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Sample records for safety requirements implementation

  1. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  2. Requirement analysis of the safety-critical software implementation for the nuclear power plant

    Chang, Hoon Seon; Jung, Jae Cheon; Kim, Jae Hack; Nam, Sang Ku; Kim, Hang Bae

    2005-01-01

    The safety critical software shall be implemented under the strict regulation and standards along with hardware qualification. In general, the safety critical software has been implemented using functional block language (FBL) and structured language like C in the real project. Software design shall comply with such characteristics as; modularity, simplicity, minimizing the use of sub-routine, and excluding the interrupt logic. To meet these prerequisites, we used the computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tool to substantiate the requirements traceability matrix that were manually developed using Word processors or Spreadsheets. And the coding standard and manual have been developed to confirm the quality of software development process, such as; readability, consistency, and maintainability in compliance with NUREG/CR-6463. System level preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is performed by analyzing preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and FMEA document. The modularity concept is effectively implemented for the overall module configurations and functions using RTP software development tool. The response time imposed on the basis of the deterministic structure of the safety-critical software was measured

  3. Safety requirement of the nuclear power plants, after TMI-2 accident and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP

    Mirhabibi, N.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, E.

    1985-01-01

    Based on the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident and other research and developments, many improvements have been required for the design, manufacturing and operation of nuclear power plants in recent years. These requirements have already been implemented to the plants in operation and considered as new safety requirements for new plants. In the present paper these requirements and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP are discussed. (Author)

  4. ORNL implementation of new health and safety requirements (DOE Order 5480.11)

    Abercrombie, J.S.

    1988-01-01

    New mandates in radiological protection outlined in DOE Order 5480. 11, include changes in the methodology for determining total radiation dose, ALARA program accountability, monitoring requirements, and standards for public entrance into controlled areas. The new order places distinct requirements concerning training at all DOE facilities. Radiation protection training requirements are addressed, including the effective communication of operations changes to all employees. This paper details the endeavors underway at ORNL in designing, developing, and delivering the training required by the new mandates. Strategies taken to reach the intended goals are explained. Efforts involve the design and implementation of the above mentioned radiation protection programs, a job-specific ALARA instructional package, and a Risk-Based Philosophy program matched to operational changes. 4 refs., 5 tabs

  5. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  6. Evaluation of the implementation of new traceability and food safety requirements in the pig industry in eastern Australia.

    Hernández-Jover, M; Schembri, N; Toribio, J-A; Holyoake, P K

    2009-10-01

    To evaluate the implementation and barriers to adoption, among pig producers, of a newly introduced traceability and food safety system in Australia. Implementation of the PigPass national vendor declaration (NVD) linked to an on-farm quality assurance (QA) program was evaluated in May and December 2007 at saleyards and abattoirs in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Four focus group discussions with saleyard producers were held between April and July 2007. Implementation of the PigPass system in terms of accurate completion of the form and QA accreditation was higher at the export abattoir than at the regional saleyard at the first audit (P 64%), and many vendors did not appear to be QA-accredited. During focus groups, producers expressed the view that PigPass implementation improved animal and product traceability. They identified the associated costs and a perceived lack of support by information providers as obstacles for adoption. Improvement in the implementation of PigPass among producers marketing pigs at export abattoirs was observed during the 8-month period of the study. There is a need for a more uniform message to producers from government agencies on the importance of the PigPass NVD and QA and extension and education targeted toward producers supplying pigs to saleyards and domestic abattoirs to ensure compliance with the traceability requirements.

  7. 78 FR 14309 - Implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act Provision Requiring FDA To Establish...

    2013-03-05

    ... FDA's Product Tracing Web page at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ucm270851.htm . This... Submit a Report to Congress for the Improvement of Tracking and Tracing of Food; Request for Comments and... Institute of Food Technologists (IFT) to execute product tracing pilot projects as described in the FDA Food...

  8. Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    DEFIGH PRICE, C.

    2000-01-01

    In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry

  9. Assessing and implementing training requirements for staff at plants to meet safety, environment and job needs

    Lagasse, L. (Manitoba Hydro, Winnipeg, MB (Canada))

    1999-01-01

    The rationale for and the process to establish a team to develop a framework for a training plan, determine the cost of such a program for all employees of the Power Supply Division of Manitoba Hydro, and to establish guidelines for implementation of the plan are described. The end result of the process is a job profile and skill and knowledge inventory for some 25 job families within the Power Supply Division; a form to establish training needs for all employees for a three year period which will provide the basis for a three-year training plan and budget; an implementation guide and training plan spreadsheet to facilitate the implementation process; and a series of performance indicators. 4 figs.

  10. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  11. Range Flight Safety Requirements

    Loftin, Charles E.; Hudson, Sandra M.

    2018-01-01

    The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

  12. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  13. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  14. Evaluating safety management system implementation

    Preuss, M.

    2009-01-01

    Canada is committed to not only maintaining, but also improving upon our record of having one of the safest aviation systems in the world. The development, implementation and maintenance of safety management systems is a significant step towards improving safety performance. Canada is considered a world leader in this area and we are fully engaged in implementation. By integrating risk management systems and business practices, the aviation industry stands to gain better safety performance with less regulatory intervention. These are important steps towards improving safety and enhancing the public's confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system. (author)

  15. Infrastructural requirements for local implementation of safety policies: the discordance between top-down and bottom-up systems of action

    Lindqvist Kent

    2009-03-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Safety promotion is planned and practised not only by public health organizations, but also by other welfare state agencies, private companies and non-governmental organizations. The term 'infrastructure' originally denoted the underlying resources needed for warfare, e.g. roads, industries, and an industrial workforce. Today, 'infrastructure' refers to the physical elements, organizations and people needed to run projects in different societal arenas. The aim of this study was to examine associations between infrastructure and local implementation of safety policies in injury prevention and safety promotion programs. Methods Qualitative data on municipalities in Sweden designated as Safe Communities were collected from focus group interviews with municipal politicians and administrators, as well as from policy documents, and materials published on the Internet. Actor network theory was used to identify weaknesses in the present infrastructure and determine strategies that can be used to resolve these. Results The weakness identification analysis revealed that the factual infrastructure available for effectuating national strategies varied between safety areas and approaches, basically reflecting differences between bureaucratic and network-based organizational models. At the local level, a contradiction between safety promotion and the existence of quasi-markets for local public service providers was found to predispose for a poor local infrastructure diminishing the interest in integrated inter-agency activities. The weakness resolution analysis showed that development of an adequate infrastructure for safety promotion would require adjustment of the legal framework regulating injury data exchange, and would also require rational financial models for multi-party investments in local infrastructures. Conclusion We found that the "silo" structure of government organization and assignment of resources was a barrier to

  16. Infrastructural requirements for local implementation of safety policies: the discordance between top-down and bottom-up systems of action.

    Timpka, Toomas; Nordqvist, Cecilia; Lindqvist, Kent

    2009-03-09

    Safety promotion is planned and practised not only by public health organizations, but also by other welfare state agencies, private companies and non-governmental organizations. The term 'infrastructure' originally denoted the underlying resources needed for warfare, e.g. roads, industries, and an industrial workforce. Today, 'infrastructure' refers to the physical elements, organizations and people needed to run projects in different societal arenas. The aim of this study was to examine associations between infrastructure and local implementation of safety policies in injury prevention and safety promotion programs. Qualitative data on municipalities in Sweden designated as Safe Communities were collected from focus group interviews with municipal politicians and administrators, as well as from policy documents, and materials published on the Internet. Actor network theory was used to identify weaknesses in the present infrastructure and determine strategies that can be used to resolve these. The weakness identification analysis revealed that the factual infrastructure available for effectuating national strategies varied between safety areas and approaches, basically reflecting differences between bureaucratic and network-based organizational models. At the local level, a contradiction between safety promotion and the existence of quasi-markets for local public service providers was found to predispose for a poor local infrastructure diminishing the interest in integrated inter-agency activities. The weakness resolution analysis showed that development of an adequate infrastructure for safety promotion would require adjustment of the legal framework regulating injury data exchange, and would also require rational financial models for multi-party investments in local infrastructures. We found that the "silo" structure of government organization and assignment of resources was a barrier to collaborative action for safety at a community level. It may therefore be

  17. Implementation of the INEEL safety analyst training standard

    Hochhalter, E. E.

    2000-01-01

    The Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) safety analysis units at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) are in the process of implementing the recently issued INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107). Safety analyst training and qualifications are integral to the development and maintenance of core safety analysis capabilities. The INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107) was developed directly from EFCOG Training Subgroup draft safety analyst training plan template, but has been adapted to the needs and requirements of the INEEL safety analysis community. The implementation of this Safety Analyst Training Standard is part of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Phase II Implementation currently underway at the INEEL. The objective of this paper is to discuss (1) the INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard, (2) the development of the safety analyst individual training plans, (3) the implementation issues encountered during this initial phase of implementation, (4) the solutions developed, and (5) the implementation activities remaining to be completed

  18. Pressure Safety Program Implementation at ORNL

    Lower, Mark [ORNL; Etheridge, Tom [ORNL; Oland, C. Barry [XCEL Engineering, Inc.

    2013-01-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a US Department of Energy (DOE) facility that is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC. In February 2006, DOE promulgated worker safety and health regulations to govern contractor activities at DOE sites. These regulations, which are provided in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program, establish requirements for worker safety and health program that reduce or prevent occupational injuries, illnesses, and accidental losses by providing DOE contractors and their workers with safe and healthful workplaces at DOE sites. The regulations state that contractors must achieve compliance no later than May 25, 2007. According to 10 CFR 851, Subpart C, Specific Program Requirements, contractors must have a structured approach to their worker safety and health programs that at a minimum includes provisions for pressure safety. In implementing the structured approach for pressure safety, contractors must establish safety policies and procedures to ensure that pressure systems are designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained, qualified personnel in accordance with applicable sound engineering principles. In addition, contractors must ensure that all pressure vessels, boilers, air receivers, and supporting piping systems conform to (1) applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2004) Sections I through XII, including applicable code cases; (2) applicable ASME B31 piping codes; and (3) the strictest applicable state and local codes. When national consensus codes are not applicable because of pressure range, vessel geometry, use of special materials, etc., contractors must implement measures to provide equivalent protection and ensure a level of safety greater than or equal to the level of protection afforded by the ASME or applicable state or local codes. This report documents the work performed to address legacy pressure vessel deficiencies and comply

  19. The development of safety requirements

    Jorel, M.

    2009-01-01

    This document describes the safety approach followed in France for the design of nuclear reactors. This safety approach is based on safety principles from which stem safety requirements that set limiting values for specific parameters. The improvements in computerized simulation, the use of more adequate new materials, a better knowledge of the concerned physical processes, the changes in the reactor operations (higher discharge burnups for instance) have to be taken into account for the definition of safety criteria and the setting of limiting values. The developments of the safety criteria linked to the risks of cladding failure and loss of primary coolant are presented. (A.C.)

  20. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    Konzen, K.K. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States). Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; Langsted, J.M. [M.H. Chew and Associates, Golden, CO (United States)

    1998-02-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets.

  1. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    Konzen, K.K.

    1998-01-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets

  2. Nuclear criticality safety department training implementation

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Department (NCSD) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The NCSD Qualification Program is described in Y/DD-694, Qualification Program, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSD personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This document supersedes Y/DD-696, Revision 2, dated 3/27/96, Training Implementation, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department. There are no backfit requirements associated with revisions to this document

  3. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    2000-01-01

    other reactor types, including innovative developments in future systems, some of the requirements may not be applicable, or may need some judgment in their interpretation. Various Safety Guides will provide guidance in the interpretation and implementation of these requirements. This publication is intended for use by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies. This publication establishes design requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety that must be met for safe operation of a nuclear power plant, and for preventing or mitigating the consequences of events that could jeopardize safety. It also establishes requirements for a comprehensive safety assessment, which is carried out in order to identify the potential hazards that may arise from the operation of the plant, under the various plant states (operational states and accident conditions). The safety assessment process includes the complementary techniques of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis. These analyses necessitate consideration of postulated initiating events (PlEs), which include many factors that, singly or in combination, may affect safety and which may: originate in the operation of the nuclear power plant itself; be caused by human action; be directly related to the nuclear power plant and its environment. This publication also addresses events that are very unlikely to occur, such as severe accidents that may result in major radioactive releases, and for which it may be appropriate and practicable to provide preventive or mitigatory features in the design. This publication does not address: external natural or human induced events that are extremely unlikely (such as the impact of a meteorite or an artificial satellite); conventional industrial accidents that under no circumstances could affect the safety of the nuclear power plant; or non-radiological effects arising

  4. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    2004-01-01

    other reactor types, including innovative developments in future systems, some of the requirements may not be applicable, or may need some judgment in their interpretation. Various Safety Guides will provide guidance in the interpretation and implementation of these requirements. This publication is intended for use by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies. This publication establishes design requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety that must be met for safe operation of a nuclear power plant, and for preventing or mitigating the consequences of events that could jeopardize safety. It also establishes requirements for a comprehensive safety assessment, which is carried out in order to identify the potential hazards that may arise from the operation of the plant, under the various plant states (operational states and accident conditions). The safety assessment process includes the complementary techniques of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis. These analyses necessitate consideration of postulated initiating events (PlEs), which include many factors that, singly or in combination, may affect safety and which may: originate in the operation of the nuclear power plant itself. Be caused by human action. Be directly related to the nuclear power plant and its environment. This publication also addresses events that are very unlikely to occur, such as severe accidents that may result in major radioactive releases, and for which it may be appropriate and practicable to provide preventive or mitigatory features in the design. This publication does not address: external natural or human induced events that are extremely unlikely (such as the impact of a meteorite or an artificial satellite). Conventional industrial accidents that under no circumstances could affect the safety of the nuclear power plant. Or non-radiological effects arising

  5. Site evaluation for nuclear installations. Safety requirements

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1). It takes account of developments relating to site evaluations for nuclear installations since the Code on Siting was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for site evaluation are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations. It is recognized that there are steady advances in technology and scientific knowledge, in nuclear safety and in what is considered adequate protection. Safety requirements change with these advances and this publication reflects the present consensus among States. This Safety Requirements publication was prepared under the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear installations. It establishes requirements and provides criteria for ensuring safety in site evaluation for nuclear installations. The Safety Guides on site evaluation listed in the references provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in this Safety Requirements publication. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements for the elements of a site evaluation for a nuclear installation so as to characterize fully the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of a nuclear installation. The purpose is to establish requirements for criteria, to be applied as appropriate to site and site-installation interaction in operational states and accident conditions, including those that could lead to emergency measures for: (a) Defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the applicant; (b) Evaluating a proposed site to ensure that the site

  6. 10 CFR 850 Implementation of Requirements

    Lee, S

    2012-01-05

    10 CFR 850 defines a contractor as any entity, including affiliated entities, such as a parent corporation, under contract with DOE, including a subcontractor at any tier, with responsibility for performing work at a DOE site in furtherance of a DOE mission. The Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program (CBDPP) applies to beryllium-related activities that are performed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The CBDPP or Beryllium Safety Program is integrated into the LLNL Worker Safety and Health Program and, thus, implementation documents and responsibilities are integrated in various documents and organizational structures. Program development and management of the CBDPP is delegated to the Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) Directorate, Worker Safety and Health Functional Area. As per 10 CFR 850, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) periodically submits a CBDPP to the National Nuclear Security Administration/Livermore Site Office (NNSA/LSO). The requirements of this plan are communicated to LLNS workers through ES&H Manual Document 14.4, 'Working Safely with Beryllium.' 10 CFR 850 is implemented by the LLNL CBDPP, which integrates the safety and health standards required by the regulation, components of the LLNL Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), and incorporates other components of the LLNL ES&H Program. As described in the regulation, and to fully comply with the regulation, specific portions of existing programs and additional requirements are identified in the CBDPP. The CBDPP is implemented by documents that interface with the workers, principally through ES&H Manual Document 14.4. This document contains information on how the management practices prescribed by the LLNL ISMS are implemented, how beryllium hazards that are associated with LLNL work activities are controlled, and who is responsible for implementing the controls. Adherence to the requirements and processes described in the ES&H Manual ensures

  7. The practical implementation of safety culture

    Touzet, Rodolfo

    2008-01-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  8. The practical implementation of safety culture

    Touzet, Rodolfo [Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Buenos Aires. (Argentina)

    2008-07-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  9. Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Basis Implementation Strategy

    TRAWINSKI, B.J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the Safety Basis Implementation is to ensure that implementation of activities is accomplished in order to support readiness to move spent fuel from K West Basin. Activities may be performed directly by the Safety Basis Implementation Team or they may be performed by other organizations and tracked by the Team. This strategy will focus on five key elements, (1) Administration of Safety Basis Implementation (general items), (2) Implementing documents, (3) Implementing equipment (including verification of operability), (4) Training, (5) SNF Project Technical Requirements (STRS) database system

  10. Fire safety requirements for electrical cables towards nuclear reactor safety

    Raju, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Electrical power supply forms a very important part of any nuclear reactor. Power supplies have been categorized in to class I, II, III and IV from reliability point. The safety related equipment are provided with highly reliable power supply to achieve the safety of very high order. Vast network of cables in a nuclear reactor are grouped and segregated to ensure availability of power to at least one group under all anticipated occurrences. Since fire can result in failures leading to unavailability of power caused by common cause, both passive and active fire protection methods are adopted in addition to fire detection system. The paper describes the requirement for passive fire protection to electrical cables viz. fire barrier and fire breaks. The paper gives an account of the tests required to standardize the products. Fire safety implementation for cables in research reactors is described

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  12. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose

  13. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose.

  14. Implementing Patient Safety Initiatives in Rural Hospitals

    Klingner, Jill; Moscovice, Ira; Tupper, Judith; Coburn, Andrew; Wakefield, Mary

    2009-01-01

    Implementation of patient safety initiatives can be costly in time and energy. Because of small volumes and limited resources, rural hospitals often are not included in nationally driven patient safety initiatives. This article describes the Tennessee Rural Hospital Patient Safety Demonstration project, whose goal was to strengthen capacity for…

  15. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO Safety Management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which the management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of the safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi-purpose research reactor and achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation like the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops, the development of safety culture indicators, the survey on the attitude of safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e-Learning program for safety education. (author)

  16. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose

  17. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose.

  18. Specification of requirements for the implementation of ASICs and FPGA in instrumentation and control systems important to safety in German NPPs

    Schnurer, G.

    2007-01-01

    This paper gives an overview concerning the design as well as the verification and validation of Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in German NPPs which are applied to carry out I and C functions. The qualification procedures dealt with restricted on ASICs without any microcontroller core. Dependent on the different safety categories, recommendations concerning the qualification level and procedures are elaborated which have to be achieved for ASICs and FPGA. Important aspects within the framework of the expert judgement for upgrading of safety relevant I and C by ASICs and FPGA are dealt with. These aspects are of general character and are mainly focused on suitability test procedures and robustness requirements of ASICs and FPGA

  19. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  20. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  1. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  2. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  3. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  4. Environment, safety, and health regulatory implementation plan

    1993-01-01

    To identify, document, and maintain the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project's environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) regulatory requirements, the US Department of Energy (DOE) UMTRA Project Office tasked the Technical Assistance Contractor (TAC) to develop a regulatory operating envelope for the UMTRA Project. The system selected for managing the UMTRA regulatory operating envelope data bass is based on the Integrated Project Control/Regulatory Compliance System (IPC/RCS) developed by WASTREN, Inc. (WASTREN, 1993). The IPC/RCS is a tool used for identifying regulatory and institutional requirements and indexing them to hardware, personnel, and program systems on a project. The IPC/RCS will be customized for the UMTRA Project surface remedial action and groundwater restoration programs. The purpose of this plan is to establish the process for implementing and maintaining the UMTRA Project's regulatory operating envelope, which involves identifying all applicable regulatory and institutional requirements and determining compliance status. The plan describes how the Project will identify ES ampersand H regulatory requirements, analyze applicability to the UMTRA Project, and evaluate UMTRA Project compliance status

  5. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  6. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  7. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  8. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  9. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  10. Strategy for Coordinated EPA/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Implementation of the Chemical Accident Prevention Requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990

    EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) share responsibility for prevention: OSHA has the Process Safety Management Standard to protect workers, and EPA the Risk Management Program to protect the general public and environment.

  11. Management implementation plan for a safety analysis and review system

    Hulburt, D.A.; Berkey, B.D.

    1981-04-01

    The US Department of Energy has issued an Order, DOE 5481.1, which establishes uniform requirements for the preparation and review of Safety Analysis for DOE Operations. The Management Implementation Plan specified herein establishes the administrative procedures and technical requirements for implementing DOE 5481.1 to Operations under the cognizance of the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. This Implementation Plan is applicable to all present and future Operations under the cognizance of PETC. The Plan identifies those Operations for which DOE 5481.1 is applicable and those Operations for which no further analysis is required because the initial determination and review has concluded that DOE 5481.1 does not apply

  12. Requirements of safety and reliability

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the findings derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essential for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occuring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  15. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to all types of radioactive waste disposal facility. It is linked to the fundamental safety principles for each disposal option and establishes a set of strategic requirements that must be in place before facilities are developed. Consideration is also given to the safety of existing facilities developed prior to the establishment of present day standards. The requirements will be complemented by Safety Guides that will provide guidance on good practice for meeting the requirements for different types of waste disposal facility. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Safety requirements for planning for the disposal of radioactive waste; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of a disposal facility; 5. Assurance of safety; 6. Existing disposal facilities; Appendices.

  16. Safety Assurance Process for FRMS : EJcase Implementation

    Stewart, S.; Koornneef, F.; Akselsson, R.; Barton, P.

    2009-01-01

    Chapter 6: Safety Assurance Process for FRMS - eJcase Implementation The European Commission HILAS project (Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems - a project supported by the European Commission’s 6th Framework between 2005-2009) was focused on using human factors knowledge and

  17. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    1993-01-01

    In accordance with the section 26 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) the safety requirements to be taken into account in planning laboratories and other premises, which affect safety in the use of radioactive materials, are confirmed by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The guide specifies the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive materials are used or stored as unsealed sources. There are also some general instructions concerning work procedures in a radionuclide laboratory

  18. Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

    Wetherholt, Martha S.; Radley, Charles F.

    1994-01-01

    Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of

  19. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  20. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  1. Safety design requirements for safety systems and components of JSFR

    Kubo, Shigenobu; Shimakawa, Yoshio; Yamano, Hidemasa; Kotake, Shoji

    2011-01-01

    Safety design requirements for JSFR were summarized taking the development targets of the FaCT project and design feature of JSFR into account. The related safety principle and requirements for Monju, CRBRP, PRISM, SPX, LWRs, IAEA standards, goals of GIF, basic principle of INPRO etc. were also taken into account so that the safety design requirements can be a next-generation global standard. The development targets for safety and reliability are set based on those of FaCT, namely, ensuring safety and reliability equal to future LWR and related fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve these targets, the defence-in-depth concept is used as the basic safety design principle. General features of the safety design requirements are 1) Achievement of higher reliability, 2) Achievement of higher inspectability and maintainability, 3) Introduction of passive safety features, 4) Reduction of operator action needs, 5) Design consideration against Beyond Design Basis Events, 6) In-Vessel Retention of degraded core materials, 7) Prevention and mitigation against sodium chemical reactions, and 8) Design against external events. The current specific requirements for each system and component are summarized taking the basic design concept of JSFR into account, which is an advanced loop-type large-output power plant with a mixed-oxide-fuelled core. (author)

  2. Evolving US Food Safety Regulations and International Competitors: Implementation Dynamics

    Tekuni Nakuja

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The 2011 US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA represents a major initiative to improve food safety. The legislation mandates the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA with developing a regulatory system to implement the Act. Both domestic and foreign firms that wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable increase in regulatory costs. Implementation has proved challenging for the FDA leading to delays which increase investment risks for foreign suppliers, particulalry from developing countries. This paper sets out the major FSMA requirements and examines how the regulatory burden may fall on foreign versus US suppliers.

  3. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  4. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  5. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  6. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  7. Meeting the maglev system's safety requirements

    Pierick, K

    1983-12-01

    The author shows how the safety requirements of the maglev track system derive from the general legal conditions for the safety of tracked transport. It is described how their compliance beyond the so-called ''development-accompanying'' and ''acceptance-preparatory'' safety work can be assured for the Transrapid test layout (TVE) now building in Emsland and also for later application as public transport system in Germany within the meaning of the General Railway Act.

  8. Public requirement to demonstrate safety

    Green, P.

    1991-01-01

    To many working within Government or industry, public concern over the disposal of radioactive waste is misplaced and has arisen out of an irrational and unscientific fear of technology, or even science in general. Members of the public, it is argued, are concerned because they do not understand the size of the risk in question. From the industry's point of view, the risk arising from the disposal of radioactive waste is ''negligible when compared to other everyday risks of life. Furthermore, any public exposure that may arise, either soon after closure of a facility or in the far future would comply with internationally accepted safety standards. In this context, the continuing concern over disposal of radioactive waste is viewed as evidence of the irrational and unscientific attitude of the public. The assessment and regulation of risk from waste disposal therefore is presented as a purely scientific question. Some of these issues are examined and public concern is shown not to be irrational but to be based upon legitimate questions over current waste management policy. An important question is not just ''how safe is safe, but who decides and how?''. (Author)

  9. The establishment and implementation of safety culture policy in Indonesia

    Antariksawan, A.R.; Suharno; Arbie, B.

    2001-01-01

    This paper describes the progress in the establishment and implementation of safety culture in Indonesia, especially in BATAN, with special attention given to the development of safety culture indicators. The spirit of safety culture implementation is marked firstly by declaration of Policy Statement by the Head of BATAN. In order to monitor the implementation of safety culture, six indicators are established. Based on those indicators, it is seemed that at present the progress of implementation of safety culture is quite good enough. (author)

  10. Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection

    1984-01-01

    In execution of the new Atomic Energy Act the Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection was put into force on 1 February 1985. It takes into account all forms of peaceful nuclear energy and ionizing radiation uses in nuclear installations, irradiation facilities and devices in research, industries, and health services, and in radioactive isotope production and laboratories. It covers all aspects of safety and protection and defines atomic safety as nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whereas radiation protection includes the total of requirements, measures, means and methods necessary to protect man and the environment from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. It has been based on ICRP Recommendation No. 26 and the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards and supersedes the Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1969

  11. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Feather, Martin; Rutledge, Peter; Sen, Dev; Youngblood, Robert

    2015-01-01

    This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

  12. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  14. Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

    Rodman, D.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

  15. Safety goals and safety culture opening plenary. 2. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

    Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

    2001-01-01

    more strict than those recommended in the INSAG-3 and INSAG-12 reports, but they correlate with the value of negligible individual risk of 10 -6 , established in 'Radiation Safety Standards' (NRB-99) and consider still a high level of uncertainty in calculation of these probabilities. OPB- 88/97 also defines safety culture and principles of its formation and provision. Gosatomnadzor of Russia is a federal executive authority implementing state safety regulation in nuclear energy use. One of the main activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia is nuclear and radiation safety regulation in sitting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The activities include the following: 1. development and enactment of regulatory documents; 2. licensing of activities at nuclear facilities; 3. state supervision on observing the requirements of federal rules and regulations and license conditions. Gosatomnadzor of Russia strives toward solving the problems of consistent safety improvement of facilities and technologies up to the internationally accepted level, acting within the framework of the existing set of special safety rules and regulations in production and use of nuclear energy. Simultaneously, Gosatomnadzor of Russia develops proposals aimed at the improvement of legislative and regulatory bases of the Russian Federation as well as licensing and inspection procedures and implementing them. The main principles that Gosatomnadzor of Russia follows in its practical activities are openness, publicity, and cooperation with juridical and natural persons, whose activities are regulated with the purpose of achieving safety. This cooperation is accomplished in compliance with the principle of separation of responsibilities. According to this principle, the parties that are involved in activities related to the use of nuclear materials and nuclear energy on one hand, and in the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety on the other hand, bear

  16. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings

  17. LHCb electronics - requirements, specifications and implementation

    Bibby, J

    2001-01-01

    This document is intended to serve as a requirements document, a design manual and an implementation reference for the RICH electronics systems. At the current time, the electronics design is under active consideration and this is reflected in this document which represents a working proposal as regards both the functional model and physical implementation. Comments on installation, commissioning, and maintenance are included. For convenience a description of the proposed RICH data formats is appended.

  18. Safety requirements applicable to the SMART design

    Seul, Kwang Won; Kim, Wee Kyong; Kim, Hho Jung

    1999-01-01

    The 330 MW thermal power of integral reactor, named SMART (System integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination application and electricity generation. The final product of nuclear desalination plant (NDP) is electricity and fresh water. Thus, in addition to the protection of the public around the plant facility from the possible release of radioactive materials, the fresh water should be prevented from radioactivity contamination. In this study, to ensure the safety of SMART reactor in the early stage of design development, the safety requirements applicable to the SMART design were investigated, based on the current regulatory requirements for the existing NPPs and the advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs. The interface requirements related to the desalination facility were also investigated, based on the recent IAEA research activities pertaining to the NDP. As a result, it was found that the current regulatory requirements and guidance for the existing NPPs and advanced LWR designs are applicable to the SMART design and its safety evaluation. However, the safety requirements related to the SMART-specific design and the desalination plant are needed to develop in the future to assure the safety of the SMART reactor

  19. TWRS safety SSCs: Requirements and characteristics

    Smith-Fewell, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    Safety Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) have been identified from hazard and accident analyses. These analyses were performed to support the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Basis for Interim Operation (BID). The text identifies and evaluates the SSCs and their supporting SSCs to show that they either prevent the occurrence of the accident or mitigate the consequences of the accident to below the acceptance guidelines. The requirements for the SSCs to fulfill these tasks are described

  20. Implementation of safety parameter display system at VVER-440 NPPs

    Manninen, T.

    1997-01-01

    Furnishing WWER-440 nuclear power plant units with a safety parameter display system (SPDS) fulfilling the requirements of internationally recognized standards and guidelines has been ranked high on the lists of proposed safety improvement projects. Technically such an SPDS system can be implemented either as a separate stand-alone system or as a more or less closely integrated part of a process information system of the plant unit. In the paper examples of these approaches are presented. Functionally all these examples include the well proven SPDS concept developed by IVO Power Engineering Ltd, Finland. The functional design basis, the general requirements for the system platform, experience with implementation and expansion possibilities of the systems are discussed. (author)

  1. Geological disposal of radioactive waste. Safety requirements

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication is concerned with providing protection to people and the environment from the hazards associated with waste management activities related to disposal, i.e. hazards that could arise during the operating period and following closure. It sets out the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management. It is intended for use by those involved in radioactive waste management and in making decisions in relation to the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities, especially those concerned with the related regulatory aspects. This publication contains 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. The safety requirements for geological disposal; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities; Appendix: Assurance of compliance with the safety objective and criteria; Annex I: Geological disposal and the principles of radioactive waste management; Annex II: Principles of radioactive waste management

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  5. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  6. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    KING JP

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

  7. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  8. NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

    Marshall, A.C.; Lee, J.H.; McCulloch, W.H.; Sawyer, J.C. Jr.; Bari, R.A.; Brown, N.W.; Cullingford, H.S.; Hardy, A.C.; Remp, K.; Sholtis, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An Interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top- level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed

  9. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  10. Implementation of the new regulation on radiological safety in Peru

    Medina Gironzini, E.

    1997-01-01

    Since its creation in 1975, the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN) has enacted three regulations of national importance on the norms of protection against ionizing radiation. The first regulation, which is called regulation of radiological protection (1980) approved by a resolution of IPEN, is the result of the work of a committee constituted by IPEN and the Ministry of Health. Its implementation caused some problems as result of which, in 1989, a new regulation on radiological protection was enacted through a supreme decree. Taking into account the new recommendation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the International Basic Safety Standard for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, approved in May 1997, the regulation of radiological safety also considers evolving aspects in the Project ARCAL XVII/IAEA. This regulation includes various topics such as exclusions, requirements of protection (medical exposure, occupational exposure, public exposure, chronic exposure), requirements of source safety, interventions and emergencies, control of sources and practices (exemptions, authorizations, inspections) etc. The implementation of this regulation at the national level falls to IPEN, the unique authority commissioned to control nuclear installations, radioactivity and x ray facilities in medicine, industry and research

  11. The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

    COLLOPY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    In 1995 Mr. Joseph DiNunno of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued an approach to describe the concept of an integrated safety management program which incorporates hazard and safety analysis to address a multitude of hazards affecting the public, worker, property, and the environment. Since then the U S . Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a policy to systematically integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that missions can be completed while protecting the public, worker, and the environment. While the DOE and its contractors possessed a variety of processes for analyzing fire hazards at a facility, activity, and job; the outcome and assumptions of these processes have not always been consistent for similar types of hazards within the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis. Although the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis are driven by different DOE Orders and requirements, these analyses should not be entirely independent and their preparation should be integrated to ensure consistency of assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and other controls. Under the DOE policy to implement an integrated safety management system, identification of hazards must be evaluated and agreed upon to ensure that the public. the workers. and the environment are protected from adverse consequences. The DOE program and contractor management need a uniform, up-to-date reference with which to plan. budget, and manage nuclear programs. It is crucial that DOE understand the hazards and risks necessarily to authorize the work needed to be performed. If integrated safety management is not incorporated into the preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis, inconsistencies between assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and controls may occur that affect safety. Furthermore, confusion created by inconsistencies may occur in the DOE process to grant authorization of the work. In accordance with

  12. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1, Revision 1 (Chinese Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  13. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

    Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

    2001-01-01

    The principles and approaches used by Gosatomnadzor of Russia in establishing safety goals are described. The link between safety goals and safety culture is demonstrated. Information on nuclear regulatory activities in Russia is also presented

  14. Nuclear fuels with high burnup: safety requirements

    Phuc Tran Dai

    2016-01-01

    Vietnam authorities foresees to build 3 reactors from Russian design (VVER AES 2006) by 2030. In order to prepare the preliminary report on safety analysis the Vietnamese Agency for Radioprotection and Safety has launched an investigation on the behaviour of nuclear fuels at high burnups (up to 60 GWj/tU) that will be those of the new plants. This study deals mainly with the behaviour of the fuel assemblies in case of loss of coolant (LOCA). It appears that for an average burnup of 50 GWj/tU and for the advanced design of the fuel assembly (cladding and materials) safety requirements are fulfilled. For an average burnup of 60 GWj/tU, a list of issues remains to be assessed, among which the impact of clad bursting or the hydrogen embrittlement of the advanced zirconium alloys. (A.C.)

  15. Safety requirements for the Pu carriers

    Mishima, H.

    1993-01-01

    Ministry of Transport of Japan has now set about studying requirements for Pu carriers to ensure safety. It was first studied what the basic concept of safe carriage of Pu should be, and the basic ideas have been worked out. Next the requirements for the Pu carriers were studied based on the above. There are at present no international requirements of construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers, but MOT of Japan has so far required special construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers which carry a large amount of radioactive material, such as spent fuel or low level radioactive waste, corresponding to the level of the respective potential hazard. The requirements of construction and equipment of the Pu carriers have been established considering the difference in heat generation between Pu and spent fuel, physical protection, and so forth, in addition to the above basic concept. (J.P.N.)

  16. Nuclear safety review requirements for launch approval

    Sholtis, J.A. Jr.; Winchester, R.O.

    1992-01-01

    Use of nuclear power systems in space requires approval which is preceded by extensive safety analysis and review. This careful study allows an informed risk-benefit decision at the highest level of our government. This paper describes the process as it has historically been applied to U.S. isotopic power systems. The Ulysses mission, launched in October 1990, is used to illustrate the process. Expected variations to deal with reactor-power systems are explained

  17. Safety integrity requirements for computer based I ampersand C systems

    Thuy, N.N.Q.; Ficheux-Vapne, F.

    1997-01-01

    In order to take into account increasingly demanding functional requirements, many instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems in nuclear power plants are implemented with computers. In order to ensure the required safety integrity of such equipment, i.e., to ensure that they satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions and within stated periods of time, requirements applicable to these equipment and to their life cycle need to be expressed and followed. On the other hand, the experience of the last years has led EDF (Electricite de France) and its partners to consider three classes of systems and equipment, according to their importance to safety. In the EPR project (European Pressurized water Reactor), these classes are labeled E1A, E1B and E2. The objective of this paper is to present the outline of the work currently done in the framework of the ETC-I (EPR Technical Code for I ampersand C) regarding safety integrity requirements applicable to each of the three classes. 4 refs., 2 figs

  18. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  19. Evaluation of Safety Culture Implementation and Socialization Results

    Situmorang, Johnny

    2003-01-01

    Evaluation of safety culture implementation and socialization results has been perform. Evaluation is carried out with specifying safety culture indicators, namely: Meeting between management and employee, system for incidents analysis, training activities related to improving safety, meeting with regulator, contractors, surveys on behavioural attitudes, and resources allocated to promote safety culture. Evaluation is based on observation and visiting the facilities to show the compliance indicator in term of good practices in the frame of safety culture implementation. For three facilities of research reactors, Kartini Yogyakarta, TRIGA Mark II Bandung and MPR-GAS Serpong, implementation of safety culture is considered good enough and progressive. Furthermore some indicator should be considered more intensive, for example the allocated resources, self assesment based on own questionnaire in the frame of improving the safety culture implementation. (author)

  20. Safety management - policy, analysis and implementation

    Allen, F.R.

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear industry is moving towards a period of ever increasing emphasis on business performance and profitability. Safety has, of course, always been a major concern of management in the nuclear industry and elsewhere. The civil aviation industry , for example, has had a similar concern for safety. Other industry sectors are also developing safety management as a response to events within and outside their sectors. In this paper the way that the risk management process as a whole is being addressed is looked at. Can we use risk management, initially a safety-orientated tool, to improve business performance? (author)

  1. Organizational factors affecting safety implementation in food companies in Thailand.

    Chinda, Thanwadee

    2014-01-01

    Thai food industry employs a massive number of skilled and unskilled workers. This may result in an industry with high incidences and accident rates. To improve safety and reduce the accident figures, this paper investigates factors influencing safety implementation in small, medium, and large food companies in Thailand. Five factors, i.e., management commitment, stakeholders' role, safety information and communication, supportive environment, and risk, are found important in helping to improve safety implementation. The statistical analyses also reveal that small, medium, and large food companies hold similar opinions on the risk factor, but bear different perceptions on the other 4 factors. It is also found that to improve safety implementation, the perceptions of safety goals, communication, feedback, safety resources, and supervision should be aligned in small, medium, and large companies.

  2. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  3. Guidelines for implementation of RCM on safety systems

    Kim, Tae Woon; Brijendra Singh.

    1996-04-01

    Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology was originally developed by the commercial airlines industry in the early 1960s for identifying applicable and effective preventive maintenance tasks and as currently used in nuclear power industry. Effective maintenance of the systems at a nuclear power plant (NPP) is essential for its safe and reliable operation. Reliability Centered Maintenance at NPP is the program to assure that plant systems remain within an original design criteria and are not adversely affected during the plant life time. The aim of this report is to provide the guidelines to implement the RCM approach on NPP safety systems. Safety systems are usually standby and therefore, we need to periodically detect and repair failures that may have occurred since the previous activation or inspection the equipment. The RCM guidelines are intended to help identify the failure modes and related root causes and then decide the maintenance policies to achieve the high level of safety and reliability. The RCM is intended to improve or maintain high levels of system reliability and plant availability. Since the reliability of plant systems will be improved, the plant safety correspondingly will be increased. Another goal of RCM is to optimize the maintenance and surveillance tasks such that the overall level of resources required to accomplish essential tasks is kept to minimum. RCM also strives to eliminate unnecessary corrective maintenance and to select yet most cost-effective approach to maintenance, testing and inspection for system components. 9 refs. (Author) .new

  4. Firearm Safety Locks: Federal Agency Implementation of the Presidential Directive

    1998-01-01

    ... deaths among children ages 5 to 14. In order to have the federal government serve as an example of gun safety, the President required that a safety lock device be provided with each handgun issued to federal law enforcement officers...

  5. Implementing partnerships in nonreactor facility safety analyses

    Courtney, J.C.; Perry, W.H.; Phipps, R.D.

    1996-01-01

    Faculty and students from LSU have been participating in nuclear safety analyses and radiation protection projects at ANL-W at INEL since 1973. A mutually beneficial relationship has evolved that has resulted in generation of safety-related studies acceptable to Argonne and DOE, NRC, and state regulatory groups. Most of the safety projects have involved the Hot Fuel Examination Facility or the Fuel Conditioning Facility; both are hot cells that receive spent fuel from EBR-II. A table shows some of the major projects at ANL-W that involved LSU students and faculty

  6. 78 FR 46560 - Pipeline Safety: Class Location Requirements

    2013-08-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... class location requirements for gas transmission pipelines. Section 5 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory... and, with respect to gas transmission pipeline facilities, whether applying IMP requirements to...

  7. Price anderson nuclear safety rules: Impacts of implementation

    Varchol, B.D.; Alhadeff, N.

    1995-01-01

    New nuclear safety rules are being implemented at Department of Energy sites. This paper examines the impacts of these rules as each site decides where rules will be implemented, whether implementation activities will be centralized, and how the site management and staff will be introduced to the new rules

  8. A strategic approach for Water Safety Plans implementation in Portugal.

    Vieira, Jose M P

    2011-03-01

    Effective risk assessment and risk management approaches in public drinking water systems can benefit from a systematic process for hazards identification and effective management control based on the Water Safety Plan (WSP) concept. Good results from WSP development and implementation in a small number of Portuguese water utilities have shown that a more ambitious nationwide strategic approach to disseminate this methodology is needed. However, the establishment of strategic frameworks for systematic and organic scaling-up of WSP implementation at a national level requires major constraints to be overcome: lack of legislation and policies and the need for appropriate monitoring tools. This study presents a framework to inform future policy making by understanding the key constraints and needs related to institutional, organizational and research issues for WSP development and implementation in Portugal. This methodological contribution for WSP implementation can be replicated at a global scale. National health authorities and the Regulator may promote changes in legislation and policies. Independent global monitoring and benchmarking are adequate tools for measuring the progress over time and for comparing the performance of water utilities. Water utilities self-assessment must include performance improvement, operational monitoring and verification. Research and education and resources dissemination ensure knowledge acquisition and transfer.

  9. University building safety index measurement using risk and implementation matrix

    Rahman, A.; Arumsari, F.; Maryani, A.

    2018-04-01

    Many high rise building constructed in several universities in Indonesia. The high-rise building management must provide the safety planning and proper safety equipment in each part of the building. Unfortunately, most of the university in Indonesia have not been applying safety policy yet and less awareness on treating safety facilities. Several fire accidents in university showed that some significant risk should be managed by the building management. This research developed a framework for measuring the high rise building safety index in university The framework is not only assessed the risk magnitude but also designed modular building safety checklist for measuring the safety implementation level. The safety checklist has been developed for 8 types of the university rooms, i.e.: office, classroom, 4 type of laboratories, canteen, and library. University building safety index determined using risk-implementation matrix by measuring the risk magnitude and assessing the safety implementation level. Building Safety Index measurement has been applied in 4 high rise buildings in ITS Campus. The building assessment showed that the rectorate building in secure condition and chemical department building in beware condition. While the library and administration center building was in less secure condition.

  10. Implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

    Stewart, L.; Tonkay, D.

    2004-01-01

    This paper discusses the implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Joint Convention: establishes a commitment with respect to safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; requires the Parties to ''take appropriate steps'' to ensure the safety of their spent fuel and waste management activities, but does not delineate standards the Parties must meet; and seeks to attain, through its Contracting Parties, a higher level of safety with respect to management of their spent nuclear fuel, disused sealed sources, and radioactive waste

  11. [Implementation of safety devices: biological accident prevention].

    Catalán Gómez, M Teresa; Sol Vidiella, Josep; Castellà Castellà, Manel; Castells Bo, Carolina; Losada Pla, Nuria; Espuny, Javier Lluís

    2010-04-01

    Accidental exposures to blood and biological material were the most frequent and potentially serious accidents in healthcare workers, reported in the Prevention of Occupational Risks Unit within 2002. Evaluate the biological percutaneous accidents decrease after a progressive introduction of safety devices. Biological accidents produced between 2.002 and 2.006 were analyzed and reported by the injured healthcare workers to the Level 2b Hospital Prevention of Occupational Risk Unit with 238 beds and 750 employees. The key of the study was the safety devices (peripheral i.v. catheter, needleless i.v. access device and capillary blood collection lancet). Within 2002, 54 percutaneous biological accidents were registered and 19 in 2006, that represents a 64.8% decreased. There has been no safety devices accident reported involving these material. Accidents registered during the implantation period occurred because safety devices were not used at that time. Safety devices have proven to be effective in reducing needle stick percutaneous accidents, so that they are a good choice in the primary prevention of biological accidents contact.

  12. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  15. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  16. Implementation of patient safety strategies in European hospitals.

    Suñol, R; Vallejo, P; Groene, O; Escaramis, G; Thompson, A; Kutryba, B; Garel, P

    2009-02-01

    This study is part of the Methods of Assessing Response to Quality Improvement Strategies (MARQuIS) research project on cross-border care, investigating quality improvement strategies in healthcare systems across the European Union (EU). To explore to what extent a sample of acute care European hospitals have implemented patient safety strategies and mechanisms and whether the implementation is related to the type of hospital. Data were collected on patient safety structures and mechanisms in 389 acute care hospitals in eight EU countries using a web-based questionnaire. Subsequently, an on-site audit was carried out by independent surveyors in 89 of these hospitals to assess patient safety outputs. This paper presents univariate and bivariate statistics on the implementation and explores the associations between implementation of patient safety strategies and hospital type using the chi(2) test and Fisher exact test. Structures and plans for safety (including responsibilities regarding patient safety management) are well developed in most of the hospitals that participated in this study. The study found greater variation regarding the implementation of mechanisms or activities to promote patient safety, such as electronic drug prescription systems, guidelines for prevention of wrong patient, wrong site and wrong surgical procedure, and adverse events reporting systems. In the sample of hospitals that underwent audit, a considerable proportion do not comply with basic patient safety strategies--for example, using bracelets for adult patient identification and correct labelling of medication.

  17. Dependency safety for Java - implementing failboxes

    Bosnacki, D.; van den Brand, M.G.J.; Denissen, P.E.J.G.; Huizing, C.; Jacobs, B.; Kuiper, R.; Wijs, A.J.; Wiłkowski, M.; Zhang, D.

    2016-01-01

    Exception mechanisms help to ensure that a program satisfies the important robustness criterion of dependency safety: if an operation fails, no code that depends on the operation's successful completion is executed anymore nor will wait for the completion. However, the exception handling mechanisms

  18. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  19. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  20. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    2010-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  1. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    2009-01-01

    installed; (i) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived

  2. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  3. Safety research needs for Russian-designed reactors. Requirements situation

    Brown, R. Allan; Holmstrom, Heikki; Reocreux, Michel; Schulz, Helmut; Liesch, Klaus; Santarossa, Giampiero; Hayamizu, Yoshitaka; Asmolov, Vladimir; Bolshov, Leonid; Strizhov, Valerii; Bougaenko, Sergei; Nikitin, Yuri N.; Proklov, Vladimir; Potapov, Alexandre; Kinnersly, Stephen R.; Voronin, Leonid M.; Honekamp, John R.; Frescura, Gianni M.; Maki, Nobuo; Reig, Javier; ); Bekjord, Eric S.; Rosinger, Herbert E.

    1998-01-01

    integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - VVER severe accident research should focus on validation of codes for accident management procedures, and on extension and qualification of an appropriate data base for materials properties and their interactions. - RBMK thermal-hydraulic research is needed to improve the technical basis for further development of RBMK safety criteria. - Assessment of the integrity of the RBMK primary coolant circuit, and especially the fuel channel, requires urgent research. Methods of assessing RBMK pressure boundary integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - RBMK severe accident research should focus on prevention of accidents and Accident Management for cases of loss of heat sink and Beyond Design-Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. For these purposes, simple physical models and parametric codes need development and should be systematically used in plant specific analysis. Recommendations; - A Safety Research Strategic Plan should be developed. Such a plan sets goals, defines products, and describes when and how work will be done, including determination of research priorities. - Key players, including regulators, operators, plant designers and researchers should be involved in developing and implementing this plan and its execution and applying the results. - International cooperation in safety research should be encouraged for purposes of improving quality, preventing technical isolation and cost sharing. - New approaches, such as technical fora for specific technical topics, should be established to make safety research information in OECD countries available to researchers working on the safety of Russian-designed reactors

  4. Oracle accrual plans from requirements to implementation

    Rivera, Christine K [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    Implementing any new business software can be an intimidating prospect and this paper is intended to offer some insight in to how to approach this challenge with some fundamental rules for success. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) had undergone an original ERP implementation of HRMS, Oracle Advanced Benefits, Worker Self Service, Manager Self Service, Project Accounting, Financials and PO, and recently completed a project to implement Oracle Payroll, Time and Labor and Accrual Plans. This paper will describe some of the important lessons that can be applied to any implementation as a whole, and then specifically how this knowledge was applied to the design and deployment of Oracle Accrual Plans for LANL. Finally, detail on the functionality available in Oracle Accrual Plans will be described, as well as the detailed setups.that were utilized at LANL.

  5. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  6. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  7. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  8. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  9. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  10. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

    2017-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  11. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

    2015-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

  12. Development and implementation of setpoint tolerances for special safety systems

    Oliva, A.F.; Balog, G.; Parkinson, D.G.; Archinoff, G.H.

    1991-01-01

    The establishment of tolerances and impairment limits for special safety system setpoints is part of the process whereby the plant operator demonstrates to the regulatory authority that the plant operates safely and within the defined plant licensing envelope. The licensing envelope represents the set of limits and plant operating state and for which acceptably safe plant operation has been demonstrated by the safety analysis. By definition, operation beyond this envelope contributes to overall safety system unavailability. Definition of the licensing envelope is provided in a wide range of documents including the plant operating licence, the safety report, and the plant operating policies and principles documents. As part of the safety analysis, limits are derived for each special safety system initiating parameter such that the relevant safety design objectives are achieved for all design basis events. If initiation on a given parameter occurs at a level beyond its limit, there is a potential reduction in safety system effectiveness relative to the performance credited in the plant safety analysis. These safety system parameter limits, when corrected for random and systematic instrument errors and other errors inherent in the process of periodic testing or calibration, are then used to derive parameter impairment levels and setpoint tolerances. This paper describes the methodology that has evolved at Ontario Hydro for developing and implementing tolerances for special safety system parameters (i.e., the shutdown systems, emergency coolant injection system and containment system). Tolerances for special safety system initiation setpoints are addressed specifically, although many of the considerations discussed here will apply to performance limits for other safety system components. The first part of the paper deals with the approach that has been adopted for defining and establishing setpoint limits and tolerances. The remainder of the paper addresses operational

  13. The actual development of European aviation safety requirements in aviation medicine: prospects of future EASA requirements.

    Siedenburg, J

    2009-04-01

    Common Rules for Aviation Safety had been developed under the aegis of the Joint Aviation Authorities in the 1990s. In 2002 the Basic Regulation 1592/2002 was the founding document of a new entity, the European Aviation Safety Agency. Areas of activity were Certification and Maintenance of aircraft. On 18 March the new Basic Regulation 216/2008, repealing the original Basic Regulation was published and applicable from 08 April on. The included Essential Requirements extended the competencies of EASA inter alia to Pilot Licensing and Flight Operations. The future aeromedical requirements will be included as Annex II in another Implementing Regulation on Personnel Licensing. The detailed provisions will be published as guidance material. The proposals for these provisions have been published on 05 June 2008 as NPA 2008- 17c. After public consultation, processing of comments and final adoption the new proposals may be applicable form the second half of 2009 on. A transition period of four year will apply. Whereas the provisions are based on Joint Aviation Requirement-Flight Crew Licensing (JAR-FCL) 3, a new Light Aircraft Pilot Licence (LAPL) project and the details of the associated medical certification regarding general practitioners will be something new in aviation medicine. This paper consists of 6 sections. The introduction outlines the idea of international aviation safety. The second section describes the development of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the first step to common rules for aviation safety in Europe. The third section encompasses a major change as next step: the foundation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the development of its rules. In the following section provides an outline of the new medical requirements. Section five emphasizes the new concept of a Leisure Pilot Licence. The last section gives an outlook on ongoing rulemaking activities and the opportunities of the public to participate in them.

  14. Implementation of radiation safety program in a medical institution

    Palanca, Elena D.

    1999-01-01

    A medical institution that utilizes radiation for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of malignancies develops and implements a radiation safety program to keep occupational exposures of radiation workers and exposures of non-radiation workers and the public to the achievable and a more achievable minimum, to optimize the use of radiation, and to prevent misadministration. The hospital radiation safety program is established by a core medical radiation committee composed of trained radiation safety officers and head of authorized users of radioactive materials and radiation machines from the different departments. The radiation safety program sets up procedural guidelines of the safe use of radioactive material and of radiation equipment. It offers regular training to radiation workers and radiation safety awareness courses to hospital staff. The program has a comprehensive radiation safety information system or radsis that circularizes the radiation safety program in the hospital. The radsis keeps the drafted and updated records of safety guides and policies, radioactive material and equipment inventory, personnel dosimetry reports, administrative, regulatory and licensing activity document, laboratory procedures, emergency procedures, quality assurance and quality control program process, physics and dosimetry procedures and reports, personnel and hospital staff training program. The medical radiation protection committee is tasked to oversee the actual implementation of the radiation safety guidelines in the different radiation facilities in the hospital, to review personnel exposures, incident reports and ALARA actions, operating procedures, facility inspections and audit reports, to evaluate the existing radiation safety procedures, to make necessary changes to these procedures, and make modifications of course content of the training program. The effective implementation of the radiation safety program provides increased confidence that the physician and

  15. Regulatory Safety Requirements for Operating Nuclear Installations

    Gubela, W.

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No 47 of 1999) and its mandate and authority are conferred through sections 5 and 7 of this Act, setting out the NNR's objectives and functions, which include exercising regulatory control over siting, design, construction etc of nuclear installations through the granting of nuclear authorisations. The NNR's responsibilities embrace all those actions aimed at providing the public with confidence and assurance that the risks arising from the production of nuclear energy remain within acceptable safety limits -> Therefore: Set fundamental safety standards, conducting pro-active safety assessments, determining licence conditions and obtaining assurance of compliance. The promotional aspects of nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No 46 of 1999). The NNR approach to regulations of nuclear safety and security take into consideration, amongst others, the potential hazards associated with the facility or activity, safety related programmes, the importance of the authorisation holder's safety related processes as well as the need to exercise regulatory control over the technical aspects such as of the design and operation of a nuclear facility in ensuring nuclear safety and security. South Africa does not have national nuclear industry codes and standards. The NNR is therefore non-prescriptive as it comes to the use of industry codes and standards. Regulatory framework (current) provide for the protection of persons, property, and environment against nuclear damage, through Licensing Process: Safety standards; Safety assessment; Authorisation and conditions of authorisation; Public participation process; Compliance assurance; Enforcement

  16. Job safety and awareness analysis of safety implementation among electrical workers in airport service company

    Putra Perdana Suteja

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Electrical is a fundamental process in the company that has high risk and responsibility especially in public service company such as an airport. Hence, the company that operates activities in the airport has to identify and control the safety activities of workers. On the safety implementation, the lack of workers’ awareness is fundamental aspects to the safety failure. Therefore, this study aimed to analyse the safety awareness and identify risk in the electrical workplace. Safety awareness questionnaires are distributed to ten workers in order to analyse their awareness. Job safety analysis method used to identify the risk in the electrical workplace. The preliminary study stated that workers were not aware of personal protective equipment usage so that the awareness and behavioural need to be analysed. The result is the hazard was found such as electrical shock and noise for various intensity in the workplace. While electrical workers were aware of safety implementation but less of safety behaviour. Furthermore, the recommendation can be implemented are the implementation of behaviour-based safety (BBS, 5S implementation and accident report list.

  17. Meeting up-to-date safety requirements in the Russian NPP projects

    Tepkyan, G. O.; Yashkin, A. V.

    2014-01-01

    Safety features in Russian NPP designs are implemented by the combination of active and passive safety systems • Russian NPP designs are in compliance with up-to-date international and European safety requirements and refer to Generation III+ • Russian state-of-the-art designs have already implemented some design solutions, which take into account “post-Fukushima” requirements. Russian NPP design principles have been approved during the European discussions in spring 2012, including the IAEA extraordinary session addressed to Fukushima NPP accident

  18. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design

  19. The main requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards

    Webb, G.A.M.

    1998-01-01

    The main requirements of the new international basic safety standards are discussed, including such topics as health effects of ionizing radiations, the revision of basic safety standards, the requirements for radiation protection practices, the requirements for intervention,and the field of regulatory infrastructures. (A.K.)

  20. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1; System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Smith, Curtis; Stamatelatos, Michael; Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual

  1. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues

    1992-12-01

    This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs), Generic Safety Issues(GSIs), and other Multiplant Actions (MPAs) that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  2. Site safety requirements for high level waste disposal

    Chen Weiming; Wang Ju

    2006-01-01

    This paper outlines the content, status and trend of site safety requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency, America, France, Sweden, Finland and Japan. Site safety requirements are usually represented as advantageous vis-a-vis disadvantagous conditions, and potential advantage vis-a-vis disadvantage conditions, respectively in aspects of geohydrology, geochemistry, lithology, climate and human intrusion etc. Study framework and steps of site safety requirements for China are discussed under the view of systems science. (authors)

  3. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  4. Contribution of Rostechnadzor in Implementing the State Nuclear Safety Policy

    Ferapontov, A.

    2016-01-01

    The report considers major areas of Rostechnadzor activities on implementation of the state policy in the area of nuclear safety, including actions to be implemented. Ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the use of atomic energy is one of the most important components of the national security of the Russian Federation. On March 1, 2012, the President of the Russian Federation approved the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety aimed at consistent reduction of risks associated with man-made impact on the public and the environment in using atomic energy, as well as at prevention of emergencies and accidents in nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities. Rostechnadzor is an authorized body for state safety regulation in the use of atomic energy, which implements functions of regulatory and legal control, licensing of various types of activity and federal state supervision of the atomic energy facilities. The activity in the area of regulatory and legal control is implemented in compliance with the Concept of Enhancement of Regulatory and Legal Control of Safety and Standardization in the Area of the Use of Atomic Energy and the Plan of Implementation of this Concept, which envisages the completion of reviewing the regulatory and legal documents by 2023. Corresponding to the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Federation for the Period of 2025, Rostechnadzor successfully implemented the actions of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2015, creating all conditions for phased reduction of the amounts of nuclear legacy and ensuring radical increase in their level of nuclear and radiation safety. In 2016, Rostechnadzor embarked on implementation of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2030, with creation of infrastructure facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management and definitive response to the challenges of nuclear

  5. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  6. Philosophy and safety requirements for land-based nuclear installations

    Kellermann, Otto

    1978-01-01

    The main ideas of safety philosophy for land-based nuclear installations are presented together with their background of protection goals. Today's requirements for design and quality assurance are deductively shown. Finally a proposition is made for a new balancing of safety philosophy according to the high safety level that nuclear installations have reached

  7. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  8. EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

    Bouteille, Francois; Czech, Juergen; Sloan, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    features are implemented to satisfy the following safety objectives required by the Safety Authorities: - achieve a significantly lower core melt probability by appropriate prevention means, - achieve the 'preclusion' of accidents liable to cause early containment failure, such as core melt under high pressure conditions, - achieve a major reduction in the radioactive releases, which could result from low pressure core melt accidents. The EPR is furthermore characterized by a robust containment not only with respect to hypothetical loads resulting from a core melt accident but also from external hazards resulting from extreme situations such as an aircraft crash directly on the Nuclear Island buildings. The evolutionary approach chosen by EPR designers thus corresponds to the optimal mix between largely proven solutions derived from the largest experience and innovative features needed to meet new requirements, particularly in the field of safety. (authors)

  9. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-05-19

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program.

  10. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program

  11. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  12. Beam Stability: Raytracing Requirements and Implementations

    Green, Michael A.; Bissen, Mark J.; Pedley, Robert T.; Severson, Mary C.; Stott, John P.; Hallin, Emil L.

    2004-01-01

    Stability to-the-user fundamentally starts with present needs and future goals from the user community conveyed to facility staff in terms of user observables into the sample chamber. These are then projected onto the requirements for both the beamlines and the sources. In turn, specifications unfold for performance of subsystems, individual components, and facility services. Altogether, this process involves users, and facility staff from beamlines, operations, engineering, controls, and machine physics.This paper focuses on the transformation of user-to-source requirements, which is a small, but critical, part of the general subject. This translation has been expedited by semi-automated use, via scripting, of the SHADOW raytracing software. The dependence of each user observable on each source parameter is functionally determined, and inverted, for variable values of the user observables. In this way, source stability requirements can be readily determined for the needs of a given experiment on a given beamline in a particular mode. A description of the algorithms, with a working example on a new, slitless undulator beamline at SRC are presented

  13. High-Speed Maglev Trains; German Safety Requirements

    1991-12-31

    This document is a translation of technology-specific safety requirements developed : for the German Transrapid Maglev technology. These requirements were developed by a : working group composed of representatives of German Federal Railways (DB), Tes...

  14. Requirements Engineering for Software Integrity and Safety

    Leveson, Nancy G.

    2002-01-01

    Requirements flaws are the most common cause of errors and software-related accidents in operational software. Most aerospace firms list requirements as one of their most important outstanding software development problems and all of the recent, NASA spacecraft losses related to software (including the highly publicized Mars Program failures) can be traced to requirements flaws. In light of these facts, it is surprising that relatively little research is devoted to requirements in contrast with other software engineering topics. The research proposed built on our previous work. including both criteria for determining whether a requirements specification is acceptably complete and a new approach to structuring system specifications called Intent Specifications. This grant was to fund basic research on how these ideas could be extended to leverage innovative approaches to the problems of (1) reducing the impact of changing requirements, (2) finding requirements specification flaws early through formal and informal analysis, and (3) avoiding common flaws entirely through appropriate requirements specification language design.

  15. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's financial guarantee requirements

    Ferch, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) the legal authority to require licensees to provide financial guarantees in order to meet the purposes of the Act. CNSC policy and guidance with regard to financial guarantees is outlined, and the current status of financial guarantee requirements as applied to various CNSC licensees is described. (author)

  16. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  17. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues. Supplement 4

    1994-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. Supplement 3 gives status as of September 30, 1993. This annual report, Supplement 4, presents updated information as of September 30, 1994. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  18. What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?

    Cahen, B.

    2010-01-01

    Bruno Cahen, Director Safety Division (ANDRA) presented the point of view of the NEA Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) on 'What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?' B. Cahen acknowledged that the national experience in siting and developing conceptual designs of geological disposal is growing rapidly. It implies increasing opportunities for interactions between implementers and regulators. There has been large development of international guidance in the recent years. Many regulators have already developed a regulatory framework. The implementers need practical, transparent and deliverable regulations. These regulations should draw on experiences gained from development of geological disposal projects. The IGSC has identified five key questions that the RF may focus on: 1. Over what time frame are the waste deemed to present a hazard? 2. Over what time frames are regulatory criteria applied and do they change over time? 3. Over what time frame(s) are safety assessments required to be conducted? 4. How do implementers have to address uncertainties in the long time frames? 5. What happens after cut-offs: are additional analyses needed? What types of arguments are to be used? Stable, understandable and practical criteria mean, namely, that they need to be developed on a strong scientific and societal basis, that there is consistency of safety options and requirements for different types of waste, that, in the longer time frames, the emphasis is given to robust systems, passive safety and multiple safety functions and that the criteria should fit the various phases of the project (siting, designing, operating, closure and post-closure). Experience feedback from safety cases shows that safety priorities depend very much on time frames. The derived safety criteria for the individual components should lead to measurable, verifiable specifications. The assessment of geological repository post-closure safety

  19. Implementation of safety management systems in Hong Kong construction industry - A safety practitioner's perspective.

    Yiu, Nicole S N; Sze, N N; Chan, Daniel W M

    2018-02-01

    In the 1980s, the safety management system (SMS) was introduced in the construction industry to mitigate against workplaces hazards, reduce the risk of injuries, and minimize property damage. Also, the Factories and Industrial Undertakings (Safety Management) Regulation was introduced on 24 November 1999 in Hong Kong to empower the mandatory implementation of a SMS in certain industries including building construction. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in improving construction safety and identify the factors that influence its implementation in Hong Kong. A review of the current state-of-the-practice helped to establish the critical success factors (CSFs), benefits, and difficulties of implementing the SMS in the construction industry, while structured interviews were used to establish the key factors of the SMS implementation. Results of the state-of-the-practice review and structured interviews indicated that visible senior commitment, in terms of manpower and cost allocation, and competency of safety manager as key drivers for the SMS implementation. More so, reduced accident rates and accident costs, improved organization framework, and increased safety audit ratings were identified as core benefits of implementing the SMS. Meanwhile, factors such as insufficient resources, tight working schedule, and high labor turnover rate were the key challenges to the effective SMS implementation in Hong Kong. The findings of the study were consistent and indicative of the future development of safety management practice and the sustainable safety improvement of Hong Kong construction industry in the long run. Copyright © 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  20. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  1. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  2. Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

    Lutz, Robyn R.

    1993-01-01

    This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

  3. Safety culture enhancement through the implementation of IAEA guidelines

    Mengolini, A.; Debarberis, L.

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents the methodology applied and the results achieved in adapting and implementing the IAEA guidelines on safety culture to a research reactor as a step towards supporting its Life Management Program. The background is presented together with the effort undertaken to develop awareness on safety culture and the enhancement programme hereafter developed. The present study shows how issues of safety culture, management awareness and commitment deserve attention and can be of fundamental relevance also for research reactors. The study presents how guidelines developed specifically for nuclear power installations (NPPs) can be adapted to meet the needs and peculiarities of other nuclear installations. Moreover, the difficulties met during the implementation of the guidelines are discussed and important information and lessons can be learnt for the nuclear industry in general

  4. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  5. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  6. Implementing national nuclear safety plan at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development

    Xue Yabin; Cui Shaozhang; Pan Fengguo; Zhang Lizhen; Shi Yonggang

    2014-01-01

    This study discusses the importance of nuclear power project design and engineering methods at the preliminary stage of its development on nuclear power plant's operational safety from the professional view. Specifically, we share our understanding of national nuclear safety plan's requirement on new reactor accident probability, technology, site selection, as well as building and improving nuclear safety culture and strengthening public participation, with a focus on plan's implications on preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. Last, we introduce China Huaneng Group's work on nuclear power project preliminary development and the experience accumulated during the process. By analyzing the siting philosophy of nuclear power plant and the necessity of building nuclear safety culture at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development, this study explicates how to fully implement the nuclear safety plan's requirements at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. (authors)

  7. Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

    Jeevarajan, Judith A.; Darcy, Eric C.

    2014-01-01

    This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

  8. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  9. Implementation of safety goals in NRC's regulatory process

    Murley, T.E.

    1985-01-01

    In May 1983 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a policy statement on Safety Goals For Nuclear Power Plant Operation. The Commission at the same time judged that a two-year evaluation period was necessary to judge the effectiveness of the goals and design objectives, and directed the staff to develop information and understanding as to how to further define and use the design objectives and the cost-benefit guidelines. In carrying out the Commission's mandate, the staff framed three major questions to be addressed during the safety goal evaluation period. These three questions are: 1) to what extent is it practical to use safety goals in the regulatory process. 2) Should the quantitative design objectives be modified or supplemented. If so, how. 3) How should the safety goals be implemented at the end of the evaluation period. The staff's conclusions are discussed

  10. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    2000-01-01

    The guide lays down the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive substances are used or stored as unsealed sources. In addition, some general instructions concerning work in radionuclide laboratories are set out

  11. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    The guide lays down the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive substances are used or stored as unsealed sources. In addition, some general instructions concerning work in radionuclide laboratories are set out.

  12. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

    Huls, Dale Thomas; Meehan, Kevin

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Colimbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational

  15. Principles and standards of nuclear safety and their implementation

    Franzen, L.F.

    1979-01-01

    Nuclear safety starts with the design of a nuclear facility and is only completed with its decommissioning. In the various phases of a nuclear facility's lifetime, safety evaluations are required. The licensing prerequisites for construction, operation, modification, decommissioning are based on elements of the relevant national legislation and related ordinances as well as on international regulations. They should be expanded by a system of criteria and standards spelling out the proven practice as developed over the last decades in the industrialized countries and by international organizations such IAEA with its safety codes and guides. (NEA) [fr

  16. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication applies to the disposal of radioactive waste of all types by means of emplacement in designed disposal facilities, subject to the necessary limitations and controls being placed on the disposal of the waste and on the development, operation and closure of facilities. The classification of radioactive waste is discussed. This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements to provide assurance of the radiation safety of the disposal of radioactive waste, in the operation of a disposal facility and especially after its closure. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This is achieved by setting requirements on the site selection and evaluation and design of a disposal facility, and on its construction, operation and closure, including organizational and regulatory requirements.

  17. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  18. Design requirements of communication architecture of SMART safety system

    Park, H. Y.; Kim, D. H.; Sin, Y. C.; Lee, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    To develop the communication network architecture of safety system of SMART, the evaluation elements for reliability and performance factors are extracted from commercial networks and classified the required-level by importance. A predictable determinacy, status and fixed based architecture, separation and isolation from other systems, high reliability, verification and validation are introduced as the essential requirements of safety system communication network. Based on the suggested requirements, optical cable, star topology, synchronous transmission, point-to-point physical link, connection-oriented logical link, MAC (medium access control) with fixed allocation are selected as the design elements. The proposed architecture will be applied as basic communication network architecture of SMART safety system

  19. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  20. Understanding middle managers' influence in implementing patient safety culture.

    Gutberg, Jennifer; Berta, Whitney

    2017-08-22

    The past fifteen years have been marked by large-scale change efforts undertaken by healthcare organizations to improve patient safety and patient-centered care. Despite substantial investment of effort and resources, many of these large-scale or "radical change" initiatives, like those in other industries, have enjoyed limited success - with practice and behavioural changes neither fully adopted nor ultimately sustained - which has in large part been ascribed to inadequate implementation efforts. Culture change to "patient safety culture" (PSC) is among these radical change initiatives, where results to date have been mixed at best. This paper responds to calls for research that focus on explicating factors that affect efforts to implement radical change in healthcare contexts, and focuses on PSC as the radical change implementation. Specifically, this paper offers a novel conceptual model based on Organizational Learning Theory to explain the ability of middle managers in healthcare organizations to influence patient safety culture change. We propose that middle managers can capitalize on their unique position between upper and lower levels in the organization and engage in 'ambidextrous' learning that is critical to implementing and sustaining radical change. This organizational learning perspective offers an innovative way of framing the mid-level managers' role, through both explorative and exploitative activities, which further considers the necessary organizational context in which they operate.

  1. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 4. Utility's Activities for Better Safety Culture After the JCO Accident

    Omoto, Akira

    2001-01-01

    three activities described below. As a part of self-diagnosis of organizational behavior and an individual's factors influencing safety, measurement was carried out by asking questions to every employee at the station, i.e., 21 questions asking if we are appropriately implementing safety culture 'standards' as set forth in INSAG-4 (Ref. 2). The purpose was twofold: to educate about INSAG-4 and to find areas for improvement. The results indicated that employees want to learn more about (a) the background for the specific actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines and (b) how things go wrong if they do not strictly follow the procedures/guidelines. These were important findings, which led to the reconstruction of the on-site education and training. Considering that employees should be well informed on safety culture; management's policy; and lessons learned from incidents, domestic or international, we started the bimonthly magazine Safety Culture. The first publication included articles on 'Lessons Learned from JCO', 'The Results from the Self- Diagnosis', 'Lessons from an Incident at Hunterston NPS (LOOP Followed by Operator Actions for Safe Shutdown)', and others. The on-site training system has two elements: on-the-job training and off-the-job study with classroom and hands-on training. Most of the employees are trained at the On-Site Training Center with equipment and are qualified for specific job categories. Training of operators has its own lengthy program. Given the foregoing findings, we (a) started lectures on JCO lessons learned, (b) modified the educational system at the On-Site Training Center to nurture the employees with well-balanced knowledge and thinking (Fig. 1), and (c) prepared documents that describe the background and reasons for the actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines for use in on-the-job training. The important point to be remembered about the JCO accident is that the criticality safety at this facility

  2. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  3. Implementation of Safety and Security Issues in the Transport of Radioactive Material in Argentina

    López Vietri, J.; Elechosa, C.; Gerez Miranda, C.; Menossi, S.; Rodríguez Roldán, M.S.; Fernández, A.

    2016-01-01

    This paper is intended to describe implementation of safety and security issues in the transport of radioactive material by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (in Spanish Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, ARN), which is the Competent Authority of Argentina in Safety, Security and Safeguards of radioactive and nuclear material. There are depicted main regulatory activities dealing with the mentioned issues, and relevant milestones of national regulatory standards and guidance applied, that are based on requirements and guides from IAEA. Interfaces between Safety and Security sections are most of the times complementary but sometimes conflictive, therefore the resolution of such conflicts and goals achieved during their implementation are also commented; as well as future joint planned activities between both sections of ARN as a way to provide safety and security without compromising one or the other. (author)

  4. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Erven, Ulrich (ed.) [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard (ed.) [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De (ed.) [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  5. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Erven, Ulrich [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  6. PATIENT SAFETY IN SURGERY: THE QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT SAFETY CHECKLISTS IN A REGIONAL HOSPITAL

    V. Karyadinata

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available Introduction. Patient safety and the avoidance of inhospital adverse events is a key focus of clinical practice and medical audit. A large of proportion of medical errors affect surgical patients in the peri-operative setting. Safety checklists have been adopted by the medical profession from the aviation industry as a cheap and reliable method of avoiding errors which arise from complex or stressful situations. Current evidence suggests that the use of periooperative checklists has led to a decrease in surgical morbidity and hospital costs. Aim. To assess the quality of implementation of a modified patient safety checklist in a UK district general hospital. Methods. An observational tool was designed to assess in real time the peri-operative performance of the surgical safety checklist in patients undergoing general surgical, urological or orthopaedic procedures. Initiation of the checklist, duration of performance and staff participation were audited in real time. Results. 338 cases were monitored. Nurses were most active in initiating the safety checklist. The checklist was performed successfully in less than a minute in most cases. 11-24% of staff (according to professional group present in the operating room did not participate in the checklist. Critical safety checks (patient identity and procedure name were performed in all cases across all specialties. Variations were noted in checking other categories, such as deep vein thrombosis (DVT prophylaxis or patient warming. Conclusions. There is still a potential for improving the practice and culture of surgical patient safety activities. Staff training and designation of patient safety leadership roles is needed in increasing compliance and implementation of patient safety mechanism, such as peri-operative checklists. There is significant data to advocate the need to implement patient safety surgical checklists internationally

  7. Requirements for the design and implementation of checklists for surgical processes

    Verdaasdonk, E.G.G.; Stassen, L.P.S.; Widhiasmara, P.P.; Dankelman, J.

    2008-01-01

    Background- The use of checklists is a promising strategy for improving patient safety in all types of surgical processes inside and outside the operating room. This article aims to provide requirements and implementation of checklists for surgical processes. Methods- The literature on checklist use

  8. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  9. Safety Design Approach for the Development of Safety Requirements for Design of Commercial HTGR

    Ohashi, Hirofumi; Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Tachibana, Yukio; Nishihara, Tetsuo; Yan, Xing; Sakaba, Nariaki; Kunitomi, Kazuhiko

    2014-01-01

    The research committee on “Safety requirements for HTGR design” was established in 2013 under the Atomic Energy Society of Japan to develop the draft safety requirements for the design of commercial High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), which incorporate the HTGR safety features demonstrated using the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), lessons learned from the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and requirements for the integration of the hydrogen production plants. The safety design approach for the commercial HTGRs which is a basement of the safety requirements is determined prior to the development of the safety requirements. The safety design approaches for the commercial HTGRs are to confine the radioactive materials within the coated fuel particles not only during normal operation but also during accident conditions, and the integrity of the coated fuel particles and other requiring physical barriers are protected by the inherent and passive safety features. This paper describes the main topics of the research committee, the safety design approaches and the safety functions of the commercial HTGRs determined in the research committee. (author)

  10. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  11. Safety assessment requirements for onsite transfers of radioactive material

    Opperman, E.K.; Jackson, E.J.; Eggers, A.G.

    1992-05-01

    This document contains the requirements for developing a safety assessment document for an onsite package containing radioactive material. It also provides format and content guidance to establish uniformity in the safety assessment documentation and to ensure completeness of the information provided

  12. Implementation of probabilistic safety concepts in international codes

    Borges, J.F.

    1977-01-01

    Recent progress in the implementation of safety concepts in international structure codes is briefly presented. Special attention is paid to the work of the Joint-Committee on Structural Safety. The discussion is centered on some problems such as: safety differentiation, definition and combination of actions, spaces for checking safety and non-linear structural behaviour. When discussing safety differentiation it should be considered that the total probability of failure derives from a theoretical probability of failure and a probability of failure due to error and gross negligence. Optimization of design criteria should take into account both causes of failure. The quantification of reliability implies a probabilistic idealization of all basic variables. Steps taken to obtain an improved definition of different types of actions and rules for their combination are described. Safety checking can be carried out in terms of basic variables, action-effects, or any other suitable variable. However, the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of formulation should be discussed, particularly in the case of non-linear structural behaviour. (orig.) [de

  13. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  14. Requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services

    1989-01-01

    The requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services are established. The norms is applied to activities related to the radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutics and 'in vivo' diagnostics purposes. (M.C.K.) [pt

  15. Requirements to be met by a safety philosophy

    Hahn, L.

    1990-01-01

    The author's assessment of the use of safety philosophies is that, since 'safety philosophers' still are not certain whether a safety philosophy ought to be applicable to just one, particular technology, or rather to a variety of different technologies, there is reason to state that the required ethical, philosophical and political foundations to build a safety philosophy on are still missing. And this, the author presumes, is one of the reasons why our society to a far extent is incapable of acting, faced not only with the nuclear issue, but also with the present and future ecological challenge. (orig./DG) [de

  16. Quality assurance requirements for the computer software and safety analyses

    Husarecek, J.

    1992-01-01

    The requirements are given as placed on the development, procurement, maintenance, and application of software for the creation or processing of data during the design, construction, operation, repair, maintenance and safety-related upgrading of nuclear power plants. The verification and validation processes are highlighted, and the requirements put on the software documentation are outlined. The general quality assurance principles applied to safety analyses are characterized. (J.B.). 1 ref

  17. Treaty implementation applied to conventions on nuclear safety

    Montjoie, Michel

    2015-01-01

    Given that safety is the number one priority for the nuclear industry, it would seem normal that procedures exist to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the conventions on nuclear safety, as already exist for numerous international treaties. Unfortunately, these procedures are either weak or even nonexistent. Therefore, consideration must be given to whether this weakness represents a genuine deficiency in ensuring the main objective of these conventions, which is to achieve a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. But, before one can even address that issue, a prior question must be answered: does the specific nature of the international legal framework on nuclear safety automatically result in a lack of non-compliance procedures in international conventions on the subject? If so, the lack of procedures is justified, despite the drawbacks. The specific nature of the international law on nuclear safety, which in 1994 shaped the content of the CNS by notably not 'allowing' (even today) the incorporation of precise international rules have been taken into account. The next step is to examine whether the absence of non-compliance procedures (which could have been integrated into the text) is a hindrance in ensuring the objectives of the conventions on nuclear safety, and to examine the procedures that could have been used, based on existing provisions in other areas of international law (environmental law, financial law, disarmament law, human rights, etc.). International environmental law will be the main source of this study, as it has certain similarities with the international law on nuclear safety due to the sometimes vague nature of its obligations and irrespective of the fact that one of the purposes of nuclear safety is in particular to protect the environment from radiological hazards. Indeed, the provisions of the law on nuclear safety are mainly technical and designed to guarantee the normal operation of nuclear facilities

  18. LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2004-01-01

    DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

  19. HTR-PM Safety requirement and Licensing experience

    Li Fu; Zhang Zuoyi; Dong Yujie; Wu Zongxin; Sun Yuliang

    2014-01-01

    HTR-PM is a 200MWe modular pebble bed high temperature reactor demonstration plant which is being built in Shidao Bay, Weihai, Shandong, China. The main design parameters of HTR-PM were fixed in 2006, the basic design was completed in 2008. The review of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of HTR-PM was started in April 2008, completed in September 2009. In general, HTR- PM design complies with the current safety requirement for nuclear power plant in China, no special standards are developed for modular HTR. Anyway, Chinese Nuclear Safety Authority, together with the designers, developed some dedicated design criteria for key systems and components and published the guideline for the review of safety analysis report of HTR-PM, based on the experiences from licensing of HTR-10 and new development of nuclear safety. The probabilistic safety goal for HTR-PM was also defined by the safety authority. The review of HTR-PM PSAR lasted for one and a half years, with 3 dialogues meetings and 8 topics meetings, with more than 2000 worksheets and answer sheets. The heavily discussed topics during the PSAR review process included: the requirement for the sub-atmospheric ventilation system, the utilization of PSA in design process, the scope of beyond design basis accidents, the requirement for the qualification of TRISO coating particle fuel, and etc. Because of the characteristics of first of a kind for the demonstration plant, the safety authority emphasized the requirement for the experiment and validation, the PSAR was licensed with certain licensing conditions. The whole licensing process was under control, and was re-evaluated again after Fukushima accident to be shown that the design of HTR-PM complies with current safety requirement. This is a good example for how to license a new reactor. (author)

  20. Implementing electronic handover: interventions to improve efficiency, safety and sustainability.

    Alhamid, Sharifah Munirah; Lee, Desmond Xue-Yuan; Wong, Hei Man; Chuah, Matthew Bingfeng; Wong, Yu Jun; Narasimhalu, Kaavya; Tan, Thuan Tong; Low, Su Ying

    2016-10-01

    Effective handovers are critical for patient care and safety. Electronic handover tools are increasingly used today to provide an effective and standardized platform for information exchange. The implementation of an electronic handover system in tertiary hospitals can be a major challenge. Previous efforts in implementing an electronic handover tool failed due to poor compliance and buy-in from end-users. A new electronic handover tool was developed and incorporated into the existing electronic medical records (EMRs) for medical patients in Singapore General Hospital (SGH). There was poor compliance by on-call doctors in acknowledging electronic handovers, and lack of adherence to safety rules, raising concerns about the safety and efficiency of the electronic handover tool. Urgent measures were needed to ensure its safe and sustained use. A quality improvement group comprising stakeholders, including end-users, developed multi-faceted interventions using rapid PDSA (P-Plan, D-Do, S-Study, A-Act ) cycles to address these issues. Innovative solutions using media and online software provided cost-efficient measures to improve compliance. The percentage of unacknowledged handovers per day was used as the main outcome measure throughout all PDSA cycles. Doctors were also assessed for improvement in their knowledge of safety rules and their perception of the electronic handover tool. An electronic handover tool complementing daily clinical practice can be successfully implemented using solutions devised through close collaboration with end-users supported by the senior leadership. A combined 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approach with regular process evaluations is crucial for its long-term sustainability. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  1. Implementing knowledge management at the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK)

    Schwarz, G.F.; Veyre, J.C.

    2007-01-01

    The Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK) currently faces a generation change. In the years 2005 to 2007 up to 15 retirements of experienced experts are anticipated. Within only three years HSK will have to replace one third of its management and will at the same time loose valuable know-how. Experience has taught us that it becomes increasingly difficult to replace the leaving employees by qualified specialists. Consequently recruitment and training of new staff members becomes more time-consuming and expensive. HSK considers knowledge management to be a valuable tool in order to cope with this change. Therefore a concept has been developed, which evaluates the existing or planned elements of knowledge management considering the amount of work, the benefit and the feasibility and combining them to an efficient system. By doing so HSK encountered two specific problems: - Generally there is rather too much information than too little within an organization. However the information available is not in the required form. Much knowledge is stored unstructured in the offices of the experts and can therefore only be accessed with their aid. Since it is very expensive to compile and collate any unstructured information, it is absolutely important to identify the valuable knowledge of the organization. One must permanently assure that the necessary knowledge is present and that information no longer required is removed from the system. - Knowledge is not only explicit. A large portion of knowledge is tacit in the heads of the employees. It is very difficult to convert this tacit knowledge into an explicit form. It can therefore not be processed electronically not even with the best data base systems and search engines. In this context, technology is important but technology alone can not resolve every problem. Personnel development is just as important. Ways must be found to pass on tacit knowledge within the staff. With its management system HSK possesses a powerful

  2. International standardization of safety requirements for fast reactors

    2011-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is conducting the FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project in cooperation with Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Mitsubishi FBR systems inc. (MFBR), where an advanced loop-type fast reactor named JSFR (Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) is being developed. It is important to develop software technologies (a safety guideline, safety design criteria, safety design standards etc.) of FBRs as well as hardware ones (a reactor plant itself) in order to address prospective worldwide utilization of FBR technology. Therefore, it is expected to establish a rational safety guideline applicable to the JSFR and harmonized with national nuclear-safety regulations as well, including Japan, the United States and the European Union. This report presents domestic and international status of safety guideline development for sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), results of comparative study for safety requirements provided in existing documents and a proposal for safety requirements of future SFRs with a roadmap for their refinement and worldwide utilization. (author)

  3. Perceived Requirements of MIS Curriculum Implementation in Bilingual Developing Countries

    Kabeil, Magdy M.

    2005-01-01

    This paper addresses additional requirements associated with implementing a standard curriculum of Management Information Systems (MIS) in bilingual developing countries where both students and workplace users speak English as a second language. In such countries, MIS graduates are required to develop bilingual computer applications and to…

  4. Radiation safety requirements for training of users of diagnostic X ...

    Background. Globally, the aim of requirements regarding the use and ownership of diagnostic medical X-ray equipment is to limit radiation by abiding by the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle. The ignorance of radiographers with regard to radiation safety requirements, however, is currently a cause of ...

  5. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ''Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ''Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points

  6. Safety Requirements and Modern Technical Requirements in Human Information Systems in Amman Hotels

    Farouq Ahmad Alazzam; Sattam Rakan Allahawiah; Mohammad Nayef Alsarayreh; Kafa Hmoud Abdallah al Nawaiseh

    2015-01-01

    This study aimed to demonstrate the availability of Safety requirements and modern technical requirements in human information systems in Amman hotels. an the most important results of this study is the availability of security and safety requirements in human information systems In Amman hotels and The adequacy of the information that it provided .and show that all departments are not connected by appropriate and effective communication networks in adequate form . Also sophisticated operatin...

  7. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  8. Implementation of Energy Code Controls Requirements in New Commercial Buildings

    Rosenberg, Michael I. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hart, Philip R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hatten, Mike [Solarc Energy Group, LLC, Seattle, WA (United States); Jones, Dennis [Group 14 Engineering, Inc., Denver, CO (United States); Cooper, Matthew [Group 14 Engineering, Inc., Denver, CO (United States)

    2017-03-24

    Most state energy codes in the United States are based on one of two national model codes; ANSI/ASHRAE/IES 90.1 (Standard 90.1) or the International Code Council (ICC) International Energy Conservation Code (IECC). Since 2004, covering the last four cycles of Standard 90.1 updates, about 30% of all new requirements have been related to building controls. These requirements can be difficult to implement and verification is beyond the expertise of most building code officials, yet the assumption in studies that measure the savings from energy codes is that they are implemented and working correctly. The objective of the current research is to evaluate the degree to which high impact controls requirements included in commercial energy codes are properly designed, commissioned and implemented in new buildings. This study also evaluates the degree to which these control requirements are realizing their savings potential. This was done using a three-step process. The first step involved interviewing commissioning agents to get a better understanding of their activities as they relate to energy code required controls measures. The second involved field audits of a sample of commercial buildings to determine whether the code required control measures are being designed, commissioned and correctly implemented and functioning in new buildings. The third step includes compilation and analysis of the information gather during the first two steps. Information gathered during these activities could be valuable to code developers, energy planners, designers, building owners, and building officials.

  9. The Implementation and Maintenance of a Behavioral Safety Process in a Petroleum Refinery

    Myers, Wanda V.; McSween, Terry E.; Medina, Rixio E.; Rost, Kristen; Alvero, Alicia M.

    2010-01-01

    A values-centered and team-based behavioral safety process was implemented in a petroleum oil refinery. Employee teams defined the refinery's safety values and related practices, which were used to guide the process design and implementation. The process included (a) a safety assessment; (b) the clarification of safety-related values and related…

  10. Implementation of a patient safety program at a tertiary health system: A longitudinal analysis of interventions and serious safety events.

    Cropper, Douglas P; Harb, Nidal H; Said, Patricia A; Lemke, Jon H; Shammas, Nicolas W

    2018-04-01

    We hypothesize that implementation of a safety program based on high reliability organization principles will reduce serious safety events (SSE). The safety program focused on 7 essential elements: (a) safety rounding, (b) safety oversight teams, (c) safety huddles, (d) safety coaches, (e) good catches/safety heroes, (f) safety education, and (g) red rule. An educational curriculum was implemented focusing on changing high-risk behaviors and implementing critical safety policies. All unusual occurrences were captured in the Midas system and investigated by risk specialists, the safety officer, and the chief medical officer. A multidepartmental committee evaluated these events, and a root cause analysis (RCA) was performed. Events were tabulated and serious safety event (SSE) recorded and plotted over time. Safety success stories (SSSs) were also evaluated over time. A steady drop in SSEs was seen over 9 years. Also a rise in SSSs was evident, reflecting on staff engagement in the program. The parallel change in SSEs, SSSs, and the implementation of various safety interventions highly suggest that the program was successful in achieving its goals. A safety program based on high-reliability organization principles and made a core value of the institution can have a significant positive impact on reducing SSEs. © 2018 American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of the American Hospital Association.

  11. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  12. Lessons Learned from Implementing National Nuclear Safety Knowledge Platforms

    Simo, A.

    2016-01-01

    The Integrated Nuclear Security Advisory Services (INSServ) took place in Cameroon from 21st to 25th April 2014 and the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) from 12th to 21st October 2014. This was after the government requested the Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an official correspondence on 11th June 2013, for these missions. The main objective was to further improve the effectiveness of the Cameroon governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety and security. Revision of the legal and regulatory framework so that all international safety and security standards are addressed in laws and statutes have been done with documents downloaded from Nuclear portal sites found in GNSSN. Establishment and implementation of integrated management systems by NRPA is being done with documentation under the National Nuclear Portal with lessons learned from the IAEA review missions. The regulatory documents have been uploaded on the platform and can be accessed through FNRBA and NRPA website (www.anrp.cm). UN organizations implementing projects in Cameroon are also linked to the platform. The action plans and progress reports for IAEA/AFRA projects are also available. Moreover, NRPA regulatory activities and licensing sources are available on this platform.

  13. Requirements and international co-operation in nuclear safety for evolutionary light water reactors

    Carnino, A.

    1999-01-01

    The principles of safety are now well known and implemented world-wide, leading to a situation of harmonisation in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Future reactors are expected not only to meet current requirements but to go beyond the safety level presently accepted. To this end, technical safety requirements, as defined by the IAEA document Safety Fundamentals, need be duly considered in the design, the risks to workers and population must be decreased, a stable, transparent and objective regulatory process, including an international harmonisation with respect to licensing of new reactors, must be developed, and the issue of public acceptance must be addressed. Well-performing existing installations are seen as a prerequisite for an improved public acceptability; there should be no major accidents, the results from safety performance indicators must be unquestionable, and compliance with internationally harmonised criteria is essential. Economical competitiveness is another factor that influences the acceptability; the costs for constructing the plant, for its operation and maintenance, for the fuel cycle, and for the final decommissioning are of paramount importance. Plant simplification, longer fuel cycles, life extension are appealing options, but safety will have first priority. The IAEA can play an important role in this field, by providing peer reviews by teams of international experts and assistance to Member States on the use of its safety standards. (author)

  14. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will

  15. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  16. Improving safety culture in hospitals: Facilitators and barriers to implementation of Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM).

    Zecevic, Aleksandra A; Li, Alvin Ho-Ting; Ngo, Charity; Halligan, Michelle; Kothari, Anita

    2017-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to assess the facilitators and barriers to implementation of the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM) on selected hospital units. A cross-sectional explanatory mixed methods design was used to converge results from a standardized safety culture survey with themes that emerged from interviews and focus groups. Findings were organized by six elements of the Ottawa Model of Research Use framework. A geriatric rehabilitation unit of an acute care hospital and a neurological unit of a rehabilitation hospital were selected purposefully due to the high frequency of falls. Hospital staff who took part in: surveys (n = 39), interviews (n = 10) and focus groups (n = 12), and 38 people who were interviewed during falls investigations: fallers, family, unit staff and hospital management. Implementation of the SFIM to investigate fall occurrences. Percent of positive responses on the Modified Stanford Patient Safety Culture Survey Instrument converged with qualitative themes on facilitators and barriers for intervention implementation. Both hospital units had an overall poor safety culture which hindered intervention implementation. Facilitators were hospital accreditation, strong emphasis on patient safety, infrastructure and dedicated champions. Barriers included heavy workloads, lack of time, lack of resources and poor communication. Successful implementation of SFIM requires regulatory and organizational support, committed frontline staff and allocation of resources to identify active causes and latent contributing factors to falls. System-wide adjustments show promise for promotion of safety culture in hospitals where falls happen regularly. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

  17. General Approaches and Requirements on Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials Transport in Russian Federation

    Ershov, V.N.; Buchel'nikov, A.E.; Komarov, S.V.

    2016-01-01

    Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)

  18. Current regulatory developments concerning the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses for external hazards in Germany

    Krauss, Matias; Berg, Heinz-Peter

    2014-01-01

    Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). This expert group, led by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), has the task to advise the BMU on all methodological issues for the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses and has elaborated two publications on methods and data for PSA with the aim to support a unified application of the PSA in Germany. With the publication 'Safety requirements for nuclear power plants', a modern version of a German nuclear safety regulations has been published. In this regulation the broad experience of the application of the periodic safety reviews have been incorporated as a key element of regulatory supervision. Further key findings from the European safety review of nuclear power plants were taken into account after the accident at Fukushima. The revision also paid special attention to the requirements and recommendations of WENRA and IAEA. In addition, the recommendations and guidelines of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) and the expert group on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA FAK) have also been updated. The activities of the updates have been focused the natural external hazards 'earthquake' and 'flooding' in the German regulations: - Probabilistic assessment for retrofit measures in individual cases for all operating modes and the PSA level 1 and level 2 is possible. - Deterministic and probabilistic site hazard analysis for the events 'earthquake' and 'flood' are required. - For the event 'earthquake' according to IAEA plants receives a minimum design comparable to 0.1 g >concept. - Furthermore, a seismic instrumentation independent of the location of intensity is required for each installation. - The importance of quality assured plant walk downs to determine the specified plant conditions was explicitly emphasized and required measures to ensure. - Furthermore, the existing methods for their applicability verified the associated generic data base for PSA updated. - The

  19. Key elements on implementing an occupational health and safety management system using ISO 45001 standard

    Darabont Doru Costin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Occupational health and safety (OHS management system is one of the main elements of the company’s general management system. During last decade, Romanian companies gained a valuable experience on implementing this type of management systems, using OHSAS 18001 referential and standard. However, the projected release of the ISO 45001 represents a new approach which requires the companies to take in consideration new key elements for a successful implementation of the OHS management system. The aim of the paper is to identify and analyse these key elements, by integration of the following issues: standard requirements, Romanian OHS legislation and good practice examples, including the general control measures for new and emerging risks such as psycho-social risks, workforce ageing and new technologies. The study results represent an important work instrument for each company interested to implement or upgrade its OHS management system using ISO 45001 standard and could be used regardless the company size or activity domain.

  20. Implementing size-optimal discrete neural networks require analog circuitry

    Beiu, V.

    1998-12-01

    This paper starts by overviewing results dealing with the approximation capabilities of neural networks, as well as bounds on the size of threshold gate circuits. Based on a constructive solution for Kolmogorov`s superpositions the authors show that implementing Boolean functions can be done using neurons having an identity transfer function. Because in this case the size of the network is minimized, it follows that size-optimal solutions for implementing Boolean functions can be obtained using analog circuitry. Conclusions and several comments on the required precision are ending the paper.

  1. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  2. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  3. Usage of information safety requirements in improving tube bending process

    Livshitz, I. I.; Kunakov, E.; Lontsikh, P. A.

    2018-05-01

    This article is devoted to an improvement of the technological process's analysis with the information security requirements implementation. The aim of this research is the competition increase analysis in aircraft industry enterprises due to the information technology implementation by the example of the tube bending technological process. The article analyzes tube bending kinds and current technique. In addition, a potential risks analysis in a tube bending technological process is carried out in terms of information security.

  4. Improving radiopharmaceutical supply chain safety by implementing bar code technology.

    Matanza, David; Hallouard, François; Rioufol, Catherine; Fessi, Hatem; Fraysse, Marc

    2014-11-01

    The aim of this study was to describe and evaluate an approach for improving radiopharmaceutical supply chain safety by implementing bar code technology. We first evaluated the current situation of our radiopharmaceutical supply chain and, by means of the ALARM protocol, analysed two dispensing errors that occurred in our department. Thereafter, we implemented a bar code system to secure selected key stages of the radiopharmaceutical supply chain. Finally, we evaluated the cost of this implementation, from overtime, to overheads, to additional radiation exposure to workers. An analysis of the events that occurred revealed a lack of identification of prepared or dispensed drugs. Moreover, the evaluation of the current radiopharmaceutical supply chain showed that the dispensation and injection steps needed to be further secured. The bar code system was used to reinforce product identification at three selected key stages: at usable stock entry; at preparation-dispensation; and during administration, allowing to check conformity between the labelling of the delivered product (identity and activity) and the prescription. The extra time needed for all these steps had no impact on the number and successful conduct of examinations. The investment cost was reduced (2600 euros for new material and 30 euros a year for additional supplies) because of pre-existing computing equipment. With regard to the radiation exposure to workers there was an insignificant overexposure for hands with this new organization because of the labelling and scanning processes of radiolabelled preparation vials. Implementation of bar code technology is now an essential part of a global securing approach towards optimum patient management.

  5. Safety Culture Implementation in Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN)

    Nurwidi Astuti, Y.H.; Dewanto, P.

    2016-01-01

    The Indonesia Nuclear Energy Act no. 10 of 1997 clearly stated that Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) is the Nuclear Regulatory Body. This is the legal basis of BAPETEN to perform regulatory functions on the use of nuclear energy in Indonesia, including regulation, authorisation, inspection and enforcement. The Independent regulatory functions are stipulated in Article 4 and Article 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act no. 10 (1997) which require the government to establish regulatory body that is reporting directly to the president and has responsibility to control of the use of nuclear energy. BAPETEN has been start fully its functioning on January 4, 1999. In it roles as a regulatory body, the main aspect that continues and always to be developed is the safety culture. One of the objectives of regulatory functions is “to increase legal awareness of nuclear energy of the user to develop safety culture” (Article 15, point d), while in the elucidation of article 15 it is stipulated that “safety culture is that of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individual that emphasise the importance of safety”.

  6. Quality and Safety Assurance - Priority Task at Nuclear Power Projects Implementation

    Nenkova, B.; Manchev, B.; Tomov, E.

    2010-01-01

    Quality and safety assurance at implementation of nuclear power engineering projects is important and difficult task for realization. Many problems arise during this process, when many companies from different countries participate, with various kinds of activities and services provided. The scope of activities necessary for quality and safety assurance is therefore quite expanded and diverse. In order to increase the safety and reliability of Kozloduy NPP Plc (KNPP) Units 5 and 6, as well as to bring the units in conformity with the newest international requirements for quality and safety in the field of nuclear energy, a program for their modernization on the basis of different technical studies and assessments was implemented. The Units 5 and 6 Modernization Program of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was composed of 212 modifications aimed to improve the safety, operability, and reliability of the Units. The Program was realized by stages during yearly planned outages since year 2002 to 2007, without additional outages. A major Program Objective was to extend the Units Life Time in at least 15 Years, under a continuous, safe, and reliable operation. The Modernization Program of Units 5 and 6 of the Bulgarian Nuclear Power Plant in Kozloduy was the first and for the time being the only one in the world, program in the field of nuclear power engineering, by which the full scope of recommendations for improvement of the Kozloduy NPP units was applied. The main goal of the National Electric Company, which is the Employer for the construction of new nuclear facility in Bulgaria, is after completion of all activities regarding construction of Belene NPP the plant to meet or exceed the requirements of the respective national and international quality and safety codes and standards, as well as the IAEA guidelines, as they are established. The objective of this report is to describe different aspects of the quality assurance according to the requirements of quality and

  7. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  8. Dissemination and Implementation Research for Occupational Safety and Health.

    Dugan, Alicia G; Punnett, Laura

    2017-12-01

    The translation of evidence-based health innovations into real-world practice is both incomplete and exceedingly slow. This represents a poor return on research investment dollars for the general public. U.S. funders of health sciences research (e.g., NIH, CDC, NIOSH) are increasingly calling for dissemination plans, and to a lesser extent for dissemination and implementation (D&I) research, which are studies that examine the effectiveness of D&I efforts and strategies and the predictors of D&I success. For example, rather than merely broadcasting information about a preventable hazard, D&I research in occupational safety and health (OSH) might examine how employers or practitioners are most likely to receive and act upon that information. We propose here that D&I research should be seen as a dedicated and necessary area of study within OSH, as a way to generate new knowledge that can bridge the research-to-practice gap. We present D&I concepts, frameworks, and examples that can increase the capacity of OSH professionals to conduct D&I research and accelerate the translation of research findings into meaningful everyday practice to improve worker safety and health.

  9. Challenges in Implementing IAEA National Nuclear Safety Knowledge Platforms

    Samba, R.N.; Simo, A.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: Integrated Management Systems and human resource development of nuclear knowledge have always been a challenge for developing countries. NRPA staff when trained by IAEA return and restitute with all colleagues the themes acquired in nuclear knowledge. NRPA became a member of Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) in 2009. FNRBA organized with IAEA a workshop from 14th to 18th October 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya on Knowledge Safety Network. NRPA of Cameroon created the first National Nuclear Portail under FNRBA. This was linked to other national websites. During the IAEA review missions, most counterparts took opportunity from the thermatic site to share information and develop advance reference materials. The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) team also shared materials that could not be transferred through email with national counterparts using the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network (GNSSN) sharepoint website due to large file sizes.The regulatory documents have been uploaded on the platform and can be accessed through FNRBA and NRPA website (www.anrp.cm). UN organizations implementing projects in Cameroon are also linked to the platform. The action plans and progress reports for IAEA/AFRA projects are also available. Moreover, NRPA regulatory activities and licensing sources are available on this platform. (author

  10. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  11. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Arabic Edition)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  12. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  13. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  14. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Chinese Edition)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  15. Development of photovoltaic array and module safety requirements

    1982-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations likely to be used in residential, intermediate, and large-scale applications were identified and developed. The National Electrical Code and Building Codes were reviewed with respect to present provisions which may be considered to affect the design of photovoltaic modules. Limited testing, primarily in the roof fire resistance field was conducted. Additional studies and further investigations led to the development of a proposed standard for safety for flat-plate photovoltaic modules and panels. Additional work covered the initial investigation of conceptual approaches and temporary deployment, for concept verification purposes, of a differential dc ground-fault detection circuit suitable as a part of a photovoltaic array safety system.

  16. Department of Energy's safety and health program for enrichment plant workers is not adequately implemented

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) program to protect the safety and health of employees at its contractor-operated uranium enrichment plants has not been fully implemented by DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office. Appraisals and inspections of plant conditions are not as frequent and/or as thorough as required. Instead of independently investigating employee complaints, DOE has delegated this responsibility to the contractor. It is recommended that the Secretary of Energy make sure that Oak Ridge properly conducts inspections and appraisals and investigates and follows up on all employee complaints. He should also take steps to provide increased independence and objectivity in the Oak Ridge Operations Office's safety and health program. Furthermore, the Congress should authorize the Secretary of Energy to institute a program of non-reimbursable penalties and fines for violations of safety and health standards and procedures

  17. Regulatory requirements and administrative practice in safety of nuclear installations

    Servant, J.

    1977-01-01

    This paper reviews the current situation of the France regulatory rules and procedures dealing with the safety of the main nuclear facilities and, more broadly, the nuclear security. First, the author outlines the policy of the French administration which requires that the licensee responsible for an installation has to demonstrate that all possible measures are taken to ensure a sufficient level of safety, from the early stage of the project to the end of the operation of the plant. Thus, the administration performs the assessment on a case-by-case basis, of the safety of each installation before granting a nuclear license. On the other hand, the administration settles overall safety requirements for specific categories of installations or components, which determine the ultimate safety performances, but avoid, as far as possible, to detail the technical specifications to be applied in order to comply with these goals. This approach, which allows the designers and the licensees to rely upon sound codes and standards, gains the advantage of a great flexibility without imparing the nuclear safety. The author outlines the licensing progress for the main categories of installations: nuclear power plants of the PWR type, fast breeders, uranium isotope separation plants, and irradiated fuel processing plants. Emphasis is placed on the most noteworthy points: standardization of projects, specific risks of each site, problems of advanced type reactors, etc... The development of the technical regulations is presented with emphasis on the importance of an internationally concerned action within the nuclear international community. The second part of this paper describes the France operating experience of nuclear installations from the safety point of view. Especially, the author examines the technical and administrative utilization of data from safety significant incidents in reactors and plants, and the results of the control performed by the nuclear installations

  18. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  19. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for an Environmental Restoration Management Contractor

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of the Standards/Requirements Identification Program, developed partially in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, was to identify applicable requirements that established the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor's (ERMC) responsibilities and authorities under the Environmental Restoration Management Contract, determine the adequacy of these requirements, ascertain a baseline level of compliance with them, and implement a maintenance program that would keep the program current as requirements or compliance levels change. The resultant Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RIDs) consolidate the applicable requirements. These documents govern the development of procedures and manuals to ensure compliance with the requirements. Twenty-four such documents, corresponding with each functional area identified at the site, are to be issued. These requirements are included in the contractor's management plan

  20. Effects of Implemented Initiatives on Patient Safety Culture in Fateme Al-zahra Hospital in Najafabad

    Ahmadreza Izadi

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: Patient safety improvement requires ongoing culture. This cultural change is the most important challenge that managers are faced with in creation of a safe system. This study aims to show the results of initiatives to improvement in patient safety culture in Fateme Al-zahra hospital. Method: In the quasi-experimental research, patient safety culture was measured using the Persian questionnaire on adaptation of the hospital survey on patient safety culture in 12 dimensions. The research was conducted before (January 2010 and after (September 2012 the improvement initiatives. In this study, all units were determined and no sampling method was used. Reliability of the questionnaire was tested by Alpha Chronbakh (0.83. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics indices and Independent T-Test by SPSS Software (version 18. Results: 350 questionnaires were distributed in each phaseand overall response rate was 58 and 56 percent, respectively. According to Independent T-test, Management expectations and actions, Organizational learning, Management support, Feedback and communication about error, Communication openness, Overall Perceptions of Safety, Non-punitive Response to Error, Frequency of Event Reporting, and Patient safety culture showed significant differences (P-value0.05. The mean score of Patient safety culture was 2.27 (from 5 and it was increased to 2.46 after initiatives that showed a significant difference (P-value<0.05. Conclusion: Although, improvement in patient safety culture needs teamwork and continuous attempts, the study showed that initiatives implemented in the case hospital had been effective in some dimensions. However, Teamwork within hospital units, Teamwork across units, Hospital handoffs and transitions, and Staffing dimensions were recognized for further intervention. Hospital could improve the patient safety culture with planning and measures in these dimensions.

  1. Companies' opinions and acceptance of global food safety initiative benchmarks after implementation.

    Crandall, Phil; Van Loo, Ellen J; O'Bryan, Corliss A; Mauromoustakos, Andy; Yiannas, Frank; Dyenson, Natalie; Berdnik, Irina

    2012-09-01

    International attention has been focused on minimizing costs that may unnecessarily raise food prices. One important aspect to consider is the redundant and overlapping costs of food safety audits. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) has devised benchmarked schemes based on existing international food safety standards for use as a unifying standard accepted by many retailers. The present study was conducted to evaluate the impact of the decision made by Walmart Stores (Bentonville, AR) to require their suppliers to become GFSI compliant. An online survey of 174 retail suppliers was conducted to assess food suppliers' opinions of this requirement and the benefits suppliers realized when they transitioned from their previous food safety systems. The most common reason for becoming GFSI compliant was to meet customers' requirements; thus, supplier implementation of the GFSI standards was not entirely voluntary. Other reasons given for compliance were enhancing food safety and remaining competitive. About 54 % of food processing plants using GFSI benchmarked schemes followed the guidelines of Safe Quality Food 2000 and 37 % followed those of the British Retail Consortium. At the supplier level, 58 % followed Safe Quality Food 2000 and 31 % followed the British Retail Consortium. Respondents reported that the certification process took about 10 months. The most common reason for selecting a certain GFSI benchmarked scheme was because it was widely accepted by customers (retailers). Four other common reasons were (i) the standard has a good reputation in the industry, (ii) the standard was recommended by others, (iii) the standard is most often used in the industry, and (iv) the standard was required by one of their customers. Most suppliers agreed that increased safety of their products was required to comply with GFSI benchmarked schemes. They also agreed that the GFSI required a more carefully documented food safety management system, which often required

  2. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  3. 77 FR 2126 - Pipeline Safety: Implementation of the National Registry of Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas...

    2012-01-13

    ... Natural Gas Operators AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No...: ``Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements.'' The final rule...

  4. The 2002 Drigg post-closure safety case: implementation of a multiple factor safety case

    Lean, C.B.; Grimwood, P.D.; Watts, L.; Fowler, L.; Thomson, G.; Kelly, E.; Hodgkinson, D.

    2004-01-01

    British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) owns and operates the Drigg disposal site, which is the UK's principal facility for the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLW). Disposals are carried out under the terms of an authorization granted by the UK Environment Agency (the Agency). The Agency periodically reviews the authorization to take account of new information and any revisions to regulatory requirements. In September 2002 new Operational Environmental and Post-Closure Safety Cases (OESC and PCSC respectively) were submitted to the Agency to support the next authorization review. The OESC assesses radiological safety aspects up until closure of the site, including a post-operational management phase, whilst the PCSC considers the longer-term radiological safety. The Drigg disposal facility has been operational since 1959. For the first 3 decades of operations, disposals were solely by tumble tipping wastes into excavated trenches. This was phased out in favour of vault disposal and disposals to the trenches were completed in 1995. The first vault (Vault 8) commenced operations in 1988 and construction of future vaults is planned up to the estimated end of disposal operations in about 50 years time. This paper describes the main components of the 2002 Drigg PCSC and how they relate to each other. Central to the safety case is a systematic comprehensive post-closure radiological safety assessment (PCRSA). However, the importance of the more qualitative aspects of the safety case, including a demonstration of optimisation, is also highlighted. In addition, other confidence-building activities which are key to developing and presenting the safety case are discussed. (author)

  5. Long term safety requirements and safety indicators for the assessment of underground radioactive waste repositories

    Vovk, Ivan

    1998-01-01

    This presentation defines: waste disposal, safety issues, risk estimation; describes the integrated waste disposal process including quality assurance program. Related to actinides inventory it shows the main results of calculated activity obtained by deterministic estimation. It includes the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards and requirements; features related to site, design and waste package characteristics, as technical long term safety criteria for radioactive waste disposal facilities. Fundamental concern regarding the safety of radioactive waste disposal systems is their radiological impact on human beings and the environment. Safety requirements and criteria for judging the level of safety of such systems have been developed and there is a consensus among the international community on their basis within the well-established system of radiological protection. So far, however, little experience has been gained in applying long term safety criteria to actual disposal systems; consequently, there is an international debate on the most appropriate nature and form of the criteria to be used, taking into account the uncertainties involved. Emerging from the debate is the increasing conviction that the combined use of a variety of indicators would be advantageous in addressing the issue of reasonable assurance in the different time frames involved and in supporting the safety case for any particular repository concept. Indicators including risk, dose, radionuclide concentration, transit time, toxicity indices, fluxes at different points within the system, and barrier performance have all been identified as potentially relevant. Dose and risk are the indicators generally seen as most fundamental, as they seek directly to describe the radiological impact of a disposal system, and these are the ones that have been incorporated into most national standards to date. There are, however, certain problems in applying them. Application of a variety of different indicators

  6. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    The design of layout plans requires adequate assessment tools for the quantification of safety performance. The general focus of the present work is to introduce an inherent safety perspective at different points of the layout design process. In particular, index approaches for safety assessment and decision-making in the early stages of layout design are developed and discussed in this two-part contribution. Part 1 (accompanying paper) of the current work presents an integrated index approach for safety assessment of early plant layout. In the present paper (Part 2), an index for evaluation of the hazard related to the potential of domino effects is developed. The index considers the actual consequences of possible escalation scenarios and scores or ranks the subsequent accident propagation potential. The effects of inherent and passive protection measures are also assessed. The result is a rapid quantification of domino hazard potential that can provide substantial support for choices in the early stages of layout design. Additionally, a case study concerning selection among various layout options is presented and analyzed. The case study demonstrates the use and applicability of the indices developed in both parts of the current work and highlights the value of introducing inherent safety features early in layout design

  7. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATIONS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUADRICYCLES

    Ana Pavlovic

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, a new class of compact vehicles has been emerging and wide-spreading all around Europe: the quadricycle. These four-wheeled motor vehicles, originally derived from motorcycles, are a small and fuel-efficient mean of transportation used in rural or urban areas as an alternative to motorbikes or city cars. In some countries, they are also endorsed by local authorities and institutions which support small and environmentally-friendly vehicles. In this paper, several general considerations on quadricycles will be provided including the vehicle classification, evolution of regulations (as homologation, driver licence, emissions, etc, technical characteristics, safety requirements, most relevant investigations, and other additional useful information (e.g. references, links. It represents an important and actual topic of investigation for designers and manufacturers considering that the new EU regulation on the approval and market surveillance of quadricycles will soon enter in force providing conclusive requirements for functional safety environmental protection of these promising vehicles.

  8. Implementing the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP) to Improve Patient Safety in an Academic Primary Care Practice.

    Pitts, Samantha I; Maruthur, Nisa M; Luu, Ngoc-Phuong; Curreri, Kimberly; Grimes, Renee; Nigrin, Candace; Sateia, Heather F; Sawyer, Melinda D; Pronovost, Peter J; Clark, Jeanne M; Peairs, Kimberly S

    2017-11-01

    While there is growing awareness of the risk of harm in ambulatory health care, most patient safety efforts have focused on the inpatient setting. The Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program (CUSP) has been an integral part of highly successful safety efforts in inpatient settings. In 2014 CUSP was implemented in an academic primary care practice. As part of CUSP implementation, staff and clinicians underwent training on the science of safety and completed a two-question safety assessment survey to identify safety concerns in the practice. The concerns identified by team members were used to select two initial safety priorities. The impact of CUSP on safety climate and teamwork was assessed through a pre-post comparison of results on the validated Safety Attitudes Questionnaire. Ninety-six percent of staff completed science of safety training as part of CUSP implementation, and 100% of staff completed the two-question safety assessment. The most frequently identified safety concerns were related to medications (n = 11, 28.2), diagnostic testing (n = 9, 25), and communication (n = 5, 14). The CUSP team initially prioritized communication and infection control, which led to standardization of work flows within the practice. Six months following CUSP implementation, large but nonstatistically significant increases were found for the percentage of survey respondents who reported knowledge of the proper channels for questions about patient safety, felt encouraged to report safety concerns, and believed that the work setting made it easy to learn from the errors of others. CUSP is a promising tool to improve safety climate and to identify and address safety concerns within ambulatory health care. Copyright © 2017 The Joint Commission. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0).

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-06-30

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models

  10. Responsibility for the Violation of Ecological Safety Requirements

    Selivanovskaya, J. I.; Gilmutdinova, I.

    2018-01-01

    The article deals with the problems of responsibility for the violation of ecological safety requirements from the point of view of sustainable development of the state. Such types of responsibility as property, disciplinary, financial, administrative and criminal responsibility in the area are analysed. Suggestions on the improvement of legislation are put forward. Among other things it is suggested to introduce criminal sanctions against legal bodies (enterprises) for ecological crimes with punishments in the form of fines, suspension or discontinuation of activities.

  11. Evaluation of Influence Factors within Implementing of Nuclear Safety Culture in Embarking Countries

    Situmorang, J.

    2016-01-01

    The evaluation of the implementation nuclear safety culture at BATAN has been performed. BATAN is Indonesia’s national nuclear energy agency. Nowadays, BATAN is planning to develop an experimental power reactor. To implement the nuclear safety culture BATAN has issued BATAN chairman regulation (Perka BATAN 200). Perka BATAN is the reference for individuals and organizations to implement nuclear safety culture which includes basic principles, mechanisms, assessment, as well as the implementation of the application of safety culture. It covers the establishment of safety policies, program development, program implementation, development and measurement of safety culture. Each facilities within BATAN is expected to well implement a safety culture. The implementation of safety culture is developed by considering the characteristics, attributes and indicators. The characteristics, attributes and indicators referenced are elaborated from the IAEA. The activities to strengthen safety culture are monthly workshop with participants is head of every facilities, safety leadership training and workshop for safety division manager in every facilities. It is also issued a handbook of safety that is distributed to all employees BATAN.

  12. WIPP Waste Characterization: Implementing Regulatory Requirements in the Real World

    Cooper Wayman, J.D.; Goldstein, J.D.

    1999-01-01

    It is imperative to ensure compliance of the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In particular, compliance with the waste characterization requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and its implementing regulation found at 40 CFR Parts 262,264 and 265 for hazardous and mixed wastes, as well as those of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, as amended, and their implementing regulations found at 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 for non-mixed radioactive wastes, are often difficult to ensure at the operational level. For example, where a regulation may limit a waste to a certain concentration, this concentration may be difficult to measure. For example, does the definition of transuranic waste (TRU) as 100 nCi/grain of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste mean that the radioassay of a waste must show a reading of 100 plus the sampling and measurement error for the waste to be a TRU waste? Although the use of acceptable knowledge to characterize waste is authorized by statute, regulation and DOE Orders, its implementation is similarly beset with difficulty. When is a document or documents sufficient to constitute acceptable knowledge? What standard can be used to determine if knowledge is acceptable for waste characterization purposes? The inherent conflict between waste characterization regulatory requirements and their implementation in the real world, and the resolution of this conflict, will be discussed

  13. Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware: For Human Spaceflight. Revision A

    Bernstein, Karen S.; Kujala, Rod; Fogt, Vince; Romine, Paul

    2011-01-01

    This document establishes the structural requirements for human-rated spaceflight hardware including launch vehicles, spacecraft and payloads. These requirements are applicable to Government Furnished Equipment activities as well as all related contractor, subcontractor and commercial efforts. These requirements are not imposed on systems other than human-rated spacecraft, such as ground test articles, but may be tailored for use in specific cases where it is prudent to do so such as for personnel safety or when assets are at risk. The requirements in this document are focused on design rather than verification. Implementation of the requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with NASA Technical Authority approval.

  14. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  15. Design and implementation of a safety health and environment management system in BHP Petroleum

    Mattes, B.W.; Walters, C. [BHP Petroleum, Melbourne, VIC (Australia)

    1995-12-31

    The Australian/Asian operations group within BHP Petroleum (BHPP) is implementing and integrated management system with safety, occupational health and environmental elements as crucial components of all BHPP operations. Responsibility for the development, implementation and maintenance of the management system, and compliance with its provisions, rests with line management, a logical extension of the accountability and responsibility for safety, health and environment matters that rests with line managers within BHPP. Contractors are scrutinized to assess their safety, health and environmental performance and failure to meet minimal standards will result in their disqualification. The effectiveness of the BHPP Management System is yet to be fully determined, however, it will be measured against the performance of the company in the areas of zero lost time due to injuries, a drop in incidences requiring medical treatment or first aid, lower absenteeism and workers compensation bills, no oil spills, less car accidents, less back pain and RSI, better management of waste emissions to air, land and sea, and less equipment breakdowns. The trend in improved safety, health and environment performance are already apparent and auger well for the Company as it moves towards the new millennium. 7 figs., 2 photos., 4 refs.

  16. Verification of implementation of the radiological safety standards through the regulatory inspections

    Perez Gonzalez, Francisco; Fornet Rodriguez, Ofelia M.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: As an element of the updating process of the legal framework on radiological safety in Cuba, a new rule was put into force; the Radiological Basic Safety Standards (RBSS) in January 2002. Five years after the application of these new safety requirements, it was considered appropriate to assess the effectiveness of its implementation. Therefore, in this work the authors analysed the outcomes of the regulatory inspections conducted in this period upon medical and industrial practices in a sample of facilities representative of those with the highest radiological risks in the territory under supervision of a Territorial Delegation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. For better understanding of this presentation, a summary explanation of the structure of the rule is given in its introduction. The work was to identify for each deficiency, or finding, or counter-measure; out of the relevant inspections; the corresponding requirement/Article of the RBSS that shows difficulties in implementation. For each installation an analysis is made with regard to the relevant articles difficult to implement. Finally, the appraisal is shown separately for the medical practice, and for the industrial practice, and also in general for the whole sample of installations under review. The study showed that the implementation of the Standards has been satisfactory and uniform in the practices under review. So far it seems that there have not been major difficulties with the implementation of the Titles; III On Intervention, IV Dose Limits, as well as with the Especial, Final, and Transitory Dispositions. On the other hand, it is shown there is a need for continued work only with regard to the implementation of the requirements in Section IV Verification of Safety and in Section V On the responsibilities with regard to occupational exposure in Chapter III Title I, and correspondingly in Chapter II Occupational Exposure in Title II. It is recommended to conduct this kind of

  17. 47 CFR 80.305 - Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety Convention.

    2010-10-01

    ... and the Safety Convention. 80.305 Section 80.305 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.305 Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety...

  18. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: implementing inherent safety perspective. Part 1 - guideword applicability and method description.

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-12-15

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design.

  19. Safety requirements in the design of research reactors: A Canadian perspective

    Lee, A.G.; Langman, V.J.

    2000-01-01

    In Canada, the formal development of safety requirements for the design of research reactors in general began under an inter-organizational Small Reactor Criteria Committee. This committee developed safety and licensing criteria for use by several small reactor projects in their licensing discussions with the Atomic Energy Control Board. The small reactor projects or facilities represented included the MAPLE-X10 reactor, the proposed SES-10 heating reactor and its prototype, the SDR reactor at the Whiteshell Laboratories, the Korea Multipurpose Research Reactor (a.k.a., HANARO) in Korea, the SCORE project, and the McMaster University Nuclear Reactor. The top level set of criteria which form a safety philosophy and serve as a framework for more detailed developments was presented at an IAEA Conference in 1989. AECL continued this work to develop safety principles and design criteria for new small reactors. The first major application of this work has been to the design, safety analysis and licensing of the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors for the MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor Project. This paper provides an overview of the safety principles and design criteria. Examples of an implementation of these safety principles and design criteria are drawn from the work to design the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors. (author)

  20. Implementation Science: New Approaches to Integrating Quality and Safety Education for Nurses Competencies in Nursing Education.

    Dolansky, Mary A; Schexnayder, Julie; Patrician, Patricia A; Sales, Anne

    Although quality and safety competencies were developed and disseminated nearly a decade ago by the Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) project, the uptake in schools of nursing has been slow. The use of implementation science methods may be useful to accelerate quality and safety competency integration in nursing education. The article includes a definition and description of implementation science methods and practical implementation strategies for nurse educators to consider when integrating the QSEN competencies into nursing curriculum.

  1. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  2. Behavioral Emergency Response Team: Implementation Improves Patient Safety, Staff Safety, and Staff Collaboration.

    Zicko, Cdr Jennifer M; Schroeder, Lcdr Rebecca A; Byers, Cdr William S; Taylor, Lt Adam M; Spence, Cdr Dennis L

    2017-10-01

    Staff members working on our nonmental health (non-MH) units (i.e., medical-surgical [MS] units) were not educated in recognizing or deescalating behavioral emergencies. Published evidence suggests a behavioral emergency response team (BERT) composed of MH experts who assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies may be beneficial in these situations. Therefore, we sought to implement a BERT on the inpatient non-MH units at our military treatment facility. The objectives of this evidence-based practice process improvement project were to determine how implementation of a BERT affects staff and patient safety and to examine nursing staffs' level of knowledge, confidence, and support in caring for psychiatric patients and patients exhibiting behavioral emergencies. A BERT was piloted on one MS unit for 5 months and expanded to two additional units for 3 months. Pre- and postimplementation staff surveys were conducted, and the number of staff assaults and injuries, restraint usage, and security intervention were compared. The BERT responded to 17 behavioral emergencies. The number of assaults decreased from 10 (pre) to 1 (post); security intervention decreased from 14 to 1; and restraint use decreased from 8 to 1. MS staffs' level of BERT knowledge and rating of support between MH staff and their staff significantly increased. Both MS and MH nurses rated the BERT as supportive and effective. A BERT can assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies, and improve staff collaboration and patient and staff safety. © 2017 Sigma Theta Tau International.

  3. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  4. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  5. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  6. Requirements on the provisional safety analyses and technical comparison of safety measures

    2010-04-01

    decide on the provision of a design license for a repository site for SMA and another one for HAA, or for a common site for both SMA and HAA. The present report concerns the second step and recapitulates the assertions of SGT on the provisional safety analyses and on the safety technical comparison. It establishes the specific requirements of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) on provisional safety and the safety technical comparison. Further, it defines the extent and content of the safety technical documentation necessary for step 2

  7. [Storage of plant protection products in farms: minimum safety requirements].

    Dutto, Moreno; Alfonzo, Santo; Rubbiani, Maristella

    2012-01-01

    Failure to comply with requirements for proper storage and use of pesticides in farms can be extremely hazardous and the risk of accidents involving farm workers, other persons and even animals is high. There are still wide differences in the interpretation of the concept of "securing or making safe", by workers in this sector. One of the critical points detected, particularly in the fruit sector, is the establishment of an adequate storage site for plant protection products. The definition of "safe storage of pesticides" is still unclear despite the recent enactment of Legislative Decree 81/2008 regulating health and work safety in Italy. In addition, there are no national guidelines setting clear minimum criteria for storage of plant protection products in farms. The authors, on the basis of their professional experience and through analysis of recent legislation, establish certain minimum safety standards for storage of pesticides in farms.

  8. Safety-related requirements for photovoltaic modules and arrays

    Levins, A.; Smoot, A.; Wagner, R.

    1984-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations for residential, intermediate, and large scale applications are investigated. Concepts for safety systems, where each system is a collection of subsystems which together address the total anticipated hazard situation, are described. Descriptions of hardware, and system usefulness and viability are included. A comparison of these systems, as against the provisions of the 1984 National Electrical Code covering photovoltaic systems is made. A discussion of the Underwriters Laboratory UL investigation of the photovoltaic module evaluated to the provisions of the proposed UL standard for plat plate photovoltaic modules and panels is included. Grounding systems, their basis and nature, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are described. The meaning of frame grounding, circuit groundings, and the type of circuit ground are covered.

  9. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-01-01

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

  10. Evaluation and qualification of novel control techniques with safety requirements

    Gossner, S.; Wach, D.

    1985-01-01

    The paper discusses the questions related to the assessment and qualification of new I and C-systems. The tasks of nuclear power plant I and Cs as well as the efficiency of the new techniques are reflected. Problems with application of new I and Cs and the state of application in Germany and abroad are addressed. Starting from the essential differencies between conventional and new I and C-systems it is evaluated, if and in which way existing safety requirements can be met and to what extent new requirements need to be formulated. An overall concept has to be developed comprising the definition of graded requirement profiles for design and qualification. Associated qualification procedures and tools have to be adapted, developed and tuned upon each other. (orig./HP) [de

  11. Lessons learned while implementing a safety parameter display system at the Comanche Peak steam electric station

    Hagar, B.

    1987-01-01

    With the completion of site Verification and Validation tests, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will be fully operational at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Implementation of the SPDS, which began in 1982, included: modifying generic Safety Assessment System Software; developing site-specific displays and features; installing and integrating system equipment into the plant; modifying station heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems to provide necessary cooling; installing an additional uninterruptible power supply system to provide necessary power; and training station personnel in the operation and use of the system. Lessons learned during this project can be discussed in terms of an ideal SPDS implementation project. Such a project would design and implement an SPDS for a plant that is already under construction or operating, and would progress through a sequence of activities that includes: (1) developing and documenting the system design bases, and including all major design influences; (2) developing a database description and system functional specifications to clarify specific system requirements; (3) developing detailed system hardware and software design specifications to fully describe the system, and to enable identification of necessary site design changes early in the project; (4) implementing the system design; (5) configuring and extensively testing the system prior to routine system operation; and (6) tuning the system after the completion of system installation. The ideal project would include future system users in design development and system testing, and would use Verification and Validation techniques throughout the project to ensure that each sequential step is appropriate and correct

  12. Specific requirements of GS-R3 related to process implementation

    Florescu, N.

    2009-01-01

    The PowerPoint presentation gives: an overview of IAEA management system requirements or topics; - the requirements specific to processes and process implementation; - the key practical challenge of using the process approach specified in IAEA SG GS-G3.1 and GS-G3.5. The following items are thoroughly discussed: - Requirements related to specific process implementation and developing processes; - Process management; Generic management; - System processes: - Control of documents; Control of products; Control of records; - Purchasing; - Communication; - Managing organizational change; - Other requirements concerning the process management system; - General management system; - Grading; - Documentation; - Fulfilling the requirements of interested parties; - Management responsibility; - Planning responsibility and authority for the management system monitoring and measurement; - Independent assessment; - Management system review; - Non-conformances, corrective and preventive actions; - Improvement key practical challenge of using the process approach specified in IAEA SG GS-G3.1 and GS-G3.5; - Key challenge: - Process common to all stages; - Phases of process development proposed by IAEA. The following conclusions complete the presentation: GS-R-3 sets basic requirements for process-based integrated management system; - Some key generic processes required, no specific process model favoured namely, no reference to management, core and support processes; - Up to organization to determine appropriate process model; - Easily applicable to a wide range of facilities and activities, including those of a regulatory body; - Specific requirements are found in specific Safety Guide. (author)

  13. Implementing evidence-based policy in a network setting: road safety policy in the Netherlands.

    Bax, Charlotte; de Jong, Martin; Koppenjan, Joop

    2010-01-01

    In the early 1990s, in order to improve road safety in The Netherlands, the Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV) developed an evidence-based "Sustainable Safety" concept. Based on this concept, Dutch road safety policy, was seen as successful and as a best practice in Europe. In The Netherlands, the policy context has now changed from a sectoral policy setting towards a fragmented network in which safety is a facet of other transport-related policies. In this contribution, it is argued that the implementation strategy underlying Sustainable Safety should be aligned with the changed context. In order to explore the adjustments needed, two perspectives of policy implementation are discussed: (1) national evidence-based policies with sectoral implementation; and (2) decentralized negotiation on transport policy in which road safety is but one aspect. We argue that the latter approach matches the characteristics of the newly evolved policy context best, and conclude with recommendations for reformulating the implementation strategy.

  14. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    2004-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  15. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    2000-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  16. Structural observation of long-span suspension bridges for safety assessment: implementation of an optical displacement measurement system

    Martins, L Lages; Ribeiro, A Silva; Rebordão, J M

    2015-01-01

    This paper addresses the implementation of an optical displacement measurement system in the observation scenario of a long-span suspension bridge and its contribution for structural safety assessment. The metrological background required for quality assurance of the measurements is described, namely, the system's intrinsic parameterization and integration in the SI dimensional traceability chain by calibration, including its measurement uncertainty assessment

  17. Relationship between general safety requirements and safety culture in the improvement of safe operation of I.N.R. TRIGA reactor facilities

    Ciocanescu, M.; Preda, M.; Chiritescu, M.; Dumitru, M.

    1996-01-01

    Acquiring of the basic principles of ''safety culture'' by a large number of profesionals in the nuclear field drew the attention of the decision factors in the INR managerial structure, who decided to promote certain practical actions at each level in order to improve nuclear safety. Starting from the ''Republican Standards for Nuclear Safety'' issued by CSEN in 1975, where general safety criteria are defined for nuclear reactors and NPPs, the specialists at the TRIGA reactor originated and implemented a coherent and secure system to ensure nuclear safety over all steps of nuclear activities: research, conception, execution, commissioning and operation. This system has been continuosly corrected so that now it is completely integrated in a modern safety system. The paper presents the way in which a modern system for nuclear safety at the TRIGA reactor has been implemented and developed, in accordance to specific criteria and requirements imposed by related National Regulations and with the principles of safety culture. Starting from the definition of specific responsabilities, there are presented the internal stipulations and practical actions at all levels in order to enhance nuclear safety. (orig.)

  18. Nuclear safety requirements for operation licensing of Egyptian research reactors

    Ahmed, E.E.M.; Rahman, F.A.

    2000-01-01

    From the view of responsibility for health and nuclear safety, this work creates a framework for the application of nuclear regulatory rules to ensure safe operation for the sake of obtaining or maintaining operation licensing for nuclear research reactors. It has been performed according to the recommendations of the IAEA for research reactor safety regulations which clearly states that the scope of the application should include all research reactors being designed, constructed, commissioned, operated, modified or decommissioned. From that concept, the present work establishes a model structure and a computer logic program for a regulatory licensing system (RLS code). It applies both the regulatory inspection and enforcement regulatory rules on the different licensing process stages. The present established RLS code is then applied to the Egyptian Research Reactors, namely; the first ET-RR-1, which was constructed and still operating since 1961, and the second MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2) which is now in the preliminary operation stage. The results showed that for the ET-RR-1 reactor, all operational activities, including maintenance, in-service inspection, renewal, modification and experiments should meet the appropriate regulatory compliance action program. Also, the results showed that for the new MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2), all commissioning and operational stages should also meet the regulatory inspection and enforcement action program of the operational licensing safety requirements. (author)

  19. Safety requirements and feedback of commonly used material handling equipment

    Pathak, M.K.

    2009-01-01

    Different types of cranes, hoists, chain pulley blocks are the most commonly used material handling equipment in industry along with attachments like chains, wire rope slings, d-shackles, etc. These equipment are used at work for transferring loads from one place to another and attachments are used for anchoring, fixing or supporting the load. Selection of the correct equipment, identification of the equipment planning of material handling operation, examination/testing of the equipment, education and training of the persons engaged in operation of the material handling equipment can reduce the risks to safety of people in workplace. Different safety systems like boom angle indicator, overload tripping device, limit switches, etc. should be available in the cranes for their safe use. Safety requirement for safe operation of material handling equipment with emphasis on different cranes and attachments particularly wire rope slings and chain slings have been brought out in this paper. An attempt has also been made to bring out common nature of deficiencies observed during regulatory inspection carried out by AERB. (author)

  20. Lean Six-Sigma in Aviation Safety: An implementation guide for measuring aviation system’s safety performance

    Panagopoulos, I.; Atkin, C.J.; Sikora, I.

    2016-01-01

    The paper introduces a conceptual framework that could improve the safety performance measurement process and ultimately the aviation system safety performance. The framework provides an implementation guide on how organisations could design and develop a proactive, measurement tool for assessing and measuring the Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) at sigma (σ) level, a statistical measurement unit. In fact, the methodology adapts and combines quality management tools, a leading i...

  1. 78 FR 65427 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied...

    2013-10-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration...

  2. Status of NDE research in the US-contributions of NDE to reactor safety and implementation of NDE technology

    Ammirato, F. [EPRI, Charlotte, NC (United States)

    1999-08-01

    Power plant designers, plant owners, and regulators have developed inservice inspection (ISI) programs as part of their comprehensive approach to ensuring nuclear safety. This paper examines the role of ISI in reactor safety through several examples drawn from recent industry initiatives to address implementation of effective examination technology for nuclear power plant piping, and BWR and PWR reactor pressure vessels. These examples also illustrate the importance of well designed performance demonstration activities to support application of effective ISI. Finally, the efforts required to implement effective ISI technology for field inspection is addressed. (orig./DGE)

  3. Supervision of nuclear safety - IAEA requirements, accepted solutions, trends

    Jurkowski, M.

    2007-01-01

    Ten principles of the nuclear safety, based on the IAEA's standards are presented. Convention on Nuclear Safety recommends for nuclear safety landscape, the control transparency, culture safety, legal framework and knowledge preservation. Examples of solutions accepted in France, Finland, and Czech Republic are discussed. New trends in safety fundamentals and Integration Regulatory Review are presented

  4. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  5. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  6. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department`s enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion.

  7. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department's enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion

  8. ALWR safety approaches and trends. Implementation of passive safety features in the design

    Ignatiev, V.

    1995-11-01

    Reactor vendors world-wide are examining various advanced light water reactors (ALWR) options to reach utility goals. The amount of information available about each design varies essentially depending on its maturity. Some advanced reactor designs are the evolutionary results of combining old structures, systems and components in new ways, others use innovative solutions. A summary review is given for better understanding of new ALWR design trends and approaches in different countries and subsequent R and D activities. An attempt was made to describe and assess specific innovative and passive features implemented in the leading ALWR designs for further plant design safety improvements. The advantages and disadvantages of these innovations in obtaining reliable systems have been considered. Also, this report indicates the importance of uncertainties remaining and identifies the additional work needed. 51 refs, 27 figs, 7 tabs

  9. ALWR safety approaches and trends. Implementation of passive safety features in the design

    Ignatiev, V

    1995-11-01

    Reactor vendors world-wide are examining various advanced light water reactors (ALWR) options to reach utility goals. The amount of information available about each design varies essentially depending on its maturity. Some advanced reactor designs are the evolutionary results of combining old structures, systems and components in new ways, others use innovative solutions. A summary review is given for better understanding of new ALWR design trends and approaches in different countries and subsequent R and D activities. An attempt was made to describe and assess specific innovative and passive features implemented in the leading ALWR designs for further plant design safety improvements. The advantages and disadvantages of these innovations in obtaining reliable systems have been considered. Also, this report indicates the importance of uncertainties remaining and identifies the additional work needed. 51 refs, 27 figs, 7 tabs.

  10. Food Safety Programs Based on HACCP Principles in School Nutrition Programs: Implementation Status and Factors Related to Implementation

    Stinson, Wendy Bounds; Carr, Deborah; Nettles, Mary Frances; Johnson, James T.

    2011-01-01

    Purpose/Objectives: The objectives of this study were to assess the extent to which school nutrition (SN) programs have implemented food safety programs based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles, as well as factors, barriers, and practices related to implementation of these programs. Methods: An online survey was…

  11. Implementation of food safety management systems in the UK

    Mensah, L. D.; Julien, D.

    2011-01-01

    This paper reports the first stage of work being undertaken to understand the factors that have impacted on the current state of food safety in the UK food manufacturing sector. The paper first explores developments in international food safety regulation in general and in particular, the UK. Using a survey and case study methodology, the paper examines the response of food manufacturing enterprises to food safety regulation, and uses statistical techniques to investigate th...

  12. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Chinese Edition)

    2014-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  13. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources: International basic safety standards. General safety requirements. Pt. 3 (French Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  14. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Arabic Edition)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  15. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1994-01-01

    This presentation will describe the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation's (FERMCO) Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RlDs) Program, the unique process used to implement it, and the status of the program. We will also discuss the lessons learned as the program was implemented. The Department of Energy (DOE) established the Fernald site to produce uranium metals for the nation's defense programs in 1953. In 1989, DOE suspended production and, in 1991, the mission of the site was formally changed to one of environmental cleanup and restoration. The site was renamed the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP). FERMCO's mission is to provide safe, early, and least-cost final clean-up of the site in compliance with all regulations and commitments. DOE has managed nuclear facilities primarily through its oversight of Management and Operating contractors. Comprehensive nuclear industry standards were absent when most DOE sites were first established, Management and Operating contractors had to apply existing non-nuclear industry standards and, in many cases, formulate new technical standards. Because it was satisfied with the operation of its facilities, DOE did not incorporate modern practices and standards as they became available. In March 1990, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 90-2, which called for DOE to identify relevant standards and requirements, conduct adequacy assessments of requirements in protecting environmental, public, and worker health and safety, and determine the extent to which the requirements are being implemented. The Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Office of DOE embraced the recommendation for facilities under its control. Strict accountability requirements made it essential that FERMCO and DOE clearly identify applicable requirements necessary, determine the requirements' adequacy, and assess FERMCO's level of compliance

  16. 42 CFR 3.210 - Required disclosure of patient safety work product to the Secretary.

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Required disclosure of patient safety work product... HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT Confidentiality and Privilege Protections of Patient Safety Work Product § 3.210 Required disclosure of patient...

  17. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  18. Improvement of the regulatory system by implementation new safety demands

    Iglesias, R.; Alfonso, C.

    1996-01-01

    The work describes in broad terms, the analysis that is being performed aiming at the adoption of a regulatory system that could meet the current safety demands, but which, at the same time, could be a general system that might allow different safety assessments to be done by making use of more specific technical standards of the technology supplier

  19. [How patient safety programmes can be successfully implemented - an example from Switzerland].

    Kobler, Irene; Mascherek, Anna; Bezzola, Paula

    2015-01-01

    Internationally, the implementation of patient safety programmes poses a major challenge. In the first part, we will demonstrate that various measures have been found to be effective in the literature but that they often do not reach the patient because their implementation proves difficult. Difficulties arise from both the complexity of the interventions themselves and from different organisational settings in individual hospitals. The second part specifically describes the implementation of patient safety improvement programmes in Switzerland and discusses measures intended to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of implementation in Switzerland. Then, the national pilot programme to improve patient safety in surgery is presented, which was launched by the federal Swiss government and has been implemented by the patient safety foundation. Procedures, challenges and highlights in implementing the programme in Switzerland on a national level are outlined. Finally, first (preliminary) results are presented and critically discussed. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier GmbH.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  1. Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Safety requirements

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements apply to all those practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention and that are: (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the sponsoring organizations to provide for the application of the requirements. (B) Used by States with the assistance of the FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, OCHA or WHO in compliance with applicable national rules and regulations. (C) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or supervision. Or (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to provide for the application of the requirements. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors. Facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores. Facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities. Facilities for the management of radioactive waste. The transport of radioactive material. Sources of radiation used in

  2. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  3. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  4. Implementing 10 CFR 830 at the FEMP Silos: Nuclear Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analysis

    Fisk, Patricia; Rutherford, Lavon

    2003-01-01

    The objective of the Silos Project at the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) is to safely remediate high-grade uranium ore residues (Silos 1 and 2) and metal oxide residues (Silo 3). The evolution of Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities has reflected the changes in remediation processes. The final stage in silos DSAs is an interpretation of 10 CFR 830 Safe Harbor Requirements that combines a Health and Safety Plan with nuclear safety requirements. This paper will address the development of a Nuclear Health and Safety Plan, or N-HASP

  5. Safety requirements and radiological protection for ore installations

    2003-06-01

    This norm establishes the safety and radiological protection requirements for mining installations which manipulates, process and storing ores, raw materials, steriles, slags and wastes containing radionuclides of the uranium and thorium natural series, simultaneously or separated, and which can cause undue exposures to the public and workers, at anytime of the functioning or pos operational stage. This norm applies to the mining installations activities, suspended or which have ceased their activities before the issue date of this norm, destined to the mining, physical, chemical and metallurgical processing, and the industrialization of raw materials and residues containing associated radionuclides from the natural series of uranium and thorium, including the stages of implantation, operation and decommissioning of the installation

  6. Examining the Relationship Between Safety Management System Implementation and Safety Culture in Collegiate Flight Schools

    Robertson, Michael F

    2018-01-01

    Safety management systems (SMS) are becoming the industry standard for safety management throughout the aviation industry. As the Federal Aviation Administration continues to mandate SMS for different segments, the assessment of an organization’s safety culture becomes more important. An SMS can facilitate the development of a strong aviation safety culture. This study describes how safety culture and SMS are integrated. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between an ...

  7. Evaluation of implementation an Integrated Safety and Preventive Maintenance System for Improving of Safety Indexes

    I mohammadfam

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available Accident analysis shows that one of the main reasons for accidents is non-integration of maintenance units with safety. Merging these two processes through an integrated system can reduce and or eliminate accidents, diseases, and environmental pollution. These issues lead to improvement in organizational performance, as well. The aim of this study is to design and establish an integrated system for obtaining the aforementioned goal. Integration was carried out at Nirou Moharreke Machine Tools Company via Structured System Analysis & Design Method (SSADM. In order to measure the effectiveness of the system, selected indexes were compared using statistical methods prior and after system establishment. Results show that the accident severity index reduced from 135.46 in 2010, to 43.85 in 2012. Moreover, system effectiveness improved equipment reliability and availability (e.g. reliability of the Pfeiffer Milling machine (P (t>50 increased from 0.89 in 2010, to 0.9 in 2012. This system by forecasting various failures, and planning and designing the required operations for preventing occurrence of these failures, plays an important role in improving safety conditions of equipment, and increasing organizational performance, and is capable of presenting an excellent accident prevention program.

  8. DISPELLING MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS TO IMPLEMENT A SAFETY CULTURE

    Potts, T. Todd; Smith, Ken; Hylko, James M.

    2003-02-27

    Industrial accidents are typically reported in terms of technological malfunctions, ignoring the human element in accident causation. However, over two-thirds of all accidents are attributable to human and organizational factors (e.g., planning, written procedures, job factors, training, communication, and teamwork), thereby affecting risk perception, behavior and attitudes. This paper reviews the development of WESKEM, LLC's Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Program that addresses human and organizational factors from a top-down, bottom-up approach. This approach is derived from the Department of Energy's Integrated Safety Management System. As a result, dispelling common myths and misconceptions about safety, while empowering employees to ''STOP work'' if necessary, have contributed to reducing an unusually high number of vehicle, ergonomic and slip/trip/fall incidents successfully. Furthermore, the safety culture that has developed within WESKEM, LLC's workforce consists of three common characteristics: (1) all employees hold safety as a value; (2) each individual feels responsible for the safety of their co-workers as well as themselves; and (3) each individual is willing and able to ''go beyond the call of duty'' on behalf of the safety of others. WESKEM, LLC as a company, upholds the safety culture and continues to enhance its existing ES&H program by incorporating employee feedback and lessons learned collected from other high-stress industries, thereby protecting its most vital resource - the employees. The success of this program is evident by reduced accident and injury rates, as well as the number of safe work hours accrued while performing hands-on field activities. WESKEM, LLC (Paducah + Oak Ridge) achieved over 800,000 safe work hours through August 2002. WESKEM-Paducah has achieved over 665,000 safe work hours without a recordable injury or lost workday case since it started operations on

  9. Design requirements for SRB production control system. Volume 4: Implementation

    1981-01-01

    The implementation plan which is presented was developed to provide the means for the successful implementation of the automated production control system. There are three factors which the implementation plan encompasses: detailed planning; phased implementation; and user involvement. The plan is detailed to the task level in terms of necessary activities as the system is developed, refined, installed, and tested. These tasks are scheduled, on a preliminary basis, over a two-and-one-half-year time frame.

  10. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S.

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide

  11. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide.

  12. Design and implementation of an identification system in construction site safety for proactive accident prevention.

    Yang, Huanjia; Chew, David A S; Wu, Weiwei; Zhou, Zhipeng; Li, Qiming

    2012-09-01

    Identifying accident precursors using real-time identity information has great potential to improve safety performance in construction industry, which is still suffering from day to day records of accident fatality and injury. Based on the requirements analysis for identifying precursor and the discussion of enabling technology solutions for acquiring and sharing real-time automatic identification information on construction site, this paper proposes an identification system design for proactive accident prevention to improve construction site safety. Firstly, a case study is conducted to analyze the automatic identification requirements for identifying accident precursors in construction site. Results show that it mainly consists of three aspects, namely access control, training and inspection information and operation authority. The system is then designed to fulfill these requirements based on ZigBee enabled wireless sensor network (WSN), radio frequency identification (RFID) technology and an integrated ZigBee RFID sensor network structure. At the same time, an information database is also designed and implemented, which includes 15 tables, 54 queries and several reports and forms. In the end, a demonstration system based on the proposed system design is developed as a proof of concept prototype. The contributions of this study include the requirement analysis and technical design of a real-time identity information tracking solution for proactive accident prevention on construction sites. The technical solution proposed in this paper has a significant importance in improving safety performance on construction sites. Moreover, this study can serve as a reference design for future system integrations where more functions, such as environment monitoring and location tracking, can be added. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  13. Regulatory framework and safety requirements for new (gen III) reactors

    Mourlon, Sophie

    2014-01-01

    Sophie Mourlon, ASN Deputy General Director, described the international process to enhance safety between local safety authorities through organizations such as WENRA. Then she explained to the participants the regulatory issues for the next generation of NPPs

  14. Special safety requirements applied to Brazilian nuclear power plant

    Lepecki, W.P.S.; Hamel, H.J.E.; Koenig, N.; Vieira, P.C.R.; Fritzsche, J.C.

    1981-01-01

    Some safety aspects of the Angra 2 and 3 nuclear power plants are presented. An analysis of the civil and mechanical project of these nuclear power plant having in view a safety analysis is done. (E.G.) [pt

  15. Firefighter safety for PV systems: Overview of future requirements and protection systems

    Spataru, Sergiu; Sera, Dezso; Blaabjerg, Frede

    2013-01-01

    for operators during maintenance or fire-fighting. One of the solutions is individual module shutdown by short-circuiting or disconnecting each PV module from the PV string. However, currently no standards have been adopted either for implementing or testing these methods, or doing an evaluation of the module...... shutdown procedures. This paper gives an overview on the most recent fire - and firefighter safety requirements for PV systems, with focus on system and module shutdown systems. Several solutions are presented, analyzed and compared by considering a number of essential characteristics, including......An important and highly discussed safety issue for photovoltaic systems is that, as long as they are illuminated, a high voltage is present at the PV string terminals and cables between the string and inverters, independent of the state of the inverter's dc disconnection switch, which poses a risk...

  16. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Laycak, D.T.

    2010-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

  17. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Laycak, D T

    2008-06-16

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

  18. What Isn’t Working and New Requirements. The Need to Harmonize Safety and Security Requirements

    Flory, D.

    2016-01-01

    This paper sets out the key issues for consideration at the transport conference. It will introduce each of the aspects of the framework for safe, secure and sustainable transport, building on the description of the existing situation presented in Session 1A. It will discuss purpose of the IAEA framework, and examine the scientific basis, the IAEA recommendations and requirements, the UN interface, the use of conventions, national implementation, industry compliance, communication and information, response and restoration. It will also look at the activities and related requirements outside of transport which could influence the transport frameworks either in a positive or negative manner. (author)

  19. Considerations in the development of safety requirements for innovative reactors: Application to modular high temperature gas cooled reactors

    2003-08-01

    of the present publication is to propose a technical basis and methodology, based on principles of defence in depth, for conducting design safety assessments and in the long term generating design safety requirements for innovative reactors. The MHTGR is used as an example to illustrate this process. For this purpose, the document provides an overview of the safety related features of current MHTGR technology, examines how the defence in depth principle can be implemented/adopted by the MHTGR design, and how MHTGR designs could satisfy the three fundamental safety objectives: general nuclear safety; radiation protection; technical safety. The present TECDOC is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather suggests a systematic approach to be used in the development of detailed safety requirements

  20. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Standard Criticality Safety Requirements #1-520 g Operations in PF-4

    Yamanaka, Alan Joseph Jr. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-13

    Guidance has been requested from the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD) regarding processes that involve 520 grams of fissionable material or less. This Level-3 evaluation was conducted and documented in accordance with NCS-AP-004 (Ref. 1), formerly NCS-GUIDE-01. This evaluation is being written as a generic evaluation for all operations that will be able to operate using a 520-gram mass limit. Implementation for specific operations will be performed using a Level 1 CSED, which will confirm and document that this CSED can be used for the specific operation as discussed in NCS-MEMO-17-007 (Ref. 2). This Level 3 CSED updates and supersedes the analysis performed in NCS-TECH-14-014 (Ref. 3).

  1. Examining the Relationship between Safety Management System Implementation and Safety Culture in Collegiate Flight Schools

    Robertson, Mike Fuller

    2017-01-01

    Safety Management Systems (SMS) are becoming the industry standard for safety management throughout the aviation industry. As the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues to mandate SMS for different segments, the assessment of an organization's safety culture becomes more important. An SMS can facilitate the development of a strong…

  2. Implementation of the safety assessment in the practice of industrial radiography

    Alfonso Pallarés, C.; Pérez Reyes, Y.

    2015-01-01

    The CNSN as regulatory authority has regulatory control processes based on regulations, permits, inspections and limitation to ensure the supervision and control of the practice of industrial radiography. On the other hand in the light of the new regulations approved and being implemented such as: Resolution 334/2011 CITMA 'Regulation on Notification and authorization of practices and activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation sources' and Resolution 17 / 2012, Security Guide: Security Assessment Practices and Activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation (recommendatory), it is necessary for compliance with regulatory requirements concerning the safety assessment. Since 2009 it has been applied this experience in different medical practices and industry, providing a systematic and consistent basis, to the safety assessment of all facilities and activities, which has helped increase the confidence that has been achieved an adequate level of security. The work was able to identify that there is a group of barriers operating in the risk reduction in various accident sequences and therefore have a relative importance in risk reduction, recommendations in this regard to improve the program management of safety in the practice of industrial radiography. [es

  3. What Isn't Working and New Requirements. The Need to Harmonize Safety and Security Requirements

    Flory, D.

    2011-01-01

    The year 2011 marks the 50th anniversary of the first IAEA regulations governing the transport of radioactive material. However transport safety at the IAEA obviously predates this, since the regulations took time to develop. In 1957, GC. 1/1 already states: 'The Agency should undertake studies with a view to the establishment of regulations relating to the international transportation of radioactive materials. ...'. And goes further: 'The transport of radioisotopes and radiation sources has brought to light many problems and involves the need for uniform packaging and shipping regulations ... facilitate the acceptance of such materials by sea and air carriers'. This conference reiterates the challenge given then through the sub-title 'The next fifty years - Creating a Safe, Secure and Sustainable Framework'. Looking back, we can see that the sustainable framework was a goal in 1957, where radioactive material could be transported should it be desired. Since these early days we have added to safety the need to ensure security. However we still see the same calls today to eradicate denial of shipment, which might suggest we have not progressed. But the picture today is very different - we have today well established requirements for safe transport of radioactive material, and the recommendations for security in transport are coming of age for all radioactive materials. The outstanding issue would seem to be harmonisation, not just between safety and security in IAEA documents, but also harmonisation between Member States.

  4. JET-ISX-B beryllium limiter experiment safety analysis report and operational safety requirements

    Edmonds, P.H.

    1985-09-01

    An experiment to evaluate the suitability of beryllium as a limiter material has been completed on the ISX-B tokamak. The experiment consisted of two phases: (1) the initial operation and characterization in the ISX experiment, and a period of continued operation to the specified surface fluence (10 22 atoms/cm 2 ) of hydrogen ions; and (2) the disassembly, decontamination, or disposal of the ISX facility. During these two phases of the project, the possibility existed for beryllium and/or beryllium oxide powder to be produced inside the vacuum vessel. Beryllium dust is a highly toxic material, and extensive precautions are required to prevent the release of the beryllium into the experimental work area and to prevent the contamination of personnel working on the device. Details of the health hazards associated with beryllium and the appropriate precautions are presented. Also described in appendixes to this report are the various operational safety requirements for the project

  5. 75 FR 67450 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management Implementation Workshop

    2010-11-02

    ... regulations to address human factors and other aspects of control room management for certain pipelines where controllers use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Under the final rule, pipeline... Washington, DC on October 22, 2010. Jeffrey D. Wiese, Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. [FR Doc...

  6. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  7. [Evidence-based clinical oral healthcare guidelines 4. Adherence requires an implementation strategy].

    Braspenning, J C C; Mettes, T G P H; van der Sanden, W J M; Wensing, M J P

    2015-03-01

    Adherence to clinical guidelines requires support in practice. However, systematic implementation of evidence-based guidelines is not common practice in oral healthcare. The Knowledge Institute Oral Care (KiMo) offers the opportunity to take into account potential barriers and facilitators during the development of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. These factors which are relevant to the guideline and the oral healthcare practice provide the ingredients for a tailor-made programme of implementation that has a scientific basis. Elements of any implementation programme are the quality indicators derived from the oral healthcare guidelines. These indicators should fit, on the one hand, the specific goals of the guidelines (patient safety, effectiveness, efficiency, patient-centred, timeliness, accessibility) and, onthe other hand, the various perspectives of the different stakeholders, such as patients, caregivers, health insurers and inspectorate. These quality indicators provide information on adherence to the guidelines, the results of a certain treatment and the success of the implementation strategy, all with the aim to improve the quality of oral healthcare.

  8. PRA and the implementation of quantitative safety goals

    Okrent, D.

    1983-01-01

    With the adoption by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in January, 1983, of a Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, probabilitstic risk assessment (PRA) has taken on increased importance in nuclear reactor safety. Although the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, was a major pioneering effort that revolutionized thinking about reactor safety, PRA was used only on occasion by the NRC regulatory staff prior to the accident at Three Mile Island. Since then, PRA has been used more and more as an important factor in decision making, usually for specific issues. The nuclear industry has also employed PRA, sometimes to make its case on specific issues, sometimes to present a position on overall risk. The advent of the Zion and Indian Point PRAs, with their treatment of risks from fire, wind, and earthquakes, and their examination of the course of core melt accidents, has added a new dimension to the overall picture. Although the NRC has stated that during the next two year evolution period, its quantitative design objectives and PRA are not to enter directly into the licensing process, many important issues will be influenced significantly by the results of risk and reliability studies. In fact, PRA may be coming into a position of great importance before the methodology, data, and process are sufficiently mature for the task. Large gaps still exist in our understanding of phenomena and in input information; and much of the final result depends on subjective input; large differences of opinion can and should be expected to persist. Accepted standards for quality assurance, and adequacy and depth of independent, peer review remain to be formulated and achieved. This paper will summarize the recently adopted NRC safety policy and the two-year evaluation plan, and will provide, by example, some words of caution concerning a few of the difficulties which may arise. (orig.)

  9. Evaluation and review of the safety management system implementation in the Royal Thai Air Force

    Chaiwan, Sakkarin

    This study was designed to determine situation and effectiveness of the safety management system currently implemented in the Royal Thai Air Force. Reviewing the ICAO's SMS and the RTAF's SMS was conducted to identify similarities and differences between the two safety management systems. Later, the researcher acquired safety statistics from the RTAF Safety Center to investigate effectiveness of its safety system. The researcher also collected data to identify other factors affecting effectiveness of the safety system during conducting in-depth interviews. Findings and Conclusions: The study shows that the Royal Thai Air Force has never applied the International Civil Aviation Organization's Safety management System to its safety system. However, the RTAF's SMS and the ICAO's SMS have been developed based on the same concepts. These concepts are from Richard H. Woods's book, Aviation safety programs: A management handbook. However, the effectiveness of the Royal Thai Air Force's safety system is in good stance. An accident rate has been decreasing regularly but there are no known factors to describe the increasing rate, according to the participants' opinion. The participants have informed that there are many issues to be resolved to improve the RTAF's safety system. Those issues are cooperation among safety center's staffs, attitude toward safety of the RTAF senior commanders, and safety standards.

  10. ON THE IMPACT OF FLIGHT SAFETY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON THE AERODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

    Vladimir I. Shevyakov

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The article considers the issue of aerodynamics efficiency implementation taking into account certification requirements for flight safety. Aerodynamics efficiency means high aerodynamic performance (depending on the airplane size, aerodynamic performance in cruise flight, high aerodynamic performance at takeoff, as well as lift performance at landing.The author estimated the impact on aerodynamics efficiency of both the requirements for aerodynamics performance and requirements for aircraft systems, noncompliance with which may result in significant change of expected operating conditions. It was shown that the use of supercritical wing profiles may result in flight mode limitations due to failure of the required buffeting capacities. It does not allow engaging all the advantages of aerodynamics layout and requires special design solutions to prevent such cases.There were reviewed certification requirements for flight level pressure altitude accuracy and icing conditions warning sysytem. The research presented the methods of aerodynamic efficiency increase by meeting the requirements for reduced vertical separation minima flights and in icing conditions, including requirements for air data probes. Reduced vertical separation minima flight requirements are met by means of efficient air data probes location. Theoretical methods of flow calculation determine areas on the airplane skin surface where static probes minimize errors depending on angle-of-attack and sideslip. It was shown that if certification requirements are not met and in case of flight out of reduced vertical separation minima area, aerodynamics efficiency is significantly reduced and fuel consumption can be increased by 10% and higher. Suggested approaches implementation allows increasing commercial airplanes competitiveness.

  11. What are occupational safety and health management systems and why do companies implement them?

    Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M.

    2014-01-01

    In company practice and in governmental legislation, it is increasingly acknowledged that occupational safety and health (OSH) management should be performed systematically and continually. Implementing an OSH Management System (OSH MS) is the major strategy to achieve this.

  12. Data concentrator requirements for a safety parameter display system

    Brewer, C.R.

    1983-01-01

    To comply with NUREG 0696 several nuclear plants are being fitted with new facilities and data systems; specifically a Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operational Facility (EOF), and Backup Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) and Nuclear Data Link (NDL). The TSC, OSC, and EOF are physical locations while the SPDS, ERCS, and NDL are Systems. The SPDS and ERCS are usually separate and independent systems, however, they may share a common front end data acquisition system that acquires and sends SPDS related data to both the SPDS and to the ERCS. In the situation just described an SPDS system must depend upon input data from a source that is SPDS host computer independent. To achieve this independence the front end data acquisition system may employ a concept of intelligent distributed processing. This concept essentially takes functional capabilities that were once found only in realtime host computers and distributes it to front end data acquisition systems. Thus by expanding the functionality of the data acquisition system in a manner that provides more capability, independence from the computer vendor, links to multiple computer systems, processing power and redundancy, the concept of a data concentrator evolved. This paper will define this new distributed functionality, and its related requirements. It will also examine different system configuration approaches

  13. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda; Andrés Felipe Ausenón; Jairo Alberto Ayala; Diana Carolina Cabezas; Lina Gissella Calvache; Juan Pablo Caicedo; Jose Andres Calvache

    2014-01-01

    Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO) is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic ...

  14. Regulatory considerations for computational requirements for nuclear criticality safety

    Bidinger, G.H.

    1995-01-01

    As part of its safety mission, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves the use of computational methods as part of the demonstration of nuclear criticality safety. While each NRC office has different criteria for accepting computational methods for nuclear criticality safety results, the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) approves the use of specific computational methods and methodologies for nuclear criticality safety analyses by specific companies (licensees or consultants). By contrast, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation approves codes for general use. Historically, computational methods progressed from empirical methods to one-dimensional diffusion and discrete ordinates transport calculations and then to three-dimensional Monte Carlo transport calculations. With the advent of faster computational ability, three-dimensional diffusion and discrete ordinates transport calculations are gaining favor. With the proper user controls, NMSS has accepted any and all of these methods for demonstrations of nuclear criticality safety

  15. Requirement and prospect of nuclear data activities for nuclear safety

    Kimura, Itsuro

    2000-01-01

    Owing to continuous efforts by the members of JNDC (Japanese Nuclear Data Committee) and Nuclear Data Center in JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute), several superb evaluated nuclear data files, such as JENDL, FP (fission product) yields and decay heat, have been compiled in Japan and opened to the world. However, they are seldom adopted in safety design and safety evaluation of light water reactors and are hardly found in related safety regulatory guidelines and standards except the decay heat. In this report, shown are a few examples of presently used nuclear data in the safety design and the safety evaluation of PWRs (pressurized water reactors) and so forth. And then, several procedures are recommended in order to enhance more utilization of Japanese evaluated nuclear data files for nuclear safety. (author)

  16. TELEPERM XS Implementation and Upgrading of Safety I and C

    Niedzballa, G.

    2004-01-01

    In this paper information regarding the general characteristics to the architecture of the hardware and the engineering process as well as the development of the software is given. Based on the applications of the TELEPERM XS platforms, experience with these operating and safety I and C system in nuclear plants both in Europe and abroad is described. Application examples for 23 NPP units in 8 countries, where TELEPERM XS operates, and current and future projects are listed

  17. Conducting organizational safety reviews - requirements, methods and experience

    Reiman, T.; Oedewald, P.; Wahlstroem, B.; Rollenhagen, C.; Kahlbom, U.

    2008-03-01

    Organizational safety reviews are part of the safety management process of power plants. They are typically performed after major reorganizations, significant incidents or according to specified review programs. Organizational reviews can also be a part of a benchmarking between organizations that aims to improve work practices. Thus, they are important instruments in proactive safety management and safety culture. Most methods that have been used for organizational reviews are based more on practical considerations than a sound scientific theory of how various organizational or technical issues influence safety. Review practices and methods also vary considerably. The objective of this research is to promote understanding on approaches used in organizational safety reviews as well as to initiate discussion on criteria and methods of organizational assessment. The research identified a set of issues that need to be taken into account when planning and conducting organizational safety reviews. Examples of the issues are definition of appropriate criteria for evaluation, the expertise needed in the assessment and the organizational motivation for conducting the assessment. The study indicates that organizational safety assessments involve plenty of issues and situations where choices have to be made regarding what is considered valid information and a balance has to be struck between focus on various organizational phenomena. It is very important that these choices are based on a sound theoretical framework and that these choices can later be evaluated together with the assessment findings. The research concludes that at its best, the organizational safety reviews can be utilised as a source of information concerning the changing vulnerabilities and the actual safety performance of the organization. In order to do this, certain basic organizational phenomena and assessment issues have to be acknowledged and considered. The research concludes with recommendations on

  18. Conducting organizational safety reviews - requirements, methods and experience

    Reiman, T.; Oedewald, P.; Wahlstroem, B. [Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT (Finland); Rollenhagen, C. [Royal Institute of Technology, KTH, (Sweden); Kahlbom, U. [RiskPilot (Sweden)

    2008-03-15

    Organizational safety reviews are part of the safety management process of power plants. They are typically performed after major reorganizations, significant incidents or according to specified review programs. Organizational reviews can also be a part of a benchmarking between organizations that aims to improve work practices. Thus, they are important instruments in proactive safety management and safety culture. Most methods that have been used for organizational reviews are based more on practical considerations than a sound scientific theory of how various organizational or technical issues influence safety. Review practices and methods also vary considerably. The objective of this research is to promote understanding on approaches used in organizational safety reviews as well as to initiate discussion on criteria and methods of organizational assessment. The research identified a set of issues that need to be taken into account when planning and conducting organizational safety reviews. Examples of the issues are definition of appropriate criteria for evaluation, the expertise needed in the assessment and the organizational motivation for conducting the assessment. The study indicates that organizational safety assessments involve plenty of issues and situations where choices have to be made regarding what is considered valid information and a balance has to be struck between focus on various organizational phenomena. It is very important that these choices are based on a sound theoretical framework and that these choices can later be evaluated together with the assessment findings. The research concludes that at its best, the organizational safety reviews can be utilised as a source of information concerning the changing vulnerabilities and the actual safety performance of the organization. In order to do this, certain basic organizational phenomena and assessment issues have to be acknowledged and considered. The research concludes with recommendations on

  19. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-01-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was cla...

  20. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-10

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels.

  1. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels

  2. Implementation of the basic safety standards directive in the UK

    Bines, W.

    2003-01-01

    Implementation of the European Council BSS Directive 96/29/Euratom in the UK is not achieved through any one piece of legislation (though the majority of the provisions are implemented by the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999) but by a mosaic of provisions, supported by codes of practice, non-statutory guidance and administrative arrangements. The paper describes some of the features of UK occupational radiation protection and the reason for the apparent differences between the UK and other EU Member States in their approach to agreeing the precise provisions of European legislation. (author)

  3. Harnessing implementation science to improve care quality and patient safety: a systematic review of targeted literature.

    Braithwaite, Jeffrey; Marks, Danielle; Taylor, Natalie

    2014-06-01

    Getting greater levels of evidence into practice is a key problem for health systems, compounded by the volume of research produced. Implementation science aims to improve the adoption and spread of research evidence. A linked problem is how to enhance quality of care and patient safety based on evidence when care settings are complex adaptive systems. Our research question was: according to the implementation science literature, which common implementation factors are associated with improving the quality and safety of care for patients? We conducted a targeted search of key journals to examine implementation science in the quality and safety domain applying PRISMA procedures. Fifty-seven out of 466 references retrieved were considered relevant following the application of exclusion criteria. Included articles were subjected to content analysis. Three reviewers extracted and documented key characteristics of the papers. Grounded theory was used to distil key features of the literature to derive emergent success factors. Eight success factors of implementation emerged: preparing for change, capacity for implementation-people, capacity for implementation-setting, types of implementation, resources, leverage, desirable implementation enabling features, and sustainability. Obstacles in implementation are the mirror image of these: for example, when people fail to prepare, have insufficient capacity for implementation or when the setting is resistant to change, then care quality is at risk, and patient safety can be compromised. This review of key studies in the quality and safety literature discusses the current state-of-play of implementation science applied to these domains. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

  4. Implications of safety requirements for the treatment of THMC processes in geological disposal systems for radioactive waste

    Frédéric Bernier

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The mission of nuclear safety authorities in national radioactive waste disposal programmes is to ensure that people and the environment are protected against the hazards of ionising radiations emitted by the waste. It implies the establishment of safety requirements and the oversight of the activities of the waste management organisation in charge of implementing the programme. In Belgium, the safety requirements for geological disposal rest on the following principles: defence-in-depth, demonstrability and the radiation protection principles elaborated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP. Applying these principles requires notably an appropriate identification and characterisation of the processes upon which the safety functions fulfilled by the disposal system rely and of the processes that may affect the system performance. Therefore, research and development (R&D on safety-relevant thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC issues is important to build confidence in the safety assessment. This paper points out the key THMC processes that might influence radionuclide transport in a disposal system and its surrounding environment, considering the dynamic nature of these processes. Their nature and significance are expected to change according to prevailing internal and external conditions, which evolve from the repository construction phase to the whole heating–cooling cycle of decaying waste after closure. As these processes have a potential impact on safety, it is essential to identify and to understand them properly when developing a disposal concept to ensure compliance with relevant safety requirements. In particular, the investigation of THMC processes is needed to manage uncertainties. This includes the identification and characterisation of uncertainties as well as for the understanding of their safety-relevance. R&D may also be necessary to reduce uncertainties of which the magnitude does not allow

  5. Discussion on several important safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant

    Yan Tianwen; Li Jigen; Zhang Lin; Feng Youcai; Jia Xiang; Li Wenhong

    2013-01-01

    Post the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chinese government raised higher safety goals and safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The paper expounded the important indicators of safety requirements and the aspects of safety modification that had been developed for the new NPPs. It also discussed and analyzed the main fields required by the new NPPs safety requirements in the safety goals, safety evaluation of sites, defenses of internal and external events, severe accident prevention and mitigation, design of reactor core, containment system and I and C system, and optimization of engineering measure, which gave some references to the design, construction and safety modifications of new NPPs in China. (authors)

  6. [Implementation of "5S" methodology in laboratory safety and its effect on employee satisfaction].

    Dogan, Yavuz; Ozkutuk, Aydan; Dogan, Ozlem

    2014-04-01

    Health institutions use the accreditation process to achieve improvement across the organization and management of the health care system. An ISO 15189 quality and efficiency standard is the recommended standard for medical laboratories qualification. The "safety and accommodation conditions" of this standard covers the requirement to improve working conditions and maintain the necessary safety precautions. The most inevitable precaution for ensuring a safe environment is the creation of a clean and orderly environment to maintain a potentially safe surroundings. In this context, the 5S application which is a superior improvement tool that has been used by the industry, includes some advantages such as encouraging employees to participate in and to help increase the productivity. The main target of this study was to implement 5S methods in a clinical laboratory of a university hospital for evaluating its effect on employees' satisfaction, and correction of non-compliance in terms of the working environment. To start with, first, 5S education was given to management and employees. Secondly, a 5S team was formed and then the main steps of 5S (Seiri: Sort, Seiton: Set in order, Seiso: Shine, Seiketsu: Standardize, and Shitsuke: Systematize) were implemented for a duration of 3 months. A five-point likert scale questionnaire was used in order to determine and assess the impact of 5S on employees' satisfaction considering the areas such as facilitating the job, the job satisfaction, setting up a safe environment, and the effect of participation in management. Questionnaire form was given to 114 employees who actively worked during the 5S implementation period, and the data obtained from 63 (52.3%) participants (16 male, 47 female) were evaluated. The reliability of the questionnaire's Cronbach's alpha value was determined as 0.858 (p5S it was observed and determined that facilitating the job and setting up a safe environment created a statistically significant effect on

  7. Regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning

    Lipar, M.

    1997-01-01

    A review of regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning is given. It contains licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning; Status and methodology of Mochovce safety analysis report; Mochovce NPP safety enhancement program; Regulatory body policy towards Mochovce NPP safety enhancement; Recent development in Mochovce pre-operational safety enhancement program review and assessment process; Licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning

  8. Technical Support Section Instrument Support Program for nuclear and nonnuclear facilities with safety requirements

    Adkisson, B.P.; Allison, K.L.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes requirements, procedures, and supervisory responsibilities of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Instrumentation and Controls (I ampersand C) Division's Technical Support Section (TSS) for instrument surveillance and maintenance in nonreactor nuclear facilities having identified Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) or Limiting Conditions Document (LCDs). Implementation of requirements comply with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.5, 5480.22, and 5481.1B; Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), Policy Procedure ESS-FS-201; and ORNL SPP X-ESH-15. OSRs and LCDs constitute an agreement or contract between DOE and the facility operating management regarding the safe operation of the facility. One basic difference between OSRs and LCDs is that violation of an OSR is considered a Category II occurrence, whereas violation of an LCD requirement is considered a Category III occurrence (see Energy Systems Standard ESS-OP-301 and ORNL SPP X-GP-13). OSRs are required for high- and moderate-hazard nuclear facilities, whereas the less-rigorous LCDs are required for low-hazard nuclear facilities and selected open-quotes generally acceptedclose quotes operations. Hazard classifications are determined through a hazard screening process, which each division conducts for its facilities

  9. Legal requirements concerning the technical safety of nuclear installations

    Nolte, R.

    1984-01-01

    A short survey on nuclear risks and the nuclear safety conception is followed by the attempted clear definition of the semantic import of section 7, sub-section (2), No. 3 of the Atomic Energy Act. There are first beginnings of a concretization of the state-of-the-art in science and technology, i.e. all kinds of sub-legislative regulations such as the regulations of the Radiation Protection Ordinance which show scientific substance, guidelines issued by the Ministers, as well as codes for practice set up by various technical bodies and standardization associations, all of which are designed to compensate for this loop hole in the legislation. This study goes to examine to what extent administration and jurisdiction may take into account such codes of practice for the concretization of the legal requirements, and whether they are even binding on those executing the law. Only the respective regulations of the Radiation Protection Ordinance have a binding effect. All other guidelines and codes of practice are not legally binding per se, nor are they capable of being legally permitted by being referred to in terms of legal norms or by the self-commitment of those executing the law. Any attempt of using them, as the basis of a prime facie evidence or as an anticipating expertise, at least evidentarily for the concretization will have to fail owing to their evaluating character and to the fact that they may interfere in sociological conflict. An exception may be a case where a clear distinction can be made as to what extent the contents of such codes of practice is related to scientific and technological findings or to decisions based on evaluations. In such a case, a prima facil evicdence for the conformity of the regulation in question with the state-of-the-art in science and technology may be considered, which would easy the concretization of Art. 7 II Section 3 of the Atomic Law. (orig./HSCH) [de

  10. Food Safety and the Implementation of Quality System in Food

    Noveria Sjafrina; Alvi Yani

    2013-01-01

    One of the goals the development of the food sector in Indonesia is food secured the release of which is characterized by the type of food that are harmful to health. In some way of avoiding the kind of food that is harmful to health, strengthen institutional food sector, and increase the number of food industry comply with regulations. Implementation of Good Handling Pratice (GHP) and Good Manufacturing Pratice (GMP) and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) are a responsibility and...

  11. MRP (materiel requirements planning) II implementation: a case study.

    Sheldon, D

    1994-05-01

    Manufacturing resource planning (MRP II) is a powerful and effective business planning template on which to build a continuous improvement culture. MRP II, when successfully implemented, encourages a disciplined yet nonthreatening environment centered on measurement and accountability. From the education that accompanies an MRP II implementation, the employees can better understand the vision and mission of the organization. This common goal keeps everyone's energy directed toward the same final objective. The Raymond Corporation is a major materiels handling equipment manufacturer headquartered in Greene, New York, with class "A" MRP II manufacturing facilities in Greene and Brantford, Ontario and an aftermark distribution facility in East Syracuse, New York. Prior to the implementation of MRP II in its Greene plant (from 1988 through 1990) good intentions and hard work were proving to be less than necessary to compete in the global market. Certified class "A" in February 1990. The Raymond Corporation has built a world-class organization from these foundations.

  12. 77 FR 75439 - Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New...

    2012-12-20

    ...] Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New Drug Applications and Bioavailability/Bioequivalence Studies, and a Small Entity Compliance Guide; Availability... Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies'' and ``Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  13. 10 CFR 76.87 - Technical safety requirements.

    2010-01-01

    ...: (1) Effects of natural phenomena; (2) Building and process ventilation and offgas; (3) Criticality...; (8) Environmental protection; (9) Packaging and transporting nuclear materials; (10) Accident analysis; (11) Chemical safety; (12) Sharing of facilities, structures, systems and components; (13...

  14. 24 CFR 572.220 - Implementation grants-matching requirements.

    2010-04-01

    ... amount of the implementation grant shall be provided from non-Federal sources to carry out the... exempt from taxation by the United States, the contribution is the present discounted cash value of the... homebuyer, based on a discount rate equal to the interest rate on the borrowed funds; (B) If the loan is...

  15. Reactivity requirements and safety systems for heavy water reactors

    Kati, S.L.; Rustagi, R.S.

    1977-01-01

    The natural uranium fuelled pressurised heavy water reactors are currently being installed in India. In the design of nuclear reactors, adequate attention has to be given to the safety systems. In recent years, several design modifications having bearing on safety, in the reactor processes, protective and containment systems have been made. These have resulted either from new trends in safety and reliability standards or as a result of feed-back from operating reactors of this type. The significant areas of modifications that have been introduced in the design of Indian PHWR's are: sophisticated theoretical modelling of reactor accidents, reactivity control, two independent fast acting systems, full double containment and improved post-accident depressurisation and building clean-up. This paper brings out the evolution of design of safety systems for heavy water reactors. A short review of safety systems which have been used in different heavy water reactors, of varying sizes, has been made. In particular, the safety systems selected for the latest 235 MWe twin reactor unit station in Narora, in Northern India, have been discussed in detail. Research and Development efforts made in this connection are discussed. The experience of design and operation of the systems in Rajasthan and Kalpakkam reactors has also been outlined

  16. Workers' involvement--a missing component in the implementation of occupational safety and health management systems in enterprises.

    Podgórski, Daniel

    2005-01-01

    Effective implementation of occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation based on European Union directives requires promotion of OSH management systems (OSH MS). To this end, voluntary Polish standards (PN-N-18000) have been adopted, setting forth OSH MS specifications and guidelines. However, the number of enterprises implementing OSH MS has increased slowly, falling short of expectations, which call for a new national policy on OSH MS promotion. To develop a national policy in this area, a survey was conducted in 40 enterprises with OSH MS in place. The survey was aimed at identifying motivational factors underlying OSH MS implementation decisions. Specifically, workers' and their representatives' involvement in OSH MS implementation was investigated. The results showed that the level of workers' involvement was relatively low, which may result in a low effectiveness of those systems. The same result also applies to the involvement of workers' representatives and that of trade unions.

  17. HEU Transparency Implementation Program and its Radiation Safety Program

    Radev, R

    2002-01-01

    In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence that the nonproliferation goals

  18. Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-12-01

    This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included

  19. Safety evaluations required in the safety regulations for Monju and the validity confirmation of safety evaluation methods

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    The purposes of this study are to perform the safety evaluations of the fast breeder reactor 'Monju' and to confirm the validity of the safety evaluation methods. In JFY 2012, the following results were obtained. As for the development of safety evaluation methods needed in the safety examination achieved for the reactor establishment permission, development of the analysis codes, such as a core damage analysis code, were carried out according to the plan. As for the development of the safety evaluation method needed for the risk informed safety regulation, the quantification technique of the event tree using the Continuous Markov chain Monte Carlo method (CMMC method) were studied. (author)

  20. Small nuclear reactor safety design requirements for autonomous operation

    Kozier, K.S.; Kupca, S.

    1997-01-01

    Small nuclear power reactors offer compelling safety advantages in terms of the limited consequences that can arise from major accident events and the enhanced ability to use reliable, passive means to eliminate their occurrence by design. Accordingly, for some small reactor designs featuring a high degree of safety autonomy, it may be-possible to delineate a ''safety envelope'' for a given set of reactor circumstances within which safe reactor operation can be guaranteed without outside intervention for time periods of practical significance (i.e., days or weeks). The capability to operate a small reactor without the need for highly skilled technical staff permanently present, but with continuous remote monitoring, would aid the economic case for small reactors, simplify their use in remote regions and enhance safety by limiting the potential for accidents initiated by inappropriate operator action. This paper considers some of the technical design options and issues associated with the use of small power reactors in an autonomous mode for limited periods. The focus is on systems that are suitable for a variety of applications, producing steam for electricity generation, district heating, water desalination and/or marine propulsion. Near-term prospects at low power levels favour the use of pressurized, light-water-cooled reactor designs, among which those having an integral core arrangement appear to offer cost and passive-safety advantages. Small integral pressurized water reactors have been studied in many countries, including the test operation of prototype systems. (author)

  1. 75 FR 60129 - Draft Guidance for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for...

    2010-09-29

    ...., Bldg. 51, rm. 2201, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; or the Office of Communication, Outreach, and...'s ability to review critical safety information, improve safety monitoring of human drug and..., will represent the Agency's current thinking on safety reporting requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  2. 42 CFR 9.10 - Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements.

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and... SANCTUARY SYSTEM § 9.10 Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements. (a) How are employee Occupational Health and Safety Program risks and concerns addressed? The sanctuary shall...

  3. Evaluation of safety, an unavoidable requirement in the applications of ionizing radiations

    Jova Sed, Luis Andres

    2013-01-01

    The safety assessments should be conducted as a means to evaluate compliance with safety requirements (and thus the application of fundamental safety principles) for all facilities and activities in order to determine the measures to be taken to ensure safety. It is an essential tool in decision making. For long time we have linked the safety assessment to nuclear facilities and not to all practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in daily life. However, the main purpose of the safety assessment is to determine if it has reached an appropriate level of safety for an installation or activity and if it has fulfilled the objectives of safety and basic safety criteria set by the designer, operating organization and the regulatory body under the protection and safety requirements set out in the International Basic safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. This paper presents some criteria and personal experiences with the new international recommendations on this subject and its practical application in the region and demonstrates the importance of this requirement. Reflects the need to train personnel of the operator and the regulatory body in the proportional application of this requirement in practice with ionizing radiation

  4. 78 FR 48326 - Partial Disapproval of State Implementation Plan; Arizona; Regional Haze Requirements

    2013-08-08

    ... Disapproval of State Implementation Plan; Arizona; Regional Haze Requirements AGENCY: Environmental Protection... behalf of National Parks Conservation Association, Sierra Club, Physicians for Social Responsibility... Haze State Implementation Plan Revision submitted by the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality on...

  5. Implementation of reactor safety analysis code CATHARE and its use on FACOM M-380

    Ishiguro, Misako; Shinozawa, Naohisa; Tomiyama, Mineyoshi; Fujisaki, Masahide

    1986-05-01

    CATHARE is an advanced safety analysis code developed at the Nuclear Research Center of Grenoble in France. The code simulates thermohydraulic phenomena involved in loss of coolant accidents in pressurized water reactors. The code has been introduced into JAERI as a part of the technical exchange between the JAERI ROSA-IV Program and the French BETHSY-CATHARE Program. The code was delivered in the form of 23 files containing 115,000 statements in total. A large part of CATHARE code has been written in an extended Fortran language 'Esope' which is mainly used for managing dynamic memory allocation. The JAERI version is created from the IBM version which has been used on Amdhal computer at ISPRA. Some modifications are required in order to implement the CATHARE code at JAERI because of difference in softwares. In this report, the overview of the code structure, the JAERI usage, the implementation method, the error correction method, the problems special to install the code in JAERI, and the distribution of computing time are described. (author)

  6. Nursing implementation science: how evidence-based nursing requires evidence-based implementation.

    Achterberg, T. van; Schoonhoven, L.; Grol, R.P.T.M.

    2008-01-01

    PURPOSE: Evidence is not always used in practice, and many examples of problematic implementation of research into practice exist. The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction and overview of current developments in implementation science and to apply these to nursing. METHODS: We discuss a

  7. The specific tasks of RF TSO - FSUE VO 'Safety', related with Implementation of obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    Potapov, V.; Kuznetsov, M.; Kapralov, E.

    2010-01-01

    It was more than 20 years ago that IAEA discussed the issue pertaining to the need in scientific and engineering support to the regulatory body. The Convention on Nuclear Safety being the keystone in assurance of the global nuclear safety and security regime was adopted in 1994. It is pointed out that two independent organizations supervised by Rostechnadzor have been established within the Russian TSO system, FSUE VO 'Safety' being one of them. The tasks of the organization comprise obligatory certification of equipment as well as acceptance of equipment before its delivery to the NPP both in Russia and in the countries constructing the power units based on the Russian designs. The acceptance procedure has been set forth in the new Russian document at the level of the federal rules and regulations for nuclear safety assurance. As far as its implementation decision is concerned, a task for selection and training of personnel has been set and allocated on the Training and Methodological Center of Nuclear and Radiation Safety established with the support of FSUE VO 'Safety', which provides training programmes and specific lecture courses in the wide range of the relevant topics. (author)

  8. Implementing size-optimal discrete neural networks requires analog circuitry

    Beiu, V.

    1998-03-01

    Neural networks (NNs) have been experimentally shown to be quite effective in many applications. This success has led researchers to undertake a rigorous analysis of the mathematical properties that enable them to perform so well. It has generated two directions of research: (i) to find existence/constructive proofs for what is now known as the universal approximation problem; (ii) to find tight bounds on the size needed by the approximation problem (or some particular cases). The paper will focus on both aspects, for the particular case when the functions to be implemented are Boolean.

  9. Consensus standards utilized and implemented for nuclear criticality safety in Japan

    Nomura, Yasushi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1996-01-01

    The fundamental framework for the criticality safety of nuclear fuel facilities regulations is, in many advanced countries, generally formulated so that technical standards or handbook data are utilized to support the licensing safety review and to implement its guidelines. In Japan also, adequacy of the safety design of nuclear fuel facilities is checked and reviewed on the basis of licensing safety review guides. These guides are, first, open-quotes The Basic Guides for Licensing Safety Review of Nuclear Fuel Facilities,close quotes and as its subsidiaries, open-quotes The Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing Safety Review Guidesclose quotes and open-quotes The Reprocessing Facility Licensing Safety Review Guides.close quotes The open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook close-quote of Japan and the Technical Data Collection are published and utilized to supply related data and information for the licensing safety review, such as for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The well-established technical standards and data abroad such as those by the American Nuclear Society and the American National Standards Institute are also utilized to complement the standards in Japan. The basic principles of criticality safety control for nuclear fuel facilities in Japan are duly stipulated in the aforementioned basic guides as follows: 1. Guide 10: Criticality control for a single unit; 2. Guide 11: Criticality control for multiple units; 3. Guide 12: Consideration for a criticality accident

  10. SAFETY

    Niels Dupont

    2013-01-01

    CERN Safety rules and Radiation Protection at CMS The CERN Safety rules are defined by the Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit (HSE Unit), CERN’s institutional authority and central Safety organ attached to the Director General. In particular the Radiation Protection group (DGS-RP1) ensures that personnel on the CERN sites and the public are protected from potentially harmful effects of ionising radiation linked to CERN activities. The RP Group fulfils its mandate in collaboration with the CERN departments owning or operating sources of ionising radiation and having the responsibility for Radiation Safety of these sources. The specific responsibilities concerning "Radiation Safety" and "Radiation Protection" are delegated as follows: Radiation Safety is the responsibility of every CERN Department owning radiation sources or using radiation sources put at its disposition. These Departments are in charge of implementing the requi...

  11. New safety and security requirements for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Hungary

    Katona, T.; Horvath, K.; Safar, J.

    2016-01-01

    In addition to the promulgation of mode-specific regulations of international transport of dangerous goods, some Hungarian governmental and ministerial decrees impose further conditions upon the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. One of these ministerial decrees on the transport, carriage and packaging of radioactive materials is under revision and it will require • approval of emergency response plan (including security and safety contingency plan); • report on transport incidents and accidents for classifying them in accordance with the INES scale; • the competent authority to request experts’ support for the approval of package designs, radioactive material designs and shipments. Regarding the security of the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials a new Hungarian governmental decree and a related guidance are about to be published which will supply additional requirements in the field of the transport security especially concerning radioactive materials, implementing - among others - IAEA recommendations of the NSS No9 and No14. The main and relevant features of the Hungarian nuclear regulatory system and the details of both new decrees regarding the safety and security issues of transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials will be discussed. (author)

  12. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  13. Development of safety-related regulatory requirements for nuclear power in developing countries. Key issue paper no. 4

    Han, K.I.

    2000-01-01

    In implementing a national nuclear power program, balanced regulatory requirements are necessary to ensure nuclear safety and cost competitive nuclear power, and to help gain public acceptance. However, this is difficult due to the technology-intensive nature of the nuclear regulatory requirements, the need to reflect evolving technology and the need for cooperation among multidisciplinary technical groups. This paper suggests approaches to development of balanced nuclear regulatory requirements in developing countries related to nuclear power plant safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management along with key technical regulatory issues. It does not deal with economic or market regulation of electric utilities using nuclear power. It suggests that national regulatory requirements be developed using IAEA safety recommendations as guidelines and safety requirements of the supplier country as a main reference after careful planning, manpower buildup and thorough study of international and supplier country's regulations. Regulation making is not recommended before experienced manpower has been accumulated. With an option that the supplier country's regulations may be used in the interim, the lack of complete national regulatory requirements should not deter introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. (author)

  14. Exploring the Effects of Cultural Variables in the Implementation of Behavior-Based Safety in Two Organizations

    Bumstead, Alaina; Boyce, Thomas E.

    2005-01-01

    The present case study examines how culture can influence behavior-based safety in different organizational settings and how behavior-based safety can impact different organizational cultures. Behavior-based safety processes implemented in two culturally diverse work settings are described. Specifically, despite identical implementation plans,…

  15. Meeting the next generation PWR safety requirements: The EPR Reactor

    Salhi, Othman

    2008-01-01

    The development process pursued the harmonization of technical solutions and the integration of all the lessons learned from earlier nuclear plants built by both vendors. As far as safety more specifically is concerned, the basic choice for the EPR was to adopt an evolutionary approach based on experience feedback from the reactors built by Areva, which at the time already amounted to nearly 100. This philosophy makes today's Areva EPR the natural descendant of the most advanced French N4 and German Konvoi power reactors currently in operation. EPR design choices affecting safety were motivated by a continuous quest for higher levels of safety. A two-fold approach was followed: 1. improvement of the measures aimed at further reducing the already very low probability of core melt 2. incorporation of measures aimed at further limiting the consequences of a severe accident, in the knowledge that its probability of occurrence has been considerably reduced. Through its filiations with French N4 and German Konvoi power reactors, the EPR benefits from the uninterrupted, evolutionary innovation process that has supported the development of PWRs since their introduction into the market place. This is especially true for safety where the EPR brings a unique combination of both tried and tested and innovative features that further improve the prevention of severe accidents and their mitigation

  16. Environmental and Personal Safety: No Vision Required. Practice Report

    Bozeman, Laura A.

    2004-01-01

    Personal safety is an important issue for all people, regardless of their physical capabilities. For people with visual impairments (that is, those who are blind or have low vision), real concerns exist regarding their vulnerability to crime and their greater risk of attack. With a nationwide increase in crime in the United States, "Three out of…

  17. 76 FR 5494 - Pipeline Safety: Mechanical Fitting Failure Reporting Requirements

    2011-02-01

    ... style'' fittings ( provides no explanation or e.g. stab, nut follower, bolted). justification for the...-RELATED CONDITION REPORTS 0 1. The authority citation for part 191 continues to read as follows: Authority... OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE: MINIMUM FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS 0 3. The authority citation...

  18. 12 CFR Appendix A to Part 1720 - Policy Guidance; Minimum Safety and Soundness Requirements

    2010-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS Pt. 1720, App. A... effectively and to model the effect of differing interest rate scenarios on the Enterprise's financial... are implemented effectively, and that the Enterprise's organization structure and assignment of...

  19. Designing interactive ambient multimedia applications : requirements and implementation challenges

    Obrenovic, Z.; Nack, F.-M.; Hardman, H.L.

    2006-01-01

    Ambient intelligence opens new possibilities for interactive multimedia, leading towards applications where the selection, generation and playback of multimedia content can be directed and influenced by multiple users in an ambient sensor network. In this paper, we derive the basic requirements for

  20. A safeguards program for implementing Department of Energy requirements

    Erkkila, B.H.

    1989-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a new materials control and accountability (MC ampersand A) order 5633.3 in February of 1988. This order contains all of the requirements for an effective MC ampersand A (safeguards) program for facilities that control and account for nuclear materials in their operations. All contractors were expected to come into compliance with the order by April 30, 1989, or obtain approval for exceptions and/or extensions. The order also contains various performance requirements that are not in effect until the DOE issues the guidelines to the performance requirements. After evaluations were completed in February 1989, it was determined there were several deficiencies in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) safeguards program. Documentation of policy and procedures needed correction before LANL could be in compliance with the new MC ampersand A order. Differences between the old and new orders were addressed. After this determination, action teams were established to corrected LANL's safeguards program. Compliance with the DOE requirements was the goal of this activity. The accomplishments of the action teams are the subject of this paper

  1. An effective technique for the software requirements analysis of NPP safety-critical systems, based on software inspection, requirements traceability, and formal specification

    Koo, Seo Ryong; Seong, Poong Hyun; Yoo, Junbeom; Cha, Sung Deok; Yoo, Yeong Jae

    2005-01-01

    A thorough requirements analysis is indispensable for developing and implementing safety-critical software systems such as nuclear power plant (NPP) software systems because a single error in the requirements can generate serious software faults. However, it is very difficult to completely analyze system requirements. In this paper, an effective technique for the software requirements analysis is suggested. For requirements verification and validation (V and V) tasks, our technique uses software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification with structural decomposition. Software inspection and requirements traceability analysis are widely considered the most effective software V and V methods. Although formal methods are also considered an effective V and V activity, they are difficult to use properly in the nuclear fields as well as in other fields because of their mathematical nature. In this work, we propose an integrated environment (IE) approach for requirements, which is an integrated approach that enables easy inspection by combining requirement traceability and effective use of a formal method. The paper also introduces computer-aided tools for supporting IE approach for requirements. Called the nuclear software inspection support and requirements traceability (NuSISRT), the tool incorporates software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification capabilities. We designed the NuSISRT to partially automate software inspection and analysis of requirement traceability. In addition, for the formal specification and analysis, we used the formal requirements specification and analysis tool for nuclear engineering (NuSRS)

  2. Recommendations to Improve the Implementation Compliance of Surgical Safety Checklist in Surgery Rooms

    Juliana Sandrawati

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Surgical Safety Checklist has been adopted in surgery room as a tool to improve safe surgery. Its implementation during 2012 was low (33.9% so was the completeness of filling it (57.3%. Objective: To increase the implementation of Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC through analyzing the effect of policy, procedures, patient safety culture, and individual factors on compliance SSC implementation in the surgery room. Methods: Cross-sectional study with descriptive observational approach was done to find influencing factors of health care personnels’ compliance to fill SSC. Sample consisted of all surgery room nurses (45 nurses, 10 surgeons and 4 anesthesists. Data collection was made use of questionnaires, surgical medical records and SSC form. Results:The compliance to fill SSC in April 2013 was still low (55.9%. Written policy on patient safety was absent and awareness of respondents about the procedure was low. Respondents’ assessment showed that patient safety culture in surgery room was good, except management and stress recognition dimensions. Likewise, the respondents’ knowledge about SSC was low (61.0%. Conclusion: The study conclude that influencing factors of compliance implementation SSC is absence of the written policy in patient safety, lack of socialization of Standar Prosedur Operasional to health care personnels, lack of knowledge about SSC, lack awareness about the importance of SSC, shortage of surgery room nurses, and innappropriate perception about filling SSC as workload. Recomendation:The study will be making of written policy in patient safety and SSC, followed by socialization to health care personnels, training about SSC implementation, empowering and advocating surgery room nurses and use of reminders.

  3. Design a Smart Control Strategy to Implement an Intelligent Energy Safety and Management System

    Jing-Min Wang; Ming-Ta Yang

    2014-01-01

    The energy saving and electricity safety are today a cause for increasing concern for homes and buildings. Integrating the radio frequency identification (RFID) and ZigBee wireless sensor network (WSN) mature technologies, the paper designs a smart control strategy to implement an intelligent energy safety and management system (IESMS) which performs energy measuring, controlling, monitoring, and saving of the power outlet system. The presented RFID and billing module is used to identify user...

  4. 45 CFR 98.41 - Health and safety requirements.

    2010-10-01

    ... establishment of any new or additional requirements if existing requirements comply with the requirements of the... as grandparents, great grandparents, siblings (if living in a separate residence), aunts, and uncles... care providers” does not include grandparents, great grandparents, siblings (if such providers live in...

  5. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic literature search in PubMed/MEDLINE. Articles that describe or present as primary or secondary endpoints barriers or limitations during the implementation of the checklist WHO were selected. Observational or experimental articles were included from the date of the official launch of the WHO list. To describe the data a summary table was designed. Detailed results were organized qualitatively extracting the most prevalent limitations. Results: 17 studies were included in the final review process. The main findings were: 1 a large number of constraints reported in the literature that hinder the implementation process, 2 limitations were grouped into 9 categories according to their similarities and 3 the most frequently reported category was “knowledge”. Discussion: There are several factors that limit the proper implementation of the surgical safety checklist WHO. Among these, cultural factors, knowledge, indifference and / or relevance, communication, filling completeness, among others. Effective implementation strategies would reach its successful implementation.

  6. A Step Toward High Reliability: Implementation of a Daily Safety Brief in a Children's Hospital.

    Saysana, Michele; McCaskey, Marjorie; Cox, Elaine; Thompson, Rachel; Tuttle, Lora K; Haut, Paul R

    2017-09-01

    Health care is a high-risk industry. To improve communication about daily events and begin the journey toward a high reliability organization, the Riley Hospital for Children at Indiana University Health implemented a daily safety brief. Various departments in our children's hospital were asked to participate in a daily safety brief, reporting daily events and unexpected outcomes within their scope of responsibility. Participants were surveyed before and after implementation of the safety brief about communication and awareness of events in the hospital. The length of the brief and percentage of departments reporting unexpected outcomes were measured. The analysis of the presurvey and the postsurvey showed a statistically significant improvement in the questions related to the awareness of daily events as well as communication and relationships between departments. The monthly mean length of time for the brief was 15 minutes or less. Unexpected outcomes were reported by 50% of the departments for 8 months. A daily safety brief can be successfully implemented in a children's hospital. Communication between departments and awareness of daily events were improved. Implementation of a daily safety brief is a step toward becoming a high reliability organization.

  7. Implementation of safety parameter display system on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors

    Dounaev, V.G.; Neboyan, V.T.

    1996-01-01

    This report gives a short overview of the status of safety parameter display systems (SPDS) implementation on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors and also discusses the SPDS, which is being developed for Kalinin NPP. The assessment of the safety status of the plant is done by the continuous monitoring of six critical safety functions and the corresponding status trees. Besides, a number of additional functions are realized within the scope of KlnNPP, aimed at providing the operator and the safety engineer in the main control room with more detailed information in accidental situation as well as during the normal operation. In particular, these functions are: archiving, data logs and alarm handling, safety actions monitoring, mnemonic diagrams indicating the state of main technological equipment and basic plant parameters, reference data, etc. Also, the operator support function ''computerized procedures'' is included in the scope of SPDS. The basic SPDS implementation platform is ADACS of SEMA GROUP design. The system architecture includes two workstations in the main control room: one is for reactor operator and the other one for safety engineer. Every station has two CRT screens which ensures computerized procedures implementation and provides for extra services for the operator. Also, the information from the SPDS is transmitted to the local crisis centre and to the crisis centre of the State utility organization concern ''Rosenergoatom''. (author). 3 refs

  8. Safety and licensing requirements in the Republic of South Africa

    Simpson, D.M.; Langford, E.L.

    1986-01-01

    The principles for licensing of nuclear installations in South Africa are based on the control of mortality risk to the operators of an installation and the population resident in the vicinity of the site. This paper describes the development of this safety philosophy, and the nuclear licensing process used in this country. The structure of the nuclear regulatory function is briefly described, including the respective roles of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Licencing Branch and the Council for Nuclear Safety. The development of risk criteria and quantitative release magnitude-probability criteria for radioactive material is outlined. Tasks that have to be undertaken by a potential waste disposal site licensee before a site licence is issued are described. Once the facility is commissioned periodic monitoring procedures will have to be adopted throughout the lifetime of the facility. The scope of typical monitoring activities is outlined and the ongoing analyses to be performed and the records to be kept are discussed

  9. Experiences with the implementation of measures and tools for road safety improvement

    Mikusova, M.

    2016-07-01

    The paper presents an overview on the road safety measures implemented in the framework of the “SOL – Save our lives” project. It contains summarization of general knowledge regarding the efficiency of the measures applied and conclusions from the analyses of developed strategies and action plans, including common issues, strengths and weaknesses of developed tools and puts these in the context of wider European Road Safety strategies. The purpose of the paper is to provide recommendations for an effective professional development of road safety programs at community level in the context of sustainable mobility. (Author)

  10. Diversity requirements for safety critical software-based automation systems

    Korhonen, J.; Pulkkinen, U.; Haapanen, P.

    1998-03-01

    System vendors nowadays propose software-based systems even for the most critical safety functions in nuclear power plants. Due to the nature and mechanisms of influence of software faults new methods are needed for the safety and reliability evaluation of these systems. In the research project 'Programmable automation systems in nuclear power plants (OHA)' various safety assessment methods and tools for software based systems are developed and evaluated. This report first discusses the (common cause) failure mechanisms in software-based systems, then defines fault-tolerant system architectures to avoid common cause failures, then studies the various alternatives to apply diversity and their influence on system reliability. Finally, a method for the assessment of diversity is described. Other recently published reports in OHA-report series handles the statistical reliability assessment of software based (STUK-YTO-TR 119), usage models in reliability assessment of software-based systems (STUK-YTO-TR 128) and handling of programmable automation in plant PSA-studies (STUK-YTO-TR 129)

  11. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  12. [Design, implementation and evaluation of a management model of patient safety in hospitals in Catalonia, Spain].

    Saura, Rosa Maria; Moreno, Pilar; Vallejo, Paula; Oliva, Glòria; Alava, Fernando; Esquerra, Miquel; Davins, Josep; Vallès, Roser; Bañeres, Joaquim

    2014-07-01

    Since its inception in 2006, the Alliance for Patient Safety in Catalonia has played a major role in promoting and shaping a series of projects related to the strategy of the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, for improving patient safety. One such project was the creation of functional units or committees of safety in hospitals in order to facilitate the management of patient safety. The strategy has been implemented in hospitals in Catalonia which were selected based on criteria of representativeness. The intervention was based on two lines of action, one to develop the model framework and the other for its development. Firstly the strategy for safety management based on EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) was defined with the development of standards, targets and indicators to implement security while the second part involved the introduction of tools, methodologies and knowledge to the management support of patient safety and risk prevention. The project was developed in four hospital areas considered higher risk, each assuming six goals for safety management. Some of these targets such as the security control panel or system of adverse event reporting were shared. 23 hospitals joined the project in Catalonia. Despite the different situations in each centre, high compliance was achieved in the development of the objectives. In each of the participating areas the security control panel was developed. Stable structures for safety management were established or strengthened. Training in patient safety played and important role, 1415 professionals participated. Through these kind of projects not only have been introduced programs of proven effectiveness in reducing risks, but they also provide to the facilities a work system that allows autonomy in diagnosis and analysis of the different risk situations or centre specific safety issues. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Espana.

  13. 75 FR 82277 - Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient...

    2010-12-30

    ...-AA06 Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient... Register (FR Doc 2010-29596 (75 FR 74864)) entitled ``Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss... request for comments entitled ``Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR...

  14. Patient safety climate strength: a concept that requires more attention

    Ginsburg, Liane; Gilin Oore, Debra

    2016-01-01

    Background When patient safety climate (PSC) surveys are used in healthcare, reporting typically focuses on PSC level (mean or per cent positive scores). This paper explores how an additional focus on PSC strength can enhance the utility of PSC survey data. Setting and participants 442 care providers from 24 emergency departments (EDs) across Canada. Methods We use anonymised data from the Can-PSCS PSC instrument collected in 2011 as part of the Qmentum accreditation programme. We examine differences in climate strength across EDs using the Rwg(j) and intraclass correlation coefficients measures of inter-rater agreement. Results Across the six survey dimensions, median Rwg(j) was sufficiently high to support shared climate perceptions (0.64–0.83), but varied widely across the 24 ED units. We provide an illustrative example showing vastly different climate strength (Rwg(j) range=0.17–0.86) for units with an equivalent level of PSC (eg, climate mean score=3). Conclusions Most PSC survey results focus solely on climate level. To facilitate improvement in PSC, we advocate a simple, holistic safety climate profile including three metrics: climate level (using mean or per cent positive climate scores), climate strength (using the Rwg(j), or SD as a proxy) and the shape of the distribution (using histograms to see the distribution of scores within units). In PSC research, we advocate paying attention to climate strength as an important variable in its own right. Focusing on PSC level and strength can further understanding of the extent to which PSC is a key variable in the domain of patient safety. PMID:26453636

  15. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-01

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S ampersand H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules

  16. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk (requirements of safety and reliability)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    Starting out from the given safety objectives as they have evolved during the past few years and from the present legal and regulatory provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the hazards involved in regular operation, accidents and emergency situations are discussed. In compliance with the positive safety balance of nuclear power plants in the FRG, special attention is focused on the preventive safety analysis within the frame of the nuclear licensing procedure. Reference is made to the beginnings of a comprehensive hazard concept for an unbiased plant assessment. Emergency situations are discussed from the point of view of general hazard comparisons. (orig.) [de

  17. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-14

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

  18. Spacelab user implementation assessment study. (Software requirements analysis). Volume 2: Technical report

    1976-01-01

    The engineering analyses and evaluation studies conducted for the Software Requirements Analysis are discussed. Included are the development of the study data base, synthesis of implementation approaches for software required by both mandatory onboard computer services and command/control functions, and identification and implementation of software for ground processing activities.

  19. Radiation safety requirements for radioactive waste management in the framework of a quality management system

    Salgado, M.M.; Benitez, J.C.; Pernas, R.; Gonzalez, N.

    2007-01-01

    The Center for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR) is the institution responsible for the management of radioactive wastes generated from nuclear applications in medicine, industry and research in Cuba. Radioactive Waste Management Service is provided at a national level and it includes the collection and transportation of radioactive wastes to the Centralized Waste Management Facilities, where they are characterized, segregated, treated, conditioned and stored. A Quality Management System, according to the ISO 9001 Standard has been implemented for the RWM Service at CPHR. The Management System includes the radiation safety requirements established for RWM in national regulations and in the Licence's conditions. The role of the Regulatory Body and the Radiation Protection Officer in the Quality Management System, the authorization of practices, training and personal qualification, record keeping, inspections of the Regulatory Body and internal inspection of the Radiation Protection Officer, among other aspects, are described in this paper. The Quality Management System has shown to be an efficient tool to demonstrate that adequate measures are in place to ensure the safety in radioactive waste management activities and their continual improvement. (authors)

  20. 76 FR 22944 - Pipeline Safety: Notice of Public Webinars on Implementation of Distribution Integrity Management...

    2011-04-25

    ... oversight program and operating conditions as well as the evolutionary process that distribution system... 20590. Hand Delivery: Docket Management System, Room W12-140, on the ground floor of the West Building... PHMSA-2011-0084] Pipeline Safety: Notice of Public Webinars on Implementation of Distribution Integrity...

  1. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS

  2. The End-To-End Safety Verification Process Implemented to Ensure Safe Operations of the Columbus Research Module

    Arndt, J.; Kreimer, J.

    2010-09-01

    The European Space Laboratory COLUMBUS was launched in February 2008 with NASA Space Shuttle Atlantis. Since successful docking and activation this manned laboratory forms part of the International Space Station(ISS). Depending on the objectives of the Mission Increments the on-orbit configuration of the COLUMBUS Module varies with each increment. This paper describes the end-to-end verification which has been implemented to ensure safe operations under the condition of a changing on-orbit configuration. That verification process has to cover not only the configuration changes as foreseen by the Mission Increment planning but also those configuration changes on short notice which become necessary due to near real-time requests initiated by crew or Flight Control, and changes - most challenging since unpredictable - due to on-orbit anomalies. Subject of the safety verification is on one hand the on orbit configuration itself including the hardware and software products, on the other hand the related Ground facilities needed for commanding of and communication to the on-orbit System. But also the operational products, e.g. the procedures prepared for crew and ground control in accordance to increment planning, are subject of the overall safety verification. In order to analyse the on-orbit configuration for potential hazards and to verify the implementation of the related Safety required hazard controls, a hierarchical approach is applied. The key element of the analytical safety integration of the whole COLUMBUS Payload Complement including hardware owned by International Partners is the Integrated Experiment Hazard Assessment(IEHA). The IEHA especially identifies those hazardous scenarios which could potentially arise through physical and operational interaction of experiments. A major challenge is the implementation of a Safety process which owns quite some rigidity in order to provide reliable verification of on-board Safety and which likewise provides enough

  3. Implementing an interprofessional patient safety learning initiative: insights from participants, project leads and steering committee members.

    Jeffs, Lianne; Abramovich, Ilona Alex; Hayes, Chris; Smith, Orla; Tregunno, Deborah; Chan, Wai-Hin; Reeves, Scott

    2013-11-01

    Effective teamwork and interprofessional collaboration are vital for healthcare quality and safety; however, challenges persist in creating interprofessional teamwork and resilient professional teams. A study was undertaken to delineate perceptions of individuals involved with the implementation of an interprofessional patient safety competency-based intervention and intervention participants. The study employed a qualitative study design that triangulated data from interviews with six steering committee members and five members of the project team who developed and monitored the intervention and six focus groups with clinical team members who participated in the intervention and implemented local patient safety projects within a large teaching hospital in Canada. Our study findings reveal that healthcare professionals and support staff acquired patient safety competencies in an interprofessional context that can result in improved patient and work flow processes. However, key challenges exist including managing projects amidst competing priorities, lacking physician engagement and sustaining projects. Our findings point to leaders to provide opportunities for healthcare teams to engage in interprofessional teamwork and patient safety projects to improve quality of patient care. Further research efforts should examine the sustainability of interprofessional safety projects and how leaders can more fully engage the participation of all professions, specifically physicians.

  4. Does unbelted safety requirement affect protection for belted occupants?

    Hu, Jingwen; Klinich, Kathleen D; Manary, Miriam A; Flannagan, Carol A C; Narayanaswamy, Prabha; Reed, Matthew P; Andreen, Margaret; Neal, Mark; Lin, Chin-Hsu

    2017-05-29

    Federal regulations in the United States require vehicles to meet occupant performance requirements with unbelted test dummies. Removing the test requirements with unbelted occupants might encourage the deployment of seat belt interlocks and allow restraint optimization to focus on belted occupants. The objective of this study is to compare the performance of restraint systems optimized for belted-only occupants with those optimized for both belted and unbelted occupants using computer simulations and field crash data analyses. In this study, 2 validated finite element (FE) vehicle/occupant models (a midsize sedan and a midsize SUV) were selected. Restraint design optimizations under standardized crash conditions (U.S.-NCAP and FMVSS 208) with and without unbelted requirements were conducted using Hybrid III (HIII) small female and midsize male anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) in both vehicles on both driver and right front passenger positions. A total of 10 to 12 design parameters were varied in each optimization using a combination of response surface method (RSM) and genetic algorithm. To evaluate the field performance of restraints optimized with and without unbelted requirements, 55 frontal crash conditions covering a greater variety of crash types than those in the standardized crashes were selected. A total of 1,760 FE simulations were conducted for the field performance evaluation. Frontal crashes in the NASS-CDS database from 2002 to 2012 were used to develop injury risk curves and to provide the baseline performance of current restraint system and estimate the injury risk change by removing the unbelted requirement. Unbelted requirements do not affect the optimal seat belt and airbag design parameters in 3 out of 4 vehicle/occupant position conditions, except for the SUV passenger side. Overall, compared to the optimal designs with unbelted requirements, optimal designs without unbelted requirements generated the same or lower total injury risks for

  5. Correct safety requirements during the life cycle of heating plants; Korrekta saekerhetskrav under vaermeanlaeggningars livscykel

    Tegehall, Jan; Hedberg, Johan [Swedish National Testing and Research Inst., Boraas (Sweden)

    2006-10-15

    The safety of old steam boilers or hot water generators is in principle based on electromechanical components which are generally easy to understand. The use of safety-PLC is a new and flexible way to design a safe system. A programmable system offers more degrees of freedom and consequently new problems may arise. As a result, new standards which use the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) concept for the level of safety have been elaborated. The goal is to define a way of working to handle requirements on safety in control systems of heat and power plants. SIL-requirements are relatively new within the domain and there is a need for guidance to be able to follow the requirements. The target of this report is the people who work with safety questions during new construction, reconstruction, or modification of furnace plants. In the work, the Pressure Equipment Directive, 97/23/EC, as well as standards which use the SIL concept have been studied. Additionally, standards for water-tube boilers have been studied. The focus has been on the safety systems (safety functions) which are used in water-tube boilers for heat and power plants; other systems, which are parts of these boilers, have not been considered. Guidance has been given for the aforementioned standards as well as safety requirements specification and risk analysis. An old hot water generator and a relatively new steam boiler have been used as case studies. The design principles and safety functions of the furnaces have been described. During the risk analysis important hazards were identified. A method for performing a risk analysis has been described and the appropriate content of a safety requirements specification has been defined. If a heat or power plant is constructed, modified, or reconstructed, a safety life cycle shall be followed. The purpose of the safety life cycle is to plan, describe, document, perform, check, test, and validate that everything is correctly done. The components of the safety

  6. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  7. Use of FPGA and CPLD in nuclear reactor safety systems and its regulatory review requirements for reactor safety

    Roy, Suvadip; Biswas, Animesh; Pradhan, S.K.

    2015-01-01

    Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLD) is being used widely in safety critical and safety related systems in nuclear power plans like in trip logic units, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation decision logic and neutronic signal processing for their reprogrammability feature and compact design. These HDL Programmable devices (HPD) are complex devices consisting of both hardware and software which is used to implement the logic on the FPGA. It is observed that these Programmable devices suffer from various modes of failure and the major failures in these devices are due to Single Event Upset (SEU), where a highly energetic ionizing radiation may lead to device failure which can even occur in radiologically benign environment. Other failures can occur during steps of developing the hardware using software tools like during Synthesis and placement and routing of the desired hardware. Here a study on use of such devices in Nuclear Reactors, study on mode of failures of these devices, way to tackle such failure and development of review guidelines for review of such devices used in safety critical and safety related systems with special emphasis on choice of software tools, way to mitigate effects of SEU and simulation and hardware testing results to be reviewed by regulatory body during design safety review is done. (author)

  8. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Isabel M. Herrera-Sánchez

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (unsuccessful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade.

  9. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Herrera-Sánchez, Isabel M.; León-Pérez, José M.; León-Rubio, José M.

    2017-01-01

    There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (un)successful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade. PMID:29375413

  10. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Yun, Y. C. [LG-EDS Systems, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage.

  11. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Yun, Y. C.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S.

    2000-01-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage

  12. PCA safety data review after clinical decision support and smart pump technology implementation.

    Prewitt, Judy; Schneider, Susan; Horvath, Monica; Hammond, Julia; Jackson, Jason; Ginsberg, Brian

    2013-06-01

    Medication errors account for 20% of medical errors in the United States with the largest risk at prescribing and administration. Analgesics or opioids are frequently used medications that can be associated with patient harm when prescribed or administered improperly. In an effort to decrease medication errors, Duke University Hospital implemented clinical decision support via computer provider order entry (CPOE) and "smart pump" technology, 2/2008, with the goal to decrease patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) adverse events. This project evaluated PCA safety events, reviewing voluntary report system and adverse drug events via surveillance (ADE-S), on intermediate and step-down units preimplementation and postimplementation of clinical decision support via CPOE and PCA smart pumps for the prescribing and administration of opioids therapy in the adult patient requiring analgesia for acute pain. Voluntary report system and ADE-S PCA events decreased based upon 1000 PCA days; ADE-S PCA events per 1000 PCA days decreased 22%, from 5.3 (pre) to 4.2 (post) (P = 0.09). Voluntary report system events decreased 72%, from 2.4/1000 PCA days (pre) to 0.66/1000 PCA days (post) and was statistically significant (P PCA events between time periods in both the ADE-S and voluntary report system data, thus supporting the recommendation of clinical decision support via CPOE and PCA smart pump technology.

  13. The Attitude of Construction Workers toward the Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS)

    Widaningsih, L.; Susanti, I.; Chandra, T.

    2018-02-01

    Construction industry refers to one of the industries dealing with high accident rate. Besides its outdoor workplace involving many workers who usually work manually, the workers’ work culture and less awareness of occupational health and safety (OHS) are attributed to the high accident rate. This study explores some construction workers who are involved in some construction projects in big cities such as Bandung and Jakarta. The questionnaire-given to the construction workers focusing on stone construction, wood construction, and finishing session-reveals that the construction workers knowledge and understanding of nine Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) aspects reach above 50%. However, does not appear to reflect their knowledge and understanding of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). The results of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and an in-depth interview show that the fallacious implementation of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) is attributed to their traditional “work culture”.

  14. Requirements to amend the main influence factors on the safety culture after fukushima accident

    Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2015-01-01

    The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

  15. Implementing the 2009 Institute of Medicine recommendations on resident physician work hours, supervision, and safety.

    Blum, Alexander B; Shea, Sandra; Czeisler, Charles A; Landrigan, Christopher P; Leape, Lucian

    2011-01-01

    Institute of Medicine report has been largely confined to the medical education community, led by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME). To begin gathering these perspectives and developing a plan to implement safer work hours for resident physicians, a conference entitled "Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety: What will it take to implement the Institute of Medicine recommendations?" was held at Harvard Medical School on June 17-18, 2010. This White Paper is a product of a diverse group of 26 representative stakeholders bringing relevant new information and innovative practices to bear on a critical patient safety problem. Given that our conference included experts from across disciplines with diverse perspectives and interests, not every recommendation was endorsed by each invited conference participant. However, every recommendation made here was endorsed by the majority of the group, and many were endorsed unanimously. Conference members participated in the process, reviewed the final product, and provided input before publication. Participants provided their individual perspectives, which do not necessarily represent the formal views of any organization. In September 2010 the ACGME issued new rules to go into effect on July 1, 2011. Unfortunately, they stop considerably short of the Institute of Medicine's recommendations and those endorsed by this conference. In particular, the ACGME only applied the limitation of 16 hours to first-year resident physicans. Thus, it is clear that policymakers, hospital administrators, and residency program directors who wish to implement safer health care systems must go far beyond what the ACGME will require. We hope this White Paper will serve as a guide and provide encouragement for that effort. RESIDENT PHYSICIAN WORKLOAD AND SUPERVISION: By the end of training, a resident physician should be able to practice independently. Yet much of resident physicians' time is dominated by tasks with little

  16. Safety requirements expected to the prototype fast breeder reactor 'Monju'

    2014-11-01

    In July 2013, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has enforced new regulatory requirements in consideration of severe accidents for the commercial light water reactors (LWR) and also prototype power generation reactors such as the sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) of 'Monju' based on TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (hereinafter referred to as '1F accident') occurred in March 2011. Although the regulatory requirements for SFR will be revised by NRA with consideration for public comments, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) set up 'Advisory Committee on Monju Safety Requirements' consisting of fast breeder reactor (FBR) and safety assessment experts in order to establish original safety requirements expected to the prototype FBR 'Monju' considering severe accidents with knowledge from JAEA as well as scientific and technical insights from the experts. This report summarizes the safety requirements expected to Monju discussed by the committee. (author)

  17. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 3. Shifting to a Coaching Culture Through a 360-Degree Assessment Process

    Snow, Bruce A.; Maciuska, Frank

    2001-01-01

    Error-free operation is the ultimate objective of any safety culture. Ginna Training and Operations has embarked on an approach directed at further developing coaching skills, attitudes, and values. To accomplish this, a 360-deg assessment process designed to enhance coaching skills, attitudes, and values has been implemented. The process includes measuring participants based on a set of values and an individual self-development plan based on the feedback from the 360-deg assessment. The skills and experience of the people who make up that culture are irreplaceable. As nuclear organizations mature and generations retire, knowledge and skills must be transferred to the incoming generations without a loss in performance. The application of a 360- deg assessment process can shift the culture to include coaching in a strong command and control environment. It is a process of change management strengthened by experience while meeting the challenge to improve human performance by changing workplace attitudes. At Ginna, training programs and new processes were initiated to pursue the ultimate objective: error-free operation. The overall objective of the programs is to create a common knowledge base and the skill required to consistently incorporate ownership of 'coach and collaborate' responsibility into a strong existing 'command and control' culture. This involves the role of coach; the role of communications; and concept integration, which includes communications, coaching, and team dimensional training (TDT). The overall objective of the processes, TDT and shifting to a coaching culture through the application of a 360-deg assessment process, is to provide guidance for applying the skills learned in the programs. As depicted in Fig. 1, the TDT (a process that identifies 'strengths and challenges') can be greatly improved by applying good communications and coaching practices. As the training programs were implemented, the participants were observed and coached in

  18. [Implementation of a safety and health planning system in a teaching hospital].

    Mariani, F; Bravi, C; Dolcetti, L; Moretto, A; Palermo, A; Ronchin, M; Tonelli, F; Carrer, P

    2007-01-01

    University Hospital "L. Sacco" had started in 2006 a two-year project in order to set up a "Health and Safety Management System (HSMS)" referring to the technical guideline OHSAS 18001:1999 and the UNI and INAIL "Guidelines for a health and safety management system at workplace". So far, the following operations had been implemented: Setting up of a specific Commission within the Risk Management Committee; Identification and appointment of Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Carrying out of a training course addressed to Workers Representatives for Safety and Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Development of an Integrated Informative System for Prevention and Safety; Auditors qualification; Inspection of the Occupational Health Unit and the Prevention and Safety Service: reporting of critical situations and monitoring solutions adopted. Short term objectives are: Self-evaluation through check-lists of each department; Sharing of the Improvement Plan among the departments of the hospital; Planning of Health and Safety training activities in the framework of the Hospital Training Plan; Safety audit.

  19. Development and implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program

    Frush, Karen S.; Alton, Michael; Frush, Donald P.

    2006-01-01

    Evidence from numerous studies indicates that large numbers of patients are harmed by medical errors while receiving health-care services in the United States today. The 1999 Institute of Medicine report on medical errors recommended that hospitals and health-care agencies ''establish safety programs to act as a catalyst for the development of a culture of safety'' [1]. In this article, we describe one approach to successful implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program. Although our experience at Duke University Health System will be used as an example, the needs, principles, and solutions can apply to a variety of other health-care practices. Key components include the development of safety teams, provision of tools that teams can use to support an environment of safety, and ongoing program modification to meet patient and staff needs and respond to changing priorities. By moving patient safety to the forefront of all that we do as health-care providers, we can continue to improve our delivery of health care to children and adults alike. This improvement is fostered when we enhance the culture of safety, develop a constant awareness of the possibility of human and system errors in the delivery of care, and establish additional safeguards to intercept medical errors in order to prevent harm to patients. (orig.)

  20. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology

    Kowalski, Marek L; Ansotegui, Ignacio; Aberer, Werner

    2016-01-01

    One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment) of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin...... attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO), representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk...... associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access...

  1. The safety of food products requires X-ray testing

    Lardiere, C.

    2017-01-01

    Food safety through standards and regulations imposes food products to be tested for the presence of alien elements. So far metal detectors have been used to detect metal parts, now they have been progressively replaced with X-ray scanners that allow the detection of a lot more contaminants. The improvement of algorithms for image processing combined with the availability of ever more powerful PC have led to the routine use of X-ray testing on industrial processes. Technological progress has made X-ray testing more efficient: while previously a power of 500 W was necessary to cross a 10 cm thickness of water, now only 100 W is necessary. The main advantage of X-ray testing is to be able to test food even packed in metal containers and to detect if the container is deformed. Another advantages is to be able to detect a lot of elements like pieces of glass, small stones or bits of bones. The minimal size to be detected is 0.5 mm for stainless steels and 2 mm for glass or bones. Usually metal detectors are set at the end of the production line just before packaging but in some cases they can be included in the line in order to protect the next machine that intervenes to process the food. (A.C.)

  2. Design safety improvements of Kozloduy NPP to meet the modern safety requirements towards the old generation PWR

    Hinovski, M.P.; Sabinov, S.

    2001-01-01

    Activities related to safety improvement of Kozloduy NPP units, started at the end of 1970s included seismic resistance upgrading, fire safety improvement, reliable heat final absorber etc. During the last 10 years the approach was systematized and improved. Units 1 to 4 are of great interest; therefore here we will discuss these units only. As a result of studies and analyses performed at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, problems related to the safety were identified and complex of technical measures was developed and planned. A considerable part of these measures has already been implemented, and the rest will be performed during the next years. Activities were performed by stages, and at the moment the last stage is under way. It shall be finished by the year 2003. The number of the measures is quite large to describe them here in full scope -- during the first stage of the safety program (1991-1993) were developed and analyzed more than 4200 documents and more than 160 measures were executed. During the second and third stages more than 300 important improvements were realized. In the frame of the program, financed by EBRD, 10 new systems with great importance were implemented and 8 systems were significantly modified. The main measures are described below. (author)

  3. Meteorological aspects of the reactor safety study requiring further study

    Slinn, W.G.N.

    1981-01-01

    Simple and approximate methods are used in a search for meteorological features that dominate estimates of reactor-accident consequences, and that require more accurate descriptions if consequence estimates are to be more realistic. By considering variations in the source term, it is seen that accidents involving containment-vessel failure dominate both the mean and variance of the distribution of consequences, although this conclusion is subject to uncertainties about plume rise. Research is recommended on the behavior of horizontal, sonic jets, with heat transfer to the ground, and especially during stable atmospheric conditions. Diffusion with fumigation and lofting require further study; use of K-theory and National Weather Service data should be vigorously pursued. Conditional upon an accident occurring, precipitation scavenging appears to dominate the variance of the consequences

  4. 49 CFR 1106.3 - Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required. 1106.3 Section 1106.3 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... TRANSPORTATION BOARD CONSIDERATION OF SAFETY INTEGRATION PLANS IN CASES INVOLVING RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS...

  5. 45 CFR 1356.30 - Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.

    2010-10-01

    ... licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive... ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD AND...

  6. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan.

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-12-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  7. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    Wen-Hwa Ko

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry.

  8. A systems engineering approach to implementation of safety management systems in the Norwegian fishing fleet

    McGuinness, Edgar; Utne, Ingrid B.

    2014-01-01

    The fishing industry is plagued by a long history of fatality and injury occurrence. Commercial fishing is hence recognized as the most dangerous and difficult of professional callings, in all jurisdictions. Fishing vessels have their own unique set of hazards, a myriad collection of complex occupational accident potentials, barely controlled, co-existing in a perilous work environment. The work in this article is directed by the Norwegian Systematic Health, Environmental and Safety Activities in Enterprises (1997) (Internal Control Regulations [1]), the ISM Code [2] for vessels and their recent applicability to the fishing fleet of Norway. Both safety management works place requirements on the vessel operators and crew to actively manage safety as an on-going concern. The application of these safety management system (SMS) control documents to fishing vessels is just the latest instalment in a continual drive to improve safety in this sector. The difficulty is that there has been no previous systematic approach to safety within the fishing fleet. This article uses the tenants of systems engineering to determine the requirements for such a SMS, detailing the limiting factors and restrictive issues of this complex operating environment. - Highlights: • Systems engineer is applied as a tool for determining requirements for design and construction of a safety management system (SMS). • Outlining a simplistic format, identifying, designingand facilitating improvement opportunities in the conduction and application of SMS’s on fishing vessels. • Knowledge provision is a key requirement of management systems, through provision of understanding, detail orientation and applicable skills for realization. • Outlining, what is to be done and how it is to be completed to accomplish compliance with pertinent legislative requirements. • Promoting a combination of documentation and communication arrangements by which the actionsnecessary for management can be

  9. 78 FR 2797 - Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles

    2013-01-14

    ... Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles; Draft Environmental Assessment for Rulemaking To Establish Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles; Proposed Rules #0;#0;Federal Register...-0148] RIN 2127-AK93 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and...

  10. Modeling the Non-functional Requirements in the Context of Usability, Performance, Safety and Security

    Sadiq, Mazhar

    2007-01-01

    Requirement engineering is the most significant part of the software development life cycle. Until now great emphasis has been put on the maturity of the functional requirements. But with the passage of time it reveals that the success of software development does not only pertain to the functional requirements rather non-functional requirements should also be taken into consideration. Among the non-functional requirements usability, performance, safety and security are considered important. ...

  11. Defence-in-depth and development of safety requirements for advanced nuclear reactors

    Carnino, A.; Gasparini, M.

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses a general approach for the preparation of the design safety requirements using the IAEA Safety Objectives and the strategy of defence-in-depth. It proposes a general method (top-down approach) to prepare safety requirements for a given kind of reactor using the IAEA requirements for nuclear power plants as a starting point through a critical interpretation and application of the strategy of defence-in-depth. The IAEA has recently developed a general methodology for screening the defence-in-depth of nuclear power plants starting from the fundamental safety objectives as proposed in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. This methodology may provide a useful tool for the preparation of safety requirements for the design and operation of any kind of reactor. Currently the IAEA is preparing the technical basis for the development of safety requirements for Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors, with the aim of showing the viability of the method. A draft TECDOC has been prepared and circulated among several experts for comments. This paper is largely based on the content of the draft TECDOC. (authors)

  12. Lithuanian requirements for ageing management of systems and components important to safety of nuclear power plant

    Ramanauskiene, A.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper the Lithuanian requirements for ageing management of systems and components important to safety of Ignalina nuclear power plant (two RBMK-1500 water-cooled graphite moderated channel-type power reactors) are presented

  13. Design and Implementation of the Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality.

    Gandhi, Tejal K; Abookire, Susan A; Kachalia, Allen; Sands, Kenneth; Mort, Elizabeth; Bommarito, Grace; Gagne, Jane; Sato, Luke; Weingart, Saul N

    2016-01-01

    The Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality is a 2-year physician-oriented training program with a strong operational orientation, embedding trainees in the quality departments of participating hospitals. It also integrates didactic and experiential learning and offers the option of obtaining a master's degree in public health. The program focuses on methodologically rigorous improvement and measurement, with an emphasis on the development and implementation of innovative practice. The operational orientation is intended to foster the professional development of future quality and safety leaders. The purpose of this article is to describe the design and development of the fellowship. © The Author(s) 2014.

  14. Guidance on the implementation of a risk based safety performance monitoring system for nuclear power plants

    Sewell, R.T.; Kuritzky, A.S.; Khatib-Rahbar, M.

    1997-05-01

    The principal objective of the present study is to review and evaluate existing Performance Indicator (PI) monitoring programs, and to develop and demonstrate an overall PSA-based methodology and framework for the monitoring and use of risk-based PIs and SIs (Safety Indicator), that would enable: Identification of trends and patterns in safety performance at a specific plant and a population of plants; Assessment of the significance of the trends and patterns; Identification of precursors of accident sequences and safety reductions; Identification of the most critical functional areas of concern, especially as they relate to a defense-in-depth safety philosophy; Comparison of safety performance trends at a plant with those at comparable plants; Incorporation of the PIs and SIs into a risk- and performance-based decision process. To support the overall project objective, it is important that information needs and data collection procedures are clearly outlined. Of key significance in this regard is the premise that a performance monitoring system should not be burdened by an excessive number of low-level PIs that may have only a peripheral relationship to safety. Other supporting objectives of the study include: To identify and discuss other issues pertaining to the practical implementation of a safety performance monitoring system (outlining the databases and algorithms needed); and to demonstrate implementation of the preliminary guidance for monitoring and use of the selected set of PIs and SIs, within the proposed framework, via application to the operating history of a NPP having a PSA and readily available event data

  15. 75 FR 76260 - Conforming Changes to Applicant Submission Requirements; Implementing Federal Financial Report...

    2010-12-08

    ... HUD regulations to reference the new governmentwide Federal Financial Report (FFR) approved by the... task of filing required financial reports. Similarly, CCR registration has been required of applicants...] RIN 2501-AD50 Conforming Changes to Applicant Submission Requirements; Implementing Federal Financial...

  16. “The Safety of Tourist” - Required Community Standard

    Olguta Ludmila Benescu

    2010-06-01

    be forgotten which would attract tourists.The Romanian State, in order to have had an attractive and profitable tourism it must turn into a leading provider of safety.

  17. Dimensioning of emergency condensers in accordance with safety requirements

    Palavecino, C [SIEMENS, Energieerzeugung, Offenbach (Germany)

    1996-12-01

    The emergency condensers are heat exchangers consisting of a parallel arrangement of horizontal U-tubes between two common heads. The tope header is connected via piping to the reactor vessel steam space, while the lower header is connected to the reactor vessel below the reactor vessel water level. The heat exchangers are located in a pool filled with cold water. The emergency condensers and the reactor vessel thus form a system of communicating pipes. At normal reactor water level, the emergency condensers are flooded with cold, non-flowing water. No heat transfer takes place in this condition. If there is a drop in the reactor water level, the heat exchanging surfaces are gradually uncovered and the incoming steam condenses on the cold surfaces. The cold condensate in returned to the reactor vessel. In this way, heat is removed from the reactor vessel and water simultaneously supplied to the reactor vessel. This means that the emergency condensers function as a heat removal system while at the same time serving as HP and LP coolant injection systems. The emergency condensers operate with the highest possible degree of passivity imaginable, namely through a drop in the reactor vessel water level alone, requiring neither control systems nor power supply. The design of the emergency condensers must meet the requirements dictated by the thermal and the hydraulic conditions. Taking into consideration a redundancy degree of N + 2, a specific thermal rating of 63 MW per emergency condenser results for a reactor with an output of 2778 MW. The total performance of the emergency condenser system in thus 252 MW, or 9.1% of reactor output. The probability of failure of the emergency condenser of Siemens SWR 1000 is approximately 10{sup -4} per demand, while that of the older emergency condenser designs is approximately 2 to 3 x 10{sup -3} per demand. (author). 7 figs, 2 tabs.

  18. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS

    2012-05-01

    plants has been confirmed as high, being based on particularly robust plant designs and numerous provisions in the beyond design basis domain. The plants have been retrofitted in an extensive manner in the course of the years, especially the older units which started operation 40 years ago. Additionally, the plants go through a comprehensive check at least every ten years during the so called periodic safety review. Nonetheless improvements are always possible and the process of reassessing and reanalysing in the light of new knowledge does not ever reach a final answer. This holds true also for the regulators' own supervision processes as well as for the emergency preparedness and the nuclear safety regime at national level. The constant questioning attitude and search for improvements are fundamental factors for a good safety culture. In its response to the Fukushima accident ENSI has chosen a stepwise approach. This allows the incorporation of new lessons as soon as they become available from further accident investigations in Japan which will certainly take some more years to be completed. ENSI requested the Swiss operators to address topics such as protection against earthquakes and flooding within increased hazard assumptions, design of spent fuel pools and availability of the ultimate heat sink, but also availability and transport of accident management equipment from offsite locations. This was accompanied by topical inspections and resulted in improvement measures ordered by ENSI. Examples of such measures are: additional level and temperature instrumentation for the spent fuel pools, redundant pool cooling systems, various improvement measures for protection against flooding, the implementation of an alternate ultimate heat sink, and the storage of accident management equipment in an external dedicated storage facility. The response program launched by ENSI aims at covering all areas identified to have played a role in the accident in Japan. While the design

  19. DS424: A Roadmap for the Implementation of the IAEA Safety Standards

    Yllera, Javier

    2010-01-01

    Many countries interested in developing nuclear power programmes for the first time need to have experience in using and regulating radioactive source materials. They need to have experience in building and operating large non-nuclear construction projects. Nuclear power has unique attributes and commitments associated with it that other industries do not. Although undertaken as a national endeavour with many national implications, building and operating a nuclear facility also has global implications (financial, political, safety, etc.). DG’s 2008 General Conference speech: “Every country has the right to introduce nuclear power, as well as the responsibility to do it right.”. The development of IAEA Safety Standards is an statutory function of the IAEA (article III of the IAEA Statute): “The Agency is authorized to establish or adopt… standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property…”. New guide (DS 424) constitutes a “Road-map” to apply the entire suite of IAEA Safety Standards progressively during the early phases of the implementation of a nuclear power programme. IAEA safety review missions based on internationally agreed safety standards are well established and are the best tools to build up confidence on the capacity of a country to develop nuclear energy in a safe way

  20. PROVIDING OF SAFETY AT WORKS IMPLEMENTATION ON RECONSTRUCTION OF PLUMBINGS NETWORKS IN THE STRAITENED TERMS

    DIDENKO L. M.

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Summary. Raising of problem. In all regions of our country plumbings networks have a considerable physical and moral wear, because in the majority they were laid in the middle of the last century. It is known that more than 50 % on-the-road pipelines are made from steel, here middle tenure of employment of metallic pipes for plumbings networks makes 30. [1]. Statistical data testify that more than 34 % plumbings and sewage networks are in the emergency state. Thus, a large enough stake in building industry of Ukraine is on works on the reconstruction of this type of engineering networks. Thus complete replacement of all pipes requires heavy material tolls, a reconstruction and major repairs of separate emergency areas are mainly produced on this account. Logically to assert that providing of safe production of the examined type of works becomes complicated by the presence of harmful and dangerous productive factors arising up due to the complex factor of straitened. This factor is stipulated by that plumbings networks are laid within the limits of folded municipal building and on territory of operating industrial enterprises. About the danger of production of works on a reconstruction the high level of traumatism testifies at their production. According to the law of Ukraine "On a labour (item 13 protection", an employer is under an obligation to create in the workplace the terms of labour accordingly normatively - to the legal acts, requirements of legislation on the observance of rights of workers in area of labour protection. [2] Providing of safety at implementation of works on the reconstruction of plumbings networks, maybe only at the complex going near the study of this problem, that plugs in itself: research of influence of factors of straitened; exposure of features of technology of production building, assembling, breaking-down, earthen and other types of works executable on a site area at a reconstruction; perfection of existent

  1. Implementing the 2009 Institute of Medicine recommendations on resident physician work hours, supervision, and safety

    Blum, Alexander B; Shea, Sandra; Czeisler, Charles A; Landrigan, Christopher P; Leape, Lucian

    2011-01-01

    , discussion of the Institute of Medicine report has been largely confined to the medical education community, led by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME). To begin gathering these perspectives and developing a plan to implement safer work hours for resident physicians, a conference entitled “Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety: What will it take to implement the Institute of Medicine recommendations?” was held at Harvard Medical School on June 17–18, 2010. This White Paper is a product of a diverse group of 26 representative stakeholders bringing relevant new information and innovative practices to bear on a critical patient safety problem. Given that our conference included experts from across disciplines with diverse perspectives and interests, not every recommendation was endorsed by each invited conference participant. However, every recommendation made here was endorsed by the majority of the group, and many were endorsed unanimously. Conference members participated in the process, reviewed the final product, and provided input before publication. Participants provided their individual perspectives, which do not necessarily represent the formal views of any organization. In September 2010 the ACGME issued new rules to go into effect on July 1, 2011. Unfortunately, they stop considerably short of the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations and those endorsed by this conference. In particular, the ACGME only applied the limitation of 16 hours to first-year resident physicans. Thus, it is clear that policymakers, hospital administrators, and residency program directors who wish to implement safer health care systems must go far beyond what the ACGME will require. We hope this White Paper will serve as a guide and provide encouragement for that effort. Resident physician workload and supervision By the end of training, a resident physician should be able to practice independently. Yet much of resident physicians’ time is dominated by

  2. User requirements in the area of safety of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycle installations

    Kuczera, B.; Juhn, P.E.; Fukuda, K.; )

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Against the background of already existing IAEA and INSAC publications in the area of safety, in the framework of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) a set of user requirements for the safety of future nuclear installations has been established. Five top-level requirements are expected to apply to any type of innovative design. They should foster an increased level of safety that is transparent to and fully accepted by the general public. The approach to future reactor safety includes two complementary strategies: increased emphasis on inherent safety characteristics and enhancement of defense in depth. As compared to existing plants, the effectiveness of preventing measures should be highly enhanced, resulting in fewer mitigation measures. The targets and possible approaches of each of the five levels of defense developed for innovative reactor designs are outlined in the paper

  3. Promoters and Barriers to Implementation of Tracheal Intubation Airway Safety Bundle: A Mixed-Method Analysis.

    Finn Davis, Katherine; Napolitano, Natalie; Li, Simon; Buffman, Hayley; Rehder, Kyle; Pinto, Matthew; Nett, Sholeen; Jarvis, J Dean; Kamat, Pradip; Sanders, Ronald C; Turner, David A; Sullivan, Janice E; Bysani, Kris; Lee, Anthony; Parker, Margaret; Adu-Darko, Michelle; Giuliano, John; Biagas, Katherine; Nadkarni, Vinay; Nishisaki, Akira

    2017-10-01

    To describe promoters and barriers to implementation of an airway safety quality improvement bundle from the perspective of interdisciplinary frontline clinicians and ICU quality improvement leaders. Mixed methods. Thirteen PICUs of the National Emergency Airway Registry for Children network. Remote or on-site focus groups with interdisciplinary ICU staff. Two semistructured interviews with ICU quality improvement leaders with quantitative and qualitative data-based feedbacks. Bundle implementation success (compliance) was defined as greater than or equal to 80% use for tracheal intubations for 3 consecutive months. ICUs were classified as early or late adopters. Focus group discussions concentrated on safety concerns and promoters and barriers to bundle implementation. Initial semistructured quality improvement leader interviews assessed implementation tactics and provided recommendations. Follow-up interviews assessed degree of acceptance and changes made after initial interview. Transcripts were thematically analyzed and contrasted by early versus late adopters. Median duration to achieve success was 502 days (interquartile range, 182-781). Five sites were early (median, 153 d; interquartile range, 146-267) and eight sites were late adopters (median, 783 d; interquartile range, 773-845). Focus groups identified common "promoter" themes-interdisciplinary approach, influential champions, and quality improvement bundle customization-and "barrier" themes-time constraints, competing paperwork and quality improvement activities, and poor engagement. Semistructured interviews with quality improvement leaders identified effective and ineffective tactics implemented by early and late adopters. Effective tactics included interdisciplinary quality improvement team involvement (early adopter: 5/5, 100% vs late adopter: 3/8, 38%; p = 0.08); ineffective tactics included physician-only rollouts, lack of interdisciplinary education, lack of data feedback to frontline clinicians

  4. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  5. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    2006-01-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  6. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition

  7. Statement on safety requirements concerning the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station

    2012-12-01

    This report published by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI investigates the safety requirements with respect to the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station in Switzerland. Relevant international requirements and Swiss legal stipulations concerning the long-term operation of the power station are stated. The management of aging processes is looked at. The regular verification of the integrity of various plant components such as containments, piping, steam generation system, etc. is looked at in detail. The state-of-the-art concerning deterministic accident analyses and refitting technology are discussed, as are automated safety systems. The applicable laws, decrees and guidelines are listed in appendices

  8. Analysis of normative requirements for the development and implementation of a quality management system in Brazilian nuclear installations and activities

    Kibrit, Eduardo

    2008-01-01

    The present work identifies, characterizes and analyses the normative requirements for the development and implementation of quality management systems in Brazilian nuclear installations and activities. The requirements established in standards IAEA GS-R-3, IAEA GS-G-3.1, IAEA DS 349, NBR ISO 9001:2000 e CNEN-NN-1.16 are critically analyzed. A correlation matrix of the applicable standards is presented and the related topics among them are identified. The standards IAEA GS-R-3, IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA DS 349 define general requirements for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system in nuclear installations and activities, in IAEA member countries. The standard NBR ISO 9001:2000 establishes general requirements for the implementation of a quality management system in all kinds of organizations. The standard CNEN NN-1.16 establishes the regulating requirements for the quality assurance systems and programs of nuclear installations, for licensing and authorization for operation of these installations in Brazil. The standard IAEA GS-R-3 that replaces the code IAEA 50-C-Q introduces the concept of 'Integrated Management System' for the nuclear area, in preference to the concepts of 'Quality Assurance' and 'Quality Management'. This new approach is aligned with the current tendency incorporating requirements of quality, safety, health, environment, security, economics and other in a unique management system. Examples of quality management systems implemented by Brazilian nuclear organizations and by nuclear organizations outside Brazil are analyzed and considered in the discussion of results. (author)

  9. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  10. [Implementation of good quality and safety practices. Descriptive study in a occupational mutual health centre].

    Manzanera, R; Plana, M; Moya, D; Ortner, J; Mira, J J

    2016-01-01

    To describe the level of implementation of quality and safety good practice elements in a Mutual Society health centre. A Cross-sectional study was conducted to assess the level of implementation of good practices using a questionnaire. Some quality dimensions were also assessed (scale 0 to 10) by a set of 87 quality coordinators of health centres and a random sample of 54 healthcare professionals working in small centres. Seventy quality coordinators and 27 professionals replied (response rates 80% and 50%, respectively. There were no differences in the assessment of quality attributes between both groups. They identified as areas for improvement: use of practice guidelines (7.6/10), scientific and technical skills (7.5/10), and patient satisfaction (7.7/10). Availability and accessibility to clinical reports, informed consent, availability of hydro-alcoholic solution, and to record allergies, were considered of high importance to be implemented, with training and research, improvements in equipment and technology plans, adherence to clinical practice guidelines and the preparation of risk maps, being of less importance. The good practices related to equipment and resources have a higher likelihood to be implemented, meanwhile those related to quality and safety attitudes have more barriers before being implemented. The mutual has a similar behaviour than other healthcare institutions. Copyright © 2015 SECA. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  11. Beyond usability: designing effective technology implementation systems to promote patient safety.

    Karsh, B-T

    2004-10-01

    Evidence is emerging that certain technologies such as computerized provider order entry may reduce the likelihood of patient harm. However, many technologies that should reduce medical errors have been abandoned because of problems with their design, their impact on workflow, and general dissatisfaction with them by end users. Patient safety researchers have therefore looked to human factors engineering for guidance on how to design technologies to be usable (easy to use) and useful (improving job performance, efficiency, and/or quality). While this is a necessary step towards improving the likelihood of end user satisfaction, it is still not sufficient. Human factors engineering research has shown that the manner in which technologies are implemented also needs to be designed carefully if benefits are to be realized. This paper reviews the theoretical knowledge on what leads to successful technology implementation and how this can be translated into specifically designed processes for successful technology change. The literature on diffusion of innovations, technology acceptance, organisational justice, participative decision making, and organisational change is reviewed and strategies for promoting successful implementation are provided. Given the rapid and ever increasing pace of technology implementation in health care, it is critical for the science of technology implementation to be understood and incorporated into efforts to improve patient safety.

  12. Safety assessment to support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors

    Fan, H.Z.; Laurie, T.; Siddiqi, A.; Li, Z.P.; Rouben, D.; Zhu, W.; Lau, V.; Cottrell, C.M. [CANDU Energy Inc., Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    The Natural Uranium Equivalent (NUE) fuel contains a combination of recycled uranium and depleted uranium, in such a manner that the resulting mixture is similar to the natural uranium currently used in CANDU® reactors. Based on successful preliminary results of 24 bundles of NUE fuel demonstration irradiation in Qinshan CANDU 6 Unit 1, the NUE full core implementation program has been developed in cooperation with the Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company and Candu Energy Inc, which has recently received Chinese government policy and funding support from their National-Level Energy Innovation program. This paper presents the safety assessment results to technically support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors. (author)

  13. Excellence and safety in surgery require excellent and safe tutoring.

    Ferrarese, Alessia; Buccelli, Claudio; Addeo, Giuseppe; Capasso, Emanuele; Conti, Adelaide; Amato, Maurizio; Compagna, Rita; Niola, Massimo; Martino, Valter

    2016-01-01

    The surgical education in Italy has always been a very important issue. The aim of this article is to bring together the feedback of the definitions of the various components of the learning scheme and to evaluate the importance of the legal point. In March 2016 we performed a literature review. We have also examinated the internet pages of the Italian Department of Education, Health and Medical Order. In Italy the tutor had an unclear role from a legal point of view. He is the person who must be able to perform a specific procedure with expert technical and who must know how to stop the student if this is about to perform a dangerous maneuver. In Italy the ability to work for the trainee is limited in all reality, it depends on several factors including the increase of numbers of medical-legal disputes, the timing, the commitment it requires mentoring and a lack of mentors. In surgery, the problem is greater because of the increasingly of medico-legal implications that we are after surgical procedure. It would be necessary to define a role of the tutor in a regular protocol and a proper assessment of his performance.

  14. Organization and implementation of a national regulatory infrastructure governing protection against ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources. Interim report for comment

    1999-02-01

    A number of IAEA Member States are undertaking to strengthen their radiation protection and safety infrastructures in order to facilitate the adoption of the requirements established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the Standards). In this connection, the IAEA has developed a technical co-operation programme (Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure) to improve radiation protection and safety infrastructures in 51 Member States, taking into account national profiles and needs of the individual participating, countries. The present report deals with the elements of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation protection and safety and intends to facilitate the, implementation of the Basic Safety Standards in practice. It takes into account the proposals in an earlier report, IAEA-TECDOC-663, but it has been expanded to include enabling legislation and modified to be more attuned to infrastructure issues related to implementation of the Standards. The orientation is toward infrastructures concerned with protection and safety for radiation sources used in medicine, agriculture, research, industry and education rather than infrastructures for protection and safety for complex nuclear facilities. It also discusses options for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the infrastructure in accordance with the size and scope of radiation practices and available regulatory resources within a country

  15. Radiation Safety Analysis In The NFEC For Assessing Possible Implementation Of The ICRP-60 Standard

    Yowono, I.

    1998-01-01

    Radiation safety analysis of the 3 facilities in the nuclear fuel element center (NFEC) for assessing possible implementation of the ICRP-60 standard has been done. The analysis has covered the radiation dose received by workers, dose rate in the working area, surface contamination level, air contamination level and the level of radioactive gas release to the environment. The analysis has been based on BATAN regulation and ICRP-60 standard. The result of the analysis has showed that the highest radiation dose received has been found to be only around 15% of the set value in the ICRP-60 standard and only 6% of the set value in the BATAN regulation. Thus the ICRP-60 as radiation safety standard could be implemented without changing the laboratory design

  16. Development of Occupational Safety and Health Requirement Management System (OSHREMS Software Using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 for Building Construction Project

    Abas Nor Haslinda

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The construction industry sector is considered as being risky with frequent and high accident rate. According to Social Security Organization (SOCSO, the construction accidents has arisen from time to time. Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB has developed the Safety and Health Assessment System in Construction (SHASSIC for evaluating the performance of a contractor in construction project by setting out the safety and health management and practices, however the requirement checklist provided is not comprehensive. Therefore, this study aims to develop a software system for facilitating OSH in building construction project, namely OSH requirements management system (OSHREMS, using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 and Sublime Text as PHP editor. The results from a preliminary study which was conducted through interviews showed that, the respondents were only implementing the basic requirements that comply with legislations, with the absence of appropriate and specific guideline in ensuring occupational safety and health (OSH at the workplace. The tool will be benefits for contractors and other parties to effectively manage the OSH requirements for their projects based on project details.

  17. 42 CFR 495.338 - Health information technology implementation advance planning document requirements (HIT IAPD).

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Health information technology implementation... CERTIFICATION STANDARDS FOR THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to the Medicaid Program § 495.338 Health information technology implementation advance planning document...

  18. Developing and implementing safety culture in the uses of radiation sources

    Rojkind, R.H.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents an approach to develop and implement safety culture in the uses of radiation sources in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and teaching, and makes reference to the experience gained by the industries where that culture has been developed and improved, i.e. the nuclear industry. Suggestions to assist progress toward safety culture are here described for regulators, organisations using those sources, and professional associations. Even though emphasis is given to small organisations or teams of workers, this approach may be also useful to greater organisations like industrial irradiation companies or governmental research laboratories. In each case, parties being the principal focus of the learning process toward a progressive safety culture should be identified. (author)

  19. Implementing a pediatric surgical safety checklist in the OR and beyond.

    Norton, Elizabeth K; Rangel, Shawn J

    2010-07-01

    An international study about implementation of the World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist showed that use of the checklist reduced complication and death rates in adult surgical patients. Clinicians at Children's Hospital Boston, Massachusetts, modified the Surgical Safety Checklist for pediatric populations. We pilot tested the Pediatric Surgical Safety Checklist and created a large checklist poster for each OR to allow the entire surgical team to view the checklist simultaneously and to promote shared responsibility for conducting the time out. Results of the pilot test showed improvements in teamwork, communication, and adherence to process measures. Parallel efforts were made in other areas of the hospital where invasive procedures are performed. Compliance with the checklist at our facility has been good, and team members have expressed satisfaction with the flow and content of the checklist. Copyright (c) 2010 AORN, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Implementation of a radiological safety management system in a hospital of Mexico City

    Martinez V, D.; Rivera M, T.; Velez D, V.

    2007-01-01

    Full text: The reflection of this work is based in some radiological accidents that its have happened in some hospital centers or of research. The over exposure of some people is due to the pursuit of the procedures, the lack of quality assurance of the equipment or the inappropriate actions of the technicians. In Mexico one has seen in several hospitals the lack of existence of a Quality Assurance Program to prevent the accidents, the execution of the same ones and those good practices and the lack of Safety Culture makes that the hospital radiological safety it is faulty. The objective of the present work is the implementation of a radiological safety management in a hospital of Mexico City. (Author)

  1. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  2. Negotiation as a means of developing and implementing health and safety policy

    Caldart, Charles C.; Ashford, Nicholas Askounes

    1998-01-01

    In the health, safety, and environmental area, negotiated rulemaking, implementation, and compliance are proposed by their advocates as delivering two primary benefits: reduced rulemaking time and decreased litigation over a final agency rule. The experience to date, however, indicates that negotiated rulemaking cannot be relied upon to deliver either of these benefits. Nonetheless, experience indicates that negotiation can, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate a better understanding of i...

  3. Modeling of requirement specification for safety critical real time computer system using formal mathematical specifications

    Sankar, Bindu; Sasidhar Rao, B.; Ilango Sambasivam, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Real time computer systems are increasingly used for safety critical supervision and control of nuclear reactors. Typical application areas are supervision of reactor core against coolant flow blockage, supervision of clad hot spot, supervision of undesirable power excursion, power control and control logic for fuel handling systems. The most frequent cause of fault in safety critical real time computer system is traced to fuzziness in requirement specification. To ensure the specified safety, it is necessary to model the requirement specification of safety critical real time computer systems using formal mathematical methods. Modeling eliminates the fuzziness in the requirement specification and also helps to prepare the verification and validation schemes. Test data can be easily designed from the model of the requirement specification. Z and B are the popular languages used for modeling the requirement specification. A typical safety critical real time computer system for supervising the reactor core of prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) against flow blockage is taken as case study. Modeling techniques and the actual model are explained in detail. The advantages of modeling for ensuring the safety are summarized

  4. Practical implementation of good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise in the Lodz region.

    Michalak, Jacek

    2002-10-01

    Good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise (GP HESME) is the process that aims at continuous improvement in health, environment and safety performance, involving all stakeholders within and outside the enterprise. The GP HESME system is intended to function at different levels: international, national, local community, and enterprise. The most important issues at the first stage of GP HESME implementation in the Lodz region are described. Also, the proposals of future activities in Lodz are presented. Practical implementation of GP HESME requires close co-operation among all stakeholders: local authorities, employers, employees, research institutions, and the state inspectorate. The WHO and the Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine (NIOM) are initiating implementation, delivering professional consultation, education and training of stakeholders in the NIOM School of Public Health. The implementation of GP HESME in the Lodz region started in 1999 from a WHO meeting on criteria and indicators, followed by close collaboration of NIOM with the city's Department of Public Health. 'Directions of Actions for Health of Lodz Citizens' is now the city's official document that includes GP HESME as an important part of public health policy in Lodz. Several conferences were organized by NIOM together with the Professional Managers' Club, Labor Inspection, and the city's Department of Public Health to assess the most important needs of enterprises. The employers and managerial staff, who predominated among the participants, stated the need for tailored sets of indicators and economic appraisal of GP HESME activities. Special attention is paid to GP HESME in supermarkets and community-owned enterprises, e.g., a local transportation company. A special program for small- and medium-size enterprises will be the next step of GP HESME in the Lodz region. The implementation of GP HESME is possible if the efforts of local authorities; research

  5. Lessons learned - development of the tritium facilities 5480.23 safety analysis report and technical safety requirements

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Bowman, M.E.; Goff, L.

    1997-01-01

    A review was performed which identified open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes from the development of the 5480.23 Tritium Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Tritium Facilities (TF). The open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes were based on an evaluation of the use of the SRS procedures, processes, and work practices which contributed to the success or lack thereof. This review also identified recommendations and suggestions for improving the development of SARs and TSRs at SRS. The 5480.23 SAR describes the site for the TF, the various process systems in the process buildings, a complete hazards and accident analysis of the most significant hazards affecting the nearby offsite population, and the selection of safety systems, structures, and components to protect both the public and site workers. It also provides descriptions of important programs and processes which add defense in depth to public and worker protection

  6. Nuclear Safety R&D for the Knowledge-Based Implementation of Defence in Depth

    Baek, W-P., E-mail: wpbaek@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Department of Nuclear Safety Research, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Assuring a high level of safety is a pre-requisite for the development and utilization of nuclear technology. The most fundamental approach for nuclear power plant (NPP) safety is “defence in depth (DiD),” which is a combination of multiple physical barriers and multiple (generally 5) levels of protection, with the aim of accident prevention and mitigation. NPPs around the world have shown excellent safety records for over 14,500 cumulative reactor years, compared with other electricity sources, by properly implementing DiD. However, the occurrence and severe consequences of the Fukushima accident have provoked controversy on the completeness of the DiD concept. There have been active discussions on DiD with respect to the Fukushima accident. A general consensus has been arrived that the concept of DiD is still valid but its implementation was incomplete for the Fukushima NPP. Had DiD been properly implemented during the design, construction and operation, much better provisioning against the extreme earthquake and tsunami would have been available and the accident consequences would not have been so disastrous.

  7. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    2016-07-01

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20 th , 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined. The

  8. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    NONE

    2016-07-15

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20{sup th}, 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined

  9. Objective 1: Extend Life, Improve Performance, and Maintain Safety of the Current Fleet Implementation Plan

    Robert Youngblood

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear power has reliably and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 70%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. By the year 2030, domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow to levels of 16 to 36% higher than 2007 levels. At the same time, most currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their 60 year operating licenses. Figure E 1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years, the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will begin to decline—even with the expected addition of new nuclear generating capacity. The oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap has organized its activities in accordance with four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The objectives are as follows: (1) develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; (2) develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change goals; (3) develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and (4) understand and minimize risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document describes how Objective 1 and the LWRS Program will be implemented. The existing U.S. nuclear fleet has a remarkable safety and performance record and today accounts for 70% of the low greenhouse

  10. Objective 1: Extend Life, Improve Performance, and Maintain Safety of the Current Fleet Implementation Plan

    Robert Youngblood

    2011-02-01

    Nuclear power has reliably and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 70%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. By the year 2030, domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow to levels of 16 to 36% higher than 2007 levels. At the same time, most currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their 60 year operating licenses. Figure E 1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years, the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will begin to decline—even with the expected addition of new nuclear generating capacity. The oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap has organized its activities in accordance with four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The objectives are as follows: (1) develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; (2) develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change goals; (3) develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and (4) understand and minimize risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document describes how Objective 1 and the LWRS Program will be implemented. The existing U.S. nuclear fleet has a remarkable safety and performance record and today accounts for 70% of the low greenhouse

  11. Objective 1: Extend Life, Improve Performance, and Maintain Safety of the Current Fleet; Implementation Plan

    Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear power has reliably and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 70%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. By the year 2030, domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow to levels of 16 to 36% higher than 2007 levels. At the same time, most currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their 60 year operating licenses. Figure E 1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years, the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will begin to decline - even with the expected addition of new nuclear generating capacity. The oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy's Research and Development (R and D) Roadmap has organized its activities in accordance with four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The objectives are as follows: (1) develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; (2) develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration's energy security and climate change goals; (3) develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and (4) understand and minimize risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document describes how Objective 1 and the LWRS Program will be implemented. The existing U.S. nuclear fleet has a remarkable safety and performance record and today accounts for 70% of the low greenhouse

  12. Impact of New Radiation Safety Standards on Licensing Requirements of Nuclear Power Plant

    Strohal, P.; Subasic, D.; Valcic, I.

    1996-01-01

    As the outcomes of the newly introduced safety philosophies, new and more strict safety design requirements for nuclear installation are expected to be introduced. New in-depth defence measures should be incorporated into the design and operation procedure for a nuclear installation, to compensate for potential failures in protection or safety measures. The new requirements will also apply to licensing of NPP's operation as well as to licensing of nuclear sites, especially for radioactive waste disposal sites. This paper intends to give an overview of possible impacts of new internationally agreed basic safety standards with respect to NPP and related technologies. Recently issued new basic safety standards for radiation protection are introducing some new safety principles which may have essential impact on future licensing requirements regarding nuclear power plants and radioactive waste installations. These new standards recognize exposures under normal conditions ('practices') and intervention conditions. The term interventions describes the human activities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure or existing likelihood of incurring exposure which is not part of a controlled practice. The other new development in safety standards is the introduction of so called potential exposure based on the experience gained from a number of radiation accidents. This exposure is not expected to be delivered with certainty but it may result from an accident at a source or owing to an event or sequence of events of a probabilistic nature, including equipment failures and operating errors. (author)

  13. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    2007-07-01

    conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as reasonably achievable and also

  14. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    NONE

    2007-07-15

    . Emergency drills are conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as

  15. What are the requirements of a successful ERP implementation in SMEs? Special focus on Southern Africa

    Victoria Hasheela-Mufeti

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Many international Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP systems were developed based on the best practices of organizations in which they were developed. These organizations are usually large, and in developed countries. However, small organizations in other parts of the world are also implementing ERP. Implementing a system based on different practices that differ from yours is certainly bound to come with issues. The objective of the study is to identify challenges experienced by SMEs when implementing ERP systems, and to suggest requirements of achieving successful implementations in SMEs in Southern Africa. A thematic analysis methodology was used to explore identified challenges from fourteen SMEs and to identify themes within the data. The study suggested that a successful ERP implementation requires sufficient and appropriate training, reliable internet connection, involvement of end-users, change management, as well as sufficient demonstration of the prospective ERP system.

  16. Analysis respons to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture using AHP-TOPSIS

    Situmorang, J.; Kuntoro, I.; Santoso, S.; Subekti, M.; Sunaryo, G. R.

    2018-02-01

    An analysis of responses to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture has been done using AHP (Analitic Hierarchy Process) - TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution). Safety culture is considered as collective commitments of the decision-making level, management level, and individual level. Thus each level will provide a subjective perspective as an alternative approach to implementation. Furthermore safety culture is considered by the statement of five characteristics which in more detail form consist of 37 attributes, and therefore can be expressed as multi-attribute state. Those characteristics and or attributes will be a criterion and its value is difficult to determine. Those criteria of course, will determine and strongly influence the implementation of the corresponding safety culture. To determine the pattern and magnitude of the influence is done by using a TOPSIS that is based on decision matrix approach and is composed of alternatives and criteria. The weight of each criterion is determined by AHP technique. The data used are data collected through questionnaires at the workshop on safety and health in 2015. .Reliability test of data gives Cronbah Alpha value of 95.5% which according to the criteria is stated reliable. Validity test using bivariate correlation analysis technique between each attribute give Pearson correlation for all attribute is significant at level 0,01. Using confirmatory factor analysis gives Kaise-Meyer-Olkin of sampling Adequacy (KMO) is 0.719 and it is greater than the acceptance criterion 0.5 as well as the 0.000 significance level much smaller than 0.05 and stated that further analysis could be performed. As a result of the analysis it is found that responses from the level of decision maker (second echelon) dominate the best order preference rank to be the best solution in strengthening the nuclear installation safety culture, except for the first characteristics, safety is a

  17. Content and implementation of new legislation governing atomic safety and radiation protection in the GDR

    Ifflaender, G.

    1987-01-01

    In the regulatory framework of the GDR all measures aiming to ensure the safe use of atomic energy are defined by the term Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection, where atomic safety includes nuclear safety, physical protection and nuclear material control. In 1984, a new Atomic Energy Act went into effect followed, in 1985, by the new Ordinance on the Assurance of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection and the pertaining Executory Provision. Section 2 of the Ordinance defines the following goals for the safe use of atomic energy: (1) the protection of life and health of man, and, from the genetic point of view, also of future generations from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation; (2) the protection of the environment from radioactive contamination, in particular by the careful handling of radioactive materials and safe disposal of radioactive wastes; (3) the protection of workers in nuclear facilities and of members of the public in their surroundings, and of material assets by strict observance and implementation of nuclear safety and radiation protection measures; (4) the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities from any criminal attacks and unauthorized interference; and (5) the fulfilment of the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the GDR and the IAEA by accounting for the use of nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. Under Section 6 of the Atomic Energy Act, the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection (SAAS) is the competent authority for the state control in the field of protection against the risks from the use of atomic energy, which is exercised by licensing and surveillance as described in this report. Other topics also dealt with in more detail are the in-plant organization of atomic safety and radiation protection and the powers of the regulatory body to impose enforcement measures and sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the pertinent provisions. (author)

  18. 10 CFR 73.58 - Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.

    2010-01-01

    ... requirements for nuclear power reactors. (a) Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors. 73.58 Section 73.58 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF...

  19. Occupational safety and health in the Universities: fulfilling the fundamental requirement of OSHA and AELA

    Ismail Bahari

    2000-01-01

    This paper discusses the result of a survey among the universities to looks at whether such basic similarities in requirements by both Acts actually help in fulfilling and integrating the fundamental requirement of OSHA, Malaysian Occupational Safety and Health Act and AELA, Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Act especially through self-regulation

  20. 78 FR 47015 - Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of...

    2013-08-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0195] Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission... issuing a revised regulatory guide (RG), revision 1 of RG 1.172, ``Software Requirement Specifications for...

  1. Safety requirements to the operation of hydropower plants; Sicherheit beim Betrieb von Wasserkraftwerken

    Lux, Reinhard [Berufsgenossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugnisse (BG ETEM), Koeln (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Employers have to take into account various safety and health requirements relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of hydropower plants. Especially the diversity of the hydropower plant components requires the consideration of different safety and health aspects. In 2011 the ''Fachausschuss Elektrotechnik'' (expert committee electro-technics) of the institution for statutory accident insurance and prevention presented a new ''BG-Information'' dealing with ''Safe methods operating hydropower plants''. The following article gives an introduction into the conception and the essential requirements of this new BG-Information. (orig.)

  2. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  3. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  4. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  5. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  6. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Asgar Aghaei Hashjin

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS and patient-centeredness (PC strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade in Iran. METHODS: A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. RESULTS: The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO, and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  7. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  8. Implementation of Patient Safety and Patient-Centeredness Strategies in Iranian Hospitals

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    Objective To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. Methods A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009–2010. Results The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient’s diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Conclusions Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention. PMID:25268797

  9. Consequences for people from changed economic requirements and implementations of new technology

    Myhre, L.A.

    1994-01-01

    The offshore oil and gas business has reached mature levels where improvements and efficiency, optimisation and down-sizing are necessary to achieve required economic performance. The paper discusses the oil worker in future with the focus on manning and safety as a consequence of new technologies and cost reduction. 1 fig

  10. 78 FR 62509 - Approval of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Navajo Nation; Regional Haze Requirements for...

    2013-10-22

    .... Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks H. Executive... typically used in conjunction with SCR or other add-on controls to first reduce NO X formation during... requires the EPA to promulgate such rulemaking.'' Ariz. Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir...

  11. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand.

  12. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  13. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong

    2015-01-01

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand

  14. Probabilistic safety analysis and risk-based inspection of nuclear research reactors: state-of-the-art and implementation proposal

    Marques, Raíssa O.; Vasceoncelos, Vanderley de; Soares, Wellington A.; Silva Júnior, Silvério F.; Raso, Amanda L.; Mesquita, Amir Z., E-mail: raissaomarques@gmail.com, E-mail: vasconv@cdtn.br, E-mail: soaresw@cdtn.br, E-mail: silvasf@cdtn.br, E-mail: amandaraso@hotmail.com, E-mail: amir@cdtn.br [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN/CNEN-MG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    Industrial facilities systems deteriorate over time during operation, thus increasing the possibility of accidents. Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) classifies such systems by their risk information with the purpose of prioritizing inspection efforts. RBI can reduce inspection activities, resulting in lower risk levels, and maintaining reliability and safety in acceptable levels. Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) is a RBI approach used in nuclear industry. RI-ISI uses outcomes from Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to plan In-Service Inspections (ISI). Despite nuclear research reactors are simpler and have lower risks than power reactors, the application of PSA to them may be useful for safety improvements once they are more flexible, provide easier access to its core, and allow changes in fuel configurations in case of experimental tests. Ageing management of structures, systems and components important to safety of a nuclear research reactor throughout its lifetime is also required to assure continued adequacy of safety levels, reliable operation, and compliance with operational limits and conditions. This includes periodic review of ISI programs in which monitoring of material deterioration and aging effects are considered, and that can be supported by the RBI approach. A review of state-of-the-art of PSA and RBI applications to nuclear reactors is presented in this work. Advantages to apply these methodologies are also analyzed. PSA and RBI implementation proposal applied to nuclear research reactors is also presented, as well as its application to a TRIGA research nuclear reactor using computer codes developed by ReliaSoft® Corporation. (author)

  15. Probabilistic safety analysis and risk-based inspection of nuclear research reactors: state-of-the-art and implementation proposal

    Marques, Raíssa O.; Vasceoncelos, Vanderley de; Soares, Wellington A.; Silva Júnior, Silvério F.; Raso, Amanda L.; Mesquita, Amir Z.

    2017-01-01

    Industrial facilities systems deteriorate over time during operation, thus increasing the possibility of accidents. Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) classifies such systems by their risk information with the purpose of prioritizing inspection efforts. RBI can reduce inspection activities, resulting in lower risk levels, and maintaining reliability and safety in acceptable levels. Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) is a RBI approach used in nuclear industry. RI-ISI uses outcomes from Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to plan In-Service Inspections (ISI). Despite nuclear research reactors are simpler and have lower risks than power reactors, the application of PSA to them may be useful for safety improvements once they are more flexible, provide easier access to its core, and allow changes in fuel configurations in case of experimental tests. Ageing management of structures, systems and components important to safety of a nuclear research reactor throughout its lifetime is also required to assure continued adequacy of safety levels, reliable operation, and compliance with operational limits and conditions. This includes periodic review of ISI programs in which monitoring of material deterioration and aging effects are considered, and that can be supported by the RBI approach. A review of state-of-the-art of PSA and RBI applications to nuclear reactors is presented in this work. Advantages to apply these methodologies are also analyzed. PSA and RBI implementation proposal applied to nuclear research reactors is also presented, as well as its application to a TRIGA research nuclear reactor using computer codes developed by ReliaSoft® Corporation. (author)

  16. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Dey, M.

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements

  17. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Dey, M. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Issue Resolution; Arsenault, F.; Patterson, M.; Gaal, M. [SCIENTECH, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States)

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements.

  18. Requirements for guidelines systems: implementation challenges and lessons from existing software-engineering efforts.

    Shah, Hemant; Allard, Raymond D; Enberg, Robert; Krishnan, Ganesh; Williams, Patricia; Nadkarni, Prakash M

    2012-03-09

    A large body of work in the clinical guidelines field has identified requirements for guideline systems, but there are formidable challenges in translating such requirements into production-quality systems that can be used in routine patient care. Detailed analysis of requirements from an implementation perspective can be useful in helping define sub-requirements to the point where they are implementable. Further, additional requirements emerge as a result of such analysis. During such an analysis, study of examples of existing, software-engineering efforts in non-biomedical fields can provide useful signposts to the implementer of a clinical guideline system. In addition to requirements described by guideline-system authors, comparative reviews of such systems, and publications discussing information needs for guideline systems and clinical decision support systems in general, we have incorporated additional requirements related to production-system robustness and functionality from publications in the business workflow domain, in addition to drawing on our own experience in the development of the Proteus guideline system (http://proteme.org). The sub-requirements are discussed by conveniently grouping them into the categories used by the review of Isern and Moreno 2008. We cite previous work under each category and then provide sub-requirements under each category, and provide example of similar work in software-engineering efforts that have addressed a similar problem in a non-biomedical context. When analyzing requirements from the implementation viewpoint, knowledge of successes and failures in related software-engineering efforts can guide implementers in the choice of effective design and development strategies.

  19. A study to develop the domestic functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU

    Kim, Man Woong [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jae Young; Park, Kun Chul [Handong Global Univ., Pohang (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2003-03-15

    The present research has been made to develop and review critically the functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU such as SDS-1, SDS2, ECCS, and containment. Based on R documents for this, a systematic study was made to develop the domestic regulation statements. Also, the conventional laws are carefully reviewed to see the compatibility to CANDU. Also, the safety assessment method for CANDU was studied by reviewing C documents and recommendation of IAEA. Through the present works, the vague policy in the CANDU safety regulation is cleaning up in a systematic form and a new frame to measure the objective risk of nuclear power plants was developed.

  20. A study to develop the domestic functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU

    Kim, Man Woong; Lee, Jae Young; Bang, Kwang Hyun [Handong Global Univ., Pohang (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2001-03-15

    The present research has been made to develop and review critically the functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU such as SOS-1, SOS-2, ECCS and containment. Based on R documents for this, a systematic study was made to develop the domestic regulation statements. Also, the conventional laws are carefully reviewed to see the compatibility to CANDU. Also, the safety assessment method for CANDU was studied by reviewing C documents and recommendation of IAEA. Through the present works, the vague policy in the CANDU safety regulation is cleaning up in a systematic form and a new frame to measure the objective risk of nuclear power plants was developed.