existing operating facility can be prompted for the following: (a) Evidence of a greater seismic hazard at the site than expected before, owing to new or additional data and/or to new methods; (b) Regulatory requirements, such as periodic safety reviews, to ensure that the plant has adequate margins for seismic loads; (c) Lack of anti-seismic design or poor anti-seismic design; (d) New technical finding such as vulnerability of some structures (masonry walls) or equipment (relays), other feedback and new experience from real earthquakes. Post-construction evaluation programmes evaluate the current capability of the plant to withstand the seismic concern and identify any necessary upgrades or changes in operating procedures. Seismic qualification is distinguished from seismic evaluation primarily in that seismic qualification is intended to be performed at the design stage of a plant, whereas seismic evaluation is intended to be applied after a plant has been constructed. Although some guidelines do exist for the evaluation of existing NPPs, these are not established at the level of a regulatory guide or its equivalent. Nevertheless, a number of existing NPPs throughout the world have been and are being subjected to review of their

  5. Seismic evaluation of safety systems at the Savannah River reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hardy, G.S.; Johnson, J.J.; Eder, S.J.; Monahon, T.M.; Ketcham, D.R.

    1989-01-01

    A thorough review of all safety related systems in commercial nuclear power plants was prompted by the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant. As a consequence of this review, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) focused its attention on the environmental and seismic qualification of the industry's electrical and mechanical equipment. In 1980, the NRC issued Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 to verify the seismic adequacy of the equipment required to safely shut down a plant and maintain a stable condition for 72 hours. After extensive research by the NRC, it became apparent that traditional analysis and testing methods would not be a feasible mechanism to address this USI A-46 issue. The costs associated with utilizing the standard analytical and testing qualification approaches were exorbitant and could not be justified. In addition, the only equipment available to be shake table testing which is similar to the item being qualified is typically the nuclear plant component itself. After 8 years of studies and data collection, the NRC issued its ''Generic Safety Evaluation Report'' approving an alternate seismic qualification approach based on the use of seismic experience data. This experience-based seismic assessment approach will be the basis for evaluating each of the 70 pre-1972 commercial nuclear power units in the United States and for an undetermined number of nuclear plants located in foreign countries. This same cost-effective developed for the commercial nuclear power industry is currently being applied to the Savannah River Production Reactors to address similar seismic adequacy issues. This paper documents the results of the Savannah River Plant seismic evaluating program. This effort marks the first complete (non-trial) application of this state-of-the-art USI A-46 resolution methodology

  6. Seismic evaluation of safety systems at the Savannah River reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hardy, G.S.; Johnson, J.J.; Eder, S.J.; Monahon, T.; Ketcham, D.

    1989-01-01

    A thorough review of all safety related systems in commercial nuclear power plants was prompted by the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant. As a consequence of this review, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) focused its attention on the environmental and seismic qualification of the industry's electrical and mechanical equipment. In 1980, the NRC issued Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 to verify the seismic adequacy of the equipment required to safely shut down a plant and maintain a stable condition for 72 hours. After extensive research by the NRC, it became apparent that traditional analysis and testing methods would not be a feasible mechanism to address this USI A-46 issue. The costs associated with utilizing the standard analytical and testing qualification approaches were exorbitant and could not be justified. In addition, the only equipment available to be shake table tested which is similar to the item being qualified is typically the nuclear plant component itself. After 8 years of studies and data collection, the NRC issued its Generic Safety Evaluation Report approving an alternate seismic qualification approach based on the use of seismic experience data. This experience-based seismic assessment approach will be the basis for evaluating each of the 70 pre-1972 commercial nuclear power units in the US and for an undetermined number of nuclear plants located in foreign countries. This same cost-effective approach developed for the commercial nuclear power industry is currently being applied to the Savannah River Production Reactors to address similar seismic adequacy issues. This paper documents the results of the Savannah River Plant seismic evaluation program. This effort marks the first complete (non-trial) application of this state-of-the-art USI A-46 resolution methodology

  7. Social acceptance for seismic safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oiso, Shinichi

    2010-01-01

    The social acceptance of seismic safety of the nuclear installations was considered based on the situation that people's concern and anxieties for it having risen by earthquake suffering of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa facility in 2007, etc. It aimed mainly to extract a social awareness (acknowledgment and evaluation) which is peculiar to the earthquake in the field of nuclear power generation, and to show the attention point concerning the public relations of seismic safety of the nuclear power plant. As a result, it was suggested that we should explain based on the opinion of the third party which has a high trust such as specialist scholars, and emphasize that the severe examinations of outside third parties such as committee of the prefecture are conducted. (author)

  8. The role of IAEA in the seismic assessment and upgrading of existing NPPs. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Guerpinar, A; Godoy, A [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (IAEA). Div. of Nuclear Installation Safety

    1997-03-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in Eastern Europe and in particular WWER type nuclear power plants during the past seven years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on `Benchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants`. These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  9. The role of IAEA in the seismic assessment and upgrading of existing NPPs. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guerpinar, A.; Godoy, A.; . Div. of Nuclear Installation Safety)

    1997-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in Eastern Europe and in particular WWER type nuclear power plants during the past seven years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on 'Benchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants'. These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  10. Handbook of nuclear power plant seismic fragilities, Seismic Safety Margins Research Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cover, L.E.; Bohn, M.P.; Campbell, R.D.; Wesley, D.A.

    1983-12-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) has a gola to develop a complete fully coupled analysis procedure (including methods and computer codes) for estimating the risk of an earthquake-induced radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant. As part of this program, calculations of the seismic risk from a typical commercial nuclear reactor were made. These calculations required a knowledge of the probability of failure (fragility) of safety-related components in the reactor system which actively participate in the hypothesized accident scenarios. This report describes the development of the required fragility relations and the data sources and data reduction techniques upon which they are based. Both building and component fragilities are covered. The building fragilities are for the Zion Unit 1 reactor which was the specific plant used for development of methodology in the program. Some of the component fragilities are site-specific also, but most would be usable for other sites as well

  11. Development of Seismic Safety Assessment Technology for Containment Structure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jang, J.B.; Suh, Y.P.; Lee, J.R. [Korea Electric Power Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    2002-07-01

    This final report is made based on the research results of seismic analysis and seismic margin assessment field, carried out during 3rd stage ('01.4.1{approx}'02.3.31) under financial support of MOST(Ministry of Science and Technology). The objective of this research is to develop the soil - structure interaction analysis technique with high reliability, the main research subjects, performed during 3rd stage are as follows. 1) Preparation of user's guide manual for SSI analysis with high accuracy. 2) Sensitivity analysis of effective shear strain and seismic input motion. 3) Database construction of Hualien earthquake recorded data. (author). 21 refs., 27 figs., 2 tabs.

  12. Seismic methodology in determining basis earthquake for nuclear installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ameli Zamani, Sh.

    2008-01-01

    Design basis earthquake ground motions for nuclear installations should be determined to assure the design purpose of reactor safety: that reactors should be built and operated to pose no undue risk to public health and safety from earthquake and other hazards. Regarding the influence of seismic hazard to a site, large numbers of earthquake ground motions can be predicted considering possible variability among the source, path, and site parameters. However, seismic safety design using all predicted ground motions is practically impossible. In the determination of design basis earthquake ground motions it is therefore important to represent the influences of the large numbers of earthquake ground motions derived from the seismic ground motion prediction methods for the surrounding seismic sources. Viewing the relations between current design basis earthquake ground motion determination and modem earthquake ground motion estimation, a development of risk-informed design basis earthquake ground motion methodology is discussed for insight into the on going modernization of the Examination Guide for Seismic Design on NPP

  13. Seismic qualification method of equipment for nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, J.S.; Choi, T.H.; Sulaimana, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    Safety related equipment installed in Korean Nuclear Power Plants are required to perform a safety function during and after a seismic event. To accomplish this safety function, they must be seismically qualified in accordance with the intent and requirements of the USNRC Reg. Guide 1.100 Rev. 02 and IEEE Std. 344-1987. This paper defines and summarizes acceptable criteria and procedures, based on the Korean experience, for seismic qualification of purchased equipment to be installed in a nuclear power plant. As such the paper is intended to be a concise reference by equipment designers, architectural engineering company and plant owners in uniform implementation of commitments to nuclear regulatory agencies such as the USNRC or Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) relating to adequacy of seismic Category 1 equipment. Thus, the paper provides the methodologies which can be used for qualifying equipment for safely related service in Nuclear Power Plants in a cost effective manner

  14. Efforts toward enhancing seismic safety at Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamashita, Kazuhiko

    2009-01-01

    It has been two years since the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (NCOE) occurred in 2007. The earthquake brought a major disaster for Kashiwazaki, Kariwa, and the neighboring areas. First of all, we would like to give condolences to people in the devastated area and to pray for the immediate recovery. Our Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station located in the same area was naturally caught up in the earthquake. The station was hit by a big tremor more than its intensity assumed to be valid at the station design stage. In spite of unexpected tremor, preventive functions for the station safety worked as expected as it designed. Critical facilities designed as high seismic class were not damaged, though considerable damages were seen in outside-facilities designed as low seismic class. We currently make efforts to inspect and recover damages. While we carefully carry out inspection and assessment to make sure the station integrity, we are also going forward restoration as well as construction for seismic safety enhancement in turn. This report introduces details of the following accounts, these are an outline of guidelines for seismic design evaluation that was revised in 2006, a situation at Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in the aftermath of the earthquake, and efforts toward enhancing seismic safety that the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has made since the seismic disaster, and our approach to evaluation of facility integrity. (author)

  15. Seismic safety margins research program. Phase I final report - Overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Dong, R.G.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Chuang, T.Y.; Cummings, G.E.; Johnson, J.J.; Mensing, R.W.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-04-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is a multiyear, multiphase program whose overall objective is to develop improved methods for seismic safety assessments of nuclear power plants, using a probabilistic computational procedure. The program is being carried out at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and is sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Phase I of the SSMRP was successfully completed in January 1981: A probabilistic computational procedure for the seismic risk assessment of nuclear power plants has been developed and demonstrated. The methodology is implemented by three computer programs: HAZARD, which assesses the seismic hazard at a given site, SMACS, which computes in-structure and subsystem seismic responses, and SEISIM, which calculates system failure probabilities and radioactive release probabilities, given (1) the response results of SMACS, (2) a set of event trees, (3) a family of fault trees, (4) a set of structural and component fragility descriptions, and (5) a curve describing the local seismic hazard. The practicality of this methodology was demonstrated by computing preliminary release probabilities for Unit 1 of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant north of Chicago, Illinois. Studies have begun aimed at quantifying the sources of uncertainty in these computations. Numerous side studies were undertaken to examine modeling alternatives, sources of error, and available analysis techniques. Extensive sets of data were amassed and evaluated as part of projects to establish seismic input parameters and to produce the fragility curves. (author)

  16. Armenian nuclear power plant: US NRC assistance programme for seismic upgrade and safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simos, N.; Perkins, K.; Jo, J.; Carew, J.; Ramsey, J.

    2003-01-01

    This paper summarizes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (US NRC) technical support program activities associated with the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) safety upgrade. The US NRC program, integrated within the overall IAEA-led initiative for safety re-evaluation of the WWER plants, has as its main thrust the technical support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) through close collaboration with the scientific staff at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). Several major technical areas of support to ANRA form the basis of the NRC program. These include the seismic re-evaluation and upgrade of the ANPP, safety evaluation of critical systems, and the generation of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Specifically, the seismic re-evaluation of the ANPP is part of a broader activity that involves the re-assessment of the seismic hazard at the site, the identification of the Safe Shutdown Equipment at the plant and the evaluation of their seismic capacity, the detailed modeling and analysis of the critical facilities at ANPP, and the generation of the Floor Response Spectra (FRS). Based on the new spectra that incorporate all new findings (hazard, site soil, structure, etc.), the overall capacity of the main structures and the seismic capacity of the critical systems are being re-evaluated. In addition, analyses of critical safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown processes are being performed to ensure both the capabilities of the operating systems and the enhancement of safety due to system upgrades. At present, one of the principal goals of the US NRC's regulatory assistance activities with ANRA is enhancing ANRA's regulatory oversight of high-priority safety issues (both generic and plant-specific) associated with operation of the ANPP. As such, assisting ANRA in understanding and assessing plant-specific seismic and other safety issues associated with the ANPP is a high priority given the ANPP's being located in a seismically active area

  17. Japan`s international cooperation programs on seismic safety of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sanada, Akira [Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, Tokyo (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    MITI is promoting many international cooperation programs on nuclear safety area. The seismic safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is a one of most important cooperation areas. Experts from MITI and related organization join the multilateral cooperation programs carried out by international organization such as IAEA, OECD/NEA etc. MITI is also promoting bilateral cooperation programs such as information exchange meetings, training programs and seminars on nuclear safety with several countries. Concerning to the cooperation programs on seismic safety of NPPs such as information exchange and training, MITI shall continue and expand these programs. (J.P.N.)

  18. Approach of seismic upgrading in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Hitoshi

    2009-01-01

    Because guide for reviewing seismic design of nuclear power reactor facilities was reworked in 2006, we formulated new Design Base Seismic Motion Ss, and we are doing evaluation of seismic safety (back-check). In Japan, depending on aseismatic importance, equipments are classified into S-class, B-class and C-class. For S-class equipments, we evaluate it on the basis of new Ss, and do seismic upgrading. For B-class and C-class equipments, we do seismic upgrading voluntarily on the basis of the experiences of the Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki (NCO) Earthquake. (author)

  19. Occupational radiation protection. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. In 1996, the Agency published Safety Fundamentals on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 120) and International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing, Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115), both of which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization. These publications set out, respectively, the objectives and principles for radiation safety and the requirements to be met to apply the principles and to achieve the objectives. The establishment of safety requirements and guidance on occupational radiation protection is a major component of the support for radiation safety provided by the IAEA to its Member States. The objective of the IAEA's occupational protection programme is to promote an internationally harmonized approach to the optimization of occupational radiation protection, through the development and application of guidelines for restricting radiation exposures and applying current radiation protection techniques in the workplace. Guidance on meeting the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards for occupational protection is provided in three interrelated Safety Guides, one giving general guidance on the development of occupational radiation protection programmes and two giving more detailed guidance on the monitoring and assessment of workers' exposure due to external radiation sources and from intakes of radionuclides, respectively. These Safety

  20. Occupational radiation protection. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. In 1996, the Agency published Safety Fundamentals on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 120) and International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing, Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115), both of which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization. These publications set out, respectively, the objectives and principles for radiation safety and the requirements to be met to apply the principles and to achieve the objectives. The establishment of safety requirements and guidance on occupational radiation protection is a major component of the support for radiation safety provided by the IAEA to its Member States. The objective of the IAEA's occupational protection programme is to promote an internationally harmonized approach to the optimization of occupational radiation protection, through the development and application of guidelines for restricting radiation exposures and applying current radiation protection techniques in the workplace. Guidance on meeting the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards for occupational protection is provided in three interrelated Safety Guides, one giving general guidance on the development of occupational radiation protection programmes and two giving more detailed guidance on the monitoring and assessment of workers' exposure due to external radiation sources and from intakes of radionuclides, respectively. These Safety

  1. Occupational radiation protection. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. In 1996, the Agency published Safety Fundamentals on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 120) and International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing, Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115), both of which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization. These publications set out, respectively, the objectives and principles for radiation safety and the requirements to be met to apply the principles and to achieve the objectives. The establishment of safety requirements and guidance on occupational radiation protection is a major component of the support for radiation safety provided by the IAEA to its Member States. The objective of the IAEA's occupational protection programme is to promote an internationally harmonized approach to the optimization of occupational radiation protection, through the development and application of guidelines for restricting radiation exposures and applying current radiation protection techniques in the workplace. Guidance on meeting the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards for occupational protection is provided in three interrelated Safety Guides, one giving general guidance on the development of occupational radiation protection programmes and two giving more detailed guidance on the monitoring and assessment of workers' exposure due to external radiation sources and from intakes of radionuclides, respectively. These Safety

  2. Occupational radiation protection. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. In 1996, the Agency published Safety Fundamentals on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 120) and International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing, Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115), both of which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization. These publications set out, respectively, the objectives and principles for radiation safety and the requirements to be met to apply the principles and to achieve the objectives. The establishment of safety requirements and guidance on occupational radiation protection is a major component of the support for radiation safety provided by the IAEA to its Member States. The objective of the IAEA's occupational protection programme is to promote an internationally harmonized approach to the optimization of occupational radiation protection, through the development and application of guidelines for restricting radiation exposures and applying current radiation protection techniques in the workplace. Guidance on meeting the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards for occupational protection is provided in three interrelated Safety Guides, one giving general guidance on the development of occupational radiation protection programmes and two giving more detailed guidance on the monitoring and assessment of workers' exposure due to external radiation sources and from intakes of radionuclides, respectively. These Safety

  3. Probabilistic safety analysis procedures guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papazoglou, I.A.; Bari, R.A.; Buslik, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    A procedures guide for the performance of probabilistic safety assessment has been prepared for interim use in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs. The probabilistic safety assessment studies performed are intended to produce probabilistic predictive models that can be used and extended by the utilities and by NRC to sharpen the focus of inquiries into a range of tissues affecting reactor safety. This guide addresses the determination of the probability (per year) of core damage resulting from accident initiators internal to the plant and from loss of offsite electric power. The scope includes analyses of problem-solving (cognitive) human errors, a determination of importance of the various core damage accident sequences, and an explicit treatment and display of uncertainties for the key accident sequences. Ultimately, the guide will be augmented to include the plant-specific analysis of in-plant processes (i.e., containment performance) and the risk associated with external accident initiators, as consensus is developed regarding suitable methodologies in these areas. This guide provides the structure of a probabilistic safety study to be performed, and indicates what products of the study are essential for regulatory decision making. Methodology is treated in the guide only to the extent necessary to indicate the range of methods which is acceptable; ample reference is given to alternative methodologies which may be utilized in the performance of the study

  4. Seismic safety margins research program. Project I SONGS 1 AFWS Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chuang, T.Y.; Smith, P.D.; Dong, R.G.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Cummings, G.E.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-01-01

    The seismic qualification requirements of auxiliary feedwater systems (AFWS) of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) were developed over a number of years. These are formalized in the publication General Design Criteria (Appendix A to 10CFR50). The full recognition of the system as an engineered safety feature did not occur until publication of the Standard Review Plan (1975). Efforts to determine how to backfit seismic requirements to earlier plants has been undertaken primarily in the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) for a limited number of operating reactors. Nuclear Reactor Research (RES) and NRR have requested LLNL to perform a probabilistic study on the AFWS of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 utilizing the tools developed by the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). The main objectives of this project are to: identify the weak links of AFWS; compare the failure probabilities of SONGS 1 and Zion 1 AFWS: and compare the seismic responses due to different input spectra and design values

  5. A progressive methodology for seismic safety evaluation of gravity dams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghrib, F.; Leger, P.; Tinawi, R.; Lupien, R.; Veilleux, M.

    1995-01-01

    A progressive methodology for the seismic safety evaluation of existing concrete gravity dams was described. The methodology was based on five structural analysis levels with increasing complexity to represent inertia forces, dam-foundation and dam-interaction mechanisms, as well as concrete cracking. The five levels were (1) preliminary screening, (2) pseudo-static method, (3) pseudo-dynamic method, (4) linear time history analysis, and (5) non-linear history analysis. The first four levels of analysis were applied for the seismic safety evaluation of Paugan gravity dam (Quebec). Results showed that internal forces from pseudo-dynamic, response spectra and transient finite element analyses could be used to interpret the dynamic stability of dams from familiar strength-based criteria. However, as soon as the base was cracked, the seismically induced forces were modified, and level IV analyses proved more suitable to handle rationally these complexities. 8 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab

  6. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission seismic safety research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenneally, R.M.; Guzy, D.J.; Murphy, A.J.

    1988-01-01

    The seismic safety research program sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is directed toward improving the evaluation of potential earthquake effects on nuclear power plant operations. The research has been divided into three major program areas: earth sciences, seismic design margins, and fragilities and response. A major thrust of this research is to assess plant behavior for seismic events more severe and less probable than those considered in design. However, there is also research aimed at improving the evaluation of earthquake input and plant response at plant design levels

  7. Seismic assessment of Technical Area V (TA-V).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Medrano, Carlos S.

    2014-03-01

    The Technical Area V (TA-V) Seismic Assessment Report was commissioned as part of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Self Assessment Requirement per DOE O 414.1, Quality Assurance, for seismic impact on existing facilities at Technical Area-V (TA-V). SNL TA-V facilities are located on an existing Uniform Building Code (UBC) Seismic Zone IIB Site within the physical boundary of the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB). The document delineates a summary of the existing facilities with their safety-significant structure, system and components, identifies DOE Guidance, conceptual framework, past assessments and the present Geological and Seismic conditions. Building upon the past information and the evolution of the new seismic design criteria, the document discusses the potential impact of the new standards and provides recommendations based upon the current International Building Code (IBC) per DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety and DOE G 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and Non-Nuclear Facilities.

  8. Nuclear criticality safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ro, Seong Ki; Shin, Hee Seong; Park, Seong Won; Shin, Young Joon.

    1997-06-01

    Nuclear criticality safety guide was described for handling, transportation and storage of nuclear fissile materials in this report. The major part of the report was excerpted frp, TID-7016(revision 2) and nuclear criticality safety written by Knief. (author). 16 tabs., 44 figs., 5 refs

  9. Nuclear safety guide TID-7016 Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, J.T.

    1980-01-01

    The present revision of TID-7016 Nuclear Safety Guide is discussed. This Guide differs significantly from its predecessor in that the latter was intentionally conservative in its recommendations. Firmly based on experimental evidence of criticality, the original Guide and the first revision were considered to be of most value to organizations whose activities with fissionable materials were not extensive and, secondarily, that it would serve as a point of departure for members of established nuclear safety teams, experienced in the field. The reader will find a significant change in the character of information presented in this version. Nuclear Criticality Safety has matured in the past twelve years. The advance of calculational capability has permitted validated calculations to extend and substitute for experimental data. The broadened data base has enabled better interpolation, extension, and understanding of available, information, especially in areas previously addressed by undefined but adequate factors of safety. The content has been thereby enriched in qualitative guidance. The information inherently contains, and the user can recapture, the quantitative guidance characteristic of the former Guides by employing appropriate safety factors. In fact, it becomes incumbent on the Criticality Safety Specialist to necessarily impose safety factors consistent with the possible normal and abnormal credible contingencies of an operation as revealed by his evaluation. In its present form the Guide easily becomes a suitable module in any compendium or handbook tailored for internal use by organizations. It is hoped the Guide will continue to serve immediate needs and will encourage continuing and more comprehensive efforts toward organizing nuclear criticality safety information

  10. Criticality safety basics, a study guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    V. L. Putman

    1999-09-01

    This document is a self-study and classroom guide, for criticality safety of activities with fissile materials outside nuclear reactors. This guide provides a basic overview of criticality safety and criticality accident prevention methods divided into three parts: theory, application, and history. Except for topic emphasis, theory and history information is general, while application information is specific to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Information presented here should be useful to personnel who must know criticality safety basics to perform their assignments safely or to design critically safe equipment or operations. However, the guide's primary target audience is fissile material handler candidates.

  11. Criticality safety basics, a study guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Putman, V.L.

    1999-01-01

    This document is a self-study and classroom guide, for criticality safety of activities with fissile materials outside nuclear reactors. This guide provides a basic overview of criticality safety and criticality accident prevention methods divided into three parts: theory, application, and history. Except for topic emphasis, theory and history information is general, while application information is specific to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Information presented here should be useful to personnel who must know criticality safety basics to perform their assignments safely or to design critically safe equipment or operations. However, the guide's primary target audience is fissile material handler candidates

  12. Nuclear safety guide. TID-7016, Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, J.T.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Guide was first issued in 1956 as classified AEC report LA-2063 and was reprinted the next year, unclassified, as TID-7016. Revision 1, published in 1961, extended the scope and refined the guiding information. The present revision of the Guide differs significantly from its predecessor in that the latter was intentionally conservative in its recommendations. Firmly based on experimental evidence of criticality, the original Guide and the first revision were considered to be of most value to organizations whose activities with fissionable materials were not extensive and, secondarily, that it would serve as a point of departure for members of established nuclear safety teams, experienced in the field. The reader will find a significant change in the character of information presented in this version. Nuclear Criticality Safety has matured in the past twelve years. The advance of calculational capability has permitted validated calculations to extend and substitute for experimental data. The broadened data base has enabled better interpolation, extension, and understanding of available information, especially in areas previously addressed by undefined but adequate factors of safety. The content has been thereby enriched in qualitative guidance. The information inherently contains, and the user can recapture, the quantitative guidance characteristic of the formerGuides by employing appropriate safety factors. In fact, it becomes incumbent on the Criticality Safety Specialist to necessarily impose safety factors consistent with the possible normal and abnormal credible contingencies of an operation as revealed by his evaluation. In its present form the Guide easily becomes a suitable module in any compendium or handbook tailored for internal use by organizations. It is hoped the Guide will continue to serve immediate needs and will encourage continuing and more comprehensive efforts toward organizing nuclear criticality safety information

  13. Nuclear safety guide. TID-7016, Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, J T [ed.

    1978-05-01

    The Nuclear Safety Guide was first issued in 1956 as classified AEC report LA-2063 and was reprinted the next year, unclassified, as TID-7016. Revision 1, published in 1961, extended the scope and refined the guiding information. The present revision of the Guide differs significantly from its predecessor in that the latter was intentionally conservative in its recommendations. Firmly based on experimental evidence of criticality, the original Guide and the first revision were considered to be of most value to organizations whose activities with fissionable materials were not extensive and, secondarily, that it would serve as a point of departure for members of established nuclear safety teams, experienced in the field. The reader will find a significant change in the character of information presented in this version. Nuclear Criticality Safety has matured in the past twelve years. The advance of calculational capability has permitted validated calculations to extend and substitute for experimental data. The broadened data base has enabled better interpolation, extension, and understanding of available information, especially in areas previously addressed by undefined but adequate factors of safety. The content has been thereby enriched in qualitative guidance. The information inherently contains, and the user can recapture, the quantitative guidance characteristic of the formerGuides by employing appropriate safety factors. In fact, it becomes incumbent on the Criticality Safety Specialist to necessarily impose safety factors consistent with the possible normal and abnormal credible contingencies of an operation as revealed by his evaluation. In its present form the Guide easily becomes a suitable module in any compendium or handbook tailored for internal use by organizations. It is hoped the Guide will continue to serve immediate needs and will encourage continuing and more comprehensive efforts toward organizing nuclear criticality safety information.

  14. Hydrogen Technologies Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rivkin, C. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Burgess, R. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Buttner, W. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide basic background information on hydrogen technologies. It is intended to provide project developers, code officials, and other interested parties the background information to be able to put hydrogen safety in context. For example, code officials reviewing permit applications for hydrogen projects will get an understanding of the industrial history of hydrogen, basic safety concerns, and safety requirements.

  15. A framework of risk-informed seismic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kondo, S.; Sakagami, M.; Hirano, M.; Shiba, M.

    2001-01-01

    A framework of risk-informed seismic design and safety evaluation of nuclear power plants is under consideration in Japan so as to utilize the progress in the seismic probabilistic safety assessment methodology. Issues resolved to introduce this framework are discussed after the concept, evaluation process and characteristics of the framework are described. (author)

  16. 41 CFR 128-1.8005 - Seismic safety standards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... the model building codes that the Interagency Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction (ICSSC...) Uniform Building Code (UBC); (2) The 1992 Supplement to the Building Officials and Code Administrators International (BOCA) National Building Code (NBC); and (3) The 1992 Amendments to the Southern Building Code...

  17. Instrumentation and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1: Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (the Requirements for Design), which establishes the design requirements for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements should be met for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems important to safety. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides: Safety Series Nos 50-SG-D3 and 50-SG-D8, which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. The revision takes account of developments in I and C systems important to safety since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1980 and 1984, respectively. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the design of I and C systems important to safety in nuclear power plants, including all I and C components, from the sensors allocated to the mechanical systems to the actuated equipment, operator interfaces and auxiliary equipment. This Safety Guide deals mainly with design requirements for those I and C systems that are important to safety. It expands on paragraphs of Ref in the area of I and C systems important to safety. This publication is intended for use primarily by designers of nuclear power plants and also by owners and/or operators and regulators of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide provides general guidance on I and C systems important to safety which is broadly applicable to many nuclear power plants. More detailed requirements and limitations for safe operation specific to a particular plant type should be established as part of the design process. The present guidance is focused on the design principles for systems important to safety that warrant particular attention, and should be applied to both the design of new I and C systems and the modernization of existing systems. Guidance is provided on how design

  18. Seismic performance assessment of base-isolated safety-related nuclear structures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Y.-N.; Whittaker, A.S.; Luco, N.

    2010-01-01

    Seismic or base isolation is a proven technology for reducing the effects of earthquake shaking on buildings, bridges and infrastructure. The benefit of base isolation has been presented in terms of reduced accelerations and drifts on superstructure components but never quantified in terms of either a percentage reduction in seismic loss (or percentage increase in safety) or the probability of an unacceptable performance. Herein, we quantify the benefits of base isolation in terms of increased safety (or smaller loss) by comparing the safety of a sample conventional and base-isolated nuclear power plant (NPP) located in the Eastern U.S. Scenario- and time-based assessments are performed using a new methodology. Three base isolation systems are considered, namely, (1) Friction Pendulum??? bearings, (2) lead-rubber bearings and (3) low-damping rubber bearings together with linear viscous dampers. Unacceptable performance is defined by the failure of key secondary systems because these systems represent much of the investment in a new build power plant and ensure the safe operation of the plant. For the scenario-based assessments, the probability of unacceptable performance is computed for an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.3 at a distance 7.5 km from the plant. For the time-based assessments, the annual frequency of unacceptable performance is computed considering all potential earthquakes that may occur. For both assessments, the implementation of base isolation reduces the probability of unacceptable performance by approximately four orders of magnitude for the same NPP superstructure and secondary systems. The increase in NPP construction cost associated with the installation of seismic isolators can be offset by substantially reducing the required seismic strength of secondary components and systems and potentially eliminating the need to seismically qualify many secondary components and systems. ?? 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  19. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  20. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  1. Seismic analysis for safety related structures of 900MWe PWR NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Wei

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant aseismic design becomes more and more important in China due to the fact that China is a country where earthquakes occur frequently and most of plants arc unavoidably located in seismic regions. Therefore, Chinese nuclear safety authority and organizations have worked out a series of regulations and codes related to NPP anti-seismic design taking account of local conditions. The author presents here an example of structural anti-seismic design of 90GM We PWR NPP which is comprised of: ground motion input, including the principles for ground motion determination and time history generation; soil and upper-structure modelling, presenting modeling procedures and typical models of safety related buildings such as Reactor Building, Nuclear Auxiliary Building and Fuel Building; soil-structure interaction analysis; and in-structure response analysis and floor response spectrum generation. With this example, the author intends to give an overview of Chinese practice in NPP structure anti-seismic design such as the main procedures to be followed and the codes and regulations to be respected. (author)

  2. Re-assessment of seismic loads in conjunction with periodic safety review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonczyk, Josef

    2002-01-01

    The objective of this paper is the fundamental consideration of a safeguard-aim-oriented approach for use in the re-assessment of seismic events with regard to the periodic safety review (PSR) of nuclear power plants (NPP). The re-assessment aspects of site-specific design earthquakes (DEQ), specially the procedure for seismic hazard analysis, will not, however, be considered in detail here. The proposed assessment concept clearly presents a general approach for safety assessments. The approach is based on a successive screening review of components that are considered sufficiently earthquake-resistant. In this respect, the principle of maximum practical application of the design documentation has been considered in the re-assessment process. On the other hand, the safeguard-aim-oriented evaluation will also be applied with regard to whether the requirements of the safety regulations are fulfilled with respect to the safety goals. The review in conjunction with PSR does not, however, attempt to perform this under all technical aspects. Moreover, it is possible to make extensive use of experimental knowledge and engineering judgement with regard to the structural capacity behaviour in case of a seismic event. Compared with design procedures, however, this proposed approach differs from the one applied in licensing procedures, in which such assessment freedom will not usually be exhausted. (author)

  3. Research items regarding seismic residual risk evaluation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    After learning the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP severe accidents in 2011, the government investigation committee proposed the effective use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and now it is required to establish new safety rules reflecting the results of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and proposed severe accident measures. Since the Seismic Design Guide has been revised on September 19, 2006, JNES has been discussing seismic PRA (Levels 1-3) methods to review licensees' residual risk assessment while preparing seismic PRA models. Meanwhile, new safety standards for light water reactors are to be issued and enforced on July 2013, which require the residual risk of tsunami, in addition to earthquakes, should be lowered as much as possible. The Fukushima accidents raised the problems related to risk assessment, e.g. approaches based on multi-hazard (earthquake and tsunami), multi-unit, multi-site, and equipment's common cause failure. This fiscal year, while performing seismic and/or tsunami PRA to work on these problems, JNES picked up the equipment whose failure greatly contribute to core damage, surveyed accident management measures on those equipment as well as effectiveness to reduce core damage probability. (author)

  4. Seismic safety review mission for the follow-up of the seismic upgrading of Kozloduy NPP (Units 1-4). Sofia, Bulgaria, 16-20 November 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    David, M.; Shibata, H.; Stevenson, J.D.; Godoy, A.; Gurpinar, A.

    1992-11-01

    A Seismic Safety Review Mission for the follow-up of the design and implementation of the seismic upgrading of Kozloduy NPP was performed in Sofia from 16-20 November 1992. This mission continued the second task of the follow-up activities of the design and implementation of the seismic upgrading (Phases 1 and 2), which is being carried out in Units 1 and 2 of the NPP. Thus the objectives of the mission was to assist the Bulgarian authorities in the technical evaluation of the design tasks defined for Phases 1 and 2 item HB of WANO 6 Month Programme, as follows: anchorage upgrades of low seismic capacity components; list of seismic safety related systems and components; detailed walkdown to assess seismic capacity of components and define priorities for the upgrading; determination of seismic structural capacity of pump house, diesel generator building and turbine building and design of required upgrades; liquefaction potential evaluation. Tabs

  5. The regulatory requirements, design bases, researches and assessments in the field of Ukrainian NPP's seismic safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mykolaychuk, O.; Mayboroda, O.; Krytskyy, V.; Karnaukhov, O.

    2001-01-01

    State Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Ukraine (SNRA) pays large attention to problem of nuclear installations seismic stability. As a result the seismic design regulatory guides is revised, additional seismic researches of NPP sites are conducted, seismic reassessment of NPP designs were begun. The experts involved address all seismic related factors under close contact with the staff of NPP, design institutes and research organizations. This document takes stock on the situation and the research programs. (author)

  6. New French basic safety rule on seismic input ground motions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forner, Sophie; Boulaigue, Yves

    2002-01-01

    French regulatory practice requires that the main safety functions of a land-based major nuclear facility, in particular in accordance with its specific characteristics, safe shutdown, cooling and containment of radioactive substances, be assured during and/or after earthquake events that can plausibly occur at the site where the installation is located. This rule specifies an acceptable method for determining the seismic motion to be taken into account when designing a facility to address the seismic risk. In regions where deformation factors are low, such as in metropolitan France, the intervals between strong earthquakes are long and it can be difficult to associate some earthquakes with known faults. In addition, despite substantial progress in recent years, it is difficult, given the French seismotectonic situation, to identify potentially seismogenic faults and determine the characteristics of the earthquakes that are liable to occur. Therefore, the approach proposed in this Basic Safety Rule is intended to avoid this difficulty by allowing for all direct and indirect influences that can play a role in the occurrence of earthquakes, as well as all seismic knowledge. Furthermore, as concerns calculation of seismic motion, the low number of records of strong motion in metropolitan France makes it necessary to use data from other regions of the world

  7. Regulatory Guide 1.122: Development of floor design response spectra for seismic design of floor-supported equipment or components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1993-01-01

    ''Reactor Site Criteria,'' requires, in part, that safety-related structures, systems, and components remain functional in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). It specifies the use of a suitable dynamic analysis as one method of ensuring that the structures, systems, and components can withstand the seismic loads. Similarly, paragraph (a)(2) of Section VI of the same appendix requires, in part, that the structures, systems, and components necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public remain functional in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). Again, the use of suitable dynamic analysis is specified as one method of ensuring that the structures, systems, and components can withstand the seismic loads. This guide describes methods acceptable to the NRC staff for developing two horizontal and one vertical floor design response spectra at various floors or other equipment-support locations of interest from the time-history motions resulting from the dynamic analysis of the supporting structure. These floor design response spectra are needed for the dynamic analysis of the systems or equipment supported at various locations of the supporting structure

  8. Commissioning of research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on meeting the requirements for the commissioning of research reactors on the basis of international best practices. Specifically, it provides recommendations on fulfilling the requirements established in paras 6.44 and 7.42-7.50 of International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety of Research Reactors, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-4, IAEA, Vienna (2005) and guidance and specific and consequential recommendations relating to the recommendations presented in paras 615-621 of International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors, Safety Series No. 35-G2, IAEA, Vienna (1994) and paras 228-229 of International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Assessment of Research Reactors and Preparation of the Safety Analysis Report, Safety Series No. 35-G1, IAEA, Vienna (1994). This Safety Guide is intended for use by all organizations involved in commissioning for a research reactor, including the operating organization, the regulatory body and other organizations involved in the research reactor project

  9. Seismic test for safety evaluation of low level radioactive wastes containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohoka, Makoto; Horikiri, Morito

    1998-08-01

    Seismic safety of three-piled container system used in Tokai reprocessing center was confirmed by seismic test and computational analysis. Two types of container were evaluated, for low level noninflammable radioactive solid wastes, and for used filters wrapped by large plastic bags. Seismic integrity of three-piled containers was confirmed by evaluating response characteristics such as acceleration and displacement under the design earthquake condition S1, which is the maximum earthquake expected at the stored site during the storage time. Computational dynamic analysis was also performed, and several conclusions described below were made. (1) Response characteristics of the bottom board and the side board were different. The number of pile did not affect the response characteristics of the bottom board of each container. They behaved as a rigid body. (2) The response of the side board was larger than that of the bottom board. (3) The response depended on the direction in each board, either side or bottom. The response acceleration became larger to the seismic wave perpendicular to the plane which has the entrance for fork lift and the radioactive warning mark. (4) The maximum horizontal response displacement under the S1 seismic wave was approximately 10 mm. It is so small that it does not affect the seismic safety. (5) The stoppers to prevent fall down had no influence to the response acceleration. (6) There was no fall down to the S1 seismic wave and 2 times of S1 seismic wave, which was the maximum input condition of the test. (7) The response of the bottom board of the containers, which are main elements of fall down, had good agreements both in the test and in the computational analysis. (author)

  10. Seismic design and performance of nuclear safety related RC structures based on new seismic design principle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murugan, R.; Sivathanu Pillai, C.; Chattopadhyaya, S.; Sundaramurthy, C.

    2011-01-01

    Full text: Seismic design of safety related Reinforced Concrete (RC) structures of Nuclear power plants (NPP) in India as per the present AERB codal procedures tries to ensure predominantly elastic behaviour under OBE so that the features of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) necessary for continued safe operation are designed to remain functional and prevent accident (collapse) of NPP under SSE for which certain Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) those are necessary to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor safely, are designed to remain functional. While the seismic design principles of non safety related structures as per Indian code (IS 1893-2002) are ensuring elastic behaviour under DBE and inelastic behaviour under MCE by utilizing ductility and energy dissipation capacity of the structure effectively. The design principle of AERB code is ensuring elastic behaviour under OBE and is not enlightening much inference about the overall structural behaviour under SSE (only ensuring the capability of certain SSCs required for safe shutdown of reactor). Various buildings and structures of Indian Nuclear power plant are classified from the basis of associated safety functions in a descending order in according with their roles in preventions and mitigation of an accident or support functions for prevention. This paper covers a comprehensive seismic analysis and design methodology based on the AERB codal provisions followed for safety related RC structure taking Diesel Generator Building of PFBR as a case study and study and investigates its performance under OBE and SSE by carrying out Non-linear static Pushover analysis. Based on the analysis, observed variations, recommendations are given for getting the desired performance level so as to implement performance based design in the future NPP design

  11. Seismic design of equipment and piping systems for nuclear power plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minematsu, Akiyoshi

    1997-01-01

    The philosophy of seismic design for nuclear power plant facilities in Japan is based on 'Examination Guide for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Safety Committee, July 20, 1981' (referred to as 'Examination Guide' hereinafter) and the present design criteria have been established based on the survey of governmental improvement and standardization program. The detailed design implementation procedure is further described in 'Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, JEAG4601-1987: Japan Electric Association'. This report describes the principles and design procedure of the seismic design of equipment/piping systems for nuclear power plant in Japan. (J.P.N.)

  12. Seismic design of equipment and piping systems for nuclear power plants in Japan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Minematsu, Akiyoshi [Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    The philosophy of seismic design for nuclear power plant facilities in Japan is based on `Examination Guide for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Safety Committee, July 20, 1981` (referred to as `Examination Guide` hereinafter) and the present design criteria have been established based on the survey of governmental improvement and standardization program. The detailed design implementation procedure is further described in `Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, JEAG4601-1987: Japan Electric Association`. This report describes the principles and design procedure of the seismic design of equipment/piping systems for nuclear power plant in Japan. (J.P.N.)

  13. Differences in safety margins between nuclear and conventional design standards with regards to seismic hazard definition and design criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Saudy, A.; Orbovic, N.; Dejan, D.

    2006-01-01

    With the surging interest in new build nuclear all over the world and a permanent interest in earthquake resistance of nuclear plants, there is a need to quantify the safety margins in nuclear buildings design in comparison to conventional buildings in order to increase the public confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants. Nuclear (CAN3-N289 series) and conventional (NBCC 2005) seismic standards have different approaches regarding the design of civil structures. The origin of the differences lays in the safety philosophy behind the seismic nuclear and conventional standards. Conventional seismic codes contain the minimal requirement destined primarily to safeguard against major structural failure and loss of life. It doesn't limit damage to a certain acceptable degree or maintain function. Nuclear seismic code requires that structures, systems and components important to safety, withstand the effects of earthquakes. The requirement states that for equipment important to safety, both integrity and functionality should be ascertained. The seismic hazard is generally defined on the basis of the annual probability of exceedence (return period). There is a major difference on the return period and the confidence level for design earthquakes between the conventional and the nuclear seismic standards. The seismic design criteria of conventional structures are based on the use of Force Modification Factors to take into account the energy dissipation by incursion in non-elastic domain and the reserve of strength. The use of such factors to lower intentionally the seismic input is consistent with the safety philosophy of the conventional seismic standard which is the 'non collapse' rather than the integrity and/or the operability of the structures or components. Nuclear seismic standard requires that the structure remain in the elastic domain; energy dissipation by incursion in non-elastic domain is not allowed for design basis earthquake conditions. This is

  14. A procedure for seismic risk reduction in Campania Region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zuccaro, G.; Palmieri, M.; Cicalese, S.; Grassi, V.; Rauci, M.; Maggio, F.

    2008-01-01

    The Campania Region has set and performed a peculiar procedure in the field of seismic risk reduction. Great attention has been paid to public strategic buildings such as town halls, civil protection buildings and schools. The Ordinance 3274 promulgate in the 2004 by the Italian central authority obliged the owners of strategic buildings to perform seismic analyses within 2008 in order to check the safety of the structures and the adequacy to the use. In the procedure the Campania region, instead of the local authorities, ensure the complete drafting of seismic checks through financial resources of the Italian Government. A regional scientific technical committee has been constituted, composed of scientific experts, academics in seismic engineering. The committee has drawn up guidelines for the processing of seismic analyses. At the same time, the Region has issued a public competition to select technical seismic engineering experts to appoint seismic analysis in accordance with guidelines. The scientific committee has the option of requiring additional documents and studies in order to approve the safety checks elaborated. The Committee is supported by a technical and administrative secretariat composed of a group of expert in seismic engineering. At the moment several seismic safety checks have been completed. The results will be presented in this paper. Moreover, the policy to mitigate the seismic risk, set by Campania region, was to spend the most of the financial resources available on structural strengthening of public strategic buildings rather than in safety checks. A first set of buildings of which the response under seismic action was already known by data and studies of vulnerability previously realised, were selected for immediate retrofitting designs. Secondly, an other set of buildings were identified for structural strengthening. These were selected by using the criteria specified in the Guide Line prepared by the Scientific Committee and based on

  15. A procedure for seismic risk reduction in Campania Region

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zuccaro, G.; Palmieri, M.; Maggiรฒ, F.; Cicalese, S.; Grassi, V.; Rauci, M.

    2008-07-01

    The Campania Region has set and performed a peculiar procedure in the field of seismic risk reduction. Great attention has been paid to public strategic buildings such as town halls, civil protection buildings and schools. The Ordinance 3274 promulgate in the 2004 by the Italian central authority obliged the owners of strategic buildings to perform seismic analyses within 2008 in order to check the safety of the structures and the adequacy to the use. In the procedure the Campania region, instead of the local authorities, ensure the complete drafting of seismic checks through financial resources of the Italian Government. A regional scientific technical committee has been constituted, composed of scientific experts, academics in seismic engineering. The committee has drawn up guidelines for the processing of seismic analyses. At the same time, the Region has issued a public competition to select technical seismic engineering experts to appoint seismic analysis in accordance with guidelines. The scientific committee has the option of requiring additional documents and studies in order to approve the safety checks elaborated. The Committee is supported by a technical and administrative secretariat composed of a group of expert in seismic engineering. At the moment several seismic safety checks have been completed. The results will be presented in this paper. Moreover, the policy to mitigate the seismic risk, set by Campania region, was to spend the most of the financial resources available on structural strengthening of public strategic buildings rather than in safety checks. A first set of buildings of which the response under seismic action was already known by data and studies of vulnerability previously realised, were selected for immediate retrofitting designs. Secondly, an other set of buildings were identified for structural strengthening. These were selected by using the criteria specified in the Guide Line prepared by the Scientific Committee and based on

  16. Major structural response methods used in the seismic safety margins research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chou, C.K.; Lo, T.; Vagliente, V.

    1979-01-01

    In order to evaluate the conservatisms in present nuclear power plant seismic safety requirements, a probabilistic based systems model is being developed. This model will also be used to develop improved requirements. In Phase I of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP), this methodology will be developed for a specific nuclear power plant and used to perform probabilistic sensitivity studies to gain engineering insights into seismic safety requirements. Random variables in the structural response analysis area, or parameters which cause uncertainty in the response, are discussed and classified into three categories; i.e., material properties, structural dynamic characteristics and related modeling techniques, and analytical methods. The sensitivity studies are grouped into two categories; deterministic and probabilistic. In a system analysis, transfer functions in simple form are needed since there are too many responses which have to be calculated in a Monte Carlo simulation to use the usual straightforward calculation approach. Therefore, the development of these simple transfer functions is one of the important tasks in SSMRP. Simplified as well as classical transfer functions are discussed

  17. Nuclear safety guide: TID--7016, Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, J.T.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Guide was first issued in 1956 as classified AEC report LA-2063 and was reprinted the next year, unclassified, as TID-7016. Revision 1, published in 1961, extended the scope and refined the guiding information. Revision 2 of the Guide differs significantly from its predecessor in that the latter was intentionally conservative in its recommendations. Firmly based on experimental evidence of criticality, the original Guide and the first revision were considered to be of most value to organizations whose activities with fissionable materials were not extensive and, secondarily, that it would serve as a point of departure for members of established nuclear safety teams experienced in the field. The advance of calculational capability has permitted validated calculations to extend and substitute for experimental data. The broadened data base has enabled better interpolation, extension, and understanding of available information, especially in areas previously addressed by undefined but adequate factors of safety. The content has been thereby enriched in qualitative guidance. The information inherently contains, and the user can recapture, the quantitative guidance characteristic of the former Guides by employing appropriate safety factors

  18. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program. Phase 1. Project V. Structural sub-system response: subsystem response review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fogelquist, J.; Kaul, M.K.; Koppe, R.; Tagart, S.W. Jr.; Thailer, H.; Uffer, R.

    1980-03-01

    This project is directed toward a portion of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program which includes one link in the seismic methodology chain. The link addressed here is the structural subsystem dynamic response which consists of those components and systems whose behavior is often determined decoupled from the major structural response. Typically the mathematical model utilized for the major structural response will include only the mass effects of the subsystem and the main model is used to produce the support motion inputs for subsystem seismic qualification. The main questions addressed in this report have to do with the seismic response uncertainty of safety-related components or equipment whose seismic qualification is performed by (a) analysis, (b) tests, or (c) combinations of analysis and tests, and where the seismic input is assumed to have no uncertainty

  19. German seismic regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Danisch, Ruediger

    2002-01-01

    Rules and regulations for seismic design in Germany cover the following: seismic design of conventional buildings; and seismic design of nuclear facilities. Safety criteria for NPPs, accident guidelines, and guidelines for PWRs as well as safety standards are cited. Safety standards concerned with NPPs seismic design include basic principles, soil analysis, design of building structures, design of mechanical and electrical components, seismic instrumentation, and measures to be undertaken after the earthquake

  20. Recommended research program for improving seismic safety of light-water nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    Recommendations are presented for research areas concerned with seismic safety. These recommendations are based on an analysis of the answers to a questionnaire which was sent to over 80 persons working in the area of seismic safety of nuclear power plants. In addition to the answers of the 55 questionnaires which were received, the recommendations are based on ideas expressed at a meeting of an ad hoc group of professionals formed by Sandia, review of literature, current research programs, and engineering judgement

  1. Safety design guides for fire protection for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide establishes design requirements to ensure the radiological risk to the public due to fire is acceptable and operating personnel are adequately protected from the hazards of fires. This safety design guide also specifies the safety criteria for fire protection to be applied to mitigate fires and recommends the fire protection program to be established to initiate, coordinate and document the design activities associated with fire protection. The requirements for fire protection outlined in this safety design guide shall be satisfied in the design stage and the change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and incorporated into this safety design guide accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  2. Seismic qualification of equipment in operating nuclear power plants: Unresolved Safety Issue A-46

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, T.Y.

    1987-02-01

    The margin of safety provided in existing nuclear power plant equipment to resist seismically induced loads and perform their intended safety functions may vary considerably, because of significant changes in design criteria and methods for the seismic qualification of equipment over the years. Therefore, the seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants must be reassessed to determine whether requalification is necessary. The objective of technical studies performed under the Task Action Plan A-46 was to establish an explicit set of guidelines and acceptance criteria to judge the adequacy of equipment under seismic loading at all operating plants, in lieu of requiring qualification to the current criteria that are applied to new plants. This report summarizes the work accomplished on USI A-46. In addition, the collection and review of seismic experience data and existing seismic test data are presented. Staff assessment of work accomplished under USI A-46 leads to the conclusion that the use of seismic experience data provides the most reasonable alternative to current qualification criteria. Consideration of seismic qualification by use of experience data was a specific task in USI A-46. Several other A-46 tasks serve to support the use of an experienced data base. The principal technical finding of USI A-46 is that seismic experience data, supplemented by existing seismic test data, applied in accordance with the guidelines developed, can be used to verify the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment in operating nuclear plants. Explicit seismic qualification should be required only if seismic experience data or existing test data on similar components cannot be shown to apply

  3. Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 - seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, N.

    1985-01-01

    Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants was designated as an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) in December, 1980. The USI A-46 program was developed in early 1981 to investigate the adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment in operating plants to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. The approach taken was to develop viable, cost effective alternatives to current seismic qualification licensing requirements which could be applied to operating nuclear power plants. The tasks investigated include: (1) identification of seismic sensitive systems and equipment; (2) assessment of adequacy of existing seismic qualification methods; (3) development and assessment of in-situ test procedures to assist in qualification of equipment; (4) seismic qualification of equipment using seismic experience data; and (5) development of methods to generate generic floor response spectra. Progress to date and plans for completion of resolution are reported

  4. Current status of ground motions evaluation in seismic design guide for nuclear power facilities. Investigation on IAEA and US.NRC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakajima, Masato; Ito, Hiroshi; Hirata, Kazuta

    2009-01-01

    Recently, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and US.NRC (US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) published several standards and technical reports on seismic design and safety evaluation for nuclear power facilities. This report summarizes the current status of the international guidelines on seismic design and safety evaluation for nuclear power facilities in order to explore the future research topics. The main results obtained are as follows: 1 IAEA: (1) In the safety standard series, two levels are defined as seismic design levels, and design earthquake ground motion is determined corresponding to each seismic design level. (2) A new framework on seismic design which consists of conventional deterministic method and risk-based method is discussed in the technical report although the framework is not adopted in the safety guidelines. 2 USA: (1) US.NRC discusses a performance-based seismic design framework which has been originally developed by the private organization (American Society of Civil Engineers). (2) Design earthquakes and earthquake ground motion are mainly evaluated and determined based on probabilistic seismic hazard evaluations. 3 Future works: It should be emphasized that IAEA and US.NRC have investigated the implementation of risk-based concept into seismic design. The implementation of risk-based concept into regulation and seismic design makes it possible to consider various uncertainties and to improve accountability. Therefore, we need to develop the methods for evaluating seismic risk of structures, and to correlate seismic margin and seismic risk quantitatively. Moreover, the probabilistic method of earthquake ground motions, that is required in the risk-based design, should be applied to sites in Japan. (author)

  5. Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide harmonized guidance to designers, operators, regulators and providers of technical support on deterministic safety analysis for nuclear power plants. It provides information on the utilization of the results of such analysis for safety and reliability improvements. The Safety Guide addresses conservative, best estimate and uncertainty evaluation approaches to deterministic safety analysis and is applicable to current and future designs. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Grouping of initiating events and associated transients relating to plant states; 3. Deterministic safety analysis and acceptance criteria; 4. Conservative deterministic safety analysis; 5. Best estimate plus uncertainty analysis; 6. Verification and validation of computer codes; 7. Relation of deterministic safety analysis to engineering aspects of safety and probabilistic safety analysis; 8. Application of deterministic safety analysis; 9. Source term evaluation for operational states and accident conditions; References

  6. Consecutive collection of new finding and knowledge on science and technology to be reflected to seismic safety assessment for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsutsumi, Hideaki; Iijima, Toru

    2013-05-01

    JNES had been collecting and analyzing new finding and knowledge on science and technology to be reflected to seismic safety assessment for nuclear facilities, which was updated so as to develop a system to organize and disseminate such information in response to Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)'s policy on new safety regulations requesting enhanced protective measures against extreme natural hazards. The tasks were as follows; (1) collection of new finding and knowledge from seismic safety research of JNES, (2) constructing database of seismic safety research from documents published by committees and including the Great East Japan Earthquake and (3) dissemination of information related to seismic research. As for JFY 2012 activities, collecting and analyzing new finding and knowledge were on three areas such as active fault, seismic source/ground motion and tsunami. 4 theme related with the Great East Japan Earthquake, 7 items not related with the Great East Japan Earthquake and one item on external event were collected and analyzed whether incorporating in seismic safety research important for regulation to increase seismic safety of nuclear facilities, with no such theme confirmed. (T. Tanaka)

  7. Challenges Ahead for Nuclear Facility Site-Specific Seismic Hazard Assessment in France: The Alternative Energies and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) Vision

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berge-Thierry, C.; Hollender, F.; Guyonnet-Benaize, C.; Baumont, D.; Ameri, G.; Bollinger, L.

    2017-09-01

    Seismic analysis in the context of nuclear safety in France is currently guided by a pure deterministic approach based on Basic Safety Rule ( Rรจgle Fondamentale de Sรปretรฉ) RFS 2001-01 for seismic hazard assessment, and on the ASN/2/01 Guide that provides design rules for nuclear civil engineering structures. After the 2011 Tohohu earthquake, nuclear operators worldwide were asked to estimate the ability of their facilities to sustain extreme seismic loads. The French licensees then defined the `hard core seismic levels', which are higher than those considered for design or re-assessment of the safety of a facility. These were initially established on a deterministic basis, and they have been finally justified through state-of-the-art probabilistic seismic hazard assessments. The appreciation and propagation of uncertainties when assessing seismic hazard in France have changed considerably over the past 15 years. This evolution provided the motivation for the present article, the objectives of which are threefold: (1) to provide a description of the current practices in France to assess seismic hazard in terms of nuclear safety; (2) to discuss and highlight the sources of uncertainties and their treatment; and (3) to use a specific case study to illustrate how extended source modeling can help to constrain the key assumptions or parameters that impact upon seismic hazard assessment. This article discusses in particular seismic source characterization, strong ground motion prediction, and maximal magnitude constraints, according to the practice of the French Atomic Energy Commission. Due to increases in strong motion databases in terms of the number and quality of the records in their metadata and the uncertainty characterization, several recently published empirical ground motion prediction models are eligible for seismic hazard assessment in France. We show that propagation of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is feasible in a deterministic approach, as in a

  8. Seismic Hazard Assessment and Uncertainties Treatment: Discussion on the current French regulation, practices and open issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berge-Thierry, Catherine

    2014-01-01

    Taking into account the seismic risk in the context of nuclear safety in France is guided by the Fundamental Safety Rule (RFS2001-01) for the assessment of seismic hazard, and by the Guide ASN/2/01 for the design rules of civil engineering structures. These two references have been updated respectively in 2001 and 2006 and validated by the Nuclear Safety Authority. The French approach is anchored on a deterministic approach. We propose to recall the principles of the methodology recommended by the RFS 2001-01, and to illustrate the advantages and limitations highlighted in recent years. Indeed, this regulatory framework is used both in the design stage and for safety reassessment of all nuclear facilities, power reactors and experimental laboratories and factories. We focus on: (i) key parameters of the approach, and their level of knowledge, (ii) key steps and principles that lead to a non-homogeneous approach between various geographic sites, depending on the seismic activity and / or knowledge, (iii) on physical phenomena (such as the geometric extension of the seismic source, the complexity of earthquake rupture on the fault plane) that are not taken into account, or for which (2D and 3D site effects, and non-linear soil behavior under strong motions), the RFS 2001-01 approach does not provide any guidance, (iv) consideration of epistemic and random uncertainties. We discuss also the probabilistic approaches widely implemented both in France as recently to establish the seismic zoning (reference for the regulation of conventional building and classified installations for the environment), used worldwide and strongly supported by the international Atomic Energy Agency references (safety guides and guidelines). The Tohoku earthquake that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011, triggering the tsunami that itself caused the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi site has resulted in the realization in France of the Complementary Safety Studies as a request of the

  9. Seismic safety margin research program. Program plan, Revision I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Tokarz, F.J.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Cummings, G.E.; Chou, C.K.; Vagliente, V.N.

    1978-01-01

    The overall objective of the SSMRP is to develop mathematical models that realistically predict the probability of radioactive releases from seismically induced events in nuclear power plants. These models will be used for four purposes: (1) To perform sensitivity studies to determine the weak links in seismic methodology. The weak links will then be improved by research and development. (2) To estimate the probability of release for a plant. It is believed that the major difficulty in the program will be to obtain acceptably small confidence limits on the probability of release. (3) To estimate the conservatisms in the Standard Review Plan (SRP) seismic design methodology. This will be done by comparing the results of the SRP methodology and the methodology resulting from the research and development in (1). (4) To develop an improved seismic design methodology based on probability. The Phase I objective proposed in this report is to develop mathematical models which will accomplish the purposes No. 1 and No. 2 with simplified assumptions such as linear elastic analysis, limited assessment on component fragility (considering only accident sequences leading to core melt), and simplified safety system

  10. Seismic structural fragility investigation for the Zion Nuclear Power Plant. Seismic safety margins research program (phase 1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wesley, D.A.; Hashimoto, P.S.

    1981-10-01

    An evaluation of the seismic capacity of the essential structures for the Zion Nuclear Power Plant in Zion, Illinois, was conducted as part of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). The structures included the reactor containment building, the turbine/auxiliary building, and the crib house (intake structure). The evaluation was devoted to seismically induced failures rather than those resulting from combined Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or other extreme load combinations. The seismic loads used in the investigation were based on elastic analyses. The loads for the reactor containment and turbine/auxiliary buildings were developed by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory using time history analyses. The loads used for the crib house were the original seismic design loads developed by Sargent and Lundy. No non-linear seismic analyses were conducted. The seismic capacity of the structures accounted for the actual concrete and steel material properties including the aging of the concrete. Median centered properties were used throughout the evaluation including levels of damping considered appropriate for structures close to collapse as compared to the more conservative values used for design. The inelastic effects were accounted for using ductility modified response spectrum techniques based on system ductility ratios expected for structures near collapse. Sources of both inherent randomness and uncertainties resulting from lack of knowledge or approximations in analytical modelling were considered in developing the dispersion of the structural dynamic characteristics. Coefficients of variation were developed assuming lognormal distributions for all variables. The earthquake levels for many of the seismically induced failure modes are so high as to be considered physically incredible. (author)

  11. Outline of the report on the seismic safety examination of nuclear facilities based on the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake (tentative translation) - September 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    From the standpoint of thoroughly confirming the seismic safety of nuclear facilities, Nuclear Safety Commission established an Examination Committee on the Seismic Safety of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (hereinafter called Seismic Safety Examination Committee) based on the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake on January 19, 1995, two days after the occurrence of the earthquake, in order to examine the validity of related guidelines on the seismic design to be used for the safety examination. This report outlines the results of the examinations by the Seismic Safety Examination Committee: basic principle of examinations at the seismic safety examination committee, overview on the related guidelines of the seismic design, information and knowledge obtained on the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, examination of validity of the guidelines based on various information of the Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake. The Seismic Design Examination Committee surveyed the related guidelines on seismic design, selected the items to be examined, and examined on those items based on the knowledge obtained from the Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake. As a result, the Committee confirmed that the validity of the guidelines regulating the seismic design of nuclear facilities is not impaired even though on the basis of the Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake. However, the people related to the nuclear facilities may not be content with the above result, but continuously put efforts in doing the following matters to improve furthermore the reliability of seismic design of nuclear facilities by always reflecting the latest knowledge on the seismic design. 1) - The people related to nuclear facilities must seriously accept the fact that valuable knowledge could be obtained from the Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, try to study and analyze the obtained data, and reflect the results of investigations, studies, and examinations conducted appropriately to the seismic design of nuclear facilities referring to the investigations

  12. Seismic safety margin research program. Program plan, Revision II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Tokarz, F.J.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Cummings, G.E.; Chou, C.K.; Vagliente, V.N.; Johnson, J.J.; Dong, R.G.

    1978-01-01

    The document has been prepared pursuant to the second meeting of the Senior Research Review Group of the Seismic Safety Margin Research Program (SSMRP), which was held on June 15, 16, 1978. The major portion of the material contained in the document is descriptions of specific subtasks to be performed on the SSMRP. This is preceded by a brief discussion of the objective of the SSMRP and the approach to be used. Specific subtasks to be performed in Phase I of the SSMRP are as follows: (1) plant/site selection, (2) seismic input, (3) soil structure interaction, (4) structural building response, (5) structural sub-system response, (6) fragility, (7) system analysis, and (8) Phase II task definition

  13. Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-05-15

    This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on how to meet the relevant requirements for ensuring subcriticality when dealing with fissile material and for planning the response to criticality accidents. The guidance and recommendations are applicable to both regulatory bodies and operating organizations. The objectives of criticality safety are to prevent a self-sustained nuclear chain reaction and to minimize the consequences of this if it were to occur. The Safety Guide makes recommendations on how to ensure subcriticality in systems involving fissile materials during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and, in the case of accident conditions, within design basis accidents, from initial design through commissioning, operation, and decommissioning and disposal.

  14. Meteorological events in site evaluation for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on conducting hazard assessments of extreme and rare meteorological phenomena. It is of interest to safety assessors and regulators involved in the licensing process as well as to designers of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements the IAEA Safety Requirements publication on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Facilities which is to supersede the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (1988). The present Safety Guide supersedes two earlier Safety Guides: Safety Series No. 50-SG-S11A (1981) on Extreme Meteorological Events in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, Excluding Tropical Cyclones and Safety Series No. 50-SG-S11B (1984) on Design Basis Tropical Cyclone for Nuclear Power Plants. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance on conducting hazard assessments of extreme and rare meteorological phenomena. This Safety Guide provides interpretation of the Safety Requirements publication on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Facilities and guidance on how to fulfil these requirements. It is aimed at safety assessors or regulators involved in the licensing process as well as designers of nuclear power plants, and provides them with guidance on the methods and procedures for analyses that support the assessment of the hazards associated with extreme and rare meteorological events. This Safety Guide discusses the extreme values of meteorological variables and rare meteorological phenomena, as well as their rates of occurrence, according to the following definitions: (a) Extreme values of meteorological variables such as air temperature and wind speed characterize the meteorological or climatological environment. And (b) Rare meteorological phenomena

  15. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-10-15

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  16. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  17. Seismic qualification of safety class components in non-reactor nuclear facilities at Hanford site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ocoma, E.C.

    1989-01-01

    This paper presents the methods used during the walkdowns to compile as-built structural information to seismically qualify or verify the seismic adequacy of safety class components in the Plutonium Finishing Plant complex. The Plutonium finishing Plant is a non-reactor nuclear facility built during the 1950's and was designed to the Uniform Building Code criteria for both seismic and wind events. This facility is located at the US Department of Energy Hanford Site near Richland, Washington

  18. Regulatory control of radiation sources. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The basic requirements for the protection of persons against exposure to ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources were established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the Basic Safety Standards), jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/ NEA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (the Sponsoring Organizations). The application of the Basic Safety Standards is based on the presumption that national infrastructures are in place to enable governments to discharge their responsibilities for radiation protection and safety. Requirements relating to the legal and governmental infrastructure for the safety of nuclear facilities and sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material are established in the Safety Requirements on Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1. This Safety Guide, which is jointly sponsored by the FAO, the IAEA, the International Labour Office, the PAHO and the WHO, gives detailed guidance on the key elements for the organization and operation of a national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety, with particular reference to the functions of the national regulatory body that are necessary to ensure the implementation of the Basic Safety Standards. The Safety Guide is based technically on material first published in IAEA-TECDOC-10671, which was jointly sponsored by the FAO, the IAEA, the OECD/NEA, the PAHO and the WHO. The requirements established in GS-R-1 have been taken into account. The Safety Guide is oriented towards national

  19. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and in outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography.

  20. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  1. Safety guide on fire protection in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The purpose of the Safety Guide is to give specific design and operational guidance for protection from fire and explosion in nuclear power plants, based on the general guidance given in the relevant sections of the 'Safety Code of Practice - Design' and the 'Safety Code of Practice - Operation' of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The guide will confine itself to fire protection of safety systems and items important to safety, leaving the non-safety matters of fire protection in nuclear power plants to be decided upon the basis of the various available national and international practices and regulations. (HP) [de

  2. Preclosure Safety Analysis Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D.D. Orvis

    2003-01-01

    A preclosure safety analysis (PSA) is a required element of the License Application (LA) for the high- level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain. This guide provides analysts and other Yucca Mountain Repository Project (the Project) personnel with standardized methods for developing and documenting the PSA. The definition of the PSA is provided in 10 CFR 63.2, while more specific requirements for the PSA are provided in 10 CFR 63.112, as described in Sections 1.2 and 2. The PSA requirements described in 10 CFR Part 63 were developed as risk-informed performance-based regulations. These requirements must be met for the LA. The PSA addresses the safety of the Geologic Repository Operations Area (GROA) for the preclosure period (the time up to permanent closure) in accordance with the radiological performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111. Performance objectives for the repository after permanent closure (described in 10 CFR 63.113) are not mentioned in the requirements for the PSA and they are not considered in this guide. The LA will be comprised of two phases: the LA for construction authorization (CA) and the LA amendment to receive and possess (R and P) high-level radioactive waste (HLW). PSA methods must support the safety analyses that will be based on the differing degrees of design detail in the two phases. The methods described herein combine elements of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and deterministic analyses that comprise a risk-informed performance-based safety analysis. This revision to the PSA guide was prepared for the following objectives: (1) To correct factual and typographical errors. (2) To provide additional material suggested from reviews by the Project, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staffs. (3) To update material in accordance with approaches and/or strategies adopted by the Project. In addition, a principal objective for the planned revision was to ensure that the methods and

  3. Review on the seismic safety of JRR-3 according to the revised regulatory code on seismic design for nuclear reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kobayashi, Tetsuya; Araki, Masaaki; Ohba, Toshinobu; Torii, Yoshiya [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan); Takeuchi, Masaki [Nuclear Safety Commission (Japan)

    2012-03-15

    JRR-3(Japan Research Reactor No.3) with the thermal power of 20MW is a light water moderated and cooled, swimming pool type research reactor. JRR-3 has been operated without major troubles. This paper presents about review on the seismic safety of JRR-3 according to the revised regulatory code on seismic design for nuclear reactors. In addition, some topics concerning damages in JRR-3 due to the Great East Japan Earthquake are presented. (author)

  4. Seismic PSA implementation standards by AESJ and the utilization of the advanced safety examination guideline for seismic design for nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebisawa, Katsumi; Hibino, Kenta

    2008-01-01

    The Advanced Safety Examination Guideline for Seismic Design for Nuclear Power Plant (the advanced safety examination guideline) was worked out on September 19, 2006. In this paper, a summary of the method of probability theory in the advanced safety examination guideline and the Seismic PSA Implementation Standards is stated. On utilization of the probability theory for the advanced safety examination guideline, the uncertainty resulting from the process of the decision of the basic design earthquake ground motion (Ss) is stated to be considered using the proper method. The references of the extra probability for evaluation of earthquake hazard and combination of the working load and the earthquake load are stated. Definition, evaluation method and effort to lower the 'residual risks', and relation between the residual risks and the extra probability of Ss are described. A summary of the earthquake-resistant design for nuclear power facilities is explained by the old guideline. (S.Y.)

  5. Methodology and results of the seismic probabilistic safety assessment of Krsko nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vermaut, M.K.; Monette, P.; Campbell, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    A seismic IPEEE (Individual Plant Examination for External Events) was performed for the Krsko plant. The methodology adopted is the seismic PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment). The Krsko NPP is located on a medium to high seismicity site. The PSA study described here includes all the steps in the PSA sequence, i.e. reassessment of the site hazard, calculation of plant structures response including soil-structure interaction, seismic plant walkdowns, probabilistic seismic fragility analysis of plant structures and components, and quantification of seismic core damage frequency (CDF). Also relay chatter analysis and soil stability studies were performed. The seismic PSA described here is limited to the analysis of CDF (level I PSA). The subsequent determination and quantification of plant damage states, containment behaviour and radioactive releases to the outside (level 2 PSA) have been performed for the Krsko NPP but are not further described in this paper. The results of the seismic PSA study indicate that, with some upgrades suggested by the PSA team, the seismic induced CDF is comparable to that of most US and Western Europe NPPs. (author)

  6. Technical guidelines for the seismic safety re-evaluation at Eastern European NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Godoy, A.R.; Guerpinar, A.

    2001-01-01

    The paper describes one of the outcomes of the Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS) that the IAEA provides as an element of the Agency's national, regional and interregional technical assistance and co-operation programmes and other extrabudgetary programmes to assess the safety of nuclear facilities. This refers to the establishment of detailed guidelines for conducting the seismic safety re-evaluation of existing nuclear power plants in Eastern European countries in line with updated criteria and current international practice. (author)

  7. Design and commissioning of the Seismicity Network of Darkhovein Nuclear Power Plant (IR360)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aram, M. R.

    2012-01-01

    The study of micro seismicity and monitoring the micro seismic for the purpose of surveying the existing faults treatments and recognition of blind faults and other active tectonic structures in various phases of constructing the important structures, specially nuclear power plants, is unavoidable. According to IAEA safety guides and US-NRC regulatory guides, suitable instrumentation must be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features importantly from the safety point of view. According to R.G. 1.165 seismic monitoring by a network of seismic stations in the site area should be established as soon as possible after the site selection. Also, it is necessary to shutdown the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceeds the operating basis earthquake. The current research demonstrates the field works and studies for locating the local seismograph network in Darkhovein nuclear power plant. After the official studies and the primary visit of the old seismograph stations it was found that the mentioned network doesn't cover completely the geological structures around the power plant. Therefore, new locations have been introduced through the field investigation and computational methods of optimization. In positioning the new stations, places with the least amount of noise and the best coverage for seismic sources were selected. The modeling with considering an imaginative station at the selected places shows that the thresholds of the complete records of earthquakes around Darkhovein site is under the magnitude 1 (about 0.8).

  8. Development of Safety Review Guide for the Periodic Safety Review of Reactor Vessel Internals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jeongsoon; Ko, Hanok; Kim, Seonjae; Jhung, Myungjo

    2013-01-01

    Aging management of the reactor vessel internals (RVIs) is one of the important issues for long-term operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Safety review on the assessment and management of the RVI aging is conducted through the process of a periodic safety review (PSR). The regulatory body should check that reactor facilities sustain safety functions in light of degradation due to aging and that the operator of a nuclear power reactor establishes and implements management program to deal with degradation due to aging in order to guarantee the safety functions and the safety margin as a result of PSR. KINS(Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety) has utilized safety review guides (SRG) which provide guidance to KINS staffs in performing safety reviews in order to assure the quality and uniformity of staff safety reviews. The KINS SRGs for the continued operation of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) published in 2006 contain areas of review regarding aging management of RVIs in chapter 2 (III.2.15, Appendix 2.0.1). However unlike the SRGs for the continued operation, KINS has not officially published the SRGs for the PSR of PWRs, but published them as a form of the research report. In addition to that, the report provides almost same review procedures for aging assessment and management of RVIs with the ones provided in the SRGs for the continued operation, it cannot provide review guidance specific to PSRs. Therefore, a PSR safety review guide should be developed for RVIs in PWRs. In this study, a draft PSR safety review guide for reactor vessel internals in PWRs is developed and provided. In this paper, a draft PSR safety review guide for reactor vessel internals (PSR SRG-RVIs) in PWRs is introduced and main contents of the draft are provided. However, since the PSR safety review guides for areas other than RVIs in the pressurized water reactors (PWRs) are expected to be developed in the near future, the draft PSR SRG-RVIs should be revisited to be compatible with

  9. Safety goals for seismic and tsunami risks: Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saji, Genn, E-mail: sajig@bd5.so-net.ne.jp

    2014-12-15

    Highlights: โ€ข Reviewed why the Fukushima disaster was not anticipated among seismologists. โ€ข Reviewed Fukushima Daiichi's preparedness against the earthquake and tsunami. โ€ข There was a large โ€œcliff edgeโ€ in radiological consequences from the design basis tsunami. โ€ข By including earthquakes as an โ€œexternal eventโ€ resulted in insufficient โ€œdefense in depthsโ€. โ€ข Proposes a new probabilistic seismic and tsunami safety goal be developed. - Abstract: This paper first reviews why the potential occurrence of the Tohoku-oki earthquake with momentum magnitude M{sub w} of 9.0 earthquake was not anticipated by Japanese seismologists, and to clarify our limitations in predicting rare but severe earthquakes at our current knowledge in the field of geosciences. Although there was a large volume of historical records related to earthquakes and tsunamis, generally this data infer high plate coupling in regions where earthquakes were known to have already occurred, with only partial or even no coupling from the Japan Trench to a point approximately midway between the trench and the coastlineโ€”precisely the region where the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake occurred. This phenomenon has been explained as a โ€œsilent earthquakeโ€ or a fault creep as observed at the San Andreas Faults in the US. Considering the large uncertainties in seismic events, nuclear power plants should be conservatively designed with adequate safety margins. TEPCO's preparedness against seismic and tsunami hazards were reviewed in order to clarify why the established safety margin was not sufficient during the Fukushima Daiichi. It was found that the plant incorporated the necessary safety margins against seismic oscillation however, there was a large โ€œcliff edgeโ€ in which the radiological consequences surged by several orders of magnitude from the design basis tsunami. Since the tsunami's height was greater than the ground level of the turbine hall, a large amount of the

  10. Safety goals for seismic and tsunami risks: Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saji, Genn

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: โ€ข Reviewed why the Fukushima disaster was not anticipated among seismologists. โ€ข Reviewed Fukushima Daiichi's preparedness against the earthquake and tsunami. โ€ข There was a large โ€œcliff edgeโ€ in radiological consequences from the design basis tsunami. โ€ข By including earthquakes as an โ€œexternal eventโ€ resulted in insufficient โ€œdefense in depthsโ€. โ€ข Proposes a new probabilistic seismic and tsunami safety goal be developed. - Abstract: This paper first reviews why the potential occurrence of the Tohoku-oki earthquake with momentum magnitude M w of 9.0 earthquake was not anticipated by Japanese seismologists, and to clarify our limitations in predicting rare but severe earthquakes at our current knowledge in the field of geosciences. Although there was a large volume of historical records related to earthquakes and tsunamis, generally this data infer high plate coupling in regions where earthquakes were known to have already occurred, with only partial or even no coupling from the Japan Trench to a point approximately midway between the trench and the coastlineโ€”precisely the region where the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake occurred. This phenomenon has been explained as a โ€œsilent earthquakeโ€ or a fault creep as observed at the San Andreas Faults in the US. Considering the large uncertainties in seismic events, nuclear power plants should be conservatively designed with adequate safety margins. TEPCO's preparedness against seismic and tsunami hazards were reviewed in order to clarify why the established safety margin was not sufficient during the Fukushima Daiichi. It was found that the plant incorporated the necessary safety margins against seismic oscillation however, there was a large โ€œcliff edgeโ€ in which the radiological consequences surged by several orders of magnitude from the design basis tsunami. Since the tsunami's height was greater than the ground level of the turbine hall, a large amount of the tsunami

  11. Safety design guide for safety related systems for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    In general, two types of safety related systems and structures exist in the nuclear plant; The one is a systems and structures which perform safety functions during the normal operation of the plant, and the other is a systems and structures which perform safety functions to mitigate events caused by failure of the normally operating systems or by naturally occurring phenomena. In this safety design guide, these systems are identified in detail, and the major events for which the safety functions are required and the major safety requirements are identified in the list. As the probabilistic safety assessments are completed during the course of the project, additions or deletions to the list may be justified. 3 tabs. (Author) .new

  12. Safety design guide for safety related systems for CANDU 9

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of); Wright, A.C.D. [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Toronto (Canada)

    1996-03-01

    In general, two types of safety related systems and structures exist in the nuclear plant; The one is a systems and structures which perform safety functions during the normal operation of the plant, and the other is a systems and structures which perform safety functions to mitigate events caused by failure of the normally operating systems or by naturally occurring phenomena. In this safety design guide, these systems are identified in detail, and the major events for which the safety functions are required and the major safety requirements are identified in the list. As the probabilistic safety assessments are completed during the course of the project, additions or deletions to the list may be justified. 3 tabs. (Author) .new.

  13. Report on the seismic safety examination of nuclear facilities based on the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Just after the Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake occurred, Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan established a committee to examine the validity or related guidelines on the seismic design to be used for the safety examination. After the 8 months study, the committee confirmed that the validity of guidelines regulating the seismic design of nuclear facilities is not impaired even though on the basis of the Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake. This report is the outline of the Committee's study results. (author)

  14. Seismic safety research program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    This document presents a plan for seismic research to be performed by the Structural and Seismic Engineering Branch in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The plan describes the regulatory needs and related research necessary to address the following issues: uncertainties in seismic hazard, earthquakes larger than the design basis, seismic vulnerabilities, shifts in building frequency, piping design, and the adequacy of current criteria and methods. In addition to presenting current and proposed research within the NRC, the plan discusses research sponsored by other domestic and foreign sources

  15. Laboratory Safety Guide for Arkansas K-12 Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arkansas State Dept. of Education, Little Rock.

    This document presents laboratory safety rules for Arkansas K-12 schools which were developed by the Arkansas Science Teachers Association (ASTA) and the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE). Contents include: (1) "Laboratory Safety Guide for Arkansas K-12 Schools"; (2) "Safety Considerations"; (3) "Safety Standards for Science Laboratories";โ€ฆ

  16. Regulatory analysis for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, T.Y.; Anderson, N.R.

    1987-02-01

    The margin of safety provided in existing nuclear power plant equipment to resist seismically induced loads and perform required safety functions may vary considerably, because of significant changes in design criteria and methods for the seismic qualification of equipment over the years. Therefore, the seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants must be reassessed to determine whether requalification is necessary. The objective of technical studies performed under Task Action Plan A-46 was to establish an explicit set of guidelines and acceptance criteria to judge the adequacy of equipment under seismic loading at all operating plants, in lieu of requiring these plants to meet the criteria that are applied to new plants. This report presents the regulatory analysis for Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46. It includes: Statement of the Problem; the Objective of USI A-46; a Summary of A-46 Tasks; a Proposed Implementation Procedure; a Value-Impact Analysis; Application of the Backfit Rule; 10 CFR 50.109; Implementation; and Operating Plants To Be Reviewed to USI A-46 Requirements

  17. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  18. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  19. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  20. End of mission report on seismic safety review mission for Belene NPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Mohammadioun, B.; Schneider, H.; Serva, L.

    1995-01-01

    Upon the invitation of the Bulgarian government through the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and within the framework of the implementation of the Technical Cooperation project BUL/9/012 related to site and seismic of NPPs, a mission visited Sofia 3 - 7 July 1995. The mission constituted a follow-up of the interim review of subjects related to tectonic stability and seismic hazard characterization of the site which was performed in September 1993. The main objective of the mission was the final review of the subjects already reviewed in September 1993 as well as issues related to geotechnical engineering and foundation safety. The main terms of reference of the present mission was to verify the implementation of the recommendations of the Site Safety Review Mission of June 1990. This document gives findings on geology-tectonics, seismology and foundation safety. In the end conclusions and recommendations of the mission are presented

  1. A development of an evaluation flow chart for seismic stability of rock slopes based on relations between safety factor and sliding failure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawai, Tadashi; Ishimaru, Makoto

    2010-01-01

    Recently, it is necessary to assess quantitatively seismic safety of critical facilities against the earthquake- induced rock slope failure from the viewpoint of seismic PSA. Under these circumstances, it is needed to evaluate the seismic stability of surrounding slopes against extremely strong ground motions. In order to evaluate the seismic stability of surrounding slopes, the most conventional method is to compare safety factors on an expected sliding surface, which is calculated from the stability analysis based on the limit equilibrium concept, to a critical value which judges stability or instability. The method is very effective to examine whether or not the sliding surface is safe. However, it does not mean that the sliding surface falls whenever the safety factor becomes smaller than the critical value during an earthquake. Therefore the authors develop a new evaluation flow chart for the seismic stability of rock slopes based on relations between safety factor and sliding failure. Furthermore, the developed flow chart was validated by comparing two kinds of safety factors calculated from a centrifuge test result concerned with a rock slope. (author)

  2. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  3. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  4. The safety evaluation guide for laboratories and plants a tool for enhancing safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lhomme, Veronique; Daubard, Jean-Paul

    2013-01-01

    The Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) acts as technical support for the French government Authorities competent in nuclear safety and radiation protection for civil and defence activities. In this frame, the Institute's performs safety assessments of the safety cases submitted by operators to these Authorities for each stage in the life cycle of a nuclear facility, including dismantling operations, which is subjected to a licensing procedure. In the fuel cycle field, this concerns a large variety of facilities. Very often, depending on facilities and on safety cases, safety assessment to be performed is multidisciplinary and involves the supervisor in charge of the facility and several safety experts, particularly to cover the whole set of risks (criticality, exposure to radiation, fire, handling, containment, human and organisational factors...) encountered during facility's operations. Taking these into account, and in order to formalize the assessment process of the fuel cycle facilities, laboratories, irradiators, particle accelerators, under-decommissioning reactors and radioactive waste management, the 'Plants, Laboratories, Transports and Waste Safety' Division of IRSN has developed an internal guide, as a tool: - To present the methodological framework, and possible specificities, for the assessment according to the 'Defence in Depth Concept' (Part 1); - To provide key questions associated to the necessary contradictory technical review of the safety cases (Part 2); - To capitalise on experience on the basis of technical examples (coming from incident reports, previous safety assessments...) demonstrating the questioning (Part 3). The guide is divided in chapters, each dedicated to a type of risk (dissemination of radioactive material, external or internal exposure from ionising radiation, criticality, radiolysis mechanisms, handling operations, earthquake, human or organisational factors...) or to a type

  5. Assessment of NPP safety taking into account seismic and engineering-geological factors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yakovlev, E.A.

    1990-01-01

    Consideration is given to the problem of probabilistic analysis of NPP safety with account of risk of destructive effect of earthquakes and the danger of accidental geological processes (diapirism, karst etc.) under NPP operation. It is shown that account of seismic and engineering-geological (engineering-seismological) risk factors in probabilistic analysis of safety enables to perform anticipatory analysis of behaviour of principle plant objects and to improve safety of their operation by revealing the most unstable elements of geotechnical system forming the main contribution to the total NPP risk

  6. Seismic response analysis of Wolsung NPP structure and equipment subjected to scenario earthquakes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, In Kil; Ahn, Seong Moon; Choun, Young Sun; Seo, Jeong Moon

    2005-03-15

    The standard response spectrum proposed by US NRC has been used as a design earthquake for the design of Korean nuclear power plant structures. However, it does not reflect the characteristic of seismological and geological of Korea. In this study, the seismic response analysis of Wolsung NPP structure and equipment were performed. Three types of input motions, artificial time histories that envelop the US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum and the probability based scenario earthquake spectra developed for the Korean NPP site and a typical near-fault earthquake recorded at thirty sites, were used as input motions. The acceleration, displacement and shear force responses of Wolsung containment structure due to the design earthquake were larger than those due to the other input earthquakes. But, considering displacement response increases abruptly as Wolsung NPP structure does nonlinear behavior, the reassessment of the seismic safety margin based on the displacement is necessary if the structure does nonlinear behavior; although it has adequate the seismic safety margin within elastic limit. Among the main safety-related devices, electrical cabinet and pump showed the large responses on the scenario earthquake which has the high frequency characteristic. This has great effects of the seismic capacity of the main devices installed inside of the building. This means that the design earthquake is not so conservative for the safety of the safety related nuclear power plant equipments.

  7. Seismic response analysis of Wolsung NPP structure and equipment subjected to scenario earthquakes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, In Kil; Ahn, Seong Moon; Choun, Young Sun; Seo, Jeong Moon

    2005-03-01

    The standard response spectrum proposed by US NRC has been used as a design earthquake for the design of Korean nuclear power plant structures. However, it does not reflect the characteristic of seismological and geological of Korea. In this study, the seismic response analysis of Wolsung NPP structure and equipment were performed. Three types of input motions, artificial time histories that envelop the US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum and the probability based scenario earthquake spectra developed for the Korean NPP site and a typical near-fault earthquake recorded at thirty sites, were used as input motions. The acceleration, displacement and shear force responses of Wolsung containment structure due to the design earthquake were larger than those due to the other input earthquakes. But, considering displacement response increases abruptly as Wolsung NPP structure does nonlinear behavior, the reassessment of the seismic safety margin based on the displacement is necessary if the structure does nonlinear behavior; although it has adequate the seismic safety margin within elastic limit. Among the main safety-related devices, electrical cabinet and pump showed the large responses on the scenario earthquake which has the high frequency characteristic. This has great effects of the seismic capacity of the main devices installed inside of the building. This means that the design earthquake is not so conservative for the safety of the safety related nuclear power plant equipments

  8. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (Phase I). Project VII. Systems analysis specification of computational approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wall, I.B.; Kaul, M.K.; Post, R.I.; Tagart, S.W. Jr.; Vinson, T.J.

    1979-02-01

    An initial specification is presented of a computation approach for a probabilistic risk assessment model for use in the Seismic Safety Margin Research Program. This model encompasses the whole seismic calculational chain from seismic input through soil-structure interaction, transfer functions to the probability of component failure, integration of these failures into a system model and thereby estimate the probability of a release of radioactive material to the environment. It is intended that the primary use of this model will be in sensitivity studies to assess the potential conservatism of different modeling elements in the chain and to provide guidance on priorities for research in seismic design of nuclear power plants

  9. Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to regulatory bodies and operating organizations on planning and provision for the safe management of the decommissioning of non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities. While the basic safety considerations for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are similar to those for nuclear power plants, there are important differences, notably in the design and operating parameters for the facilities, the type of radioactive material and the support systems available. It is the objective of this Safety Guide to provide guidance for the shutdown and eventual decommissioning of such facilities, their individual characteristics being taken into account

  10. Proceedings of the twenty-fourth water reactor safety information meeting. Volume 3: PRA and HRA; Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and seismic siting criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Monteleone, S. [comp.] [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1997-02-01

    This three-volume report contains papers presented at the Twenty-Fourth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting held at the Bethesda Marriott Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland, October 21--23, 1996. The papers are printed in the order of their presentation in each session and describe progress and results of programs in nuclear safety research conducted in this country and abroad. Foreign participation in the meeting included papers presented by researchers from Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Russia and United Kingdom. This volume is divided into the following sections: PRA and HRA and probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and seismic siting criteria. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

  11. Proceedings of the twenty-fourth water reactor safety information meeting. Volume 3: PRA and HRA; Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and seismic siting criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Monteleone, S.

    1997-02-01

    This three-volume report contains papers presented at the Twenty-Fourth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting held at the Bethesda Marriott Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland, October 21--23, 1996. The papers are printed in the order of their presentation in each session and describe progress and results of programs in nuclear safety research conducted in this country and abroad. Foreign participation in the meeting included papers presented by researchers from Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Russia and United Kingdom. This volume is divided into the following sections: PRA and HRA and probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and seismic siting criteria. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database

  12. The IAEA International Seismic Safety Centre and IAEA safety standards for site evaluation and design of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Godoy, A.; Sollogoub, P; )

    2009-01-01

    This presentation covers the following topics: 'Lessons learned' from the occurrence of strong natural events, (tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.) The International Seismic Safety Centre as a global focal point for the nuclear engineering community in those fields. A need for international cooperation, openness and transparency โ€“ Sharing of experience

  13. Study on seismic design margin based upon inelastic shaking test of the piping and support system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishiguro, Takami; Eto, Kazutoshi; Ikeda, Kazutoyo; Yoshii, Toshiaki; Kondo, Masami; Tai, Koichi

    2009-01-01

    In Japan, according to the revised Regulatory Guide for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, September 2006, criteria of design basis earthquakes of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities become more severe. Then, evaluating seismic design margin took on a great importance and it has been profoundly discussed. Since seismic safety is one of the major key issues of nuclear power plant safety, it has been demonstrated that nuclear piping system possesses large safety margins by various durability test reports for piping in ultimate conditions. Though the knowledge of safety margin has been accumulated from these reports, there still remain some technical uncertainties about the phenomenon when both piping and support structures show inelastic behavior in extremely high seismic excitation level. In order to obtain the influences of inelastic behavior of the support structures to the whole piping system response when both piping and support structures show inelastic behavior, we examined seismic proving tests and we conducted simulation analyses for the piping system which focused on the inelastic behavior of the support to the whole piping system response. This paper introduces major results of the seismic shaking tests of the piping and support system and the simulation analyses of these tests. (author)

  14. Guide for understanding and evaluation of safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This report was the guide of understanding and evaluation of safety culture. Operator's activities for enhancement of safety culture in nuclear installations became an object of safety regulation in the management system. Evaluation of operator's activities (including top management's involvement) to prevent degradation of safety culture and organization climate in daily works needed understanding of safety culture and diversity of operator's activities. This guide was prepared to check indications of degradation of safety culture and organization climate in operator's activities in daily works and encourage operator's activities to enhance safety culture improvement and good practice. Comprehensive evaluation of operator's activities to prevent degradation of safety culture and organization climate would be performed from the standpoints of 14 safety culture elements such as top management commitment, clear plan and implementation of upper manager, measures to avoid wrong decision making, questioning attitude, reporting culture, good communications, accountability and openness, compliance, learning system, activities to prevent accidents or incidents beforehand, self-assessment or third party evaluation, work management, change management and attitudes/motivation. Element-wise examples and targets for evaluation were attached with evaluation check tables. (T. Tanaka)

  15. Radiation Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the BSS with regard to irradiation facilities. This Safety Guide provides specific, practical recommendations on the safe design and operation of gamma, electron and X ray irradiators for use by operating organizations and the designers of these facilities, and by regulatory bodies. SCOPE. The facilities considered in this publication include five types of irradiator, whether operated on a commercial basis or for research and development purposes. This publication is concerned with radiation safety issues and not with the uses of irradiators, nor does it cover the irradiation of product or its quality management. The five types of irradiator are: - Panoramic dry source storage irradiators; - Underwater irradiators, in which both the source and the product being irradiated are under water; - Panoramic wet source storage irradiators; - Electron beam irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process; - X ray irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process. Consideration of non-radiation-related risks and of the benefits resulting from the operation of irradiators is outside the scope of this Safety Guide. The practices of radiotherapy and radiography are also outside the scope of this Safety Guide. Category I gamma irradiators (i.e. 'self-shielded' irradiators) are outside the scope of this Safety Guide

  16. Predisposal management of high level radioactive waste. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Radioactive waste is generated in the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants and in the use of radioactive material in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized. The principles and requirements that govern the safety of the management of radioactive waste are presented in 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management', 'Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety' and 'Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Including Decommissioning'. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established in Refs for the predisposal management of HLW. This Safety Guide applies to the predisposal management of HLW. For liquid HLW arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel the recommendations of this Safety Guide apply from when liquid waste from the first extraction process is collected for storage and subsequent processing. Recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor are provided in Refs. For spent fuel declared as waste this Safety Guide applies to all activities subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor and prior to its disposal. Requirements pertaining to the transport of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, and of all forms of HLW are established. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the safety aspects of managing HLW, including the planning, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of equipment or facilities for the predisposal management of HLW. It addresses the following elements: (a) The characterization and processing (i.e. pretreatment

  17. Safety inspection guide, Mod III (a systematic approach to conducting a safety inspection)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davidson, J.E.

    1977-06-01

    This guide was developed as a comprehensive/systematic approach to the problem of performing a safety inspection. Five basic sections (categories) are considered in the guide: physical work place; machines/mechanical equipment; hazardous materials/processes/environments; energy sources; and management hazard . control factors. The basic concept is that one starts evaluating hazard potentials from the physical work place and continues considering other elements as they are added to the physical work place. This approach provides a better understanding of the interfaces of each section to the entire group. The guide is supported by an Area Safety Inspection Result form to record defects or conditions found, the evaluation (best estimate) of the urgency or priority for correcting deficiencies or areas of noncompliance, and the status of corrective action. Additionally, the guide serves as an educational tool in accident prevention for supervisors and employees

  18. Seismic qualification of equipment in operating nuclear power plants. Unresolved safety issue A-46, draft report for comment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, T.Y.

    1985-08-01

    The margin of safety provided in existing nuclear power plant equipment to resist seismically induced loads and perform their intended safety functions may vary considerably, because of significant changes in design criteria and methods for the seismic qualification of equipment over the years. Therefore, the seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants should be reassessed to determine whether requalification is necessary. The objective of technical studies performed under the Task Action Plan A-46 was to establish an explicit set of guidelines and acceptance criteria to judge the adequacy of equipment under seismic loading at all operating plants, in lieu of requiring qualification to the current criteria that are applied to new plants. This report summarizes the work accomplished on USI A-46 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff and its contractors, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Southwest Research Institute, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, the collection and review of seismic experience data by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group and the review and recommendations of a group of seismic consultants, the Senior Seismic Review Advisory Panel, are presented. Staff assessment of work accomplished under USI A-46 leads to the conclusion that the use of seismic experience data provides the most reasonable alternative to current qualification criteria. Consideration of seismic qualification by use of experience data was a specific task in USI A-46. Several other A-46 tasks serve to support the use of an experience data base

  19. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  20. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  1. Predisposal management of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Radioactive waste is generated in the generation of electricity in nuclear power reactors and in the use of radioactive material in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized. The principles and requirements that govern the safety of the management of radioactive waste are presented in 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management', 'Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety' and 'Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Including Decommissioning'. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established in Refs for the predisposal management of LLW. This Safety Guide deals with the safety issues associated with the predisposal management of LLW from nuclear fuel cycle facilities, large research and development installations and radioisotope production facilities. This includes all steps and activities in the management of waste, from its initial generation to its final acceptance at a waste disposal facility or the removal of regulatory control. The predisposal management of radioactive waste includes decommissioning. The term 'decommissioning' encompasses both the process of decommissioning a facility and the management of the waste that results (prior to its disposal). Recommendations on the process of decommissioning are provided in Refs. Recommendations on the management of the waste resulting from decommissioning are included in this Safety Guide. Although the mining and milling of uranium and thorium ores is part of the nuclear fuel cycle, the management of the operational waste (e.g. waste rock, tailings and effluent treatment waste) from these activities is not within the scope of this Safety Guide. The LLW that is

  2. Safety study application guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly open-quotes lowclose quotes) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, open-quotes Technical Safety Requirements,close quotes and 5480.23, open-quotes Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.close quotes A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis

  3. Seismic analysis of the safety related piping and PCLS of the WWER-440 NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkovski, A.M.; Kostarev, V.V.; Schukin, A.J.; Boiadjiev, Z.; Kostov, M.

    2001-01-01

    This paper presents the results of seismic analysis of Safety Related Piping Systems of the typical WWER-440 NPP. The methodology of this analysis is based on WANO Terms of Reference and ASME BPVC. The different possibilities for seismic upgrading of Primary Coolant Loop System (PCLS) were considered. The first one is increasing of hydraulic snubber units and the second way is installation of limited number of High Viscous Dampers (HVD). (author)

  4. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  5. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  6. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  7. Decommissioning of Medical, Industrial and Research Facilities. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

  8. Decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

  9. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and in outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography

  10. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in โ€ฆ shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and in outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography

  11. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography.

  12. Design of reactor containment systems for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It is a revision of the Safety Guide on Design of the Reactor Containment Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Series No. 50-Sg-D1) issued in 1985 and supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. The present Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of the relevant publications, including the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, the Safety fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, Safety Guides, INSAG Reports, a Technical Report and other publications covering the safety of nuclear power plants. 1.2. The confinement of radioactive material in a nuclear plant, including the control of discharges and the minimization of releases, is a fundamental safety function to be ensured in normal operational modes, for anticipated operational occurrences, in design basis accidents and, to the extent practicable, in selected beyond design basis accidents. In accordance with the concept of defence in depth, this fundamental safety function is achieved by means of several barriers and levels of defence. In most designs, the third and fourth levels of defence are achieved mainly by means of a strong structure enveloping the nuclear reactor. This structure is called the 'containment structure' or simply the 'containment'. This definition also applies to double wall containments. 1.3. The containment structure also protects the reactor against external events and provides radiation shielding in operational states and accident conditions. The containment structure and its associated systems with the functions of isolation, energy management, and control of radionuclides and combustible gases are referred to as the containment systems

  13. Design of reactor containment systems for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It is a revision of the Safety Guide on Design of the Reactor Containment Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Series No. 50-Sg-D1) issued in 1985 and supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. The present Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of the relevant publications, including the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, the Safety fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, Safety Guides, INSAG Reports, a Technical Report and other publications covering the safety of nuclear power plants. 1.2. The confinement of radioactive material in a nuclear plant, including the control of discharges and the minimization of releases, is a fundamental safety function to be ensured in normal operational modes, for anticipated operational occurrences, in design basis accidents and, to the extent practicable, in selected beyond design basis accidents. In accordance with the concept of defence in depth, this fundamental safety function is achieved by means of several barriers and levels of defence. In most designs, the third and fourth levels of defence are achieved mainly by means of a strong structure enveloping the nuclear reactor. This structure is called the 'containment structure' or simply the 'containment'. This definition also applies to double wall containments. 1.3. The containment structure also protects the reactor against external events and provides radiation shielding in operational states and accident conditions. The containment structure and its associated systems with the functions of isolation, energy management, and control of radionuclides and combustible gases are referred to as the containment systems

  14. IAEA code and safety guides on quality assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raisic, N.

    1980-01-01

    In the framework of its programme in safety standards development, the IAEA has recently published a Code of Practice on Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants. The Code establishes minimum requirements for quality assurance which Member States should use in the context of their own nuclear safety requirements. A series of 10 Safety Guides which describe acceptable methods of implementing the requirements of specific sections of the Code are in preparation. (orig.)

  15. A Study on the Development of Prototype Seismic Isolation Device for NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Hongpyo; Cho, Myungsug; Kim, Sunyong; Lee, Yonghee; Kang Kyunghun [KHNP-CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    Korean nuclear power plants have been and still are based on seismic resistance design including all of the natural disasters. However, in regions of high seismic hazard, seismic isolation technology is needed to guarantee the seismic safety on nuclear power plants. To achieve this purpose, the research and development of seismic isolation system for the construction in high seismicity area is on-going in Korea. In this study, prototype seismic isolation devices as mentioned above are developed and tested to identify the basic shear and compressive characteristics of them. In this study, assessment performance of basic characteristics on the prototype LRB and EQS seismic isolation for nuclear power plant structures is employed to compare with design values. Based on the test results of compression and shear characteristics, it is judged that they meet the measuring efficiency range conditions which are presented in ISO 22762 and AASHOT guide specification. Therefore, prototype seismic isolation devices like LRB and EQS developed in this study can be expected to be used as reference data when designing a seismic isolation system for nuclear power plant structures in the future.

  16. IAEA codes and guides for safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raisic, N.

    1980-01-01

    The objectives and scope of the Agency's programme of nuclear safety standards are described and the role of these documents in regulation of nuclear power im Member States is discussed. For each of the five areas of safety standards development, i.e. siting, design, operation, quality assurance and governmental organization, a set of principles underlying requirements and recommendations contained in the Code of Practice and Safety Guides will be presented. Safety Guides in each of the five areas will be reviewed in respect of the scope and content. A consideration will be given to the future development of the safety standards and to the revision and updating of the published documents. (orig./RW)

  17. Research on Safety Factor of Dam Slope of High Embankment Dam under Seismic Condition

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Li Bin

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available With the constant development of construction technology of embankment dam, the constructed embankment dam becomes higher and higher, and the embankment dam with its height over 200m will always adopt the current design criteria of embankment dam only suitable for the construction of embankment dam lower than 200m in height. So the design criteria of high embankment dam shall be improved. We shall calculate the stability and safety factors of dam slope of high embankment dam under different dam height, slope ratio and different seismic intensity based on ratio of safety margin, and clarify the change rules of stability and safety factors of dam slope of high embankment dam with its height over 200m. We calculate the ratio of safety margin of traditional and reliable method by taking the stable, allowable and reliability index 4.2 of dam slope of high embankment dam with its height over 200m as the standard value, and conduct linear regression for both. As a result, the conditions, where 1.3 is considered as the stability and safety factors of dam slope of high embankment dam with its height over 200m under seismic condition and 4.2 as the allowable and reliability index, are under the same risk control level.

  18. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  19. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  20. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  1. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  2. Potential seismic structural failure modes associated with the Zion Nuclear Plant. Seismic safety margins research program (Phase I). Project VI. Fragilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    The Zion 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plant consists of a number of structures. The most important of these from the viewpoint of safety are the containment buildings, the auxiliary building, the turbine building, and the crib house (or intake structure). The evaluation of the potential seismic failure modes and determination of the ultimate seismic capacity of the structures is a complex undertaking which will require a large number of detailed calculations. As the first step in this evaluation, a number of potential modes of structural failure have been determined and are discussed. The report is principally directed towards seismically induced failure of structures. To some extent, modes involving soil foundation failures are discussed in so far as they affect the buildings. However, failure modes involving soil liquefaction, surface faulting, tsunamis, etc., are considered outside the scope of this evaluation

  3. Seismic simulation and functional performance evaluation of a safety related, seismic category I control room emergency air cleaning system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, D.K.; Porco, R.D.; Choi, S.H.

    1985-01-01

    Under a nuclear contract MSA was required to design, manufacture, seismically test and functionally test a complete Safety Related, Seismic Category I, Control Room Emergency Air Cleaning System before shipment to the Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Yankee Nuclear Station in Rowe, Massachusetts. The installation of this system was required to satisfy the NRC requirements of NUREG-0737, Section III, D.3.4, ''Control Room Habitability''. The filter system tested was approximately 3 ft. wide by 8 ft. high by 18 ft. long and weighed an estimated 8300 pounds. It had a design flow rate of 3000 SCFM and contained four stages of filtration - prefilters, upstream and downstream HEPA filters and Type II sideload charcoal adsorber cells. The filter train design followed the guidelines set forth by ANSI/ASME N509-1980. Seismic Category I Qualification Testing consisted of resonance search testing and triaxial random multifrequency testing. In addition to ANSI/ASME N510-1980 testing, triaxial response accelerometers were placed at specific locations on designated prefilters, HEPA filters, charcoal adsorbers and test canisters along with accelerometers at the corresponding filter seal face locations. The purpose of this test was to demonstrate the integrity of the filters, filter seals, and monitor seismic response levels which is directly related to the system's ability to function during a seismic occurrence. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleaning System demonstrated the ability to withstand the maximum postulated earthquake for the plant site by remaining structurally sound and functional

  4. Radiation protection and safety guide no. GRPB-G-4: inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schandorf, C.; Darko, O.; Yeboah, J.; Osei, E.K.; Asiamah, S.D.

    1995-01-01

    The use of ionizing radiation and radiation sources in Ghana is on the increase due to national developmental efforts in Health Care, Food and Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology. This regulatory Guide has been developed to assist both the Regulatory Body (Radiation Protection Board) and operating organizations to perform systematic inspections commensurate with the level of hazard associated with the application of radiation sources and radioactive materials. The present Guide applies to the Radiation Protection and Safety inspection and/or audit conducted by the Radiation Protection Board or Radiation Safety Officer. The present Guide is applicable in Ghana and to foreign suppliers of radiation sources. The present Guide applies to notifying person, licensee, or registrant and unauthorized practice

  5. Field Test of the World Health Organization Multi-Professional Patient Safety Curriculum Guide

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farley, Donna; Zheng, Hao; Rousi, Eirini; Leotsakos, Agnรจs

    2015-01-01

    Introduction Although the importance of training in patient safety has been acknowledged for over a decade, it remains under-utilized and under-valued in most countries. WHO developed the Multi-professional Patient Safety Curriculum Guide to provide schools with the requirements and tools for incorporating patient safety in education. It was field tested with 12 participating schools across the six WHO regions, to assess its effectiveness for teaching patient safety to undergraduate and graduate students in a global variety of settings. Methods The evaluation used a combined prospective/retrospective design to generate formative information on the experiences of working with the Guide and summative information on the impacts of the Guide. Using stakeholder interviews and student surveys, data were gathered from each participating school at three times: the start of the field test (baseline), soon after each school started teaching, and soon after each school finished teaching. Results Stakeholders interviewed were strongly positive about the Guide, noting that it emphasized universally important patient safety topics, was culturally appropriate for their countries, and gave credibility and created a focus on patient safety at their schools. Student perceptions and attitudes regarding patient safety improved substantially during the field test, and their knowledge of the topics they were taught doubled, from 10.7% to 20.8% of correct answers on the student survey. Discussion This evaluation documented the effectiveness of the Curriculum Guide, for both ease of use by schools and its impacts on improving the patient safety knowledge of healthcare students. WHO should be well positioned to refine the contents of the Guide and move forward in encouraging broader use of the Guide globally for teaching patient safety. PMID:26406893

  6. Field Test of the World Health Organization Multi-Professional Patient Safety Curriculum Guide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farley, Donna; Zheng, Hao; Rousi, Eirini; Leotsakos, Agnรจs

    2015-01-01

    Although the importance of training in patient safety has been acknowledged for over a decade, it remains under-utilized and under-valued in most countries. WHO developed the Multi-professional Patient Safety Curriculum Guide to provide schools with the requirements and tools for incorporating patient safety in education. It was field tested with 12 participating schools across the six WHO regions, to assess its effectiveness for teaching patient safety to undergraduate and graduate students in a global variety of settings. The evaluation used a combined prospective/retrospective design to generate formative information on the experiences of working with the Guide and summative information on the impacts of the Guide. Using stakeholder interviews and student surveys, data were gathered from each participating school at three times: the start of the field test (baseline), soon after each school started teaching, and soon after each school finished teaching. Stakeholders interviewed were strongly positive about the Guide, noting that it emphasized universally important patient safety topics, was culturally appropriate for their countries, and gave credibility and created a focus on patient safety at their schools. Student perceptions and attitudes regarding patient safety improved substantially during the field test, and their knowledge of the topics they were taught doubled, from 10.7% to 20.8% of correct answers on the student survey. This evaluation documented the effectiveness of the Curriculum Guide, for both ease of use by schools and its impacts on improving the patient safety knowledge of healthcare students. WHO should be well positioned to refine the contents of the Guide and move forward in encouraging broader use of the Guide globally for teaching patient safety.

  7. Proceedings of the Specialist Meeting on the Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The main objectives of the Meeting were to review recent advances in the methodology of Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (SPSA), to discuss practical applications, to review the current state of the art, and to identify methodological issues where further research would be beneficial in enhancing the usefulness of the methodology. Applications of the Seismic Margin Assessment methodology (SMA), a methodology related to SPSA, were also discussed. One specific objective was to compare the situation today with the situation at the time of the 1999 Tokyo workshop, and to develop a set of findings and recommendations that would update those from that earlier workshop. There was a consensus at the Specialists Meeting that SPSA is now in widespread use throughout the nuclear-power industry worldwide, by the operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) themselves, by the various national regulatory agencies, and by the designers of new NPPs. It was also widely agreed that it can systematically accomplish several very important objectives; specifically, it can contribute: - To understanding the seismic risk arising from NPPs. - To understanding the safety significance of seismic design shortfalls. - To prioritizing seismic safety improvements. - To evaluating and improving seismic regulations. - To modifying the seismic regulatory/licensing basis of an individual NPP. Compared to the situation in 1999, when the first Workshop was held in Tokyo, there have been significant expansions in the use of SPSA in many different areas. Some countries provided detailed information on their regulatory framework for using seismic PSA. Many other countries also provided some information in their papers as background for conducting SPSA. During the Meeting, a small number of important weaknesses in SPSA methodology were identified. None of these are new, all having been widely recognized for many years. However, for some of the weaknesses, extensive discussions during the Meeting provided

  8. Proceedings of the Specialist Meeting on the Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-11-14

    The main objectives of the Meeting were to review recent advances in the methodology of Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (SPSA), to discuss practical applications, to review the current state of the art, and to identify methodological issues where further research would be beneficial in enhancing the usefulness of the methodology. Applications of the Seismic Margin Assessment methodology (SMA), a methodology related to SPSA, were also discussed. One specific objective was to compare the situation today with the situation at the time of the 1999 Tokyo workshop, and to develop a set of findings and recommendations that would update those from that earlier workshop. There was a consensus at the Specialists Meeting that SPSA is now in widespread use throughout the nuclear-power industry worldwide, by the operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) themselves, by the various national regulatory agencies, and by the designers of new NPPs. It was also widely agreed that it can systematically accomplish several very important objectives; specifically, it can contribute: - To understanding the seismic risk arising from NPPs. - To understanding the safety significance of seismic design shortfalls. - To prioritizing seismic safety improvements. - To evaluating and improving seismic regulations. - To modifying the seismic regulatory/licensing basis of an individual NPP. Compared to the situation in 1999, when the first Workshop was held in Tokyo, there have been significant expansions in the use of SPSA in many different areas. Some countries provided detailed information on their regulatory framework for using seismic PSA. Many other countries also provided some information in their papers as background for conducting SPSA. During the Meeting, a small number of important weaknesses in SPSA methodology were identified. None of these are new, all having been widely recognized for many years. However, for some of the weaknesses, extensive discussions during the Meeting provided

  9. Safety, Health, and Environmental Auditing A Practical Guide

    CERN Document Server

    Pain, Simon Watson

    2010-01-01

    A practical guide to environmental, safety, and occupational health audits. It allows organizations and business to avoid expensive external auditors and retain the knowledge and learning 'in-house'. It allows any competent manager or safety/environmental officer to undertake in-house audits in a competent and reproducible fashion.

  10. Task force activity to take the effect of elastic-plastic behaviour into account on the seismic safety evaluation of nuclear piping systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakamura, Izumi; Shiratori, Masaki; Morishita, Masaki; Otani, Akihito; Shibutani, Tadahito

    2015-01-01

    According to investigations of several nuclear power plants (NPPs) hit by actual seismic events and a number of experimental researches on the failure behavior of piping systems under seismic loads, it is recognized that piping systems used in NPPs include a large seismic safety margin until boundary failure. Since the stress assessment based on the elastic analysis does not reflect actual seismic capability of piping systems including plastic region, it is necessary to develop a rational procedures to estimate the elastic-plastic behavior of piping systems under a large seismic load. With the aim of establishing a procedure that takes into account the elastic-plastic behavior effect in the seismic safety estimation of nuclear piping systems, a task force activity has been planned. Through the activity, the authors intend to establish guidelines to estimate the elastic-plastic behavior of piping systems rationally and conservatively, and to provide new rational seismic safety criteria taking the effect of elastic-plastic behavior into account. As the first step of making out the analysis guideline, benchmark analyses are conducted for a pipe element test and a piping system test. In this paper, the outline of the research activity and the preliminary results of benchmark analyses are described. (author)

  11. Application of the management system for facilities and activities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Guide supports the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. It provides generic guidance to aid in establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a management system that complies with the requirements established. In addition to this Safety Guide, there are a number of Safety Guides for specific technical areas. Together these provide all the guidance necessary for implementing these requirements. This publication supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-Q1-Q7 (1996). The guidance provided here may be used by organizations in the following ways: - To assist in the development of the management systems of organizations directly responsible for operating facilities and activities and providing services for: Nuclear facilities; Activities using sources of ionizing radiation; Radioactive waste management; The transport of radioactive material; Radiation protection activities; Any other practices or circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources; The regulation of such facilities and activities; - To assist in the development of the management systems of the relevant regulatory bodies; - By the operator, to specify to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any guidance of this Safety Guide that should be included in the supplier's management system for the supply and delivery of products

  12. Seismic safety review mission to assist in the evaluation of the design of seismic upgrading for Kozloduy NPP. Sofia, Bulgaria, 19-23 October 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ma, D.; Prato, C.; Godoy, A.

    1992-10-01

    A seismic Safety Review Mission to assist in the evaluation of the design of seismic upgrading for Kozloduy NPP was performed in Sofia from 19-23 October 1992. The objectives of the mission were to assist the Bulgarian authorities in: the evaluation of the floor response spectra of the main buildings of units 1-4 at Kozloduy NPP, calculated for the new defined seismic parameters at site (Review Level Earthquake - RLE); the evaluation of the remedial and strengthening measures proposed for the seismic upgrading of the pump house and diesel generator buildings to the new defined RLE. This mission completed the scope of previous IAEA mission - BUL/9/012-18b - (see Report 3262) performed from 3-7 August 1992, with regard to tasks which were not evaluated at that time because they had not been finished. 2 tabs

  13. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program. Phase I. Interim definition of terms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Dong, R.G.

    1980-01-01

    This report documents interim definitions of terms in the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). Intent is to establish a common-based terminology integral to the probabilistic methods that predict more realistically the behavior of nuclear power plants during an earthquake. These definitions are a response to a request by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards at its meeting held November 15-16, 1979

  14. Seismicity and seismic monitoring in the Asse salt mine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flach, D.; Gommlich, G.; Hente, B.

    1987-01-01

    Seismicity analyses are made in order to assess the safety of candidate sites for ultimate disposal of hazardous wastes. The report in hand reviews the seismicity history of the Asse salt mine and presents recent results of a measuring campaign made in the area. The monitoring network installed at the site supplies data and information on the regional seismicity, on seismic amplitudes under ground and above ground, and on microseismic activities. (DG) [de

  15. Safety design guides for environmental qualification for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide describes the safety philosophy and requirements for the environmental qualification of safety related systems and components for CANDU 9. The environmental qualification program identifies the equipments to be qualified and conditions to be used for qualification and provides comprehensive set of documentation to ensure that the qualification is complete and can be maintained for the life of the plant. A summary of the system, components and structures requiring environmental qualification is provided in the table for the guidance of the system design, and this table will be subject to change or confirmation by the environmental qualification program. Also, plant ares subject to harsh environment is provided in the figure. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 tab., 5 figs. (Author) .new

  16. Environment, health and safety guiding principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-06-01

    The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) has taken a leadership role in promoting responsible planning, management and work practices that meet the pipeline industry's environment, health and safety objectives. This brochure contains CEPA's environment, health and safety statement. It lists the guiding principles developed and endorsed by CEPA and its member companies in support of protecting the environment and the health and safety of its employees and the public. The 11 CEPA member companies are: Alberta Natural Gas Company Ltd., ATCO Gas Services Ltd., Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd., Interprovincial Pipe Line Inc., NOVA Gas Transmission Limited, TransGas Limited, Trans Mountain Pipe Line Company Ltd., Trans-Northern Pipelines Inc., Trans Quebec and Maritimes Pipeline Inc., and Westcoast Energy Inc

  17. Protection of the patient in medical exposure - the related IAEA safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turai, I.

    1999-01-01

    The Radiation Safety Section of the Agency has recently completed the draft Safety Guide on Radiation Protection in Medical Exposures' for submission to the Publication Committee of the IAEA. The author as served as one of the scientific secretaries responsible for the preparation and review of this document in the last two years. The drafts of this IAEA Safety Guide have undergone a detailed review process by specialists of 14 Member States and the co-sponsoring organizations, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO). The last draft is the primary source of this paper. The Safety Guide will be part of the Safety Standards Series. It is addressed to Regulatory Authorities and other National Institutions to provide them with guidance at the national level on the practical implementation of Appendix II (Medical Exposure) of the International Basic Safety Standards for the Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources

  18. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body for nuclear facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this safety guide is to provide recommendations for national authorities on the appropriate management system, organization and staffing for the regulatory body responsible for the regulation of nuclear facilities in order to achieve compliance with the applicable safety requirements. This safety guide covers the organization and staffing in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And radioactive waste management facilities such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This safety guide also covers issues related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation

  19. Application of the concepts of exclusion, exemption and clearance. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to national authorities, including regulatory bodies, and operating organizations on the application of the concepts of exclusion, exemption and clearance as established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS). The Safety Guide includes specific values of activity concentration for both radionuclides of natural origin and those of artificial origin that may be used for bulk amounts of material for the purpose of applying exclusion or exemption. It also elaborates on the possible application of these values to clearance

  20. Seismic isolation - efficient procedure for seismic response assessement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zamfir, M. A.; Androne, M.

    2016-01-01

    The aim of this analysis is to reduce the dynamic response of a structure. The seismic isolation solution must take into consideration the specific site ground motion. In this paper will be presented results obtained by applying the seismic isolation method. Based on the obtained results, important conclusions can be outlined: the seismic isolation device has the ability to reduce seismic acceleration of the seismic isolated structure to values that no longer present a danger to people and environment; the seismic isolation solution is limiting devices deformations to safety values for ensuring structural integrity and stability of the entire system; the effective seismic energy dissipation and with no side effects both for the seismic isolated building and for the devices used, and the return to the initial position before earthquake occurence are obtained with acceptable permanent displacement. (authors)

  1. Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for meeting the IAEA safety requirements in performing or managing a level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) project for a nuclear power plant; thus it complements the Safety Guide on level 1 PSA. One of the aims of this Safety Guide is to promote a standard framework, standard terms and a standard set of documents for level 2 PSAs to facilitate regulatory and external peer review of their results. It describes all elements of the level 2 PSA that need to be carried out if the starting point is a fully comprehensive level 1 PSA. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. PSA project management and organization; 3. Identification of design aspects important to severe accidents and acquisition of information; 4. Interface with level 1 PSA: Grouping of sequences; 5. Accident progression and containment analysis; 6. Source terms for severe accidents; 7. Documentation of the analysis: Presentation and interpretation of results; 8. Use and applications of the PSA; Annex I: Example of a typical schedule for a level 2 PSA; Annex II: Computer codes for simulation of severe accidents; Annex III: Sample outline of documentation for a level 2 PSA study.

  2. Core management and fuel handling for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for core management and fuel handling that are presented in Section 5 of the Safety Requirements publication on the operation of nuclear power plants. The present publication supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Aspects of Core Management and Fuel Handling, issued in 1985 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-010. It is also related to the Safety Guide on the Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants, which identifies fuel management as one of the various functions to be performed by the operating organization. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for core management and fuel handling at nuclear power plants on the basis of current international good practice. The present Safety Guide addresses those aspects of fuel management activities that are necessary in order to allow optimum reactor core operation without compromising the limits imposed by the design safety considerations relating to the nuclear fuel and the plant as a whole. In this publication, 'core management' refers to those activities that are associated with fuel management in the core and reactivity control, and 'fuel handling' refers to the movement, storage and control of fresh and irradiated fuel. Fuel management comprises both core management and fuel handling. This Safety Guide deals with fuel management for all types of land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. It describes the safety objectives of core management, the tasks that have to be accomplished to meet these objectives and the activities undertaken to perform those tasks. It also deals with the receipt of fresh fuel, storage and handling of fuel and other core components, the loading and unloading of fuel and core components, and the insertion and removal of other reactor materials. In addition, it deals with loading a transport container with irradiated fuel and its preparation for transport off the site. Transport

  3. Core management and fuel handling for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This Safety Guide supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for core management and fuel handling that are presented in Section 5 of the Safety Requirements publication on the operation of nuclear power plants. The present publication supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Aspects of Core Management and Fuel Handling, issued in 1985 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-010. It is also related to the Safety Guide on the Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants, which identifies fuel management as one of the various functions to be performed by the operating organization. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for core management and fuel handling at nuclear power plants on the basis of current international good practice. The present Safety Guide addresses those aspects of fuel management activities that are necessary in order to allow optimum reactor core operation without compromising the limits imposed by the design safety considerations relating to the nuclear fuel and the plant as a whole. In this publication, 'core management' refers to those activities that are associated with fuel management in the core and reactivity control, and 'fuel handling' refers to the movement, storage and control of fresh and irradiated fuel. Fuel management comprises both core management and fuel handling. This Safety Guide deals with fuel management for all types of land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. It describes the safety objectives of core management, the tasks that have to be accomplished to meet these objectives and the activities undertaken to perform those tasks. It also deals with the receipt of fresh fuel, storage and handling of fuel and other core components, the loading and unloading of fuel and core components, and the insertion and removal of other reactor materials. In addition, it deals with loading a transport container with irradiated fuel and its preparation for transport off the site. Transport

  4. Design of Instrumentation and Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is a revision and combination of two Safety Guides, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.1 and No. NS-G-1.3. The revision takes into account developments in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems since the publication of the earlier Safety Guides. The main changes relate to the continuing development of computer applications and the evolution of the methods necessary for their safe, secure and practical use. In addition, account is taken of developments in human factors engineering and the need for computer security. This Safety Guide references and takes into account other IAEA Safety Standards and Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to I&C design

  5. Department of Energy Construction Safety Reference Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-01

    DOE has adopted the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1926 ``Safety and Health Regulations for Construction,`` and related parts of 29 CFR 1910, ``Occupational Safety and Health Standards.`` This nonmandatory reference guide is based on these OSHA regulations and, where appropriate, incorporates additional standards, codes, directives, and work practices that are recognized and accepted by DOE and the construction industry. It covers excavation, scaffolding, electricity, fire, signs/barricades, cranes/hoists/conveyors, hand and power tools, concrete/masonry, stairways/ladders, welding/cutting, motor vehicles/mechanical equipment, demolition, materials, blasting, steel erection, etc.

  6. Introduction of conditional mean spectrum and conditional spectrum in the practice of seismic safety evaluation in China

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ji, Kun; Bouaanani, Najib; Wen, Ruizhi; Ren, Yefei

    2018-05-01

    This paper aims at implementing and introducing the use of conditional mean spectrum (CMS) and conditional spectrum (CS) as the main input parameters in the practice of seismic safety evaluation (SSE) in China, instead of the currently used uniform hazard spectrum (UHS). For this purpose, a procedure for M-R-epsilon seismic hazard deaggregation in China was first developed. For illustration purposes, two different typical sites in China, with one to two dominant seismic zones, were considered as examples to carry out seismic hazard deaggregation and illustrate the construction of CMS/CS. Two types of correlation coefficients were used to generate CMS and the results were compared over a vibration period range of interest. Ground motion records were selected from the NSMONS (2007-2015) and PEER NGA-West2 databases to correspond to the target CMS and CS. Hazard consistency of the spectral accelerations of the selected ground motion records was evaluated and validated by computing the annual exceedance probability rate of the response spectra and comparing the results to the hazard curve corresponding to each site of concern at different periods. The tools developed in this work and their illustrative application to specific case studies in China are a first step towards the adoption of CMS and CS into the practice of seismic safety evaluation in this country.

  7. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (Phase I). Project IV. Structural building response; Structural Building Response Review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Healey, J.J.; Wu, S.T.; Murga, M.

    1980-02-01

    As part of the Phase I effort of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) being performed by the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the basic objective of Subtask IV.1 (Structural Building Response Review) is to review and summarize current methods and data pertaining to seismic response calculations particularly as they relate to the objectives of the SSMRP. This material forms one component in the development of the overall computational methodology involving state of the art computations including explicit consideration of uncertainty and aimed at ultimately deriving estimates of the probability of radioactive releases due to seismic effects on nuclear power plant facilities

  8. Guide to the safety design examination about light water reactor facilities for power generation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    This guide was compiled to evaluate the validity of the design policy when the safety design is examined at the time of the application for approval of the installation of nuclear reactors. About 7 years has elapsed since the existing guide was established, and the more appropriate guide to evaluate the safety should be made on the basis of the knowledge and experience accumulated thereafter. The range of application of this guide is limited to the above described evaluation, and it is not intended as the general standard for the design of nuclear reactors. First, the definition of the words used in this guide is given. Then, the guide to the safety examination is described about the general matters of reactor facilities, nuclear reactors and the measuring and controlling system, reactor-stopping system, reactivity-controlling system and safety protection system, reactor-cooling system, reactor containment vessels, fuel handling and waste treatment system. Several matters which require attention in the application of this guide or the clarification of the significance and interpretation of the guide itself were found, therefore the explanation about them was added at the end of this guide. (Kako, I.)

  9. Design of the reactor coolant system and associated systems in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are established in the Safety Requirements publication, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1 on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, which it supplements. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements for the design of the reactor coolant system (RCS) and associated systems in nuclear power plants should be met. 1.2. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides, Safety Series No. 50-SG-D6 on Ultimate Heat Sink and Directly Associated Heat Transport Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (1981), and Safety Series No. 50-SG-D13 on Reactor Coolant and Associated Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (1986), which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. 1.3. The revision takes account of developments in the design of the RCS and associated systems in nuclear power plants since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1981 and 1986, respectively. The other objectives of the revision are to ensure consistency with Ref., issued in 2000, and to update the technical content. In addition, an appendix on pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) has been included

  10. Seismic qualification of equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heidebrecht, A.C.; Tso, W.K.

    1983-03-01

    This report describes the results of an investigation into the seismic qualification of equipment located in CANDU nuclear power plants. It is particularly concerned with the evaluation of current seismic qualification requirements, the development of a suitable methodology for the seismic qualification of safety systems, and the evaluation of seismic qualification analysis and testing procedures

  11. Nuclear regulatory guides for LWR (PWR) fuel in Japan and some related safety research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ichikawa, M.

    1994-01-01

    The general aspects of licensing procedure for NPPs in Japan and regulatory guides are described. The expert committee reports closely related to PWR fuel are reviewed. Some major results of reactor safety research experiments at NSPR (Nuclear Safety Research Reactor of JAERI) used for establishment of related guide, are discussed. It is pointed out that the reactor safety research in Japan supports the regularity activities by establishing and revising guides and preparing the necessary regulatory data as well as improving nuclear safety. 10 figs., 4 refs

  12. Nuclear regulatory guides for LWR (PWR) fuel in Japan and some related safety research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ichikawa, M [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    1994-12-31

    The general aspects of licensing procedure for NPPs in Japan and regulatory guides are described. The expert committee reports closely related to PWR fuel are reviewed. Some major results of reactor safety research experiments at NSPR (Nuclear Safety Research Reactor of JAERI) used for establishment of related guide, are discussed. It is pointed out that the reactor safety research in Japan supports the regularity activities by establishing and revising guides and preparing the necessary regulatory data as well as improving nuclear safety. 10 figs., 4 refs.

  13. Protection against internal fires and explosions in the design of nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Experience of the past two decades in the operation of nuclear power plants and modern analysis techniques confirm that fire may be a real threat to nuclear safety and should receive adequate attention from the beginning of the design process throughout the life of the plant. Within the framework of the NUSS programme, a Safety Guide on fire protection had therefore been developed to enlarge on the general requirements given in the Code. Since its first publication in 1979, there has been considerable development in protection technology and analysis methods and after the Chernobyl accident it was decided to revise the existing Guide. This Safety Guide supplements the requirements established in Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1), Fire Protection in Nuclear Power Plants: A Safety Guide, issued in 1992.The present Safety Guide is intended to advise designers, safety assessors and regulators on the concept of fire protection in the design of nuclear power plants and on recommended ways of implementing the concept in some detail in practice

  14. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent nuclear fuel. It covers all types of storage facilities and all types of spent fuel from nuclear power plants and research reactors. It takes into consideration the longer storage periods that have become necessary owing to delays in the development of disposal facilities and the decrease in reprocessing activities. It also considers developments associated with nuclear fuel, such as higher enrichment, mixed oxide fuels and higher burnup. The Safety Guide is not intended to cover the storage of spent fuel if this is part of the operation of a nuclear power plant or spent fuel reprocessing facility. Guidance is provided on all stages for spent fuel storage facilities, from planning through siting and design to operation and decommissioning, and in particular retrieval of spent fuel. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Roles and responsibilities; 4. Management system; 5. Safety case and safety assessment; 6. General safety considerations for storage of spent fuel. Appendix I: Specific safety considerations for wet or dry storage of spent fuel; Appendix II: Conditions for specific types of fuel and additional considerations; Annex: I: Short term and long term storage; Annex II: Operational and safety considerations for wet and dry spent fuel storage facilities; Annex III: Examples of sections of operating procedures for a spent fuel storage facility; Annex IV: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external human induced phenomena); Annex V: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external natural phenomena); Annex VI: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external human induced phenomena); Annex VII: Postulated initiating events for consideration in a safety assessment (internal phenomena).

  15. IAEA safety guides in the light of recent developments in earthquake engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.

    1988-11-01

    The IAEA safety guides 50-SG-S1 and 50-SG-S2 emphasize on the determination of the design basis earthquake ground motion and earthquake resistant design considerations for nuclear power plants, respectively. Since the elaboration of these safety guides years have elapsed and a review of some of these concepts is necessary, taking into account the information collected and the technical developments. In this article, topics within the scope of these safety guides are discussed. In particular, the results of some recent research which may have a bearing on the nuclear industry are highlighted. Conclusions and recommendations are presented. 6 fig., 19 refs. (F.M.)

  16. Seismic Safety Program: Ground motion and structural response

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-01

    In 1964, John A. Blume & Associates Research Division (Blume) began a broad-range structural response program to assist the Nevada Operations Office of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in ensuring the continued safe conduct of underground nuclear detonation testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and elsewhere. Blume`s long experience in earthquake engineering provided a general basis for the program, but much more specialized knowledge was required for the AEC`s purposes. Over the next 24 years Blume conducted a major research program to provide essential understanding of the detailed nature of the response of structures to dynamic loads such as those imposed by seismic wave propagation. The program`s results have been embodied in a prediction technology which has served to provide reliable advanced knowledge of the probable effects of seismic ground motion on all kinds of structures, for use in earthquake engineering and in building codes as well as for the continuing needs of the US Department of Energy`s Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV). This report is primarily an accounting of the Blume work, beginning with the setting in 1964 and the perception of the program needs as envisioned by Dr. John A. Blume. Subsequent chapters describe the structural response program in detail and the structural prediction procedures which resulted; the intensive data acquisition program which, as is discussed at some length, relied heavily on the contributions of other consultant-contractors in the DOE/NV Seismic Safety Support Program; laboratory and field studies to provide data on building elements and structures subjected to dynamic loads from sources ranging from testing machines to earthquakes; structural response activities undertaken for testing at the NTS and for off-NTS underground nuclear detonations; and concluding with an account of corollary studies including effects of natural forces and of related studies on building response.

  17. Study on structural seismic margin and probabilistic seismic risk. Development of a structural capacity-seismic risk diagram

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakajima, Masato; Ohtori, Yasuki; Hirata, Kazuta

    2010-01-01

    Seismic margin is extremely important index and information when we evaluate and account seismic safety of critical structures, systems and components quantitatively. Therefore, it is required that electric power companies evaluate the seismic margin of each plant in back-check of nuclear power plants in Japan. The seismic margin of structures is usually defined as a structural capacity margin corresponding to design earthquake ground motion. However, there is little agreement as to the definition of the seismic margin and we have no knowledge about a relationship between the seismic margin and seismic risk (annual failure probability) which is obtained in PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment). The purpose of this report is to discuss a definition of structural seismic margin and to develop a diagram which can identify a relation between seismic margin and seismic risk. The main results of this paper are described as follows: (1) We develop seismic margin which is defined based on the fact that intensity of earthquake ground motion is more appropriate than the conventional definition (i.e., the response-based seismic margin) for the following reasons: -seismic margin based on earthquake ground motion is invariant where different typed structures are considered, -stakeholders can understand the seismic margin based on the earthquake ground motion better than the response-based one. (2) The developed seismic margin-risk diagram facilitates us to judge easily whether we need to perform detailed probabilistic risk analysis or only deterministic analysis, given that the reference risk level although information on the uncertainty parameter beta is not obtained. (3) We have performed numerical simulations based on the developed method for four sites in Japan. The structural capacity-risk diagram differs depending on each location because the diagram is greatly influenced by seismic hazard information for a target site. Furthermore, the required structural capacity

  18. Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VINCENT, Andrew

    2005-01-01

    In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the

  19. Assessment of occupational exposure due to external sources of radiation. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. The three Safety Guides on occupational radiation protection are jointly sponsored by the IAEA and the International Labour Office. The Agency gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the European Commission to the development of the present Safety Guide. The present Safety Guide addresses the assessment of exposure due to external sources of radiation in the workplace. Such exposure can result from a number of sources within a workplace, and the monitoring of workers and the workplace in such situations is an integral part of any occupational radiation protection programme. The assessment of exposure due to external radiation sources depends critically upon knowledge of the radiation type and energy and the conditions of exposure. The present Safety Guide reflects the major changes over the past decade in international practice in external dose assessment

  20. Assessment of occupational exposure due to external sources of radiation. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. The three Safety Guides on occupational radiation protection are jointly sponsored by the IAEA and the International Labour Office. The Agency gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the European Commission to the development of the present Safety Guide. The present Safety Guide addresses the assessment of exposure due to external sources of radiation in the workplace. Such exposure can result from a number of sources within a workplace, and the monitoring of workers and the workplace in such situations is an integral part of any occupational radiation protection programme. The assessment of exposure due to external radiation sources depends critically upon knowledge of the radiation type and energy and the conditions of exposure. The present Safety Guide reflects the major changes over the past decade in international practice in external dose assessment

  1. Assessment of occupational exposure due to external sources of radiation. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Occupational exposure to ionizing radiation can occur in a range of industries, medical institutions, educational and research establishments and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Adequate radiation protection of workers is essential for the safe and acceptable use of radiation, radioactive materials and nuclear energy. The three Safety Guides on occupational radiation protection are jointly sponsored by the IAEA and the International Labour Office. The Agency gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the European Commission to the development of the present Safety Guide. The present Safety Guide addresses the assessment of exposure due to external sources of radiation in the workplace. Such exposure can result from a number of sources within a workplace, and the monitoring of workers and the workplace in such situations is an integral part of any occupational radiation protection programme. The assessment of exposure due to external radiation sources depends critically upon knowledge of the radiation type and energy and the conditions of exposure. The present Safety Guide reflects the major changes over the past decade in international practice in external dose assessment

  2. Countermeasures that work : a highway safety countermeasure guide for state highway safety offices : eighth edition : 2015

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-11-01

    The guide is a basic reference to assist State Highway Safety Offices in selecting effective, evidence- based : countermeasures for traffic safety problem areas. These areas include: : - Alcohol-and Drug-Impaired Driving; : - Seat Belts and Child Res...

  3. Assessment of occupational exposure due to intakes of radionuclides. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Occupational exposure due to radioactive materials can occur as a result of various human activities. These include work associated with the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of radioactive sources in medicine, scientific research, agriculture and industry, and occupations which involve the handling of materials containing enhanced concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. In order to control this exposure, it is necessary to be able to assess the magnitude of the doses involved. Three interrelated Safety Guides, prepared jointly by the IAEA and the International Labour Office (ILO), provide guidance on the application of the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards with respect to occupational exposure. Reference [3] gives general advice on the exposure conditions for which monitoring programmes should be set up to assess radiation doses arising from external radiation and from intakes of radionuclides by workers. More specific guidance on the assessment of doses from external sources of radiation can be found in Ref. [4] and the present Safety Guide deals with intakes of radioactive materials. Recommendations related to occupational radiation protection have also been developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [5]. These and other current recommendations of the ICRP [6] have been taken into account in preparing this Safety Guide. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance for regulatory authorities on conducting assessments of intakes of radioactive material arising from occupational exposure. This Guide will also be useful to those concerned with the planning, management and operation of occupational monitoring programmes, and to those involved in the design of equipment for use in internal dosimetry and workplace monitoring

  4. Assessment of occupational exposure due to intakes of radionuclides. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Occupational exposure due to radioactive materials can occur as a result of various human activities. These include work associated with the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of radioactive sources in medicine, scientific research, agriculture and industry, and occupations which involve the handling of materials containing enhanced concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. In order to control this exposure, it is necessary to be able to assess the magnitude of the doses involved. Three interrelated Safety Guides, prepared jointly by the IAEA and the International Labour Office (ILO), provide guidance on the application of the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards with respect to occupational exposure. Reference [3] gives general advice on the exposure conditions for which monitoring programmes should be set up to assess radiation doses arising from external radiation and from intakes of radionuclides by workers. More specific guidance on the assessment of doses from external sources of radiation can be found in Ref. [4] and the present Safety Guide deals with intakes of radioactive materials. Recommendations related to occupational radiation protection have also been developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [5]. These and other current recommendations of the ICRP [6] have been taken into account in preparing this Safety Guide. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance for regulatory authorities on conducting assessments of intakes of radioactive material arising from occupational exposure. This Guide will also be useful to those concerned with the planning, management and operation of occupational monitoring programmes, and to those involved in the design of equipment for use in internal dosimetry and workplace monitoring

  5. Assessment of occupational exposure due to intakes of radionuclides. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Occupational exposure due to radioactive materials can occur as a result of various human activities. These include work associated with the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of radioactive sources in medicine, scientific research, agriculture and industry, and occupations which involve the handling of materials containing enhanced concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. In order to control this exposure, it is necessary to be able to assess the magnitude of the doses involved. Three interrelated Safety Guides, prepared jointly by the IAEA and the International Labour Office (ILO), provide guidance on the application of the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards with respect to occupational exposure. Reference [3] gives general advice on the exposure conditions for which monitoring programmes should be set up to assess radiation doses arising from external radiation and from intakes of radionuclides by workers. More specific guidance on the assessment of doses from external sources of radiation can be found in Ref. [4] and the present Safety Guide deals with intakes of radioactive materials. Recommendations related to occupational radiation protection have also been developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [5]. These and other current recommendations of the ICRP [6] have been taken into account in preparing this Safety Guide. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance for regulatory authorities on conducting assessments of intakes of radioactive material arising from occupational exposure. This Guide will also be useful to those concerned with the planning, management and operation of occupational monitoring programmes, and to those involved in the design of equipment for use in internal dosimetry and workplace monitoring

  6. Assessment of occupational exposure due to intakes of radionuclides. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Occupational exposure due to radioactive materials can occur as a result of various human activities. These include work associated with the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of radioactive sources in medicine, scientific research, agriculture and industry, and occupations which involve the handling of materials containing enhanced concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. In order to control this exposure, it is necessary to be able to assess the magnitude of the doses involved. Three interrelated Safety Guides, prepared jointly by the IAEA and the International Labour Office (ILO), provide guidance on the application of the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards with respect to occupational exposure. Reference [3] gives general advice on the exposure conditions for which monitoring programmes should be set up to assess radiation doses arising from external radiation and from intakes of radionuclides by workers. More specific guidance on the assessment of doses from external sources of radiation can be found in Ref. [4] and the present Safety Guide deals with intakes of radioactive materials. Recommendations related to occupational radiation protection have also been developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [5]. These and other current recommendations of the ICRP [6] have been taken into account in preparing this Safety Guide. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance for regulatory authorities on conducting assessments of intakes of radioactive material arising from occupational exposure. This Guide will also be useful to those concerned with the planning, management and operation of occupational monitoring programmes, and to those involved in the design of equipment for use in internal dosimetry and workplace monitoring

  7. Assessment of occupational exposure due to intakes of radionuclides. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Occupational exposure due to radioactive materials can occur as a result of various human activities. These include work associated with the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of radioactive sources in medicine, scientific research, agriculture and industry, and occupations which involve the handling of materials containing enhanced concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. In order to control this exposure, it is necessary to be able to assess the magnitude of the doses involved. Three interrelated Safety Guides, prepared jointly by the IAEA and the International Labour Office (ILO), provide guidance on the application of the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards with respect to occupational exposure. Reference [3] gives general advice on the exposure conditions for which monitoring programmes should be set up to assess radiation doses arising from external radiation and from intakes of radionuclides by workers. More specific guidance on the assessment of doses from external sources of radiation can be found in Ref. [4] and the present Safety Guide deals with intakes of radioactive materials. Recommendations related to occupational radiation protection have also been developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [5]. These and other current recommendations of the ICRP [6] have been taken into account in preparing this Safety Guide. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance for regulatory authorities on conducting assessments of intakes of radioactive material arising from occupational exposure. This Guide will also be useful to those concerned with the planning, management and operation of occupational monitoring programmes, and to those involved in the design of equipment for use in internal dosimetry and workplace monitoring

  8. Seismic re-evaluation of Mochovce nuclear power plant. Seismic reevaluation of civil structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Podrouzek, P.

    1997-01-01

    In this contribution, an overview of seismic design procedures used for reassessment of seismic safety of civil structures at the Mochovce NPP in Slovak Republic presented. As an introduction, the objectives, history, and current status of seismic design of the NPP have been explained. General philosophy of design methods, seismic classification of buildings, seismic data, calculation methods, assumptions on structural behavior under seismic loading and reliability assessment were described in detail in the subsequent section. Examples of calculation models used for dynamic calculations of seismic response are given in the last section. (author)

  9. Safety design guides for grouping and separation for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for grouping and separation describes the philosophy of physical and functional separation for systems, structures and components in CANDU 9 plants and provides the requirements for the implementation of the philosophy in the detailed plant design. The separation of the safety systems is to ensure that common cause events and functional interconnections between systems do not impair the capability to perform the required safety functions for accident conditions. The separation requirements are also applied to the design by grouping the plant systems into two basic groups. Group 1 includes the power production systems and Group 2 includes the safety related systems required for the mitigation of serious process failure. The Group 2 is further separated into subgroups to ensure that events that could cause failure of a special safety system in one subgroup can be mitigated by the other subgroup. The change status for the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 2 tabs., 6 figs. (Author) .new

  10. Safety design guides for grouping and separation for CANDU 9

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of); Wright, A C.D. [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Toronto (Canada)

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for grouping and separation describes the philosophy of physical and functional separation for systems, structures and components in CANDU 9 plants and provides the requirements for the implementation of the philosophy in the detailed plant design. The separation of the safety systems is to ensure that common cause events and functional interconnections between systems do not impair the capability to perform the required safety functions for accident conditions. The separation requirements are also applied to the design by grouping the plant systems into two basic groups. Group 1 includes the power production systems and Group 2 includes the safety related systems required for the mitigation of serious process failure. The Group 2 is further separated into subgroups to ensure that events that could cause failure of a special safety system in one subgroup can be mitigated by the other subgroup. The change status for the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 2 tabs., 6 figs. (Author) .new.

  11. Probabilistic seismic safety assessment of a CANDU 6 nuclear power plant including ambient vibration tests: Case study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nour, Ali [Hydro Quรฉbec, Montrรฉal, Quรฉbec H2L4P5 (Canada); ร‰cole Polytechnique de Montrรฉal, Montrรฉal, Quรฉbec H3C3A7 (Canada); Cherfaoui, Abdelhalim; Gocevski, Vladimir [Hydro Quรฉbec, Montrรฉal, Quรฉbec H2L4P5 (Canada); Lรฉger, Pierre [ร‰cole Polytechnique de Montrรฉal, Montrรฉal, Quรฉbec H3C3A7 (Canada)

    2016-08-01

    Highlights: โ€ข In this case study, the seismic PSA methodology adopted for a CANDU 6 is presented. โ€ข Ambient vibrations testing to calibrate a 3D FEM and to reduce uncertainties is performed. โ€ข Procedure for the development of FRS for the RB considering wave incoherency effect is proposed. โ€ข Seismic fragility analysis for the RB is presented. - Abstract: Following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan there is a worldwide interest in reducing uncertainties in seismic safety assessment of existing nuclear power plant (NPP). Within the scope of a Canadian refurbishment project of a CANDU 6 (NPP) put in service in 1983, structures and equipment must sustain a new seismic demand characterised by the uniform hazard spectrum (UHS) obtained from a site specific study defined for a return period of 1/10,000 years. This UHS exhibits larger spectral ordinates in the high-frequency range than those used in design. To reduce modeling uncertainties as part of a seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), Hydro-Quรฉbec developed a procedure using ambient vibrations testing to calibrate a detailed 3D finite element model (FEM) of the containment and reactor building (RB). This calibrated FE model is then used for generating floor response spectra (FRS) based on ground motion time histories compatible with the UHS. Seismic fragility analyses of the reactor building (RB) and structural components are also performed in the context of a case study. Because the RB is founded on a large circular raft, it is possible to consider the effect of the seismic wave incoherency to filter out the high-frequency content, mainly above 10 Hz, using the incoherency transfer function (ITF) method. This allows reducing significantly the non-necessary conservatism in resulting FRS, an important issue for an existing NPP. The proposed case study, and related methodology using ambient vibration testing, is particularly useful to engineers involved in seismic re-evaluation of

  12. Construction for Nuclear Installations. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance based on international good practices in the construction of nuclear installations, which will enable construction to proceed with high quality. It can be applied to support the development, implementation and assessment of construction methods and procedures and the identification of good practices for ensuring the quality of the construction to meet the design intent and ensure safety. It will be a useful tool for regulatory bodies, licensees and new entrant countries for nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations

  13. Development of a Seismic Setpoint Calculation Methodology Using a Safety System Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Jae; Baik, Kwang Il; Lee, Sang Jeong

    2013-01-01

    The Automatic Seismic Trip System (ASTS) automatically actuates reactor trip when it detects seismic activities whose magnitudes are comparable to a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which is the maximum hypothetical earthquake at the nuclear power plant site. To ensure that the reactor is tripped before the magnitude of earthquake exceeds the SSE, it is crucial to reasonably determine the seismic setpoint. The trip setpoint and allowable value for the ASTS for Advanced Power Reactor (APR) 1400 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) were determined by the methodology presented in this paper. The ASTS that trips the reactor when a large earthquake occurs is categorized as a non safety system because the system is not required by design basis event criteria. This means ASTS has neither specific analytical limit nor dedicated setpoint calculation methodology. Therefore, we developed the ASTS setpoint calculation methodology by conservatively considering that of PPS. By incorporating the developed methodology into the ASTS for APR1400, the more conservative trip setpoint and allowable value were determined. In addition, the ZPA from the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) FRS of the floor where the sensor module is located is 0.1g. Thus, the allowance of 0.17g between OBE of 0.1 g and ASTS trip setpoint of 0.27 g is sufficient to prevent the reactor trip before the magnitude of the earthquake exceeds the OBE. In result, the developed ASTS setpoint calculation methodology is evaluated as reasonable in both aspects of the safety and performance of the NPPs. This will be used to determine the ASTS trip setpoint and allowable for newly constructed plants

  14. Recruitment, qualification and training of personnel for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to outline the various factors that should to be considered in order to ensure that the operating organization has a sufficient number of qualified personnel for safe operation of a nuclear power plant. In particular, the objective of this publication is to provide general recommendations on the recruitment and selection of plant personnel and on the training and qualification practices that have been adopted in the nuclear industry since the predecessor Safety Guide was published in 1991. In addition, this Safety Guide seeks to establish a framework for ensuring that all managers and staff employed at a nuclear power plant demonstrate their commitment to the management of safety to high professional standards. This Safety Guide deals specifically with those aspects of qualification and training that are important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It provides recommendations on the recruitment, selection, qualification, training and authorization of plant personnel. That is, of all personnel in all safety related functions and at all levels of the plant. Some parts or all of this Safety Guide may also be used, with due adaptation, as a guide to the recruitment, selection, training and qualification of staff for other nuclear installations (such as research reactors or nuclear fuel cycle facilities). Section 2 gives guidance on the recruitment and selection of suitable personnel for a nuclear power plant. Section 3 gives guidance on the establishment of personnel qualification, explains the relationship between qualification and competence, and identifies how competence may be developed through education, experience and training. Section 4 deals with general aspects of the training policy for nuclear power plant personnel: the systematic approach, training settings and methods, initial and continuing training, and the keeping of training records. Section 5 provides guidance on the main aspects of training programmes

  15. Recruitment, qualification and training of personnel for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to outline the various factors that should to be considered in order to ensure that the operating organization has a sufficient number of qualified personnel for safe operation of a nuclear power plant. In particular, the objective of this publication is to provide general recommendations on the recruitment and selection of plant personnel and on the training and qualification practices that have been adopted in the nuclear industry since the predecessor Safety Guide was published in 1991. In addition, this Safety Guide seeks to establish a framework for ensuring that all managers and staff employed at a nuclear power plant demonstrate their commitment to the management of safety to high professional standards. This Safety Guide deals specifically with those aspects of qualification and training that are important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It provides recommendations on the recruitment, selection, qualification, training and authorization of plant personnel; that is, of all personnel in all safety related functions and at all levels of the plant. Some parts or all of this Safety Guide may also be used, with due adaptation, as a guide to the recruitment, selection, training and qualification of staff for other nuclear installations (such as research reactors or nuclear fuel cycle facilities). Section 2 gives guidance on the recruitment and selection of suitable personnel for a nuclear power plant. Section 3 gives guidance on the establishment of personnel qualification, explains the relationship between qualification and competence, and identifies how competence may be developed through education, experience and training. Section 4 deals with general aspects of the training policy for nuclear power plant personnel: the systematic approach, training settings and methods, initial and continuing training, and the keeping of training records. Section 5 provides guidance on the main aspects of training programmes

  16. Radiation protection programmes for the transport of radioactive material. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides guidance on meeting the requirements for the establishment of radiation protection programmes (RPPs) for the transport of radioactive material, to optimize radiation protection in order to meet the requirements for radiation protection that underlie the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. This Guide covers general aspects of meeting the requirements for radiation protection, but does not cover criticality safety or other possible hazardous properties of radioactive material. The annexes of this Guide include examples of RPPs, relevant excerpts from the Transport Regulations, examples of total dose per transport index handled, a checklist for road transport, specific segregation distances and emergency instructions for vehicle operators

  17. An introduction to a new IAEA safety guide: 'ageing management for nuclear power plants'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pachner, J.; Inagaki, T.; Kang, K.S.

    2008-01-01

    This paper reports on a new IAEA Safety Guide entitled 'Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants' which is currently in an advanced draft form, awaiting approval of publication. The new Safety Guide will be an umbrella document for a comprehensive set of guidance documents on ageing management which have been issued by the IAEA. The Safety Guide first presents basic concepts of ageing management as a common basis for the recommendations on: proactive management of ageing throughout the life cycle of a nuclear power plant (NPP); systematic approach to managing ageing in the operation of NPPs; managing obsolescence; and review of ageing management for long term operation (life extension). The Safety Guide is intended to assist operators in establishing, implementing and improving systematic ageing management programs in NPPs and may be used by regulators in preparing regulatory standards and guides, and in verifying that ageing in nuclear power plants is being effectively managed. (author)

  18. Methods used to seismically upgrade. The safety related components of Belgian plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafaille, J.P.

    1993-01-01

    Belgian nuclear power amounts to about 6,000 MW, generated by seven plants that started operation as early as 1967. The latest plant started in 1985. Some of these plants were designed with no seismic requirements whatsoever. Even for those that had seismic requirements at the design stage, seismic demand was raised after design had been frozen (late during construction or at the 10 years revision). As a consequence all the plants had to undergo, to a variable extent, a seismic reevaluation and/or backfitting. Civil structures were concerned as well as electro-mechanical equipment and piping systems. The present paper deals with the mechanical aspect of the problem (equipment and piping). In order to minimize hardware modifications, advanced analytical techniques were used throughout the process, starting with the elaboration of a site specific spectrum, and using a full soil-structure interaction in order to get as 'realistic' as possible floor response spectra. In some instances, non linear elasto-plastic time history analysis was performed on piping-systems in order to qualify them without hardware modifications. In other cases a 'Load Coefficient Method' was used. Sometimes stresses or displacements taken from the original stress reports and scaled by comparison of applicable spectra, allowed to assess the seismic validity of the system under investigation. Seismic acceptability of installed active equipment is more difficult to demonstrate, as this is usually done by testing. This problem is a generic issue in the US, identified under the label USI-A-46 (Unresolved Safety Issue). It is treated by. a group of Utilities (SQUG = Seismic Qualification Utilities Group). The Belgian Utility is member of that group since 1985. The application of this program is starting in the US. SQUG methodology has been applied to three Belgian plants starting in 1988 and is now completed. The required fixes are being implemented. Experience gained in the process has been applied

  19. Seismic analysis and testing of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The following subjects are discussed in this guide: General Recommendations for seismic classification, loading combinations and allowable limits; seismic analysis methods; implications for seismic design; seismic testing and qualification; seismic instrumentation; modelling techniques; material property characterization; seismic response of soil deposits and earth structures; liquefaction and ground failure; slope stability; sloshing effects in water pools; qualification testing by means of the transport vehicle

  20. Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

  1. Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

  2. Evaluation of response factors for seismic probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebisawa, K.; Abe, K.; Muramatsu, K.; Itoh, M.; Kohno, K.; Tanaka, T.

    1994-01-01

    This paper presents a method for evaluating 'response factors' of components in nuclear power plants for use in a seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The response factor here is a measure of conservatism included in response calculations in seismic design analysis of components and is defined as a ratio of conservative design resonse to actual response. This method has the following characteristic features: (1) The components are classified into several groups based on the differences in their location and in the vibration models used in design response analyses; (2) the response factors are decomposed into subfactors corresponding to the stages of the seismic response analyses in the design practices; (3) the response factors for components are calculated as products of subfactors; (4) the subfactors are expressed either as a single value or as a function of parameters that influence the response of components. This paper describes the outline of this method and results from an application to a sample problem in which response factors were quantified for examples of components selected from the groups. (orig.)

  3. Safety critical systems handbook a straightforward guide to functional safety : IEC 61508 (2010 edition) and related standards

    CERN Document Server

    Smith, David J

    2010-01-01

    Electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems increasingly carry out safety functions to guard workers and the public against injury or death and the environment against pollution. The international functional safety standard IEC 61508 was revised in 2010, and this is the first comprehensive guide available to the revised standard. As functional safety is applicable to many industries, this book will have a wide readership beyond the chemical and process sector, including oil and gas, power generation, nuclear, aircraft, and automotive industries, plus project, instrumentation, design, and control engineers. * The only comprehensive guide to IEC 61508, updated to cover the 2010 amendments, that will ensure engineers are compliant with the latest process safety systems design and operation standards* Helps readers understand the process required to apply safety critical systems standards* Real-world approach helps users to interpret the standard, with case studies and best practice design examples...

  4. Seismic analysis of safety class 1 incinerator glovebox in building 232-Z 200 W Area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ocoma, E.C.

    1994-09-01

    This report documents the seismic evaluation for the existing safety class 1 incinerator glovebox in 232Z Building. The glovebox is no longer in use and most of the internal mechanical equipment have been removed. However, the insulation firebricks are still in the glovebox for proper disposal

  5. CARES-ESTSC, Seismic Structure Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Costantino, C.J.; Miller, C.A.; Heymsfield, E.; Yang, A.

    1999-01-01

    1 - Description of program or function: CARES, Computer Analysis for Rapid Evaluation of Structures, was developed for NRC staff use to determine the validity and accuracy of the analysis methods used by various utilities for structural safety evaluations of nuclear power plants. CARES is organized in a modular format with the basic modules of the system performing static, seismic, and nonlinear analysis. In this release, only the seismic module is implemented. This module defines the design seismic criteria at a given site, evaluates the free-field motion, and computes the structural response and floor response spectra including soil-structure interaction. The eight options in CARES currently are: a general manager for the seismic module, deconvolution analysis, structural data preparation for soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis, input motion preparation for SSI analysis, SSI analysis, earthquake simulations/data, PSD (Power Spectral Density) related acceleration time history/spectra analysis, and plot generation. 2 - Method of solution: The seismic module works in the frequency domain. Earthquake motion simulation is based on the fundamental property that any periodic function can be expanded in a series of sinusoidal waves. The computer uses a random number generator to produce strings of phase angles with uniform distribution in the 0-2 pi range. Then, a linear correction procedure due to Scanlon and Sacks is employed to derive an adjusted array of amplitudes. The acceleration ensemble is subsequently modified by a deterministic intensity function composed of three segments: an initial buildup, a stationary duration, and exponential steady decay. A parabolic correction procedure outlined by Jennings and Housner is applied to the acceleration ensemble to bring the end velocity of the ground motion to zero. The soil-structure system is represented by a three-dimensional lumped parameter type model. The structural model is built up from three

  6. Fire Safety. Managing School Facilities, Guide 6.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Department for Education and Employment, London (England). Architects and Building Branch.

    This booklet discusses how United Kingdom schools can manage fire safety and minimize the risk of fire. The guide examines what legislation school buildings must comply with and covers the major risks. It also describes training and evacuation procedures and provides guidance on fire precautions, alarm systems, fire fighting equipment, and escapeโ€ฆ

  7. The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a)To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b)As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c)To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a)Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b)Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c)Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d)Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e)Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear installation. (f

  8. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program: Phase II program plan (FY 83-FY 84)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bohn, M.P.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Cover, L.E.; Johnson, J.J.; Shieh, L.C.; Shukla, S.N.; Wells, J.E.

    1982-01-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is an NRC-funded, multiyear program conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Its goal is to develop a complete, fully coupled analysis procedure (including methods and computer codes) for estimating the risk of an earthquake-caused radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant. The analysis procedure is based upon a state-of-the-art evaluation of the current seismic analysis and design process and explicitly includes the uncertainties inherent in such a process. The results will be used to improve seismic licensing requirements for nuclear power plants. As currently planned, the SSMRP will be completed in September, 1984. This document presents the program plan for work to be done during the remainder of the program. In Phase I of the SSMRP, the necessary tools (both computer codes and data bases) for performing a detailed seismic risk analysis were identified and developed. Demonstration calculations were performed on the Zion Nuclear Power Plant. In the remainder of the program (Phase II) work will be concentrated on developing a simplified SSMRP methodology for routine probabilistic risk assessments, quantitative validation of the tools developed and application of the simplified methodology to a Boiling Water Reactor. (The Zion plant is a pressurized water reactor.) In addition, considerable effort will be devoted to making the codes and data bases easily accessible to the public

  9. Design of the reactor coolant system and associated systems in nuclear power plants. Safety guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are established in the Safety Requirements publication, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1 on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, which it supplements. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements for the design of the reactor coolant system (RCS) and associated systems in nuclear power plants should be met. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides, Safety Series No. 50-SG-D6 on Ultimate Heat Sink and Directly Associated Heat Transport Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (1982), and Safety Series No. 50-SG-D13 on Reactor Coolant and Associated Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (1987), which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. The revision takes account of developments in the design of the RCS and associated systems in nuclear power plants since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1982 and 1987, respectively. The other objectives of the revision are to ensure consistency with Ref., issued in 2004, and to update the technical content. In addition, an appendix on pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) has been included.

  10. Consideration of vertical seismic response spectrum in nuclear safety review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Zaozhan; Huang Bingchen

    2011-01-01

    The basic requirements for civil nuclear installation are introduced in the article. Starting from the basic concept of seismic response spectrum, the authors analyze the site seismic response spectrum and the design seismic response spectrum that desire much consideration. By distinguishing the absolute seismic response spectrum and relative seismic response spectrum, the authors analyze the difference and relationship between the vertical seismic response spectrum and horizontal seismic response spectrum. The authors also bring forward some suggestions for determining the site vertical seismic response spectrum by considering the fact in our country. (authors)

  11. IAEA program for the preparation of safety codes and guides for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    On the 13th of September, 1974, the IAEA Governors' Council has given its consent to the programme for the establishment of safety codes and guides (annex VII to IAEA document G.C. (XVIII/526)). The programme envisages the establishment of one code of practice for each of the issues governmental organization, siting, design, operation and quality assurance and also of about 50 safety guides between 1975 and 1980. These codes will contain the minimum requirements for the safety of the nuclear power stations, their systems and components. The guides will recommend methods to achieve the aims stated in the codes. It is the purpose of these IAEA activities to provide recommendations and guiding rules which may serve as standards for the assessment of the safety of nuclear power stations for all nations which may become participants in the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the next few years. (orig./AK) [de

  12. Safety Aspects of Sustainable Storage Dams and Earthquake Safety of Existing Dams

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Wieland

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The basic element in any sustainable dam project is safety, which includes the following safety elements: โ‘  structural safety, โ‘ก dam safety monitoring, โ‘ข operational safety and maintenance, and โ‘ฃ emergency planning. Long-term safety primarily includes the analysis of all hazards affecting the project; that is, hazards from the natural environment, hazards from the man-made environment, and project-specific and site-specific hazards. The special features of the seismic safety of dams are discussed. Large dams were the first structures to be systematically designed against earthquakes, starting in the 1930s. However, the seismic safety of older dams is unknown, as most were designed using seismic design criteria and methods of dynamic analysis that are considered obsolete today. Therefore, we need to reevaluate the seismic safety of existing dams based on current state-of-the-art practices and rehabilitate deficient dams. For large dams, a site-specific seismic hazard analysis is usually recommended. Today, large dams and the safety-relevant elements used for controlling the reservoir after a strong earthquake must be able to withstand the ground motions of a safety evaluation earthquake. The ground motion parameters can be determined either by a probabilistic or a deterministic seismic hazard analysis. During strong earthquakes, inelastic deformations may occur in a dam; therefore, the seismic analysis has to be carried out in the time domain. Furthermore, earthquakes create multiple seismic hazards for dams such as ground shaking, fault movements, mass movements, and others. The ground motions needed by the dam engineer are not real earthquake ground motions but models of the ground motion, which allow the safe design of dams. It must also be kept in mind that dam safety evaluations must be carried out several times during the long life of large storage dams. These features are discussed in this paper.

  13. Radiation protection aspects of design for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    . The IAEA takes seriously the enduring challenge for users and regulators everywhere: that of ensuring a high level of safety in the use of nuclear materials and radiation sources around the world. Their continuing utilization for the benefit of humankind must be managed in a safe manner, and the IAEA safety standards are designed to facilitate the achievement of that goal. This Safety Guide has been prepared as a part of the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear power plants. It includes recommendations on how to satisfy the requirements established in the Safety Requirements publication on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It addresses the provisions that should be made in the design of nuclear power plants in order to protect site personnel, the public and the environment against radiological hazards for operational states, decommissioning and accident conditions. The recommendations on radiation protection provided in this Safety Guide are consistent with the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS), which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). This Safety Guide supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-D9, Design Aspects of Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, published in 1985. Effective radiation protection is a combination of good design, high quality construction and proper operation. Procedures that address the radiation protection aspects of operation are covered in the Safety Guide on Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the operation of Nuclear Power Plants

  14. Comparison of seismic margin assessment and probabilistic risk assessment in seismic IPE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, J.W.; Kassawara, R.P.

    1993-01-01

    A comparison of technical requirements and managerial issues between seismic margin assessment (SMA) and seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) in a seismic Individual Plant Examination (IPE) is presented and related to requirements for an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 review which is required for older nuclear power plants. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed for each approach. Technical requirements reviewed for a seismic IPE include: scope of plants covered, seismic input, scope of review, selection of equipment, required experience and training of engineers, walkdown procedure, evaluation of components, relay review, containment review, quality assurance, products, documentation requirements, and closure procedure. Managerial issues discussed include regulatory acceptability, compatibility with seismic IPE, compliance with seismic IPE requirements, ease of use by utilities, and relative cost

  15. For safety in procurement, follow the guide!

    CERN Multimedia

    HSE Unit

    2014-01-01

    At one time or another, whether as part of a project or for an activity or service, you may find that you have to write a technical specification before placing an order for equipment or machinery. In all cases, when specifying what you need, you must make sure that aspects linked to safety and, in some cases, radiation protection and the protection of the environment, are taken into account in your invitation to tender/price enquiry. ย  In order to help you with this, the HSE Unit has just published Safety Guideline GS 0-0-1: โ€œ27 Key Questions to Ensure that Safety Aspects are Integrated into Invitations to Tender". This guide, available on EDMS under document number 1334815, has been drawn up after the verification of safety aspects of over 300 invitations to tender recently issued by CERN. It collates the most commonly received comments and remarks concerning safety in a question-and-answer format, so you will find plenty of explanations and points to include in your doc...

  16. Lean Six-Sigma in Aviation Safety: An implementation guide for measuring aviation systemโ€™s safety performance

    OpenAIRE

    Panagopoulos, I.; Atkin, C.J.; Sikora, I.

    2016-01-01

    The paper introduces a conceptual framework that could improve the safety performance measurement process and ultimately the aviation system safety performance. The framework provides an implementation guide on how organisations could design and develop a proactive, measurement tool for assessing and measuring the Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) at sigma (ฯƒ) level, a statistical measurement unit. In fact, the methodology adapts and combines quality management tools, a leading i...

  17. Seismic analysis of control and safety rod drive mechanism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meher Prasad, A.; Jaya, K.P.; Chellapandi, P.; Rajan Babu, V.; Selvaraj, T.

    2003-01-01

    Control rod and its driving mechanism for a Fast Breeder Reactor is to facilitate safe shutdown of the reactor in case of emergency. A theoretical study on the seismic qualification of control and safety rod driving mechanism is carried out. Earthquake excitations under Operational Basis (ORE) and Safe Shutdown condition (SSE) are considered. The time required for the control rod to reach the bottom position in order to shut down the reaction under excited condition is traced out. The maximum displaced positions and extreme stresses in various parts of the system under excitations are evaluated. The system modeled using beam elements. The connections between different parts are modeled through rigid elements. The interaction between various parts are modeled using GAP elements. (author)

  18. Seismic design features of the ACR Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Saudy, A.; Aziz, T.

    2003-01-01

    Through their worldwide operating records, CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have repeatedly demonstrated safe, reliable and competitive performance. Currently, there are fourteen CANDU 6 single unit reactors operating or under construction worldwide. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Advanced CANDU Reactor - the ACR. - is the genesis of a new generation of technologically advanced reactors founded on the CANDU reactor concept. The ACR is the next step in the evolution of the CANDU product line. The ACR products (ACR-700 and ACR-1000) are based on CANDU 6 (700 MWe class) and CANDU 9 (900 MWe class) reactors, therefore continuing AECL's successful approach of offering CANDU plants that appeal to a broad segment of the power generation market. The ACR products are based on the proven CANDU technology and incorporate advanced design technologies. The ACR NPP seismic design complies with Canadian standards that were specifically developed for nuclear seismic design and also with relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Design Standards and Guides. However, since the ACR is also being offered to several markets with many potential sites and different regulatory environments, there is a need to develop a comprehensive approach for the seismic design input parameters. These input parameters are used in the design of the standard ACR product that is suitable for many sites while also maintaining its economic competitiveness. For this purpose, the ACR standard plant is conservatively qualified for a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) with a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.3g for a wide range of soil/rock foundation conditions and Ground Response Spectra (GRS). These input parameters also address some of the current technical issues such as high frequency content and near field effects. In this paper, the ACR seismic design philosophy and seismic design approach for meeting the safety design requirements are reviewed. Also the seismic design

  19. Compliance assurance for the safe transport of radioactive material. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objectives of this Safety Guide are to assist competent authorities in the development and maintenance of compliance assurance programmes in connection with the transport of radioactive material, and to assist applicants, licensees and organizations in their interactions with competent authorities. In order to increase cooperation between competent authorities and to promote the uniform application of international regulations and recommendations, it is desirable to adopt a common approach to regulatory activities. This Safety Guide is intended to assist in accomplishing such a uniform application by recommending most of the actions for which competent authorities need to provide in their programmes for ensuring compliance with the Transport Regulations. This Safety Guide addresses radiation safety aspects of the transport of radioactive material; that is, the subjects that are covered by the Transport Regulations. Radioactive material may have other dangerous properties, however, such as explosiveness, flammability, pyrophoricity, chemical toxicity and corrosiveness; these properties are required to be taken into account in the regulatory control of the design and transport of packages. Physical protection and systems for accounting for and control of nuclear material are also discussed in this Safety Guide. These subjects are not within the scope of the Transport Regulations, but information on them is included here because they must be taken into account in the overall regulatory control of transport, especially when the regulatory framework is being established. Section 1 informs about the background, the objective, the scope and the structure of this publication. Section 2 provides recommendations on the responsibilities and functions of the competent authority. Section 3 provides information on the various national and international regulations and guides for the transport of radioactive material. Section 4 provides recommendations on carrying out

  20. Communication and Consultation with Interested Parties by the Regulatory Body. General Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the safety requirements concerning communication and consultation with the public and other interested parties by the regulatory body about the possible radiation risks associated with facilities and activities, and about processes and decisions of the regulatory body. The Safety Guide can be used by authorized parties in circumstances where there are regulatory requirements placed on them for communication and consultation. It may also be used by other organizations or individuals considering their responsibilities for communication and consultation with interested parties.

  1. Seismic safety review mission Almaty WWR 10 MW research reactor Almaty, Kazakhstan. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Slemmons, D.B.; David, M.; Masopust, R.

    1995-06-01

    On the request of the government of Kazakhstan and within the scope of the TC project KAZ/0/004, a seismic safety review mission was conducted in Almaty, 8-19 May 1995 for the WWR 10 Mw research reactor. This review followed the fact finding mission which visited Almaty in November 1993 together with an INSARR mission. At that time some information regarding the seismotectonic setting of the site as well as the seismic capacity of the facility was obtained. This document presents the results of further work carried out on both the issues. It discusses technical session findings on geology, seismology, structures and equipments. In the end conclusions and recommendations of the mission are given. 4 refs, figs, tabs, 18 photos

  2. Seismic Margin of 500MWe PFBR Beyond Safe Shutdown Earthquake

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sajish, S.D.; Chellapandi, P.; Chetal, S.C.

    2012-01-01

    Summary: โ€ข Seismic design aspects of safety related systems and components of PFBR is discussed with a focus on reactor assembly components. โ€ข PFBR is situated in a low seismic area with a peak ground acceleration value of 0.156 g. โ€ข The design basis ground motion parameters for the seismic design are evaluated by deterministic method and confirmed by probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. โ€ข Review of the seismic design of various safety related systems and components indicate that margin is available to meet any demand due to an earthquake beyond SSE. โ€ข Reactor assembly vessels are the most critical components w.r.t seismic loading. โ€ข Minimum safety margin is 1.41 for plastic deformation and 1.46 against buckling. โ€ข From the preliminary investigation we come to the conclusion that PFBR can withstand an earthquake up to 0.22 g without violating any safety limits. โ€ข Additional margin can be estimated by detailed fragility analysis and seismic margin assessment methods

  3. Seismic Design of a Single Bored Tunnel: Longitudinal Deformations and Seismic Joints

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oh, J.; Moon, T.

    2018-03-01

    The large diameter bored tunnel passing through rock and alluvial deposits subjected to seismic loading is analyzed for estimating longitudinal deformations and member forces on the segmental tunnel liners. The project site has challenges including high hydrostatic pressure, variable ground profile and high seismic loading. To ensure the safety of segmental tunnel liner from the seismic demands, the performance-based two-level design earthquake approach, Functional Evaluation Earthquake and Safety Evaluation Earthquake, has been adopted. The longitudinal tunnel and ground response seismic analyses are performed using a three-dimensional quasi-static linear elastic and nonlinear elastic discrete beam-spring elements to represent segmental liner and ground spring, respectively. Three components (longitudinal, transverse and vertical) of free-field ground displacement-time histories evaluated from site response analyses considering wave passage effects have been applied at the end support of the strain-compatible ground springs. The result of the longitudinal seismic analyses suggests that seismic joint for the mitigation measure requiring the design deflection capacity of 5-7.5 cm is to be furnished at the transition zone between hard and soft ground condition where the maximum member forces on the segmental liner (i.e., axial, shear forces and bending moments) are induced. The paper illustrates how detailed numerical analyses can be practically applied to evaluate the axial and curvature deformations along the tunnel alignment under difficult ground conditions and to provide the seismic joints at proper locations to effectively reduce the seismic demands below the allowable levels.

  4. Decision making with epistemic uncertainty under safety constraints: An application to seismic design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Veneziano, D.; Agarwal, A.; Karaca, E.

    2009-01-01

    The problem of accounting for epistemic uncertainty in risk management decisions is conceptually straightforward, but is riddled with practical difficulties. Simple approximations are often used whereby future variations in epistemic uncertainty are ignored or worst-case scenarios are postulated. These strategies tend to produce sub-optimal decisions. We develop a general framework based on Bayesian decision theory and exemplify it for the case of seismic design of buildings. When temporal fluctuations of the epistemic uncertainties and regulatory safety constraints are included, the optimal level of seismic protection exceeds the normative level at the time of construction. Optimal Bayesian decisions do not depend on the aleatory or epistemic nature of the uncertainties, but only on the total (epistemic plus aleatory) uncertainty and how that total uncertainty varies randomly during the lifetime of the project. ?? 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. Development of Canadian seismic design approach and overview of seismic standards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Usmani, A. [Amec Foster Wheeler, Toronto, ON (Canada); Aziz, T. [TSAziz Consulting Inc., Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    2015-07-01

    Historically the Canadian seismic design approaches have evolved for CANDUยฎ nuclear power plants to ensure that they are designed to withstand a design basis earthquake (DBE) and have margins to meet the safety requirements of beyond DBE (BDBE). While the Canadian approach differs from others, it is comparable and in some cases more conservative. The seismic requirements are captured in five CSA nuclear standards which are kept up to date and incorporate lessons learnt from recent seismic events. This paper describes the evolution of Canadian approach, comparison with others and provides an overview and salient features of CSA seismic standards. (author)

  6. Co-operative development of nuclear safety regulations, guides and standards based on NUSS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pachner, J.; Boyd, F.C.; Yaremy, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    A major need of developing Member States building nuclear power plants (NPPs) of foreign origin is to acquire a capability to regulate such nuclear plants independently. Among other things, this requires the development of national nuclear safety regulations, guides and standards to govern the development and use of nuclear technology. Recognizing the importance and complexity of this task, it seems appropriate that the NPP-exporting Member States share their experience and assist the NPP-importing Member States in the development of their national regulations and guides. In 1983, the Atomic Energy Control Board and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. conducted a study of a possible joint programme involving Canada, an NPP-importing Member State and the IAEA for the development of the national nuclear safety regulations and guides based on NUSS documents. During the study, a work plan with manpower estimates for the development of design regulations, safety guides and a guide for regulatory evaluation of design was prepared as an investigatory exercise. The work plan suggests that a successful NUSS implementation in developing Member States will require availability of significant resources at the start of the programme. The study showed that such a joint programme could provide an effective mechanism for transfer of nuclear safety know-how to the developing Member States through NUSS implementation. (author)

  7. Safety design guide for pipe rupture protection for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for pipe rupture protection identifies high-energy systems in which pipe ruptures must be postulated to occur, as well as systems that must be protected from the dynamic effects of such ruptures. Dynamic effects considered in this SDG consist of pipe whip (including missiles generated by pipe ruptures, if any) and jet impingement, Requirements for protection against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture and method of protection of essential structures, systems and components are specified for these effects. The change status for the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 2 tabs., 5 refs. (Author) .new

  8. Seismic safety of the LLL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Torkarz, F.J.; Shaw, G.

    1980-01-01

    This report states the basis for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's assurance to the public that the plutonium operations at the Laboratory pose essentially no risk to anyone's health or safety, either under normal circumstances or in the event of an earthquake or a fire. The report is intended for a general audience, and so for the most part it is not highly technical. It summarizes the steps taken to ensure the seismic safety of the plutonium facility (Bldg. 332). It describes plutonium and its potential hazard and how the facility copes with that hazard. It recounts the geologic investigations and interpretations that led to the design-basis earthquake (DBE) for the Livermore site, and presents a summary analysis of the facility structure in relation to the DBE. An appendix presents a quantitative calculation of the health risk to the public associated with the worst-case hypothetical fire. The document supports the conclusions that the facility will continue to function safely after the maximum earthquake ground motion to which it may be subjected and that there is no evidence of a potential for surface offset under it

  9. Proposal for a seismic facility for reactor safety research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, C.A.; Dove, R.C.; Rhorer, R.L.

    1976-07-01

    Certain problem areas in the seismic analysis and design of nuclear reactors are enumerated and the way in which an experimental program might contribute to each area is examined. The use of seismic simulation testing receives particular attention, especially with regard to the verification of structural response analysis. The importance of scale modeling used in conjunction with seismic simulation is also stressed. The capabilities of existing seismic simulators are summarized, and a proposed facility is described which would considerably extend the ability to conduct, with confidence, confirmatory experiments on the behavior of reactor components when subjected to seismic excitation. Particular applications to gas-cooled and other reactor types are described

  10. Non-compliance with agrochemical safety guides and associated ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Although several occupational health hazards are associated with farming, cocoa farmers could be exposed to more health hazards through use of agrochemicals. The objective of this study was to analyze the effect of non-compliance with agrochemical safety guides on health risks of farmers. The data were collected fromย ...

  11. Seismic studies for nuclear installations sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohammadioun, B.; Faure, J.

    1988-01-01

    The french experience in seismic risks assessment for french nuclear installations permits to set out the objectives, the phases the geographic extensions of workings to be realized for the installation safety. The data to be collected for the safety analysis are specified, they concern the regional seismotectonics, the essential seismic data for determining the seism level to be taken into account and defining the soil movement spectra adapted to the site. It is necessary to follow up the seismic surveillance during the installation construction and life. 7 refs. (F.M.)

  12. The art of appropriate evaluation : a guide for highway safety program managers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-08-01

    The guide, updated from its original release in 1999, is intended for project managers who will oversee the evaluation of traffic safety programs. It describes the benefits of evaluation and provides an overview of the steps involved. The guide inclu...

  13. Seismic assessment of a site using the time series method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krutzik, N.J.; Rotaru, I.; Bobei, M.; Mingiuc, C.; Serban, V.; Androne, M.

    1997-01-01

    To increase the safety of a NPP located on a seismic site, the seismic acceleration level to which the NPP should be qualified must be as representative as possible for that site, with a conservative degree of safety but not too exaggerated. The consideration of the seismic events affecting the site as independent events and the use of statistic methods to define some safety levels with very low annual occurrence probability (10 -4 ) may lead to some exaggerations of the seismic safety level. The use of some very high value for the seismic acceleration imposed by the seismic safety levels required by the hazard analysis may lead to very costly technical solutions that can make the plant operation more difficult and increase maintenance costs. The considerations of seismic events as a time series with dependence among the events produced, may lead to a more representative assessment of a NPP site seismic activity and consequently to a prognosis on the seismic level values to which the NPP would be ensured throughout its life-span. That prognosis should consider the actual seismic activity (including small earthquakes in real time) of the focuses that affect the plant site. The paper proposes the applications of Autoregressive Time Series to issue a prognosis on the seismic activity of a focus and presents the analysis on Vrancea focus that affects NPP Cernavoda site, by this method. The paper also presents the manner to analyse the focus activity as per the new approach and it assesses the maximum seismic acceleration that may affect NPP Cernavoda throughout its life-span (โˆผ 30 years). Development and applications of new mathematical analysis method, both for long - and short - time intervals, may lead to important contributions in the process of foretelling the seismic events in the future. (authors)

  14. Proceedings of the OECD/NEA workshop on seismic risk - Summary and conclusions - Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations PWG3 and PWG5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The objectives of the Workshop were: - To provide a forum to review the recent advances in methodology and application of seismic probabilistic safety assessment and seismic margin analysis of nuclear installations, - To discuss the effective uses of the seismic PSA/margin analysis with consideration of merits and limitations of probabilistic methods, - To review the state of the art methodology to provide guidance for conducting seismic PSA, and - To discuss methodological issues and identify areas in which further research is needed for enhancing the usefulness of seismic PSA. The emphasis of the Workshop was placed on the exchange of ideas on effective ways of using seismic PSA rather than the numerical PSA results for specific plants such as core damage frequencies or seismic hazard. From the presentations and discussions in this workshop, it can be concluded that the seismic PSA/Margin methods have been and are being used world-wide, providing useful information for safety improvement or decision making, and great amount of experience has been accumulated, although the status of programs in member countries vary widely. The objectives of such studies include the following: - To examine whether there are cost effective ways to improve safety from ALARP point of view - To assist in decision making in backfitting by identifying cost effective improvements - To demonstrate the seismic margin of existing or future plants - To examine the vulnerabilities in protection against severe accident - To improve design of future reactors by identifying relatively weak points - To assist in selection of new sites for NPPs. Although numerical results from seismic PSA have not been directly used in seismic design as an alternate or supplement to current deterministic analysis methods, some countries have already adopted the use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for determining design basis earthquakes (SSE in USA) and some activities are ongoing to develop methods for

  15. Maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Effective maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection (MS and I) are essential for the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance for MS and I activities to ensure that SSCs important to safety are available to perform their functions in accordance with the assumptions and intent of the design. This Safety Guide covers the organizational and procedural aspects of MS and I. However, it does not give detailed technical advice in relation to particular items of plant equipment, nor does it cover inspections made for and/or by the regulatory body. This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance for preventive and remedial measures, including testing, surveillance and in-service inspection, that are necessary to ensure that all plant structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety are capable of performing as intended. This Safety Guide covers measures for fulfilling the organizational and administrative requirements for: establishing and implementing schedules for preventive and predictive maintenance, repairing defective plant items, selecting and training personnel, providing related facilities and equipment, procuring stores and spare parts, and generating, collecting and retaining maintenance records for establishing and implementing an adequate feedback system for information on maintenance. MS and I should be subject to quality assurance in relation to all aspects important to safety. Quality assurance has been dealt with in detail in other IAEA safety standards and is covered here only in specific instances, for emphasis. In Section 2, a concept of MS and I is presented and the interrelationship between maintenance, surveillance and inspection is discussed. Section 3 concerns the functions and responsibilities of different organizations involved in MS and I activities. Section 4 provides recommendations and guidance on such organizational aspects as

  16. Maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Effective maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection (MS and I) are essential for the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance for MS and I activities to ensure that SSCs important to safety are available to perform their functions in accordance with the assumptions and intent of the design. This Safety Guide covers the organizational and procedural aspects of MS and I. However, it does not give detailed technical advice in relation to particular items of plant equipment, nor does it cover inspections made for and/or by the regulatory body. This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance for preventive and remedial measures, including testing, surveillance and in-service inspection, that are necessary to ensure that all plant structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety are capable of performing as intended. This Safety Guide covers measures for fulfilling the organizational and administrative requirements for: establishing and implementing schedules for preventive and predictive maintenance, repairing defective plant items, selecting and training personnel, providing related facilities and equipment, procuring stores and spare parts, and generating, collecting and retaining maintenance records for establishing and implementing an adequate feedback system for information on maintenance. MS and I should be subject to quality assurance in relation to all aspects important to safety. Quality assurance has been dealt with in detail in other IAEA safety standards and is covered here only in specific instances, for emphasis. In Section 2, a concept of MS and I is presented and the interrelationship between maintenance, surveillance and inspection is discussed. Section 3 concerns the functions and responsibilities of different organizations involved in MS and I activities. Section 4 provides recommendations and guidance on such organizational aspects as

  17. Seismic dynamic analysis of Heat Exchangers inside of the Auxiliary Buildings in AP1000TM NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Di Fonzo, M.; Aragon, J.; Moraleda, F.; Palazuelos, M.; San Vicente, J. L.

    2011-01-01

    Seismic dynamic analysis was carried out for the Heat Exchangers (RNS-HR) located inside of the Auxiliary Building in AP 1000 T M NPP. The main function of the RNS-HX is to provide shutdown reactor cooling. These equipment's are safety-related. So the seismic analysis was done using the methodology for Seismic Category I (SCI) structures. The most important topic is that the RNS-HX shall withstand the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and maintain the specified design functions. for the analysis, two finite element models (FEM) were built in order to investigate the structural response of the couple system of building and equipment. The response spectra method was used. The floor response spectra (FRS) at the slab-wall connection were used as input Lateral seismic restrain was necessary to added in order to achieve the natural frequency of 33 Hz. The global structural response was obtained by means of the modal combination method indicated in the Regulatory Guide 1.92.

  18. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-07-15

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  19. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  20. Advances in crosshole seismic instrumentation for dam safety monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anderlini, G.; Anderlini, C. [BC Hydro, Burnaby, BC (Canada); Taylor, R. [RST Instruments Ltd., Coquitlam, BC (Canada)

    2009-07-01

    Since 1996, crosshole shear wave velocity measurements have been performed annually at the WAC Bennett Dam in order to monitor the performance of the dam core and integrity of the 1997 sinkhole repairs. As the testing showed to be responsive to embankment conditions and capable of detecting subtle changes, the testing program was expanded to include the development of an electrical shear wave source capable of carrying out crosshole seismic testing in Mica and Revelstoke Dams over distances of 100 metres and depths of 250 metres. This paper discussed the development and capabilities of the crosshole seismic instrumentation and presented preliminary results obtained during initial testing. Specific topics that were discussed included conventional crosshole seismic equipment; design basics; description of new crosshole seismic equipment; and automated in-situ crosshole seismic system (ACSS) system description and operation. It was concluded that the ACSS and accompanying electrical shear wave source, developed as part of the project, has advanced and improved on traditional crosshole seismic equipment. 7 refs., 9 figs.

  1. Safe adventures. An ethnographic study of safety and adventure guides in Arctic Norway

    OpenAIRE

    Johannessen, Mats Hoel

    2016-01-01

    With numerous entrepreneurs already established within the area, adventure tourism is a growing industry within Arctic Norway. The continuously expanding interest for the phenomenon has gained universitiesโ€™ attention with recent education programs for guides being established. A cultural change involving a more professionalized approach to adventure tourism has also been noticed. At the forefront of ensuring touristsโ€™ safety are the guides, who work in the area. In former research on safety i...

  2. Seismic instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-06-01

    RFS or Regles Fondamentales de Surete (Basic Safety Rules) applicable to certain types of nuclear facilities lay down requirements with which compliance, for the type of facilities and within the scope of application covered by the RFS, is considered to be equivalent to compliance with technical French regulatory practice. The object of the RFS is to take advantage of standardization in the field of safety, while allowing for technical progress in that field. They are designed to enable the operating utility and contractors to know the rules pertaining to various subjects which are considered to be acceptable by the Service Central de Surete des Installations Nucleaires, or the SCSIN (Central Department for the Safety of Nuclear Facilities). These RFS should make safety analysis easier and lead to better understanding between experts and individuals concerned with the problems of nuclear safety. The SCSIN reserves the right to modify, when considered necessary, any RFS and specify, if need be, the terms under which a modification is deemed retroactive. The aim of this RFS is to define the type, location and operating conditions for seismic instrumentation needed to determine promptly the seismic response of nuclear power plants features important to safety to permit comparison of such response with that used as the design basis

  3. Structure soil structure interaction effects: Seismic analysis of safety related collocated concrete structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joshi, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    The Process, Purification and Stack Buildings are collocated safety related concrete shear wall structures with plan dimensions in excess of 100 feet. An important aspect of their seismic analysis was the determination of structure soil structure interaction (SSSI) effects, if any. The SSSI analysis of the Process Building, with one other building at a time, was performed with the SASSI computer code for up to 50 frequencies. Each combined model had about 1500 interaction nodes. Results of the SSSI analysis were compared with those from soil structure interaction (SSI) analysis of the individual buildings, done with ABAQUS and SASSI codes, for three parameters: peak accelerations, seismic forces and the in-structure floor response spectra (FRS). The results may be of wider interest due to the model size and the potential applicability to other deep soil layered sites. Results obtained from the ABAQUS analysis were consistently higher, as expected, than those from the SSI and SSSI analyses using the SASSI. The SSSI effect between the Process and Purification Buildings was not significant. The Process and Stack Building results demonstrated that under certain conditions a massive structure can have an observable effect on the seismic response of a smaller and less stiff structure

  4. Seismic Studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. Quittmeyer

    2006-09-25

    This technical work plan (TWP) describes the efforts to develop and confirm seismic ground motion inputs used for preclosure design and probabilistic safety 'analyses and to assess the postclosure performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As part of the effort to develop seismic inputs, the TWP covers testing and analyses that provide the technical basis for inputs to the seismic ground-motion site-response model. The TWP also addresses preparation of a seismic methodology report for submission to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The activities discussed in this TWP are planned for fiscal years (FY) 2006 through 2008. Some of the work enhances the technical basis for previously developed seismic inputs and reduces uncertainties and conservatism used in previous analyses and modeling. These activities support the defense of a license application. Other activities provide new results that will support development of the preclosure, safety case; these results directly support and will be included in the license application. Table 1 indicates which activities support the license application and which support licensing defense. The activities are listed in Section 1.2; the methods and approaches used to implement them are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2. Technical and performance objectives of this work scope are: (1) For annual ground motion exceedance probabilities appropriate for preclosure design analyses, provide site-specific seismic design acceleration response spectra for a range of damping values; strain-compatible soil properties; peak motions, strains, and curvatures as a function of depth; and time histories (acceleration, velocity, and displacement). Provide seismic design inputs for the waste emplacement level and for surface sites. Results should be consistent with the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) for Yucca Mountain and reflect, as appropriate, available knowledge on the limits to extreme ground

  5. Seismic Studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R. Quittmeyer

    2006-01-01

    This technical work plan (TWP) describes the efforts to develop and confirm seismic ground motion inputs used for preclosure design and probabilistic safety 'analyses and to assess the postclosure performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As part of the effort to develop seismic inputs, the TWP covers testing and analyses that provide the technical basis for inputs to the seismic ground-motion site-response model. The TWP also addresses preparation of a seismic methodology report for submission to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The activities discussed in this TWP are planned for fiscal years (FY) 2006 through 2008. Some of the work enhances the technical basis for previously developed seismic inputs and reduces uncertainties and conservatism used in previous analyses and modeling. These activities support the defense of a license application. Other activities provide new results that will support development of the preclosure, safety case; these results directly support and will be included in the license application. Table 1 indicates which activities support the license application and which support licensing defense. The activities are listed in Section 1.2; the methods and approaches used to implement them are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2. Technical and performance objectives of this work scope are: (1) For annual ground motion exceedance probabilities appropriate for preclosure design analyses, provide site-specific seismic design acceleration response spectra for a range of damping values; strain-compatible soil properties; peak motions, strains, and curvatures as a function of depth; and time histories (acceleration, velocity, and displacement). Provide seismic design inputs for the waste emplacement level and for surface sites. Results should be consistent with the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) for Yucca Mountain and reflect, as appropriate, available knowledge on the limits to extreme ground motion at

  6. Radiation protection aspects in the design of nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    . The IAEA takes seriously the enduring challenge for users and regulators everywhere: that of ensuring a high level of safety in the use of nuclear materials and radiation sources around the world. Their continuing utilization for the benefit of humankind must be managed in a safe manner, and the IAEA safety standards are designed to facilitate the achievement of that goal. This Safety Guide has been prepared as a part of the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear power plants. It includes recommendations on how to satisfy the requirements established in the Safety Requirements publication on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It addresses the provisions that should be made in the design of nuclear power plants in order to protect site personnel, the public and the environment against radiological hazards for operational states, decommissioning and accident conditions. The recommendations on radiation protection provided in this Safety Guide are consistent with the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS), which were jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). This Safety Guide supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-D9, Design Aspects of Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, published in 1985. Effective radiation protection is a combination of good design, high quality construction and proper operation. Procedures that address the radiation protection aspects of operation are covered in the Safety Guide on Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the operation of Nuclear Power Plants

  7. Seismic proof test of shielding block walls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohte, Yukio; Watanabe, Takahide; Watanabe, Hiroyuki; Maruyama, Kazuhide

    1989-01-01

    Most of the shielding block walls used for building nuclear facilities are built by dry process. When a nuclear facility is designed, seismic waves specific at each site are set as input seismic motions and they are adopted in the design. Therefore, it is necessary to assure safety of the shielding block walls for earthquake by performing anti-seismic experiments under the conditions at each site. In order to establish the normal form that can be applied to various seismic conditions in various areas, Shimizu Corp. made an actual-size test samples for the shielding block wall and confirmed the safety for earthquake and validity of normalization. (author)

  8. Seismic safety reexaminations to NPPs in Taiwan. Lessons learned from 20061226 Taiwan Hengchun and 20070716 Japan Niigata-Chuetsu oki earthquakes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chow Ting; Wu Yuanchieh; Gau Yunchau

    2008-01-01

    On December 26 2006, a strong earthquake with a local magnitude M L of 7.0 hit the most southern part of Taiwan, Hengchun village, where the Maanshan Nuclear Power Station is located. This is a historic high earthquake ever been experienced to Taiwan's existing nuclear power units, and it raised high public concerns about the seismic safety of the nuclear power plants operation. More recently on July 16 2007, in Japan, where the earthquake focal mechanisms are very similar to those in Taiwan, all 7 nuclear power units in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site were struck by a more devastating earthquake and as the result, the design earthquakes for all the nuclear units have been exceeded. Therefore, the assurance of good seismic design and the appropriateness of associated post-earthquake actions to the nuclear power units in Taiwan become very urgent topics. Based on the experiences learned from the above mentioned two earthquakes, this paper will focus on the seismic safety reexamination of Taiwan's existing nuclear power plants of the following aspects: (1) current US orientated seismic designs/regulations from earthquake probabilistic risk point of view, (2) earthquake shut-down criterion, especially the CAV parameter and its threshold value, and (3) current post earthquake actions. (author)

  9. Determination of Seismic Safety Zones during the Surface Mining Operation Development in the Case of the โ€œBuvaฤโ€ Open Pit

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimir Malbasic

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Determination of the blasting safety area is a very important step in the process of drilling and blasting works, and the preparation of solid rock materials for loading. Through monitoring and analysis of the negative seismic effects to the objects and infrastructures around and at the mine area, we were able to adapt the drilling and blasting parameters and organization of drilling and blasting operation according to the mining progress so that the affected infrastructures could be protected. This paper analyses the safety distances and model safety zones of drilling and blasting for the period 2013โ€“2018 at the open pit at โ€œBuvaฤโ€, Omarska. This mathematical calculation procedure can be used during the whole life of the mine. By monitoring of the blasting seismic influence in first years of the mine's work, as well as by using recorded vibration velocities, mathematical dependence of the important parameters can be defined. Additionally, the level and laws of distribution and intensity of the seismic activity can be defined. On one hand, those are known quantities of the explosive and the distances between blasting location and endangered objects. On the other hand, those are coefficients of the manner of blasting and the environment where blasting is done, K, as well as the coefficient of the weakening of seismic waves as they spread, n. With the usage of the allowed vibration velocities, based on certain safety criteria and mathematical formulas of laws of spreading and intensity of seismic influence for a concrete case, it is possible to calculate explosive quantities and distances, with numerically-defined values of parameter K and n. Minimum distances are calculated based on defined or projected explosive quantities. Additionally, we calculate the maximum allowed explosive quantities based on known distances which can be used based on projected drilling-blasting parameters. For the purpose of the planning of drilling and blasting

  10. Ensuring seismic safety of Blahutovice nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartak, V.; David, M.; Hrabe, T.; Simunek, P.

    1989-01-01

    The results are presented of the seismic and geological survey of the Blahutovice nuclear power plant site. The variants are discussed of laying foundations and securing earthquake protection of the reactor building. The calculations made show that all variants are suitable with respect to seismic effects because the acceleration of seismic vibrations at the foundation slab level reaches the maximum intensity of 8deg MSK 64. The variant envisaging that the reactor building should be supported on spring insulators with viscous dampers is considered most advanced. (J.B.). 8 figs., 1 tab

  11. Building competence in radiation protection and the safe use of radiation sources. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    An essential element of a national infrastructure for radiation protection and safety is the maintenance of an adequate number of competent personnel. This Safety Guide makes recommendations concerning the building of competence in protection and safety, which relate to the training and assessment of qualification of new personnel and retraining of existing personnel in order to develop and maintain appropriate levels of competence. This Safety Guide addresses training in protection and safety aspects in relation to all practices and intervention situations in nuclear and radiation related technologies. This document covers the following aspects: the categories of persons to be trained. The requirements for education, training and experience for each category. The processes of qualification and authorization of persons. A national strategy for building competence

  12. Effects of relay chatter in seismic probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, J.W.; Shiu, K.K.

    1985-01-01

    In the Zion and Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Studies, relay chatter was dismissed as a credible event and hence was not formally included in the analyses. Although little discussion is given in the Zion and Indian Point PSA documentation concerning the basis for this decision, it has been expressed informally that it was assumed that the operators will be able to reset all relays in a timely manner. Currently, it is the opinion of many professionals that this may be an oversimplification. The three basic areas which must be considered in addressing relay chatter include the fragility of the relays per se, the reliability of the operators to reset the relays and finally the systems response aspects. Each of these areas is reviewed and the implications for seismic PSA are discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research are given

  13. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide (French Edition); Surete radiologique en radiographie industrielle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-05-15

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in Horizontal-Ellipsis shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and in outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography.

  14. Classification of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2009-11-15

    This publication is a revision of an earlier Safety Guide of the same title issued in 1994. It recommends revised waste management strategies that reflect changes in practices and approaches since then. It sets out a classification system for the management of waste prior to disposal and for disposal, driven by long term safety considerations. It includes a number of schemes for classifying radioactive waste that can be used to assist with planning overall national approaches to radioactive waste management and to assist with operational management at facilities. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The radioactive waste classification scheme; Appendix: The classification of radioactive waste; Annex I: Evolution of IAEA standards on radioactive waste classification; Annex II: Methods of classification; Annex III: Origin and types of radioactive waste.

  15. Classification of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This publication is a revision of an earlier Safety Guide of the same title issued in 1994. It recommends revised waste management strategies that reflect changes in practices and approaches since then. It sets out a classification system for the management of waste prior to disposal and for disposal, driven by long term safety considerations. It includes a number of schemes for classifying radioactive waste that can be used to assist with planning overall national approaches to radioactive waste management and to assist with operational management at facilities. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The radioactive waste classification scheme; Appendix: The classification of radioactive waste; Annex I: Evolution of IAEA standards on radioactive waste classification; Annex II: Methods of classification; Annex III: Origin and types of radioactive waste

  16. Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear facilities. Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-01

    Programmes for re-evaluation and upgrading of safety of existing nuclear facilities are presently under way in a number of countries around the world. An important component of these programmes is the re-evaluation of the seismic safety through definition of new seismic parameters at the site and evaluation of seismic capacity of structures, equipment and distribution systems following updated information and criteria. The Seminar is intended to provide a forum for the exchange of information and discussion of the state-of-the-art on seismic safety of nuclear facilities in operation or under construction. Both analytical and experimental techniques for the evaluation of seismic capacity of structures, equipment and distribution systems are discussed. Full scale and field tests of structures and components using shaking tables, mechanical exciters, explosive and shock tests, and ambient vibrations are included in the seminar programme with emphasis on recent case histories. Presentations at the Seminar also include analytical techniques for the determination of dynamic properties of soil-structure systems from experiments as well as calibration of numerical models. Methods and criteria for seismic margin assessment based on experience data obtained from the behaviour of structures and components in real earthquakes are discussed. Guidelines for defining technical requirements for capacity re-evaluation (i.e. acceptable behaviour limits and design and implementation of structure and components upgrades are also presented and discussed. The following topics were covered during 7 sessions: earthquake experience and seismic re-evaluation; country experience in seismic re-evaluation programme; generic WWER studies; analytical methods for seismic capacity re-evaluation; experimental methods for seismic capacity re-evaluation; case studies.

  17. Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear facilities. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Programmes for re-evaluation and upgrading of safety of existing nuclear facilities are presently under way in a number of countries around the world. An important component of these programmes is the re-evaluation of the seismic safety through definition of new seismic parameters at the site and evaluation of seismic capacity of structures, equipment and distribution systems following updated information and criteria. The Seminar is intended to provide a forum for the exchange of information and discussion of the state-of-the-art on seismic safety of nuclear facilities in operation or under construction. Both analytical and experimental techniques for the evaluation of seismic capacity of structures, equipment and distribution systems are discussed. Full scale and field tests of structures and components using shaking tables, mechanical exciters, explosive and shock tests, and ambient vibrations are included in the seminar programme with emphasis on recent case histories. Presentations at the Seminar also include analytical techniques for the determination of dynamic properties of soil-structure systems from experiments as well as calibration of numerical models. Methods and criteria for seismic margin assessment based on experience data obtained from the behaviour of structures and components in real earthquakes are discussed. Guidelines for defining technical requirements for capacity re-evaluation (i.e. acceptable behaviour limits and design and implementation of structure and components upgrades are also presented and discussed. The following topics were covered during 7 sessions: earthquake experience and seismic re-evaluation; country experience in seismic re-evaluation programme; generic WWER studies; analytical methods for seismic capacity re-evaluation; experimental methods for seismic capacity re-evaluation; case studies

  18. Experimental study of seismic behaviour of electric equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buland, P.; Henry, J.Y.; Simon, D.

    1992-02-01

    Safety analysis of a nuclear power plant imposes taking into account a number of impacts both internal and external, seismic events being one of them. Approach taken for seismicity is deterministic and is based on keeping the safety margin on a high enough level concerning the impact. The objective is to ensure the integrity and proper functioning of the utility in spite of a seismic event. In order to achieve these objectives, design, construction and operation regulations are analysed. Seismic behaviour related to design and construction regulations is validated, in order to maintain the proposed approach

  19. The NUSS safety guides in design and the use of computers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, J.

    1986-01-01

    After a brief summary of the NUSS programme, the two design guides are discussed which deal with instrumentation and control circuitry. The potential use of computers is covered differently in these guides because of the historical development and more importantly because of the difference in importance to safety of the I and C systems which are dealt with in these papers. The Agency would consider modifications to the existing guides only when sufficient consensus about the use of computers would warrant a revision of the documents. (author)

  20. Seismic testing of the base-isolated PWR spent-fuel storage rack

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Katsuhisa; Tanaka, Mamoru; Nakamura, Masaaki; Tsujikura, Yonezo.

    1990-01-01

    The present paper aims to verify the seismic safety of the base-isolated spent-fuel storage rack. A series of seismic tests has been conducted using a three-dimensional shaking table. A sliding-type base-isolation system was employed for the prototype rack considering environmental conditions in an actual plant. A non linear seismic response analysis was also performed, and it is verified that the prototype of a base-isolated spent-fuel storage rack has a sufficient seismic safety margin for design seismic conditions from the viewpoint of seismic response. (author)

  1. Conduct of Operations at Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide identifies the main responsibilities and practices of nuclear power plant (NPP) operations departments in relation to their responsibility for the safe functioning of the plant. The guide presents the factors to be considered in structuring the operations department of an NPP; setting high standards of performance; making safety related decisions in an effective manner; conducting control room and field activities in a thorough and professional manner; and maintaining an NPP within established operational limits and conditions. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management and organization of plant operations; 3. Shift complement and functions; 4. Shift routines and operating practices; 5. Control of equipment and plant status; 6. Operations equipment and operator aids; 7. Work control and authorization.

  2. SSI sensitivity studies and model improvements for the US NRC Seismic Safety Margins Research Program. Rev. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, J.J.; Maslenikov, O.R.; Benda, B.J.

    1984-10-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is a US NRC-funded program conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Its goal is to develop a complete fully coupled analysis procedure for estimating the risk of an earthquake-induced radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant. In Phase II of the SSMRP, the methodology was applied to the Zion nuclear power plant. Three topics in the SSI analysis of Zion were investigated and reported here - flexible foundation modeling, structure-to-structure interaction, and basemat uplift. The results of these investigations were incorporated in the SSMRP seismic risk analysis. 14 references, 51 figures, 13 tables

  3. A Framework for Seismic Design of Items in Safety-Critical Facilities for Implementing a Risk-Informed Defense-in-Depth-Based Concept

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tatsuya Itoi

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Recently, especially after the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the need for treating residual risks and cliff-edge effects in safety-critical facilities has been widely recognized as an extremely important issue. In this article, the sophistication of seismic designs in safety-critical facilities is discussed from the viewpoint of mitigating the consequences of accidents, such as the avoidance of cliff-edge effects. For this purpose, the implementation of a risk-informed defense-in-depth-based framework is proposed in this study. A basic framework that utilizes diversity in the dynamic characteristics of items and also provides additional seismic margin to items important for safety when needed is proposed to prevent common cause failure and to avoid cliff-edge effects as far as practicable. The proposed method is demonstrated to be effective using an example calculation.

  4. Seismic dynamic analysis of Heat Exchangers inside of the Auxiliary Buildings in AP1000{sup T}M NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Di Fonzo, M.; Aragon, J.; Moraleda, F.; Palazuelos, M.; San vicente, J. L.

    2011-07-01

    Seismic dynamic analysis was carried out for the Heat Exchangers (RNS-HR) located inside of the Auxiliary Building in AP 1000{sup T}M NPP. The main function of the RNS-HX is to provide shutdown reactor cooling. These equipment's are safety-related. So the seismic analysis was done using the methodology for Seismic Category I (SCI) structures. The most important topic is that the RNS-HX shall withstand the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and maintain the specified design functions. for the analysis, two finite element models (FEM) were built in order to investigate the structural response of the couple system of building and equipment. The response spectra method was used. The floor response spectra (FRS) at the slab-wall connection were used as input Lateral seismic restrain was necessary to added in order to achieve the natural frequency of 33 Hz. The global structural response was obtained by means of the modal combination method indicated in the Regulatory Guide 1.92.

  5. Pre-Operational Seismic Walk-Through of NPPs in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soni, R.S.; Mishra, R.K.; Agrawal, M.K.; Reddy, G.R.; Kushwaha, H.S.; Venkat Raj, V.; Badrinarayan, G.; Hawaldar, R.V.; Ingole, S.M.

    2002-01-01

    In nuclear power plants, it is essential to design the various safety and safety related systems and components of the plant in such a manner that they maintain their structural integrity as well as serve their functional performance during a seismic event. The pre-operational seismic walk-through helps in ensuring the installation of various seismic supports as per design intent, identifying the areas where supports are inadequate, identifying the interaction concerns between the systems of various safety classes and locating the various undesired loose, untied / unanchored components, tools, etc. used during the construction activity. A detailed procedure for the pre-operational seismic walk-through of the NPPs was therefore, prepared. Since the types and locations of seismic supports for the various systems and components of the plant had been already reviewed, the major emphasis during the walk-through was laid on their proper installation. (authors)

  6. Summary report on the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummings, G.E.

    1986-01-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was a program to develop a complete, fully coupled analysis procedure (including methods and computer codes) for estimating the risk of an earthquake-induced radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant. The SSMRP was the first effort to trace seismically induced failure modes in a reactor system down to the individual component level, and to take into account common-cause earthquake-induced failures at the component level. This report summarizes methods and results generated by SSMRP. The SSMRP method makes use of three computer codes, HAZARD, SMACS and SEISIM to calculate ground motion acceleration time histories, structure and component responses and failure, and radioactive release probabilities. To demonstrate the methodology, an analysis was done of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant. The median frequency of core melt was computed to be 3E-5 per year, with upper (90%) and lower (10%) bounds of 8E-4 and 6E-7 per year. The main contribution to risk came from earthquakes about 2 through 4 times the design basis earthquake level. Risk was dominated by structural and inter-building piping failures and loss of off-site power. Sensitivity studies were undertaken to test assumptions and modeling procedures relative to soil-structure interaction effects, feed-and-bleed cooling, and structural failures. Assumptions made could have an order-of-magnitude effect on core melt frequency. Also, guidelines were developed for simplifying the SSMRP method, and importance rankings were generated based on the Zion analysis. 56 refs., 6 figs

  7. Seismic motions from project Rulison

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Loux, P C [Environmental Research Corp., Alexandria, VA (United States)

    1970-05-15

    In the range from a few to a few hundred km, seismic measurements from the Rulison event are shown and compared with experimentally and analytically derived pre-event estimates. Seismograms, peak accelerations, and response spectra are given along with a description of the associated geologic environment. Techniques used for the pre-event estimates are identified with emphasis on supportive data and on Rulison results. Of particular interest is the close-in seismic frequency content which is expected to contain stronger high frequency components. This higher frequency content translates into stronger accelerations within the first tens of km, which in turn affect safety preparations. Additionally, the local geologic structure at nearby population centers must be considered. Pre-event reverse profile refraction surveys are used to delineate the geology at Rifle, Rulison, Grand Valley, and other sites. The geologic parameters are then used as input to seismic amplification models which deliver estimates of local resonant frequencies. Prediction of such resonances allows improved safety assurance against seismic effects hazards. (author)

  8. Walkdown procedure: Seismic adequacy review of safety class 3 ampersand 4 commodities in 2736-Z ampersand ZB buildings at PFP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ocoma, E.C.

    1995-01-01

    Seismic evaluation of existing safety class (SC) 3 and non-SC 4 commodities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is integrated into an area walkdown program. Field walkdowns of potential PFP seismic deficiencies associated with structural failure and falling will be performed using the DOE SQUG/EPRI methodology. Potential proximity interactions are also addressed. Objective of the walkdown is to qualify as much of the equipment as practical and to identify candidates for further evaluation

  9. Seismic reevaluation of existing nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hennart, J.C.

    1978-01-01

    The codes and regulations governing Nuclear Power Plant seismic analysis are continuously becoming more stringent. In addition, design ground accelerations of existing plants must sometimes be increased as a result of discovery of faulting zones or recording of recent earthquakes near the plant location after plant design. These new factors can result in augmented seismic design criteria. Seismic reanalysius of the existing Nuclear Power Plant structures and equipments is necessary to prevent the consequences of newly postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health or safety of the public. This paper reviews the developments of seismic analysis as applied to Nuclear Power Plants and the methods used by Westinghouse to requalify existing plants to the most recent safety requirements. (author)

  10. The Management System for Nuclear Installations. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a) To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b) As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c) To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a) Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b) Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c) Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d) Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e) Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear

  11. CONCIDERATION OF FOUNDATION AND SEISMIC CONDITIONS OF AREA IN ANALYSIS OF SEISMIC RESISTANCE OF REACTOR COMPARTMENT

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    SEDIN V. L.

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Problem statement. Providing of safe exploitation of nuclear power plants, as well as a safety of staff and environment is a very important problem. A distinct feature of this problem is a necessity to provide not only a strength of structures, but also a safe functioning of all systems that control nuclear process. In particular, the influence of earthquake should be considered on constructions of buildings and structures of nuclear and thermal power plant, taking into account soil-structure interaction. According to IAEAโ€™s SSD-9 recommendations, a risk of vibration of soil should be analyzed for each NPP connected with earthquakes soil that means researches, including general, detailed and microseismic zoning of the area works. One of the distinctive features of the considered problem is an evaluation of the seismicity of area and getting the response spectrum on the free surface. Purpose. Determination of seismic resistance of buildings of high category of safety with the example of the reactor compartment of Zaporoghskaya NPP including the soil structure interaction. Conclusion The seismicity assessment of the area and obtaining of response specters on free surface was made during research and analysis of seismic resistance of buildings of high category of safety including the effects of foundation and structures. The method of modeling of the equivalent dynamic characteristics of the base was considered during the research in seismic impacts.

  12. Seismic PSA of nuclear power plants a case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hari Prasad, M.; Dubey, P.N.; Reddy, G.R.; Saraf, R.K.; Ghosh, A.K.

    2006-07-01

    Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (Seismic PSA) analysis is an external event PSA analysis. The objective of seismic PSA for the plants is to examine the existence of plant vulnerabilities against postulated earthquakes by numerically assessing the plant safety and to take appropriate measures to enhance the plant safety. Seismic PSA analysis integrates the seismic hazard analysis, seismic response analysis, seismic fragility analysis and system reliability/ accident sequence analysis. In general, the plant consists of normally operating and emergency standby systems and components. The failure during an earthquake (induced directly by excessive inertial stresses or indirectly following the failure of some other item) of an operating component will lead to a change in the state of the plant. In that case, various scenarios can follow depending on the initiating event and the status of other sub-systems. The analysis represents these possible chronological sequences by an event tree. The event trees and the associated fault trees model the sub-systems down to the level of individual components. The procedure has been applied for a typical Indian nuclear power plant. From the internal event PSA level I analysis significant contribution to the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) was found due to the Fire Water System. Hence, this system was selected to establish the procedure of seismic PSA. In this report the different elements that go into seismic PSA analysis have been discussed. Hazard curves have been developed for the site. Fragility curve for the seismically induced failure of Class IV power has been developed. The fragility curve for fire-water piping system has been generated. Event tree for Class IV power supply has been developed and the dominating accident sequences were identified. CDF has been estimated from these dominating accident sequences by convoluting hazard curves of initiating event and fragility curves of the safety systems. (author)

  13. ASN guide project. Safety policy and management in INBs (base nuclear installations)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This guide presents the recommendations of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in the field of safety policy and management (PMS) for base nuclear installations (INBs). It gives an overview and comments of some prescriptions of the so-called INB order and PMS decision. These regulatory texts define a framework for provisions any INB operator must implement to establish his safety policy, to define and implement a system which allows the safety to be maintained, the improvement of his INB safety to be permanently looked for. The following issues are addressed: operator's safety policy, identification of elements important for safety, of activities pertaining to safety, and of associated requirements, safety management organization and system, management of activities pertaining to safety, documentation and archiving

  14. Improvement of seismic observation systems in JOYO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sumino, Kozo; Suto, Masayoshi; Tanaka, Akihiro

    2013-01-01

    In the experimental fast reactor 'Joyo' in order to perform the seismic observation in and around the building block and ground, SMAC type seismographs had continuously been used for about 38 years. However, this equipment aged, and the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake on Mach 11, 2011 increased the importance of seismic data of the reactor facilities from the viewpoint of earthquake-proof safety. For these reasons, Joyo updated the system to the seismic observation system reflecting the latest technology/information, while keeping consistency with the observation data of the former seismographs (SMAC type seismograph). This updating improved various problems on the former observation seismographs. In addition, the installation of now observation points in the locations that are important in seismic safety evaluation expanded the data, and further improved the reliability of the seismic observation and evaluation on 'Joyo'. (A.O.)

  15. Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition); Seguridad radiologica en la radiografia industrial

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-12-15

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations for ensuring radiation safety in industrial radiography used in non-destructive testing. This includes industrial radiography work that utilizes X ray and gamma sources, both in shielded facilities that have effective engineering controls and in outside shielded facilities using mobile sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Duties and responsibilities; 3. Safety assessment; 4. Radiation protection programme; 5. Training and qualification; 6. Individual monitoring of workers; 7. Workplace monitoring; 8. Control of radioactive sources; 9. Safety of industrial radiography sources and exposure devices; 10. Radiography in shielded enclosures; 11. Site radiography; 12. Transport of radioactive sources; 13. Emergency preparedness and response; Appendix: IAEA categorization of radioactive sources; Annex I: Example safety assessment; Annex II: Overview of industrial radiography sources and equipment; Annex III: Examples of accidents in industrial radiography.

  16. Seismic assessment of a site using the time series method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krutzik, N.J.; Rotaru, I.; Bobei, M.; Mingiuc, C.; Serban, V.; Androne, M.

    2001-01-01

    1. To increase the safety of a NPP located on a seismic site, the seismic acceleration level to which the NPP should be qualified must be as representative as possible for that site, with a conservative degree of safety but not too exaggerated. 2. The consideration of the seismic events affecting the site as independent events and the use of statistic methods to define some safety levels with very low annual occurrence probabilities (10 -4 ) may lead to some exaggerations of the seismic safety level. 3. The use of some very high values for the seismic accelerations imposed by the seismic safety levels required by the hazard analysis may lead to very expensive technical solutions that can make the plant operation more difficult and increase the maintenance costs. 4. The consideration of seismic events as a time series with dependence among the events produced may lead to a more representative assessment of a NPP site seismic activity and consequently to a prognosis on the seismic level values to which the NPP would be ensured throughout its life-span. That prognosis should consider the actual seismic activity (including small earthquakes in real time) of the focuses that affect the plant site. The method is useful for two purposes: a) research, i.e. homogenizing the history data basis by the generation of earthquakes during periods lacking information and correlation of the information with the existing information. The aim is to perform the hazard analysis using a homogeneous data set in order to determine the seismic design data for a site; b) operation, i.e. the performance of a prognosis on the seismic activity on a certain site and consideration of preventive measures to minimize the possible effects of an earthquake. 5. The paper proposes the application of Autoregressive Time Series to issue a prognosis on the seismic activity of a focus and presents the analysis on Vrancea focus that affects Cernavoda NPP site by this method. 6. The paper also presents the

  17. Seismic and environmental qualification of class IE equipment manufactured in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerini, P.; Lumbreras, A.; Naredo, F.

    1978-01-01

    Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control design is affected by several factors such as various plant operating conditions, transient response capability, safety requirements and changes in IEEE standards. Recent upgraded IEEE standards that call for Qualification of all Safety related I anc C equipment, namely IEEE 323 (Qualifying Class IE Electric Equipment for nuclear power generating stations) and its daughter Standard IEEE 344 (Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for nuclear power generating stations) have been endorsed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the issuance of corresponding Regulatory Guides. The author describes the Qualification requirements applicable to the Class IE I and C Components made in Spain for the different vintages of plants, and the programs implemented or plans established by Westinghouse to fulfill those requirements. (author)

  18. Review on conformance of JMTR reactor facility to safety design examination guides for water-cooled reactors for test and research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ide, Hiroshi; Naka, Michihiro; Sakuta, Yoshiyuki; Hori, Naohiko; Matsui, Yoshinori; Miyazawa, Masataka

    2009-03-01

    The safety design examination guides for water-cooled reactors for test and research are formulated as fundamental judgements on the basic design validity for licensing from a viewpoint of the safety. Taking the refurbishment opportunity of the JMTR, the conformance of the JMTR reactor facility to current safety design examination guides was reviewed with licensing documents, annexes and related documents. As a result, it was found that licensing documents fully satisfied the requirements of the current guides. Moreover, it was found that the JMTR reactor facility itself also satisfied the guides requirements as well as the safety performance, since the facility with safety function such as structure, systems, devices had been installed based on the licensing documents under the permission by the regulation authority. Important devices for safety have been produced under authorization of regulating authority. Therefore, it was confirmed that the licensing was conformed to guides, and that the JMTR has enough performance. (author)

  19. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program. Phase I final report - Subsystem response (Project V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shieh, L.C.; Chuang, T.Y.; O'Connell, W.J.

    1981-10-01

    This document reports on (1) the computation of the responses of subsystems, given the input subsystem support motion for components and systems whose failure can lead to an accident sequence (radioactive release), and (2) the results of a sensitivity study undertaken to determine the contributions of the several links in the seismic methodology chain (SMC) - seismic input (SI), soil-structure interaction (SSI), structure response (STR), and subsystem response (SUB) - to the uncertainty in subsystem response. For the singly supported subsystems (e.g., pumps, turbines, electrical control panels, etc.), we used the spectral acceleration response of the structure at the point where the subsystem components were mounted. For the multiple supported subsystems, we developed 13 piping models of five safety-related systems, and then used the pseudostatic-mode method with multisupport input motion to compute the response parameters in terms of the parameters used in the fragility descriptions (i.e., peak resultant accelerations for valves and peak resultant moments for piping). Damping and frequency were varied to represent the sources of modeling and random uncertainty. Two codes were developed: a modified version of SAPIV which assembles the piping supports into groups depending on the support's location relative to the attached structure, and SAPPAC a stand-alone modular program from which the time-history analysis module is extracted. On the basis of our sensitivity study, we determined that the variability in the combined soil-structure interaction, structural response, and subsystem response areas contribute more to uncertainty in subsystem response than does the variability in the seismic input area, assuming an earthquake within the limited peak ground acceleration range, i.e., 0.15 to 0.30g. The seismic input variations were in terms of different earthquake time histories. (author)

  20. Forklift safety a practical guide to preventing powered industrial truck incidents and injuries

    CERN Document Server

    Swartz, George

    1999-01-01

    Written for the more than 1.5 million powered industrial truck operators and supervisors in general industry, as well as those in the construction and marine industries, this Second Edition provides an updated guide to training operators in safety and complying with OSHA's 1999 forklift standard. This edition of Forklift Safety includes a new chapter devoted to the new OSHA 1910.178 standard and new information regarding dock safety, narrow aisle trucks, off-dock incidents, tip-over safety, pallet safety, and carbon monoxide.

  1. Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides guidance on various aspects of emergency planning and preparedness for dealing effectively and safely with transport accidents involving radioactive material, including the assignment of responsibilities. It reflects the requirements specified in Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, and those of Safety Series No. 115, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Framework for planning and preparing for response to accidents in the transport of radioactive material; 3. Responsibilities for planning and preparing for response to accidents in the transport of radioactive material; 4. Planning for response to accidents in the transport of radioactive material; 5. Preparing for response to accidents in the transport of radioactive material; Appendix I: Features of the transport regulations influencing emergency response to transport accidents; Appendix II: Preliminary emergency response reference matrix; Appendix III: Guide to suitable instrumentation; Appendix IV: Overview of emergency management for a transport accident involving radioactive material; Appendix V: Examples of response to transport accidents; Appendix VI: Example equipment kit for a radiation protection team; Annex I: Example of guidance on emergency response to carriers; Annex II: Emergency response guide.

  2. NRC Seismic Design Margins Program Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummings, G.E.; Johnson, J.J.; Budnitz, R.J.

    1985-08-01

    Recent studies estimate that seismically induced core melt comes mainly from earthquakes in the peak ground acceleration range from 2 to 4 times the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) acceleration used in plant design. However, from the licensing perspective of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, there is a continuing need for consideration of the inherent quantitative seismic margins because of, among other things, the changing perceptions of the seismic hazard. This paper discusses a Seismic Design Margins Program Plan, developed under the auspices of the US NRC, that provides the technical basis for assessing the significance of design margins in terms of overall plant safety. The Plan will also identify potential weaknesses that might have to be addressed, and will recommend technical methods for assessing margins at existing plants. For the purposes of this program, a general definition of seismic design margin is expressed in terms of how much larger that the design basis earthquake an earthquake must be to compromise plant safety. In this context, margin needs to be determined at the plant, system/function, structure, and component levels. 14 refs., 1 fig

  3. IAEA activities to prepare safety codes and guides for thermal neutron nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iansiti, E.

    1977-01-01

    In accordance with the programme presented to, and endorsed by, the eighteenth General Conference in September 1974, the IAEA is now developing a complete set of safety codes and guides that will represent recommendations for the safety of thermal neutron power plants. The safety codes outline the minimum requirements for achieving this safety, and the safety guides set forth the criteria, procedures and methods to implement the safety codes. The whole programme is directed towards the five areas of Governmental Organization, Siting, Design, Operation, and Quality Assurance. One Scientific Secretary from the Agency Secretariat is responsible for each of these areas and a Co-ordinator takes care of common problems. For the development of each of these documents a working group of a few world experts is first convened which prepare a preliminary draft. This draft is then reviewed by a larger, international Technical Review Committee (one for each of the five areas) and a subsequent review by the Senior Advisory Group - with representatives from 20 states - ensures that the document is well coordinated within the programme. At this stage, it is sent to Member States for comments. The Technical Review Committee concerned is reconvened to integrate these comments into the document, and, after a final review by the Senior Advisory Group, the document is ready for transmission to the Director General of the Agency for endorsement and publication. A preliminary to this procedure is the collation by the Secretariat of large amounts of information submitted by Member States so that the first draft is really based on a very complete knowledge of what is done in each area all over the world. This collation frequently reveals differences in approach which are not random but due, rather, to the local conditions and the types of reactors. These differences must be harmonized in the documents produced without detracting from the effectiveness of the code or guide. The whole

  4. Upgrading of seismic design of nuclear power plant building

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Akiyama, Hiroshi [Tokyo Univ. (Japan). Faculty of Engineering; Kitada, Yoshio

    1997-03-01

    In Japan seismic design methodology of nuclear power plant (NPP) structures has been established as introduced in the previous session. And yet efforts have been continued to date to upgrade the methodology, because of conservative nature given to the methodology in regard to unknown phenomena and technically-limited modeling involved in design analyses. The conservative nature tends to produce excessive safety margins, and inevitably send NPP construction cost up. Moreover, excessive seismic design can increase the burden on normal plant operation, though not necessarily contributing to overall plant safety. Therefore, seismic engineering has put to many tests and simulation analyses in hopes to rationalize seismic design and enhance reliability of seismic safety of NPPs. In this paper, we describe some studies on structural seismic design of NPP underway as part of Japan`s effort to upgrade existing seismic design methodology. Most studies described here are carried out by NUPEC (Nuclear Power Engineering Company) funded by MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry Japan), though, similar studies with the same motive are also carrying out by nuclear industries such as utilities, NPP equipment and system manufacturers and building constructors. This paper consists of three sections, each introducing studies relating to NPP structural seismic design, new siting technology, and upgrading of the methodology of structural design analyses. (J.P.N.)

  5. Upgrading of seismic design of nuclear power plant building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Akiyama, Hiroshi; Kitada, Yoshio.

    1997-01-01

    In Japan seismic design methodology of nuclear power plant (NPP) structures has been established as introduced in the previous session. And yet efforts have been continued to date to upgrade the methodology, because of conservative nature given to the methodology in regard to unknown phenomena and technically-limited modeling involved in design analyses. The conservative nature tends to produce excessive safety margins, and inevitably send NPP construction cost up. Moreover, excessive seismic design can increase the burden on normal plant operation, though not necessarily contributing to overall plant safety. Therefore, seismic engineering has put to many tests and simulation analyses in hopes to rationalize seismic design and enhance reliability of seismic safety of NPPs. In this paper, we describe some studies on structural seismic design of NPP underway as part of Japan's effort to upgrade existing seismic design methodology. Most studies described here are carried out by NUPEC (Nuclear Power Engineering Company) funded by MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry Japan), though, similar studies with the same motive are also carrying out by nuclear industries such as utilities, NPP equipment and system manufacturers and building constructors. This paper consists of three sections, each introducing studies relating to NPP structural seismic design, new siting technology, and upgrading of the methodology of structural design analyses. (J.P.N.)

  6. Seismic analysis - what goal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tagart, S.W.

    1978-01-01

    The seismic analysis of nuclear components is characterized today by extensive engineering computer calculations in order to satisfy both the component standard codes such as ASME III as well as federal regulations and guides. The current nuclear siesmic design procedure has envolved in a fragmented fashion and continues to change its elements as improved technology leads to changing standards and guides. The dominant trend is a monotonic increase in the overall conservation with time causing a similar trend in costs of nuclear power plants. Ironically the improvements in the state of art are feeding a process which is eroding the very incentives that attracted us to nuclear power in the first place. This paper examines the cause of this process and suggests that what is needed is a realistic goal which appropriately addresses the overall uncertainty of the seismic design process. (Auth.)

  7. Seismic fragility capacity of equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iijima, Toru; Abe, Hiroshi; Suzuki, Kenichi

    2006-01-01

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is an available method to evaluate residual risks of nuclear plants that are designed on definitive seismic conditions. From our preliminary seismic PSA analysis, horizontal shaft pumps are important components that have significant influences on the core damage frequency (CDF). An actual horizontal shaft pump and some kinds of elements were tested to evaluate realistic fragility capacities. Our test results showed that the realistic fragility capacity of horizontal shaft pump would be at least four times as high as a current value, 1.6 x 9.8 m/s 2 , used for our seismic PSA. We are going to incorporate the fragility capacity data that were obtained from those tests into our seismic PSA analysis, and we expect that the reliability of seismic PSA should increase. (author)

  8. Seismic analysis for translational failure of landfills with retaining walls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feng, Shi-Jin; Gao, Li-Ya

    2010-11-01

    In the seismic impact zone, seismic force can be a major triggering mechanism for translational failures of landfills. The scope of this paper is to develop a three-part wedge method for seismic analysis of translational failures of landfills with retaining walls. The approximate solution of the factor of safety can be calculated. Unlike previous conventional limit equilibrium methods, the new method is capable of revealing the effects of both the solid waste shear strength and the retaining wall on the translational failures of landfills during earthquake. Parameter studies of the developed method show that the factor of safety decreases with the increase of the seismic coefficient, while it increases quickly with the increase of the minimum friction angle beneath waste mass for various horizontal seismic coefficients. Increasing the minimum friction angle beneath the waste mass appears to be more effective than any other parameters for increasing the factor of safety under the considered condition. Thus, selecting liner materials with higher friction angle will considerably reduce the potential for translational failures of landfills during earthquake. The factor of safety gradually increases with the increase of the height of retaining wall for various horizontal seismic coefficients. A higher retaining wall is beneficial to the seismic stability of the landfill. Simply ignoring the retaining wall will lead to serious underestimation of the factor of safety. Besides, the approximate solution of the yield acceleration coefficient of the landfill is also presented based on the calculated method. Copyright ยฉ 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. Seismic-Scale Rock Physics of Methane Hydrate

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Amos Nur

    2009-01-08

    We quantify natural methane hydrate reservoirs by generating synthetic seismic traces and comparing them to real seismic data: if the synthetic matches the observed data, then the reservoir properties and conditions used in synthetic modeling might be the same as the actual, in-situ reservoir conditions. This approach is model-based: it uses rock physics equations that link the porosity and mineralogy of the host sediment, pressure, and hydrate saturation, and the resulting elastic-wave velocity and density. One result of such seismic forward modeling is a catalogue of seismic reflections of methane hydrate which can serve as a field guide to hydrate identification from real seismic data. We verify this approach using field data from known hydrate deposits.

  10. Seismic contracts and agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, N.M.; Krause, V.

    1999-01-01

    Some points to consider regarding management of seismic projects within the Canadian petroleum industry were reviewed. Seismic projects involve the integration of many services. This paper focused on user-provider relationships, the project planning process, competitive bid considerations, the types of agreement used for seismic and their implications, and the impact that certain points of control may have on a company: (1) initial estimate versus actual cost, (2) liability, (3) safety and operational performance, and (4) quality of deliverables. The objective is to drive home the point that in today's environment where companies are forming, merging, or collapsing on a weekly basis , chain of command and accountability are issues that can no longer be dealt with casually. Companies must form business relationships with service providers with a full knowledge of benefits and liabilities of the style of relationship they choose. Diligent and proactive management tends to optimize cost, safety and liability issues, all of which have a bearing on the points of control available to the company

  11. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework. 1. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  12. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework; 1. ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  13. Tornadoes: Nature's Most Violent Storms. A Preparedness Guide Including Safety Information for Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    American National Red Cross, Washington, DC.

    This preparedness guide explains and describes tornadoes, and includes safety information for schools. A tornado is defined as a violently rotating column of air extending from a thunderstorm to the ground. The guide explains the cause of tornadoes, provides diagrams of how they form, describes variations of tornadoes, and classifies tornadoes byโ€ฆ

  14. Seismic margin analysis technique for nuclear power plant structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Jeong Moon; Choi, In Kil

    2001-04-01

    In general, the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) and the Seismic Margin Assessment(SAM) are used for the evaluation of realistic seismic capacity of nuclear power plant structures. Seismic PRA is a systematic process to evaluate the seismic safety of nuclear power plant. In our country, SPRA has been used to perform the probabilistic safety assessment for the earthquake event. SMA is a simple and cost effective manner to quantify the seismic margin of individual structural elements. This study was performed to improve the reliability of SMA results and to confirm the assessment procedure. To achieve this goal, review for the current status of the techniques and procedures was performed. Two methodologies, CDFM (Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin) sponsored by NRC and FA (Fragility Analysis) sponsored by EPRI, were developed for the seismic margin review of NPP structures. FA method was originally developed for Seismic PRA. CDFM approach is more amenable to use by experienced design engineers including utility staff design engineers. In this study, detailed review on the procedures of CDFM and FA methodology was performed

  15. Calculation of anti-seismic design for Xi'an pulsed reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Shuian

    2002-01-01

    The author describes the reactor safety rule, safety regulation and design code that must be observed to anti-seismic design in Xi'an pulsed reactor. It includes the classification of reactor installation, determination of seismic loads, calculate contents, program, method, results and synthetically evaluation. According to the different anti-seismic structure character of reactor installation, an appropriate method was selected to calculate the seismic response. The results were evaluated synthetically using the design code and design requirement. The evaluate results showed that the anti-seismic design function of reactor installation of Xi'an pules reactor is well, and the structure integrality and normal property of reactor installation can be protect under the designed classification of the earthquake

  16. Seismic risk assessment of a BWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wells, J.E.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Chen, J.C.; Lappa, D.A.; Chuang, T.Y.; Murray, R.C.; Johnson, J.J.

    1987-01-01

    The simplified seismic risk methodology developed in the USNRC Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was demonstrated by its application to the Zion nuclear power plant (PWR). The simplified seismic risk methodology was developed to reduce the costs associated with a seismic risk analysis while providing adequate results. A detailed model of Zion, including systems analysis models (initiating events, event trees, and fault trees), SSI and structure models, and piping models, was developed and used in assessing the seismic risk of the Zion nuclear power plant (FSAR). The simplified seismic risk methodology was applied to the LaSalle County Station nuclear power plant, a BWR; to further demonstrate its applicability, and if possible, to provide a basis for comparing the seismic risk from PWRs and BWRs. (orig./HP)

  17. Predisposal Management of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established for the predisposal management of low and intermediate level waste. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Roles and responsibilities; 4. General safety considerations; 5. Safety features for the predisposal management of LILW; 6. Record keeping and reporting; 7. Safety assessment; 8. Quality assurance; Annex I: Nature and sources of LILW from nuclear facilities; Annex II: Development of specifications for waste packages; Annex III: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external natural phenomena); Annex IV: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external human induced phenomena); Annex V: Postulated initiating events for consideration in a safety assessment (internal phenomena).

  18. NSR&D Program Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Call for Proposals Mitigation of Seismic Risk at Nuclear Facilities using Seismic Isolation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coleman, Justin [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-02-01

    Seismic isolation (SI) has the potential to drastically reduce seismic response of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and therefore the risk associated with large seismic events (large seismic event could be defined as the design basis earthquake (DBE) and/or the beyond design basis earthquake (BDBE) depending on the site location). This would correspond to a potential increase in nuclear safety by minimizing the structural response and thus minimizing the risk of material release during large seismic events that have uncertainty associated with their magnitude and frequency. The national consensus standard America Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 4, Seismic Analysis of Safety Related Nuclear Structures recently incorporated language and commentary for seismically isolating a large light water reactor or similar large nuclear structure. Some potential benefits of SI are: 1) substantially decoupling the SSC from the earthquake hazard thus decreasing risk of material release during large earthquakes, 2) cost savings for the facility and/or equipment, and 3) applicability to both nuclear (current and next generation) and high hazard non-nuclear facilities. Issue: To date no one has evaluated how the benefit of seismic risk reduction reduces cost to construct a nuclear facility. Objective: Use seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to evaluate the reduction in seismic risk and estimate potential cost savings of seismic isolation of a generic nuclear facility. This project would leverage ongoing Idaho National Laboratory (INL) activities that are developing advanced (SPRA) methods using Nonlinear Soil-Structure Interaction (NLSSI) analysis. Technical Approach: The proposed study is intended to obtain an estimate on the reduction in seismic risk and construction cost that might be achieved by seismically isolating a nuclear facility. The nuclear facility is a representative pressurized water reactor building nuclear power plant (NPP) structure

  19. Regulatory inspection of nuclear facilities and enforcement by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on the inspection of nuclear facilities, regulatory enforcement and related matters. The objective is to provide the regulatory body with a high level of confidence that operators have the processes in place to ensure compliance and that they do comply with legal requirements, including meeting the safety objectives and requirements of the regulatory body. However, in the event of non-compliance, the regulatory body should take appropriate enforcement action. This Safety Guide covers regulatory inspection and enforcement in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants; nuclear power plants; other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies; spent fuel reprocessing plants; and facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Section 2 sets out the objectives of regulatory inspection and enforcement. Section 3 covers the management of regulatory inspections. Section 4 covers the performance of regulatory inspections, including internal guidance, planning and preparation, methods of inspection and reports of inspections. Section 5 deals with regulatory enforcement actions. Section 6 covers the assessment of regulatory inspections and enforcement activities. The Appendix provides further details on inspection areas for nuclear facilities

  20. Seismic hazard assessment in intra-plate areas and backfitting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asmis, G.J.K.; Eng, P.

    2001-01-01

    Typically, fuel cycle facilities have been constructed over a 40 year time period incorporating various ages of seismic design provisions ranging from no specific seismic requirements to the life safety provisions normally incorporated in national building codes through to the latest seismic nuclear codes that provide not only for structural robustness but also include operational requirements for continued operation of essential safety functions. The task is to ensure uniform seismic risk in all facilities. Since the majority of the fuel cycle infrastructure has been built the emphasis is on re-evaluation and backfitting. The wide range of facilities included in the fuel cycle and the vastly varying hazard to safety, health and the environment suggest a performance based approach. This paper presents such an approach, placed in an intra-plate setting of a Stable Continental Region (SCR) typical to that found in Eastern Canada. (author)

  1. Seismic hazard analysis of Sinop province, Turkey using ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    1997-01-11

    Jan 11, 1997 ... 2008 in the Sinop province of Turkey this study presents a seismic hazard analysis based on ... Considering the development and improvement ... It is one of the most populated cities in the coun- ... done as reliably as the seismic hazard of region per- .... Seismic safety work of underground networks was.

  2. NRC systematic evaluation program: seismic review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levin, H.A.

    1980-01-01

    The NRC Systematic Evaluation Program is currently making an assessment of the seismic design safety of 11 older nuclear power plant facilities. The general review philosophy and review criteria relative to seismic input, structural response, and equipment functionability are presented, including the rationale for the development of these guidelines considering the significant evolution of seismic design criteria since these plants were originally licensed. Technical approaches thought more realistic in light of current knowledge are utilized. Initial findings for plants designed to early seismic design procedures suggest that with minor exceptions, these plants possess adequate seismic design margins when evaluated against the intent of current criteria. However, seismic qualification of electrical equipment has been identified as a subject which requires more in-depth evaluation

  3. A SIL quantification approach based on an operating situation model for safety evaluation in complex guided transportation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beugin, J.; Renaux, D.; Cauffriez, L.

    2007-01-01

    Safety analysis in guided transportation systems is essential to avoid rare but potentially catastrophic accidents. This article presents a quantitative probabilistic model that integrates Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) for evaluating the safety of such systems. The standardized SIL indicator allows the safety requirements of each safety subsystem, function and/or piece of equipment to be specified, making SILs pivotal parameters in safety evaluation. However, different interpretations of SIL exist, and faced with the complexity of guided transportation systems, the current SIL allocation methods are inadequate for the task of safety assessment. To remedy these problems, the model developed in this paper seeks to verify, during the design phase of guided transportation system, whether or not the safety specifications established by the transport authorities allow the overall safety target to be attained (i.e., if the SIL allocated to the different safety functions are sufficient to ensure the required level of safety). To meet this objective, the model is based both on the operating situation concept and on Monte Carlo simulation. The former allows safety systems to be formalized and their dynamics to be analyzed in order to show the evolution of the system in time and space, and the latter make it possible to perform probabilistic calculations based on the scenario structure obtained

  4. Preliminary standard review guide for Environmental Restoration/Decontamination and Decommissioning safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, D.R.

    1993-06-01

    The review guide is based on the shared experiences, approaches, and philosophies of the Environmental Restoration/Decontamination and Decommissioning (ER/D ampersand D) subgroup members. It is presented in the form of a review guide to maximize the benefit to both the safety analyses practitioner and reviewer. The guide focuses on those challenges that tend to be unique to ER/D ampersand D cleanup activities. Some of these experiences, approaches, and philosophies may find application or be beneficial to a broader spectrum of activities such as terminal cleanout or even new operations. Challenges unique to ER/D ampersand D activities include (1) consent agreements requiring activity startup on designated dates; (2) the increased uncertainty of specific hazards; and (3) the highly variable activities covered under the broad category of ER/D ampersand D. These unique challenges are in addition to the challenges encountered in all activities; e.g., new and changing requirements and multiple interpretations. The experiences in approaches, methods, and solutions to the challenges are documented from the practitioner and reviewer's perspective, thereby providing the viewpoints on why a direction was taken and the concerns expressed. Site cleanup consent agreements with predetermined dates for restoration activity startup add the dimension of imposed punitive actions for failure to meet the date. Approval of the safety analysis is a prerequisite to startup. Actions that increase expediency are (1) assuring activity safety; (2) documenting that assurance; and (3) acquiring the necessary approvals. These actions increase the timeliness of startup and decrease the potential for punitive action. Improvement in expediency has been achieved by using safety analysis techniques to provide input to the line management decision process rather than as a review of line management decisions. Expediency is also improved by sharing the safety input and resultant decisions with

  5. Seismic Adequacy Review of PC012 SCEs that are Potential Seismic Hazards with PC3 SCEs - CVD Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    OCOMA, E.C.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides seismic adequacy review of PCO12 Systems, Components L Equipment anchorage that are potential seismic interaction hazards with PC3 SCEs during a Design Basis Earthquake. The PCO12 items are identified in the Safety Equipment List as 3/1 SCEs

  6. Evaluation of the seismic integrity of a plutonium-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coats, D.W.

    1981-01-01

    Many studies have been made by and for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to ensure the seismic safety of its Plutonium Facility (Building 332). These studies have included seismological and geologic field investigations to define the actual seismic hazard existing at the Laboratory site as well as structural studies of the Facility itself. Because the basic seismic design criteria has undergone changes over the years, numerous structural studies and upgrades have been completed. The seismic criteria in use at the LLNL site is reviewed on a continuing basis as new information on the seismicity and geology of the Livermore Valley is obtained. At present, the Laboratory's Earth Sciences Division is conducting a multi-million dollar program to identify and characterize the geologic hazards at the Livermore site, with the primary emphasis on earthquake hazards in the Livermore Valley. This effort is undergoing an independent review by Woodward-Clyde Associates. Additionally, because of increased concerns over the seismic safety of Building 332, the Laboratory has initiated an independent structural review. This review effort will be monitored by the California Seismic Safety Commission to ensure its independence. Both of these studiies are in their early stages and results are not yet available

  7. Seismic Isolation Studies and Applications for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choun, Young Sun

    2005-01-01

    Seismic isolation, which is being used worldwide for buildings, is a well-known technology to protect structures from destructive earthquakes. In spite of the many potential advantages of a seismic isolation, however, the applications of a seismic isolation to nuclear facilities have been very limited because of a lack of sufficient knowledge about the isolation practices. The most important advantage of seismic isolation applications in nuclear power plants is that the safety and reliability of the plants can be remarkably improved through the standardization of the structures and equipment regardless of the seismic conditions of the sites. The standardization of structures and equipment will reduce the capital cost and design/construction schedule for future plants. Also, a seismic isolation can facilitate decoupling of the design and development for equipment, piping, and components due to the use of the generic in-structure response spectra associated with the standardized plant. Moreover, a seismic isolation will improve the plant safety margin against the design basis earthquake (DBE) as well as a beyond design basis seismic event due to its superior seismic performance. A number of seismic isolation systems have been developed and tested since 1970s, and some of them have been applied to conventional structures in several countries of high seismicity. In the nuclear field, there have been many studies on the applicability of such seismic isolation systems, but the application of a seismic isolation is very limited. Currently, there are some discussions on the application of seismic isolation systems to nuclear facilities between the nuclear industries and the regulatory agencies in the U.S.. In the future, a seismic isolation for nuclear facilities will be one of the important issues in the nuclear industry. This paper summarizes the past studies and applications of a seismic isolation in the nuclear industry

  8. Methodology for seismic PSA of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jirsa, P.

    1999-09-01

    A general methodology is outlined for seismic PSA (probabilistic safety assessment). The main objectives of seismic PSA include: description of the course of an event; understanding the most probable failure sequences; gaining insight into the overall probability of reactor core damage; identification of the main seismic risk contributors; identification of the range of peak ground accelerations contributing significantly to the plant risk; and comparison of the seismic risk with risks from other events. The results of seismic PSA are typically compared with those of internal PSA and of PSA of other external events. If the results of internal and external PSA are available, sensitivity studies and cost benefit analyses are performed prior to any decision regarding corrective actions. If the seismic PSA involves analysis of the containment, useful information can be gained regarding potential seismic damage of the containment. (P.A.)

  9. Seismic fragility analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostov, Marin

    2000-01-01

    In the last two decades there is increasing number of probabilistic seismic risk assessments performed. The basic ideas of the procedure for performing a Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of critical structures (NUREG/CR-2300, 1983) could be used also for normal industrial and residential buildings, dams or other structures. The general formulation of the risk assessment procedure applied in this investigation is presented in Franzini, et al., 1984. The probability of failure of a structure for an expected lifetime (for example 50 years) can be obtained from the annual frequency of failure, ฮฒ E determined by the relation: ฮฒ E โˆซ[d[ฮฒ(x)]/dx]P(flx)dx. ฮฒ(x) is the annual frequency of exceedance of load level x (for example, the variable x may be peak ground acceleration), P(fI x) is the conditional probability of structure failure at a given seismic load level x. The problem leads to the assessment of the seismic hazard ฮฒ(x) and the fragility P(fl x). The seismic hazard curves are obtained by the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. The fragility curves are obtained after the response of the structure is defined as probabilistic and its capacity and the associated uncertainties are assessed. Finally the fragility curves are combined with the seismic loading to estimate the frequency of failure for each critical scenario. The frequency of failure due to seismic event is presented by the scenario with the highest frequency. The tools usually applied for probabilistic safety analyses of critical structures could relatively easily be adopted to ordinary structures. The key problems are the seismic hazard definitions and the fragility analyses. The fragility could be derived either based on scaling procedures or on the base of generation. Both approaches have been presented in the paper. After the seismic risk (in terms of failure probability) is assessed there are several approaches for risk reduction. Generally the methods could be classified in two groups. The

  10. LANL seismic screening method for existing buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, S.L.; Feller, K.C.; Fritz de la Orta, G.O.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Seismic Screening Method is to provide a comprehensive, rational, and inexpensive method for evaluating the relative seismic integrity of a large building inventory using substantial life-safety as the minimum goal. The substantial life-safety goal is deemed to be satisfied if the extent of structural damage or nonstructural component damage does not pose a significant risk to human life. The screening is limited to Performance Category (PC) -0, -1, and -2 buildings and structures. Because of their higher performance objectives, PC-3 and PC-4 buildings automatically fail the LANL Seismic Screening Method and will be subject to a more detailed seismic analysis. The Laboratory has also designated that PC-0, PC-1, and PC-2 unreinforced masonry bearing wall and masonry infill shear wall buildings fail the LANL Seismic Screening Method because of their historically poor seismic performance or complex behavior. These building types are also recommended for a more detailed seismic analysis. The results of the LANL Seismic Screening Method are expressed in terms of separate scores for potential configuration or physical hazards (Phase One) and calculated capacity/demand ratios (Phase Two). This two-phase method allows the user to quickly identify buildings that have adequate seismic characteristics and structural capacity and screen them out from further evaluation. The resulting scores also provide a ranking of those buildings found to be inadequate. Thus, buildings not passing the screening can be rationally prioritized for further evaluation. For the purpose of complying with Executive Order 12941, the buildings failing the LANL Seismic Screening Method are deemed to have seismic deficiencies, and cost estimates for mitigation must be prepared. Mitigation techniques and cost-estimate guidelines are not included in the LANL Seismic Screening Method

  11. Analysis of EAST tokamak cryostat anti-seismic performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Wei; Kong Xiaoling; Liu Sumei; Ni Xiaojun; Wang Zhongwei

    2014-01-01

    A 3-D finite element model for EAST tokamak cryostat is established by using ANSYS. On the basis of the modal analysis, the seismic response of the EAST tokamak cryostat structure is calculated according to an input of the design seismic response spectrum referring to code for seismic design of nuclear power plants. Calculation results show that EAST cryostat displacement and stress response is small under the action of earthquake. According to the standards, EAST tokamak cryostat structure under the action of design seismic can meet the requirements of anti-seismic design intensity, and ensure the anti-seismic safety of equipment. (authors)

  12. Enhancement of seismic resistance of buildings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Claudiu-Sorin Dragomir

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The objectives of the paper are both seismic instrumentation for damage assessment and enhancing of seismic resistance of buildings. In according with seismic design codes in force the buildings are designed to resist at seismic actions. Due to the time evolution of these design provisions, there are buildings that were designed decades ago, under the less stringent provisions. The conceptual conformation is nowadays provided in all Codes of seismic design. According to the Code of seismic design P100-1:2006 the asymmetric structures do not have an appropriate seismic configuration; they have disadvantageous distribution of volumes, mass and stiffness. Using results of temporary seismic instrumentation the safety condition of the building may be assessed in different phases of work. Based on this method, the strengthening solutions may be identified and the need of seismic joints may be emphasised. All the aforementioned ideas are illustrated through a case study. Therefore it will be analysed the dynamic parameter evolution of an educational building obtained in different periods. Also, structural intervention scenarios to enhance seismic resistance will be presented.

  13. New seismic attributes and methodology for automated stratigraphic, structural, and reservoir analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Randen, Trygve; Reymond, Benoit; Sjulstad, Hans Ivar; Soenneland, Lars

    1998-12-31

    Seismic stratigraphy represents an attractive framework for interpretation of 3-D data. This presentation is an introduction to a set of primitives that will enable guided interpretation of seismic signals in the framework of seismic stratigraphy. A method capable of automatic detection of terminations is proposed. The new procedure can be run on the entire seismic volume or it may be restricted to a limited time interval and detects terminations in an unguided manner without prior interpretation. The density of terminations can be computed. The procedure may alternatively be guided by pre-existing interpretation, e.g. detecting terminations onto an interpreted horizon. In such a case, the density of terminations will be a new surface attribute. 6 refs., 3 figs.

  14. New seismic attributes and methodology for automated stratigraphic, structural, and reservoir analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Randen, Trygve; Reymond, Benoit; Sjulstad, Hans Ivar; Soenneland, Lars

    1999-12-31

    Seismic stratigraphy represents an attractive framework for interpretation of 3-D data. This presentation is an introduction to a set of primitives that will enable guided interpretation of seismic signals in the framework of seismic stratigraphy. A method capable of automatic detection of terminations is proposed. The new procedure can be run on the entire seismic volume or it may be restricted to a limited time interval and detects terminations in an unguided manner without prior interpretation. The density of terminations can be computed. The procedure may alternatively be guided by pre-existing interpretation, e.g. detecting terminations onto an interpreted horizon. In such a case, the density of terminations will be a new surface attribute. 6 refs., 3 figs.

  15. External human induced events in site evaluation for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of the present Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance for the examination of the region considered for site evaluation for a plant in order to identity hazardous phenomena associated with human induced events initiated by sources external to the plant. In some cases it also presents preliminary guidance for deriving values of relevant parameters for the design basis. This Safety Guide is also applicable for periodic site evaluation and site evaluation following a major human induced event, and for the design and operation of the site's environmental monitoring system. Site evaluation includes site characterization. Consideration of external events that could lead to a degradation of the safety features of the plant and cause a release of radioactive material from the plant and/or affect the dispersion of such material in the environment. And consideration of population issues and access issues significant to safety (such as the feasibility of evacuation, the population distribution and the location of resources). The process of site evaluation continues throughout the lifetime of the facility, from siting to design, construction, operation and decommissioning. The external human induced events considered in this Safety Guide are all of accidental origin. Considerations relating to the physical protection of the plant against wilful actions by third parties are outside its scope. However, the methods described herein may also have some application for the purposes of such physical protection. The present Safety Guide may also be used for events that may originate within the boundaries of the site, but from sources which are not directly involved in the operational states of the nuclear power plant units, such as fuel depots or areas for the storage of hazardous materials for the construction of other facilities at the same site. Special consideration should be given to the hazardous material handled during the construction, operation and

  16. New seismic source `BLASTER` for seismic survey; Hasaiyaku wo shingen to shite mochiita danseiha tansa

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koike, G; Yoshikuni, Y [OYO Corp., Tokyo (Japan)

    1996-10-01

    Built-up weight and vacuole have been conceived as seismic sources without using explosive. There have been problems that they have smaller energy to generate elastic wave than explosive, and that they have inferior working performance. Concrete crushing explosive is tried to use as a new seismic source. It is considered to possess rather large seismic generating energy, and it is easy to handle from the viewpoint of safety. Performance as seismic source and applicability to exploration works of this crushing explosive were compared with four kinds of seismic sources using dynamite, dropping weight, shot-pipe utilizing shot vacuole, and impact by wooden maul. When considered by the velocity amplitude, the seismic generating energy of the crushing explosive of 120 g is about one-fifth of dynamite of 100 g. Elastic wave generated includes less high frequency component than that by dynamite, and similar to that using seismic source without explosive, such as the weight dropping. The maximum seismic receiving distance obtained by the seismic generation was about 100 m. This was effective for the slope survey with the exploration depth between 20 m and 30 m. 1 ref., 9 figs., 2 tabs.

  17. Topical opinion paper - Apparent Discrepancies Between Nuclear and Conventional Seismic Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donald, John; Smith, Ian

    2003-01-01

    The differences between nuclear and conventional seismic standards are considered and their potential significance discussed. The approach to the design of nuclear facilities is appropriately both more rigorous and conservative than that required by conventional seismic standards and codes. For nuclear seismic design the requirements can be presented as assessment principles, e.g., NII SAPs or a safety guide e.g. IAEA; Seismic Design and Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants. The adoption of novel methods or designs are required to be supported by appropriate research and development with the ability to cite a precedent within the industry being a powerful endorsement. The method adopted must reliably predict the seismic response of the item to be qualified, including the seismic response of attached or supported Structures, Systems and Components. (SSC's) The traditional method adopted for seismic qualification by analysis has been based on linear elastic analyses. This is justified on the basis that the response is reliably predicted and realistic, provided that the elements remain elastic. In contrast the benefit of ductile behaviour of conventional structures within the design envelope has long been recognised and used as the basis to justify significant reductions in the seismic demand. Provided the acceptance criteria are met, the SAPs do not preclude and the IAEA safety guide specifically permits non linear behaviour within the design envelope for category 1 items. Both the current nuclear practice and the current conventional seismic standards can be classified as 'force based'. The displacement based approach, also referred to as performance based engineering (PBE), has been developed as a powerful tool in the evaluation and seismic retrofit of existing structures. This approach could be equally valid to the design of new structures and can be used to represent elastic or non linear behaviour although the full benefit will only be realised in the latter

  18. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides guidance on the predisposal management of all types of radioactive waste (including spent nuclear fuel declared as waste and high level waste) generated at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These waste management facilities may be located within larger facilities or may be separate, dedicated waste management facilities (including centralized waste management facilities). The Safety Guide covers all stages in the lifetime of these facilities, including their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and shutdown and decommissioning. It covers all steps carried out in the management of radioactive waste following its generation up to (but not including) disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning). Radioactive waste generated both during normal operation and in accident conditions is considered

  19. THK: CLB Crossed Linear Bearing Seismic Isolators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toniolo, Roberto

    2008-01-01

    This text highlights the new seismic isolation technology called CLB (Crossed Linear Bearing), which is made of linear guides with recirculating steel ball technology. It describes specifications and building characteristics, provides examples of seismic isolation and application functionalities and shows experimental data. Since 1994, the constant commitment by Japan to develop diversified anti-seismic systems based on the precise needs of the structures to protect and the areas where they were built has led to the creation of important synergy between the research institutions of leading Japanese companies and THK's Centre for Research and Development. Their goal has been to develop new technology and solutions to allow seismic isolation to be effective in the following cases:

  20. A report on seismic re-evaluation of Cirus systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varma, Veto; Reddy, G.R.; Vaze, K.K.; Kushwaha, H.S.

    2003-06-01

    Cirus was initiated way back in 1955 and its design was made with the methods prevailing at that time. The design codes and safety standards have changed since then, particularly with respect to seismic design criteria. As the structure is an important safety related structure it is mandatory to meet the present statutory requirement. This report contains the seismic qualification for some of the Cirus systems. The report has four parts. Part I gives the analytical studies performed in the containment building, Part II describes of experimental studies carried out to validate the analytical studies for containment builaing, Part III explains the seismic retrofitting of Battery bank, and Part IV summarizes the seismic qualification of inlet and exhaust damper of Cirus. (author)

  1. Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment for Point Lepreau Generating Station

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mullin, D. [New Brunswick Power Corp., Point Lepreau Generating Station, Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada); Lavine, A. [AMEC Foster Wheeler Environment and Infrastructure Americas, Oakland, California (United States); Egan, J. [SAGE Engineers, Oakland, California (United States)

    2015-09-15

    A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA) has been performed for the Point Lepreau Generating Station (PLGS). The objective is to provide characterization of the earthquake ground shaking that will be used to evaluate seismic safety. The assessment is based on the current state of knowledge of the informed scientific and engineering community regarding earthquake hazards in the site region, and includes two primary components-a seismic source model and a ground motion model. This paper provides the methodology and results of the PLGS PSHA. The implications of the updated hazard information for site safety are discussed in a separate paper. (author)

  2. Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment for Point Lepreau Generating Station

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mullin, D., E-mail: dmullin@nbpower.com [New Brunswick Power Corporation, Point Lepreau Generating Station, Point Lepreau, NB (Canada); Lavine, A., E-mail: alexis.lavine@amecfw.com [AMEC Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure Americas, Oakland, CA (United States); Egan, J., E-mail: jegan@sageengineers.com [SAGE Engineers, Oakland, CA (United States)

    2015-07-01

    A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA) has been performed for the Point Lepreau Generating Station (PLGS). The objective is to provide characterization of the earthquake ground shaking that will be used to evaluate seismic safety. The assessment is based on the current state of knowledge of the informed scientific and engineering community regarding earthquake hazards in the site region, and includes two primary components--a seismic source model and a ground motion model. This paper provides the methodology and results of the PLGS PSHA. The implications of the updated hazard information for site safety are discussed in a separate paper. (author)

  3. A cost summary applicable to seismic construction and maintenance of nuclear safety related piping

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevenson, J.D.

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents a summary of costs applicable to nuclear power plant piping for an earthquake defined as 0.2 SSE-PGA as a function of three eras of initial construction: 1967--1974, 1974--1981 and 1981--1990. Costs have been presented for both new construction and maintenance in operating plants using both the original PSAR-FSAR design criteria and current SRP requirements. It is recommended that the cost information contained in this report be considered in evaluating the cost benefit relationships associated with current and proposed future changes in seismic design procedures applicable to safety-related piping systems

  4. Salt Repository Project input to seismic design: Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    The Salt Repository Program (SRP) Input to Seismic Design (ISD) documents the assumptions, rationale, approaches, judgments, and analyses that support the development of seismic-specific data and information to be used for shaft design in accordance with the SRP Shaft Design Guide (SDG). The contents of this document are divided into four subject areas: (1) seismic assessment, (2) stratigraphy and material properties for seismic design, (3) development of seismic design parameters, and (4) host media stability. These four subject areas have been developed considering expected conditions at a proposed site in Deaf Smith County, Texas. The ISD should be used only in conjunction with seismic design of the exploratory and repository shafts. Seismic design considerations relating to surface facilities are not addressed in this document. 54 refs., 55 figs., 18 tabs

  5. Inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body for nuclear power plants. A safety guide. A publication within the NUSS programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on fulfilling the requirements for inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body, as set out in the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; Governmental Organization. This Safety Guide deals with the responsibilities of the regulatory body, the organization of inspection programmes, the inspection resources of the regulatory body, methods of inspection, requirements on the applicant/licensee in regard to regulatory inspection, inspection reports, and regulatory action and enforcement. It is recognized that many of the provisions of this Safety Guide may be applicable to the regulations of other nuclear facilities and related activities including research reactors, fuel processing and manufacturing plants, irradiated fuel processing plants and radioactive waste management facilities. This Safety Guide does not deal specifically with the functions of a regulatory body responsible for such matters; however, the guidance presented here may be applied as appropriate to these activities. 11 refs, 1 fig

  6. Seismic design of reactors in NUCEF

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kurosaki, Akira [Mitsui Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd., Tokyo (Japan); Kuchiya, Masao; Yasuda, Naomitsu; Kitanaka, Tsutomu; Ogawa, Kazuhiko; Sakuraba, Koichi; Izawa, Naoki; Takeshita, Isao

    1997-03-01

    Basic concept and calculation method for the seismic design of the main equipment of the reactors in NUCEF (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety Engineering Research Facility) are described with actual calculation examples. The present paper is published to help the seismic design of the equipment and application of the authorization for the design and constructing of facilities. (author)

  7. Research and development studies on the seismic behaviour of the PEC fast reactor (safety analysis detailed report no. 8)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martelli, A.; Forni, M.; Masoni, P.; Maresca, G.; Castoldi, A.; Muzzi, F. [ENEA, Rome (Italy); Ansaldo Spa, Genoa [Italy; ISMES Spa, Bergamo [Italy

    1988-01-15

    This paper presents the main features and results of the numerical and experimental studies that were carried out by ENEA (Italian Commission for Alternative Energy Sources) for the seismic verification of the Italian PEC fast reactor test facility. More precisely, the paper focuses on the wide-ranging research and development programme that has been performed (and recently completed) on the reactor building, the reactor-block, the main vessel, the core and the shutdown system. The needs of these detailed studies are stressed and the feed-backs on the design, necessary safisfy the seismic safety requirements, are recalled. The general validity of the analyses in the framework of the research and development activities for nuclear reactor is also pointed out.

  8. Seismic verification methods for structures and equipment of VVER-type and RBMK-type NPPs (summary of experiences)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masopust, R.

    2003-01-01

    The main verification methods for structures and equipment of already existing VVER-type and RBMK-type NPPs are briefly described. The following aspects are discussed: fundamental seismic safety assessment principles for VVER/RBMK-type NPPs (seismic safety assessment procedure, typical work plan for seismic safety assessment of existing NPPs, SMA (HCLPF) calculations, modified GIP (GIP-VVER) procedure, similarity of VVER/RBMK equipment to that included in the SQUG databases and seismic interactions

  9. Investigation on seismic signals for blasting in quarries

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Pandula, B.; Kondela, J.; Holub, Karel

    2012-01-01

    Roฤ. 19, ฤ. 1 (2012), s. 41-59 ISSN 1803-1447 Institutional support: RVO:68145535 Keywords : blasting operations * seismic safety * seismic waves Subject RIV: DC - Siesmology, Volcanology, Earth Structure http://www.caag.cz/egrse/2012-1/04_pandula-r.pdf

  10. Taking into account seismic risk on glove boxes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ladurelle, Marie; Philipponneau, Yannick

    2005-01-01

    Built in 1981, the LEFCA is a Basic Nuclear Facility (BNF) in which experimental plutonium based fuels are produced and characterised in about a hundred Gloves Boxes (GB). Many safety rules are required, especially those concerning seismic risk. In order to prepare the December 2003 safety reconsideration, the following methodology has been proposed so that GB might resist the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. 1) The determination of a safety target: the GB static containment. 2) The realisation of an ''in situ'' assessment: the definition of several classes of GB, vibrating table tests and the modelling of the GB behaviour with seismic solicitations, 3) A strength diagnosis for equipment: filters, connecting tunnels and pipes holding. 4) A proposal for further strengthening modifications if necessary : fixing the frame, interlocking GB and the frame, taking internal or external GB missiles into account. This process has contributed to a reduction in the radiological potential seismic impact for the neighbouring populations. We shall present the implemented methodology and the strengthening works that have been approved by Safety Authorities. Reinforcement modifications will begin in 2004. (Author)

  11. Taking into account seismic risk on glove boxes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladurelle, Marie; Philipponneau, Yannick

    2005-01-01

    Built in 1981, the LEFCA is a Basic Nuclear Facility (BNF) in which experimental plutonium based fuels are produced and characterised in about a hundred Gloves Boxes (GB). Many safety rules are required, especially those concerning seismic risk. In order to prepare the December 2003 safety reconsideration, the following methodology has been proposed so that GB might resist the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. 1) The determination of a safety target: the GB static containment. 2) The realisation of an ''in situ'' assessment: the definition of several classes of GB, vibrating table tests and the modelling of the GB behaviour with seismic solicitations, 3) A strength diagnosis for equipment: filters, connecting tunnels and pipes holding. 4) A proposal for further strengthening modifications if necessary : fixing the frame, interlocking GB and the frame, taking internal or external GB missiles into account. This process has contributed to a reduction in the radiological potential seismic impact for the neighbouring populations. We shall present the implemented methodology and the strengthening works that have been approved by Safety Authorities. Reinforcement modifications will begin in 2004. (Author)

  12. Seismic proving test of BWR primary loop recirculation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, H.; Shigeta, M.; Karasawa, Y.

    1987-01-01

    The seismic proving test of BWR Primary Loop Recirculation system is the second test to use the large-scale, high-performance vibration table of Tadotsu Engineering Laboratory. The purpose of this test is to prove the seismic reliability of the primary loop recirculation system (PLR), one of the most important safety components in the BWR nuclear plants, and also to confirm the adequacy of seismic analysis method used in the current seismic design. To achieve the purpose, the test was conducted under conditions and scale as near as possible to actual systems. The strength proving test was carried out with the test model mounted on the vibration table in consideration of basic design earthquake ground motions and other conditions to confirm the soundness of structure and the strength against earthquakes. Detailed analysis and analytic evaluation of the data obtained from the test was conducted to confirm the adequacy of the seismic analysis method and earthquake response analysis method used in the current seismic design. Then, on the basis of the results obtained, the seismic safety and reliability of BWR primary loop recirculation of the actual plants was fully evaluated

  13. The Virtual Seismic Atlas Project: sharing the interpretation of seismic data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Butler, R.; Mortimer, E.; McCaffrey, B.; Stuart, G.; Sizer, M.; Clayton, S.

    2007-12-01

    Through the activities of academic research programs, national institutions and corporations, especially oil and gas companies, there is a substantial volume of seismic reflection data. Although the majority is proprietary and confidential, there are significant volumes of data that are potentially within the public domain and available for research. Yet the community is poorly connected to these data and consequently geological and other research using seismic reflection data is limited to very few groups of researchers. This is about to change. The Virtual Seismic Atlas (VSA) is generating an independent, free-to-use, community based internet resource that captures and shares the geological interpretation of seismic data globally. Images and associated documents are explicitly indexed using not only existing survey and geographical data but also on the geology they portray. By using "Guided Navigation" to search, discover and retrieve images, users are exposed to arrays of geological analogues that provide novel insights and opportunities for research and education. The VSA goes live, with evolving content and functionality, through 2008. There are opportunities for designed integration with other global data programs in the earth sciences.

  14. Civil Works Seismic Designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-12-01

    RFS or Regles Fondamentales de Surete (Basic Safety Rules) applicable to certain types of nuclear facilities lay down requirements with which compliance, for the type of facilities and within the scope of application covered by the RFS, is considered to be equivalent to compliance with technical French regulatory practice. The object of the RFS is to take advantage of standardization in the field of safety, while allowing for technical progress in that field. They are designed to enable the operating utility and contractors to know the rules pertaining to various subjects which are considered to be acceptable by the Service Central de Surete des Installations Nucleaires, or the SCSIN (Central Department for the Safety of Nuclear Facilities). These RFS should make safety analysis easier and lead to better understanding between experts and individuals concerned with the problems of nuclear safety. The SCSIN reserves the right to modify, when considered necessary, any RFS and specify, if need be, the terms under which a modification is deemed retroactive. This rule defines: - the parameters characterizing the design seismic motions - the calculation methods - the mathematical schematization principles on which calculations are based - the use of the seismic response for the structure checking - the content of the documents to be presented

  15. Seismic qualification of equipment by means of probabilistic risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Azarm, M.A.; Farahzad, P.; Boccio, J.L.

    1982-01-01

    Upon the sponsorship of the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) of NRC, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has utilized a risk-based approach for identifying, in a generic fashion, seismically risk-sensitive equipment. It is anticipated that the conclusions drawn therefrom and the methodology employed will, in part, reconcile some of the concerns dealing with the seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants. The approach taken augments an existing sensitivity analysis, based upon the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study (RSS), by accounting for seismicity and component fragility with the Kennedy model and by essentially including the requisite seismic data presented in the Zion Probabilistic Safety Study (ZPSS). Parametrically adjusting the seismic-related variables and ascertaining their effects on overall plant risk, core-melt probability, accident sequence probability, etc., allows one to identify those seismically risk-sensitive systems and equipment. This paper describes the approach taken and highlights the results obtained thus far for a hypothetical pressurized water reactor

  16. Integrity analysis of an upper guide structure flange

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Ki Hyoung; Kang, Sung Sik; Jhung, Myung Jo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The integrity assessment of reactor vessel internals should be conducted in the design process to secure the safety of nuclear power plants. Various loads such as self-weight, seismic load, flow-induced load, and preload are applied to the internals. Therefore, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section III, defines the stress limit for reactor vessel internals. The present study focused on structural response analyses of the upper guide structure upper flange. The distributions of the stress intensity in the flange body were analyzed under various design load cases during normal operation. The allowable stress intensities along the expected sections of stress concentration were derived from the results of the finite element analysis for evaluating the structural integrity of the flange design. Furthermore, seismic analyses of the upper flange were performed to identify dynamic behavior with respect to the seismic and impact input. The mode superposition and full transient methods were used to perform timeโ€“history analyses, and the displacement at the lower end of the flange was obtained. The effect of the damping ratio on the response of the flange was also evaluated, and the acceleration was obtained. The results of elastic and seismic analyses in this study will be used as basic information to judge whether a flange design meets the acceptance criteria.

  17. Russian seismic standards and demands for equipment and their conformity with international standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaznovsky, S.; Ostretsov, I.

    1993-01-01

    The principle regulations of standard documents concerning seismic safety of NPPs and demands for reactor equipment conformity with international standards are presented in this report. General state of NPP safety standards is reviewed, with a special emphasis on the state of seismic design standards for NPP equipment and piping. Russian standards documents on seismic resistance of NPPs and requirements are compared to international ones

  18. On development and improvement of evaluation techniques for seismic ground motion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    Issues regarding evaluation of active fault and ground motion for formulation of design basis ground motion (Ss) were prescribed in 'NSC seismic and tsunami safety reviewing manual' in 2012. Moreover, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is establishing the new seismic safety guideline. In this theme following four subjects were investigated to resolve the important problems for ground motion evaluation, (1) advanced evaluation of ground motion using fault model and uncertainty; (2) improving evaluation of ground motion using attenuation relation of response spectrum; (3) development of advanced and generic techniques for ground motion observation and observation tool in deep borehole; (4) improving the evaluation of site effect and seismic wave propagation characteristics. In addition as emergency requirements from NRA following two subjects were also investigated; (5) hazard evaluation development on fault displacement; (6) ground motion evaluation at near-by source location. Obtained results will be reflected not only in the domestic guideline established by NRA but in the national safety review and also in the safety standard guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through its Extra-Budgetary Program (EBP), thereby contributing to technical cooperation in global nuclear seismic safety. (author)

  19. Seismic assessment of safety-related structures: laboratory testing of the pressure relief duct frame at pickering NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghobarah, A.; Biddah, A.; Pilette, C.

    1995-01-01

    The pressure relief duct (PRD) is a Special safety System in the CANDU-PHW multi-unit nuclear power plants (NPP). It is designed to contain and direct the outflow from the reactor building to the pressure suppression and containing systems in the vacuum building. The PRD is a large elevated reinforced concrete box structure of internal width of 6.1 m, height of 7.6 m, and wall thickness of 0.6 m. The PRD is 662 m long and is supported every 22 m by concrete frames of height of 21 m. Typical frame members are 1.8 m in depth and width. A representative elevation of the frame is presented. The section of the PRD under investigation was designed and constructed before the current seismic design codes were in effect. An assessment of the PRD structure when subjected to various levels of ground motion has shown that the frame has a limited seismic withstand capacity. Its seismic performance is dependent on the ductility of the beams and on the ability of the beam-column joint to transfer bending moments and shear forces. The objectives of this study are to provide the data to validate the frame analysis results through laboratory testing of a scaled specimen of the beam-column joint, and to compare the observed response with the response of a beam-column joint when the shear reinforcement is detailed according to current seismic design codes. (author). 3 refs., 10 figs

  20. Seismic assessment and upgrading of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tamas, K.

    2001-01-01

    A comprehensive programme for seismic assessment and upgrading is currently in progress at Hungary's Paks NPP. The re-evaluation of the site seismic hazard had been already completed. The technology of safe shut down and heat removal is established and the systems and structures relevant for seismic safety are identified. A seismic instrumentation is installed. The pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake actions are elaborated. The methods for seismic capacity assessment are selected. The seismic capacity evaluation and the design of upgrading measures are currently in progress. The easy to perform upgrading covering the most urgent measures had been already performed. (author)

  1. Stabilizer for seismically exposed bridge cranes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engelke, M.; Kuhr, H.

    1982-01-01

    The invention concerns a stabilizer for seismically exposed bridge cranes in reactor buildings. The trolley and the crane bridge are fitted with the stabilizer consisting of a bipartite safety catch which is connected with a joint and able to take up the vertical loads during an earthquake. This stabilizer is suitable for all kinds of bridge cranes operated in seismically active regions

  2. Seismic fragility analysis of a nuclear building based on probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and soil-structure interaction analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gonzalez, R.; Ni, S.; Chen, R.; Han, X.M. [CANDU Energy Inc, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada); Mullin, D. [New Brunswick Power, Point Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada)

    2016-09-15

    Seismic fragility analyses are conducted as part of seismic probabilistic safety assessment (SPSA) for nuclear facilities. Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) has been undertaken for a nuclear power plant in eastern Canada. Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS), obtained from the PSHA, is characterized by high frequency content which differs from the original plant design basis earthquake spectral shape. Seismic fragility calculations for the service building of a CANDU 6 nuclear power plant suggests that the high frequency effects of the UHS can be mitigated through site response analysis with site specific geological conditions and state-of-the-art soil-structure interaction analysis. In this paper, it is shown that by performing a detailed seismic analysis using the latest technology, the conservatism embedded in the original seismic design can be quantified and the seismic capacity of the building in terms of High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) can be improved. (author)

  3. Development of seismic hazard analysis in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itoh, T.; Ishii, K.; Ishikawa, Y.; Okumura, T.

    1987-01-01

    In recent years, seismic risk assessment of the nuclear power plant have been conducted increasingly in various countries, particularly in the United States to evaluate probabilistically the safety of existing plants under earthquake loading. The first step of the seismic risk assessment is the seismic hazard analysis, in which the relationship between the maximum earthquake ground motions at the plant site and their annual probability of exceedance, i.e. the seismic hazard curve, is estimated. In this paper, seismic hazard curves are evaluated and examined based on historical earthquake records model, in which seismic sources are modeled with area-sources, for several different sites in Japan. A new evaluation method is also proposed to compute the response spectra of the earthquake ground motions in connection with estimating the probabilistic structural response. Finally the numerical result of probabilistic risk assessment for a base-isolated three story RC structure, in which the frequency of seismic induced structural failure is evaluated combining the seismic hazard analysis, is described briefly

  4. Subsystem response review. Seismic safety margins research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.P.; Campbell, R.D.; Wesley, D.A.; Kamil, H.; Gantayat, A.; Vasudevan, R.

    1981-07-01

    A study was conducted to document the state of the art in seismic qualification of nuclear power plant components and subsystems by analysis and testing and to identify the sources and magnitude of the uncertainties associated with analysis and testing methods. The uncertainties are defined in probabilistic terms for use in probabilistic seismic risk studies. Recommendations are made for the most appropriate subsystem response analysis methods to minimize response uncertainties. Additional studies, to further quantify testing uncertainties, are identified. Although the general effect of non-linearities on subsystem response is discussed, recommendations and conclusions are based principally on linear elastic analysis and testing models. (author)

  5. Comparison and Analysis of IEEE 344 and IEC 60980 standards for harmonization of seismic qualification of safety-related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Young Ok; Kim, Jong Seog; Seo, Jeong Ho; Kim, Myung Jun

    2011-01-01

    The seismic qualification of safety related equipment in nuclear power plants should demonstrate an equipment's ability to perform its safety function during/or after the time it is subjected to the forces resulting from one SSE. In addition, the equipment must withstand the effects of a number of OBEs, preceding the SSE. IEEE 344 and IEC 60980 present the criteria for establishing procedures demonstrating that the Class 1E equipment can meet its performance requirement during seismic events. Currently, IEEE 344 is used for regulation of nuclear power plant in the United State whereas IEC 60980 is mainly used in Europe. In particular, NPPs of France and China apply with RCC-E and GB that are domestic standards, respectively. Equipment supplier and Utility have difficulties because of different applicable standards. Equipment supplier to export S/R components/equipment to other standard area performs additional seismic qualification. For example, equipment are qualifies according to IEC 60980, RCC-E, GB although they have been qualified in accordance with IEEE 344. Also, utility to attempt power up-rate, life extension of NPP constructed under rules of RCC-E such as Ulchin NPP 1 and 2 has similar difficulties. RCC-E endorses IEC 60980 and GB is almost same as IEC 60980 except minor difference of earthquake environment definition. Therefore this paper surveys the similarities and differences between IEEE 344 and IEC 60980. In addition, this paper considers how the two sets of standards may be used in a complementary fashion to be possible using one or the other standard area

  6. Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection. Safety Guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide international guidance, coherent with contemporary radiation protection principles and IAEA safety requirements, on the strategy of monitoring in relation to: (a) control of radionuclide discharges under practice conditions, and (b) intervention, such as in cases of nuclear or radiological emergencies or past contamination of areas with long lived radionuclides. Three categories of monitoring are discussed: monitoring at the source of the discharge (source monitoring), monitoring in the environment (environmental monitoring) and monitoring of individual exposure in emergencies (individual monitoring). The Safety Guide also provides general guidance on assessment of the doses to critical groups of the population due to the presence of radioactive materials or radiation fields in the environment both from routine operation of nuclear and other related facilities (practice) and from nuclear or radiological emergencies and past contamination of areas with long lived radionuclides (intervention). The dose assessments are based on the results of source monitoring, environmental monitoring, individual monitoring or their combinations. This Safety Guide is primarily intended for use by national regulatory bodies and other agencies involved in national systems of radiation monitoring, as well as by operators of nuclear installations and other facilities where natural or human made radionuclides are treated and monitored. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Meeting regulatory requirements for monitoring in practices and interventions; 3. Responsibilities for monitoring; 4. Generic aspects of monitoring programmes; 5. Programmes for monitoring in practices and interventions; 6. Technical conditions for monitoring procedures; 7. Considerations in dose assessment; 8. Interpretation of monitoring results; 9. Quality assurance; 10. Recording of results; 11. Education and training; Glossary.

  7. Overview of seismic re-evaluation methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, R.D.; Johnson, J.J.

    1993-01-01

    Several seismic licensing and safety issues have emerged over the past fifteen years for commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plants and U.S. Government research reactors, production reactors and process facilities. The methodologies for resolution of these issues have been developed in numerous government and utility sponsored research programs. The resolution criteria have included conservative deterministic design criteria, deterministic seismic margins assessments criteria (SMA) and seismic probabilistic safety assessment criteria (SPSA). The criteria for SMAs and SPSAs have been based on realistically considering the inelastic energy absorption capability of ductile structures, equipment and piping and have incorporated the use of earthquake and testing experience to evaluate the operability of complex mechanical and electrical equipment. Most of the applications to date have been confined to the U.S. but there have been several applications to Asian, Western and Eastern Europe reactors. This paper summarizes the major issues addressed, the development of reevaluation criteria and selected applications to non U.S. reactors including WWER reactors. (author)

  8. Safety codes and guides for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iansiti, E.

    1976-01-01

    The Codes of Practice and Safety Guides that are being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency are divided in five topical areas: Governmental Organization, Siting, Design, Operation and Quality Assurance. In each area, a scientific secretary is responsible for developing the documents and five Technical Review Committees composed of 10 to 12 experts from various Members Countries revise the drafts at different stages. A Senior Advisory Group supervises the entire programme and revises the document. A scientific co-ordinator is responsible for the co-ordination within the programme with other sections of the IAEA, and with other international organizations. In preparing a document, information on the practice adopted by Member States is collected, a group of experts is convened for preparing a preliminary draft on the basis of this material and the draft is then reviewed by the appropriate Technical Review Committee. The document is translated into various languages, reviewed by the Senior Advisory Group and sent to Member States for comments. After the comments of Member States have been received, the Technical Review Committee and then the Senior Advisory Group are convened again for the final revision of the document. Some 25 drafts, are in different stages of development. The preparation of a document in its final form takes about two years. The programme started in 1975 and to date most of the safety codes and a few safety guides have been sent to Member States for comments. These documents will have gone through the entire development procedure by early 1977. The Senior Advisory Groups and the Technical Review Committees meet on the average four times a year for a week at a time. Until now these meetings have been mainly concerned with the development of new documents or with that part of the procedure which precedes the transmission of the draft to Member States for comments. The next series of meetings will deal with the revisions needed to

  9. Study on design method for seismically isolated FBR plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirata, Kazuta; Yabana, Shuichi; Ohtori, Yasuki; Ishida, Katsuhiko; Sawada, Yoshihiro; Shiojiri; Hiroo; Mazda, Taiji

    1998-01-01

    CRIEPI conducted 'Demonstration test on FBR seismic isolation system' from 1987 to 1996 under contract with Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan. In the demonstration test, base isolation technologies are prepared and demonstrated to apply to FBR and the design guidelines are proposed. In this report overall contents of the design guidelines entitled Design guidelines for seismically base isolated FBR plants' are included. The design guidelines, as a rule, are limited to apply to FBR plants where entire reactor building is isolated in the horizontal direction using laminated rubber bearings as isolators. The design guidelines and its concepts, however, will be useful for the development of similar guidelines for other isolation systems using different type of isolation methods and other nuclear facilities. The design guidelines consist of three parts and appendices. The first part is 'Policy for Safety Design of Base Isolated FBR Plants' specifying the principles and the requirements in the planning and the design for the safety of base isolated FBR plants. The second part is Policy for Seismic Design of Base Isolated FBR' describing the principles and the requirements in the seismic design and the evaluation of safety for base isolated FBR plants. The third part is 'Design Methods for Seismic Isolated FBR Plants' detailing the methods, procedures and parameters to be used in the design and the evaluation of safety fro base isolated FBR plants. In appendices examples of design procedures for base isolated reactor building and laminated rubber bearings as well as various test data on laminated rubber bearings, etc. are shown. (author)

  10. Development, Dedication and Application of an Automatic Seismic Trip System for Nuclear Power Plants of Taiwan Power Company

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liao, Hsin-kai; Lee, Chung-lin; Chen, Chang-kuo; Hsu, Yao-tung; Shyu, Shian-shing

    2011-01-01

    This paper describes the setups of Automatic Seismic Trip System (ASTS), including development, dedication and implementation, for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) of Taiwan Power Company (TPC). The purposed ASTS was designed to trip the reactor when big earthquake occurs. These ASTS were classified as class 1E equipment. They were developed and dedicated for safety applications in accordance with IEEE 323-1983, IEEE 344-1987, IEEE 383-1974 and Reg. Guide 1.180 R1. In order to meet the technical specification required by TPC, three sub-units in the ASTS were developed: Earthquake sensors: Kinemetrices FBA-23 triaxial accelerometers are selected since they were successfully used in Taiwan for seismic monitoring for more than 10 years. Signal conditioning module: It is designed to reduce noise from motion accelerometer (FBA-23) and then transmit seismic signal to the set-point and trip unit via instrument amplify circuit, 0.1 to 10Hz band pass filter circuit, absolute-value converter and voltage to current converter. Trip control module: after comparing the seismic signal level and set-point, the result will decide whether to drive the output relay or not. The output relay is used as the interface between ASTS and the reactor protection system in NPP. For the commercial grade item dedication for safety application, five processes were conducted. Those processes are Seismic test: to use plant specific required response spectrum (RRS), the test required spectrum should envelop RRS: Seismic auto-trip accuracy test: must not trip when filtered PA below set point minus 0.05g, and must trip when filtered PA exceeds set point over 0.05g. Trip signals occurred within 10 second interval are considered as same events: NEMA4 water proof test for sensor box: Anti-radiation test: 8.76x100 rads over 40 years: EMI/EMC test: follow RG 1.180 requirement. The ASTS were installed in three NPPs, six units in total, without connection to RPS in 2006. After one year reliable operation, the

  11. Seismic monitoring of the Creys-Malville plant - Problems raised by the seismic behaviour of a fast breeder reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Descleve, P.; Barrau, P.

    1988-01-01

    CREYS-MALVILLE reached full power in December 1986 and is presently the largest sodium cooled reactor in operation. Well established procedures of safety evaluation have been used for the design but for a large size reactor special attention must be paid to the effects of seismic disturbances. This paper describes the seismic protection and monitoring system of the plant, the core behaviour which is specific to fast reactors and the test performed to verify the analyses. Finally the seismic impact on the construction can be established as an indication for future plants. (author)

  12. Nuclear fuel assembly seismic amplitude limiter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anthony, A.J.

    1977-01-01

    The ability of a nuclear reactor to withstand high seismic loading is enhanced by including, on each fuel assembly, at least one seismic grid which reduces the magnitude of the possible lateral deflection of the individual fuel elements and the entire fuel assembly. The reduction in possible deflection minimizes the possibility of impact of the spacer grids of one fuel assembly on those of an adjacent fuel assembly and reduces the magnitude of forces associated with any such impact thereby minimizing the possibility of fuel assembly damage as a result of high seismic loading. The seismic grid is mounted from the fuel assembly guide tubes, has greater external dimensions when compared to the fuel assembly spacer grids and normally does not support or otherwise contact the fuel elements. The reduction in possible deflection is achieved through reduction of the clearance between adjacent fuel assemblies made possible by the use in the seismic grid of a high strength material characterized by favorable thermal expansion characteristics and minimal irradiation induced expansion

  13. Specific issues for seismic performance of power plant equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nawrotzki, Peter [GERB Vibration Control Systems, Berlin (Germany)

    2010-01-15

    Power plant machinery can be dynamically decoupled from the substructure by the effective use of helical steel springs and viscous dampers. Turbine foundations, coal mills, boiler feed pumps and other machine foundations benefit from this type of elastic support systems to mitigate the transmission of operational vibration. The application of these devices may also be used to protect against earthquakes and other catastrophic events, i.e. airplane crash, of particular importance in nuclear facilities. This article illustrates basic principles of elastic support systems and applications on power plant equipment and buildings in medium and high seismic areas. Spring damper combinations with special stiffness properties are used to reduce seismic acceleration levels of turbine components and other safety or non-safety related structures. For turbine buildings, the integration of the turbine sub-structure into the machine building can further reduce stress levels in all structural members. The application of this seismic protection strategy for a spent fuel storage tank in a high seismic area is also discussed. Safety in nuclear facilities is of particular importance and recent seismic events and the resulting damage in these facilities again brings up the discussion. One of the latest events is the 2007 Chuetsu earthquake in Japan. The resulting damage in the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant can be found in several reports, e.g. in Yamashita. (orig.)

  14. Seismic qualification of civil engineering structures - Temelin NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schererova, K.; Holub, I.; Stepan, J.; Maly, J.

    2004-01-01

    Basic information is presented about the input data and methodology used for evaluation of Temelin NPP civil structures. The existing conditions as listed in POSAR report for the two reactor units are considered. The original design of the power plant assumed a lower level of locality seismic hazard, as followed from seismological surveys that where then available. Later the seismic assessment was updated while fully respecting IAEA recommendations and using a minimum value of acceleration in the horizontal direction PGAHOR = 0.1 g at free field level for SL-2. In relation to the new seismic project, new qualification of the structures, components and systems classed as seismic resistance category 1 was carried out. Since the Czech Republic has no specific technical standards for seismic resistance evaluation of nuclear power plants, a detailed methodology was elaborated, comprising principles of seismic resistance evaluation based on IAEA guides and on common practice in countries with advanced nuclear power engineering. (P.A.)

  15. Dispersion of radioactive material in air and water and consideration of population distribution in site evaluation for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The IAEA issues Safety Requirements and Safety Guides pertaining to nuclear power plants and activities in the field of nuclear energy, on the basis of its Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations. The present Safety Guide, which supplements the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, concerns the effects of a nuclear power plant on the surrounding region and the consideration of population distribution in the siting of a plant. This Safety Guide makes recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, on the basis of knowledge of the mechanisms for the dispersion of effluents discharged into the atmosphere and into surface water and groundwater. Relevant site characteristics and safety considerations are discussed. Population distribution, the projected population growth rate, particular geographical features, the capabilities of local transport networks and communications networks, industry and agriculture in the region, and recreational and institutional activities in the region should be considered in assessing the feasibility of developing an emergency response plan. In the selection of a site for a facility using radioactive material, such as a nuclear power plant, account should be taken of any local features that might be affected by the facility and of the feasibility of off-site intervention, including emergency response and protective actions. This is in addition to the evaluation of any features of the site itself that might affect the safety of the facility. This Safety Guide recommends methods for the assessment of regional and local characteristics. This Safety Guide supersedes four earlier IAEA Safety Guides, namely: Atmospheric Dispersion in Nuclear Power Plant Siting (Safety Series No. 50-SG-S3 (1980)). Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution (Safety Series No. 50-SG-S4 (1980)). Hydrological

  16. Dispersion of radioactive material in air and water and consideration of population distribution in site evaluation for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The IAEA issues Safety Requirements and Safety Guides pertaining to nuclear power plants and activities in the field of nuclear energy, on the basis of its Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations. The present Safety Guide, which supplements the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, concerns the effects of a nuclear power plant on the surrounding region and the consideration of population distribution in the siting of a plant. This Safety Guide makes recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, on the basis of knowledge of the mechanisms for the dispersion of effluents discharged into the atmosphere and into surface water and groundwater. Relevant site characteristics and safety considerations are discussed. Population distribution, the projected population growth rate, particular geographical features, the capabilities of local transport networks and communications networks, industry and agriculture in the region, and recreational and institutional activities in the region should be considered in assessing the feasibility of developing an emergency response plan. In the selection of a site for a facility using radioactive material, such as a nuclear power plant, account should be taken of any local features that might be affected by the facility and of the feasibility of off-site intervention, including emergency response and protective actions. This is in addition to the evaluation of any features of the site itself that might affect the safety of the facility. This Safety Guide recommends methods for the assessment of regional and local characteristics. This Safety Guide supersedes four earlier IAEA Safety Guides, namely: Atmospheric Dispersion in Nuclear Power Plant Siting (Safety Series No. 50-SG-S3 (1980)); Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution (Safety Series No. 50-SG-S4 (1980)); Hydrological

  17. Seismic margins and calibration of piping systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shieh, L.C.; Tsai, N.C.; Yang, M.S.; Wong, W.L.

    1985-01-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission-funded, multiyear program conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Its objective is to develop a complete, fully coupled analysis procedure for estimating the risk of earthquake-induced radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant and to determine major contributors to the state-of-the-art seismic and systems analysis process and explicitly includes the uncertainties in such a process. The results will be used to improve seismic licensing requirements for nuclear power plants. In Phase I of SSMRP, the overall seismic risk assessment methodology was developed and assembled. The application of this methodology to the seismic PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant has been documented. This report documents the method deriving response factors. The response factors, which relate design calculated responses to best estimate values, were used in the seismic response determination of piping systems for a simplified seismic probablistic risk assessment. 13 references, 31 figures, 25 tables

  18. Seismic qualification of a commercial grade emergency diesel generator system in high seismic zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, Mohsin R.; Chen, Wayne W.H.; Chu, Winnie S.

    2004-01-01

    The paper presents the seismic qualification of a commercially procured emergency diesel generator (EDG) system for use in a nuclear power plant. Response spectrum analyses of finite element models, validated using in situ vibration test data, were performed to qualify the skid and floor mounted mechanical components whose functional capacity and structural integrity can be analyzed. Time history analyses of these models were also performed to obtain the amplified response spectra for seismic testing of small valves, electrical and electro-mechanical components whose functional capacity can not be analyzed to establish the seismic qualification. The operational loads were obtained by in-plant vibration monitoring. Full scale shake table testing was performed for auxiliary electrical cabinets. It is concluded that with some minor structural modifications, a commercial grade EDG system can be qualified for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants located in high seismic zones. (author)

  19. Seismic verification of the Italian PEC fast reactor and effects of seismic conditions on the design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martelli, A.; Cecchini, F.; Masoni, P.; Maresca, G.; Castoldi, A.

    1988-01-01

    This paper deals with the aseismic design features of the Italian PEC fast reactor and the effects of seismic conditions on the reactor design. More precisely, after some notes on the main plant features, the paper reports on the design earthquakes adopted, the seismic monitoring procedures and the related actions, the design requirements, criteria and methods, and also provides a brief summary of the main research and development studies performed in support of design analysis. For the above-mentioned items, comparisons with the other fast reactors of the European Community countries are presented. Furthermore, the paper stresses the design modifications adopted to guarantee PEC seismic safety

  20. Radiological protection for medical exposure to ionizing radiation. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    radiotherapy owing to an ageing population. In addition, further growth in medical radiology can be expected in developing States, where at present facilities and services are often lacking. The risks associated with these expected increases in medical exposures should be outweighed by the benefits. For the purposes of radiation protection, ionizing radiation exposures are divided into three types: Medical exposure, which is mainly the exposure of patients as part of their diagnosis or treatment (see below); Occupational exposure, which is the exposure of workers incurred in the course of their work, with some specific exclusions; and Public exposure, which comprises all other exposures of members of the public that are susceptible to human control. Medical exposure is defined in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS, the Standards) as: 'Exposure incurred by patients as part of their own medical or dental diagnosis or treatment; by persons, other than those occupationally exposed, knowingly while voluntarily helping in the support and comfort of patients; and by volunteers in a programme of biomedical research involving their exposure.' This Safety Guide covers all of the medical exposures defined above, with emphasis on the radiological protection of patients, but does not cover exposures of workers or the public derived from the application of medical radiation sources. Guidance relating to these exposures can be found in the Safety Guide on Occupational Radiation Protection. In addition to the IAEA, several intergovernmental and international organizations, among them the European Commission, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), have already published numerous recommendations, guides and codes of practice relevant to this subject area. National authorities should therefore

  1. Radiological protection for medical exposure to ionizing radiation. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    radiotherapy owing to an ageing population. In addition, further growth in medical radiology can be expected in developing States, where at present facilities and services are often lacking. The risks associated with these expected increases in medical exposures should be outweighed by the benefits. For the purposes of radiation protection, ionizing radiation exposures are divided into three types: Medical exposure, which is mainly the exposure of patients as part of their diagnosis or treatment (see below). Occupational exposure, which is the exposure of workers incurred in the course of their work, with some specific exclusions. And Public exposure, which comprises all other exposures of members of the public that are susceptible to human control. Medical exposure is defined in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS, the Standards) as: 'Exposure incurred by patients as part of their own medical or dental diagnosis or treatment. By persons, other than those occupationally exposed, knowingly while voluntarily helping in the support and comfort of patients. And by volunteers in a programme of biomedical research involving their exposure.' This Safety Guide covers all of the medical exposures defined above, with emphasis on the radiological protection of patients, but does not cover exposures of workers or the public derived from the application of medical radiation sources. Guidance relating to these exposures can be found in the Safety Guide on Occupational Radiation Protection. In addition to the IAEA, several intergovernmental and international organizations, among them the European Commission, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), have already published numerous recommendations, guides and codes of practice relevant to this subject area. National authorities should therefore

  2. Seismic signal and noise on Europa

    Science.gov (United States)

    Panning, Mark; Stรคhler, Simon; Bills, Bruce; Castillo Castellanos, Jorge; Huang, Hsin-Hua; Husker, Allen; Kedar, Sharon; Lorenz, Ralph; Pike, William T.; Schmerr, Nicholas; Tsai, Victor; Vance, Steven

    2017-10-01

    Seismology is one of our best tools for detailing interior structure of planetary bodies, and a seismometer is included in the baseline and threshold mission design for the upcoming Europa Lander mission. Guiding mission design and planning for adequate science return, though, requires modeling of both the anticipated signal and noise. Assuming ice seismicity on Europa behaves according to statistical properties observed in Earth catalogs and scaling cumulative seismic moment release to the moon, we can simulate long seismic records and estimate background noise and peak signal amplitudes (Panning et al., 2017). This suggests a sensitive instrument comparable to many broadband terrestrial instruments or the SP instrument from the InSight mission to Mars will be able to record signals, while high frequency geophones are likely inadequate. We extend this analysis to also begin incorporation of spatial and temporal variation due to the tidal cycle, which can help inform landing site selection. We also begin exploration of how chaotic terrane at the bottom of the ice shell and inter-ice heterogeneities (i.e. internal melt structures) may affect anticipated seismic observations using 2D numerical seismic simulations.M. P. Panning, S. C. Stรคhler, H.-H. Huang, S. D. Vance, S. Kedar, V. C. Tsai, W. T. Pike, R. D. Lorenz, โ€œExpected seismicity and the seismic noise environment of Europa,โ€ J. Geophys. Res., in revision, 2017.

  3. Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations to the regulatory body, focused on the operational aspects of radiation protection and radioactive waste management in nuclear power plants, and on how to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements established in the relevant Safety Requirements publications. It will also be useful for senior managers in licensee or contractor organizations who are responsible for establishing and managing programmes for radiation protection and for the management of radioactive waste. This Safety Guide gives general recommendations for the development of radiation protection programmes at nuclear power plants. The issues are then elaborated by defining the main elements of a radiation protection programme. Particular attention is paid to area classification, workplace monitoring and supervision, application of the principle of optimization of protection (also termed the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle), and facilities and equipment. This Safety Guide covers all the safety related aspects of a programme for the management of radioactive waste at a nuclear power plant. Emphasis is placed on the minimization of waste in terms of both activity and volume. The various steps in predisposal waste management are covered, namely processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Releases of effluents, the application of authorized limits and reference levels are discussed, together with the main elements of an environmental monitoring programme

  4. Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA), approach and results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    During the past 15 years there have been over 30 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (SPRAs) and Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessments (SPSAs) conducted of Western Nuclear Power Plants, principally of US design. In this paper PRA and PSA are used interchangeably as the overall process is essentially the same. Some similar assessments have been done for reactors in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Switzerland and Slovenia. These plants were also principally US supplied or built under US license. Since the restructuring of the governments in former Soviet Bloc countries, there has been grave concern regarding the safety of the reactors in these countries. To date there has been considerable activity in conducting partial seismic upgrades but the overall quantification of risk has not been pursued to the depth that it has in Western countries. This paper summarizes the methodology for Seismic PRA/PSA and compares results of two partially completed and two completed PRAs of soviet designed reactors to results from earlier PRAs on US Reactors. A WWER 440 and a WWER 1000 located in low seismic activity regions have completed PRAs and results show the seismic risk to be very low for both designs. For more active regions, partially completed PRAs of a WWER 440 and WWER 1000 located at the same site show the WWER 440 to have much greater seismic risk than the WWER 1000 plant. The seismic risk from the 1000 MW plant compares with the high end of seismic risk for earlier seismic PRAs in the US. Just as for most US plants, the seismic risk appears to be less than the risk from internal events if risk is measured is terms of mean core damage frequency. However, due to the lack of containment for the earlier WWER 440s, the risk to the public may be significantly greater due to the more probable scenario of an early release. The studies reported have not taken the accident sequences beyond the stage of core damage hence the public heath risk ratios are speculative. (author)

  5. Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear power plants and other facilities V. 2. Proceedings of the technical committee meeting. Working material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-01-01

    The objectives of this TCM are: to review the IAEA Safety Report on Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Power Plants in order to achieve a consensus among Member States on this matter and to discuss the outlines of an IAEA Co-ordinated Research Programme on specific topics related to this subject. This volume includes presentations of the member states describing the practical approach to evaluation of seismic equipment of the existing NPPs, validation of innovative systems for earthquake protection; seismic re-evaluation of the NPPs, seismic regulations and safety standards; and other activities related to seismic safety in Member States.

  6. Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear power plants and other facilities V. 2. Proceedings of the technical committee meeting. Working material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The objectives of this TCM are: to review the IAEA Safety Report on Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Power Plants in order to achieve a consensus among Member States on this matter and to discuss the outlines of an IAEA Co-ordinated Research Programme on specific topics related to this subject. This volume includes presentations of the member states describing the practical approach to evaluation of seismic equipment of the existing NPPs, validation of innovative systems for earthquake protection; seismic re-evaluation of the NPPs, seismic regulations and safety standards; and other activities related to seismic safety in Member States

  7. Seismic risk assessment of a BWR: status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chuang, T.Y.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Wells, J.E.; Johnson, J.J.

    1985-02-01

    The seismic risk methodology developed in the US NRC Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was demonstrated by its application to the Zion nuclear power plant, a pressurized water reactor (PWR). A detailed model of Zion, including systems analysis models (initiating events, event trees, and fault trees), SSI and structure models, and piping models was developed and analyzed. The SSMRP methodology can equally be applied to a boiling water reactor (BWR). To demonstrate its applicability, to identify fundamental differences in seismic risk between a PWR and a BWR, and to provide a basis of comparison of seismic risk between a PWR and a BWR when analyzed with comparable methodology and assumptions, a seismic risk analysis is being performed on the LaSalle County Station nuclear power plant

  8. Theoretical seismic analysis of butterfly valve for nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Sang Uk; Ahn, Jun Tae; Han, Seung Ho; Lee, Kyung Chul

    2012-01-01

    Valves are one of the most important components of a pipeline system in a nuclear power plant, and it is important to ensure their structural safety under seismic loads. A crucial aspect of structural safety verification is the seismic qualification, and therefore, an optimal shape design and experimental seismic qualification is necessary in case the configuration of the valve parts needs to be modified and their performance needs to be improved. Recently, intensive numerical analyses have been preformed before the experimental verification in order to determine the appropriate design variables that satisfy the performance requirements under seismic loads. In this study, static and dynamic numerical structural analyses of a 200A butterfly valve for a nuclear power plant were performed according to the KEPIC MFA. The result of static analysis considering an equivalent static load under SSE condition gave an applied stress of 135MPa. In addition, the result of dynamic analysis gave an applied stress of 183MPa, where the CQC method using response spectrums was taken into account. These values are under the allowable strength of the materials used for manufacturing the butterfly valve, and therefore, its structural safety satisfies the requirements of KEPIC MFA

  9. Theoretical seismic analysis of butterfly valve for nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Han, Sang Uk; Ahn, Jun Tae; Han, Seung Ho [Donga Univ., Busan (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Kyung Chul [Dukwon Valve Co., Ltd., Busan (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-09-15

    Valves are one of the most important components of a pipeline system in a nuclear power plant, and it is important to ensure their structural safety under seismic loads. A crucial aspect of structural safety verification is the seismic qualification, and therefore, an optimal shape design and experimental seismic qualification is necessary in case the configuration of the valve parts needs to be modified and their performance needs to be improved. Recently, intensive numerical analyses have been preformed before the experimental verification in order to determine the appropriate design variables that satisfy the performance requirements under seismic loads. In this study, static and dynamic numerical structural analyses of a 200A butterfly valve for a nuclear power plant were performed according to the KEPIC MFA. The result of static analysis considering an equivalent static load under SSE condition gave an applied stress of 135MPa. In addition, the result of dynamic analysis gave an applied stress of 183MPa, where the CQC method using response spectrums was taken into account. These values are under the allowable strength of the materials used for manufacturing the butterfly valve, and therefore, its structural safety satisfies the requirements of KEPIC MFA.

  10. Super-virtual interferometric diffractions as guide stars

    KAUST Repository

    Dai, Wei

    2011-01-01

    A significant problem in seismic imaging is seismically seeing below salt structures: large velocity contrasts and the irregular geometry of the salt-sediment interface strongly defocus both the downgoing and upgoing seismic wavefields. This can result in severely defocused migration images so as to seismically render some subsalt reserves invisible. The potential cure is a good estimate of the subsalt and salt velocity distributions, but that is also the problem: severe velocity contrasts prevent the appearance of coherent subsalt reflections in the surface records so that MVA or tomographic methods can become ineffective. We now present an interferometric method for extracting the diffraction signals that emanate from diffractors, also denoted as seismic guide stars. The signal-to-noise ratio of these interferometric diffractions is enhanced by N, where N is the number of source points coincident with the receiver points. Thus, diffractions from subsalt guide stars can then be rendered visible and so can be used for velocity analysis, migration, and focusing of subsalt reflections. Both synthetic and field data records are used to demonstrate the benefits and limitations of this method. ยฉ 2011 Society of Exploration Geophysicists.

  11. Influence of joint dip angle on seismic behaviors of rock foundation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Lei; Gao, Yang; Jiang, Yujing; Li, Bo; Li Shucai

    2012-01-01

    The seismic response of rock foundation to seismic loads is an important issue to the stability and safety of nuclear power plants. Due to the fact that the discontinuities like joints existing in the rock mass govern principally the deformation and failure behaviors of the rock mass, the influence of discontinuities on the seismic behaviors of rock mass remains as one of the fundamental problems in the safety assessment of nuclear power plants. In this study, the distinct element method (DEM) and finite element method (FEM) were adopted to investigate the seismic responses of rock foundation to a real seismic wave, taking into account the effect of joint dip angle on the deformation and dynamic behaviors of rock foundation. In the DEM simulations, the intact rock has an amplification effect on the amplitudes of seismic waves, while the joints exhibit an attenuation effect on the seismic waves. In the FEM simulations, however, the attenuation effect of joints is not obvious. The dip angle of joints has strong effects on the deformation and dynamic behaviors of rock foundation, in terms that different dip angles lead to obviously different deformation and horizontal stress in the rock foundation when subjected to seismic load. When the dip angle of joints is around 60deg, the seismic velocity, displacement and stress reach the maximums. Therefore, attentions need to be paid on this factor during the seismic design of nuclear power plants. (author)

  12. Seismic Data Gathering and Validation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coleman, Justin [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-02-01

    Three recent earthquakes in the last seven years have exceeded their design basis earthquake values (so it is implied that damage to SSCโ€™s should have occurred). These seismic events were recorded at North Anna (August 2011, detailed information provided in [Virginia Electric and Power Company Memo]), Fukushima Daichii and Daini (March 2011 [TEPCO 1]), and Kaswazaki-Kariwa (2007, [TEPCO 2]). However, seismic walk downs at some of these plants indicate that very little damage occurred to safety class systems and components due to the seismic motion. This report presents seismic data gathered for two of the three events mentioned above and recommends a path for using that data for two purposes. One purpose is to determine what margins exist in current industry standard seismic soil-structure interaction (SSI) tools. The second purpose is the use the data to validated seismic site response tools and SSI tools. The gathered data represents free field soil and in-structure acceleration time histories data. Gathered data also includes elastic and dynamic soil properties and structural drawings. Gathering data and comparing with existing models has potential to identify areas of uncertainty that should be removed from current seismic analysis and SPRA approaches. Removing uncertainty (to the extent possible) from SPRAโ€™s will allow NPP owners to make decisions on where to reduce risk. Once a realistic understanding of seismic response is established for a nuclear power plant (NPP) then decisions on needed protective measures, such as SI, can be made.

  13. The SAFER guides: empowering organizations to improve the safety and effectiveness of electronic health records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sittig, Dean F; Ash, Joan S; Singh, Hardeep

    2014-05-01

    Electronic health records (EHRs) have potential to improve quality and safety of healthcare. However, EHR users have experienced safety concerns from EHR design and usability features that are not optimally adapted for the complex work flow of real-world practice. Few strategies exist to address unintended consequences from implementation of EHRs and other health information technologies. We propose that organizations equipped with EHRs should consider the strategy of "proactive risk assessment" of their EHR-enabled healthcare system to identify and address EHR-related safety concerns. In this paper, we describe the conceptual underpinning of an EHR-related self-assessment strategy to provide institutions a foundation upon which they could build their safety efforts. With support from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), we used a rigorous, iterative process to develop a set of 9 self-assessment tools to optimize the safety and safe use of EHRs. These tools, referred to as the Safety Assurance Factors for EHR Resilience (SAFER) guides, could be used to self-assess safety and effectiveness of EHR implementations, identify specific areas of vulnerability, and create solutions and culture change to mitigate risks. A variety of audiences could conduct these assessments, including frontline clinicians or care teams in different practices, or clinical, quality, or administrative leaders within larger institutions. The guides use a multifaceted systems-based approach to assess risk and empower organizations to work with internal or external stakeholders (eg, EHR developers) on optimizing EHR functionality and using EHRs to drive improvements in the quality and safety of healthcare.

  14. Seismic risk and safety of nuclear installations. A look at the Cadarache Centre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Verrhiest-Leblanc, G.; Chevallier, A.

    2010-01-01

    After a brief recall of some important seismic events which occurred in the past in the south-eastern part of France, the authors indicate the nuclear installations present in this region. They outline the difference between requirements for a usual building and for basic nuclear installations. They indicate laws and regulations which are to be applied to these installations like to any hazardous industrial installation. They describe the seismic risk as it has been determined for the Cadarache area, and evoke the para-seismic design of new nuclear installations which are to be built in Cadarache and actions for a para-seismic reinforcement of existing constructions. Finally, they evoke organisational aspects (emergency plans) and the approach for a better information and transparency about the seismic risk

  15. Management of Radioactive Waste from the Mining and Milling of Ores. Safety Guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on the safe management of radioactive waste resulting from the mining and milling of ores, with the purpose of protecting workers, the public and the environment from the consequences of these activities. It supplements Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-1, Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Administrative, legal and regulatory framework; 3. Protection of human health and the environment; 4. Strategy for waste management; 5. Safety considerations in different phases of operations; 6. Safety assessment; 7. Quality assurance; 8. Monitoring and surveillance; 9. Institutional control for the post-closure phase.

  16. Consideration on the applicability of the design seismic coefficient of a large cutting slope under the strong earthquake

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ito, Hiroshi; Sawada, Yoshihiro; Satou, Kiyotaka

    1989-01-01

    In this study, the characteristic of equivalent seismic coefficient and the applicability of the design seismic coefficient of a large cutting rock slope around Nuclear Power Plant were examined by analytical parameter survey. As the results, the equivalent seismic coefficient by dynamic analysis become great with increase of transverse elastic wave velocity and the case of long period motion. That is, as the wave length of rock mass become longer, the equivalent seismic coefficient become great parabolically. Moreover, there is a inverse proportion relation between the ratio (dynamic safety factor/static safety factor) and wave length. In addition, the graph to forecast the dynamic sliding safety factor under the input seismic motion of the max. Acceleration 500 gal from the result of static simple method was proposed and the applicable range of design seismic coefficient of rock slope was indicated. (author)

  17. Evaluation of safety assessment methodologies in Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide (1985) and Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report (1987)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, B.; Fisher, C.; Zigler, G.; Clark, R.A.

    1990-01-01

    FSARs. Rockwell International, as operating contractor at the Rocky Flats plant, conducted a safety analysis program during the 1980s. That effort resulted in Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) for several buildings, one of them being the Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report, June 87 (707FSAR) and a Plant Safety Analysis Report. Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide, March 1985 (RFRAG85) documents the methodologies that were used for those FSARs. Resources available for preparation of those Rocky Flats FSARs were very limited. After addressing the more pressing safety issues, some of which are described below, the present contractor (EG ampersand G) intends to conduct a program of upgrading the FSARs. This report presents the results of a review of the methodologies described in RFRAG85 and 707FSAR and contains suggestions that might be incorporated into the methodology for the FSAR upgrade effort

  18. Development of a seismic damage assessment program for nuclear power plant structures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koh, Hyun Moo; Cho, Yang Heui; Shin, Hyun Mok [Seoul National Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2001-12-15

    The most part of the nuclear power plants operating currently in Korea are more than 20 years old and obviously we cannot pretend that their original performance is actually maintained. In addition, earthquake occurrences show an increasing trend all over the world, and Korea can no more be considered as a zone safe from earthquake. Therefore, need is to guarantee the safety of these power plant structures against seismic accident, to decide to maintain them operational and to obtain data relative to maintenance/repair. Such objectives can be reached by damage assessment using inelastic seismic analysis considering aging degradation. It appears to be more important particularly for the structure enclosing the nuclear reactor that must absolutely protect against any radioactive leakage. Actually, the tendency of the technical world, led by the OECD/NEA, BNL in the United States, CEA in France and IAEA, is to develop researches or programs to assess the seismic safety considering aging degradation of operating nuclear power plants. Regard to the above-mentioned international technical trend, a technology to establish inelastic seismic analysis considering aging degradation so as to assess damage level and seismic safety margin appears to be necessary. Damage assessment and prediction system to grasp in real-time the actual seismic resistance capacity and damage level by 3-dimensional graphic representations are also required.

  19. Development of a seismic damage assessment program for nuclear power plant structures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koh, Hyun Moo; Cho, Ho Hyun; Cho, Yang Hui [Seoul National Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2000-12-15

    Some of nuclear power plants operating currently in Korea have been passed about 20 years after construction. Moreover, in the case of KORI I the service year is over 20 years, so their abilities are different from initial abilities. Also, earthquake outbreak increase, our country is not safe area for earthquake. Therefore, need is to guarantee the safety of these power plant structures against seismic accident, to decide to maintain them operational and to obtain data relative to maintenance/repair. Such objectives can be reached by damage assessment using inelastic seismic analysis considering aging degradation. It appears to be more important particularly for the structure enclosing the nuclear reactor that must absolutely protect against any radioactive leakage. Actually, the tendency of the technical world, led by the OECD/NEA, BNL in the United States, CEA in France and IAEA, is to develop researches or programs to assess the seismic safety considering aging degradation of operating nuclear power plants. Regard to the above-mentioned international technical trend, a technology to establish inelastic seismic analysis considering aging degradation so as to assess damage level and seismic safety margin appears to be necessary. Damage assessment and prediction system to grasp in real-time the actual seismic resistance capacity and damage level by 3-dimensional graphic representations are also required.

  20. A proposal for seismic evaluation index of mid-rise existing RC buildings in Afghanistan

    Science.gov (United States)

    Naqi, Ahmad; Saito, Taiki

    2017-10-01

    Mid-rise RC buildings gradually rise in Kabul and entire Afghanistan since 2001 due to rapid increase of population. To protect the safety of resident, Afghan Structure Code was issued in 2012. But the building constructed before 2012 failed to conform the code requirements. In Japan, new sets of rules and law for seismic design of buildings had been issued in 1981 and severe earthquake damage was disclosed for the buildings designed before 1981. Hence, the Standard for Seismic Evaluation of RC Building published in 1977 has been widely used in Japan to evaluate the seismic capacity of existing buildings designed before 1981. Currently similar problem existed in Afghanistan, therefore, this research examined the seismic capacity of six RC buildings which were built before 2012 in Kabul by applying the seismic screening procedure presented by Japanese standard. Among three screening procedures with different capability, the less detailed screening procedure, the first level of screening, is applied. The study founds an average seismic index (IS-average=0.21) of target buildings. Then, the results were compared with those of more accurate seismic evaluation procedures of Capacity Spectrum Method (CSM) and Time History Analysis (THA). The results for CSM and THA show poor seismic performance of target buildings not able to satisfy the safety design limit (1/100) of the maximum story drift. The target buildings are then improved by installing RC shear walls. The seismic indices of these retrofitted buildings were recalculated and the maximum story drifts were analyzed by CSM and THA. The seismic indices and CSM and THA results are compared and found that building with seismic index larger than (IS-average =0.4) are able to satisfy the safety design limit. Finally, to screen and minimize the earthquake damage over the existing buildings, the judgement seismic index (IS-Judgment=0.5) for the first level of screening is proposed.

  1. Development of seismic technology and reliability based on vibration tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, Youichi

    1997-01-01

    This paper deals with some of the vibration tests and investigations on the seismic safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Japan. To ensure the reliability of the seismic safety of nuclear power plants, nuclear power plants in Japan have been designed according to the Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants. This guideline has been developed based on technical date base and findings which were obtained from many vibration tests and investigations. Besides the tests for the guideline, proving tests on seismic reliability of operating nuclear power plants equipment and systems have been carried out. In this paper some vibration tests and their evaluation results are presented. They have crucially contributed to develop the guideline. (J.P.N.)

  2. Development of seismic technology and reliability based on vibration tests

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sasaki, Youichi [Nuclear Power Engineering Corp., Tokyo (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    This paper deals with some of the vibration tests and investigations on the seismic safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Japan. To ensure the reliability of the seismic safety of nuclear power plants, nuclear power plants in Japan have been designed according to the Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants. This guideline has been developed based on technical date base and findings which were obtained from many vibration tests and investigations. Besides the tests for the guideline, proving tests on seismic reliability of operating nuclear power plants equipment and systems have been carried out. In this paper some vibration tests and their evaluation results are presented. They have crucially contributed to develop the guideline. (J.P.N.)

  3. Drop Test Results of CRDM under Seismic Loads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Myoung-Hwan; Cho, Yeong-Garp; Kim, Gyeong-Ho; Sun, Jong-Oh; Huh, Hyung

    2016-01-01

    This paper describes the test results to demonstrate the drop performance of CRDM under seismic loads. The top-mounted CRDM driven by the stepping motor for Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR) has been developed in KAERI. The CRDM for JRTR has been optimized by the design improvement based on that of the HANARO. It is necessary to verify the drop performance under seismic loads such as operating basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Especially, the CAR drop times are important data for the safety analysis. confirm the drop performance under seismic loads. The delay of drop time at Rig no. 2 due to seismic loads is greater than that at Rig no. 3. The total pure drop times under seismic loads are estimated as 1.169 and 1.855, respectively

  4. Drop Test Results of CRDM under Seismic Loads

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Myoung-Hwan; Cho, Yeong-Garp; Kim, Gyeong-Ho; Sun, Jong-Oh; Huh, Hyung [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This paper describes the test results to demonstrate the drop performance of CRDM under seismic loads. The top-mounted CRDM driven by the stepping motor for Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR) has been developed in KAERI. The CRDM for JRTR has been optimized by the design improvement based on that of the HANARO. It is necessary to verify the drop performance under seismic loads such as operating basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Especially, the CAR drop times are important data for the safety analysis. confirm the drop performance under seismic loads. The delay of drop time at Rig no. 2 due to seismic loads is greater than that at Rig no. 3. The total pure drop times under seismic loads are estimated as 1.169 and 1.855, respectively.

  5. An Application of Cartesian Graphing to Seismic Exploration.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Robertson, Douglas Frederick

    1992-01-01

    Describes how college students enrolled in a course in elementary algebra apply graphing and algebra to data collected from a seismic profile to uncover the structure of a subterranean rock formation. Includes steps guiding the activity. (MDH)

  6. Seismic fragility testing of naturally-aged, safety-related, class 1E battery cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonzon, L.L.; Hente, D.B.; Kukreti, B.M.; Schendel, J.S.; Black, D.A.; Paulsen, G.D.; Tulk, J.D.; Janis, W.J.; Aucoin, B.D.

    1984-01-01

    The concern over seismic susceptibility of naturally-aged lead-acid batteries used for safety-related emergency power in nuclear power stations was brought about by battery problems that periodically had been reported in Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The Turkey Point Station had reported cracked and buckled plates in several cells in October 1974 (LER 75-5). The Fitzpatrick Station had reported cracked battery cell cases in October 1977 (LER 77-55) and again in September 1979 (LER 79-59). The Browns Ferry Station had reported a cracked cell leaking a small quantity of electrolyte in July 1981 (LER 81-42). The Indian Point Station had reported cracked and leaking cells in both February (LER 82-7) and April 1982 (LER 82-16); both of these LERs indicated the cracked cells were due to expansion (i.e., growth) of the positive plates

  7. Mechanical property test of natural rubber bearing for the evaluation of uncertainty value of seismic isolation devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Kyu; Kim, Jung Han; Choi, In Kil

    2012-01-01

    Seismic safety of NPP is one of the most important issues in a nuclear field after great east Japan earthquake in 2011. For the improvement of seismic safety of nuclear power plant, seismic isolation is the easiest solution for increasing the seismic safety. Otherwise, the application of seismic isolation devices for nuclear power plants doesn't make the seismic risk of NPP increases always. The rubber bearing have many uncertainties of material properties and large displacement should absorb according to the application of isolation devices. In this study, for the evaluation of uncertainty of the material properties of rubber bearing, material tests for rubber and mechanical properties test for natural rubber bearing were performed. For the evaluation of effect of hardness of rubber, 4 kinds of rubber hardness for material property tests and 2 kinds of rubber hardness for mechanical property test were considered. As a result, the variation of material properties is higher than that of mechanical properties of natural rubber bearings

  8. Seismic re-evaluation of the Tarapur atomic power plants 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingole, S.M.; Kumar, B.S.; Gupta, S.; Singh, U.P.; Giridhar, K.; Bhawsar, S.D.; Samota, A.; Chhatre, A.G.; Dixit, K.B.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2004-01-01

    Two Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) of 210 MWe each at Tarapur Atomic Power Station, Units-1 and 2 (TAPS-1-2) were commissioned in the year 1969. The safety related civil structures at TAPS had been designed for a seismic coefficient of 0.2 g and other structures for 0.1 g. The work of seismic re-evaluation of the TAPS-1-2 has been taken up in the year 2002. As two new Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) plants of 540 MWe each, Tarapur Atomic Power Project Units-3 and 4 (TAPP-3-4), are coming up in the vicinity of TAPS-1-2, detailed geological and seismological studies of the area around TAPS-1-2 are available. The same free-field ground motion as generated for TAPP-3-4 has been used for TAPS-1-2. The seismic re-evaluation of the plant has been performed as per the procedure given in IAEA, Safety Reports Series entitled 'Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Power Plants', and meeting the various codes and standards, viz., ASME, ASCE, IEEE standards etc. The Safety Systems (SS) and Safety Support Systems (SSS) are qualified by adopting detailed analysis and testing methods. The equipment in the SS and SSS have been qualified by conducting a walk-down as per the procedure given in Generic Implementation Procedure, Dept. of Energy (GIP--DOE), USA. The safety systems include the systems required for safe shutdown of the plant, one chain of decay heat removal and containment of activity. The safety support systems viz., Electrical, Instrumentation and Control and systems other than SS and SSS have been qualified by limited analysis, testing and mostly by following the procedure of walk-down. The paper brings out the details of the work accomplished during seismic re-evaluation of the two units of BWR at Tarapur. (authors)

  9. Effective updating process of seismic fragilities using Bayesian method and information entropy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kato, Masaaki; Takata, Takashi; Yamaguchi, Akira

    2008-01-01

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessment (SPSA) is an effective method for evaluating overall performance of seismic safety of a plant. Seismic fragilities are estimated to quantify the seismically induced accident sequences. It is a great concern that the SPSA results involve uncertainties, a part of which comes from the uncertainty in the seismic fragility of equipment and systems. A straightforward approach to reduce the uncertainty is to perform a seismic qualification test and to reflect the results on the seismic fragility estimate. In this paper, we propose a figure-of-merit to find the most cost-effective condition of the seismic qualification tests about the acceleration level and number of components tested. Then a mathematical method to reflect the test results on the fragility update is developed. A Bayesian method is used for the fragility update procedure. Since a lognormal distribution that is used for the fragility model does not have a Bayes conjugate function, a parameterization method is proposed so that the posterior distribution expresses the characteristics of the fragility. The information entropy is used as the figure-of-merit to express importance of obtained evidence. It is found that the information entropy is strongly associated with the uncertainty of the fragility. (author)

  10. Lessons Learned from Process Safety Management: A Practical Guide to Defence in Depth

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langerman, N., E-mail: neal@chemical-safety.com [Advanced Chemical Safety, Inc., San Diego (United States)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: Beginning with the experiences of Alfred Nobel, the chemical enterprise has learned from failures and implemented layers of protection to prevent unwanted incidents. Nobel developed dynamite as a more stable alternative to nitroglycerin, a process we would today call โ€œinherently safer technologyโ€. In recent years, the USA has issued regulations requiring formal โ€œrisk management plansโ€ to identify and mitigate production risks. The USA set up the โ€œChemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Boardโ€ as an independent investigator of serious chemical enterprise incidents with a mission to issue recommendations aimed at preventing repeated incidents based on lessons learned. Following a particularly violent explosion in Texas in 1989, the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued the โ€œProcess Safety Managementโ€ (PSM) rule. PSM is a singular guide to defence in depth for preventing large-scale production incidents. The formalism is equally applicable to the chemical enterprise and the nuclear installation enterprise. This presentation will discuss the key elements of PSM and offer suggestions on using PSM as a guide to developing multiple layers of protection. The methods of PSM are applicable to Nuclear Generating Stations, research reactors, fuel reprocessing plants and fissile material storage and handling. Examples from both the chemical and nuclear enterprises will be used to illustrate key points. (author)

  11. Seismic qualification of existing nuclear installations in India - a proposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basu, P.C.

    2001-01-01

    In India, the work toward seismic qualification of existing nuclear facilities has been started. Preliminary work is being undertaken with respect to identifying the facilities which would be taken up for seismic qualification, approach and methodology for re-evaluation for seismic safety, acceptance criteria, etc. Work has also been started for framing up the criteria and methodology of the seismic qualification of these facilities. Present paper contains the proposal in this respect. This proposal is on similar lines of the present practice of seismic qualification of NPP, as summarized in the Appendix, but has been modified to suit the special requirements of Indian nuclear installations. (author)

  12. Operating experience and aging-seismic assessment of electric motors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subudhi, M.; Burns, E.L.; Taylor, J.H.

    1985-06-01

    Objectives of this program are to identify concerns related to the aging and service wear of equipment operating in nuclear power plants, to assess their possible impact on plant safety, to identify effective inspection surveillance and monitoring methods and to recommend suitable maintenance practices for mitigating aging related concerns and diminish the rate of degradation due to aging and service wear. Motor design and materials of construction are reviewed to identify age-sensitive components. Operational and accidental stressors are determined, and their effect on promoting aging degradation is assessed. Failure modes, mechanisms, and causes have been reviewed from operating experiences and existing data banks. The study has also included consideration for the seismic correlation of age-degraded motor components. The aforementioned reviews and assessments were assimilated to characterize the dielectric, rotational, and mechanical hazards on motor performance and operational readiness. The functional indicators which can be monitored to assess motor component deterioration due to aging or other accidental stressors are identified. Conforming with the NPAR strategy as outlined in the program plan, the study also includes a preliminary discussion of current standards and guides, maintenance programs, and research activities pertaining to nuclear power plant safety-related electric motors

  13. Importance of modeling beam-column joints for seismic safety of reinforced concrete structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharma, Akanshu; Reddy, G.R.; Vaze, K.K.; Eligehausen, R.; Hofmann, J.

    2011-01-01

    Almost all structures, except the containment building, in a NPP can be classified as reinforced concrete (RC) framed structures. In case of such structures subjected to seismic loads, beam-column joints are recognized as the critical and vulnerable zone. During an earthquake, the global behavior of the structure is highly governed by the behavior of the joints. If the joints behave in a ductile manner, the global behavior generally will be ductile, whereas if the joints behave in a brittle fashion then the structure will display a brittle behavior. The joints of old and non-seismically detailed structures are more vulnerable and behave poorly under the earthquakes compared to the joints of new and seismically detailed structures. Modeling of these joint regions is very important for correct assessment of the seismic performance of the structures. In this paper, it is shown with the help of a recently developed joint model that not modeling the inelastic behavior of the joints can lead to significantly misleading and unsafe results in terms of the performance assessment of the structures under seismic loads. Comparison of analytical and experimental results is shown for two structures, tested under lateral monotonic seismic pushover loads. It is displayed that the model can predict the inelastic seismic response of structures considering joint distortion with high accuracy by little extra effort in modeling. (author)

  14. Seismic Search Engine: A distributed database for mining large scale seismic data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Y.; Vaidya, S.; Kuzma, H. A.

    2009-12-01

    The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBTO collects terabytes worth of seismic measurements from many receiver stations situated around the earth with the goal of detecting underground nuclear testing events and distinguishing them from other benign, but more common events such as earthquakes and mine blasts. The International Data Center (IDC) processes and analyzes these measurements, as they are collected by the IMS, to summarize event detections in daily bulletins. Thereafter, the data measurements are archived into a large format database. Our proposed Seismic Search Engine (SSE) will facilitate a framework for data exploration of the seismic database as well as the development of seismic data mining algorithms. Analogous to GenBank, the annotated genetic sequence database maintained by NIH, through SSE, we intend to provide public access to seismic data and a set of processing and analysis tools, along with community-generated annotations and statistical models to help interpret the data. SSE will implement queries as user-defined functions composed from standard tools and models. Each query is compiled and executed over the database internally before reporting results back to the user. Since queries are expressed with standard tools and models, users can easily reproduce published results within this framework for peer-review and making metric comparisons. As an illustration, an example query is โ€œwhat are the best receiver stations in East Asia for detecting events in the Middle East?โ€ Evaluating this query involves listing all receiver stations in East Asia, characterizing known seismic events in that region, and constructing a profile for each receiver station to determine how effective its measurements are at predicting each event. The results of this query can be used to help prioritize how data is collected, identify defective instruments, and guide future sensor placements.

  15. Current issues and related activities in seismic hazard analysis in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Jeong-Moon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst., Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jong-Rim; Chang, Chun-Joong

    1997-03-01

    This paper discusses some technical issues identified from the seismic hazard analyses for probabilistic safety assessment on the operating Korean nuclear power plants and the related activities to resolve the issues. Since there are no strong instrumental earthquake records in Korea, the seismic hazard analysis is mainly dependent on the historical earthquake records. Results of the past seismic hazard analyses show that there are many uncertainties in attenuation function and intensity level and that there is a need to improve statistical method. The identification of the activity of the Yangsan Fault, which is close to nuclear power plant sites, has been an important issue. But the issue has not been resolved yet in spite of much research works done. Recently, some capable faults were found in the offshore area of Gulupdo Island in the Yellow Sea. It is anticipated that the results of research on both the Yangsan Fault and reduction of uncertainty in seismic hazard analysis will have an significant influence on seismic design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants in the future. (author)

  16. Current issues and related activities in seismic hazard analysis in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Jeong-Moon; Lee, Jong-Rim; Chang, Chun-Joong.

    1997-01-01

    This paper discusses some technical issues identified from the seismic hazard analyses for probabilistic safety assessment on the operating Korean nuclear power plants and the related activities to resolve the issues. Since there are no strong instrumental earthquake records in Korea, the seismic hazard analysis is mainly dependent on the historical earthquake records. Results of the past seismic hazard analyses show that there are many uncertainties in attenuation function and intensity level and that there is a need to improve statistical method. The identification of the activity of the Yangsan Fault, which is close to nuclear power plant sites, has been an important issue. But the issue has not been resolved yet in spite of much research works done. Recently, some capable faults were found in the offshore area of Gulupdo Island in the Yellow Sea. It is anticipated that the results of research on both the Yangsan Fault and reduction of uncertainty in seismic hazard analysis will have an significant influence on seismic design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants in the future. (author)

  17. Evaluation and assessment of nuclear power plant seismic methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernreuter, D.; Tokarz, F.; Wight, L.; Smith, P.; Wells, J.; Barlow, R.

    1977-01-01

    The major emphasis of this study is to develop a methodology that can be used to assess the current methods used for assuring the seismic safety of nuclear power plants. The proposed methodology makes use of system-analysis techniques and Monte Carlo schemes. Also, in this study, we evaluate previous assessments of the current seismic-design methodology

  18. Evaluation and assessment of nuclear power plant seismic methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bernreuter, D.; Tokarz, F.; Wight, L.; Smith, P.; Wells, J.; Barlow, R.

    1977-03-01

    The major emphasis of this study is to develop a methodology that can be used to assess the current methods used for assuring the seismic safety of nuclear power plants. The proposed methodology makes use of system-analysis techniques and Monte Carlo schemes. Also, in this study, we evaluate previous assessments of the current seismic-design methodology.

  19. Resolution no. 15/2012 Safety Guide for the practice of nuclear meters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    1. This guide is Intended to complement the requirements for practice Nuclear meters out in September: โ€ข Joint Resolution CITMA-MINSAP Regulation Basic Standards Radiation safety of November 30, 2001, hereinafter NBS. โ€ข CITMA Resolution 121/2000, Regulations for the Safe Transport Radioactive Materials; hereinafter transport regulations. โ€ข Resolution 35/2003 of CITMA Regulation for the safe management of Radioactive waste of March 7, 2003, hereinafter Regulation waste. โ€ข Joint Resolution CITMA-MINSAP Regulations for the Selection, Training Authorization and Associated Personnel performing Employment Practices of Ionizing Radiation of December 19, 2003, hereinafter Staff Rules. 2. The requirements of this guide are applicable to entities and performing practice-related activities Nuclear Meters throughout the national territory.

  20. Use of experience data for DOE seismic evaluations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barlow, M.W.; Budnitz, R.; Eder, S.J.; Eli, M.W.

    1993-01-01

    As dictated by DOE Order 5480.28, seismic evaluations of essential systems and components at DOE facilities will be conducted over the next several years. For many of these systems and components, few, if any, seismic requirements applied to the original design, procurement, installation, and maintenance process. Thus the verification of the seismic adequacy of existing systems and components presents a difficult challenge. DOE has undertaken development of the criteria and procedures for these seismic evaluations that will maximize safety benefits in a timely and cost effective manner. As demonstrated in previous applications at DOE facilities and by the experience from the commercial nuclear power industry, use of experience data for these evaluations is the only viable option for most existing systems and components. This paper describes seismic experience data, the needs at DOE facilities, the precedent of application at nuclear power plants and DOE facilities, and the program being put in place for the seismic verification task ahead for DOE

  1. Seismic qualification of existing safety class manipulators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Ting-shu; Moran, T.J.

    1992-01-01

    There are two bridge type electromechanical manipulators within a nuclear fuel handling facility which were constructed over twenty-five years ago. At that time, there were only minimal seismic considerations. These manipulators together with the facility are being reactivated. Detailed analyses have shown that the manipulators will satisfy the requirements of ANSI/AISC N690-1984 when they are subjected to loadings including the site specific design basis earthquake. 4 refs

  2. Building competence in radiation protection and the safe use of radiation sources. Safety guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide makes recommendations concerning the building of competence in protection and safety within a national radiation protection infrastructure and provides guidance for setting up the structure for a national strategy. It relates to the training and assessment of qualification of new personnel and the retraining of existing personnel in order to develop and maintain appropriate levels of competence. It provides the necessary guidance to meet the requirements laid down in Safety Series No. 115, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Responsibilities for building competence in protection and safety; 3. Education, training and work experience; 4. A national strategy for building competence in protection and safety.

  3. Building competence in radiation protection and the safe use of radiation sources. Safety guide (Arabic ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Guide makes recommendations concerning the building of competence in protection and safety within a national radiation protection infrastructure and provides guidance for setting up the structure for a national strategy. It relates to the training and assessment of qualification of new personnel and the retraining of existing personnel in order to develop and maintain appropriate levels of competence. It provides the necessary guidance to meet the requirements laid down in Safety Series No. 115, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Responsibilities for building competence in protection and safety; 3. Education, training and work experience; 4. A national strategy for building competence in protection and safety.

  4. Seismic response of uplifting concrete gravity dams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leger, P.; Sauve, G.; Bhattacharjee, S.

    1992-01-01

    The foundation interaction effects on the seismic response of dam-foundation systems have generally been studied using the linear elastic finite element models. In reality, the foundation can not develop effective tensile stresses to a significant degree along the interface. A two-dimensional finite element model, in which nonlinear gap elements are used at the dam-foundation interface to determine the uplift response of concrete gravity dams subjected to seismic loads, is presented. Time domain analyses were performed for a wide range of modelling assumptions such as dam height, interface uplift pressure, interface mesh density, and earthquake input motions, that were systematically varied to find their influence on the seismic response. The nonlinear interface behavior generally reduces the seismic response of dam-foundation systems acting as a seismic isolation mechanism, and may increase the safety against sliding by reducing the base shear transmitted to the foundation. 4 refs., 5 figs., 6 tabs

  5. An experimental study on developing seismic damage indicator appearing OBE exceedance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, D. S.; Kwon, K. J.; Lee, J. L.

    2000-01-01

    Immediate measurement should be taken depending on the level of seismic damage to nuclear power plants when an earthquake exceeds Operating Base Earthquake by NRC regulatory guide. An earthquake at nuclear plant site is felt with seismic instrument and analyzed by seismic monitoring systems. However, if operators of insufficient knowledge to earthquake can recognize the intensity of the earthquake with a subsidiary indicating model, more immediate response can be conducted. This subsidiary indicating model is called seismic damage indicator. In this regard, an experimental study using shaking table was conducted to develop the seismic damage indicator by CAV and OBE compatible with NRC standard response spectrum. In this test result, stacked acrylic cylinders were manufactured to behave consistently for each direction of seismic load. If the developed SDI is installed in nuclear power plants, it is seemed to be useful in easily determining OBE exceedance easily, and counteracting by plant operator along with the existing seismic monitoring systems

  6. Seismic response analysis and upgrading design of pump houses of Kozloduy NPP units 5 and 6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jordanov, M.; Marinov, M.; Krutzik, N.

    2001-01-01

    The main objective of the presented project was to perform a feasibility study for seismic/structural evaluation of the safety related structures at Kozloduy NPP Units 5 and 6 for the new site seismicity and determine if they satisfy current international safety standards. The evaluation of the Pump House 3 (PH3) building is addressed in this paper, which was carried out by applying appropriate modeling techniques combined with failure mode and seismic margin analyses. The scope of the work defined was to present the required enhancement of the seismic capacity of the Pump House structures.(author)

  7. Seismic design considerations for nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soni, R.S.; Kushwaha, H.S.; Venkat Raj, V.

    2001-01-01

    During the last few decades, there have been considerable advances in the field of a seismic design of nuclear structures and components housed inside a Nuclear power Plant (NPP). The seismic design and qualification of theses systems and components are carried out through the use of well proven and established theoretical as well as experimental means. Many of the related research works pertaining to these methods are available in the published literature, codes, guides etc. Contrary to this, there is very little information available with regards to the seismic design aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This is probably on account of the little importance attached to these facilities from the point of view of seismic loading. In reality, some of these facilities handle a large inventory of radioactive materials and, therefore, these facilities must survive during a seismic event without giving rise to any sort of undue radiological risk to the plant personnel and the public at large. Presented herein in this paper are the seismic design considerations which are adopted for the design of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in India. (author)

  8. Use of seismic experience data for replacement and new equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, H.W.; Hardy, G.S.; Horstman, N.G.; Baughman, P.D.

    1990-01-01

    Over the past seven years the use of seismic experience data to address seismic concerns has received a great deal of attention, particularly regarding the NRC Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46. The Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) was formed in January 1982 to develop a practical alternative to the rigorous seismic qualification of equipment for resolution of USI A-46. The alternative method chosen is seismic experience technology. The purpose of this paper is to explore two additional potential applications of seismic experience technology: Replacement parts and New equipment/design change process. The need for, and benefits of, these applications are summarized. The available technology and the methodologies proposed are described. The methodology descriptions include a summary of the requirements for the seismic evaluations, an outline of the method, and the documentation requirements. (orig./HP)

  9. The management system for the disposal of radioactive waste. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on developing and implementing management systems for all phases of facilities for the disposal of radioactive waste and related activities. It covers the management systems for managing the different stages of waste disposal facilities, such as siting, design and construction, operation (i.e. the activities, which can extend over several decades, involving receipt of the waste product in its final packaging (if it is to be disposed of in packaged form), waste emplacement in the waste disposal facility, backfilling and sealing, and any subsequent period prior to closure), closure and the period of institutional control (i.e. either active control - monitoring, surveillance and remediation; or passive control - restricted land use). The management systems apply to various types of disposal facility for different categories of radioactive waste, such as: near surface (for low level waste), geological (for low, intermediate and/or high level waste), boreholes (for sealed sources), surface impoundment (for mining and milling waste) and landfill (for very low level waste). It also covers management systems for related processes and activities, such as extended monitoring and surveillance during the period of active institutional control in the post-closure phase, safety and performance assessments and development of the safety case for the waste disposal facility and regulatory authorization (e.g. licensing). This Safety Guide is intended to be used by organizations that are directly involved in, or that regulate, the facilities and activities described in paras 1.15 and 1.16, and by the suppliers of nuclear safety related products that are required to meet some or all of the requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities'. It will also be useful to legislators and to members of the public and other parties interested in the nuclear

  10. External Events Excluding Earthquakes in the Design of Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on design for the protection of nuclear power plants from the effects of external events (excluding earthquakes), i.e. events that originate either off the site or within the boundaries of the site but from sources that are not directly involved in the operational states of the nuclear power plant units. In addition, it provides recommendations on engineering related matters in order to comply with the safety objectives and requirements established in the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It is also applicable to the design and safety assessment of items important to the safety of land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Application of safety criteria to the design; 3. Design basis for external events; 4. Aircraft crash; 5. External fire; 6. Explosions; 7. Asphyxiant and toxic gases; 8. Corrosive and radioactive gases and liquids; 9. Electromagnetic interference; 10. Floods; 11. Extreme winds; 12. Extreme meteorological conditions; 13. Biological phenomena; 14. Volcanism; 15. Collisions of floating bodies with water intakes and UHS components; Annex I: Aircraft crashes; Annex II: Detonation and deflagration; Annex III: Toxicity limits.

  11. Seismic Isolation Working Meeting Gap Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coleman, Justin [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Sabharwall, Piyush [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-09-01

    The ultimate goal in nuclear facility and nuclear power plant operations is operating safety during normal operations and maintaining core cooling capabilities during off-normal events including external hazards. Understanding the impact external hazards, such as flooding and earthquakes, have on nuclear facilities and NPPs is critical to deciding how to manage these hazards to expectable levels of risk. From a seismic risk perspective the goal is to manage seismic risk. Seismic risk is determined by convolving the seismic hazard with seismic fragilities (capacity of systems, structures, and components (SSCs)). There are large uncertainties associated with evolving nature of the seismic hazard curves. Additionally there are requirements within DOE and potential requirements within NRC to reconsider updated seismic hazard curves every 10 years. Therefore opportunity exists for engineered solutions to manage this seismic uncertainty. One engineered solution is seismic isolation. Current seismic isolation (SI) designs (used in commercial industry) reduce horizontal earthquake loads and protect critical infrastructure from the potentially destructive effects of large earthquakes. The benefit of SI application in the nuclear industry is being recognized and SI systems have been proposed, in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 4 standard, to be released in 2014, for Light Water Reactors (LWR) facilities using commercially available technology. However, there is a lack of industry application to the nuclear industry and uncertainty with implementing the procedures outlined in ASCE-4. Opportunity exists to determine barriers associated with implementation of current ASCE-4 standard language.

  12. An assessment of seismic margins in nuclear plant piping

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, W.P.; Jaquay, K.R.; Chokshi, N.C.; Terao, D.

    1995-01-01

    Interim results of an ongoing program to assist the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in developing regulatory positions on the seismic analyses of piping and overall safety margins of piping systems are reported. Results of reviews of previous seismic testing, primarily the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)/NRC Piping and Fitting Dynamic Reliability Program, and assessments of the ASME Code, Section III, piping seismic design criteria as revised by the 1994 Addenda are reported. Major issues are identified herein only. Technical details are to be provided elsewhere. (author). 4 refs., 2 figs

  13. A regulatory perspective on appropriate seismic loading stress criteria for advanced light water reactor piping systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terao, D.

    1995-01-01

    In the foregoing sections, the author has discussed the NRC staff's perspective on the evolving seismic design criteria for piping systems. He also addressed the need for developing seismic loading stress criteria and provided several recommendations and considerations for ensuring piping functional capability, pressure integrity, and structural integrity. Overall, the general consensus in the NRC staff is that in the past several years, many initiatives have been developed and implemented by the industry and the NRC staff to reduce the excessive conservatisms that might have existed in nuclear piping system design criteria. The regulations, regulatory guides, and Standard Review Plan have been (or are currently in the process of being) revised to reflect these initiatives in an effort to produce requirements and guidelines that will continue to result in a safe and practical design of piping systems. However, further proposals to reduce margins are continually being submitted to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the NRC for review and approval. Improvements to the piping seismic design criteria are always encouraged, but there is a point at which the benefits might be outweighed by drawbacks. Because of this rapidly evolving situation the need exists for the industry and the NRC staff to develop a course of action to ensure that piping seismic design criteria for future ALWR plants will result in piping system designs that provide adequate safety margins and practical designs at a reasonable cost

  14. Radiological design guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, R.A.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this design guide is to provide radiological safety requirements, standards, and information necessary for designing facilities that will operate without unacceptable risk to personnel, the public, or the environment as required by the US Department of Energy (DOE). This design guide, together with WHC-CM-4-29, Nuclear Criticality Safety, WHC-CM-4-46, Nonreactor Facility Safety Analysis, and WHC-CM-7-5, Environmental Compliance, covers the radiation safety design requirements at Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). This design guide applies to the design of all new facilities. The WHC organization with line responsibility for design shall determine to what extent this design guide shall apply to the modifications to existing facilities. In making this determination, consideration shall include a cost versus benefit study. Specifically, facilities that store, handle, or process radioactive materials will be covered. This design guide replaces WHC-CM-4-9 and is designated a living document. This design guide is intended for design purposes only. Design criteria are different from operational criteria and often more stringent. Criteria that might be acceptable for operations might not be adequate for design

  15. Comments on the seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarics, A G [29 Winward Road, Belvedere, CA 94920 (United States); Kelly, J M [Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, CA (United States); Csorba, E M [Technical University Vienna, Vienna (Austria)

    2001-03-01

    After the break-up of the Soviet Union, ten countries in Eastern Europe inherited Soviet-designed nuclear power plants which were constructed without adequate provisions to resist earthquake-generated lateral forces. An earthquake at their locations could seriously damage these plants and could result in Chernobyl-like consequences on the environment. There is an ongoing program to reinforce these plants using conventional piecemeal methods. A newly developed seismic protection strategy called 'base isolation' or 'seismic isolation', widely used in the United States to retrofit existing buildings, is recommended as an economical, technically superior, and more effective solution - where applicable - to make these nuclear power plants capable of resisting seismic forces. (author)

  16. Comments on the seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarics, A.G.; Kelly, J.M.; Csorba, E.M.

    2001-01-01

    After the break-up of the Soviet Union, ten countries in Eastern Europe inherited Soviet-designed nuclear power plants which were constructed without adequate provisions to resist earthquake-generated lateral forces. An earthquake at their locations could seriously damage these plants and could result in Chernobyl-like consequences on the environment. There is an ongoing program to reinforce these plants using conventional piecemeal methods. A newly developed seismic protection strategy called 'base isolation' or 'seismic isolation', widely used in the United States to retrofit existing buildings, is recommended as an economical, technically superior, and more effective solution - where applicable - to make these nuclear power plants capable of resisting seismic forces. (author)

  17. Comparison of evaluation guidelines for life-safety seismic hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wyllie, L.A.; Love, R.J.

    1989-01-01

    The guidelines presented in Design Evaluation guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected to natural Phenomena Hazards (UCRL 15910 Draft; May 1989) include evaluation criteria for existing Department of Energy buildings subjected to earthquakes. These criteria were developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for use in both the seismic design of new structures and the evaluation of existing structures. ATC-14: Evaluating The Seismic Resistance of Existing Buildings developed by the Applied Technology Council, consists of guidelines and criteria for identifying the buildings or building components that present unacceptable risk to human lives. This paper compares and contrasts the two evaluation guidelines for existing buildings using a prototype building as an example. The prototype building is a seven story, concrete shear wall building assuming a General Use Occupancy

  18. The operating organization and the recruitment, training and qualification of personnel for research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements on the operating organization and on personnel for research reactors. It covers the typical operating organization for research reactor facilities; the recruitment process and qualification in terms of education, training and experience; programmes for initial and continuing training; the authorization process for those individuals having an immediate bearing on safety; and the processes for their requalification and reauthorization

  19. Seismic analysis with FEM for fuel transfer system of PWR nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jia Xiaofeng; Liu Pengliang; Bi Xiangjun; Ji Shunying

    2012-01-01

    In the PWR nuclear power plant, the function of the fuel transfer system (FTS) is to transfer the fuel assembly between the reactor building and the fuel building. The seismic analysis of the transfer system structure should be carried out to ensure the safety under OBE and SSE. Therefore, the ANASYS 12.0 software is adopted to construct the finite element analysis model for the fuel transfer system in a million kilowatt nuclear power plant. For the various configurations of FTS in the operating process, the stresses of the main structures, such as the transfer tube, fuel assembly container, fuel conveyor car, lifting frame in the reactor building, lifting frame in the fuel building, support and guide structure of conveyor car and the lifting frame in both buildings, are computed. The stresses are combined with the method of square root of square sum (SRSS) and assessed under various seismic conditions based on RCCM code, the results of the assessment satisfy the code. The results show that the stresses of the fuel transfer system structure meet the strength requirement, meanwhile, it can withstand the earthquake well. (authors)

  20. Seismic resistance design of nuclear power plant building structures in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitano, Takehito

    1997-01-01

    Japan is one of the countries where earthquakes occur most frequently in the world and has incurred a lot of disasters in the past. Therefore, the seismic resistance design of a nuclear power plant plays a very important role in Japan. This report describes the general method of seismic resistance design of a nuclear power plant giving examples of PWR and BWR type reactor buildings in Japan. Nuclear facilities are classified into three seismic classes and is designed according to the corresponding seismic class in Japan. Concerning reactor buildings, the short-term allowable stress design is applied for the S1 seismic load and it is confirmed that the structures have a safety margin against the S2 seismic load. (J.P.N.)

  1. Seismic resistance design of nuclear power plant building structures in Japan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kitano, Takehito [Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Osaka (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    Japan is one of the countries where earthquakes occur most frequently in the world and has incurred a lot of disasters in the past. Therefore, the seismic resistance design of a nuclear power plant plays a very important role in Japan. This report describes the general method of seismic resistance design of a nuclear power plant giving examples of PWR and BWR type reactor buildings in Japan. Nuclear facilities are classified into three seismic classes and is designed according to the corresponding seismic class in Japan. Concerning reactor buildings, the short-term allowable stress design is applied for the S1 seismic load and it is confirmed that the structures have a safety margin against the S2 seismic load. (J.P.N.)

  2. Sloshing of coolant in a seismically isolated reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, T.S.; Guildys, J.; Seidensticker, R.W.

    1988-01-01

    During a seismic event, the liquid coolant inside the reactor vessel has sloshing motion which is a low-frequency phenomenon. In a reactor system incorporated with seismic isolation, the isolation frequency usually is also very low. There is concern on the potential amplification of sloshing motion of the liquid coolant. This study investigates the effects of seismic isolation on the sloshing of liquid coolant inside the reactor vessel of a liquid metal cooled reactor. Based on a synthetic ground motion whose response spectra envelop those specified by the NRC Regulator Guide 1.60, it is found that the maximum sloshing wave height increases from 18 in. to almost 30 in. when the system is seismically isolated. Since higher sloshing wave may introduce severe impact forces and thermal shocks to the reactor closure and other components within the reactor vessel, adequate design considerations should be made either to suppress the wave height or to reduce the effects caused by high waves

  3. Seismic damage assessment of reinforced concrete containment structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, HoHyun; Koh, Hyun-Moo; Hyun, Chang-Hun; Kim, Moon-Soo; Shin, Hyun Mock

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents a procedure for assessing seismic damage of concrete containment structures using the nonlinear time-history numerical analysis. For this purpose, two kinds of damage index are introduced at finite element and structural levels. Nonlinear finite element analysis for the containment structure applies PSC shell elements using a layered approach leading to damage indices at finite element and structural levels, which are then used to assess the seismic damage of the containment structure. As an example of such seismic damage assessment, seismic damages of the containment structure of Wolsong I nuclear power plant in Korea are evaluated against 30 artificial earthquakes generated with a wide range of PGA according to US NRC regulatory guide 1.60. Structural responses and corresponding damage index according to the level of PGA and nonlinearity are investigated. It is also shown that the containment structure behaves elastically for earthquakes corresponding to or lower than DBE. (author)

  4. ACED devices and SECAF supports for the control of structure, pipe network and equipment behaviour at seismic movements in order to enhance the safety margin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serban, Viorel; Prisecaru, I.; Cretu, D.; Moldoveanu, T.

    2002-01-01

    In order to enhance the safety margin of structure, pipe networks and equipment associated to the existing NPPs, the classic consolidation solutions are very expensive and many times, impossible to be implemented. Structures, pipe networks, systems and equipment have geometries imposed by the basic construction requirements, operating and safety requirements and their modifications is not always possible. In order to enhance the strength capacity of (new or old) structures, systems and equipment mechanical devices with controlled elasticity and damping (ACED) have been designed, constructed and experimented. These devices are capable to support very large static loads over which dynamic loads (shock, vibration and seismic movements) overlap (which are damped). To increase the strength capacity of (new or existing) pipe networks and equipment connecting with pipes, SECAF supports that allow displacements from thermal expansions with low reaction force have been designed, constructed and experimented. SECAF supports are capable elastically to take permanent loads over which shocks, vibrations and seismic movements (which are damp) overlap. ACED devices and SECAF supports can be used to rehabilitate the existing NPPs with law financial costs and an increase of their strength capacity up to 100% under seismic movements, shocks and vibrations. ACED devices and SECAF supports do not require maintenance, are not affected by presence of a radiation field and their estimated service-life is similar to the NPPs

  5. Seismic safety margins research program. Phase I final report - Plant/site selection and data collection (Project I)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chuang, T.Y.

    1981-07-01

    Project I of Phase I of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) comprised two parts: the selection of a representative nuclear power plant/site for study in Phase I and the collection of data needed by the other SSMRP projects. Unit 1 of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant in Zion, Illinois, was selected for the SSMRP Phase I studies. Unit 1 of the Zion plant has been validated as a good choice for the Phase I study plant. Although no single nuclear power plant can represent all such plants equally well, selection criteria were developed to maximize the generic implications of Phase I of the SSMRP. On the basis of the selection criteria, the Zion plant and its site were found to be reasonably representative of operating and future plants with regard to its nuclear steam supply system; the type of containment structure (prestressed concrete); its electrical capacity (1100 MWe); its location (the Midwest); the peak seismic acceleration used for design (0.17g); and the properties of the underlying soil (the low-strain shear-wave velocity is 1650 ft/s in a 50- to 100-ft-thick layer of soil overlying sedimentary bedrock). (author)

  6. 30 CFR 75.1429 - Guide ropes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Hoisting and Mantrips Wire Ropes ยง 75.1429 Guide ropes. If guide... strength (manufacturer's published catalog strength) of the guide rope at installation shall meet the...

  7. Earthquake experience and seismic qualification by indirect methods in nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    In recent years, many operational nuclear power plants around the world have conducted seismic re-evaluation programmes either as part of a review of seismic hazards or to comply with best international nuclear safety practices. In this connection, Member States have called on the IAEA to carry out several seismic review missions at their plants, primarily those of WWER and RBMK design. One of the critical safety issues that arose during these missions was that of seismic qualification (determination of fitness for service) of already installed plant distribution systems, equipment and components. The qualification of new components, equipment and distribution systems cannot be replicated for equipment that is already installed and operational in plants, as this process is neither feasible nor appropriate. For this reason, seismic safety experts have developed new procedures for the qualification of installed equipment: these procedures seek to demonstrate that installed equipment, through a process of comparison with new equipment, is apt for service. However, these procedures require large sets of criteria and qualification databases and call for the use of engineering judgement and experience, all of which open the door to wide margins of interpretation. In order to guarantee a sound technical basis for the qualification of in-plant equipment, currently applied to 70% to 80% of all plant equipment, the regulatory review of this type of qualification process calls for a detailed assessment of the technical procedures applied. Such an assessment is the first step towards eliminating the risk of large differences in qualification results between different plants, operators and countries, and guaranteeing the reliability of seismic re-evaluation programmes. Bearing this in mind, in 1999, the IAEA convened a seminar and technical meeting on seismic qualification under the auspices of the IAEA Technical Co-operation programme. Altogether 66 senior experts attended the

  8. Seismic investigations of the HDR Safety Program. Summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malcher, L.; Schrammel, D.; Steinhilber, H.; Kot, C.A.

    1994-08-01

    The primary objective of the seismic investigations, performed at the HDR facility in Kahl/Main, FRG was to validate calculational methods for the seismic evaluation of nuclear-reactor systems, using experimental data from an actual nuclear plant. Using eccentric mass shaker excitation the HDR soil/structure system was tested to incipient failure, exhibiting highly nonlinear response and demonstrating that structures not seismically designed can sustain loads equivalent to a design basin earthquake (DBE). Load transmission from the structure to piping/equipment indicated significant response amplifications and shifts to higher frequencies, while the response of tanks/vessels depended mainly on their support conditions. The evaluation of various piping support configurations demonstrated that proper system design (for a given spectrum) rather than number of supports or system stiffness is important to limiting pipe greens. Piping at loads exceeding the DBE eightfold still had significant margins and failure is improbable inspite of multiple support failures. The mean value for pipe damping, even under extreme loads, was found to be about 4%. Comparison of linear and nonlinear computational results with piping response measurements showed that predictions have a wide scatter and do not necessarily yield conservative responses underpredicting, in particular, peak support forces. For the soil/structure system the quality of the predictions did not depend so much on the complexity of the modeling, but rather on whether the model captured the salient features and nonlinearities of the system

  9. Seismic analysis of liquid metal fast breeder reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilbert, R.J.; Martelli, A.

    1989-06-01

    This report is a general survey of the recent methods to predict the seismic structural behaviour of LMFBRs. It shall put into evidence the impact of seismic analysis on the design of the different structures of the reactor. This report is addressed to specialists and institutions of governmental organizations in industrialized and developing countries responsible for the design and operation of LMFBRs. The information presented should enable specialists in the R and D institutions and industries likely to be involved, to establish the correct course of the design and operation of LMFBRs. Also, the safety aspect of seismic risk are emphasized in the report. Refs and figs

  10. Earthquake experience suggests new approach to seismic criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knox, R.

    1983-01-01

    Progress in seismic qualification of nuclear power plants as reviewed at the 4th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference in Vancouver, September 1983, is discussed. The lack of experience of earthquakes in existing nuclear plants can be compensated by the growing experience of actual earthquake effects in conventional power plants and similar installations. A survey of the effects on four power stations, with a total of twenty generating units, in the area strongly shaken by the San Fernando earthquake in California in 1971 is reported. The Canadian approach to seismic qualification, international criteria, Canadian/Korean experience, safety related equipment, the Tadotsu test facility and seismic tests are discussed. (U.K.)

  11. Development of Draft Regulatory Guide on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants with New Safety Design Features

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bang, Young Seok; Woo, Sweng Woong; Hwang, Tae Suk [KINS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Sim, Suk K; Hwang, Min Jeong [Environment and Energy Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The present paper discusses the development process of the draft version of regulatory guide (DRG) on accident analysis of the NPP having the NSFD and its result. Based on the consideration on the lesson learned from the previous licensing review, a draft regulatory guide (DRG) on accident analysis for NPP with new safety design features (NSDF) was developed. New safety design features (NSDF) have been introduced to the new constructing nuclear power plants (NPP) since the early 2000 and the issuance of construction permit of SKN Units 3 and 4. Typical examples of the new safety features includes Fluidic Device (FD) within Safety Injection Tanks (SIT), Passive Auxiliary Feedwater System (PAFS), ECCS Core Barrel Duct (ECBD) which were adopted in APR1400 design and/or APR+ design to improve the safety margin of the plants for the postulated accidents of interest. Also several studies of new concept of the safety system such as Hybrid ECCS design have been reported. General and/or specific guideline of accident analysis considering the NSDF has been requested. Realistic evaluation of the impact of NSDF on accident with uncertainty and separated accident analysis accounting the NSDF impact were specified in the DRG. Per the developmental process, identification of key issues, demonstration of the DRG with specific accident with specific NSDF, and improvement of DGR for the key issues and their resolution will be conducted.

  12. Strategy for seismic upgrading of chemical plant taking productivity as criterion of judgment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oshima, M.; Kase, T.; Yashiro, H.; Fukushima, S.

    2005-01-01

    Seismic upgrading and modification of existing chemical plant facilities have been performed by means of a procedure of the Seismic Design Code and Guidelines of High-pressure Gas Facilities in Japan. Main purpose of this seismic design code is to ensure public safety at seismic events. From the viewpoints of seismic risk of corporate management, CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and productivity of the plants are also important for seismic assessment. In this paper, authors proposed strategy for seismic assessment to select appropriate pre-earthquake upgrading and modification considering productivity of plants based on fault tree analysis. This assessment will enable to select weak damage modes and to allocate countermeasure cost optimally to the selected damage modes. (authors)

  13. Design response spectra-compliant real and synthetic GMS for seismic analysis of seismically isolated nuclear reactor containment building

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahmer Ali

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available Due to the severe impacts of recent earthquakes, the use of seismic isolation is paramount for the safety of nuclear structures. The diversity observed in seismic events demands ongoing research to analyze the devastating attributes involved, and hence to enhance the sustainability of base-isolated nuclear power plants. This study reports the seismic performance of a seismically-isolated nuclear reactor containment building (NRCB under strong short-period ground motions (SPGMs and long-period ground motions (LPGMs. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission-based design response spectrum for the seismic design of nuclear power plants is stipulated as the reference spectrum for ground motion selection. Within the period range(s of interest, the spectral matching of selected records with the target spectrum is ensured using the spectral-compatibility approach. NRC-compliant SPGMs and LPGMs from the mega-thrust Tohoku earthquake are used to obtain the structural response of the base-isolated NRCB. To account for the lack of earthquakes in low-to-moderate seismicity zones and the gap in the artificial synthesis of long-period records, wavelet-decomposition based autoregressive moving average modeling for artificial generation of real ground motions is performed. Based on analysis results from real and simulated SPGMs versus LPGMs, the performance of NRCBs is discussed with suggestions for future research and seismic provisions.

  14. Design response spectra-compliant real and synthetic GMS for seismic analysis of seismically isolated nuclear reactor containment building

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ali, Ahmer [ENVICO Consultants Co. Ltd., Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Abu-Hayah, Nadin; Kim, Doo Kie [Civil and Environmental Engineering, Kunsan National University, Gunsan (Korea, Republic of); Cho, Sung Gook [Innose Tech Co., Ltd., Incheon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-06-15

    Due to the severe impacts of recent earthquakes, the use of seismic isolation is paramount for the safety of nuclear structures. The diversity observed in seismic events demands ongoing research to analyze the devastating attributes involved, and hence to enhance the sustainability of base-isolated nuclear power plants. This study reports the seismic performance of a seismically-isolated nuclear reactor containment building (NRCB) under strong short-period ground motions (SPGMs) and long-period ground motions (LPGMs). The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission-based design response spectrum for the seismic design of nuclear power plants is stipulated as the reference spectrum for ground motion selection. Within the period range(s) of interest, the spectral matching of selected records with the target spectrum is ensured using the spectral-compatibility approach. NRC-compliant SPGMs and LPGMs from the mega-thrust Tohoku earthquake are used to obtain the structural response of the base-isolated NRCB. To account for the lack of earthquakes in low-to-moderate seismicity zones and the gap in the artificial synthesis of long-period records, wavelet-decomposition based autoregressive moving average modeling for artificial generation of real ground motions is performed. Based on analysis results from real and simulated SPGMs versus LPGMs, the performance of NRCBs is discussed with suggestions for future research and seismic provisions.

  15. Nuclear criticality safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pruvost, N.L.; Paxton, H.C.

    1996-09-01

    This technical reference document cites information related to nuclear criticality safety principles, experience, and practice. The document also provides general guidance for criticality safety personnel and regulators

  16. Nuclear criticality safety guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pruvost, N.L.; Paxton, H.C. [eds.

    1996-09-01

    This technical reference document cites information related to nuclear criticality safety principles, experience, and practice. The document also provides general guidance for criticality safety personnel and regulators.

  17. Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Russian Edition); Upravlenie stareniem atomnykh ehlektrostantsij. Rukovodstvo po bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-01-15

    The median age of nuclear power plants connected to the grid worldwide is increasing. Ageing management has become an important issue in ensuring the availability of required safety functions throughout the service life of a plant. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for safe long term operation and identifies key elements of effective ageing management for nuclear power plants.

  18. Studies on the seismic buckling design guideline of FBR main vessels. 9. Buckling evaluation under elastic-plastic seismic response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagiwara, Yutaka; Yamamoto, Kohsuke; Kawamoto, Yoji; Nakagawa, Masaki; Akiyama, Hiroshi

    1998-01-01

    Plastic shear-bending buckling under seismic loadings is one of the major problems in the structural design of FBR main vessels. Pseudo-dynamic and dynamic buckling tests of cylinders were performed in order to study the effects of nonlinear seismic response on buckling strength, ductility, and plastic response reduction. The buckling strength formulae and the rule for ductility factors both derived from static tests were confirmed to be valid for the tests under dynamic loads. The displacement-constant rule for response reduction effect was modified by acceleration amplification factor in order to maintain applicability for various spectral profiles of seismic excitations. The response reduction estimated by the proposed rule was reasonably conservative for all cases of the pseudo-dynamic and the dynamic tests. Finally, a seismic safety assessment rule was proposed for plastic shear-bending buckling of cylinders, which include the proposed response reduction rule. (author)

  19. Cooperative development of nuclear safety regulations, guides and standards based on NUSS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pachner, J.; Boyd, F.C.; Yaremy, E.M.

    1984-10-01

    In 1983, the Atomic Energy Control Board and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited conducted a study of a possible joint program involving Canada, a nuclear power plant importing Member State and the IAEA for the development of the national nuclear safety regulations and guides based on NUSS documents. During the study, a work plan with manpower estimates for the development of design was prepared as an investigatory exercise. The work plan suggests that a successful NUSS implementation in developing Member States will require availability of significant resources at the start of the program. The study showed that such a joint program could provide an effective mechanism for transfer of nuclear safety know-how to the developing Member States through NUSS implementation

  20. Seismic response analyses for reactor facilities at Savannah River

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, C.A.; Costantino, C.J.; Xu, J.

    1991-01-01

    The reactor facilities at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) were designed during the 1950's. The original seismic criteria defining the input ground motion was 0.1 G with UBC [uniform building code] provisions used to evaluate structural seismic loads. Later ground motion criteria have defined the free field seismic motion with a 0.2 G ZPA [free field acceleration] and various spectral shapes. The spectral shapes have included the Housner spectra, a site specific spectra, and the US NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] Reg. Guide 1.60 shape. The development of these free field seismic criteria are discussed in the paper. The more recent seismic analyses have been of the following type: fixed base response spectra, frequency independent lumped parameter soil/structure interaction (SSI), frequency dependent lumped parameter SSI, and current state of the art analyses using computer codes such as SASSI. The results from these computations consist of structural loads and floor response spectra (used for piping and equipment qualification). These results are compared in the paper and the methods used to validate the results are discussed. 14 refs., 11 figs