WorldWideScience

Sample records for safety requirements implementation

  1. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  2. Requirement analysis of the safety-critical software implementation for the nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hoon Seon; Jung, Jae Cheon; Kim, Jae Hack; Nam, Sang Ku; Kim, Hang Bae

    2005-01-01

    The safety critical software shall be implemented under the strict regulation and standards along with hardware qualification. In general, the safety critical software has been implemented using functional block language (FBL) and structured language like C in the real project. Software design shall comply with such characteristics as; modularity, simplicity, minimizing the use of sub-routine, and excluding the interrupt logic. To meet these prerequisites, we used the computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tool to substantiate the requirements traceability matrix that were manually developed using Word processors or Spreadsheets. And the coding standard and manual have been developed to confirm the quality of software development process, such as; readability, consistency, and maintainability in compliance with NUREG/CR-6463. System level preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is performed by analyzing preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and FMEA document. The modularity concept is effectively implemented for the overall module configurations and functions using RTP software development tool. The response time imposed on the basis of the deterministic structure of the safety-critical software was measured

  3. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  4. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  5. 10 CFR 850 Implementation of Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, S

    2012-01-05

    10 CFR 850 defines a contractor as any entity, including affiliated entities, such as a parent corporation, under contract with DOE, including a subcontractor at any tier, with responsibility for performing work at a DOE site in furtherance of a DOE mission. The Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program (CBDPP) applies to beryllium-related activities that are performed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The CBDPP or Beryllium Safety Program is integrated into the LLNL Worker Safety and Health Program and, thus, implementation documents and responsibilities are integrated in various documents and organizational structures. Program development and management of the CBDPP is delegated to the Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) Directorate, Worker Safety and Health Functional Area. As per 10 CFR 850, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) periodically submits a CBDPP to the National Nuclear Security Administration/Livermore Site Office (NNSA/LSO). The requirements of this plan are communicated to LLNS workers through ES&H Manual Document 14.4, 'Working Safely with Beryllium.' 10 CFR 850 is implemented by the LLNL CBDPP, which integrates the safety and health standards required by the regulation, components of the LLNL Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), and incorporates other components of the LLNL ES&H Program. As described in the regulation, and to fully comply with the regulation, specific portions of existing programs and additional requirements are identified in the CBDPP. The CBDPP is implemented by documents that interface with the workers, principally through ES&H Manual Document 14.4. This document contains information on how the management practices prescribed by the LLNL ISMS are implemented, how beryllium hazards that are associated with LLNL work activities are controlled, and who is responsible for implementing the controls. Adherence to the requirements and processes described in the ES&H Manual ensures

  6. Safety requirement of the nuclear power plants, after TMI-2 accident and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirhabibi, N.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, E.

    1985-01-01

    Based on the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident and other research and developments, many improvements have been required for the design, manufacturing and operation of nuclear power plants in recent years. These requirements have already been implemented to the plants in operation and considered as new safety requirements for new plants. In the present paper these requirements and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP are discussed. (Author)

  7. Implementation of the INEEL safety analyst training standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hochhalter, E. E.

    2000-01-01

    The Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) safety analysis units at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) are in the process of implementing the recently issued INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107). Safety analyst training and qualifications are integral to the development and maintenance of core safety analysis capabilities. The INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107) was developed directly from EFCOG Training Subgroup draft safety analyst training plan template, but has been adapted to the needs and requirements of the INEEL safety analysis community. The implementation of this Safety Analyst Training Standard is part of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Phase II Implementation currently underway at the INEEL. The objective of this paper is to discuss (1) the INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard, (2) the development of the safety analyst individual training plans, (3) the implementation issues encountered during this initial phase of implementation, (4) the solutions developed, and (5) the implementation activities remaining to be completed

  8. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KING JP

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

  9. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  11. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Konzen, K.K. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States). Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; Langsted, J.M. [M.H. Chew and Associates, Golden, CO (United States)

    1998-02-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets.

  12. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konzen, K.K.

    1998-01-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets

  13. Pressure Safety Program Implementation at ORNL

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lower, Mark [ORNL; Etheridge, Tom [ORNL; Oland, C. Barry [XCEL Engineering, Inc.

    2013-01-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a US Department of Energy (DOE) facility that is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC. In February 2006, DOE promulgated worker safety and health regulations to govern contractor activities at DOE sites. These regulations, which are provided in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program, establish requirements for worker safety and health program that reduce or prevent occupational injuries, illnesses, and accidental losses by providing DOE contractors and their workers with safe and healthful workplaces at DOE sites. The regulations state that contractors must achieve compliance no later than May 25, 2007. According to 10 CFR 851, Subpart C, Specific Program Requirements, contractors must have a structured approach to their worker safety and health programs that at a minimum includes provisions for pressure safety. In implementing the structured approach for pressure safety, contractors must establish safety policies and procedures to ensure that pressure systems are designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained, qualified personnel in accordance with applicable sound engineering principles. In addition, contractors must ensure that all pressure vessels, boilers, air receivers, and supporting piping systems conform to (1) applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2004) Sections I through XII, including applicable code cases; (2) applicable ASME B31 piping codes; and (3) the strictest applicable state and local codes. When national consensus codes are not applicable because of pressure range, vessel geometry, use of special materials, etc., contractors must implement measures to provide equivalent protection and ensure a level of safety greater than or equal to the level of protection afforded by the ASME or applicable state or local codes. This report documents the work performed to address legacy pressure vessel deficiencies and comply

  14. NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.; Lee, J.H.; McCulloch, W.H.; Sawyer, J.C. Jr.; Bari, R.A.; Brown, N.W.; Cullingford, H.S.; Hardy, A.C.; Remp, K.; Sholtis, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An Interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top- level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed

  15. Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Basis Implementation Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TRAWINSKI, B.J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the Safety Basis Implementation is to ensure that implementation of activities is accomplished in order to support readiness to move spent fuel from K West Basin. Activities may be performed directly by the Safety Basis Implementation Team or they may be performed by other organizations and tracked by the Team. This strategy will focus on five key elements, (1) Administration of Safety Basis Implementation (general items), (2) Implementing documents, (3) Implementing equipment (including verification of operability), (4) Training, (5) SNF Project Technical Requirements (STRS) database system

  16. Nuclear criticality safety department training implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Department (NCSD) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The NCSD Qualification Program is described in Y/DD-694, Qualification Program, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSD personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This document supersedes Y/DD-696, Revision 2, dated 3/27/96, Training Implementation, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department. There are no backfit requirements associated with revisions to this document

  17. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  20. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  3. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Feather, Martin; Rutledge, Peter; Sen, Dev; Youngblood, Robert

    2015-01-01

    This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

  4. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    other reactor types, including innovative developments in future systems, some of the requirements may not be applicable, or may need some judgment in their interpretation. Various Safety Guides will provide guidance in the interpretation and implementation of these requirements. This publication is intended for use by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies. This publication establishes design requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety that must be met for safe operation of a nuclear power plant, and for preventing or mitigating the consequences of events that could jeopardize safety. It also establishes requirements for a comprehensive safety assessment, which is carried out in order to identify the potential hazards that may arise from the operation of the plant, under the various plant states (operational states and accident conditions). The safety assessment process includes the complementary techniques of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis. These analyses necessitate consideration of postulated initiating events (PlEs), which include many factors that, singly or in combination, may affect safety and which may: originate in the operation of the nuclear power plant itself; be caused by human action; be directly related to the nuclear power plant and its environment. This publication also addresses events that are very unlikely to occur, such as severe accidents that may result in major radioactive releases, and for which it may be appropriate and practicable to provide preventive or mitigatory features in the design. This publication does not address: external natural or human induced events that are extremely unlikely (such as the impact of a meteorite or an artificial satellite); conventional industrial accidents that under no circumstances could affect the safety of the nuclear power plant; or non-radiological effects arising

  5. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    other reactor types, including innovative developments in future systems, some of the requirements may not be applicable, or may need some judgment in their interpretation. Various Safety Guides will provide guidance in the interpretation and implementation of these requirements. This publication is intended for use by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies. This publication establishes design requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety that must be met for safe operation of a nuclear power plant, and for preventing or mitigating the consequences of events that could jeopardize safety. It also establishes requirements for a comprehensive safety assessment, which is carried out in order to identify the potential hazards that may arise from the operation of the plant, under the various plant states (operational states and accident conditions). The safety assessment process includes the complementary techniques of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis. These analyses necessitate consideration of postulated initiating events (PlEs), which include many factors that, singly or in combination, may affect safety and which may: originate in the operation of the nuclear power plant itself. Be caused by human action. Be directly related to the nuclear power plant and its environment. This publication also addresses events that are very unlikely to occur, such as severe accidents that may result in major radioactive releases, and for which it may be appropriate and practicable to provide preventive or mitigatory features in the design. This publication does not address: external natural or human induced events that are extremely unlikely (such as the impact of a meteorite or an artificial satellite). Conventional industrial accidents that under no circumstances could affect the safety of the nuclear power plant. Or non-radiological effects arising

  6. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  7. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  8. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  9. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  10. Meeting up-to-date safety requirements in the Russian NPP projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tepkyan, G. O.; Yashkin, A. V.

    2014-01-01

    Safety features in Russian NPP designs are implemented by the combination of active and passive safety systems • Russian NPP designs are in compliance with up-to-date international and European safety requirements and refer to Generation III+ • Russian state-of-the-art designs have already implemented some design solutions, which take into account “post-Fukushima” requirements. Russian NPP design principles have been approved during the European discussions in spring 2012, including the IAEA extraordinary session addressed to Fukushima NPP accident

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  12. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs), Generic Safety Issues(GSIs), and other Multiplant Actions (MPAs) that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  13. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  14. Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodman, D.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

  15. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues. Supplement 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. Supplement 3 gives status as of September 30, 1993. This annual report, Supplement 4, presents updated information as of September 30, 1994. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  16. Site evaluation for nuclear installations. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1). It takes account of developments relating to site evaluations for nuclear installations since the Code on Siting was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for site evaluation are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations. It is recognized that there are steady advances in technology and scientific knowledge, in nuclear safety and in what is considered adequate protection. Safety requirements change with these advances and this publication reflects the present consensus among States. This Safety Requirements publication was prepared under the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear installations. It establishes requirements and provides criteria for ensuring safety in site evaluation for nuclear installations. The Safety Guides on site evaluation listed in the references provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in this Safety Requirements publication. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements for the elements of a site evaluation for a nuclear installation so as to characterize fully the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of a nuclear installation. The purpose is to establish requirements for criteria, to be applied as appropriate to site and site-installation interaction in operational states and accident conditions, including those that could lead to emergency measures for: (a) Defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the applicant; (b) Evaluating a proposed site to ensure that the site

  17. Fire safety requirements for electrical cables towards nuclear reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raju, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Electrical power supply forms a very important part of any nuclear reactor. Power supplies have been categorized in to class I, II, III and IV from reliability point. The safety related equipment are provided with highly reliable power supply to achieve the safety of very high order. Vast network of cables in a nuclear reactor are grouped and segregated to ensure availability of power to at least one group under all anticipated occurrences. Since fire can result in failures leading to unavailability of power caused by common cause, both passive and active fire protection methods are adopted in addition to fire detection system. The paper describes the requirement for passive fire protection to electrical cables viz. fire barrier and fire breaks. The paper gives an account of the tests required to standardize the products. Fire safety implementation for cables in research reactors is described

  18. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  19. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  20. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  1. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  2. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    installed; (i) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived

  3. Evaluating safety management system implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preuss, M.

    2009-01-01

    Canada is committed to not only maintaining, but also improving upon our record of having one of the safest aviation systems in the world. The development, implementation and maintenance of safety management systems is a significant step towards improving safety performance. Canada is considered a world leader in this area and we are fully engaged in implementation. By integrating risk management systems and business practices, the aviation industry stands to gain better safety performance with less regulatory intervention. These are important steps towards improving safety and enhancing the public's confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system. (author)

  4. The practical implementation of safety culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Touzet, Rodolfo [Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Buenos Aires. (Argentina)

    2008-07-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  5. The practical implementation of safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Touzet, Rodolfo

    2008-01-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  6. Implementation of safety parameter display system at VVER-440 NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manninen, T.

    1997-01-01

    Furnishing WWER-440 nuclear power plant units with a safety parameter display system (SPDS) fulfilling the requirements of internationally recognized standards and guidelines has been ranked high on the lists of proposed safety improvement projects. Technically such an SPDS system can be implemented either as a separate stand-alone system or as a more or less closely integrated part of a process information system of the plant unit. In the paper examples of these approaches are presented. Functionally all these examples include the well proven SPDS concept developed by IVO Power Engineering Ltd, Finland. The functional design basis, the general requirements for the system platform, experience with implementation and expansion possibilities of the systems are discussed. (author)

  7. Infrastructural requirements for local implementation of safety policies: the discordance between top-down and bottom-up systems of action.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Timpka, Toomas; Nordqvist, Cecilia; Lindqvist, Kent

    2009-03-09

    Safety promotion is planned and practised not only by public health organizations, but also by other welfare state agencies, private companies and non-governmental organizations. The term 'infrastructure' originally denoted the underlying resources needed for warfare, e.g. roads, industries, and an industrial workforce. Today, 'infrastructure' refers to the physical elements, organizations and people needed to run projects in different societal arenas. The aim of this study was to examine associations between infrastructure and local implementation of safety policies in injury prevention and safety promotion programs. Qualitative data on municipalities in Sweden designated as Safe Communities were collected from focus group interviews with municipal politicians and administrators, as well as from policy documents, and materials published on the Internet. Actor network theory was used to identify weaknesses in the present infrastructure and determine strategies that can be used to resolve these. The weakness identification analysis revealed that the factual infrastructure available for effectuating national strategies varied between safety areas and approaches, basically reflecting differences between bureaucratic and network-based organizational models. At the local level, a contradiction between safety promotion and the existence of quasi-markets for local public service providers was found to predispose for a poor local infrastructure diminishing the interest in integrated inter-agency activities. The weakness resolution analysis showed that development of an adequate infrastructure for safety promotion would require adjustment of the legal framework regulating injury data exchange, and would also require rational financial models for multi-party investments in local infrastructures. We found that the "silo" structure of government organization and assignment of resources was a barrier to collaborative action for safety at a community level. It may therefore be

  8. Management implementation plan for a safety analysis and review system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulburt, D.A.; Berkey, B.D.

    1981-04-01

    The US Department of Energy has issued an Order, DOE 5481.1, which establishes uniform requirements for the preparation and review of Safety Analysis for DOE Operations. The Management Implementation Plan specified herein establishes the administrative procedures and technical requirements for implementing DOE 5481.1 to Operations under the cognizance of the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. This Implementation Plan is applicable to all present and future Operations under the cognizance of PETC. The Plan identifies those Operations for which DOE 5481.1 is applicable and those Operations for which no further analysis is required because the initial determination and review has concluded that DOE 5481.1 does not apply

  9. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO Safety Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which the management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of the safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi-purpose research reactor and achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation like the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops, the development of safety culture indicators, the survey on the attitude of safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e-Learning program for safety education. (author)

  10. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  11. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose.

  12. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose

  13. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose.

  14. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose

  15. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  16. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  17. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  18. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  19. Infrastructural requirements for local implementation of safety policies: the discordance between top-down and bottom-up systems of action

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lindqvist Kent

    2009-03-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Safety promotion is planned and practised not only by public health organizations, but also by other welfare state agencies, private companies and non-governmental organizations. The term 'infrastructure' originally denoted the underlying resources needed for warfare, e.g. roads, industries, and an industrial workforce. Today, 'infrastructure' refers to the physical elements, organizations and people needed to run projects in different societal arenas. The aim of this study was to examine associations between infrastructure and local implementation of safety policies in injury prevention and safety promotion programs. Methods Qualitative data on municipalities in Sweden designated as Safe Communities were collected from focus group interviews with municipal politicians and administrators, as well as from policy documents, and materials published on the Internet. Actor network theory was used to identify weaknesses in the present infrastructure and determine strategies that can be used to resolve these. Results The weakness identification analysis revealed that the factual infrastructure available for effectuating national strategies varied between safety areas and approaches, basically reflecting differences between bureaucratic and network-based organizational models. At the local level, a contradiction between safety promotion and the existence of quasi-markets for local public service providers was found to predispose for a poor local infrastructure diminishing the interest in integrated inter-agency activities. The weakness resolution analysis showed that development of an adequate infrastructure for safety promotion would require adjustment of the legal framework regulating injury data exchange, and would also require rational financial models for multi-party investments in local infrastructures. Conclusion We found that the "silo" structure of government organization and assignment of resources was a barrier to

  20. Evolving US Food Safety Regulations and International Competitors: Implementation Dynamics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tekuni Nakuja

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The 2011 US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA represents a major initiative to improve food safety. The legislation mandates the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA with developing a regulatory system to implement the Act. Both domestic and foreign firms that wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable increase in regulatory costs. Implementation has proved challenging for the FDA leading to delays which increase investment risks for foreign suppliers, particulalry from developing countries. This paper sets out the major FSMA requirements and examines how the regulatory burden may fall on foreign versus US suppliers.

  1. Implementation of the new regulation on radiological safety in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Medina Gironzini, E.

    1997-01-01

    Since its creation in 1975, the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN) has enacted three regulations of national importance on the norms of protection against ionizing radiation. The first regulation, which is called regulation of radiological protection (1980) approved by a resolution of IPEN, is the result of the work of a committee constituted by IPEN and the Ministry of Health. Its implementation caused some problems as result of which, in 1989, a new regulation on radiological protection was enacted through a supreme decree. Taking into account the new recommendation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the International Basic Safety Standard for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, approved in May 1997, the regulation of radiological safety also considers evolving aspects in the Project ARCAL XVII/IAEA. This regulation includes various topics such as exclusions, requirements of protection (medical exposure, occupational exposure, public exposure, chronic exposure), requirements of source safety, interventions and emergencies, control of sources and practices (exemptions, authorizations, inspections) etc. The implementation of this regulation at the national level falls to IPEN, the unique authority commissioned to control nuclear installations, radioactivity and x ray facilities in medicine, industry and research

  2. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1, Revision 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  4. Quality and Safety Assurance - Priority Task at Nuclear Power Projects Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nenkova, B.; Manchev, B.; Tomov, E.

    2010-01-01

    Quality and safety assurance at implementation of nuclear power engineering projects is important and difficult task for realization. Many problems arise during this process, when many companies from different countries participate, with various kinds of activities and services provided. The scope of activities necessary for quality and safety assurance is therefore quite expanded and diverse. In order to increase the safety and reliability of Kozloduy NPP Plc (KNPP) Units 5 and 6, as well as to bring the units in conformity with the newest international requirements for quality and safety in the field of nuclear energy, a program for their modernization on the basis of different technical studies and assessments was implemented. The Units 5 and 6 Modernization Program of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was composed of 212 modifications aimed to improve the safety, operability, and reliability of the Units. The Program was realized by stages during yearly planned outages since year 2002 to 2007, without additional outages. A major Program Objective was to extend the Units Life Time in at least 15 Years, under a continuous, safe, and reliable operation. The Modernization Program of Units 5 and 6 of the Bulgarian Nuclear Power Plant in Kozloduy was the first and for the time being the only one in the world, program in the field of nuclear power engineering, by which the full scope of recommendations for improvement of the Kozloduy NPP units was applied. The main goal of the National Electric Company, which is the Employer for the construction of new nuclear facility in Bulgaria, is after completion of all activities regarding construction of Belene NPP the plant to meet or exceed the requirements of the respective national and international quality and safety codes and standards, as well as the IAEA guidelines, as they are established. The objective of this report is to describe different aspects of the quality assurance according to the requirements of quality and

  5. Evaluation of Safety Culture Implementation and Socialization Results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Situmorang, Johnny

    2003-01-01

    Evaluation of safety culture implementation and socialization results has been perform. Evaluation is carried out with specifying safety culture indicators, namely: Meeting between management and employee, system for incidents analysis, training activities related to improving safety, meeting with regulator, contractors, surveys on behavioural attitudes, and resources allocated to promote safety culture. Evaluation is based on observation and visiting the facilities to show the compliance indicator in term of good practices in the frame of safety culture implementation. For three facilities of research reactors, Kartini Yogyakarta, TRIGA Mark II Bandung and MPR-GAS Serpong, implementation of safety culture is considered good enough and progressive. Furthermore some indicator should be considered more intensive, for example the allocated resources, self assesment based on own questionnaire in the frame of improving the safety culture implementation. (author)

  6. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  7. Safety integrity requirements for computer based I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thuy, N.N.Q.; Ficheux-Vapne, F.

    1997-01-01

    In order to take into account increasingly demanding functional requirements, many instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems in nuclear power plants are implemented with computers. In order to ensure the required safety integrity of such equipment, i.e., to ensure that they satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions and within stated periods of time, requirements applicable to these equipment and to their life cycle need to be expressed and followed. On the other hand, the experience of the last years has led EDF (Electricite de France) and its partners to consider three classes of systems and equipment, according to their importance to safety. In the EPR project (European Pressurized water Reactor), these classes are labeled E1A, E1B and E2. The objective of this paper is to present the outline of the work currently done in the framework of the ETC-I (EPR Technical Code for I ampersand C) regarding safety integrity requirements applicable to each of the three classes. 4 refs., 2 figs

  8. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  9. General Approaches and Requirements on Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials Transport in Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ershov, V.N.; Buchel'nikov, A.E.; Komarov, S.V.

    2016-01-01

    Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)

  10. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  11. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  12. Evaluation of the implementation of new traceability and food safety requirements in the pig industry in eastern Australia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hernández-Jover, M; Schembri, N; Toribio, J-A; Holyoake, P K

    2009-10-01

    To evaluate the implementation and barriers to adoption, among pig producers, of a newly introduced traceability and food safety system in Australia. Implementation of the PigPass national vendor declaration (NVD) linked to an on-farm quality assurance (QA) program was evaluated in May and December 2007 at saleyards and abattoirs in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Four focus group discussions with saleyard producers were held between April and July 2007. Implementation of the PigPass system in terms of accurate completion of the form and QA accreditation was higher at the export abattoir than at the regional saleyard at the first audit (P 64%), and many vendors did not appear to be QA-accredited. During focus groups, producers expressed the view that PigPass implementation improved animal and product traceability. They identified the associated costs and a perceived lack of support by information providers as obstacles for adoption. Improvement in the implementation of PigPass among producers marketing pigs at export abattoirs was observed during the 8-month period of the study. There is a need for a more uniform message to producers from government agencies on the importance of the PigPass NVD and QA and extension and education targeted toward producers supplying pigs to saleyards and domestic abattoirs to ensure compliance with the traceability requirements.

  13. Job safety and awareness analysis of safety implementation among electrical workers in airport service company

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Putra Perdana Suteja

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Electrical is a fundamental process in the company that has high risk and responsibility especially in public service company such as an airport. Hence, the company that operates activities in the airport has to identify and control the safety activities of workers. On the safety implementation, the lack of workers’ awareness is fundamental aspects to the safety failure. Therefore, this study aimed to analyse the safety awareness and identify risk in the electrical workplace. Safety awareness questionnaires are distributed to ten workers in order to analyse their awareness. Job safety analysis method used to identify the risk in the electrical workplace. The preliminary study stated that workers were not aware of personal protective equipment usage so that the awareness and behavioural need to be analysed. The result is the hazard was found such as electrical shock and noise for various intensity in the workplace. While electrical workers were aware of safety implementation but less of safety behaviour. Furthermore, the recommendation can be implemented are the implementation of behaviour-based safety (BBS, 5S implementation and accident report list.

  14. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  15. Implementation of patient safety strategies in European hospitals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suñol, R; Vallejo, P; Groene, O; Escaramis, G; Thompson, A; Kutryba, B; Garel, P

    2009-02-01

    This study is part of the Methods of Assessing Response to Quality Improvement Strategies (MARQuIS) research project on cross-border care, investigating quality improvement strategies in healthcare systems across the European Union (EU). To explore to what extent a sample of acute care European hospitals have implemented patient safety strategies and mechanisms and whether the implementation is related to the type of hospital. Data were collected on patient safety structures and mechanisms in 389 acute care hospitals in eight EU countries using a web-based questionnaire. Subsequently, an on-site audit was carried out by independent surveyors in 89 of these hospitals to assess patient safety outputs. This paper presents univariate and bivariate statistics on the implementation and explores the associations between implementation of patient safety strategies and hospital type using the chi(2) test and Fisher exact test. Structures and plans for safety (including responsibilities regarding patient safety management) are well developed in most of the hospitals that participated in this study. The study found greater variation regarding the implementation of mechanisms or activities to promote patient safety, such as electronic drug prescription systems, guidelines for prevention of wrong patient, wrong site and wrong surgical procedure, and adverse events reporting systems. In the sample of hospitals that underwent audit, a considerable proportion do not comply with basic patient safety strategies--for example, using bracelets for adult patient identification and correct labelling of medication.

  16. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  17. LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2004-01-01

    DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

  18. Implementation of safety management systems in Hong Kong construction industry - A safety practitioner's perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yiu, Nicole S N; Sze, N N; Chan, Daniel W M

    2018-02-01

    In the 1980s, the safety management system (SMS) was introduced in the construction industry to mitigate against workplaces hazards, reduce the risk of injuries, and minimize property damage. Also, the Factories and Industrial Undertakings (Safety Management) Regulation was introduced on 24 November 1999 in Hong Kong to empower the mandatory implementation of a SMS in certain industries including building construction. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in improving construction safety and identify the factors that influence its implementation in Hong Kong. A review of the current state-of-the-practice helped to establish the critical success factors (CSFs), benefits, and difficulties of implementing the SMS in the construction industry, while structured interviews were used to establish the key factors of the SMS implementation. Results of the state-of-the-practice review and structured interviews indicated that visible senior commitment, in terms of manpower and cost allocation, and competency of safety manager as key drivers for the SMS implementation. More so, reduced accident rates and accident costs, improved organization framework, and increased safety audit ratings were identified as core benefits of implementing the SMS. Meanwhile, factors such as insufficient resources, tight working schedule, and high labor turnover rate were the key challenges to the effective SMS implementation in Hong Kong. The findings of the study were consistent and indicative of the future development of safety management practice and the sustainable safety improvement of Hong Kong construction industry in the long run. Copyright © 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. The establishment and implementation of safety culture policy in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Antariksawan, A.R.; Suharno; Arbie, B.

    2001-01-01

    This paper describes the progress in the establishment and implementation of safety culture in Indonesia, especially in BATAN, with special attention given to the development of safety culture indicators. The spirit of safety culture implementation is marked firstly by declaration of Policy Statement by the Head of BATAN. In order to monitor the implementation of safety culture, six indicators are established. Based on those indicators, it is seemed that at present the progress of implementation of safety culture is quite good enough. (author)

  20. Verification of implementation of the radiological safety standards through the regulatory inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez Gonzalez, Francisco; Fornet Rodriguez, Ofelia M.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: As an element of the updating process of the legal framework on radiological safety in Cuba, a new rule was put into force; the Radiological Basic Safety Standards (RBSS) in January 2002. Five years after the application of these new safety requirements, it was considered appropriate to assess the effectiveness of its implementation. Therefore, in this work the authors analysed the outcomes of the regulatory inspections conducted in this period upon medical and industrial practices in a sample of facilities representative of those with the highest radiological risks in the territory under supervision of a Territorial Delegation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. For better understanding of this presentation, a summary explanation of the structure of the rule is given in its introduction. The work was to identify for each deficiency, or finding, or counter-measure; out of the relevant inspections; the corresponding requirement/Article of the RBSS that shows difficulties in implementation. For each installation an analysis is made with regard to the relevant articles difficult to implement. Finally, the appraisal is shown separately for the medical practice, and for the industrial practice, and also in general for the whole sample of installations under review. The study showed that the implementation of the Standards has been satisfactory and uniform in the practices under review. So far it seems that there have not been major difficulties with the implementation of the Titles; III On Intervention, IV Dose Limits, as well as with the Especial, Final, and Transitory Dispositions. On the other hand, it is shown there is a need for continued work only with regard to the implementation of the requirements in Section IV Verification of Safety and in Section V On the responsibilities with regard to occupational exposure in Chapter III Title I, and correspondingly in Chapter II Occupational Exposure in Title II. It is recommended to conduct this kind of

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  4. Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    In execution of the new Atomic Energy Act the Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection was put into force on 1 February 1985. It takes into account all forms of peaceful nuclear energy and ionizing radiation uses in nuclear installations, irradiation facilities and devices in research, industries, and health services, and in radioactive isotope production and laboratories. It covers all aspects of safety and protection and defines atomic safety as nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whereas radiation protection includes the total of requirements, measures, means and methods necessary to protect man and the environment from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. It has been based on ICRP Recommendation No. 26 and the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards and supersedes the Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1969

  5. Requirements for the design and implementation of checklists for surgical processes

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Verdaasdonk, E.G.G.; Stassen, L.P.S.; Widhiasmara, P.P.; Dankelman, J.

    2008-01-01

    Background- The use of checklists is a promising strategy for improving patient safety in all types of surgical processes inside and outside the operating room. This article aims to provide requirements and implementation of checklists for surgical processes. Methods- The literature on checklist use

  6. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  7. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  8. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  9. Safety design requirements for safety systems and components of JSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, Shigenobu; Shimakawa, Yoshio; Yamano, Hidemasa; Kotake, Shoji

    2011-01-01

    Safety design requirements for JSFR were summarized taking the development targets of the FaCT project and design feature of JSFR into account. The related safety principle and requirements for Monju, CRBRP, PRISM, SPX, LWRs, IAEA standards, goals of GIF, basic principle of INPRO etc. were also taken into account so that the safety design requirements can be a next-generation global standard. The development targets for safety and reliability are set based on those of FaCT, namely, ensuring safety and reliability equal to future LWR and related fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve these targets, the defence-in-depth concept is used as the basic safety design principle. General features of the safety design requirements are 1) Achievement of higher reliability, 2) Achievement of higher inspectability and maintainability, 3) Introduction of passive safety features, 4) Reduction of operator action needs, 5) Design consideration against Beyond Design Basis Events, 6) In-Vessel Retention of degraded core materials, 7) Prevention and mitigation against sodium chemical reactions, and 8) Design against external events. The current specific requirements for each system and component are summarized taking the basic design concept of JSFR into account, which is an advanced loop-type large-output power plant with a mixed-oxide-fuelled core. (author)

  10. ORNL implementation of new health and safety requirements (DOE Order 5480.11)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abercrombie, J.S.

    1988-01-01

    New mandates in radiological protection outlined in DOE Order 5480. 11, include changes in the methodology for determining total radiation dose, ALARA program accountability, monitoring requirements, and standards for public entrance into controlled areas. The new order places distinct requirements concerning training at all DOE facilities. Radiation protection training requirements are addressed, including the effective communication of operations changes to all employees. This paper details the endeavors underway at ORNL in designing, developing, and delivering the training required by the new mandates. Strategies taken to reach the intended goals are explained. Efforts involve the design and implementation of the above mentioned radiation protection programs, a job-specific ALARA instructional package, and a Risk-Based Philosophy program matched to operational changes. 4 refs., 5 tabs

  11. Implementing Patient Safety Initiatives in Rural Hospitals

    Science.gov (United States)

    Klingner, Jill; Moscovice, Ira; Tupper, Judith; Coburn, Andrew; Wakefield, Mary

    2009-01-01

    Implementation of patient safety initiatives can be costly in time and energy. Because of small volumes and limited resources, rural hospitals often are not included in nationally driven patient safety initiatives. This article describes the Tennessee Rural Hospital Patient Safety Demonstration project, whose goal was to strengthen capacity for…

  12. Implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, L.; Tonkay, D.

    2004-01-01

    This paper discusses the implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Joint Convention: establishes a commitment with respect to safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; requires the Parties to ''take appropriate steps'' to ensure the safety of their spent fuel and waste management activities, but does not delineate standards the Parties must meet; and seeks to attain, through its Contracting Parties, a higher level of safety with respect to management of their spent nuclear fuel, disused sealed sources, and radioactive waste

  13. Implementation of Safety and Security Issues in the Transport of Radioactive Material in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    López Vietri, J.; Elechosa, C.; Gerez Miranda, C.; Menossi, S.; Rodríguez Roldán, M.S.; Fernández, A.

    2016-01-01

    This paper is intended to describe implementation of safety and security issues in the transport of radioactive material by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (in Spanish Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, ARN), which is the Competent Authority of Argentina in Safety, Security and Safeguards of radioactive and nuclear material. There are depicted main regulatory activities dealing with the mentioned issues, and relevant milestones of national regulatory standards and guidance applied, that are based on requirements and guides from IAEA. Interfaces between Safety and Security sections are most of the times complementary but sometimes conflictive, therefore the resolution of such conflicts and goals achieved during their implementation are also commented; as well as future joint planned activities between both sections of ARN as a way to provide safety and security without compromising one or the other. (author)

  14. The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COLLOPY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    In 1995 Mr. Joseph DiNunno of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued an approach to describe the concept of an integrated safety management program which incorporates hazard and safety analysis to address a multitude of hazards affecting the public, worker, property, and the environment. Since then the U S . Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a policy to systematically integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that missions can be completed while protecting the public, worker, and the environment. While the DOE and its contractors possessed a variety of processes for analyzing fire hazards at a facility, activity, and job; the outcome and assumptions of these processes have not always been consistent for similar types of hazards within the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis. Although the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis are driven by different DOE Orders and requirements, these analyses should not be entirely independent and their preparation should be integrated to ensure consistency of assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and other controls. Under the DOE policy to implement an integrated safety management system, identification of hazards must be evaluated and agreed upon to ensure that the public. the workers. and the environment are protected from adverse consequences. The DOE program and contractor management need a uniform, up-to-date reference with which to plan. budget, and manage nuclear programs. It is crucial that DOE understand the hazards and risks necessarily to authorize the work needed to be performed. If integrated safety management is not incorporated into the preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis, inconsistencies between assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and controls may occur that affect safety. Furthermore, confusion created by inconsistencies may occur in the DOE process to grant authorization of the work. In accordance with

  15. Safety goals and safety culture opening plenary. 2. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

    2001-01-01

    more strict than those recommended in the INSAG-3 and INSAG-12 reports, but they correlate with the value of negligible individual risk of 10 -6 , established in 'Radiation Safety Standards' (NRB-99) and consider still a high level of uncertainty in calculation of these probabilities. OPB- 88/97 also defines safety culture and principles of its formation and provision. Gosatomnadzor of Russia is a federal executive authority implementing state safety regulation in nuclear energy use. One of the main activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia is nuclear and radiation safety regulation in sitting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The activities include the following: 1. development and enactment of regulatory documents; 2. licensing of activities at nuclear facilities; 3. state supervision on observing the requirements of federal rules and regulations and license conditions. Gosatomnadzor of Russia strives toward solving the problems of consistent safety improvement of facilities and technologies up to the internationally accepted level, acting within the framework of the existing set of special safety rules and regulations in production and use of nuclear energy. Simultaneously, Gosatomnadzor of Russia develops proposals aimed at the improvement of legislative and regulatory bases of the Russian Federation as well as licensing and inspection procedures and implementing them. The main principles that Gosatomnadzor of Russia follows in its practical activities are openness, publicity, and cooperation with juridical and natural persons, whose activities are regulated with the purpose of achieving safety. This cooperation is accomplished in compliance with the principle of separation of responsibilities. According to this principle, the parties that are involved in activities related to the use of nuclear materials and nuclear energy on one hand, and in the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety on the other hand, bear

  16. Environment, safety, and health regulatory implementation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    To identify, document, and maintain the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project's environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) regulatory requirements, the US Department of Energy (DOE) UMTRA Project Office tasked the Technical Assistance Contractor (TAC) to develop a regulatory operating envelope for the UMTRA Project. The system selected for managing the UMTRA regulatory operating envelope data bass is based on the Integrated Project Control/Regulatory Compliance System (IPC/RCS) developed by WASTREN, Inc. (WASTREN, 1993). The IPC/RCS is a tool used for identifying regulatory and institutional requirements and indexing them to hardware, personnel, and program systems on a project. The IPC/RCS will be customized for the UMTRA Project surface remedial action and groundwater restoration programs. The purpose of this plan is to establish the process for implementing and maintaining the UMTRA Project's regulatory operating envelope, which involves identifying all applicable regulatory and institutional requirements and determining compliance status. The plan describes how the Project will identify ES ampersand H regulatory requirements, analyze applicability to the UMTRA Project, and evaluate UMTRA Project compliance status

  17. Range Flight Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loftin, Charles E.; Hudson, Sandra M.

    2018-01-01

    The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

  18. Organizational factors affecting safety implementation in food companies in Thailand.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chinda, Thanwadee

    2014-01-01

    Thai food industry employs a massive number of skilled and unskilled workers. This may result in an industry with high incidences and accident rates. To improve safety and reduce the accident figures, this paper investigates factors influencing safety implementation in small, medium, and large food companies in Thailand. Five factors, i.e., management commitment, stakeholders' role, safety information and communication, supportive environment, and risk, are found important in helping to improve safety implementation. The statistical analyses also reveal that small, medium, and large food companies hold similar opinions on the risk factor, but bear different perceptions on the other 4 factors. It is also found that to improve safety implementation, the perceptions of safety goals, communication, feedback, safety resources, and supervision should be aligned in small, medium, and large companies.

  19. Relationship between general safety requirements and safety culture in the improvement of safe operation of I.N.R. TRIGA reactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciocanescu, M.; Preda, M.; Chiritescu, M.; Dumitru, M.

    1996-01-01

    Acquiring of the basic principles of ''safety culture'' by a large number of profesionals in the nuclear field drew the attention of the decision factors in the INR managerial structure, who decided to promote certain practical actions at each level in order to improve nuclear safety. Starting from the ''Republican Standards for Nuclear Safety'' issued by CSEN in 1975, where general safety criteria are defined for nuclear reactors and NPPs, the specialists at the TRIGA reactor originated and implemented a coherent and secure system to ensure nuclear safety over all steps of nuclear activities: research, conception, execution, commissioning and operation. This system has been continuosly corrected so that now it is completely integrated in a modern safety system. The paper presents the way in which a modern system for nuclear safety at the TRIGA reactor has been implemented and developed, in accordance to specific criteria and requirements imposed by related National Regulations and with the principles of safety culture. Starting from the definition of specific responsabilities, there are presented the internal stipulations and practical actions at all levels in order to enhance nuclear safety. (orig.)

  20. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to all types of radioactive waste disposal facility. It is linked to the fundamental safety principles for each disposal option and establishes a set of strategic requirements that must be in place before facilities are developed. Consideration is also given to the safety of existing facilities developed prior to the establishment of present day standards. The requirements will be complemented by Safety Guides that will provide guidance on good practice for meeting the requirements for different types of waste disposal facility. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Safety requirements for planning for the disposal of radioactive waste; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of a disposal facility; 5. Assurance of safety; 6. Existing disposal facilities; Appendices.

  1. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  2. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  3. Evaluation of Influence Factors within Implementing of Nuclear Safety Culture in Embarking Countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Situmorang, J.

    2016-01-01

    The evaluation of the implementation nuclear safety culture at BATAN has been performed. BATAN is Indonesia’s national nuclear energy agency. Nowadays, BATAN is planning to develop an experimental power reactor. To implement the nuclear safety culture BATAN has issued BATAN chairman regulation (Perka BATAN 200). Perka BATAN is the reference for individuals and organizations to implement nuclear safety culture which includes basic principles, mechanisms, assessment, as well as the implementation of the application of safety culture. It covers the establishment of safety policies, program development, program implementation, development and measurement of safety culture. Each facilities within BATAN is expected to well implement a safety culture. The implementation of safety culture is developed by considering the characteristics, attributes and indicators. The characteristics, attributes and indicators referenced are elaborated from the IAEA. The activities to strengthen safety culture are monthly workshop with participants is head of every facilities, safety leadership training and workshop for safety division manager in every facilities. It is also issued a handbook of safety that is distributed to all employees BATAN.

  4. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  5. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  6. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  7. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  8. Implementing national nuclear safety plan at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xue Yabin; Cui Shaozhang; Pan Fengguo; Zhang Lizhen; Shi Yonggang

    2014-01-01

    This study discusses the importance of nuclear power project design and engineering methods at the preliminary stage of its development on nuclear power plant's operational safety from the professional view. Specifically, we share our understanding of national nuclear safety plan's requirement on new reactor accident probability, technology, site selection, as well as building and improving nuclear safety culture and strengthening public participation, with a focus on plan's implications on preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. Last, we introduce China Huaneng Group's work on nuclear power project preliminary development and the experience accumulated during the process. By analyzing the siting philosophy of nuclear power plant and the necessity of building nuclear safety culture at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development, this study explicates how to fully implement the nuclear safety plan's requirements at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. (authors)

  9. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ''Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ''Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points

  10. University building safety index measurement using risk and implementation matrix

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rahman, A.; Arumsari, F.; Maryani, A.

    2018-04-01

    Many high rise building constructed in several universities in Indonesia. The high-rise building management must provide the safety planning and proper safety equipment in each part of the building. Unfortunately, most of the university in Indonesia have not been applying safety policy yet and less awareness on treating safety facilities. Several fire accidents in university showed that some significant risk should be managed by the building management. This research developed a framework for measuring the high rise building safety index in university The framework is not only assessed the risk magnitude but also designed modular building safety checklist for measuring the safety implementation level. The safety checklist has been developed for 8 types of the university rooms, i.e.: office, classroom, 4 type of laboratories, canteen, and library. University building safety index determined using risk-implementation matrix by measuring the risk magnitude and assessing the safety implementation level. Building Safety Index measurement has been applied in 4 high rise buildings in ITS Campus. The building assessment showed that the rectorate building in secure condition and chemical department building in beware condition. While the library and administration center building was in less secure condition.

  11. EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bouteille, Francois; Czech, Juergen; Sloan, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    features are implemented to satisfy the following safety objectives required by the Safety Authorities: - achieve a significantly lower core melt probability by appropriate prevention means, - achieve the 'preclusion' of accidents liable to cause early containment failure, such as core melt under high pressure conditions, - achieve a major reduction in the radioactive releases, which could result from low pressure core melt accidents. The EPR is furthermore characterized by a robust containment not only with respect to hypothetical loads resulting from a core melt accident but also from external hazards resulting from extreme situations such as an aircraft crash directly on the Nuclear Island buildings. The evolutionary approach chosen by EPR designers thus corresponds to the optimal mix between largely proven solutions derived from the largest experience and innovative features needed to meet new requirements, particularly in the field of safety. (authors)

  12. What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cahen, B.

    2010-01-01

    Bruno Cahen, Director Safety Division (ANDRA) presented the point of view of the NEA Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) on 'What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?' B. Cahen acknowledged that the national experience in siting and developing conceptual designs of geological disposal is growing rapidly. It implies increasing opportunities for interactions between implementers and regulators. There has been large development of international guidance in the recent years. Many regulators have already developed a regulatory framework. The implementers need practical, transparent and deliverable regulations. These regulations should draw on experiences gained from development of geological disposal projects. The IGSC has identified five key questions that the RF may focus on: 1. Over what time frame are the waste deemed to present a hazard? 2. Over what time frames are regulatory criteria applied and do they change over time? 3. Over what time frame(s) are safety assessments required to be conducted? 4. How do implementers have to address uncertainties in the long time frames? 5. What happens after cut-offs: are additional analyses needed? What types of arguments are to be used? Stable, understandable and practical criteria mean, namely, that they need to be developed on a strong scientific and societal basis, that there is consistency of safety options and requirements for different types of waste, that, in the longer time frames, the emphasis is given to robust systems, passive safety and multiple safety functions and that the criteria should fit the various phases of the project (siting, designing, operating, closure and post-closure). Experience feedback from safety cases shows that safety priorities depend very much on time frames. The derived safety criteria for the individual components should lead to measurable, verifiable specifications. The assessment of geological repository post-closure safety

  13. Companies' opinions and acceptance of global food safety initiative benchmarks after implementation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crandall, Phil; Van Loo, Ellen J; O'Bryan, Corliss A; Mauromoustakos, Andy; Yiannas, Frank; Dyenson, Natalie; Berdnik, Irina

    2012-09-01

    International attention has been focused on minimizing costs that may unnecessarily raise food prices. One important aspect to consider is the redundant and overlapping costs of food safety audits. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) has devised benchmarked schemes based on existing international food safety standards for use as a unifying standard accepted by many retailers. The present study was conducted to evaluate the impact of the decision made by Walmart Stores (Bentonville, AR) to require their suppliers to become GFSI compliant. An online survey of 174 retail suppliers was conducted to assess food suppliers' opinions of this requirement and the benefits suppliers realized when they transitioned from their previous food safety systems. The most common reason for becoming GFSI compliant was to meet customers' requirements; thus, supplier implementation of the GFSI standards was not entirely voluntary. Other reasons given for compliance were enhancing food safety and remaining competitive. About 54 % of food processing plants using GFSI benchmarked schemes followed the guidelines of Safe Quality Food 2000 and 37 % followed those of the British Retail Consortium. At the supplier level, 58 % followed Safe Quality Food 2000 and 31 % followed the British Retail Consortium. Respondents reported that the certification process took about 10 months. The most common reason for selecting a certain GFSI benchmarked scheme was because it was widely accepted by customers (retailers). Four other common reasons were (i) the standard has a good reputation in the industry, (ii) the standard was recommended by others, (iii) the standard is most often used in the industry, and (iv) the standard was required by one of their customers. Most suppliers agreed that increased safety of their products was required to comply with GFSI benchmarked schemes. They also agreed that the GFSI required a more carefully documented food safety management system, which often required

  14. Contribution of Rostechnadzor in Implementing the State Nuclear Safety Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferapontov, A.

    2016-01-01

    The report considers major areas of Rostechnadzor activities on implementation of the state policy in the area of nuclear safety, including actions to be implemented. Ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the use of atomic energy is one of the most important components of the national security of the Russian Federation. On March 1, 2012, the President of the Russian Federation approved the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety aimed at consistent reduction of risks associated with man-made impact on the public and the environment in using atomic energy, as well as at prevention of emergencies and accidents in nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities. Rostechnadzor is an authorized body for state safety regulation in the use of atomic energy, which implements functions of regulatory and legal control, licensing of various types of activity and federal state supervision of the atomic energy facilities. The activity in the area of regulatory and legal control is implemented in compliance with the Concept of Enhancement of Regulatory and Legal Control of Safety and Standardization in the Area of the Use of Atomic Energy and the Plan of Implementation of this Concept, which envisages the completion of reviewing the regulatory and legal documents by 2023. Corresponding to the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Federation for the Period of 2025, Rostechnadzor successfully implemented the actions of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2015, creating all conditions for phased reduction of the amounts of nuclear legacy and ensuring radical increase in their level of nuclear and radiation safety. In 2016, Rostechnadzor embarked on implementation of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2030, with creation of infrastructure facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management and definitive response to the challenges of nuclear

  15. The actual development of European aviation safety requirements in aviation medicine: prospects of future EASA requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siedenburg, J

    2009-04-01

    Common Rules for Aviation Safety had been developed under the aegis of the Joint Aviation Authorities in the 1990s. In 2002 the Basic Regulation 1592/2002 was the founding document of a new entity, the European Aviation Safety Agency. Areas of activity were Certification and Maintenance of aircraft. On 18 March the new Basic Regulation 216/2008, repealing the original Basic Regulation was published and applicable from 08 April on. The included Essential Requirements extended the competencies of EASA inter alia to Pilot Licensing and Flight Operations. The future aeromedical requirements will be included as Annex II in another Implementing Regulation on Personnel Licensing. The detailed provisions will be published as guidance material. The proposals for these provisions have been published on 05 June 2008 as NPA 2008- 17c. After public consultation, processing of comments and final adoption the new proposals may be applicable form the second half of 2009 on. A transition period of four year will apply. Whereas the provisions are based on Joint Aviation Requirement-Flight Crew Licensing (JAR-FCL) 3, a new Light Aircraft Pilot Licence (LAPL) project and the details of the associated medical certification regarding general practitioners will be something new in aviation medicine. This paper consists of 6 sections. The introduction outlines the idea of international aviation safety. The second section describes the development of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the first step to common rules for aviation safety in Europe. The third section encompasses a major change as next step: the foundation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the development of its rules. In the following section provides an outline of the new medical requirements. Section five emphasizes the new concept of a Leisure Pilot Licence. The last section gives an outlook on ongoing rulemaking activities and the opportunities of the public to participate in them.

  16. The development of safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorel, M.

    2009-01-01

    This document describes the safety approach followed in France for the design of nuclear reactors. This safety approach is based on safety principles from which stem safety requirements that set limiting values for specific parameters. The improvements in computerized simulation, the use of more adequate new materials, a better knowledge of the concerned physical processes, the changes in the reactor operations (higher discharge burnups for instance) have to be taken into account for the definition of safety criteria and the setting of limiting values. The developments of the safety criteria linked to the risks of cladding failure and loss of primary coolant are presented. (A.C.)

  17. Safety Design Approach for the Development of Safety Requirements for Design of Commercial HTGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohashi, Hirofumi; Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Tachibana, Yukio; Nishihara, Tetsuo; Yan, Xing; Sakaba, Nariaki; Kunitomi, Kazuhiko

    2014-01-01

    The research committee on “Safety requirements for HTGR design” was established in 2013 under the Atomic Energy Society of Japan to develop the draft safety requirements for the design of commercial High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), which incorporate the HTGR safety features demonstrated using the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), lessons learned from the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and requirements for the integration of the hydrogen production plants. The safety design approach for the commercial HTGRs which is a basement of the safety requirements is determined prior to the development of the safety requirements. The safety design approaches for the commercial HTGRs are to confine the radioactive materials within the coated fuel particles not only during normal operation but also during accident conditions, and the integrity of the coated fuel particles and other requiring physical barriers are protected by the inherent and passive safety features. This paper describes the main topics of the research committee, the safety design approaches and the safety functions of the commercial HTGRs determined in the research committee. (author)

  18. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design

  19. Price anderson nuclear safety rules: Impacts of implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varchol, B.D.; Alhadeff, N.

    1995-01-01

    New nuclear safety rules are being implemented at Department of Energy sites. This paper examines the impacts of these rules as each site decides where rules will be implemented, whether implementation activities will be centralized, and how the site management and staff will be introduced to the new rules

  20. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    In accordance with the section 26 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) the safety requirements to be taken into account in planning laboratories and other premises, which affect safety in the use of radioactive materials, are confirmed by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The guide specifies the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive materials are used or stored as unsealed sources. There are also some general instructions concerning work procedures in a radionuclide laboratory

  1. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1994-01-01

    This presentation will describe the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation's (FERMCO) Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RlDs) Program, the unique process used to implement it, and the status of the program. We will also discuss the lessons learned as the program was implemented. The Department of Energy (DOE) established the Fernald site to produce uranium metals for the nation's defense programs in 1953. In 1989, DOE suspended production and, in 1991, the mission of the site was formally changed to one of environmental cleanup and restoration. The site was renamed the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP). FERMCO's mission is to provide safe, early, and least-cost final clean-up of the site in compliance with all regulations and commitments. DOE has managed nuclear facilities primarily through its oversight of Management and Operating contractors. Comprehensive nuclear industry standards were absent when most DOE sites were first established, Management and Operating contractors had to apply existing non-nuclear industry standards and, in many cases, formulate new technical standards. Because it was satisfied with the operation of its facilities, DOE did not incorporate modern practices and standards as they became available. In March 1990, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 90-2, which called for DOE to identify relevant standards and requirements, conduct adequacy assessments of requirements in protecting environmental, public, and worker health and safety, and determine the extent to which the requirements are being implemented. The Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Office of DOE embraced the recommendation for facilities under its control. Strict accountability requirements made it essential that FERMCO and DOE clearly identify applicable requirements necessary, determine the requirements' adequacy, and assess FERMCO's level of compliance

  2. Specific requirements of GS-R3 related to process implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Florescu, N.

    2009-01-01

    The PowerPoint presentation gives: an overview of IAEA management system requirements or topics; - the requirements specific to processes and process implementation; - the key practical challenge of using the process approach specified in IAEA SG GS-G3.1 and GS-G3.5. The following items are thoroughly discussed: - Requirements related to specific process implementation and developing processes; - Process management; Generic management; - System processes: - Control of documents; Control of products; Control of records; - Purchasing; - Communication; - Managing organizational change; - Other requirements concerning the process management system; - General management system; - Grading; - Documentation; - Fulfilling the requirements of interested parties; - Management responsibility; - Planning responsibility and authority for the management system monitoring and measurement; - Independent assessment; - Management system review; - Non-conformances, corrective and preventive actions; - Improvement key practical challenge of using the process approach specified in IAEA SG GS-G3.1 and GS-G3.5; - Key challenge: - Process common to all stages; - Phases of process development proposed by IAEA. The following conclusions complete the presentation: GS-R-3 sets basic requirements for process-based integrated management system; - Some key generic processes required, no specific process model favoured namely, no reference to management, core and support processes; - Up to organization to determine appropriate process model; - Easily applicable to a wide range of facilities and activities, including those of a regulatory body; - Specific requirements are found in specific Safety Guide. (author)

  3. Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wetherholt, Martha S.; Radley, Charles F.

    1994-01-01

    Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of

  4. Implementation of radiation safety program in a medical institution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palanca, Elena D.

    1999-01-01

    A medical institution that utilizes radiation for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of malignancies develops and implements a radiation safety program to keep occupational exposures of radiation workers and exposures of non-radiation workers and the public to the achievable and a more achievable minimum, to optimize the use of radiation, and to prevent misadministration. The hospital radiation safety program is established by a core medical radiation committee composed of trained radiation safety officers and head of authorized users of radioactive materials and radiation machines from the different departments. The radiation safety program sets up procedural guidelines of the safe use of radioactive material and of radiation equipment. It offers regular training to radiation workers and radiation safety awareness courses to hospital staff. The program has a comprehensive radiation safety information system or radsis that circularizes the radiation safety program in the hospital. The radsis keeps the drafted and updated records of safety guides and policies, radioactive material and equipment inventory, personnel dosimetry reports, administrative, regulatory and licensing activity document, laboratory procedures, emergency procedures, quality assurance and quality control program process, physics and dosimetry procedures and reports, personnel and hospital staff training program. The medical radiation protection committee is tasked to oversee the actual implementation of the radiation safety guidelines in the different radiation facilities in the hospital, to review personnel exposures, incident reports and ALARA actions, operating procedures, facility inspections and audit reports, to evaluate the existing radiation safety procedures, to make necessary changes to these procedures, and make modifications of course content of the training program. The effective implementation of the radiation safety program provides increased confidence that the physician and

  5. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  6. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  7. Safety requirements applicable to the SMART design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seul, Kwang Won; Kim, Wee Kyong; Kim, Hho Jung

    1999-01-01

    The 330 MW thermal power of integral reactor, named SMART (System integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination application and electricity generation. The final product of nuclear desalination plant (NDP) is electricity and fresh water. Thus, in addition to the protection of the public around the plant facility from the possible release of radioactive materials, the fresh water should be prevented from radioactivity contamination. In this study, to ensure the safety of SMART reactor in the early stage of design development, the safety requirements applicable to the SMART design were investigated, based on the current regulatory requirements for the existing NPPs and the advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs. The interface requirements related to the desalination facility were also investigated, based on the recent IAEA research activities pertaining to the NDP. As a result, it was found that the current regulatory requirements and guidance for the existing NPPs and advanced LWR designs are applicable to the SMART design and its safety evaluation. However, the safety requirements related to the SMART-specific design and the desalination plant are needed to develop in the future to assure the safety of the SMART reactor

  8. Implementing the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP) to Improve Patient Safety in an Academic Primary Care Practice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pitts, Samantha I; Maruthur, Nisa M; Luu, Ngoc-Phuong; Curreri, Kimberly; Grimes, Renee; Nigrin, Candace; Sateia, Heather F; Sawyer, Melinda D; Pronovost, Peter J; Clark, Jeanne M; Peairs, Kimberly S

    2017-11-01

    While there is growing awareness of the risk of harm in ambulatory health care, most patient safety efforts have focused on the inpatient setting. The Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program (CUSP) has been an integral part of highly successful safety efforts in inpatient settings. In 2014 CUSP was implemented in an academic primary care practice. As part of CUSP implementation, staff and clinicians underwent training on the science of safety and completed a two-question safety assessment survey to identify safety concerns in the practice. The concerns identified by team members were used to select two initial safety priorities. The impact of CUSP on safety climate and teamwork was assessed through a pre-post comparison of results on the validated Safety Attitudes Questionnaire. Ninety-six percent of staff completed science of safety training as part of CUSP implementation, and 100% of staff completed the two-question safety assessment. The most frequently identified safety concerns were related to medications (n = 11, 28.2), diagnostic testing (n = 9, 25), and communication (n = 5, 14). The CUSP team initially prioritized communication and infection control, which led to standardization of work flows within the practice. Six months following CUSP implementation, large but nonstatistically significant increases were found for the percentage of survey respondents who reported knowledge of the proper channels for questions about patient safety, felt encouraged to report safety concerns, and believed that the work setting made it easy to learn from the errors of others. CUSP is a promising tool to improve safety climate and to identify and address safety concerns within ambulatory health care. Copyright © 2017 The Joint Commission. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. HTR-PM Safety requirement and Licensing experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Fu; Zhang Zuoyi; Dong Yujie; Wu Zongxin; Sun Yuliang

    2014-01-01

    HTR-PM is a 200MWe modular pebble bed high temperature reactor demonstration plant which is being built in Shidao Bay, Weihai, Shandong, China. The main design parameters of HTR-PM were fixed in 2006, the basic design was completed in 2008. The review of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of HTR-PM was started in April 2008, completed in September 2009. In general, HTR- PM design complies with the current safety requirement for nuclear power plant in China, no special standards are developed for modular HTR. Anyway, Chinese Nuclear Safety Authority, together with the designers, developed some dedicated design criteria for key systems and components and published the guideline for the review of safety analysis report of HTR-PM, based on the experiences from licensing of HTR-10 and new development of nuclear safety. The probabilistic safety goal for HTR-PM was also defined by the safety authority. The review of HTR-PM PSAR lasted for one and a half years, with 3 dialogues meetings and 8 topics meetings, with more than 2000 worksheets and answer sheets. The heavily discussed topics during the PSAR review process included: the requirement for the sub-atmospheric ventilation system, the utilization of PSA in design process, the scope of beyond design basis accidents, the requirement for the qualification of TRISO coating particle fuel, and etc. Because of the characteristics of first of a kind for the demonstration plant, the safety authority emphasized the requirement for the experiment and validation, the PSAR was licensed with certain licensing conditions. The whole licensing process was under control, and was re-evaluated again after Fukushima accident to be shown that the design of HTR-PM complies with current safety requirement. This is a good example for how to license a new reactor. (author)

  10. Geological disposal of radioactive waste. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication is concerned with providing protection to people and the environment from the hazards associated with waste management activities related to disposal, i.e. hazards that could arise during the operating period and following closure. It sets out the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management. It is intended for use by those involved in radioactive waste management and in making decisions in relation to the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities, especially those concerned with the related regulatory aspects. This publication contains 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. The safety requirements for geological disposal; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities; Appendix: Assurance of compliance with the safety objective and criteria; Annex I: Geological disposal and the principles of radioactive waste management; Annex II: Principles of radioactive waste management

  11. Guidelines for implementation of RCM on safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Woon; Brijendra Singh.

    1996-04-01

    Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology was originally developed by the commercial airlines industry in the early 1960s for identifying applicable and effective preventive maintenance tasks and as currently used in nuclear power industry. Effective maintenance of the systems at a nuclear power plant (NPP) is essential for its safe and reliable operation. Reliability Centered Maintenance at NPP is the program to assure that plant systems remain within an original design criteria and are not adversely affected during the plant life time. The aim of this report is to provide the guidelines to implement the RCM approach on NPP safety systems. Safety systems are usually standby and therefore, we need to periodically detect and repair failures that may have occurred since the previous activation or inspection the equipment. The RCM guidelines are intended to help identify the failure modes and related root causes and then decide the maintenance policies to achieve the high level of safety and reliability. The RCM is intended to improve or maintain high levels of system reliability and plant availability. Since the reliability of plant systems will be improved, the plant safety correspondingly will be increased. Another goal of RCM is to optimize the maintenance and surveillance tasks such that the overall level of resources required to accomplish essential tasks is kept to minimum. RCM also strives to eliminate unnecessary corrective maintenance and to select yet most cost-effective approach to maintenance, testing and inspection for system components. 9 refs. (Author) .new

  12. Implementation of a patient safety program at a tertiary health system: A longitudinal analysis of interventions and serious safety events.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cropper, Douglas P; Harb, Nidal H; Said, Patricia A; Lemke, Jon H; Shammas, Nicolas W

    2018-04-01

    We hypothesize that implementation of a safety program based on high reliability organization principles will reduce serious safety events (SSE). The safety program focused on 7 essential elements: (a) safety rounding, (b) safety oversight teams, (c) safety huddles, (d) safety coaches, (e) good catches/safety heroes, (f) safety education, and (g) red rule. An educational curriculum was implemented focusing on changing high-risk behaviors and implementing critical safety policies. All unusual occurrences were captured in the Midas system and investigated by risk specialists, the safety officer, and the chief medical officer. A multidepartmental committee evaluated these events, and a root cause analysis (RCA) was performed. Events were tabulated and serious safety event (SSE) recorded and plotted over time. Safety success stories (SSSs) were also evaluated over time. A steady drop in SSEs was seen over 9 years. Also a rise in SSSs was evident, reflecting on staff engagement in the program. The parallel change in SSEs, SSSs, and the implementation of various safety interventions highly suggest that the program was successful in achieving its goals. A safety program based on high-reliability organization principles and made a core value of the institution can have a significant positive impact on reducing SSEs. © 2018 American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of the American Hospital Association.

  13. Requirements and international co-operation in nuclear safety for evolutionary light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1999-01-01

    The principles of safety are now well known and implemented world-wide, leading to a situation of harmonisation in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Future reactors are expected not only to meet current requirements but to go beyond the safety level presently accepted. To this end, technical safety requirements, as defined by the IAEA document Safety Fundamentals, need be duly considered in the design, the risks to workers and population must be decreased, a stable, transparent and objective regulatory process, including an international harmonisation with respect to licensing of new reactors, must be developed, and the issue of public acceptance must be addressed. Well-performing existing installations are seen as a prerequisite for an improved public acceptability; there should be no major accidents, the results from safety performance indicators must be unquestionable, and compliance with internationally harmonised criteria is essential. Economical competitiveness is another factor that influences the acceptability; the costs for constructing the plant, for its operation and maintenance, for the fuel cycle, and for the final decommissioning are of paramount importance. Plant simplification, longer fuel cycles, life extension are appealing options, but safety will have first priority. The IAEA can play an important role in this field, by providing peer reviews by teams of international experts and assistance to Member States on the use of its safety standards. (author)

  14. [How patient safety programmes can be successfully implemented - an example from Switzerland].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kobler, Irene; Mascherek, Anna; Bezzola, Paula

    2015-01-01

    Internationally, the implementation of patient safety programmes poses a major challenge. In the first part, we will demonstrate that various measures have been found to be effective in the literature but that they often do not reach the patient because their implementation proves difficult. Difficulties arise from both the complexity of the interventions themselves and from different organisational settings in individual hospitals. The second part specifically describes the implementation of patient safety improvement programmes in Switzerland and discusses measures intended to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of implementation in Switzerland. Then, the national pilot programme to improve patient safety in surgery is presented, which was launched by the federal Swiss government and has been implemented by the patient safety foundation. Procedures, challenges and highlights in implementing the programme in Switzerland on a national level are outlined. Finally, first (preliminary) results are presented and critically discussed. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier GmbH.

  15. Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements apply to all those practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention and that are: (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the sponsoring organizations to provide for the application of the requirements. (B) Used by States with the assistance of the FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, OCHA or WHO in compliance with applicable national rules and regulations. (C) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or supervision. Or (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to provide for the application of the requirements. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors. Facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores. Facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities. Facilities for the management of radioactive waste. The transport of radioactive material. Sources of radiation used in

  16. Status of NDE research in the US-contributions of NDE to reactor safety and implementation of NDE technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ammirato, F. [EPRI, Charlotte, NC (United States)

    1999-08-01

    Power plant designers, plant owners, and regulators have developed inservice inspection (ISI) programs as part of their comprehensive approach to ensuring nuclear safety. This paper examines the role of ISI in reactor safety through several examples drawn from recent industry initiatives to address implementation of effective examination technology for nuclear power plant piping, and BWR and PWR reactor pressure vessels. These examples also illustrate the importance of well designed performance demonstration activities to support application of effective ISI. Finally, the efforts required to implement effective ISI technology for field inspection is addressed. (orig./DGE)

  17. Site safety requirements for high level waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Weiming; Wang Ju

    2006-01-01

    This paper outlines the content, status and trend of site safety requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency, America, France, Sweden, Finland and Japan. Site safety requirements are usually represented as advantageous vis-a-vis disadvantagous conditions, and potential advantage vis-a-vis disadvantage conditions, respectively in aspects of geohydrology, geochemistry, lithology, climate and human intrusion etc. Study framework and steps of site safety requirements for China are discussed under the view of systems science. (authors)

  18. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  19. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

  20. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for an Environmental Restoration Management Contractor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of the Standards/Requirements Identification Program, developed partially in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, was to identify applicable requirements that established the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor's (ERMC) responsibilities and authorities under the Environmental Restoration Management Contract, determine the adequacy of these requirements, ascertain a baseline level of compliance with them, and implement a maintenance program that would keep the program current as requirements or compliance levels change. The resultant Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RIDs) consolidate the applicable requirements. These documents govern the development of procedures and manuals to ensure compliance with the requirements. Twenty-four such documents, corresponding with each functional area identified at the site, are to be issued. These requirements are included in the contractor's management plan

  1. Design and implementation of a safety health and environment management system in BHP Petroleum

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattes, B.W.; Walters, C. [BHP Petroleum, Melbourne, VIC (Australia)

    1995-12-31

    The Australian/Asian operations group within BHP Petroleum (BHPP) is implementing and integrated management system with safety, occupational health and environmental elements as crucial components of all BHPP operations. Responsibility for the development, implementation and maintenance of the management system, and compliance with its provisions, rests with line management, a logical extension of the accountability and responsibility for safety, health and environment matters that rests with line managers within BHPP. Contractors are scrutinized to assess their safety, health and environmental performance and failure to meet minimal standards will result in their disqualification. The effectiveness of the BHPP Management System is yet to be fully determined, however, it will be measured against the performance of the company in the areas of zero lost time due to injuries, a drop in incidences requiring medical treatment or first aid, lower absenteeism and workers compensation bills, no oil spills, less car accidents, less back pain and RSI, better management of waste emissions to air, land and sea, and less equipment breakdowns. The trend in improved safety, health and environment performance are already apparent and auger well for the Company as it moves towards the new millennium. 7 figs., 2 photos., 4 refs.

  2. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program

  3. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-05-19

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program.

  4. Safety requirements in the design of research reactors: A Canadian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, A.G.; Langman, V.J.

    2000-01-01

    In Canada, the formal development of safety requirements for the design of research reactors in general began under an inter-organizational Small Reactor Criteria Committee. This committee developed safety and licensing criteria for use by several small reactor projects in their licensing discussions with the Atomic Energy Control Board. The small reactor projects or facilities represented included the MAPLE-X10 reactor, the proposed SES-10 heating reactor and its prototype, the SDR reactor at the Whiteshell Laboratories, the Korea Multipurpose Research Reactor (a.k.a., HANARO) in Korea, the SCORE project, and the McMaster University Nuclear Reactor. The top level set of criteria which form a safety philosophy and serve as a framework for more detailed developments was presented at an IAEA Conference in 1989. AECL continued this work to develop safety principles and design criteria for new small reactors. The first major application of this work has been to the design, safety analysis and licensing of the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors for the MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor Project. This paper provides an overview of the safety principles and design criteria. Examples of an implementation of these safety principles and design criteria are drawn from the work to design the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors. (author)

  5. The Implementation and Maintenance of a Behavioral Safety Process in a Petroleum Refinery

    Science.gov (United States)

    Myers, Wanda V.; McSween, Terry E.; Medina, Rixio E.; Rost, Kristen; Alvero, Alicia M.

    2010-01-01

    A values-centered and team-based behavioral safety process was implemented in a petroleum oil refinery. Employee teams defined the refinery's safety values and related practices, which were used to guide the process design and implementation. The process included (a) a safety assessment; (b) the clarification of safety-related values and related…

  6. Improving safety culture in hospitals: Facilitators and barriers to implementation of Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zecevic, Aleksandra A; Li, Alvin Ho-Ting; Ngo, Charity; Halligan, Michelle; Kothari, Anita

    2017-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to assess the facilitators and barriers to implementation of the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM) on selected hospital units. A cross-sectional explanatory mixed methods design was used to converge results from a standardized safety culture survey with themes that emerged from interviews and focus groups. Findings were organized by six elements of the Ottawa Model of Research Use framework. A geriatric rehabilitation unit of an acute care hospital and a neurological unit of a rehabilitation hospital were selected purposefully due to the high frequency of falls. Hospital staff who took part in: surveys (n = 39), interviews (n = 10) and focus groups (n = 12), and 38 people who were interviewed during falls investigations: fallers, family, unit staff and hospital management. Implementation of the SFIM to investigate fall occurrences. Percent of positive responses on the Modified Stanford Patient Safety Culture Survey Instrument converged with qualitative themes on facilitators and barriers for intervention implementation. Both hospital units had an overall poor safety culture which hindered intervention implementation. Facilitators were hospital accreditation, strong emphasis on patient safety, infrastructure and dedicated champions. Barriers included heavy workloads, lack of time, lack of resources and poor communication. Successful implementation of SFIM requires regulatory and organizational support, committed frontline staff and allocation of resources to identify active causes and latent contributing factors to falls. System-wide adjustments show promise for promotion of safety culture in hospitals where falls happen regularly. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

  7. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S.; Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H.

    2016-01-01

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified

  8. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S. [KINS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H. [Formal Works Inc., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified.

  9. Nuclear safety policy working group recommendations on nuclear propulsion safety for the space exploration initiative

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marshall, Albert C.; Lee, James H.; Mcculloch, William H.; Sawyer, J. Charles, Jr.; Bari, Robert A.; Cullingford, Hatice S.; Hardy, Alva C.; Niederauer, George F.; Remp, Kerry; Rice, John W.

    1993-01-01

    An interagency Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program. These recommendations, which are contained in this report, should facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG has recommended a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the SEI nuclear propulsion safety program. In addition, the NSPWG has reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. These recommendations should be useful for the development of the program's top-level requirements for safety functions (referred to as Safety Functional Requirements). The safety requirements and guidelines address the following topics: reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations.

  10. PATIENT SAFETY IN SURGERY: THE QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT SAFETY CHECKLISTS IN A REGIONAL HOSPITAL

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    V. Karyadinata

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available Introduction. Patient safety and the avoidance of inhospital adverse events is a key focus of clinical practice and medical audit. A large of proportion of medical errors affect surgical patients in the peri-operative setting. Safety checklists have been adopted by the medical profession from the aviation industry as a cheap and reliable method of avoiding errors which arise from complex or stressful situations. Current evidence suggests that the use of periooperative checklists has led to a decrease in surgical morbidity and hospital costs. Aim. To assess the quality of implementation of a modified patient safety checklist in a UK district general hospital. Methods. An observational tool was designed to assess in real time the peri-operative performance of the surgical safety checklist in patients undergoing general surgical, urological or orthopaedic procedures. Initiation of the checklist, duration of performance and staff participation were audited in real time. Results. 338 cases were monitored. Nurses were most active in initiating the safety checklist. The checklist was performed successfully in less than a minute in most cases. 11-24% of staff (according to professional group present in the operating room did not participate in the checklist. Critical safety checks (patient identity and procedure name were performed in all cases across all specialties. Variations were noted in checking other categories, such as deep vein thrombosis (DVT prophylaxis or patient warming. Conclusions. There is still a potential for improving the practice and culture of surgical patient safety activities. Staff training and designation of patient safety leadership roles is needed in increasing compliance and implementation of patient safety mechanism, such as peri-operative checklists. There is significant data to advocate the need to implement patient safety surgical checklists internationally

  11. Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lutz, Robyn R.

    1993-01-01

    This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

  12. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  13. Meeting the maglev system's safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pierick, K

    1983-12-01

    The author shows how the safety requirements of the maglev track system derive from the general legal conditions for the safety of tracked transport. It is described how their compliance beyond the so-called ''development-accompanying'' and ''acceptance-preparatory'' safety work can be assured for the Transrapid test layout (TVE) now building in Emsland and also for later application as public transport system in Germany within the meaning of the General Railway Act.

  14. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  15. 78 FR 46560 - Pipeline Safety: Class Location Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... class location requirements for gas transmission pipelines. Section 5 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory... and, with respect to gas transmission pipeline facilities, whether applying IMP requirements to...

  16. Development of safety-related regulatory requirements for nuclear power in developing countries. Key issue paper no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, K.I.

    2000-01-01

    In implementing a national nuclear power program, balanced regulatory requirements are necessary to ensure nuclear safety and cost competitive nuclear power, and to help gain public acceptance. However, this is difficult due to the technology-intensive nature of the nuclear regulatory requirements, the need to reflect evolving technology and the need for cooperation among multidisciplinary technical groups. This paper suggests approaches to development of balanced nuclear regulatory requirements in developing countries related to nuclear power plant safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management along with key technical regulatory issues. It does not deal with economic or market regulation of electric utilities using nuclear power. It suggests that national regulatory requirements be developed using IAEA safety recommendations as guidelines and safety requirements of the supplier country as a main reference after careful planning, manpower buildup and thorough study of international and supplier country's regulations. Regulation making is not recommended before experienced manpower has been accumulated. With an option that the supplier country's regulations may be used in the interim, the lack of complete national regulatory requirements should not deter introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. (author)

  17. Safety culture enhancement through the implementation of IAEA guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mengolini, A.; Debarberis, L.

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents the methodology applied and the results achieved in adapting and implementing the IAEA guidelines on safety culture to a research reactor as a step towards supporting its Life Management Program. The background is presented together with the effort undertaken to develop awareness on safety culture and the enhancement programme hereafter developed. The present study shows how issues of safety culture, management awareness and commitment deserve attention and can be of fundamental relevance also for research reactors. The study presents how guidelines developed specifically for nuclear power installations (NPPs) can be adapted to meet the needs and peculiarities of other nuclear installations. Moreover, the difficulties met during the implementation of the guidelines are discussed and important information and lessons can be learnt for the nuclear industry in general

  18. Safety Assurance Process for FRMS : EJcase Implementation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Stewart, S.; Koornneef, F.; Akselsson, R.; Barton, P.

    2009-01-01

    Chapter 6: Safety Assurance Process for FRMS - eJcase Implementation The European Commission HILAS project (Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems - a project supported by the European Commission’s 6th Framework between 2005-2009) was focused on using human factors knowledge and

  19. Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huls, Dale Thomas; Meehan, Kevin

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Colimbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational

  20. [Evidence-based clinical oral healthcare guidelines 4. Adherence requires an implementation strategy].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Braspenning, J C C; Mettes, T G P H; van der Sanden, W J M; Wensing, M J P

    2015-03-01

    Adherence to clinical guidelines requires support in practice. However, systematic implementation of evidence-based guidelines is not common practice in oral healthcare. The Knowledge Institute Oral Care (KiMo) offers the opportunity to take into account potential barriers and facilitators during the development of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. These factors which are relevant to the guideline and the oral healthcare practice provide the ingredients for a tailor-made programme of implementation that has a scientific basis. Elements of any implementation programme are the quality indicators derived from the oral healthcare guidelines. These indicators should fit, on the one hand, the specific goals of the guidelines (patient safety, effectiveness, efficiency, patient-centred, timeliness, accessibility) and, onthe other hand, the various perspectives of the different stakeholders, such as patients, caregivers, health insurers and inspectorate. These quality indicators provide information on adherence to the guidelines, the results of a certain treatment and the success of the implementation strategy, all with the aim to improve the quality of oral healthcare.

  1. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-01-01

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

  2. International standardization of safety requirements for fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is conducting the FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project in cooperation with Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Mitsubishi FBR systems inc. (MFBR), where an advanced loop-type fast reactor named JSFR (Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) is being developed. It is important to develop software technologies (a safety guideline, safety design criteria, safety design standards etc.) of FBRs as well as hardware ones (a reactor plant itself) in order to address prospective worldwide utilization of FBR technology. Therefore, it is expected to establish a rational safety guideline applicable to the JSFR and harmonized with national nuclear-safety regulations as well, including Japan, the United States and the European Union. This report presents domestic and international status of safety guideline development for sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), results of comparative study for safety requirements provided in existing documents and a proposal for safety requirements of future SFRs with a roadmap for their refinement and worldwide utilization. (author)

  3. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  4. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication applies to the disposal of radioactive waste of all types by means of emplacement in designed disposal facilities, subject to the necessary limitations and controls being placed on the disposal of the waste and on the development, operation and closure of facilities. The classification of radioactive waste is discussed. This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements to provide assurance of the radiation safety of the disposal of radioactive waste, in the operation of a disposal facility and especially after its closure. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This is achieved by setting requirements on the site selection and evaluation and design of a disposal facility, and on its construction, operation and closure, including organizational and regulatory requirements.

  5. Implementing evidence-based policy in a network setting: road safety policy in the Netherlands.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bax, Charlotte; de Jong, Martin; Koppenjan, Joop

    2010-01-01

    In the early 1990s, in order to improve road safety in The Netherlands, the Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV) developed an evidence-based "Sustainable Safety" concept. Based on this concept, Dutch road safety policy, was seen as successful and as a best practice in Europe. In The Netherlands, the policy context has now changed from a sectoral policy setting towards a fragmented network in which safety is a facet of other transport-related policies. In this contribution, it is argued that the implementation strategy underlying Sustainable Safety should be aligned with the changed context. In order to explore the adjustments needed, two perspectives of policy implementation are discussed: (1) national evidence-based policies with sectoral implementation; and (2) decentralized negotiation on transport policy in which road safety is but one aspect. We argue that the latter approach matches the characteristics of the newly evolved policy context best, and conclude with recommendations for reformulating the implementation strategy.

  6. Understanding middle managers' influence in implementing patient safety culture.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gutberg, Jennifer; Berta, Whitney

    2017-08-22

    The past fifteen years have been marked by large-scale change efforts undertaken by healthcare organizations to improve patient safety and patient-centered care. Despite substantial investment of effort and resources, many of these large-scale or "radical change" initiatives, like those in other industries, have enjoyed limited success - with practice and behavioural changes neither fully adopted nor ultimately sustained - which has in large part been ascribed to inadequate implementation efforts. Culture change to "patient safety culture" (PSC) is among these radical change initiatives, where results to date have been mixed at best. This paper responds to calls for research that focus on explicating factors that affect efforts to implement radical change in healthcare contexts, and focuses on PSC as the radical change implementation. Specifically, this paper offers a novel conceptual model based on Organizational Learning Theory to explain the ability of middle managers in healthcare organizations to influence patient safety culture change. We propose that middle managers can capitalize on their unique position between upper and lower levels in the organization and engage in 'ambidextrous' learning that is critical to implementing and sustaining radical change. This organizational learning perspective offers an innovative way of framing the mid-level managers' role, through both explorative and exploitative activities, which further considers the necessary organizational context in which they operate.

  7. The main requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, G.A.M.

    1998-01-01

    The main requirements of the new international basic safety standards are discussed, including such topics as health effects of ionizing radiations, the revision of basic safety standards, the requirements for radiation protection practices, the requirements for intervention,and the field of regulatory infrastructures. (A.K.)

  8. A strategic approach for Water Safety Plans implementation in Portugal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vieira, Jose M P

    2011-03-01

    Effective risk assessment and risk management approaches in public drinking water systems can benefit from a systematic process for hazards identification and effective management control based on the Water Safety Plan (WSP) concept. Good results from WSP development and implementation in a small number of Portuguese water utilities have shown that a more ambitious nationwide strategic approach to disseminate this methodology is needed. However, the establishment of strategic frameworks for systematic and organic scaling-up of WSP implementation at a national level requires major constraints to be overcome: lack of legislation and policies and the need for appropriate monitoring tools. This study presents a framework to inform future policy making by understanding the key constraints and needs related to institutional, organizational and research issues for WSP development and implementation in Portugal. This methodological contribution for WSP implementation can be replicated at a global scale. National health authorities and the Regulator may promote changes in legislation and policies. Independent global monitoring and benchmarking are adequate tools for measuring the progress over time and for comparing the performance of water utilities. Water utilities self-assessment must include performance improvement, operational monitoring and verification. Research and education and resources dissemination ensure knowledge acquisition and transfer.

  9. Safety Requirements and Modern Technical Requirements in Human Information Systems in Amman Hotels

    OpenAIRE

    Farouq Ahmad Alazzam; Sattam Rakan Allahawiah; Mohammad Nayef Alsarayreh; Kafa Hmoud Abdallah al Nawaiseh

    2015-01-01

    This study aimed to demonstrate the availability of Safety requirements and modern technical requirements in human information systems in Amman hotels. an the most important results of this study is the availability of security and safety requirements in human information systems In Amman hotels and The adequacy of the information that it provided .and show that all departments are not connected by appropriate and effective communication networks in adequate form . Also sophisticated operatin...

  10. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  11. Current regulatory developments concerning the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses for external hazards in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krauss, Matias; Berg, Heinz-Peter

    2014-01-01

    Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). This expert group, led by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), has the task to advise the BMU on all methodological issues for the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses and has elaborated two publications on methods and data for PSA with the aim to support a unified application of the PSA in Germany. With the publication 'Safety requirements for nuclear power plants', a modern version of a German nuclear safety regulations has been published. In this regulation the broad experience of the application of the periodic safety reviews have been incorporated as a key element of regulatory supervision. Further key findings from the European safety review of nuclear power plants were taken into account after the accident at Fukushima. The revision also paid special attention to the requirements and recommendations of WENRA and IAEA. In addition, the recommendations and guidelines of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) and the expert group on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA FAK) have also been updated. The activities of the updates have been focused the natural external hazards 'earthquake' and 'flooding' in the German regulations: - Probabilistic assessment for retrofit measures in individual cases for all operating modes and the PSA level 1 and level 2 is possible. - Deterministic and probabilistic site hazard analysis for the events 'earthquake' and 'flood' are required. - For the event 'earthquake' according to IAEA plants receives a minimum design comparable to 0.1 g >concept. - Furthermore, a seismic instrumentation independent of the location of intensity is required for each installation. - The importance of quality assured plant walk downs to determine the specified plant conditions was explicitly emphasized and required measures to ensure. - Furthermore, the existing methods for their applicability verified the associated generic data base for PSA updated. - The

  12. Development and implementation of setpoint tolerances for special safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliva, A.F.; Balog, G.; Parkinson, D.G.; Archinoff, G.H.

    1991-01-01

    The establishment of tolerances and impairment limits for special safety system setpoints is part of the process whereby the plant operator demonstrates to the regulatory authority that the plant operates safely and within the defined plant licensing envelope. The licensing envelope represents the set of limits and plant operating state and for which acceptably safe plant operation has been demonstrated by the safety analysis. By definition, operation beyond this envelope contributes to overall safety system unavailability. Definition of the licensing envelope is provided in a wide range of documents including the plant operating licence, the safety report, and the plant operating policies and principles documents. As part of the safety analysis, limits are derived for each special safety system initiating parameter such that the relevant safety design objectives are achieved for all design basis events. If initiation on a given parameter occurs at a level beyond its limit, there is a potential reduction in safety system effectiveness relative to the performance credited in the plant safety analysis. These safety system parameter limits, when corrected for random and systematic instrument errors and other errors inherent in the process of periodic testing or calibration, are then used to derive parameter impairment levels and setpoint tolerances. This paper describes the methodology that has evolved at Ontario Hydro for developing and implementing tolerances for special safety system parameters (i.e., the shutdown systems, emergency coolant injection system and containment system). Tolerances for special safety system initiation setpoints are addressed specifically, although many of the considerations discussed here will apply to performance limits for other safety system components. The first part of the paper deals with the approach that has been adopted for defining and establishing setpoint limits and tolerances. The remainder of the paper addresses operational

  13. Lean Six-Sigma in Aviation Safety: An implementation guide for measuring aviation system’s safety performance

    OpenAIRE

    Panagopoulos, I.; Atkin, C.J.; Sikora, I.

    2016-01-01

    The paper introduces a conceptual framework that could improve the safety performance measurement process and ultimately the aviation system safety performance. The framework provides an implementation guide on how organisations could design and develop a proactive, measurement tool for assessing and measuring the Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) at sigma (σ) level, a statistical measurement unit. In fact, the methodology adapts and combines quality management tools, a leading i...

  14. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  15. Implementation of the safety assessment in the practice of industrial radiography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alfonso Pallarés, C.; Pérez Reyes, Y.

    2015-01-01

    The CNSN as regulatory authority has regulatory control processes based on regulations, permits, inspections and limitation to ensure the supervision and control of the practice of industrial radiography. On the other hand in the light of the new regulations approved and being implemented such as: Resolution 334/2011 CITMA 'Regulation on Notification and authorization of practices and activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation sources' and Resolution 17 / 2012, Security Guide: Security Assessment Practices and Activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation (recommendatory), it is necessary for compliance with regulatory requirements concerning the safety assessment. Since 2009 it has been applied this experience in different medical practices and industry, providing a systematic and consistent basis, to the safety assessment of all facilities and activities, which has helped increase the confidence that has been achieved an adequate level of security. The work was able to identify that there is a group of barriers operating in the risk reduction in various accident sequences and therefore have a relative importance in risk reduction, recommendations in this regard to improve the program management of safety in the practice of industrial radiography. [es

  16. Implementation of probabilistic safety concepts in international codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borges, J.F.

    1977-01-01

    Recent progress in the implementation of safety concepts in international structure codes is briefly presented. Special attention is paid to the work of the Joint-Committee on Structural Safety. The discussion is centered on some problems such as: safety differentiation, definition and combination of actions, spaces for checking safety and non-linear structural behaviour. When discussing safety differentiation it should be considered that the total probability of failure derives from a theoretical probability of failure and a probability of failure due to error and gross negligence. Optimization of design criteria should take into account both causes of failure. The quantification of reliability implies a probabilistic idealization of all basic variables. Steps taken to obtain an improved definition of different types of actions and rules for their combination are described. Safety checking can be carried out in terms of basic variables, action-effects, or any other suitable variable. However, the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of formulation should be discussed, particularly in the case of non-linear structural behaviour. (orig.) [de

  17. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's financial guarantee requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferch, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) the legal authority to require licensees to provide financial guarantees in order to meet the purposes of the Act. CNSC policy and guidance with regard to financial guarantees is outlined, and the current status of financial guarantee requirements as applied to various CNSC licensees is described. (author)

  18. Key elements on implementing an occupational health and safety management system using ISO 45001 standard

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Darabont Doru Costin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Occupational health and safety (OHS management system is one of the main elements of the company’s general management system. During last decade, Romanian companies gained a valuable experience on implementing this type of management systems, using OHSAS 18001 referential and standard. However, the projected release of the ISO 45001 represents a new approach which requires the companies to take in consideration new key elements for a successful implementation of the OHS management system. The aim of the paper is to identify and analyse these key elements, by integration of the following issues: standard requirements, Romanian OHS legislation and good practice examples, including the general control measures for new and emerging risks such as psycho-social risks, workforce ageing and new technologies. The study results represent an important work instrument for each company interested to implement or upgrade its OHS management system using ISO 45001 standard and could be used regardless the company size or activity domain.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  20. Implementation of safety goals in NRC's regulatory process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murley, T.E.

    1985-01-01

    In May 1983 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a policy statement on Safety Goals For Nuclear Power Plant Operation. The Commission at the same time judged that a two-year evaluation period was necessary to judge the effectiveness of the goals and design objectives, and directed the staff to develop information and understanding as to how to further define and use the design objectives and the cost-benefit guidelines. In carrying out the Commission's mandate, the staff framed three major questions to be addressed during the safety goal evaluation period. These three questions are: 1) to what extent is it practical to use safety goals in the regulatory process. 2) Should the quantitative design objectives be modified or supplemented. If so, how. 3) How should the safety goals be implemented at the end of the evaluation period. The staff's conclusions are discussed

  1. High-Speed Maglev Trains; German Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-12-31

    This document is a translation of technology-specific safety requirements developed : for the German Transrapid Maglev technology. These requirements were developed by a : working group composed of representatives of German Federal Railways (DB), Tes...

  2. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  3. Implications of safety requirements for the treatment of THMC processes in geological disposal systems for radioactive waste

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Frédéric Bernier

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The mission of nuclear safety authorities in national radioactive waste disposal programmes is to ensure that people and the environment are protected against the hazards of ionising radiations emitted by the waste. It implies the establishment of safety requirements and the oversight of the activities of the waste management organisation in charge of implementing the programme. In Belgium, the safety requirements for geological disposal rest on the following principles: defence-in-depth, demonstrability and the radiation protection principles elaborated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP. Applying these principles requires notably an appropriate identification and characterisation of the processes upon which the safety functions fulfilled by the disposal system rely and of the processes that may affect the system performance. Therefore, research and development (R&D on safety-relevant thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC issues is important to build confidence in the safety assessment. This paper points out the key THMC processes that might influence radionuclide transport in a disposal system and its surrounding environment, considering the dynamic nature of these processes. Their nature and significance are expected to change according to prevailing internal and external conditions, which evolve from the repository construction phase to the whole heating–cooling cycle of decaying waste after closure. As these processes have a potential impact on safety, it is essential to identify and to understand them properly when developing a disposal concept to ensure compliance with relevant safety requirements. In particular, the investigation of THMC processes is needed to manage uncertainties. This includes the identification and characterisation of uncertainties as well as for the understanding of their safety-relevance. R&D may also be necessary to reduce uncertainties of which the magnitude does not allow

  4. The End-To-End Safety Verification Process Implemented to Ensure Safe Operations of the Columbus Research Module

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arndt, J.; Kreimer, J.

    2010-09-01

    The European Space Laboratory COLUMBUS was launched in February 2008 with NASA Space Shuttle Atlantis. Since successful docking and activation this manned laboratory forms part of the International Space Station(ISS). Depending on the objectives of the Mission Increments the on-orbit configuration of the COLUMBUS Module varies with each increment. This paper describes the end-to-end verification which has been implemented to ensure safe operations under the condition of a changing on-orbit configuration. That verification process has to cover not only the configuration changes as foreseen by the Mission Increment planning but also those configuration changes on short notice which become necessary due to near real-time requests initiated by crew or Flight Control, and changes - most challenging since unpredictable - due to on-orbit anomalies. Subject of the safety verification is on one hand the on orbit configuration itself including the hardware and software products, on the other hand the related Ground facilities needed for commanding of and communication to the on-orbit System. But also the operational products, e.g. the procedures prepared for crew and ground control in accordance to increment planning, are subject of the overall safety verification. In order to analyse the on-orbit configuration for potential hazards and to verify the implementation of the related Safety required hazard controls, a hierarchical approach is applied. The key element of the analytical safety integration of the whole COLUMBUS Payload Complement including hardware owned by International Partners is the Integrated Experiment Hazard Assessment(IEHA). The IEHA especially identifies those hazardous scenarios which could potentially arise through physical and operational interaction of experiments. A major challenge is the implementation of a Safety process which owns quite some rigidity in order to provide reliable verification of on-board Safety and which likewise provides enough

  5. Recommendations to Improve the Implementation Compliance of Surgical Safety Checklist in Surgery Rooms

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Juliana Sandrawati

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Surgical Safety Checklist has been adopted in surgery room as a tool to improve safe surgery. Its implementation during 2012 was low (33.9% so was the completeness of filling it (57.3%. Objective: To increase the implementation of Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC through analyzing the effect of policy, procedures, patient safety culture, and individual factors on compliance SSC implementation in the surgery room. Methods: Cross-sectional study with descriptive observational approach was done to find influencing factors of health care personnels’ compliance to fill SSC. Sample consisted of all surgery room nurses (45 nurses, 10 surgeons and 4 anesthesists. Data collection was made use of questionnaires, surgical medical records and SSC form. Results:The compliance to fill SSC in April 2013 was still low (55.9%. Written policy on patient safety was absent and awareness of respondents about the procedure was low. Respondents’ assessment showed that patient safety culture in surgery room was good, except management and stress recognition dimensions. Likewise, the respondents’ knowledge about SSC was low (61.0%. Conclusion: The study conclude that influencing factors of compliance implementation SSC is absence of the written policy in patient safety, lack of socialization of Standar Prosedur Operasional to health care personnels, lack of knowledge about SSC, lack awareness about the importance of SSC, shortage of surgery room nurses, and innappropriate perception about filling SSC as workload. Recomendation:The study will be making of written policy in patient safety and SSC, followed by socialization to health care personnels, training about SSC implementation, empowering and advocating surgery room nurses and use of reminders.

  6. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erven, Ulrich (ed.) [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard (ed.) [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De (ed.) [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  7. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erven, Ulrich [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  8. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 4. Utility's Activities for Better Safety Culture After the JCO Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2001-01-01

    three activities described below. As a part of self-diagnosis of organizational behavior and an individual's factors influencing safety, measurement was carried out by asking questions to every employee at the station, i.e., 21 questions asking if we are appropriately implementing safety culture 'standards' as set forth in INSAG-4 (Ref. 2). The purpose was twofold: to educate about INSAG-4 and to find areas for improvement. The results indicated that employees want to learn more about (a) the background for the specific actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines and (b) how things go wrong if they do not strictly follow the procedures/guidelines. These were important findings, which led to the reconstruction of the on-site education and training. Considering that employees should be well informed on safety culture; management's policy; and lessons learned from incidents, domestic or international, we started the bimonthly magazine Safety Culture. The first publication included articles on 'Lessons Learned from JCO', 'The Results from the Self- Diagnosis', 'Lessons from an Incident at Hunterston NPS (LOOP Followed by Operator Actions for Safe Shutdown)', and others. The on-site training system has two elements: on-the-job training and off-the-job study with classroom and hands-on training. Most of the employees are trained at the On-Site Training Center with equipment and are qualified for specific job categories. Training of operators has its own lengthy program. Given the foregoing findings, we (a) started lectures on JCO lessons learned, (b) modified the educational system at the On-Site Training Center to nurture the employees with well-balanced knowledge and thinking (Fig. 1), and (c) prepared documents that describe the background and reasons for the actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines for use in on-the-job training. The important point to be remembered about the JCO accident is that the criticality safety at this facility

  9. IAEA Safety Standards on Management Systems and Safety Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persson, Kerstin Dahlgren

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA has developed a new set of Safety Standard for applying an integrated Management System for facilities and activities. The objective of the new Safety Standards is to define requirements and provide guidance for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a Management System that integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic related elements to ensure that safety is properly taken into account in all the activities of an organization. With an integrated approach to management system it is also necessary to include the aspect of culture, where the organizational culture and safety culture is seen as crucial elements of the successful implementation of this management system and the attainment of all the goals and particularly the safety goals of the organization. The IAEA has developed a set of service aimed at assisting it's Member States in establishing. Implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system. (author)

  10. Discussion on several important safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Tianwen; Li Jigen; Zhang Lin; Feng Youcai; Jia Xiang; Li Wenhong

    2013-01-01

    Post the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chinese government raised higher safety goals and safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The paper expounded the important indicators of safety requirements and the aspects of safety modification that had been developed for the new NPPs. It also discussed and analyzed the main fields required by the new NPPs safety requirements in the safety goals, safety evaluation of sites, defenses of internal and external events, severe accident prevention and mitigation, design of reactor core, containment system and I and C system, and optimization of engineering measure, which gave some references to the design, construction and safety modifications of new NPPs in China. (authors)

  11. Design requirements of communication architecture of SMART safety system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H. Y.; Kim, D. H.; Sin, Y. C.; Lee, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    To develop the communication network architecture of safety system of SMART, the evaluation elements for reliability and performance factors are extracted from commercial networks and classified the required-level by importance. A predictable determinacy, status and fixed based architecture, separation and isolation from other systems, high reliability, verification and validation are introduced as the essential requirements of safety system communication network. Based on the suggested requirements, optical cable, star topology, synchronous transmission, point-to-point physical link, connection-oriented logical link, MAC (medium access control) with fixed allocation are selected as the design elements. The proposed architecture will be applied as basic communication network architecture of SMART safety system

  12. Firefighter safety for PV systems: Overview of future requirements and protection systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Spataru, Sergiu; Sera, Dezso; Blaabjerg, Frede

    2013-01-01

    for operators during maintenance or fire-fighting. One of the solutions is individual module shutdown by short-circuiting or disconnecting each PV module from the PV string. However, currently no standards have been adopted either for implementing or testing these methods, or doing an evaluation of the module...... shutdown procedures. This paper gives an overview on the most recent fire - and firefighter safety requirements for PV systems, with focus on system and module shutdown systems. Several solutions are presented, analyzed and compared by considering a number of essential characteristics, including......An important and highly discussed safety issue for photovoltaic systems is that, as long as they are illuminated, a high voltage is present at the PV string terminals and cables between the string and inverters, independent of the state of the inverter's dc disconnection switch, which poses a risk...

  13. TWRS safety SSCs: Requirements and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith-Fewell, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    Safety Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) have been identified from hazard and accident analyses. These analyses were performed to support the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Basis for Interim Operation (BID). The text identifies and evaluates the SSCs and their supporting SSCs to show that they either prevent the occurrence of the accident or mitigate the consequences of the accident to below the acceptance guidelines. The requirements for the SSCs to fulfill these tasks are described

  14. Implementation of safety parameter display system on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dounaev, V.G.; Neboyan, V.T.

    1996-01-01

    This report gives a short overview of the status of safety parameter display systems (SPDS) implementation on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors and also discusses the SPDS, which is being developed for Kalinin NPP. The assessment of the safety status of the plant is done by the continuous monitoring of six critical safety functions and the corresponding status trees. Besides, a number of additional functions are realized within the scope of KlnNPP, aimed at providing the operator and the safety engineer in the main control room with more detailed information in accidental situation as well as during the normal operation. In particular, these functions are: archiving, data logs and alarm handling, safety actions monitoring, mnemonic diagrams indicating the state of main technological equipment and basic plant parameters, reference data, etc. Also, the operator support function ''computerized procedures'' is included in the scope of SPDS. The basic SPDS implementation platform is ADACS of SEMA GROUP design. The system architecture includes two workstations in the main control room: one is for reactor operator and the other one for safety engineer. Every station has two CRT screens which ensures computerized procedures implementation and provides for extra services for the operator. Also, the information from the SPDS is transmitted to the local crisis centre and to the crisis centre of the State utility organization concern ''Rosenergoatom''. (author). 3 refs

  15. Department of Energy's safety and health program for enrichment plant workers is not adequately implemented

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) program to protect the safety and health of employees at its contractor-operated uranium enrichment plants has not been fully implemented by DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office. Appraisals and inspections of plant conditions are not as frequent and/or as thorough as required. Instead of independently investigating employee complaints, DOE has delegated this responsibility to the contractor. It is recommended that the Secretary of Energy make sure that Oak Ridge properly conducts inspections and appraisals and investigates and follows up on all employee complaints. He should also take steps to provide increased independence and objectivity in the Oak Ridge Operations Office's safety and health program. Furthermore, the Congress should authorize the Secretary of Energy to institute a program of non-reimbursable penalties and fines for violations of safety and health standards and procedures

  16. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1; System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Smith, Curtis; Stamatelatos, Michael; Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual

  17. What stage are low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) at with patient safety curriculum implementation and what are the barriers to implementation? A two-stage cross-sectional study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ginsburg, Liane R; Dhingra-Kumar, Neelam; Donaldson, Liam J

    2017-01-01

    Objectives The improvement of safety in healthcare worldwide depends in part on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of staff providing care. Greater patient safety content in health professional education and training programmes has been advocated internationally. While WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guides (for Medical Schools and Multi-Professional Curricula) have been widely disseminated in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) over the last several years, little is known about patient safety curriculum implementation beyond high-income countries. The present study examines patient safety curriculum implementation in LMICs. Methods Two cross-sectional surveys were carried out. First, 88 technical officers in Ministries of Health and WHO country offices were surveyed to identify the pattern of patient safety curricula at country level. A second survey followed that gathered information from 71 people in a position to provide institution-level perspectives on patient safety curriculum implementation. Results The majority, 69% (30/44), of the countries were either considering whether to implement a patient safety curriculum or actively planning, rather than actually implementing, or embedding one. Most organisations recognised the need for patient safety education and training and felt a safety curriculum was compatible with the values of their organisation; however, important faculty-level barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation were identified. Key structural markers, such as dedicated financial resources and relevant assessment tools to evaluate trainees’ patient safety knowledge and skills, were in place in fewer than half of organisations studied. Conclusions Greater attention to patient safety curriculum implementation is needed. The barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation we identified in LMICs are not unique to these regions. We propose a framework to act as a global standard for patient safety curriculum implementation

  18. Structural observation of long-span suspension bridges for safety assessment: implementation of an optical displacement measurement system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martins, L Lages; Ribeiro, A Silva; Rebordão, J M

    2015-01-01

    This paper addresses the implementation of an optical displacement measurement system in the observation scenario of a long-span suspension bridge and its contribution for structural safety assessment. The metrological background required for quality assurance of the measurements is described, namely, the system's intrinsic parameterization and integration in the SI dimensional traceability chain by calibration, including its measurement uncertainty assessment

  19. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  20. Exploring the Effects of Cultural Variables in the Implementation of Behavior-Based Safety in Two Organizations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bumstead, Alaina; Boyce, Thomas E.

    2005-01-01

    The present case study examines how culture can influence behavior-based safety in different organizational settings and how behavior-based safety can impact different organizational cultures. Behavior-based safety processes implemented in two culturally diverse work settings are described. Specifically, despite identical implementation plans,…

  1. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  2. Management of safety, safety culture and self assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    2000-01-01

    Safety management is the term used for the measures required to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of an installation, including decommissioning. The safety culture concept and its implementation are described in part one of the paper. The principles of safety are now quite well known and are implemented worldwide. It leads to a situation where harmonization is being achieved as indicated by the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. To go beyond the present nuclear safety levels, management of safety and safety culture will be the means for achieving progress. Recent events which took place in major nuclear power countries have shown the importance of the management and the consequences on safety. At the same time, electricity deregulation is coming and will impact on safety through reductions in staffing and in operation and maintenance cost at nuclear installations. Management of safety as well as its control and monitoring by the safety authorities become a key to the future of nuclear energy.(author)

  3. Implementing 10 CFR 830 at the FEMP Silos: Nuclear Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisk, Patricia; Rutherford, Lavon

    2003-01-01

    The objective of the Silos Project at the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) is to safely remediate high-grade uranium ore residues (Silos 1 and 2) and metal oxide residues (Silo 3). The evolution of Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities has reflected the changes in remediation processes. The final stage in silos DSAs is an interpretation of 10 CFR 830 Safe Harbor Requirements that combines a Health and Safety Plan with nuclear safety requirements. This paper will address the development of a Nuclear Health and Safety Plan, or N-HASP

  4. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

  5. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-09-09

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  6. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  7. What stage are low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) at with patient safety curriculum implementation and what are the barriers to implementation? A two-stage cross-sectional study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ginsburg, Liane R; Dhingra-Kumar, Neelam; Donaldson, Liam J

    2017-06-15

    The improvement of safety in healthcare worldwide depends in part on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of staff providing care. Greater patient safety content in health professional education and training programmes has been advocated internationally. While WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guides (for Medical Schools and Multi-Professional Curricula) have been widely disseminated in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) over the last several years, little is known about patient safety curriculum implementation beyond high-income countries. The present study examines patient safety curriculum implementation in LMICs. Two cross-sectional surveys were carried out. First, 88 technical officers in Ministries of Health and WHO country offices were surveyed to identify the pattern of patient safety curricula at country level. A second survey followed that gathered information from 71 people in a position to provide institution-level perspectives on patient safety curriculum implementation. The majority, 69% (30/44), of the countries were either considering whether to implement a patient safety curriculum or actively planning, rather than actually implementing, or embedding one. Most organisations recognised the need for patient safety education and training and felt a safety curriculum was compatible with the values of their organisation; however, important faculty-level barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation were identified. Key structural markers, such as dedicated financial resources and relevant assessment tools to evaluate trainees' patient safety knowledge and skills, were in place in fewer than half of organisations studied. Greater attention to patient safety curriculum implementation is needed. The barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation we identified in LMICs are not unique to these regions. We propose a framework to act as a global standard for patient safety curriculum implementation. Educating leaders through the system in

  8. Treaty implementation applied to conventions on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montjoie, Michel

    2015-01-01

    Given that safety is the number one priority for the nuclear industry, it would seem normal that procedures exist to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the conventions on nuclear safety, as already exist for numerous international treaties. Unfortunately, these procedures are either weak or even nonexistent. Therefore, consideration must be given to whether this weakness represents a genuine deficiency in ensuring the main objective of these conventions, which is to achieve a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. But, before one can even address that issue, a prior question must be answered: does the specific nature of the international legal framework on nuclear safety automatically result in a lack of non-compliance procedures in international conventions on the subject? If so, the lack of procedures is justified, despite the drawbacks. The specific nature of the international law on nuclear safety, which in 1994 shaped the content of the CNS by notably not 'allowing' (even today) the incorporation of precise international rules have been taken into account. The next step is to examine whether the absence of non-compliance procedures (which could have been integrated into the text) is a hindrance in ensuring the objectives of the conventions on nuclear safety, and to examine the procedures that could have been used, based on existing provisions in other areas of international law (environmental law, financial law, disarmament law, human rights, etc.). International environmental law will be the main source of this study, as it has certain similarities with the international law on nuclear safety due to the sometimes vague nature of its obligations and irrespective of the fact that one of the purposes of nuclear safety is in particular to protect the environment from radiological hazards. Indeed, the provisions of the law on nuclear safety are mainly technical and designed to guarantee the normal operation of nuclear facilities

  9. Philosophy and safety requirements for land-based nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kellermann, Otto

    1978-01-01

    The main ideas of safety philosophy for land-based nuclear installations are presented together with their background of protection goals. Today's requirements for design and quality assurance are deductively shown. Finally a proposition is made for a new balancing of safety philosophy according to the high safety level that nuclear installations have reached

  10. Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware: For Human Spaceflight. Revision A

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bernstein, Karen S.; Kujala, Rod; Fogt, Vince; Romine, Paul

    2011-01-01

    This document establishes the structural requirements for human-rated spaceflight hardware including launch vehicles, spacecraft and payloads. These requirements are applicable to Government Furnished Equipment activities as well as all related contractor, subcontractor and commercial efforts. These requirements are not imposed on systems other than human-rated spacecraft, such as ground test articles, but may be tailored for use in specific cases where it is prudent to do so such as for personnel safety or when assets are at risk. The requirements in this document are focused on design rather than verification. Implementation of the requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with NASA Technical Authority approval.

  11. Examination of issues related to the development and implementation of real-time operational safety monitoring tools in the nuclear power industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puglia, William J.; Atefi, Bahman

    1995-01-01

    In recent years, risk and reliability techniques have been increasingly used to optimize deterministic requirements and to improve the operational safety of nuclear power stations. This paper discusses the historical development and current status of implementation of real-time operational safety monitoring tools in the nuclear power industry worldwide. A safety monitor is defined as a PC-based risk management tool, based on a plant specific PSA, which can be used to manage plant safety during the day-to-day operation of a nuclear power plant by planning maintenance activities and providing advisory information to plant operational staff in order to avoid high risk plant configurations. As this technique has only been applied in a few plants worldwide, the technology is still evolving and there are several technical and implementation-related issues which still need to be resolved. This paper attempts to summarize all such issues and describe how they have been addressed in several different applications of this technology around the world

  12. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  13. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  14. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  15. Evaluation of safety, an unavoidable requirement in the applications of ionizing radiations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jova Sed, Luis Andres

    2013-01-01

    The safety assessments should be conducted as a means to evaluate compliance with safety requirements (and thus the application of fundamental safety principles) for all facilities and activities in order to determine the measures to be taken to ensure safety. It is an essential tool in decision making. For long time we have linked the safety assessment to nuclear facilities and not to all practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in daily life. However, the main purpose of the safety assessment is to determine if it has reached an appropriate level of safety for an installation or activity and if it has fulfilled the objectives of safety and basic safety criteria set by the designer, operating organization and the regulatory body under the protection and safety requirements set out in the International Basic safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. This paper presents some criteria and personal experiences with the new international recommendations on this subject and its practical application in the region and demonstrates the importance of this requirement. Reflects the need to train personnel of the operator and the regulatory body in the proportional application of this requirement in practice with ionizing radiation

  16. Implementation Science: New Approaches to Integrating Quality and Safety Education for Nurses Competencies in Nursing Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dolansky, Mary A; Schexnayder, Julie; Patrician, Patricia A; Sales, Anne

    Although quality and safety competencies were developed and disseminated nearly a decade ago by the Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) project, the uptake in schools of nursing has been slow. The use of implementation science methods may be useful to accelerate quality and safety competency integration in nursing education. The article includes a definition and description of implementation science methods and practical implementation strategies for nurse educators to consider when integrating the QSEN competencies into nursing curriculum.

  17. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  18. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kowalski, Marek L; Ansotegui, Ignacio; Aberer, Werner

    2016-01-01

    One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment) of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin...... attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO), representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk...... associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access...

  19. Requirements to be met by a safety philosophy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hahn, L.

    1990-01-01

    The author's assessment of the use of safety philosophies is that, since 'safety philosophers' still are not certain whether a safety philosophy ought to be applicable to just one, particular technology, or rather to a variety of different technologies, there is reason to state that the required ethical, philosophical and political foundations to build a safety philosophy on are still missing. And this, the author presumes, is one of the reasons why our society to a far extent is incapable of acting, faced not only with the nuclear issue, but also with the present and future ecological challenge. (orig./DG) [de

  20. Defence-in-depth and development of safety requirements for advanced nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.; Gasparini, M.

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses a general approach for the preparation of the design safety requirements using the IAEA Safety Objectives and the strategy of defence-in-depth. It proposes a general method (top-down approach) to prepare safety requirements for a given kind of reactor using the IAEA requirements for nuclear power plants as a starting point through a critical interpretation and application of the strategy of defence-in-depth. The IAEA has recently developed a general methodology for screening the defence-in-depth of nuclear power plants starting from the fundamental safety objectives as proposed in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. This methodology may provide a useful tool for the preparation of safety requirements for the design and operation of any kind of reactor. Currently the IAEA is preparing the technical basis for the development of safety requirements for Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors, with the aim of showing the viability of the method. A draft TECDOC has been prepared and circulated among several experts for comments. This paper is largely based on the content of the draft TECDOC. (authors)

  1. Harnessing implementation science to improve care quality and patient safety: a systematic review of targeted literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Braithwaite, Jeffrey; Marks, Danielle; Taylor, Natalie

    2014-06-01

    Getting greater levels of evidence into practice is a key problem for health systems, compounded by the volume of research produced. Implementation science aims to improve the adoption and spread of research evidence. A linked problem is how to enhance quality of care and patient safety based on evidence when care settings are complex adaptive systems. Our research question was: according to the implementation science literature, which common implementation factors are associated with improving the quality and safety of care for patients? We conducted a targeted search of key journals to examine implementation science in the quality and safety domain applying PRISMA procedures. Fifty-seven out of 466 references retrieved were considered relevant following the application of exclusion criteria. Included articles were subjected to content analysis. Three reviewers extracted and documented key characteristics of the papers. Grounded theory was used to distil key features of the literature to derive emergent success factors. Eight success factors of implementation emerged: preparing for change, capacity for implementation-people, capacity for implementation-setting, types of implementation, resources, leverage, desirable implementation enabling features, and sustainability. Obstacles in implementation are the mirror image of these: for example, when people fail to prepare, have insufficient capacity for implementation or when the setting is resistant to change, then care quality is at risk, and patient safety can be compromised. This review of key studies in the quality and safety literature discusses the current state-of-play of implementation science applied to these domains. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

  2. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-07-15

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  3. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  4. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  5. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  6. Food Safety Programs Based on HACCP Principles in School Nutrition Programs: Implementation Status and Factors Related to Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stinson, Wendy Bounds; Carr, Deborah; Nettles, Mary Frances; Johnson, James T.

    2011-01-01

    Purpose/Objectives: The objectives of this study were to assess the extent to which school nutrition (SN) programs have implemented food safety programs based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles, as well as factors, barriers, and practices related to implementation of these programs. Methods: An online survey was…

  7. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S.

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide

  8. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide.

  9. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  10. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition); Seguridad de las centrales nucleares: Diseno. Requisitos de seguridad especificos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  12. LHCb electronics - requirements, specifications and implementation

    CERN Document Server

    Bibby, J

    2001-01-01

    This document is intended to serve as a requirements document, a design manual and an implementation reference for the RICH electronics systems. At the current time, the electronics design is under active consideration and this is reflected in this document which represents a working proposal as regards both the functional model and physical implementation. Comments on installation, commissioning, and maintenance are included. For convenience a description of the proposed RICH data formats is appended.

  13. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  14. A Step Toward High Reliability: Implementation of a Daily Safety Brief in a Children's Hospital.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saysana, Michele; McCaskey, Marjorie; Cox, Elaine; Thompson, Rachel; Tuttle, Lora K; Haut, Paul R

    2017-09-01

    Health care is a high-risk industry. To improve communication about daily events and begin the journey toward a high reliability organization, the Riley Hospital for Children at Indiana University Health implemented a daily safety brief. Various departments in our children's hospital were asked to participate in a daily safety brief, reporting daily events and unexpected outcomes within their scope of responsibility. Participants were surveyed before and after implementation of the safety brief about communication and awareness of events in the hospital. The length of the brief and percentage of departments reporting unexpected outcomes were measured. The analysis of the presurvey and the postsurvey showed a statistically significant improvement in the questions related to the awareness of daily events as well as communication and relationships between departments. The monthly mean length of time for the brief was 15 minutes or less. Unexpected outcomes were reported by 50% of the departments for 8 months. A daily safety brief can be successfully implemented in a children's hospital. Communication between departments and awareness of daily events were improved. Implementation of a daily safety brief is a step toward becoming a high reliability organization.

  15. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: implementing inherent safety perspective. Part 1 - guideword applicability and method description.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-12-15

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design.

  16. Safety assessment requirements for onsite transfers of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Opperman, E.K.; Jackson, E.J.; Eggers, A.G.

    1992-05-01

    This document contains the requirements for developing a safety assessment document for an onsite package containing radioactive material. It also provides format and content guidance to establish uniformity in the safety assessment documentation and to ensure completeness of the information provided

  17. Promoting Implementation of Safety Culture in Nuclear Application for Industrial Facilities; an Important Role of Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Setianingsih, Lilis Susanti

    2012-01-01

    Implementation of nuclear energy for industrial purposes has reached its highest peak. BAPETEN, as Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia has published regulations regarding nuclear energy utilization. As high risk associating such utilization requires direct and thoroughly supervision in order to assure its compliance to safety and security aspect, procedures related to operational activities must by fully applied. Radiation Protection Program as one type of procedures that must be available in nuclear energy utilization operation is intended to provide operators specifically technical guidance to avoid undesired negative effects of incidents or accidents. It is the responsibility of managerial level in a company to provide the procedures and to further supervise their application in the field. Radiation workers, those are all employees working in or within radiation area must understand how to execute the procedures properly. The radiation protection program is intended to protect workers, member of community and property as well as the environment from the negative impacts of nuclear utilization operational due to its radiation exposure. Safety culture, a compound of nature derived from behavior of organization and people within the organization to pay a full attention and give main priority in radiation safety matters, is expected to be achieved by implementing the radiation protection program as safety habits at the work place. It requires a management commitment to ensure that all aspect in safety and, whenever necessary, security are accomplished within the radiation protection program in order to build a safety culture in a radiation work place. Government Regulation No. 33 2007 about Safety for Ionizing Radiation and Security for Radioactive Source and Government Regulation No. 29 2008 regarding Licensing for Utilization of Ionizing Radiation and Nuclear Material present regulation and arrangement related to radiation protection program as a basic

  18. Promoting Implementation of Safety Culture in Nuclear Application for Industrial Facilities; an Important Role of Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency in Indonesia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Setianingsih, Lilis Susanti [KINS-KAIST Master Degree Program, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-03-15

    Implementation of nuclear energy for industrial purposes has reached its highest peak. BAPETEN, as Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia has published regulations regarding nuclear energy utilization. As high risk associating such utilization requires direct and thoroughly supervision in order to assure its compliance to safety and security aspect, procedures related to operational activities must by fully applied. Radiation Protection Program as one type of procedures that must be available in nuclear energy utilization operation is intended to provide operators specifically technical guidance to avoid undesired negative effects of incidents or accidents. It is the responsibility of managerial level in a company to provide the procedures and to further supervise their application in the field. Radiation workers, those are all employees working in or within radiation area must understand how to execute the procedures properly. The radiation protection program is intended to protect workers, member of community and property as well as the environment from the negative impacts of nuclear utilization operational due to its radiation exposure. Safety culture, a compound of nature derived from behavior of organization and people within the organization to pay a full attention and give main priority in radiation safety matters, is expected to be achieved by implementing the radiation protection program as safety habits at the work place. It requires a management commitment to ensure that all aspect in safety and, whenever necessary, security are accomplished within the radiation protection program in order to build a safety culture in a radiation work place. Government Regulation No. 33 2007 about Safety for Ionizing Radiation and Security for Radioactive Source and Government Regulation No. 29 2008 regarding Licensing for Utilization of Ionizing Radiation and Nuclear Material present regulation and arrangement related to radiation protection program as a basic

  19. Implementing electronic handover: interventions to improve efficiency, safety and sustainability.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alhamid, Sharifah Munirah; Lee, Desmond Xue-Yuan; Wong, Hei Man; Chuah, Matthew Bingfeng; Wong, Yu Jun; Narasimhalu, Kaavya; Tan, Thuan Tong; Low, Su Ying

    2016-10-01

    Effective handovers are critical for patient care and safety. Electronic handover tools are increasingly used today to provide an effective and standardized platform for information exchange. The implementation of an electronic handover system in tertiary hospitals can be a major challenge. Previous efforts in implementing an electronic handover tool failed due to poor compliance and buy-in from end-users. A new electronic handover tool was developed and incorporated into the existing electronic medical records (EMRs) for medical patients in Singapore General Hospital (SGH). There was poor compliance by on-call doctors in acknowledging electronic handovers, and lack of adherence to safety rules, raising concerns about the safety and efficiency of the electronic handover tool. Urgent measures were needed to ensure its safe and sustained use. A quality improvement group comprising stakeholders, including end-users, developed multi-faceted interventions using rapid PDSA (P-Plan, D-Do, S-Study, A-Act ) cycles to address these issues. Innovative solutions using media and online software provided cost-efficient measures to improve compliance. The percentage of unacknowledged handovers per day was used as the main outcome measure throughout all PDSA cycles. Doctors were also assessed for improvement in their knowledge of safety rules and their perception of the electronic handover tool. An electronic handover tool complementing daily clinical practice can be successfully implemented using solutions devised through close collaboration with end-users supported by the senior leadership. A combined 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approach with regular process evaluations is crucial for its long-term sustainability. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  20. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-10

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels.

  1. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels

  2. Safety Basis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-01

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities

  3. Safety Basis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-14

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities.

  4. Development of Occupational Safety and Health Requirement Management System (OSHREMS Software Using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 for Building Construction Project

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abas Nor Haslinda

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The construction industry sector is considered as being risky with frequent and high accident rate. According to Social Security Organization (SOCSO, the construction accidents has arisen from time to time. Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB has developed the Safety and Health Assessment System in Construction (SHASSIC for evaluating the performance of a contractor in construction project by setting out the safety and health management and practices, however the requirement checklist provided is not comprehensive. Therefore, this study aims to develop a software system for facilitating OSH in building construction project, namely OSH requirements management system (OSHREMS, using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 and Sublime Text as PHP editor. The results from a preliminary study which was conducted through interviews showed that, the respondents were only implementing the basic requirements that comply with legislations, with the absence of appropriate and specific guideline in ensuring occupational safety and health (OSH at the workplace. The tool will be benefits for contractors and other parties to effectively manage the OSH requirements for their projects based on project details.

  5. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    OpenAIRE

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-01-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was cla...

  6. Safety and environmental requirements and design targets for TIBER-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piet, S.J.

    1987-09-01

    A consistent set of safety and environmental requirements and design targets was proposed and adopted for the TIBER-II (Tokamak Ignition/Burn Experimental Reactor) design effort. TIBER-II is the most recent US version of a fusion experimental test reactor (ETR). These safety and environmental design targets were one contribution of the Fusion Safety Program in the TIBER-II design effort. The other contribution, safety analyses, is documented in the TIBER-II design report. The TIBER-II approach, described here, concentrated on logical development of, first, a complete and consistent set of safety and environmental requirements that are likely appropriate for an ETR, and, second, an initial set of design targets to guide TIBER-II. Because of limited time in the TIBER-II design effort, the iterative process only included one iteration - one set of targets and one design. Future ETR design efforts should therefore build on these design targets and the associated safety analyses. 29 refs., 5 figs., 3 tabs

  7. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings

  8. Grand Gulf-prioritization of regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meisner, M.J.

    1993-01-01

    As cost pressures mount, Grand Gulf nuclear station (GGNS) is relying increasingly on various prioritization approaches to implement, modify, eliminate, or defer regulatory requirements. Regulatory requirements can be prioritized through the use of three measures: (1) safety (or risk) significance; (2) cost; and (3) public policy (or political) significance. This paper summarizes GGNS' efforts to implement solutions to regulatory issues using these three prioritization schemes to preserve a balance between cost and safety benefit

  9. Beyond usability: designing effective technology implementation systems to promote patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karsh, B-T

    2004-10-01

    Evidence is emerging that certain technologies such as computerized provider order entry may reduce the likelihood of patient harm. However, many technologies that should reduce medical errors have been abandoned because of problems with their design, their impact on workflow, and general dissatisfaction with them by end users. Patient safety researchers have therefore looked to human factors engineering for guidance on how to design technologies to be usable (easy to use) and useful (improving job performance, efficiency, and/or quality). While this is a necessary step towards improving the likelihood of end user satisfaction, it is still not sufficient. Human factors engineering research has shown that the manner in which technologies are implemented also needs to be designed carefully if benefits are to be realized. This paper reviews the theoretical knowledge on what leads to successful technology implementation and how this can be translated into specifically designed processes for successful technology change. The literature on diffusion of innovations, technology acceptance, organisational justice, participative decision making, and organisational change is reviewed and strategies for promoting successful implementation are provided. Given the rapid and ever increasing pace of technology implementation in health care, it is critical for the science of technology implementation to be understood and incorporated into efforts to improve patient safety.

  10. Safety management systems and their role in achieving high standards of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulston, D.J.; Baylis, C.C.

    2000-01-01

    Achieving high standards of operational safety requires a robust management framework that is visible to all personnel with responsibility for its implementation. The structure of the management framework must ensure that all processes used to manage safety interlink in a logical and coherent manner, that is, they form a management system that leads to continuous improvement in safety performance. This Paper describes BNFL's safety management system (SMS). The SMS has management processes grouped within 5 main elements: 1. Policy, 2. Organisation, 3. Planning and Implementation, 4. Measuring and Reviewing Performance, 5. Audit. These elements reflect the overall process of setting safety objective (from Policy), measuring success and reviewing the performance. Effective implementation of the SMS requires senior managers to demonstrate leadership through their commitment and accountability. However, the SMS as a whole reflects that every employee at every level within BNFL is responsible for safety of operations under their control. The SMS therefore promotes a proactive safety culture and safe operations. The system is formally documented in the Company's Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Manual. Within in BNFL Group, the Company structures enables the Manual to provide overall SMS guidance and co-ordination to its range of nuclear businesses. Each business develops the SMS to be appropriate at all levels of its organisation, but ensuring that each level is consistent with the higher level. The Paper concludes with a summary of BNFL's safety performance. (author)

  11. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  12. KIT safety management. Annual report 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frank, Gerhard

    2013-01-01

    The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

  13. Safety research needs for Russian-designed reactors. Requirements situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, R. Allan; Holmstrom, Heikki; Reocreux, Michel; Schulz, Helmut; Liesch, Klaus; Santarossa, Giampiero; Hayamizu, Yoshitaka; Asmolov, Vladimir; Bolshov, Leonid; Strizhov, Valerii; Bougaenko, Sergei; Nikitin, Yuri N.; Proklov, Vladimir; Potapov, Alexandre; Kinnersly, Stephen R.; Voronin, Leonid M.; Honekamp, John R.; Frescura, Gianni M.; Maki, Nobuo; Reig, Javier; ); Bekjord, Eric S.; Rosinger, Herbert E.

    1998-01-01

    integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - VVER severe accident research should focus on validation of codes for accident management procedures, and on extension and qualification of an appropriate data base for materials properties and their interactions. - RBMK thermal-hydraulic research is needed to improve the technical basis for further development of RBMK safety criteria. - Assessment of the integrity of the RBMK primary coolant circuit, and especially the fuel channel, requires urgent research. Methods of assessing RBMK pressure boundary integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - RBMK severe accident research should focus on prevention of accidents and Accident Management for cases of loss of heat sink and Beyond Design-Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. For these purposes, simple physical models and parametric codes need development and should be systematically used in plant specific analysis. Recommendations; - A Safety Research Strategic Plan should be developed. Such a plan sets goals, defines products, and describes when and how work will be done, including determination of research priorities. - Key players, including regulators, operators, plant designers and researchers should be involved in developing and implementing this plan and its execution and applying the results. - International cooperation in safety research should be encouraged for purposes of improving quality, preventing technical isolation and cost sharing. - New approaches, such as technical fora for specific technical topics, should be established to make safety research information in OECD countries available to researchers working on the safety of Russian-designed reactors

  14. Firearm Safety Locks: Federal Agency Implementation of the Presidential Directive

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    ... deaths among children ages 5 to 14. In order to have the federal government serve as an example of gun safety, the President required that a safety lock device be provided with each handgun issued to federal law enforcement officers...

  15. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  16. Software Dependability and Safety Evaluations ESA's Initiative

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hernek, M.

    ESA has allocated funds for an initiative to evaluate Dependability and Safety methods of Software. The objectives of this initiative are; · More extensive validation of Safety and Dependability techniques for Software · Provide valuable results to improve the quality of the Software thus promoting the application of Dependability and Safety methods and techniques. ESA space systems are being developed according to defined PA requirement specifications. These requirements may be implemented through various design concepts, e.g. redundancy, diversity etc. varying from project to project. Analysis methods (FMECA. FTA, HA, etc) are frequently used during requirements analysis and design activities to assure the correct implementation of system PA requirements. The criticality level of failures, functions and systems is determined and by doing that the critical sub-systems are identified, on which dependability and safety techniques are to be applied during development. Proper performance of the software development requires the development of a technical specification for the products at the beginning of the life cycle. Such technical specification comprises both functional and non-functional requirements. These non-functional requirements address characteristics of the product such as quality, dependability, safety and maintainability. Software in space systems is more and more used in critical functions. Also the trend towards more frequent use of COTS and reusable components pose new difficulties in terms of assuring reliable and safe systems. Because of this, its dependability and safety must be carefully analysed. ESA identified and documented techniques, methods and procedures to ensure that software dependability and safety requirements are specified and taken into account during the design and development of a software system and to verify/validate that the implemented software systems comply with these requirements [R1].

  17. 78 FR 24290 - Furlough Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-24

    ... American public and aviation industry of the FAA's Aviation Safety Office's (AVS) furlough implementation... to implement furloughs. AVS and its Services/Offices will implement the required 11 days of furlough beginning April 21, 2013 and continuing through September 30, 2013. AVS will continue to focus resources on...

  18. Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo; Jee, Eunkyoung

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents

  19. Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jee, Eunkyoung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents.

  20. Design and implementation of an identification system in construction site safety for proactive accident prevention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Huanjia; Chew, David A S; Wu, Weiwei; Zhou, Zhipeng; Li, Qiming

    2012-09-01

    Identifying accident precursors using real-time identity information has great potential to improve safety performance in construction industry, which is still suffering from day to day records of accident fatality and injury. Based on the requirements analysis for identifying precursor and the discussion of enabling technology solutions for acquiring and sharing real-time automatic identification information on construction site, this paper proposes an identification system design for proactive accident prevention to improve construction site safety. Firstly, a case study is conducted to analyze the automatic identification requirements for identifying accident precursors in construction site. Results show that it mainly consists of three aspects, namely access control, training and inspection information and operation authority. The system is then designed to fulfill these requirements based on ZigBee enabled wireless sensor network (WSN), radio frequency identification (RFID) technology and an integrated ZigBee RFID sensor network structure. At the same time, an information database is also designed and implemented, which includes 15 tables, 54 queries and several reports and forms. In the end, a demonstration system based on the proposed system design is developed as a proof of concept prototype. The contributions of this study include the requirement analysis and technical design of a real-time identity information tracking solution for proactive accident prevention on construction sites. The technical solution proposed in this paper has a significant importance in improving safety performance on construction sites. Moreover, this study can serve as a reference design for future system integrations where more functions, such as environment monitoring and location tracking, can be added. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  1. Safety improvement and results of commissioning of Mochovce NPP WWER 440/213

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lipar, M.

    1998-01-01

    Mochovce NPP is the last one of this kind and compared to its predecessors, it is characterized by several modifications which contribute to the improvement of the safety level. In addition based on Nuclear Regulatory Authority requirements and based on documents: - IAEA - Safety Issues and their ranking for NPP WWER 440/213, - IAEA - Safety Improvement of Mochovce NPP Project Review Mission, - Riskaudit - Evaluation of the Mochovce NPP Safety Improvements. Additional safety measures have been implemented before commissioning. The consortium EUCOM (FRAMATOME - SIEMENS), SKODA Praha, ENERGOPROJEKT Praha, Russian organizations and VUJE Trnava Nuclear Power Plants research institute were selected for design and implementation of the safety measures. The papers summarized, safety requirements, safety measures implemented, results of commissioning and results of safety analysis report evaluation. (author)

  2. Workers' involvement--a missing component in the implementation of occupational safety and health management systems in enterprises.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podgórski, Daniel

    2005-01-01

    Effective implementation of occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation based on European Union directives requires promotion of OSH management systems (OSH MS). To this end, voluntary Polish standards (PN-N-18000) have been adopted, setting forth OSH MS specifications and guidelines. However, the number of enterprises implementing OSH MS has increased slowly, falling short of expectations, which call for a new national policy on OSH MS promotion. To develop a national policy in this area, a survey was conducted in 40 enterprises with OSH MS in place. The survey was aimed at identifying motivational factors underlying OSH MS implementation decisions. Specifically, workers' and their representatives' involvement in OSH MS implementation was investigated. The results showed that the level of workers' involvement was relatively low, which may result in a low effectiveness of those systems. The same result also applies to the involvement of workers' representatives and that of trade unions.

  3. Integrated management system implementation strategy for PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phongsakorn Prak Tom; Shaharum Ramli; Mohamad Azman Che Mat Isa; Shahirah Abdul Rahman; Mohd Zaid Mohamed; Mat Zin Mat Husin; Nurfazila Husain; Mohamad Puad Abu

    2012-01-01

    Integrated Management System (IMS) designed to fulfil the requirements integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic elements. PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP) is currently implementing the Quality Assurance Program (QAP) and looking toward implementation of IMS. This paper discussed the implementation strategy of IMS for RTP. There are nine steps of IMS implementation strategy. In implementation of IMS, Gantt chart is useful project management tool in managing the project frame work. IMS is intended as a tool to enable the continuous development of safety culture and achieve higher safety levels. (author)

  4. 47 CFR 80.305 - Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety Convention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... and the Safety Convention. 80.305 Section 80.305 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.305 Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety...

  5. Safety requirements for the Pu carriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, H.

    1993-01-01

    Ministry of Transport of Japan has now set about studying requirements for Pu carriers to ensure safety. It was first studied what the basic concept of safe carriage of Pu should be, and the basic ideas have been worked out. Next the requirements for the Pu carriers were studied based on the above. There are at present no international requirements of construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers, but MOT of Japan has so far required special construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers which carry a large amount of radioactive material, such as spent fuel or low level radioactive waste, corresponding to the level of the respective potential hazard. The requirements of construction and equipment of the Pu carriers have been established considering the difference in heat generation between Pu and spent fuel, physical protection, and so forth, in addition to the above basic concept. (J.P.N.)

  6. Role of a quality management system in improving patient safety - laboratory aspects.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Allen, Lynn C

    2013-09-01

    The aim of this study is to describe how implementation of a quality management system (QMS) based on ISO 15189 enhances patient safety. A literature review showed that several European hospitals implemented a QMS based on ISO 9001 and assessed the impact on patient safety. An Internet search showed that problems affecting patient safety have occurred in a number of laboratories across Canada. The requirements of a QMS based on ISO 15189 are outlined, and the impact of the implementation of each requirement on patient safety is summarized. The Quality Management Program - Laboratory Services in Ontario is briefly described, and the experience of Ontario laboratories with Ontario Laboratory Accreditation, based on ISO 15189, is outlined. Several hospitals that implemented ISO 9001 reported either a positive impact or no impact on patient safety. Patient safety problems in Canadian laboratories are described. Implementation of each requirement of the QMS can be seen to have a positive effect on patient safety. Average laboratory conformance on Ontario Laboratory Accreditation is very high, and laboratories must address and resolve any nonconformities. Other standards, practices, and quality requirements may also contribute to patient safety. Implementation of a QMS based on ISO 15189 provides a solid foundation for quality in the laboratory and enhances patient safety. It helps to prevent patient safety issues; when such issues do occur, effective processes are in place for investigation and resolution. Patient safety problems in Canadian laboratories might have been prevented had effective QMSs been in place. Ontario Laboratory Accreditation has had a positive impact on quality in Ontario laboratories. Copyright © 2013 The Canadian Society of Clinical Chemists. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wen-Hwa Ko

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry.

  8. Quality assurance requirements for the computer software and safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarecek, J.

    1992-01-01

    The requirements are given as placed on the development, procurement, maintenance, and application of software for the creation or processing of data during the design, construction, operation, repair, maintenance and safety-related upgrading of nuclear power plants. The verification and validation processes are highlighted, and the requirements put on the software documentation are outlined. The general quality assurance principles applied to safety analyses are characterized. (J.B.). 1 ref

  9. Electronic health records and patient safety: co-occurrence of early EHR implementation with patient safety practices in primary care settings.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tanner, C; Gans, D; White, J; Nath, R; Pohl, J

    2015-01-01

    The role of electronic health records (EHR) in enhancing patient safety, while substantiated in many studies, is still debated. This paper examines early EHR adopters in primary care to understand the extent to which EHR implementation is associated with the workflows, policies and practices that promote patient safety, as compared to practices with paper records. Early adoption is defined as those who were using EHR prior to implementation of the Meaningful Use program. We utilized the Physician Practice Patient Safety Assessment (PPPSA) to compare primary care practices with fully implemented EHR to those utilizing paper records. The PPPSA measures the extent of adoption of patient safety practices in the domains: medication management, handoffs and transition, personnel qualifications and competencies, practice management and culture, and patient communication. Data from 209 primary care practices responding between 2006-2010 were included in the analysis: 117 practices used paper medical records and 92 used an EHR. Results showed that, within all domains, EHR settings showed significantly higher rates of having workflows, policies and practices that promote patient safety than paper record settings. While these results were expected in the area of medication management, EHR use was also associated with adoption of patient safety practices in areas in which the researchers had no a priori expectations of association. Sociotechnical models of EHR use point to complex interactions between technology and other aspects of the environment related to human resources, workflow, policy, culture, among others. This study identifies that among primary care practices in the national PPPSA database, having an EHR was strongly empirically associated with the workflow, policy, communication and cultural practices recommended for safe patient care in ambulatory settings.

  10. Safety requirements expected to the prototype fast breeder reactor 'Monju'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-11-01

    In July 2013, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has enforced new regulatory requirements in consideration of severe accidents for the commercial light water reactors (LWR) and also prototype power generation reactors such as the sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) of 'Monju' based on TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (hereinafter referred to as '1F accident') occurred in March 2011. Although the regulatory requirements for SFR will be revised by NRA with consideration for public comments, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) set up 'Advisory Committee on Monju Safety Requirements' consisting of fast breeder reactor (FBR) and safety assessment experts in order to establish original safety requirements expected to the prototype FBR 'Monju' considering severe accidents with knowledge from JAEA as well as scientific and technical insights from the experts. This report summarizes the safety requirements expected to Monju discussed by the committee. (author)

  11. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  12. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  13. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  14. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Arabic Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  15. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-06-30

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models

  16. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will

  17. IAEA code and safety guides on quality assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raisic, N.

    1980-01-01

    In the framework of its programme in safety standards development, the IAEA has recently published a Code of Practice on Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants. The Code establishes minimum requirements for quality assurance which Member States should use in the context of their own nuclear safety requirements. A series of 10 Safety Guides which describe acceptable methods of implementing the requirements of specific sections of the Code are in preparation. (orig.)

  18. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  19. Development and implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frush, Karen S.; Alton, Michael; Frush, Donald P.

    2006-01-01

    Evidence from numerous studies indicates that large numbers of patients are harmed by medical errors while receiving health-care services in the United States today. The 1999 Institute of Medicine report on medical errors recommended that hospitals and health-care agencies ''establish safety programs to act as a catalyst for the development of a culture of safety'' [1]. In this article, we describe one approach to successful implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program. Although our experience at Duke University Health System will be used as an example, the needs, principles, and solutions can apply to a variety of other health-care practices. Key components include the development of safety teams, provision of tools that teams can use to support an environment of safety, and ongoing program modification to meet patient and staff needs and respond to changing priorities. By moving patient safety to the forefront of all that we do as health-care providers, we can continue to improve our delivery of health care to children and adults alike. This improvement is fostered when we enhance the culture of safety, develop a constant awareness of the possibility of human and system errors in the delivery of care, and establish additional safeguards to intercept medical errors in order to prevent harm to patients. (orig.)

  20. Nuclear Safety R&D for the Knowledge-Based Implementation of Defence in Depth

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baek, W-P., E-mail: wpbaek@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Department of Nuclear Safety Research, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Assuring a high level of safety is a pre-requisite for the development and utilization of nuclear technology. The most fundamental approach for nuclear power plant (NPP) safety is “defence in depth (DiD),” which is a combination of multiple physical barriers and multiple (generally 5) levels of protection, with the aim of accident prevention and mitigation. NPPs around the world have shown excellent safety records for over 14,500 cumulative reactor years, compared with other electricity sources, by properly implementing DiD. However, the occurrence and severe consequences of the Fukushima accident have provoked controversy on the completeness of the DiD concept. There have been active discussions on DiD with respect to the Fukushima accident. A general consensus has been arrived that the concept of DiD is still valid but its implementation was incomplete for the Fukushima NPP. Had DiD been properly implemented during the design, construction and operation, much better provisioning against the extreme earthquake and tsunami would have been available and the accident consequences would not have been so disastrous.

  1. National Ignition Facility Project Site Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dun, C

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) presents safety protocols and requirements that management and workers shall follow to assure a safe and healthful work environment during activities performed on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project Site Safety Program (NPSSP) requires that activities at the NIF Project site be performed in accordance with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual'' and the augmented set of controls and processes described in this NIF Project Site Safety Program. Specifically, this document: (1) Defines the fundamental NIF site safety philosophy. (2) Defines the areas covered by this safety program (see Appendix B). (3) Identifies management roles and responsibilities. (4) Defines core safety management processes. (5) Identifies NIF site-specific safety requirements. This NPSSP sets forth the responsibilities, requirements, rules, policies, and regulations for workers involved in work activities performed on the NIF Project site. Workers are required to implement measures to create a universal awareness that promotes safe practice at the work site and will achieve NIF management objectives in preventing accidents and illnesses. ES and H requirements are consistent with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual''. This NPSSP and implementing procedures (e.g., Management Walkabout, special work procedures, etc.,) are a comprehensive safety program that applies to NIF workers on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project site includes the B581/B681 site and support areas shown in Appendix B

  2. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand.

  3. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong

    2015-01-01

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand

  4. ON THE IMPACT OF FLIGHT SAFETY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON THE AERODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimir I. Shevyakov

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The article considers the issue of aerodynamics efficiency implementation taking into account certification requirements for flight safety. Aerodynamics efficiency means high aerodynamic performance (depending on the airplane size, aerodynamic performance in cruise flight, high aerodynamic performance at takeoff, as well as lift performance at landing.The author estimated the impact on aerodynamics efficiency of both the requirements for aerodynamics performance and requirements for aircraft systems, noncompliance with which may result in significant change of expected operating conditions. It was shown that the use of supercritical wing profiles may result in flight mode limitations due to failure of the required buffeting capacities. It does not allow engaging all the advantages of aerodynamics layout and requires special design solutions to prevent such cases.There were reviewed certification requirements for flight level pressure altitude accuracy and icing conditions warning sysytem. The research presented the methods of aerodynamic efficiency increase by meeting the requirements for reduced vertical separation minima flights and in icing conditions, including requirements for air data probes. Reduced vertical separation minima flight requirements are met by means of efficient air data probes location. Theoretical methods of flow calculation determine areas on the airplane skin surface where static probes minimize errors depending on angle-of-attack and sideslip. It was shown that if certification requirements are not met and in case of flight out of reduced vertical separation minima area, aerodynamics efficiency is significantly reduced and fuel consumption can be increased by 10% and higher. Suggested approaches implementation allows increasing commercial airplanes competitiveness.

  5. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  6. Principles and standards of nuclear safety and their implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1979-01-01

    Nuclear safety starts with the design of a nuclear facility and is only completed with its decommissioning. In the various phases of a nuclear facility's lifetime, safety evaluations are required. The licensing prerequisites for construction, operation, modification, decommissioning are based on elements of the relevant national legislation and related ordinances as well as on international regulations. They should be expanded by a system of criteria and standards spelling out the proven practice as developed over the last decades in the industrialized countries and by international organizations such IAEA with its safety codes and guides. (NEA) [fr

  7. Nuclear fuels with high burnup: safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phuc Tran Dai

    2016-01-01

    Vietnam authorities foresees to build 3 reactors from Russian design (VVER AES 2006) by 2030. In order to prepare the preliminary report on safety analysis the Vietnamese Agency for Radioprotection and Safety has launched an investigation on the behaviour of nuclear fuels at high burnups (up to 60 GWj/tU) that will be those of the new plants. This study deals mainly with the behaviour of the fuel assemblies in case of loss of coolant (LOCA). It appears that for an average burnup of 50 GWj/tU and for the advanced design of the fuel assembly (cladding and materials) safety requirements are fulfilled. For an average burnup of 60 GWj/tU, a list of issues remains to be assessed, among which the impact of clad bursting or the hydrogen embrittlement of the advanced zirconium alloys. (A.C.)

  8. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  9. 77 FR 70409 - System Safety Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-26

    ...-0060, Notice No. 2] 2130-AC31 System Safety Program AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA... rulemaking (NPRM) published on September 7, 2012, FRA proposed regulations to require commuter and intercity passenger railroads to develop and implement a system safety program (SSP) to improve the safety of their...

  10. 42 CFR 3.210 - Required disclosure of patient safety work product to the Secretary.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Required disclosure of patient safety work product... HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT Confidentiality and Privilege Protections of Patient Safety Work Product § 3.210 Required disclosure of patient...

  11. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  12. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-12-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  13. Lessons learned while implementing a safety parameter display system at the Comanche Peak steam electric station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagar, B.

    1987-01-01

    With the completion of site Verification and Validation tests, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will be fully operational at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Implementation of the SPDS, which began in 1982, included: modifying generic Safety Assessment System Software; developing site-specific displays and features; installing and integrating system equipment into the plant; modifying station heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems to provide necessary cooling; installing an additional uninterruptible power supply system to provide necessary power; and training station personnel in the operation and use of the system. Lessons learned during this project can be discussed in terms of an ideal SPDS implementation project. Such a project would design and implement an SPDS for a plant that is already under construction or operating, and would progress through a sequence of activities that includes: (1) developing and documenting the system design bases, and including all major design influences; (2) developing a database description and system functional specifications to clarify specific system requirements; (3) developing detailed system hardware and software design specifications to fully describe the system, and to enable identification of necessary site design changes early in the project; (4) implementing the system design; (5) configuring and extensively testing the system prior to routine system operation; and (6) tuning the system after the completion of system installation. The ideal project would include future system users in design development and system testing, and would use Verification and Validation techniques throughout the project to ensure that each sequential step is appropriate and correct

  14. Department of Energy safety management: A need for change

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCoy, F.B. III

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) approach to safety management is undergoing fundamental change that should improve effective implementation of requirements throughout the complex. The most significant conveyor of this change is the open-quotes necessary and sufficientclose quotes closure process. The necessary and sufficient closure process draws upon the many and varied laws, requirements, and standards that exist in today's world to systematically derive a necessary and sufficient set of requirements for the particular work at hand to provide adequate protection for the associated hazards. The set is implemented through a system of management controls that convey fundamental safety principles and include design and analyses, engineered safety features, and procedures for the particular work. Assurance that an adequate level of protection is afforded by the set demands a need for competent, disciplined, and rigorous implementation. When properly done, the necessary and sufficient closure process enables such implementation. The focus of this paper is to provide an understanding of why the necessary and sufficient closure process is a necessary safety management program change and how integrity of this process can be assured

  15. Intranet-based safety documentation in management of major hazards and occupational health and safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leino, Antti

    2002-01-01

    In the European Union, Council Directive 96/82/EC requires operators producing, using, or handling significant amounts of dangerous substances to improve their safety management systems in order to better manage the major accident potentials deriving from human error. A new safety management system for the Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant in Helsinki, Finland, was implemented in this study. The system was designed to comply with both the new safety liabilities and the requirements of OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institute, 1999). During the implementation phase experiences were gathered from the development processes in this small organisation. The complete documentation was placed in the intranet of the plant. Hyperlinks between documents were created to ensure convenience of use. Documentation was made accessible for all workers from every workstation.

  16. Development of photovoltaic array and module safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations likely to be used in residential, intermediate, and large-scale applications were identified and developed. The National Electrical Code and Building Codes were reviewed with respect to present provisions which may be considered to affect the design of photovoltaic modules. Limited testing, primarily in the roof fire resistance field was conducted. Additional studies and further investigations led to the development of a proposed standard for safety for flat-plate photovoltaic modules and panels. Additional work covered the initial investigation of conceptual approaches and temporary deployment, for concept verification purposes, of a differential dc ground-fault detection circuit suitable as a part of a photovoltaic array safety system.

  17. Technical Support Section Instrument Support Program for nuclear and nonnuclear facilities with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adkisson, B.P.; Allison, K.L.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes requirements, procedures, and supervisory responsibilities of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Instrumentation and Controls (I ampersand C) Division's Technical Support Section (TSS) for instrument surveillance and maintenance in nonreactor nuclear facilities having identified Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) or Limiting Conditions Document (LCDs). Implementation of requirements comply with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.5, 5480.22, and 5481.1B; Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), Policy Procedure ESS-FS-201; and ORNL SPP X-ESH-15. OSRs and LCDs constitute an agreement or contract between DOE and the facility operating management regarding the safe operation of the facility. One basic difference between OSRs and LCDs is that violation of an OSR is considered a Category II occurrence, whereas violation of an LCD requirement is considered a Category III occurrence (see Energy Systems Standard ESS-OP-301 and ORNL SPP X-GP-13). OSRs are required for high- and moderate-hazard nuclear facilities, whereas the less-rigorous LCDs are required for low-hazard nuclear facilities and selected open-quotes generally acceptedclose quotes operations. Hazard classifications are determined through a hazard screening process, which each division conducts for its facilities

  18. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic literature search in PubMed/MEDLINE. Articles that describe or present as primary or secondary endpoints barriers or limitations during the implementation of the checklist WHO were selected. Observational or experimental articles were included from the date of the official launch of the WHO list. To describe the data a summary table was designed. Detailed results were organized qualitatively extracting the most prevalent limitations. Results: 17 studies were included in the final review process. The main findings were: 1 a large number of constraints reported in the literature that hinder the implementation process, 2 limitations were grouped into 9 categories according to their similarities and 3 the most frequently reported category was “knowledge”. Discussion: There are several factors that limit the proper implementation of the surgical safety checklist WHO. Among these, cultural factors, knowledge, indifference and / or relevance, communication, filling completeness, among others. Effective implementation strategies would reach its successful implementation.

  19. Organization and implementation of a national regulatory infrastructure governing protection against ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources. Interim report for comment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-02-01

    A number of IAEA Member States are undertaking to strengthen their radiation protection and safety infrastructures in order to facilitate the adoption of the requirements established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the Standards). In this connection, the IAEA has developed a technical co-operation programme (Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure) to improve radiation protection and safety infrastructures in 51 Member States, taking into account national profiles and needs of the individual participating, countries. The present report deals with the elements of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation protection and safety and intends to facilitate the, implementation of the Basic Safety Standards in practice. It takes into account the proposals in an earlier report, IAEA-TECDOC-663, but it has been expanded to include enabling legislation and modified to be more attuned to infrastructure issues related to implementation of the Standards. The orientation is toward infrastructures concerned with protection and safety for radiation sources used in medicine, agriculture, research, industry and education rather than infrastructures for protection and safety for complex nuclear facilities. It also discusses options for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the infrastructure in accordance with the size and scope of radiation practices and available regulatory resources within a country

  20. Promoting safety culture in radiation industry through radiation audit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noriah, M.A.

    2007-01-01

    This paper illustrates the Malaysian experience in implementing and promoting effective radiation safety program. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. This program is known as radiation safety audit and is able to reveal where and when action is needed to make improvements to the systems of controls. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as the sole requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. As a result safety culture, which has been a vital element on safety in many industries can be improved and promote changes, leading to good safety performance and excellence. (author)

  1. [Implementation of a safety and health planning system in a teaching hospital].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariani, F; Bravi, C; Dolcetti, L; Moretto, A; Palermo, A; Ronchin, M; Tonelli, F; Carrer, P

    2007-01-01

    University Hospital "L. Sacco" had started in 2006 a two-year project in order to set up a "Health and Safety Management System (HSMS)" referring to the technical guideline OHSAS 18001:1999 and the UNI and INAIL "Guidelines for a health and safety management system at workplace". So far, the following operations had been implemented: Setting up of a specific Commission within the Risk Management Committee; Identification and appointment of Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Carrying out of a training course addressed to Workers Representatives for Safety and Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Development of an Integrated Informative System for Prevention and Safety; Auditors qualification; Inspection of the Occupational Health Unit and the Prevention and Safety Service: reporting of critical situations and monitoring solutions adopted. Short term objectives are: Self-evaluation through check-lists of each department; Sharing of the Improvement Plan among the departments of the hospital; Planning of Health and Safety training activities in the framework of the Hospital Training Plan; Safety audit.

  2. Integrated Safety in ''SARAF'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickstein, P.; Grof, Y.; Machlev, M.; Pernick, A.

    2004-01-01

    As of the very early stages of the accelerator project at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center ''SARAF'' a safety group was established which has been an inseparable participant in the planning and design of the new facility. The safety group comprises of teams responsible for the shielding, radiation protection and general industrial safety aspects of ''SARAF''. The safety group prepared and documented the safety envelope for the accelerator, dealing with the safety requirements and guidelines for the first, pre-operational, stages of the project. The safety envelope, though based upon generic principles, took into account the accelerator features and the expected modes of operation. The safety envelope was prepared in a hierarchical structure, containing Basic Principles, Basic Guidelines, General Principles for Safety Implementation, Safety Requirements and Safety Underlining Issues. The above safety envelope applies to the entire facility, which entails the accelerator itself and the experimental areas and associated plant and equipment utilizing and supporting the production of the accelerated particle beams

  3. Effects of Implemented Initiatives on Patient Safety Culture in Fateme Al-zahra Hospital in Najafabad

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahmadreza Izadi

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: Patient safety improvement requires ongoing culture. This cultural change is the most important challenge that managers are faced with in creation of a safe system. This study aims to show the results of initiatives to improvement in patient safety culture in Fateme Al-zahra hospital. Method: In the quasi-experimental research, patient safety culture was measured using the Persian questionnaire on adaptation of the hospital survey on patient safety culture in 12 dimensions. The research was conducted before (January 2010 and after (September 2012 the improvement initiatives. In this study, all units were determined and no sampling method was used. Reliability of the questionnaire was tested by Alpha Chronbakh (0.83. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics indices and Independent T-Test by SPSS Software (version 18. Results: 350 questionnaires were distributed in each phaseand overall response rate was 58 and 56 percent, respectively. According to Independent T-test, Management expectations and actions, Organizational learning, Management support, Feedback and communication about error, Communication openness, Overall Perceptions of Safety, Non-punitive Response to Error, Frequency of Event Reporting, and Patient safety culture showed significant differences (P-value0.05. The mean score of Patient safety culture was 2.27 (from 5 and it was increased to 2.46 after initiatives that showed a significant difference (P-value<0.05. Conclusion: Although, improvement in patient safety culture needs teamwork and continuous attempts, the study showed that initiatives implemented in the case hospital had been effective in some dimensions. However, Teamwork within hospital units, Teamwork across units, Hospital handoffs and transitions, and Staffing dimensions were recognized for further intervention. Hospital could improve the patient safety culture with planning and measures in these dimensions.

  4. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    OpenAIRE

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda; Andrés Felipe Ausenón; Jairo Alberto Ayala; Diana Carolina Cabezas; Lina Gissella Calvache; Juan Pablo Caicedo; Jose Andres Calvache

    2014-01-01

    Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO) is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic ...

  5. Developing and implementing safety culture in the uses of radiation sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rojkind, R.H.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents an approach to develop and implement safety culture in the uses of radiation sources in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and teaching, and makes reference to the experience gained by the industries where that culture has been developed and improved, i.e. the nuclear industry. Suggestions to assist progress toward safety culture are here described for regulators, organisations using those sources, and professional associations. Even though emphasis is given to small organisations or teams of workers, this approach may be also useful to greater organisations like industrial irradiation companies or governmental research laboratories. In each case, parties being the principal focus of the learning process toward a progressive safety culture should be identified. (author)

  6. Consensus standards utilized and implemented for nuclear criticality safety in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1996-01-01

    The fundamental framework for the criticality safety of nuclear fuel facilities regulations is, in many advanced countries, generally formulated so that technical standards or handbook data are utilized to support the licensing safety review and to implement its guidelines. In Japan also, adequacy of the safety design of nuclear fuel facilities is checked and reviewed on the basis of licensing safety review guides. These guides are, first, open-quotes The Basic Guides for Licensing Safety Review of Nuclear Fuel Facilities,close quotes and as its subsidiaries, open-quotes The Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing Safety Review Guidesclose quotes and open-quotes The Reprocessing Facility Licensing Safety Review Guides.close quotes The open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook close-quote of Japan and the Technical Data Collection are published and utilized to supply related data and information for the licensing safety review, such as for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The well-established technical standards and data abroad such as those by the American Nuclear Society and the American National Standards Institute are also utilized to complement the standards in Japan. The basic principles of criticality safety control for nuclear fuel facilities in Japan are duly stipulated in the aforementioned basic guides as follows: 1. Guide 10: Criticality control for a single unit; 2. Guide 11: Criticality control for multiple units; 3. Guide 12: Consideration for a criticality accident

  7. Design safety improvements of Kozloduy NPP to meet the modern safety requirements towards the old generation PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hinovski, M.P.; Sabinov, S.

    2001-01-01

    Activities related to safety improvement of Kozloduy NPP units, started at the end of 1970s included seismic resistance upgrading, fire safety improvement, reliable heat final absorber etc. During the last 10 years the approach was systematized and improved. Units 1 to 4 are of great interest; therefore here we will discuss these units only. As a result of studies and analyses performed at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, problems related to the safety were identified and complex of technical measures was developed and planned. A considerable part of these measures has already been implemented, and the rest will be performed during the next years. Activities were performed by stages, and at the moment the last stage is under way. It shall be finished by the year 2003. The number of the measures is quite large to describe them here in full scope -- during the first stage of the safety program (1991-1993) were developed and analyzed more than 4200 documents and more than 160 measures were executed. During the second and third stages more than 300 important improvements were realized. In the frame of the program, financed by EBRD, 10 new systems with great importance were implemented and 8 systems were significantly modified. The main measures are described below. (author)

  8. Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DEFIGH PRICE, C.

    2000-01-01

    In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry

  9. Safety Design Requirements for The Interior Architecture of Scientific Research Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElDib, A.A.

    2014-01-01

    The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.

  10. Evaluation on safety issues of SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. S.; Seol, K. W.; Yoon, Y. K.; Lee, J. H.

    2001-01-01

    Safety issues on the SMART were evaluated in the light of the compliance with the Ministerial Ordinance of Technical Requirements applying to Nuclear Installations, which was recently revised. Evaluation concludes that regulatory requirements associated with following items have to be developed as the licensing criteria for the SMART: (1) proving the safety of design or materials different form existing reactors; (2) coping with beyond design basis accidents; (3) rulemaking on the safety of reactor safeguard vessel ; (4) ensuring integrity of steam generator tubes; and (5) classifying equipment based on their safety significance. Appropriate actions including implementation of new requirements under development should be taken for safety issues such as diversity of reactivity control and in-service inspection of steam generator tubes that are not complied with the current Technical Requirements. Safety level of the SMART design will be evaluated further by the more detailed assessment according to the Technical Requirements, and additional safety issues will be identified and resolved, if it necessary

  11. Analysis respons to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture using AHP-TOPSIS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Situmorang, J.; Kuntoro, I.; Santoso, S.; Subekti, M.; Sunaryo, G. R.

    2018-02-01

    An analysis of responses to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture has been done using AHP (Analitic Hierarchy Process) - TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution). Safety culture is considered as collective commitments of the decision-making level, management level, and individual level. Thus each level will provide a subjective perspective as an alternative approach to implementation. Furthermore safety culture is considered by the statement of five characteristics which in more detail form consist of 37 attributes, and therefore can be expressed as multi-attribute state. Those characteristics and or attributes will be a criterion and its value is difficult to determine. Those criteria of course, will determine and strongly influence the implementation of the corresponding safety culture. To determine the pattern and magnitude of the influence is done by using a TOPSIS that is based on decision matrix approach and is composed of alternatives and criteria. The weight of each criterion is determined by AHP technique. The data used are data collected through questionnaires at the workshop on safety and health in 2015. .Reliability test of data gives Cronbah Alpha value of 95.5% which according to the criteria is stated reliable. Validity test using bivariate correlation analysis technique between each attribute give Pearson correlation for all attribute is significant at level 0,01. Using confirmatory factor analysis gives Kaise-Meyer-Olkin of sampling Adequacy (KMO) is 0.719 and it is greater than the acceptance criterion 0.5 as well as the 0.000 significance level much smaller than 0.05 and stated that further analysis could be performed. As a result of the analysis it is found that responses from the level of decision maker (second echelon) dominate the best order preference rank to be the best solution in strengthening the nuclear installation safety culture, except for the first characteristics, safety is a

  12. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS

  13. Safety upgrading program in NPP Mochovce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baumeister, P.

    1999-01-01

    EMO interest is to operate only nuclear power plants with high standards of nuclear safety. This aim EMO declare on preparation completion and commissioning of Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant. Wide co-operation of our company with International Atomic Energy Agency and west European Inst.ions and companies has been started with aim to fulfil the nuclear safety requirements for Mochovce NPP. Set of 87 safety measures was implemented at Mochovce Unit 1 and is under construction at Unit 2. Mochovce NPP approach to safety upgrading implementation is showed on chosen measures. This presentation is focused on the issues category III.(author)

  14. Experiences with the implementation of measures and tools for road safety improvement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mikusova, M.

    2016-07-01

    The paper presents an overview on the road safety measures implemented in the framework of the “SOL – Save our lives” project. It contains summarization of general knowledge regarding the efficiency of the measures applied and conclusions from the analyses of developed strategies and action plans, including common issues, strengths and weaknesses of developed tools and puts these in the context of wider European Road Safety strategies. The purpose of the paper is to provide recommendations for an effective professional development of road safety programs at community level in the context of sustainable mobility. (Author)

  15. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    The design of layout plans requires adequate assessment tools for the quantification of safety performance. The general focus of the present work is to introduce an inherent safety perspective at different points of the layout design process. In particular, index approaches for safety assessment and decision-making in the early stages of layout design are developed and discussed in this two-part contribution. Part 1 (accompanying paper) of the current work presents an integrated index approach for safety assessment of early plant layout. In the present paper (Part 2), an index for evaluation of the hazard related to the potential of domino effects is developed. The index considers the actual consequences of possible escalation scenarios and scores or ranks the subsequent accident propagation potential. The effects of inherent and passive protection measures are also assessed. The result is a rapid quantification of domino hazard potential that can provide substantial support for choices in the early stages of layout design. Additionally, a case study concerning selection among various layout options is presented and analyzed. The case study demonstrates the use and applicability of the indices developed in both parts of the current work and highlights the value of introducing inherent safety features early in layout design

  16. Implementation of Patient Safety and Patient-Centeredness Strategies in Iranian Hospitals

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    Objective To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. Methods A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009–2010. Results The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient’s diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Conclusions Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention. PMID:25268797

  17. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Asgar Aghaei Hashjin

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS and patient-centeredness (PC strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade in Iran. METHODS: A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. RESULTS: The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO, and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  18. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  19. Nuclear Criticality Safety Department Qualification Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Department (NCSD) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of highly qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document defines the Qualification Program to address the NCSD technical and managerial qualification as required by the Y-1 2 Training Implementation Matrix (TIM). This Qualification Program is in compliance with DOE Order 5480.20A and applicable Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (LMES) and Y-1 2 Plant procedures. It is implemented through a combination of WES plant-wide training courses and professional nuclear criticality safety training provided within the department. This document supersedes Y/DD-694, Revision 2, 2/27/96, Qualification Program, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department There are no backfit requirements associated with revisions to this document

  20. An interagency space nuclear propulsion safety policy for SEI - Issues and discussion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marshall, A. C.; Sawyer, J. C., Jr.

    1991-01-01

    An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety topics include reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations. In this paper the emphasis is placed on the safety policy and the issues and considerations that are addressed by the NSPWG recommendations.

  1. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  2. IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY PROGRAM FOR THE WORK ACCIDENTS’ CONTROL. A CASE STUDY IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Edison Cesar de Faria Nogueira

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available This article presents a case study related to the implementation of a Work Safety Program in a chemical industry, based on the Process Safety Program, PSP, of a huge energy company. The research was applied, exploratory, qualitative and with and data collection method through documentary and bibliographical research. There will be presented the main practices adopted in order to make the Safety Program a reality inside a chemical industry, its results and contributions for its better development. This paper proposes the implementation of a Safety Program must be preceded by a diagnosis of occupational safety and health management system and with constant critical analysis in order to make the necessary adjustments.

  3. Behavioral Emergency Response Team: Implementation Improves Patient Safety, Staff Safety, and Staff Collaboration.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zicko, Cdr Jennifer M; Schroeder, Lcdr Rebecca A; Byers, Cdr William S; Taylor, Lt Adam M; Spence, Cdr Dennis L

    2017-10-01

    Staff members working on our nonmental health (non-MH) units (i.e., medical-surgical [MS] units) were not educated in recognizing or deescalating behavioral emergencies. Published evidence suggests a behavioral emergency response team (BERT) composed of MH experts who assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies may be beneficial in these situations. Therefore, we sought to implement a BERT on the inpatient non-MH units at our military treatment facility. The objectives of this evidence-based practice process improvement project were to determine how implementation of a BERT affects staff and patient safety and to examine nursing staffs' level of knowledge, confidence, and support in caring for psychiatric patients and patients exhibiting behavioral emergencies. A BERT was piloted on one MS unit for 5 months and expanded to two additional units for 3 months. Pre- and postimplementation staff surveys were conducted, and the number of staff assaults and injuries, restraint usage, and security intervention were compared. The BERT responded to 17 behavioral emergencies. The number of assaults decreased from 10 (pre) to 1 (post); security intervention decreased from 14 to 1; and restraint use decreased from 8 to 1. MS staffs' level of BERT knowledge and rating of support between MH staff and their staff significantly increased. Both MS and MH nurses rated the BERT as supportive and effective. A BERT can assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies, and improve staff collaboration and patient and staff safety. © 2017 Sigma Theta Tau International.

  4. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-07-01

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20 th , 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined. The

  5. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2016-07-15

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20{sup th}, 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined

  6. Lessons Learned from Implementing National Nuclear Safety Knowledge Platforms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simo, A.

    2016-01-01

    The Integrated Nuclear Security Advisory Services (INSServ) took place in Cameroon from 21st to 25th April 2014 and the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) from 12th to 21st October 2014. This was after the government requested the Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an official correspondence on 11th June 2013, for these missions. The main objective was to further improve the effectiveness of the Cameroon governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety and security. Revision of the legal and regulatory framework so that all international safety and security standards are addressed in laws and statutes have been done with documents downloaded from Nuclear portal sites found in GNSSN. Establishment and implementation of integrated management systems by NRPA is being done with documentation under the National Nuclear Portal with lessons learned from the IAEA review missions. The regulatory documents have been uploaded on the platform and can be accessed through FNRBA and NRPA website (www.anrp.cm). UN organizations implementing projects in Cameroon are also linked to the platform. The action plans and progress reports for IAEA/AFRA projects are also available. Moreover, NRPA regulatory activities and licensing sources are available on this platform.

  7. Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-12-01

    This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included

  8. Nuclear criticality safety training: guidelines for DOE contractors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crowell, M.R.

    1983-09-01

    The DOE Order 5480.1A, Chapter V, Safety of Nuclear Facilities, establishes safety procedures and requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. This guide has been developed as an aid to implementing the Chapter V requirements pertaining to nuclear criticality safety training. The guide outlines relevant conceptual knowledge and demonstrated good practices in job performance. It addresses training program operations requirements in the areas of employee evaluations, employee training records, training program evaluations, and training program records. It also suggests appropriate feedback mechanisms for criticality safety training program improvement. The emphasis is on academic rather than hands-on training. This allows a decoupling of these guidelines from specific facilities. It would be unrealistic to dictate a universal program of training because of the wide variation of operations, levels of experience, and work environments among DOE contractors and facilities. Hence, these guidelines do not address the actual implementation of a nuclear criticality safety training program, but rather they outline the general characteristics that should be included

  9. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  10. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  11. Long term safety requirements and safety indicators for the assessment of underground radioactive waste repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vovk, Ivan

    1998-01-01

    This presentation defines: waste disposal, safety issues, risk estimation; describes the integrated waste disposal process including quality assurance program. Related to actinides inventory it shows the main results of calculated activity obtained by deterministic estimation. It includes the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards and requirements; features related to site, design and waste package characteristics, as technical long term safety criteria for radioactive waste disposal facilities. Fundamental concern regarding the safety of radioactive waste disposal systems is their radiological impact on human beings and the environment. Safety requirements and criteria for judging the level of safety of such systems have been developed and there is a consensus among the international community on their basis within the well-established system of radiological protection. So far, however, little experience has been gained in applying long term safety criteria to actual disposal systems; consequently, there is an international debate on the most appropriate nature and form of the criteria to be used, taking into account the uncertainties involved. Emerging from the debate is the increasing conviction that the combined use of a variety of indicators would be advantageous in addressing the issue of reasonable assurance in the different time frames involved and in supporting the safety case for any particular repository concept. Indicators including risk, dose, radionuclide concentration, transit time, toxicity indices, fluxes at different points within the system, and barrier performance have all been identified as potentially relevant. Dose and risk are the indicators generally seen as most fundamental, as they seek directly to describe the radiological impact of a disposal system, and these are the ones that have been incorporated into most national standards to date. There are, however, certain problems in applying them. Application of a variety of different indicators

  12. Improved safety at CERN

    CERN Multimedia

    2006-01-01

    As announced in Weekly Bulletin No. 43/2006, a new approach to the implementation of Safety at CERN has been decided, which required taking some managerial decisions. The guidelines of the new approach are described in the document 'New approach to Safety implementation at CERN', which also summarizes the main managerial decisions I have taken to strengthen compliance with the CERN Safety policy and Rules. To this end I have also reviewed the mandates of the Safety Commission and the Safety Policy Committee (SAPOCO). Some details of the document 'Safety Policy at CERN' (also known as SAPOCO42) have been modified accordingly; its essential principles, unchanged, remain the basis for the safety policy of the Organisation. I would also like to inform you that I have appointed Dr M. Bona as the new Head of the Safety Commission until 31.12.2008, and that I will proceed soon to the appointment of the members of the new Safety Policy Committee. All members of the personnel are deemed to have taken note of the d...

  13. Specification of requirements for the implementation of ASICs and FPGA in instrumentation and control systems important to safety in German NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, G.

    2007-01-01

    This paper gives an overview concerning the design as well as the verification and validation of Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in German NPPs which are applied to carry out I and C functions. The qualification procedures dealt with restricted on ASICs without any microcontroller core. Dependent on the different safety categories, recommendations concerning the qualification level and procedures are elaborated which have to be achieved for ASICs and FPGA. Important aspects within the framework of the expert judgement for upgrading of safety relevant I and C by ASICs and FPGA are dealt with. These aspects are of general character and are mainly focused on suitability test procedures and robustness requirements of ASICs and FPGA

  14. Implementation guidelines for seismic PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coman, Ovidiu; Samaddar, Sujit; Hibino, Kenta; )

    2014-01-01

    The presentation was devoted to development of guidelines for implementation of a seismic PSA. If successful, these guidelines can close an important gap. ASME/ANS PRA standards and the related IAEA Safety Guide (IAEA NS-G-2.13) describe capability requirements for seismic PSA in order to support risk-informed applications. However, practical guidance on how to meet these requirements is limited. Such guidelines could significantly contribute to improving risk-informed safety demonstration, safety management and decision making. Extensions of this effort to further PSA areas, particularly to PSA for other external hazards, can enhance risk-informed applications

  15. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  16. 12 CFR Appendix A to Part 1720 - Policy Guidance; Minimum Safety and Soundness Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS Pt. 1720, App. A... effectively and to model the effect of differing interest rate scenarios on the Enterprise's financial... are implemented effectively, and that the Enterprise's organization structure and assignment of...

  17. TYPICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AN OPERATOR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander Michaylovich Lushkin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to implement the concept of acceptable risk all airlines should have the Safety Management System (SMS from 01.01.2009 - at the request of ICAO and from 01.01.2010 - at the request of the Federal Air Transport Agen- cy. State requirements for SMS have not been formulated clearly. Leading airlines, in an effort to meet international stand- ards, develop and implement SMS on their own. So the implemented SMS differ in control settings (level of safety, proce- dures and methodological support of the processes of safety management. The summary of the best experience in develop- ment, implementation and improvement of SMS in leading airlines, allows to create a standard SMS to the airline, where the basic procedures required by the standards are systematized. The standard SMS is formed on experience in design, implementation and development of corporate SMS in three leading Russian airlines, in which the author worked in 2006-2015, and can be the basis of an SMS of the airlines operat- ing the planes and helicopters. Taken into account in a typical SMS requirements of international and national standards, research results, developed and implemented methodical maintenance of management procedures level of safety, contribut- ed to the successful passage of IATA periodic audits on developing standards of operational safety IOSA by the airline members and achieve the best level of safety not only in Russia but also in the world.

  18. Analysis of normative requirements for the development and implementation of a quality management system in Brazilian nuclear installations and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kibrit, Eduardo

    2008-01-01

    The present work identifies, characterizes and analyses the normative requirements for the development and implementation of quality management systems in Brazilian nuclear installations and activities. The requirements established in standards IAEA GS-R-3, IAEA GS-G-3.1, IAEA DS 349, NBR ISO 9001:2000 e CNEN-NN-1.16 are critically analyzed. A correlation matrix of the applicable standards is presented and the related topics among them are identified. The standards IAEA GS-R-3, IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA DS 349 define general requirements for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system in nuclear installations and activities, in IAEA member countries. The standard NBR ISO 9001:2000 establishes general requirements for the implementation of a quality management system in all kinds of organizations. The standard CNEN NN-1.16 establishes the regulating requirements for the quality assurance systems and programs of nuclear installations, for licensing and authorization for operation of these installations in Brazil. The standard IAEA GS-R-3 that replaces the code IAEA 50-C-Q introduces the concept of 'Integrated Management System' for the nuclear area, in preference to the concepts of 'Quality Assurance' and 'Quality Management'. This new approach is aligned with the current tendency incorporating requirements of quality, safety, health, environment, security, economics and other in a unique management system. Examples of quality management systems implemented by Brazilian nuclear organizations and by nuclear organizations outside Brazil are analyzed and considered in the discussion of results. (author)

  19. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  20. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Science.gov (United States)

    Herrera-Sánchez, Isabel M.; León-Pérez, José M.; León-Rubio, José M.

    2017-01-01

    There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (un)successful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade. PMID:29375413

  1. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Isabel M. Herrera-Sánchez

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (unsuccessful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade.

  2. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  3. OBTAINING FOOD SAFETY BY APPLYING HACCP SYSTEM

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    ION CRIVEANU

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to increase the confidence of the trading partners and consumers in the products which are sold on the market, enterprises producing food are required to implement the food safety system HACCP,a particularly useful system because the manufacturer is not able to fully control finished products . SR EN ISO 22000:2005 establishes requirements for a food safety management system where an organization in the food chain needs to proove its ability to control food safety hazards in order to ensure that food is safe at the time of human consumption. This paper presents the main steps which ensure food safety using the HACCP system, and SR EN ISO 20000:2005 requirements for food safety.

  4. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  5. Considerations in the development of safety requirements for innovative reactors: Application to modular high temperature gas cooled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-08-01

    of the present publication is to propose a technical basis and methodology, based on principles of defence in depth, for conducting design safety assessments and in the long term generating design safety requirements for innovative reactors. The MHTGR is used as an example to illustrate this process. For this purpose, the document provides an overview of the safety related features of current MHTGR technology, examines how the defence in depth principle can be implemented/adopted by the MHTGR design, and how MHTGR designs could satisfy the three fundamental safety objectives: general nuclear safety; radiation protection; technical safety. The present TECDOC is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather suggests a systematic approach to be used in the development of detailed safety requirements

  6. Radioisotope Power System Delivery, Ground Support and Nuclear Safety Implementation: Use of the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator for the NASA's Mars Science Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    S.G. Johnson; K.L. Lively; C.C. Dwight

    2014-07-01

    Radioisotope power systems have been used for over 50 years to enable missions in remote or hostile environments. They are a convenient means of supplying a few milliwatts up to a few hundred watts of useable, long-term electrical power. With regard to use of a radioisotope power system, the transportation, ground support and implementation of nuclear safety protocols in the field is a complex process that requires clear identification of needed technical and regulatory requirements. The appropriate care must be taken to provide high quality treatment of the item to be moved so it arrives in a condition to fulfill its missions in space. Similarly it must be transported and managed in a manner compliant with requirements for shipment and handling of special nuclear material. This presentation describes transportation, ground support operations and implementation of nuclear safety and security protocols for a radioisotope power system using recent experience involving the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator for National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Mars Science Laboratory, which launched in November of 2011.

  7. Implementation of Energy Code Controls Requirements in New Commercial Buildings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosenberg, Michael I. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hart, Philip R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hatten, Mike [Solarc Energy Group, LLC, Seattle, WA (United States); Jones, Dennis [Group 14 Engineering, Inc., Denver, CO (United States); Cooper, Matthew [Group 14 Engineering, Inc., Denver, CO (United States)

    2017-03-24

    Most state energy codes in the United States are based on one of two national model codes; ANSI/ASHRAE/IES 90.1 (Standard 90.1) or the International Code Council (ICC) International Energy Conservation Code (IECC). Since 2004, covering the last four cycles of Standard 90.1 updates, about 30% of all new requirements have been related to building controls. These requirements can be difficult to implement and verification is beyond the expertise of most building code officials, yet the assumption in studies that measure the savings from energy codes is that they are implemented and working correctly. The objective of the current research is to evaluate the degree to which high impact controls requirements included in commercial energy codes are properly designed, commissioned and implemented in new buildings. This study also evaluates the degree to which these control requirements are realizing their savings potential. This was done using a three-step process. The first step involved interviewing commissioning agents to get a better understanding of their activities as they relate to energy code required controls measures. The second involved field audits of a sample of commercial buildings to determine whether the code required control measures are being designed, commissioned and correctly implemented and functioning in new buildings. The third step includes compilation and analysis of the information gather during the first two steps. Information gathered during these activities could be valuable to code developers, energy planners, designers, building owners, and building officials.

  8. Evaluating the implementation of health and safety innovations under a regulatory context: a collective case study of Ontario's safer needle regulation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chambers, Andrea; Mustard, Cameron A; Breslin, Curtis; Holness, Linn; Nichol, Kathryn

    2013-01-22

    Implementation effectiveness models have identified important factors that can promote the successful implementation of an innovation; however, these models have been examined within contexts where innovations are adopted voluntarily and often ignore the socio-political and environmental context. In the field of occupational health and safety, there are circumstances where organizations must adopt innovations to comply with a regulatory standard. Examining how the external environment can facilitate or challenge an organization's change process may add to our understanding of implementation effectiveness. The objective of this study is to describe implementation facilitators and barriers in the context of a regulation designed to promote the uptake of safer engineered medical devices in healthcare. The proposed study will focus on Ontario's safer needle regulation (2007) which requires healthcare organizations to transition to the use of safer engineered medical devices for the prevention of needlestick injuries. A collective case study design will be used to learn from the experiences of three acute care hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada. Interviews with management and front-line healthcare workers and analysis of supporting documents will be used to describe the implementation experience and examine issues associated with the integration of these devices. The data collection and analysis process will be influenced by a conceptual framework that draws from implementation science and the occupational health and safety literature. The focus of this study in addition to the methodology creates a unique opportunity to contribute to the field of implementation science. First, the study will explore implementation experiences under circumstances where regulatory pressures are influencing the organization's change process. Second, the timing of this study provides an opportunity to focus on issues that arise during later stages of implementation, a phase

  9. Implementation of reactor safety analysis code CATHARE and its use on FACOM M-380

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishiguro, Misako; Shinozawa, Naohisa; Tomiyama, Mineyoshi; Fujisaki, Masahide

    1986-05-01

    CATHARE is an advanced safety analysis code developed at the Nuclear Research Center of Grenoble in France. The code simulates thermohydraulic phenomena involved in loss of coolant accidents in pressurized water reactors. The code has been introduced into JAERI as a part of the technical exchange between the JAERI ROSA-IV Program and the French BETHSY-CATHARE Program. The code was delivered in the form of 23 files containing 115,000 statements in total. A large part of CATHARE code has been written in an extended Fortran language 'Esope' which is mainly used for managing dynamic memory allocation. The JAERI version is created from the IBM version which has been used on Amdhal computer at ISPRA. Some modifications are required in order to implement the CATHARE code at JAERI because of difference in softwares. In this report, the overview of the code structure, the JAERI usage, the implementation method, the error correction method, the problems special to install the code in JAERI, and the distribution of computing time are described. (author)

  10. Practical implementation of good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise in the Lodz region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Michalak, Jacek

    2002-10-01

    Good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise (GP HESME) is the process that aims at continuous improvement in health, environment and safety performance, involving all stakeholders within and outside the enterprise. The GP HESME system is intended to function at different levels: international, national, local community, and enterprise. The most important issues at the first stage of GP HESME implementation in the Lodz region are described. Also, the proposals of future activities in Lodz are presented. Practical implementation of GP HESME requires close co-operation among all stakeholders: local authorities, employers, employees, research institutions, and the state inspectorate. The WHO and the Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine (NIOM) are initiating implementation, delivering professional consultation, education and training of stakeholders in the NIOM School of Public Health. The implementation of GP HESME in the Lodz region started in 1999 from a WHO meeting on criteria and indicators, followed by close collaboration of NIOM with the city's Department of Public Health. 'Directions of Actions for Health of Lodz Citizens' is now the city's official document that includes GP HESME as an important part of public health policy in Lodz. Several conferences were organized by NIOM together with the Professional Managers' Club, Labor Inspection, and the city's Department of Public Health to assess the most important needs of enterprises. The employers and managerial staff, who predominated among the participants, stated the need for tailored sets of indicators and economic appraisal of GP HESME activities. Special attention is paid to GP HESME in supermarkets and community-owned enterprises, e.g., a local transportation company. A special program for small- and medium-size enterprises will be the next step of GP HESME in the Lodz region. The implementation of GP HESME is possible if the efforts of local authorities; research

  11. Areva - Nuclear Safety Policy 2013-2016

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-03-01

    The objectives of Areva's Nuclear Safety Policy cover three areas: 1 - Safety of facilities: - Establish a group wide process to maintain the regulatory compliance of facilities and to ensure the execution of improvements required by periodic reviews of safety. - Put in place proactive measures to reduce source terms present in facilities, and in particular with regard to fire, operational waste and legacy waste on AREVA sites. - Ensure the performance of arrangements and activities central to risk prevention, in particular in the areas of containment, criticality safety and radiological protection through compliance with the associated safety requirements. - Strengthen the emergency planning arrangements to be implemented in case of accidents and test these through regular exercises. 2 - Operational Safety: - Develop and verify the level of safety culture of our staff and subcontractors and increase the presence of operational managers on the ground. - Improve the requirements and responsibilities within documentation associated with operations and interventions on the basis of a significant involvement of our staff and subcontractors. - Implement robust and formal risk prevention processes to manage temporary or transitional situations, uncommon situations, or specific risks, including but not limited to parallel activities, administrative lockout/tag-out, working with naked flames, gamma radiation, work in a radioactive environment. - Integrate human and organizational factors (HOF) in the analysis of safety-related modifications of facilities; undertake detailed reviews of the causes of all significant events inside the group and improve the communication and implementation of operating experience within all group entities. - 3 Safety Management: - Maintain an organization based on clear principles of shared responsibility and delegation of authority, and have in place a robust process to assess the impact on safety of any organizational change. - Strengthen

  12. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-10-15

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  13. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  14. Requirements on the provisional safety analyses and technical comparison of safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    decide on the provision of a design license for a repository site for SMA and another one for HAA, or for a common site for both SMA and HAA. The present report concerns the second step and recapitulates the assertions of SGT on the provisional safety analyses and on the safety technical comparison. It establishes the specific requirements of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) on provisional safety and the safety technical comparison. Further, it defines the extent and content of the safety technical documentation necessary for step 2

  15. An effective technique for the software requirements analysis of NPP safety-critical systems, based on software inspection, requirements traceability, and formal specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koo, Seo Ryong; Seong, Poong Hyun; Yoo, Junbeom; Cha, Sung Deok; Yoo, Yeong Jae

    2005-01-01

    A thorough requirements analysis is indispensable for developing and implementing safety-critical software systems such as nuclear power plant (NPP) software systems because a single error in the requirements can generate serious software faults. However, it is very difficult to completely analyze system requirements. In this paper, an effective technique for the software requirements analysis is suggested. For requirements verification and validation (V and V) tasks, our technique uses software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification with structural decomposition. Software inspection and requirements traceability analysis are widely considered the most effective software V and V methods. Although formal methods are also considered an effective V and V activity, they are difficult to use properly in the nuclear fields as well as in other fields because of their mathematical nature. In this work, we propose an integrated environment (IE) approach for requirements, which is an integrated approach that enables easy inspection by combining requirement traceability and effective use of a formal method. The paper also introduces computer-aided tools for supporting IE approach for requirements. Called the nuclear software inspection support and requirements traceability (NuSISRT), the tool incorporates software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification capabilities. We designed the NuSISRT to partially automate software inspection and analysis of requirement traceability. In addition, for the formal specification and analysis, we used the formal requirements specification and analysis tool for nuclear engineering (NuSRS)

  16. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  17. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  18. New safety and security requirements for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.; Horvath, K.; Safar, J.

    2016-01-01

    In addition to the promulgation of mode-specific regulations of international transport of dangerous goods, some Hungarian governmental and ministerial decrees impose further conditions upon the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. One of these ministerial decrees on the transport, carriage and packaging of radioactive materials is under revision and it will require • approval of emergency response plan (including security and safety contingency plan); • report on transport incidents and accidents for classifying them in accordance with the INES scale; • the competent authority to request experts’ support for the approval of package designs, radioactive material designs and shipments. Regarding the security of the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials a new Hungarian governmental decree and a related guidance are about to be published which will supply additional requirements in the field of the transport security especially concerning radioactive materials, implementing - among others - IAEA recommendations of the NSS No9 and No14. The main and relevant features of the Hungarian nuclear regulatory system and the details of both new decrees regarding the safety and security issues of transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials will be discussed. (author)

  19. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dey, M.

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements

  20. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dey, M. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Issue Resolution; Arsenault, F.; Patterson, M.; Gaal, M. [SCIENTECH, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States)

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements.

  1. The 2002 Drigg post-closure safety case: implementation of a multiple factor safety case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lean, C.B.; Grimwood, P.D.; Watts, L.; Fowler, L.; Thomson, G.; Kelly, E.; Hodgkinson, D.

    2004-01-01

    British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) owns and operates the Drigg disposal site, which is the UK's principal facility for the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLW). Disposals are carried out under the terms of an authorization granted by the UK Environment Agency (the Agency). The Agency periodically reviews the authorization to take account of new information and any revisions to regulatory requirements. In September 2002 new Operational Environmental and Post-Closure Safety Cases (OESC and PCSC respectively) were submitted to the Agency to support the next authorization review. The OESC assesses radiological safety aspects up until closure of the site, including a post-operational management phase, whilst the PCSC considers the longer-term radiological safety. The Drigg disposal facility has been operational since 1959. For the first 3 decades of operations, disposals were solely by tumble tipping wastes into excavated trenches. This was phased out in favour of vault disposal and disposals to the trenches were completed in 1995. The first vault (Vault 8) commenced operations in 1988 and construction of future vaults is planned up to the estimated end of disposal operations in about 50 years time. This paper describes the main components of the 2002 Drigg PCSC and how they relate to each other. Central to the safety case is a systematic comprehensive post-closure radiological safety assessment (PCRSA). However, the importance of the more qualitative aspects of the safety case, including a demonstration of optimisation, is also highlighted. In addition, other confidence-building activities which are key to developing and presenting the safety case are discussed. (author)

  2. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While the requirements in DOE-STD-6002-96 are generally applicable to a wide range of fusion facilities, this Standard, DOE-STD-6003-96, is concerned mainly with the implementation of those requirements in large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This Standard is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment as opposed to regulation by other regulatory agencies. As the need for guidance involving other types of fusion facilities or other regulatory environments emerges, additional guidance volumes should be prepared. The concepts, processes, and recommendations set forth here are for guidance only. They will contribute to safety at magnetic fusion facilities

  3. Savannah River Site (SRS) implementation program plan for DNFSB Recommendation 90-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Talukdar, B.K.; Loceff, F.

    1993-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) based on its review and evaluation of the content and implementation of standards relating to design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of Defense Nuclear Facilities has made the recommendations (90-2) which when implemented would assure comparable or equivalent levels of safety to the environment, public and workers as required for the commercial nuclear facilities. DOE has accepted the DNFSB 90-2 recommendations and have directed SRS and other M ampersand Os to implement them. This report discusses implementation program which commits to developing Requirement Identification Documents (RID's) for all defense nuclear facilities in the DOE complex

  4. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-03-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program has been established whereby an annual NUREG series report will be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirement areas. The data contained in this report are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by personnel in the NRC regions. This report has been prepared in order to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of all the TMI Action Plan requirements at licensed reactors, and to make this information available to other interested parties, including the public. A corollary purpose of this report is for it to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed facilities

  5. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  6. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources: International basic safety standards. General safety requirements. Pt. 3 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  7. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  8. Developing implementation strategies for firearm safety promotion in paediatric primary care for suicide prevention in two large US health systems: a study protocol for a mixed-methods implementation study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wolk, Courtney Benjamin; Jager-Hyman, Shari; Marcus, Steven C; Ahmedani, Brian K; Zeber, John E; Fein, Joel A; Brown, Gregory K; Lieberman, Adina; Beidas, Rinad S

    2017-06-24

    The promotion of safe firearm practices, or firearms means restriction, is a promising but infrequently used suicide prevention strategy in the USA. Safety Check is an evidence-based practice for improving parental firearm safety behaviour in paediatric primary care. However, providers rarely discuss firearm safety during visits, suggesting the need to better understand barriers and facilitators to promoting this approach. This study, Adolescent Suicide Prevention In Routine clinical Encounters, aims to engender a better understanding of how to implement the three firearm components of Safety Check as a suicide prevention strategy in paediatric primary care. The National Institute of Mental Health-funded Mental Health Research Network (MHRN), a consortium of 13 healthcare systems across the USA, affords a unique opportunity to better understand how to implement a firearm safety intervention in paediatric primary care from a system-level perspective. We will collaboratively develop implementation strategies in partnership with MHRN stakeholders. First, we will survey leadership of 82 primary care practices (ie, practices serving children, adolescents and young adults) within two MHRN systems to understand acceptability and use of the three firearm components of Safety Check (ie, screening, brief counselling around firearm safety and provision of firearm locks). Then, in collaboration with MHRN stakeholders, we will use intervention mapping and the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research to systematically develop and evaluate a multilevel menu of implementation strategies for promoting firearm safety as a suicide prevention strategy in paediatric primary care. Study procedures have been approved by the University of Pennsylvania. Henry Ford Health System and Baylor Scott & White institutional review boards (IRBs) have ceded IRB review to the University of Pennsylvania IRB. Results will be submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. © Article

  9. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-06-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program has been established whereby an annual NUREG report will be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirement areas. This report, the third volume of a three-volume series, addresses the status of generic safety issues (GSIs) at licensed plants. Volume 1 addressed the status of Three Mile Island Action Plan requirements and was published in March 1991. Volume 2 addressed the status of implementation and verification of unresolved safety issues and was published in May 1991. The annual NUREG report will combine these three areas in a single volume to be published in late 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive description of the status of implementation and verification of the 34 GSIs and sub-issues that have been resolved by the NRC and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This NUREG report also serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until a request for action by licensees is issued by NRC. 3 figs., 6 tabs

  10. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  11. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  12. Experience of implementation of systems of management of professional health and production safety at the Russian entities

    OpenAIRE

    Shmeleva E.; Bylinkina A.

    2016-01-01

    This article is devoted to the study of experience in implementation of management systems, occupational health and safety at Russian enterprises. Concretized the benefits and advantages that the company obtained through the implementation of OHSAS methodology. Authors specify that system approach to management of professional safety on modern industrial enterprise can significantly reduce the probability of emergence of risks of occupational accidents, accidents, and emergencies. In the conc...

  13. Radiation safety requirements for training of users of diagnostic X ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background. Globally, the aim of requirements regarding the use and ownership of diagnostic medical X-ray equipment is to limit radiation by abiding by the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle. The ignorance of radiographers with regard to radiation safety requirements, however, is currently a cause of ...

  14. Knowledge and perceived implementation of food safety risk analysis framework in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cherry, C; Mohr, A Hofelich; Lindsay, T; Diez-Gonzalez, F; Hueston, W; Sampedro, F

    2014-12-01

    Risk analysis is increasingly promoted as a tool to support science-based decisions regarding food safety. An online survey comprising 45 questions was used to gather information on the implementation of food safety risk analysis within the Latin American and Caribbean regions. Professionals working in food safety in academia, government, and private sectors in Latin American and Caribbean countries were contacted by email and surveyed to assess their individual knowledge of risk analysis and perceptions of its implementation in the region. From a total of 279 participants, 97% reported a familiarity with risk analysis concepts; however, fewer than 25% were able to correctly identify its key principles. The reported implementation of risk analysis among the different professional sectors was relatively low (46%). Participants from industries in countries with a long history of trade with the United States and the European Union, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, reported perceptions of a higher degree of risk analysis implementation (56, 50, and 20%, respectively) than those from the rest of the countries, suggesting that commerce may be a driver for achieving higher food safety standards. Disagreement among respondents on the extent of the use of risk analysis in national food safety regulations was common, illustrating a systematic lack of understanding of the current regulatory status of the country. The results of this survey can be used to target further risk analysis training on selected sectors and countries.

  15. Shutdown Safety in NEK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gluhak, Mario; Senegovic, Marko

    2014-01-01

    Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity control, continuity of core cooling, and integrity of fission product barriers are valued as essential, distinguishing attributes of nuclear station work environment'. NEK has recognized the importance of 'defence in depth'Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity

  16. Correct safety requirements during the life cycle of heating plants; Korrekta saekerhetskrav under vaermeanlaeggningars livscykel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tegehall, Jan; Hedberg, Johan [Swedish National Testing and Research Inst., Boraas (Sweden)

    2006-10-15

    The safety of old steam boilers or hot water generators is in principle based on electromechanical components which are generally easy to understand. The use of safety-PLC is a new and flexible way to design a safe system. A programmable system offers more degrees of freedom and consequently new problems may arise. As a result, new standards which use the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) concept for the level of safety have been elaborated. The goal is to define a way of working to handle requirements on safety in control systems of heat and power plants. SIL-requirements are relatively new within the domain and there is a need for guidance to be able to follow the requirements. The target of this report is the people who work with safety questions during new construction, reconstruction, or modification of furnace plants. In the work, the Pressure Equipment Directive, 97/23/EC, as well as standards which use the SIL concept have been studied. Additionally, standards for water-tube boilers have been studied. The focus has been on the safety systems (safety functions) which are used in water-tube boilers for heat and power plants; other systems, which are parts of these boilers, have not been considered. Guidance has been given for the aforementioned standards as well as safety requirements specification and risk analysis. An old hot water generator and a relatively new steam boiler have been used as case studies. The design principles and safety functions of the furnaces have been described. During the risk analysis important hazards were identified. A method for performing a risk analysis has been described and the appropriate content of a safety requirements specification has been defined. If a heat or power plant is constructed, modified, or reconstructed, a safety life cycle shall be followed. The purpose of the safety life cycle is to plan, describe, document, perform, check, test, and validate that everything is correctly done. The components of the safety

  17. [Implementation of "5S" methodology in laboratory safety and its effect on employee satisfaction].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dogan, Yavuz; Ozkutuk, Aydan; Dogan, Ozlem

    2014-04-01

    Health institutions use the accreditation process to achieve improvement across the organization and management of the health care system. An ISO 15189 quality and efficiency standard is the recommended standard for medical laboratories qualification. The "safety and accommodation conditions" of this standard covers the requirement to improve working conditions and maintain the necessary safety precautions. The most inevitable precaution for ensuring a safe environment is the creation of a clean and orderly environment to maintain a potentially safe surroundings. In this context, the 5S application which is a superior improvement tool that has been used by the industry, includes some advantages such as encouraging employees to participate in and to help increase the productivity. The main target of this study was to implement 5S methods in a clinical laboratory of a university hospital for evaluating its effect on employees' satisfaction, and correction of non-compliance in terms of the working environment. To start with, first, 5S education was given to management and employees. Secondly, a 5S team was formed and then the main steps of 5S (Seiri: Sort, Seiton: Set in order, Seiso: Shine, Seiketsu: Standardize, and Shitsuke: Systematize) were implemented for a duration of 3 months. A five-point likert scale questionnaire was used in order to determine and assess the impact of 5S on employees' satisfaction considering the areas such as facilitating the job, the job satisfaction, setting up a safe environment, and the effect of participation in management. Questionnaire form was given to 114 employees who actively worked during the 5S implementation period, and the data obtained from 63 (52.3%) participants (16 male, 47 female) were evaluated. The reliability of the questionnaire's Cronbach's alpha value was determined as 0.858 (p5S it was observed and determined that facilitating the job and setting up a safe environment created a statistically significant effect on

  18. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    CERN Document Server

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  19. Safety Culture as a Pillar of Defense-in-Depth Implementation at the Experimental Fuel Element Installation, Batan Indonesia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hardiyanti, H.; Herutomo, B.; Suryaman, G.K., E-mail: hrdyanti@batan.go.id [Center for Nuclear Fuel Technology – National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) Tangerang (Indonesia)

    2014-10-15

    Defence-in-depth (DID) needs to be implemented not only in a nuclear power plant, but also in a non-reactor nuclear facility. The application of safety culture in a nuclear facility is one way of DID implementation. Safety culture aims at the performance of safe works, the prevention of deviation, and the accomplishment of quality operation. It is in accordance with the first level of DID concept which is the prevention of abnormal operation and failures that is done through conservative design and high quality in construction and operation. Experimental Fuel Element Installation (EFEI) is a nonreactor nuclear facility that belongs to BATAN (the National Nuclear Energy Agency of the Republic of Indonesia) that functions as its research and development facility on power reactor fuel production. The objective of safety culture implementation in the EFEI is to encourage workers to have a stronger sense of responsibility on safety and to contribute actively for its development. The enhancement of safety culture in the EFEI refers to the attributes of a strong safety culture listed in the IAEA Safety Standard Series No.GS-G-3.5 (The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Guide). The strategies performed were: a) Internalization of safety values through activities such as briefings, “coffee morning”, visual management, workshops, and training; b) Enhancement of leadership effectiveness through activities such as senior management visits, safety leadership training, and personnel qualification training; c) Integration of safety into all work processes through activities such as setting up HIRADC (hazard identification, risk assessment, and determining controls) documents, setting up WHA (workplace hazard assessment), and routine housekeeping; d) Learning about safety through activities such as occupational health and safety inspections, safety self-assessments, open reporting on safety incidents, and participation in the FINAS (fuel incident notification

  20. On the development of an International Curriculum on Hydrogen Safety Engineering and its Implementation into Educational Programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dahoe, A.E.; Molkov, V.V.

    2006-01-01

    The present paper provides an overview of the development of an International Curriculum on Hydrogen Safety Engineering and its implementation into new educational programmes. The curriculum has a modular structure, and consists of five basic, six fundamental and four applied modules. The reasons for this particular structure are explained. To accelerate the development of teaching materials and their implementation in training/educational programmes, an annual European Summer School on Hydrogen Safety will be held (the first Summer School is from 15-24 Aug 2006, Belfast, UK), where leading experts deliver keynote lectures to an audience of researchers on topics covering the state-of-the-art in Hydrogen Safety Science and Engineering. The establishment of a Postgraduate Certificate course in Hydrogen Safety Engineering at the University of Ulster (starting in September 2006) as a first step in the development of a worldwide system of Hydrogen Safety education and training is described. (authors)

  1. Evaluating the implementation of health and safety innovations under a regulatory context: A collective case study of Ontario’s safer needle regulation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chambers Andrea

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Implementation effectiveness models have identified important factors that can promote the successful implementation of an innovation; however, these models have been examined within contexts where innovations are adopted voluntarily and often ignore the socio-political and environmental context. In the field of occupational health and safety, there are circumstances where organizations must adopt innovations to comply with a regulatory standard. Examining how the external environment can facilitate or challenge an organization’s change process may add to our understanding of implementation effectiveness. The objective of this study is to describe implementation facilitators and barriers in the context of a regulation designed to promote the uptake of safer engineered medical devices in healthcare. Methods The proposed study will focus on Ontario’s safer needle regulation (2007 which requires healthcare organizations to transition to the use of safer engineered medical devices for the prevention of needlestick injuries. A collective case study design will be used to learn from the experiences of three acute care hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada. Interviews with management and front-line healthcare workers and analysis of supporting documents will be used to describe the implementation experience and examine issues associated with the integration of these devices. The data collection and analysis process will be influenced by a conceptual framework that draws from implementation science and the occupational health and safety literature. Discussion The focus of this study in addition to the methodology creates a unique opportunity to contribute to the field of implementation science. First, the study will explore implementation experiences under circumstances where regulatory pressures are influencing the organization's change process. Second, the timing of this study provides an opportunity to focus on issues

  2. Implementing a pediatric surgical safety checklist in the OR and beyond.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Norton, Elizabeth K; Rangel, Shawn J

    2010-07-01

    An international study about implementation of the World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist showed that use of the checklist reduced complication and death rates in adult surgical patients. Clinicians at Children's Hospital Boston, Massachusetts, modified the Surgical Safety Checklist for pediatric populations. We pilot tested the Pediatric Surgical Safety Checklist and created a large checklist poster for each OR to allow the entire surgical team to view the checklist simultaneously and to promote shared responsibility for conducting the time out. Results of the pilot test showed improvements in teamwork, communication, and adherence to process measures. Parallel efforts were made in other areas of the hospital where invasive procedures are performed. Compliance with the checklist at our facility has been good, and team members have expressed satisfaction with the flow and content of the checklist. Copyright (c) 2010 AORN, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  3. 77 FR 75439 - Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-20

    ...] Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New Drug Applications and Bioavailability/Bioequivalence Studies, and a Small Entity Compliance Guide; Availability... Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies'' and ``Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  4. Modeling of requirement specification for safety critical real time computer system using formal mathematical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankar, Bindu; Sasidhar Rao, B.; Ilango Sambasivam, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Real time computer systems are increasingly used for safety critical supervision and control of nuclear reactors. Typical application areas are supervision of reactor core against coolant flow blockage, supervision of clad hot spot, supervision of undesirable power excursion, power control and control logic for fuel handling systems. The most frequent cause of fault in safety critical real time computer system is traced to fuzziness in requirement specification. To ensure the specified safety, it is necessary to model the requirement specification of safety critical real time computer systems using formal mathematical methods. Modeling eliminates the fuzziness in the requirement specification and also helps to prepare the verification and validation schemes. Test data can be easily designed from the model of the requirement specification. Z and B are the popular languages used for modeling the requirement specification. A typical safety critical real time computer system for supervising the reactor core of prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) against flow blockage is taken as case study. Modeling techniques and the actual model are explained in detail. The advantages of modeling for ensuring the safety are summarized

  5. Implementing an interprofessional patient safety learning initiative: insights from participants, project leads and steering committee members.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeffs, Lianne; Abramovich, Ilona Alex; Hayes, Chris; Smith, Orla; Tregunno, Deborah; Chan, Wai-Hin; Reeves, Scott

    2013-11-01

    Effective teamwork and interprofessional collaboration are vital for healthcare quality and safety; however, challenges persist in creating interprofessional teamwork and resilient professional teams. A study was undertaken to delineate perceptions of individuals involved with the implementation of an interprofessional patient safety competency-based intervention and intervention participants. The study employed a qualitative study design that triangulated data from interviews with six steering committee members and five members of the project team who developed and monitored the intervention and six focus groups with clinical team members who participated in the intervention and implemented local patient safety projects within a large teaching hospital in Canada. Our study findings reveal that healthcare professionals and support staff acquired patient safety competencies in an interprofessional context that can result in improved patient and work flow processes. However, key challenges exist including managing projects amidst competing priorities, lacking physician engagement and sustaining projects. Our findings point to leaders to provide opportunities for healthcare teams to engage in interprofessional teamwork and patient safety projects to improve quality of patient care. Further research efforts should examine the sustainability of interprofessional safety projects and how leaders can more fully engage the participation of all professions, specifically physicians.

  6. Nuclear safety review requirements for launch approval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sholtis, J.A. Jr.; Winchester, R.O.

    1992-01-01

    Use of nuclear power systems in space requires approval which is preceded by extensive safety analysis and review. This careful study allows an informed risk-benefit decision at the highest level of our government. This paper describes the process as it has historically been applied to U.S. isotopic power systems. The Ulysses mission, launched in October 1990, is used to illustrate the process. Expected variations to deal with reactor-power systems are explained

  7. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) standards/requirements identification document (S/RID)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bennett, G.L.

    1996-03-15

    This Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) set forth the Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) standards/requirements for Westinghouse Hanford Company Level Programs, where implementation and compliance is the responsibility of these organizations. These standards/requirements are adequate to ensure the protection of the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  8. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  9. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  10. Instruction of the CSN on the requirements of the system of management of the nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cid, R.; Santo, A. de; Gil Montes, B.; Toca, A.

    2008-01-01

    The Western European Nations Regulatory Authorities (WENRA) performed a nuclear safety requirements harmonization task, as a result of this work and its implementation, the Spanish Nuclear Safety Counsel (CSN) has the commitment to issue its own Regulation Safety Instructions) to identify the WENRA to level nuclear safety requirements, and to incorporate it in the Spanish regulatory pyramid. However, the Spain nuclear installations meet these requirements through the original criteria to fulfill the regulation of the country that supply the NSSS design, these requirements are not incorporated in our regulation. One of the issues, identified by WENRA, is the implementation of the management system requirements in accord with the IAEA GS-R-3 The Management System for Facilities and Activities. As these regards, the CSN has developed a Safety Instruction, basically endorsing the IAEA GS-R-3. The Safety Instruction is actually in a phase of external comments and should be issued by june 2008. This paper describes the bases for the Safety Instruction, summarises the requirements that would meet the management system for nuclear installations and the activities to perform for its implementations. (Author)

  11. Experience in the implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture assessment of research reactor operation and maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip; Suryopratomo, K.

    2001-01-01

    The implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture for research reactor operation are of importance to assure its safety status. It comprises an assessment of the quality of both technical and organizational aspects involved in safety. The method for the assessment is based on judging the quality of fulfillment of a number of essential issues for safety i.e. through audit, interview and/or discussions with personnel and management in plant. However, special consideration should be given to the data processing regarding the fuzzy nature of the data i.e. in answering the questionnaire. To accommodate this situation, the SCAP, a computer program based on fuzzy logic for assessing plant safety status, has been developed. As a case study, the experience in the assessment of Kartini research reactor safety status shows that it is strongly related to the implementation of quality assurance program in reactor operation and awareness of reactor operation staffs to safety culture practice. It is also shown that the application of the fuzzy rule in assessing reactor safety status gives a more realistic result than the traditional approach. (author)

  12. Innovative nuclear reactor - Indian approach to meet user requirements for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saha, D.; Sinha, R.K.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: For sustainable development of nuclear energy, a number of key issues are to be addressed. It should be economically competitive; it must address the issues related to nuclear safety, proliferation resistance, environmental impact, waste disposal and cross cutting issues like social and infra-structural aspects. To compete successfully in the long term, in the highly competitive energy market and to overcome other challenges, it is necessary to introduce innovative reactor and fuel cycle concepts. Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is one such innovative reactor. To guide the research and development activities related to innovative concepts, user requirements are to be formulated. User requirements covering various aspects of sustainable development are being formulated at both national and international levels. One such international project involved in the formulation of user requirements is the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). This paper deals with INPRO user requirements for safety and Indian approach to meet these requirements through AHWR

  13. Health and safety training for hazardous waste site activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Implementation of OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120(e)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, D.A.

    1988-01-01

    Among the requirements set forth by the interim final rule, 29 CFR Part 1910.120, promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in response to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), are specific provisions for health and safety training of employees involved in hazardous waste operations. These training provisions require a minimum of 40 hours of initial instruction off the site for employees involved in corrective operations and cleanup activities at hazardous waste sites. A less detailed training requirement of 24 hours is specified for employees working in more routine treatment, storage, and disposal activities. Managers and supervisors who are directly responsible for or who supervise employees engaged in hazardous waste operations must complete 8 additional hours of training related to management of hazardous waste site activities. Consistent with the intent of 29 CFR 1910.120, a training program has been developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to comply with the need to protect the safety and health of hazardous waste workers. All hourly requirements specified in the interim final rule are met by a comprehensive program structure involving three stages of training. This paper will outline and discuss the content of each of these stages of the program. The involvement of various ORNL organizations in facilitating the training will be highlighted. Implementation strategies will be discussed as well as progress made to date

  14. QUALITY - SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY - HEALTH AND SAFETY INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AUDIT ACCORDING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ISO9001:2008, SA 8000:2008, OHSAS 18001:2007 AND ISO 19011:2011 STANDARDS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Valentina TUDOR

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this paper is to present a method of perfecting the audit of the social requirements of the quality social accountability-health and safety integrated management system with the social requirements of BusinessSocial Compliance Initiative (BSCI and Supplier Ethical Data Exchange (SEDEX. The method used was tosupplement the social requirement of SA 8000:2008 standard with the additional requirements of BSCI and SEDEX.The results are based on a correspondence between the requirements of SA 8000:2008 standard and therequirements of BSCI and SEDEX codes of conducts, because some of BSCI and SEDEX requirements are moredetailed than SA 8000:2008 standard requirements which are the base for the implementation of socialrequirements of the quality-social accountability-health and safety integrated management system. A check list waselaborated with the integrated social requirements of SA 8000:2008, BSCI and SEDEX. The check list is related tochild labour, forced and compulsory labour, health and safety, freedom of association & right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, remuneration and management system. Theconclusion of the paper is that the elaborated check list allows the quality-social accountability-health and safety integrated management system audit to match to the requirements of BSCI and SEDEX.

  15. Discussion on safety culture general contract model of consultation enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dong Huimin; Zhang Hao

    2012-01-01

    With a high safety requirement, long construction period, a large amount of investment and many influencing factors of the preparation and implementation of project schedule, local nuclear power always is built through EPC. Safety level depends on EPC. Some measures should be taken for local consultation enterprises to improve situation of safety. Some suggestion as follows: safety culture should be received enough attention; management system should be established in according with requirement of safety culture; try to encourage employee involvement; to assess it in time; safety system should be entirely compatible with enterprises system. (authors)

  16. The German atomic law on trial. The requirements of the EURATOM Nuclear Safety Directive; Deutsches Atomrecht auf dem Pruefstand. Die Anforderungen aus der EURATOM-Richtlinie zur nuklearen Sicherheit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller-Dehn, Christian [E.ON Kernkraft GmbH, Hannover (Germany). Nuclear Regulation and Policy

    2016-05-15

    The EURATOM Directive on Nuclear Safety, dated 8 July 2014, is to be transposed into national law, not later than 15 August 2017. This raises the question of whether and to what extent by then the German atomic energy act is adapted to the respective requirements. On national level requirements have to be implemented now, that are already not effective. This includes the introduction of thematic peer reviews and, if necessary, regulations for the independence and effectiveness of the regulatory authorities. Here - but only here - is a need for implementation.

  17. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) standards/requirements identification document (S/RID)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, G.L.

    1996-01-01

    This Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) set forth the Environmental Safety and Health (ES ampersand amp;H) standards/requirements for Westinghouse Hanford Company Level Programs, where implementation and compliance is the responsibility of these organizations. These standards/requirements are adequate to ensure the protection of the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment

  18. 42 CFR 9.10 - Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and... SANCTUARY SYSTEM § 9.10 Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements. (a) How are employee Occupational Health and Safety Program risks and concerns addressed? The sanctuary shall...

  19. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I.; Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A.

    2010-10-01

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY TM platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY TM platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY TM platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  20. Implementation of the surgical safety checklist in Switzerland and perceptions of its benefits: cross-sectional survey.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stéphane Cullati

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVES: To examine the implementation of the Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC among surgeons and anaesthetists working in Swiss hospitals and clinics and their perceptions of the SSC. METHODS: Cross-sectional survey at the 97th Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society of Surgery, Switzerland, 2010. Opinions of the SSC were assessed with a 6-item questionnaire. RESULTS: 152 respondents answered the questionnaire (participation rate 35.1%. 64.7% respondents acknowledged having a checklist in their hospital or their clinic. Median implementation year was 2009. More than 8 out of 10 respondents reported their team applied the Sign In and the Time Out very often or quasi systematically, whereas almost half of respondents acknowledged the Sign Out was applied never or rarely. The majority of respondents agreed that the checklist improves safety and team communication, and helps to develop a safety culture. However, they were less supportive about the opinion that the checklist facilitates teamwork and eliminates social hierarchy between caregivers. CONCLUSIONS: This survey indicates that the SSC has been largely implemented in many Swiss hospitals and clinics. Both surgeons and anaesthetists perceived the SSC as a valuable tool in improving intraoperative patient safety and communication among health care professionals, with lesser importance in facilitating teamwork (and eliminating hierarchical categories.

  1. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J Hans

    2016-11-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an artificial pancreas are, however, lacking. This review aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety and design requirements of the artificial pancreas. We performed a structured literature search based on three search components-type 1 diabetes, artificial pancreas, and safety or design-and extended the discussion with our own experiences in developing artificial pancreas systems. The main hazards of the artificial pancreas are over- and under-dosing of insulin and, in case of a bi-hormonal system, of glucagon or other hormones. For each component of an artificial pancreas and for the complete system we identified safety issues related to these hazards and proposed control measures. Prerequisites that enable the control algorithms to provide safe closed-loop control are accurate and reliable input of glucose values, assured hormone delivery and an efficient user interface. In addition, the system configuration has important implications for safety, as close cooperation and data exchange between the different components is essential.

  2. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yun, Y. C.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S.

    2000-01-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage

  3. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yun, Y. C. [LG-EDS Systems, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage.

  4. 49 CFR 1106.3 - Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required. 1106.3 Section 1106.3 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... TRANSPORTATION BOARD CONSIDERATION OF SAFETY INTEGRATION PLANS IN CASES INVOLVING RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS...

  5. Explicit Precedence Constraints in Safety-Critical Java

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Puffitsch, Wolfgang; Noulard, Eric; Pagetti, Claire

    2013-01-01

    Safety-critical Java (SCJ) aims at making the amenities of Java available for the development of safety-critical applications. The multi-rate synchronous language Prelude facilitates the specification of the communication and timing requirements of complex real-time systems. This paper combines...... to provide explicit support for precedence constraints. We present the considerations behind the design of this extension and discuss our experiences with a first prototype implementation based on the SCJ implementation of the Java Optimized Processor....

  6. 48 CFR 923.7002 - Worker safety and health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... Information and Protection of Worker Safety and Health” or “952.223-77, Conditional Payment of Fee or Profit—Protection of Worker Safety and Health” implement the requirements of section 234C of the Atomic Energy Act... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Worker safety and health...

  7. Development of Network Protocol for the Integrated Safety System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. W.; Baek, J. I.; Lee, S. H.; Park, C. S.; Park, K. H.; Shin, J. M. [Hannam Univ., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2007-06-15

    Communication devices in the safety system of nuclear power plants are distinguished from those developed for commercial purposes in terms of a strict requirement of safety. The concept of safety covers the determinability, the reliability, and the separation/isolation to prevent the undesirable interactions among devices. The safety also requires that these properties be never proof less. Most of the current commercialized communication products rarely have the safety properties. Moreover, they can be neither verified nor validated to satisfy the safety property of implementation process. This research proposes the novel architecture and protocol of a data communication network for the safety system in nuclear power plants.

  8. Development of Network Protocol for the Integrated Safety System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. W.; Baek, J. I.; Lee, S. H.; Park, C. S.; Park, K. H.; Shin, J. M.

    2007-06-01

    Communication devices in the safety system of nuclear power plants are distinguished from those developed for commercial purposes in terms of a strict requirement of safety. The concept of safety covers the determinability, the reliability, and the separation/isolation to prevent the undesirable interactions among devices. The safety also requires that these properties be never proof less. Most of the current commercialized communication products rarely have the safety properties. Moreover, they can be neither verified nor validated to satisfy the safety property of implementation process. This research proposes the novel architecture and protocol of a data communication network for the safety system in nuclear power plants

  9. Regulatory requirements and administrative practice in safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servant, J.

    1977-01-01

    This paper reviews the current situation of the France regulatory rules and procedures dealing with the safety of the main nuclear facilities and, more broadly, the nuclear security. First, the author outlines the policy of the French administration which requires that the licensee responsible for an installation has to demonstrate that all possible measures are taken to ensure a sufficient level of safety, from the early stage of the project to the end of the operation of the plant. Thus, the administration performs the assessment on a case-by-case basis, of the safety of each installation before granting a nuclear license. On the other hand, the administration settles overall safety requirements for specific categories of installations or components, which determine the ultimate safety performances, but avoid, as far as possible, to detail the technical specifications to be applied in order to comply with these goals. This approach, which allows the designers and the licensees to rely upon sound codes and standards, gains the advantage of a great flexibility without imparing the nuclear safety. The author outlines the licensing progress for the main categories of installations: nuclear power plants of the PWR type, fast breeders, uranium isotope separation plants, and irradiated fuel processing plants. Emphasis is placed on the most noteworthy points: standardization of projects, specific risks of each site, problems of advanced type reactors, etc... The development of the technical regulations is presented with emphasis on the importance of an internationally concerned action within the nuclear international community. The second part of this paper describes the France operating experience of nuclear installations from the safety point of view. Especially, the author examines the technical and administrative utilization of data from safety significant incidents in reactors and plants, and the results of the control performed by the nuclear installations

  10. Radiation safety requirements for radioactive waste management in the framework of a quality management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salgado, M.M.; Benitez, J.C.; Pernas, R.; Gonzalez, N.

    2007-01-01

    The Center for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR) is the institution responsible for the management of radioactive wastes generated from nuclear applications in medicine, industry and research in Cuba. Radioactive Waste Management Service is provided at a national level and it includes the collection and transportation of radioactive wastes to the Centralized Waste Management Facilities, where they are characterized, segregated, treated, conditioned and stored. A Quality Management System, according to the ISO 9001 Standard has been implemented for the RWM Service at CPHR. The Management System includes the radiation safety requirements established for RWM in national regulations and in the Licence's conditions. The role of the Regulatory Body and the Radiation Protection Officer in the Quality Management System, the authorization of practices, training and personal qualification, record keeping, inspections of the Regulatory Body and internal inspection of the Radiation Protection Officer, among other aspects, are described in this paper. The Quality Management System has shown to be an efficient tool to demonstrate that adequate measures are in place to ensure the safety in radioactive waste management activities and their continual improvement. (authors)

  11. METHOD FOR SECURITY SPECIFICATION SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS AS A MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING A SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS SECURE - MERSEC

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Castro Mecías, L.T.

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available Often security incidents that have the object or use the software as a means of causing serious damage and legal, economic consequences, etc. Results of a survey by Kaspersky Lab reflectvulnerabilities in software are the main cause of security incidents in enterprises, the report shows that 85% of them have reported security incidents and vulnerabilities in software are the main reason is further estimated that incidents can cause significant losses estimated from 50,000 to $ 649.000. (1 In this regard academic and industry research focuses on proposals based on reducing vulnerabilities and failures of technology, with a positive influence on how the software is developed. A development process for improved safety practices and should include activities from the initial phases of the software; so that security needs are identified, manage risk and appropriate measures are implemented. This article discusses a method of analysis, acquisition and requirements specification of the software safety analysis on the basis of various proposals and deficiencies identified from participant observation in software development teams. Experiments performed using the proposed yields positive results regarding the reduction of security vulnerabilities and compliance with the safety objectives of the software.

  12. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  13. KIT safety management. Annual report 2012; KIT-Sicherheitsmanagement. Jahresbericht 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frank, Gerhard (ed.)

    2013-07-01

    The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

  14. Impact of New Radiation Safety Standards on Licensing Requirements of Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strohal, P.; Subasic, D.; Valcic, I.

    1996-01-01

    As the outcomes of the newly introduced safety philosophies, new and more strict safety design requirements for nuclear installation are expected to be introduced. New in-depth defence measures should be incorporated into the design and operation procedure for a nuclear installation, to compensate for potential failures in protection or safety measures. The new requirements will also apply to licensing of NPP's operation as well as to licensing of nuclear sites, especially for radioactive waste disposal sites. This paper intends to give an overview of possible impacts of new internationally agreed basic safety standards with respect to NPP and related technologies. Recently issued new basic safety standards for radiation protection are introducing some new safety principles which may have essential impact on future licensing requirements regarding nuclear power plants and radioactive waste installations. These new standards recognize exposures under normal conditions ('practices') and intervention conditions. The term interventions describes the human activities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure or existing likelihood of incurring exposure which is not part of a controlled practice. The other new development in safety standards is the introduction of so called potential exposure based on the experience gained from a number of radiation accidents. This exposure is not expected to be delivered with certainty but it may result from an accident at a source or owing to an event or sequence of events of a probabilistic nature, including equipment failures and operating errors. (author)

  15. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department`s enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion.

  16. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department's enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion

  17. Risk management for drinking water safety in low and middle income countries - cultural influences on water safety plan (WSP) implementation in urban water utilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Omar, Yahya Y; Parker, Alison; Smith, Jennifer A; Pollard, Simon J T

    2017-01-15

    We investigated cultural influences on the implementation of water safety plans (WSPs) using case studies from WSP pilots in India, Uganda and Jamaica. A comprehensive thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews (n=150 utility customers, n=32 WSP 'implementers' and n=9 WSP 'promoters'), field observations and related documents revealed 12 cultural themes, offered as 'enabling', 'limiting', or 'neutral', that influence WSP implementation in urban water utilities to varying extents. Aspects such as a 'deliver first, safety later' mind set; supply system knowledge management and storage practices; and non-compliance are deemed influential. Emergent themes of cultural influence (ET1 to ET12) are discussed by reference to the risk management, development studies and institutional culture literatures; by reference to their positive, negative or neutral influence on WSP implementation. The results have implications for the utility endorsement of WSPs, for the impact of organisational cultures on WSP implementation; for the scale-up of pilot studies; and they support repeated calls from practitioner communities for cultural attentiveness during WSP design. Findings on organisational cultures mirror those from utilities in higher income nations implementing WSPs - leadership, advocacy among promoters and customers (not just implementers) and purposeful knowledge management are critical to WSP success. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  18. Krsko NPP Periodic Safety Review program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basic, I.; Spiler, J.; Novsak, M.

    2001-01-01

    The need for conducting a Periodic Safety Review for the Krsko NPP has been clearly recognized both by the NEK and the regulator (SNSA). The PSR would be highly desirable both in the light of current trends in safety oversight practices and because of many benefits it is capable to provide. On January 11, 2001 the SNSA issued a decision requesting the Krsko NPP to prepare a program and determine a schedule for the implementation of the program for 'Periodic Safety Review of NPP Krsko'. The program, which is required to be in accordance with the IAEA safety philosophy and with the EU practice, was submitted for the approval to the SNSA by the end of March 2001. The paper summarizes Krsko NPP Periodic Safety Review Program [1] including implemented SNSA and IAEA Expert Mission comments.(author)

  19. Designing continuous safety improvement within chemical industrial areas

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Reniers, G.L.L.; Ale, B. J.M.; Dullaert, W.; Soudan, K.

    This article provides support in organizing and implementing novel concepts for enhancing safety on a cluster level of chemical plants. The paper elaborates the requirements for integrating Safety Management Systems of chemical plants situated within a so-called chemical cluster. Recommendations of

  20. DS424: A Roadmap for the Implementation of the IAEA Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2010-01-01

    Many countries interested in developing nuclear power programmes for the first time need to have experience in using and regulating radioactive source materials. They need to have experience in building and operating large non-nuclear construction projects. Nuclear power has unique attributes and commitments associated with it that other industries do not. Although undertaken as a national endeavour with many national implications, building and operating a nuclear facility also has global implications (financial, political, safety, etc.). DG’s 2008 General Conference speech: “Every country has the right to introduce nuclear power, as well as the responsibility to do it right.”. The development of IAEA Safety Standards is an statutory function of the IAEA (article III of the IAEA Statute): “The Agency is authorized to establish or adopt… standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property…”. New guide (DS 424) constitutes a “Road-map” to apply the entire suite of IAEA Safety Standards progressively during the early phases of the implementation of a nuclear power programme. IAEA safety review missions based on internationally agreed safety standards are well established and are the best tools to build up confidence on the capacity of a country to develop nuclear energy in a safe way

  1. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  2. Application of safety standards and rules in the Shelter Implementation Plan at the destroyed power unit of Chernobyl NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berthold, A.; Bogorinski, P.; Bykov, V.; Redko, V.; Erickson, L.; Kadkin, Ye.; Kondratiev, S.; Simonov, I.; Smyshliaieva, S.; Yesipenko, Yu.

    2002-01-01

    This report deals with the application of safety standards and rules to the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) measures. Since 1998 this plan is being implemented at the Chornobyl NPP destroyed unit (which is now known as the Shelter). It includes a set of various tasks whose performance will help partially achieve the established safety objectives. The Regulatory Authority should establish for the Shelter safety goals, principles, and criteria in general, while the Operator of the Shelter is free to independently select the optimum method for their implementation. The Operator of the Shelter must demonstrate (in safety analysis report) that established safety goals are achieved and safety principles and criteria are met. Safety goals, principles, and criteria established for radioactive waste management are reasonable to apply in measures provided for by SIP. However, due to the unique nature of the Shelter, some criteria should not be applied directly and in full scope. Norms and rules on radiation protection should be applied in full scope. The specifics of radiation protection during each Shelter-related activity are considered individually. Safety standards and rules related to technical aspects are reasonable only as a basis. Effective resolution of specific technical issues associated with safety assurance is achieved through interaction between the Operator and the Regulatory Authority during design of SIP structures and systems. Hence, effectiveness of the licensing process plays an important role in the success of the SIP.(author)

  3. A Reliable Bistable Board Implementation through I/O Redundancy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Gyu; Chung, Tae Hyok; Lee, Youn Sang; Kim, Tae Hee; Song, Seung Hwan

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power plant safety systems and related equipment used in the design, including an accident in all driving conditions that must be proven In addition, the safety-related equipment that is derived according to the digitization of the safety equipment is the most important factors. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the device was satisfied the requirements for a given performance for safety-related digital equipment for the life of the installation. These proven is done through the process, design verification of the equipment, production management, such as installation and maintenance. Among other things, it is most important to implement of the performance and reliability features the safety-related equipment in the design phase. In this paper, Bistable Board implemented to generate a ESF sign-on signal throughout the signal processing of input signal from sensors. Also, for the reliable signal input and output, I/O Module that implements the redundancy increases the reliability of the Bistable Board , to verify the performance of safety-related equipment

  4. Requirements to amend the main influence factors on the safety culture after fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2015-01-01

    The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

  5. Design a Smart Control Strategy to Implement an Intelligent Energy Safety and Management System

    OpenAIRE

    Jing-Min Wang; Ming-Ta Yang

    2014-01-01

    The energy saving and electricity safety are today a cause for increasing concern for homes and buildings. Integrating the radio frequency identification (RFID) and ZigBee wireless sensor network (WSN) mature technologies, the paper designs a smart control strategy to implement an intelligent energy safety and management system (IESMS) which performs energy measuring, controlling, monitoring, and saving of the power outlet system. The presented RFID and billing module is used to identify user...

  6. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATIONS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUADRICYCLES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ana Pavlovic

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, a new class of compact vehicles has been emerging and wide-spreading all around Europe: the quadricycle. These four-wheeled motor vehicles, originally derived from motorcycles, are a small and fuel-efficient mean of transportation used in rural or urban areas as an alternative to motorbikes or city cars. In some countries, they are also endorsed by local authorities and institutions which support small and environmentally-friendly vehicles. In this paper, several general considerations on quadricycles will be provided including the vehicle classification, evolution of regulations (as homologation, driver licence, emissions, etc, technical characteristics, safety requirements, most relevant investigations, and other additional useful information (e.g. references, links. It represents an important and actual topic of investigation for designers and manufacturers considering that the new EU regulation on the approval and market surveillance of quadricycles will soon enter in force providing conclusive requirements for functional safety environmental protection of these promising vehicles.

  7. Design Tools for Cost-Effective Implementation of Planetary Protection Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamlin, Louise; Belz, Andrea; Evans, Michael; Kastner, Jason; Satter, Celeste; Spry, Andy

    2006-01-01

    Since the Viking missions to Mars in the 1970s, accounting for the costs associated with planetary protection implementation has not been done systematically during early project formulation phases, leading to unanticipated costs during subsequent implementation phases of flight projects. The simultaneous development of more stringent planetary protection requirements, resulting from new knowledge about the limits of life on Earth, together with current plans to conduct life-detection experiments on a number of different solar system target bodies motivates a systematic approach to integrating planetary protection requirements and mission design. A current development effort at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory is aimed at integrating planetary protection requirements more fully into the early phases of mission architecture formulation and at developing tools to more rigorously predict associated cost and schedule impacts of architecture options chosen to meet planetary protection requirements.

  8. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program has been established whereby an annual NUREG report will be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirement areas. This report, the second volume of a three-volume series, addresses the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs) at licensed plants. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive description of the status of implementation and verification of the 27 safety issues designated as USIs and to make this information available to other interested parties, including the public. A corollary purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants. 3 figs., 4 tabs

  9. Requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services are established. The norms is applied to activities related to the radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutics and 'in vivo' diagnostics purposes. (M.C.K.) [pt

  10. Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from point of view of operational safety enhancement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2000-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing. (author)

  11. Edible safety requirements and assessment standards for agricultural genetically modified organisms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Pingjian; Zhou, Xiangyang; Zhou, Peng; Du, Zhong; Hou, Hongli; Yang, Dongyan; Tan, Jianjun; Wu, Xiaojin; Zhang, Jinzhou; Yang, Yongcun; Liu, Jin; Liu, Guihua; Li, Yonghong; Liu, Jianjun; Yu, Lei; Fang, Shisong; Yang, Xiaoke

    2008-05-01

    This paper describes the background, principles, concepts and methods of framing the technical regulation for edible safety requirement and assessment of agricultural genetically modified organisms (agri-GMOs) for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in the People's Republic of China. It provides a set of systematic criteria for edible safety requirements and the assessment process for agri-GMOs. First, focusing on the degree of risk and impact of different agri-GMOs, we developed hazard grades for toxicity, allergenicity, anti-nutrition effects, and unintended effects and standards for the impact type of genetic manipulation. Second, for assessing edible safety, we developed indexes and standards for different hazard grades of recipient organisms, for the influence of types of genetic manipulation and hazard grades of agri-GMOs. To evaluate the applicability of these criteria and their congruency with other safety assessment systems for GMOs applied by related organizations all over the world, we selected some agri-GMOs (soybean, maize, potato, capsicum and yeast) as cases to put through our new assessment system, and compared our results with the previous assessments. It turned out that the result of each of the cases was congruent with the original assessment.

  12. Spacelab user implementation assessment study. (Software requirements analysis). Volume 2: Technical report

    Science.gov (United States)

    1976-01-01

    The engineering analyses and evaluation studies conducted for the Software Requirements Analysis are discussed. Included are the development of the study data base, synthesis of implementation approaches for software required by both mandatory onboard computer services and command/control functions, and identification and implementation of software for ground processing activities.

  13. The specific tasks of RF TSO - FSUE VO 'Safety', related with Implementation of obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potapov, V.; Kuznetsov, M.; Kapralov, E.

    2010-01-01

    It was more than 20 years ago that IAEA discussed the issue pertaining to the need in scientific and engineering support to the regulatory body. The Convention on Nuclear Safety being the keystone in assurance of the global nuclear safety and security regime was adopted in 1994. It is pointed out that two independent organizations supervised by Rostechnadzor have been established within the Russian TSO system, FSUE VO 'Safety' being one of them. The tasks of the organization comprise obligatory certification of equipment as well as acceptance of equipment before its delivery to the NPP both in Russia and in the countries constructing the power units based on the Russian designs. The acceptance procedure has been set forth in the new Russian document at the level of the federal rules and regulations for nuclear safety assurance. As far as its implementation decision is concerned, a task for selection and training of personnel has been set and allocated on the Training and Methodological Center of Nuclear and Radiation Safety established with the support of FSUE VO 'Safety', which provides training programmes and specific lecture courses in the wide range of the relevant topics. (author)

  14. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  15. Nuclear safety improvement activities related to WWER-440 units in Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gantchev, T.

    1998-01-01

    The systematic evaluation of the deficiencies of the original design of the WWER reactors brought to the development of a Short Term Programme for Safety Upgrading and Modernisation of Kozloduy WWER-440 units. The implementation of this Programme was completed in 1997. The strive for continuos improvement of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety level, the new requirements of the Bulgarian Nuclear Safety Authority and the public concern initiated the development of new Complex Programme for Safety Improvement (PRG'97), now in a process of implementation. (author)

  16. Design and Implementation of the Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gandhi, Tejal K; Abookire, Susan A; Kachalia, Allen; Sands, Kenneth; Mort, Elizabeth; Bommarito, Grace; Gagne, Jane; Sato, Luke; Weingart, Saul N

    2016-01-01

    The Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality is a 2-year physician-oriented training program with a strong operational orientation, embedding trainees in the quality departments of participating hospitals. It also integrates didactic and experiential learning and offers the option of obtaining a master's degree in public health. The program focuses on methodologically rigorous improvement and measurement, with an emphasis on the development and implementation of innovative practice. The operational orientation is intended to foster the professional development of future quality and safety leaders. The purpose of this article is to describe the design and development of the fellowship. © The Author(s) 2014.

  17. Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, 2005 edition. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This publication includes amendments to the 1996 Edition (As Amended 2003) arising from the second cycle of the biennial review and revision process, as agreed by the Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) at its ninth meeting in March 2004, as endorsed by the Commission on Safety Standards at its meeting in June 2004 and as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2004. Although this publication is identified as a new edition, there are no changes that affect the administrative and approval requirements in Section VIII. The fields covered are General Provisions (radiation protection; emergency response; quality assurance; compliance assurance; non-compliance; special arrangement and training); Activity Limits and Materials Restrictions, Requirement and Controls for Transport , Requirements for Radioactive Materials and for Packagings and Packages, Test Procedures, Approval and Administrative Requirements

  18. Requirements for guidelines systems: implementation challenges and lessons from existing software-engineering efforts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shah, Hemant; Allard, Raymond D; Enberg, Robert; Krishnan, Ganesh; Williams, Patricia; Nadkarni, Prakash M

    2012-03-09

    A large body of work in the clinical guidelines field has identified requirements for guideline systems, but there are formidable challenges in translating such requirements into production-quality systems that can be used in routine patient care. Detailed analysis of requirements from an implementation perspective can be useful in helping define sub-requirements to the point where they are implementable. Further, additional requirements emerge as a result of such analysis. During such an analysis, study of examples of existing, software-engineering efforts in non-biomedical fields can provide useful signposts to the implementer of a clinical guideline system. In addition to requirements described by guideline-system authors, comparative reviews of such systems, and publications discussing information needs for guideline systems and clinical decision support systems in general, we have incorporated additional requirements related to production-system robustness and functionality from publications in the business workflow domain, in addition to drawing on our own experience in the development of the Proteus guideline system (http://proteme.org). The sub-requirements are discussed by conveniently grouping them into the categories used by the review of Isern and Moreno 2008. We cite previous work under each category and then provide sub-requirements under each category, and provide example of similar work in software-engineering efforts that have addressed a similar problem in a non-biomedical context. When analyzing requirements from the implementation viewpoint, knowledge of successes and failures in related software-engineering efforts can guide implementers in the choice of effective design and development strategies.

  19. Implementation of a radiological safety management system in a hospital of Mexico City

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez V, D.; Rivera M, T.; Velez D, V.

    2007-01-01

    Full text: The reflection of this work is based in some radiological accidents that its have happened in some hospital centers or of research. The over exposure of some people is due to the pursuit of the procedures, the lack of quality assurance of the equipment or the inappropriate actions of the technicians. In Mexico one has seen in several hospitals the lack of existence of a Quality Assurance Program to prevent the accidents, the execution of the same ones and those good practices and the lack of Safety Culture makes that the hospital radiological safety it is faulty. The objective of the present work is the implementation of a radiological safety management in a hospital of Mexico City. (Author)

  20. Safety requirements and options for a large size fast neutron reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cogne, F.; Megy, J.; Robert, E.; Benmergui, A.; Villeneuve, J.

    1977-01-01

    Starting from the experience gained in the safety evaluation of the PHENIX reactor, and from results already obtained in the safety studies on fast neutron reactors, the French regulatory bodies have defined since 1973 what could be the requirements and the recommendations in the matter of safety for the first large size ''prototype'' fast neutron power plant of 1200 MWe. Those requirements and recommendations, while not being compulsory due to the evolution of this type of reactors, will be used as a basis for the technical regulation that will be established in France in this field. They define particularly the care to be taken in the following areas which are essential for safety: the protection systems, the primary coolant system, the prevention of accidents at the core level, the measures to be taken with regard to the whole core accident and to the containment, the protection against sodium fires, and the design as a function of external aggressions. In applying these recommendations, the CREYS-MALVILLE plant designers have tried to achieve redundancy in the safety related systems and have justified the safety of the design with regard to the various involved phenomena. In particular, the extensive research made at the levels of the fuel and of the core instrumentation makes it possible to achieve the best defence to avoid the development of core accidents. The overall examination of the measures taken, from the standpoint of prevention and surveyance as well as from the standpoint of means of action led the French regulatory bodies to propose the construction permit of the CREYS MALVILLE plant, provided that additional examinations by the regulatory bodies be made during the construction of the plant on some technological aspects not fully clarified at the authorization time. The conservatism of the corresponding requirements should be demonstrated prior to the commissioning of the power plant. To pursue a programme on reactors of this type, or even more

  1. Nuclear safety in Slovak Republic. Safety analysis reports for WWER 440 reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rohar, S.

    1999-01-01

    Implementation of nuclear power program is connected to establishment of regulatory body for safe regulation of siting, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations. Licensing being one of the most important regulatory surveillance activity is based on independent regulatory review and assessment of information on nuclear safety for particular nuclear facility. Documents required to be submitted to the regulatory body by the licensee in Slovakia for the review and assessment usually named Safety Analysis Report (SAR) are presented in detail in this paper. Current status of Safety Analysis Reports for Bohunice V-1, Bohunice V-2 and Mochovce NPP is shown

  2. Probabilistic safety analysis of DC power supply requirements for nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranowsky, P.W.; Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Fedele, M.A.

    1981-04-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment was performed as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generic safety task A-30, Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. Event and fault tree analysis techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of DC power related accident sequences to the total core damage probability due to shutdown cooling failures. It was found that a potentially large DC power contribution could be substantially reduced by augmenting the minimum design and operational requirements. Recommendations included (1) requiring DC power divisional independence, (2) improved test, maintenance, and surveillance, and (3) requiring core cooling capability be maintained following the loss of one DC power bus and a single failure in another system

  3. Safety-related requirements for photovoltaic modules and arrays

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levins, A.; Smoot, A.; Wagner, R.

    1984-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations for residential, intermediate, and large scale applications are investigated. Concepts for safety systems, where each system is a collection of subsystems which together address the total anticipated hazard situation, are described. Descriptions of hardware, and system usefulness and viability are included. A comparison of these systems, as against the provisions of the 1984 National Electrical Code covering photovoltaic systems is made. A discussion of the Underwriters Laboratory UL investigation of the photovoltaic module evaluated to the provisions of the proposed UL standard for plat plate photovoltaic modules and panels is included. Grounding systems, their basis and nature, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are described. The meaning of frame grounding, circuit groundings, and the type of circuit ground are covered.

  4. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I. [Research and Production Corporation Radiy, 29 Geroev Stalingrada Str., Kirovograd 25006 (Ukraine); Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A., E-mail: marketing@radiy.co [Center for Safety Infrastructure-Oriented Research and Analysis, 37 Astronomicheskaya Str., Kharkiv 61085 (Ukraine)

    2010-10-15

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY{sup TM} platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY{sup TM} platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY{sup TM} platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  5. Design for safety: theoretical framework of the safety aspect of BIM system to determine the safety index

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ai Lin Evelyn Teo

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Despite the safety improvement drive that has been implemented in the construction industry in Singapore for many years, the industry continues to report the highest number of workplace fatalities, compared to other industries. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the theoretical framework of the safety aspect of a proposed BIM System to determine a Safety Index. An online questionnaire survey was conducted to ascertain the current workplace safety and health situation in the construction industry and explore how BIM can be used to improve safety performance in the industry. A safety hazard library was developed based on the main contributors to fatal accidents in the construction industry, determined from the formal records and existing literature, and a series of discussions with representatives from the Workplace Safety and Health Institute (WSH Institute in Singapore. The results from the survey suggested that the majority of the firms have implemented the necessary policies, programmes and procedures on Workplace Safety and Health (WSH practices. However, BIM is still not widely applied or explored beyond the mandatory requirement that building plans should be submitted to the authorities for approval in BIM format. This paper presents a discussion of the safety aspect of the Intelligent Productivity and Safety System (IPASS developed in the study. IPASS is an intelligent system incorporating the buildable design concept, theory on the detection, prevention and control of hazards, and the Construction Safety Audit Scoring System (ConSASS. The system is based on the premise that safety should be considered at the design stage, and BIM can be an effective tool to facilitate the efforts to enhance safety performance. IPASS allows users to analyse and monitor key aspects of the safety performance of the project before the project starts and as the project progresses.

  6. A systems engineering approach to implementation of safety management systems in the Norwegian fishing fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McGuinness, Edgar; Utne, Ingrid B.

    2014-01-01

    The fishing industry is plagued by a long history of fatality and injury occurrence. Commercial fishing is hence recognized as the most dangerous and difficult of professional callings, in all jurisdictions. Fishing vessels have their own unique set of hazards, a myriad collection of complex occupational accident potentials, barely controlled, co-existing in a perilous work environment. The work in this article is directed by the Norwegian Systematic Health, Environmental and Safety Activities in Enterprises (1997) (Internal Control Regulations [1]), the ISM Code [2] for vessels and their recent applicability to the fishing fleet of Norway. Both safety management works place requirements on the vessel operators and crew to actively manage safety as an on-going concern. The application of these safety management system (SMS) control documents to fishing vessels is just the latest instalment in a continual drive to improve safety in this sector. The difficulty is that there has been no previous systematic approach to safety within the fishing fleet. This article uses the tenants of systems engineering to determine the requirements for such a SMS, detailing the limiting factors and restrictive issues of this complex operating environment. - Highlights: • Systems engineer is applied as a tool for determining requirements for design and construction of a safety management system (SMS). • Outlining a simplistic format, identifying, designingand facilitating improvement opportunities in the conduction and application of SMS’s on fishing vessels. • Knowledge provision is a key requirement of management systems, through provision of understanding, detail orientation and applicable skills for realization. • Outlining, what is to be done and how it is to be completed to accomplish compliance with pertinent legislative requirements. • Promoting a combination of documentation and communication arrangements by which the actionsnecessary for management can be

  7. 75 FR 60129 - Draft Guidance for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    ...., Bldg. 51, rm. 2201, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; or the Office of Communication, Outreach, and...'s ability to review critical safety information, improve safety monitoring of human drug and..., will represent the Agency's current thinking on safety reporting requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  8. Commercial Crew Program Crew Safety Strategy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vassberg, Nathan; Stover, Billy

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this presentation is to explain to our international partners (ESA and JAXA) how NASA is implementing crew safety onto our commercial partners under the Commercial Crew Program. It will show them the overall strategy of 1) how crew safety boundaries have been established; 2) how Human Rating requirements have been flown down into programmatic requirements and over into contracts and partner requirements; 3) how CCP SMA has assessed CCP Certification and CoFR strategies against Shuttle baselines; 4) Discuss how Risk Based Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance is used to accomplish these strategies.

  9. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  10. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  11. International conference on the strengthening of nuclear safety in Eastern Europe. Keynote papers. Regulatory aspects of NPP safety, status of safety improvements, status of safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The Objective of the Conference was to assess the past decade of nuclear safety efforts in countries operating WWER and RBMK nuclear reactors and to address remaining safety issues which require further work. A particular focus of the Conference was on international co-operation and assistance and where such efforts should be focused in the future. All Eastern European countries that operate RBMK or WWER reactors participated in the Conference, and presented papers on three key areas of nuclear safety: Regulatory Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Safety; Status of Safety Improvements; and Status of Safety Analysis Reports. In addition, representatives from 18 additional countries that provide financial and/or technical assistance and co-operation in the area of WWER and RBMK safety offered the most extensive commentary. Key international (IAEA, World Association of Nuclear Operators, the Nuclear Energy Agency, the G-24 NUSAC, the European Commission, and the EBRD) organizations that provide nuclear safety assistance for WWER and RBMK reactors also made presentations. There is no question that considerable progress on nuclear safety has been made in Eastern Europe. Special mention should be made of successful efforts to strengthen the independence and technical competence of the nuclear regulatory authorities. Efforts should now concentrate on improving the depth and scope of the technical abilities of the regulatory authorities. More attention by governments is needed to ensure that the regulatory authorities have the financial resources and enforcement authority to fully execute their missions. In respect to the operators of the nuclear power plants, they have demonstrated clear progress in operational safety improvements. Significant additional efforts are required to maintain and enhance an effective safety culture. Design safety improvement programmes are in place in all countries. Implementation of these programmes has varied and is particularly affected by

  12. Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed PROMETHEUS Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. Kokkinos

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophy on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory

  13. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  14. Use of FPGA and CPLD in nuclear reactor safety systems and its regulatory review requirements for reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roy, Suvadip; Biswas, Animesh; Pradhan, S.K.

    2015-01-01

    Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLD) is being used widely in safety critical and safety related systems in nuclear power plans like in trip logic units, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation decision logic and neutronic signal processing for their reprogrammability feature and compact design. These HDL Programmable devices (HPD) are complex devices consisting of both hardware and software which is used to implement the logic on the FPGA. It is observed that these Programmable devices suffer from various modes of failure and the major failures in these devices are due to Single Event Upset (SEU), where a highly energetic ionizing radiation may lead to device failure which can even occur in radiologically benign environment. Other failures can occur during steps of developing the hardware using software tools like during Synthesis and placement and routing of the desired hardware. Here a study on use of such devices in Nuclear Reactors, study on mode of failures of these devices, way to tackle such failure and development of review guidelines for review of such devices used in safety critical and safety related systems with special emphasis on choice of software tools, way to mitigate effects of SEU and simulation and hardware testing results to be reviewed by regulatory body during design safety review is done. (author)

  15. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  16. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  17. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  18. Evaluation and review of the safety management system implementation in the Royal Thai Air Force

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chaiwan, Sakkarin

    This study was designed to determine situation and effectiveness of the safety management system currently implemented in the Royal Thai Air Force. Reviewing the ICAO's SMS and the RTAF's SMS was conducted to identify similarities and differences between the two safety management systems. Later, the researcher acquired safety statistics from the RTAF Safety Center to investigate effectiveness of its safety system. The researcher also collected data to identify other factors affecting effectiveness of the safety system during conducting in-depth interviews. Findings and Conclusions: The study shows that the Royal Thai Air Force has never applied the International Civil Aviation Organization's Safety management System to its safety system. However, the RTAF's SMS and the ICAO's SMS have been developed based on the same concepts. These concepts are from Richard H. Woods's book, Aviation safety programs: A management handbook. However, the effectiveness of the Royal Thai Air Force's safety system is in good stance. An accident rate has been decreasing regularly but there are no known factors to describe the increasing rate, according to the participants' opinion. The participants have informed that there are many issues to be resolved to improve the RTAF's safety system. Those issues are cooperation among safety center's staffs, attitude toward safety of the RTAF senior commanders, and safety standards.

  19. DOE standard: Firearms safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-02-01

    Information in this document is applicable to all DOE facilities, elements, and contractors engaged in work that requires the use of firearms as provided by law or contract. The standard in this document provides principles and practices for implementing a safe and effective firearms safety program for protective forces and for non-security use of firearms. This document describes acceptable interpretations and methods for meeting Order requirements

  20. DOE standard: Firearms safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-02-01

    Information in this document is applicable to all DOE facilities, elements, and contractors engaged in work that requires the use of firearms as provided by law or contract. The standard in this document provides principles and practices for implementing a safe and effective firearms safety program for protective forces and for non-security use of firearms. This document describes acceptable interpretations and methods for meeting Order requirements.

  1. What are occupational safety and health management systems and why do companies implement them?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M.

    2014-01-01

    In company practice and in governmental legislation, it is increasingly acknowledged that occupational safety and health (OSH) management should be performed systematically and continually. Implementing an OSH Management System (OSH MS) is the major strategy to achieve this.

  2. Safety requirements to the operation of hydropower plants; Sicherheit beim Betrieb von Wasserkraftwerken

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lux, Reinhard [Berufsgenossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugnisse (BG ETEM), Koeln (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Employers have to take into account various safety and health requirements relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of hydropower plants. Especially the diversity of the hydropower plant components requires the consideration of different safety and health aspects. In 2011 the ''Fachausschuss Elektrotechnik'' (expert committee electro-technics) of the institution for statutory accident insurance and prevention presented a new ''BG-Information'' dealing with ''Safe methods operating hydropower plants''. The following article gives an introduction into the conception and the essential requirements of this new BG-Information. (orig.)

  3. CNS Orientations, Safety Objectives and Implementation of the Defence in Depth Concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lacoste, A.C., E-mail: Andre-Claude.LACOSTE@asn.fr [Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire, Montrouge (France)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: The 6th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) is convened in Vienna next year for two weeks from Monday March 24{sup th} to Friday April 4{sup th} 2014. The consequences and the lessons learnt from the accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant will be a major issue. The 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS in August 2012 was totally devoted to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. One of its main conclusions was Conclusion 17 included in the summary report which says: ''Nuclear power plants should be designed, constructed and operated with the objectives of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its effects and avoiding off-site contamination. The Contracting Parties also noted that regulatory authorities should ensure that these objectives are applied in order to identify and implement appropriate safety improvements at existing plants''. The wording of the sentences of Conclusion 17 dedicated, the first one to new built reactors, the second one to existing plants, can be improved and clarified. But obviously the issue of the off-site consequences of an accident is fundamental. So the in-depth question comes: what can and should be done to achieve these safety objectives? And in particular how to improve the definition and then the implementation of the Defence in Depth Concept? From my point of view, this is clearly the main issue of this Conference. (author)

  4. Safety infrastructure for countries establishing their first research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abou Yehia, H.; Shokr, A.M.

    2010-01-01

    Establishment of a research reactor is a major project requiring careful planning, preparation, implementation, and investment in time and human resources. The implementation of such a project requires establishment of sustainable infrastructures, including legal and regulatory, safety, technical, and economic. An analysis of the needs for a new research reactor facility should be performed including the development of a utilization plan and evaluation of site availability and suitability. All these elements should be covered by a feasibility study of the project. This paper discusses the elements of such a study with the main focus on the specific activities and steps for developing the necessary safety infrastructure. Progressive involvement of the main organizations in the project, and application of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors and IAEA Safety Standards in different phases of the project are presented and discussed. (author)

  5. A formal safety analysis for PLC software-based safety critical system using Z

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Jung Soo

    1997-02-01

    This paper describes a formal safety analysis technique which is demonstrated by performing empirical formal safety analysis with the case study of beamline hutch door Interlock system that is developed by using PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) systems at the Pohang Accelerator Laboratory. In order to perform formal safety analysis, we have built the Z formal specifications representation from user requirement written in ambiguous natural language and target PLC ladder logic, respectively. We have also studied the effective method to express typical PLC timer component by using specific Z formal notation which is supported by temporal history. We present a formal proof technique specifying and verifying that the hazardous states are not introduced into ladder logic in the PLC-based safety critical system. And also, we have found that some errors or mismatches in user requirement and final implemented PLC ladder logic while analyzing the process of the consistency and completeness of Z translated formal specifications. In the case of relatively small systems like Beamline hutch door interlock system, a formal safety analysis including explicit proof is highly recommended so that the safety of PLC-based critical system may be enhanced and guaranteed. It also provides a helpful benefits enough to comprehend user requirement expressed by ambiguous natural language

  6. [Design, implementation and evaluation of a management model of patient safety in hospitals in Catalonia, Spain].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saura, Rosa Maria; Moreno, Pilar; Vallejo, Paula; Oliva, Glòria; Alava, Fernando; Esquerra, Miquel; Davins, Josep; Vallès, Roser; Bañeres, Joaquim

    2014-07-01

    Since its inception in 2006, the Alliance for Patient Safety in Catalonia has played a major role in promoting and shaping a series of projects related to the strategy of the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, for improving patient safety. One such project was the creation of functional units or committees of safety in hospitals in order to facilitate the management of patient safety. The strategy has been implemented in hospitals in Catalonia which were selected based on criteria of representativeness. The intervention was based on two lines of action, one to develop the model framework and the other for its development. Firstly the strategy for safety management based on EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) was defined with the development of standards, targets and indicators to implement security while the second part involved the introduction of tools, methodologies and knowledge to the management support of patient safety and risk prevention. The project was developed in four hospital areas considered higher risk, each assuming six goals for safety management. Some of these targets such as the security control panel or system of adverse event reporting were shared. 23 hospitals joined the project in Catalonia. Despite the different situations in each centre, high compliance was achieved in the development of the objectives. In each of the participating areas the security control panel was developed. Stable structures for safety management were established or strengthened. Training in patient safety played and important role, 1415 professionals participated. Through these kind of projects not only have been introduced programs of proven effectiveness in reducing risks, but they also provide to the facilities a work system that allows autonomy in diagnosis and analysis of the different risk situations or centre specific safety issues. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Espana.

  7. Safety standards of IAEA for management systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vincze, P.

    2005-01-01

    IAEA has developed a new series of safety standards which are assigned for constitution of the conditions and which give the instruction for setting up the management systems that integrate the aims of safety, health, life environment and quality. The new standard shall replace IAEA 50-C-Q - Requirements for security of the quality for safety in nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities as well as 14 related safety instructions mentioned in the Safety series No. 50-C/SG-Q (1996). When developing of this complex, integrated set of requirements for management systems, the IAEA requirements 50-C-Q (1996) were taken into consideration as well as the publications developed within the International organisation for standardization (ISO) ISO 9001:2000 and ISO14001: 1996. The experience of European Union member states during the development, implementation and improvement of the management systems were also taken into consideration

  8. Radiation Safety Analysis In The NFEC For Assessing Possible Implementation Of The ICRP-60 Standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yowono, I.

    1998-01-01

    Radiation safety analysis of the 3 facilities in the nuclear fuel element center (NFEC) for assessing possible implementation of the ICRP-60 standard has been done. The analysis has covered the radiation dose received by workers, dose rate in the working area, surface contamination level, air contamination level and the level of radioactive gas release to the environment. The analysis has been based on BATAN regulation and ICRP-60 standard. The result of the analysis has showed that the highest radiation dose received has been found to be only around 15% of the set value in the ICRP-60 standard and only 6% of the set value in the BATAN regulation. Thus the ICRP-60 as radiation safety standard could be implemented without changing the laboratory design

  9. Perceived Requirements of MIS Curriculum Implementation in Bilingual Developing Countries

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kabeil, Magdy M.

    2005-01-01

    This paper addresses additional requirements associated with implementing a standard curriculum of Management Information Systems (MIS) in bilingual developing countries where both students and workplace users speak English as a second language. In such countries, MIS graduates are required to develop bilingual computer applications and to…

  10. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as reasonably achievable and also

  11. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-07-15

    . Emergency drills are conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as

  12. ISMS Implementation in Nuclear Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radhiah Jamalludin; Siti Nurbahyah Hamdan; Mohd Dzul Aiman Aslan

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear Malaysia provides important services and functions that depend on the resources including information. Use of the information assets must be consistent with good professional practices and procedures and legal requirements, regulations and contracts and the need to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all information assets of the Agency. ISO / IEC 27001, the international safety standard for information security management system provides the mandatory requirement to implement, review and continuously improve the Information Security Management System (ISMS). Information security policies and the implementation of ISMS is important to protect information assets from all threats; internal or external; intentionally or unintentionally. (author)

  13. Integrating evidence-based practices for increasing cancer screenings in safety net health systems: a multiple case study using the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liang, Shuting; Kegler, Michelle C; Cotter, Megan; Emily, Phillips; Beasley, Derrick; Hermstad, April; Morton, Rentonia; Martinez, Jeremy; Riehman, Kara

    2016-08-02

    Implementing evidence-based practices (EBPs) to increase cancer screenings in safety net primary care systems has great potential for reducing cancer disparities. Yet there is a gap in understanding the factors and mechanisms that influence EBP implementation within these high-priority systems. Guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR), our study aims to fill this gap with a multiple case study of health care safety net systems that were funded by an American Cancer Society (ACS) grants program to increase breast and colorectal cancer screening rates. The initiative funded 68 safety net systems to increase cancer screening through implementation of evidence-based provider and client-oriented strategies. Data are from a mixed-methods evaluation with nine purposively selected safety net systems. Fifty-two interviews were conducted with project leaders, implementers, and ACS staff. Funded safety net systems were categorized into high-, medium-, and low-performing cases based on the level of EBP implementation. Within- and cross-case analyses were performed to identify CFIR constructs that influenced level of EBP implementation. Of 39 CFIR constructs examined, six distinguished levels of implementation. Two constructs were from the intervention characteristics domain: adaptability and trialability. Three were from the inner setting domain: leadership engagement, tension for change, and access to information and knowledge. Engaging formally appointed internal implementation leaders, from the process domain, also distinguished level of implementation. No constructs from the outer setting or individual characteristics domain differentiated systems by level of implementation. Our study identified a number of influential CFIR constructs and illustrated how they impacted EBP implementation across a variety of safety net systems. Findings may inform future dissemination efforts of EBPs for increasing cancer screening in similar settings. Moreover

  14. Safety assessment to support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fan, H.Z.; Laurie, T.; Siddiqi, A.; Li, Z.P.; Rouben, D.; Zhu, W.; Lau, V.; Cottrell, C.M. [CANDU Energy Inc., Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    The Natural Uranium Equivalent (NUE) fuel contains a combination of recycled uranium and depleted uranium, in such a manner that the resulting mixture is similar to the natural uranium currently used in CANDU® reactors. Based on successful preliminary results of 24 bundles of NUE fuel demonstration irradiation in Qinshan CANDU 6 Unit 1, the NUE full core implementation program has been developed in cooperation with the Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company and Candu Energy Inc, which has recently received Chinese government policy and funding support from their National-Level Energy Innovation program. This paper presents the safety assessment results to technically support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors. (author)

  15. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  16. 78 FR 65427 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration...

  17. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  18. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  19. NSSS supplier's response to differing safety criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cremades, J; Filkin, R; Franke, T [Westinghouse Electric Nuclear Energy Systems Europe (WENESE), Brussels (Belgium)

    1980-11-01

    The limited progress achieved to date in harmonizing national criteria has led to the development of designs which include the most common national requirements. Progress towards harmonization of safety criteria can be accelerated by expanding the IAEA leadership and co-ordination activities, and implementing an integrated approach to criteria development. National and International safety criteria are examined.

  20. Promoters and Barriers to Implementation of Tracheal Intubation Airway Safety Bundle: A Mixed-Method Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Finn Davis, Katherine; Napolitano, Natalie; Li, Simon; Buffman, Hayley; Rehder, Kyle; Pinto, Matthew; Nett, Sholeen; Jarvis, J Dean; Kamat, Pradip; Sanders, Ronald C; Turner, David A; Sullivan, Janice E; Bysani, Kris; Lee, Anthony; Parker, Margaret; Adu-Darko, Michelle; Giuliano, John; Biagas, Katherine; Nadkarni, Vinay; Nishisaki, Akira

    2017-10-01

    To describe promoters and barriers to implementation of an airway safety quality improvement bundle from the perspective of interdisciplinary frontline clinicians and ICU quality improvement leaders. Mixed methods. Thirteen PICUs of the National Emergency Airway Registry for Children network. Remote or on-site focus groups with interdisciplinary ICU staff. Two semistructured interviews with ICU quality improvement leaders with quantitative and qualitative data-based feedbacks. Bundle implementation success (compliance) was defined as greater than or equal to 80% use for tracheal intubations for 3 consecutive months. ICUs were classified as early or late adopters. Focus group discussions concentrated on safety concerns and promoters and barriers to bundle implementation. Initial semistructured quality improvement leader interviews assessed implementation tactics and provided recommendations. Follow-up interviews assessed degree of acceptance and changes made after initial interview. Transcripts were thematically analyzed and contrasted by early versus late adopters. Median duration to achieve success was 502 days (interquartile range, 182-781). Five sites were early (median, 153 d; interquartile range, 146-267) and eight sites were late adopters (median, 783 d; interquartile range, 773-845). Focus groups identified common "promoter" themes-interdisciplinary approach, influential champions, and quality improvement bundle customization-and "barrier" themes-time constraints, competing paperwork and quality improvement activities, and poor engagement. Semistructured interviews with quality improvement leaders identified effective and ineffective tactics implemented by early and late adopters. Effective tactics included interdisciplinary quality improvement team involvement (early adopter: 5/5, 100% vs late adopter: 3/8, 38%; p = 0.08); ineffective tactics included physician-only rollouts, lack of interdisciplinary education, lack of data feedback to frontline clinicians

  1. On some aspects of nuclear safety surveillance and review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ganjie; Zhu Hong; Zhou Shanyuan

    2004-01-01

    Five aspects of the nuclear safety surveillance and review are discussed: Strict implementation of nuclear safety regulation, making the nuclear safety surveillance and review more normalization, procedurization, scientific decision-making; Strictly requiring the applicant to comply with the requirements of codes, do not allowing the utilization of mixing of codes; Properly controlling the strictness for the review on significant non-conformance; Strengthening the co-operation between regional offices and technical support units, Properly treat the relations between administrational management unit and technical support units. (authors)

  2. A Safety Management Model for FAR 141 Approved Flight Schools

    OpenAIRE

    Mendonca, Flavio A. C.; Carney, Thomas Q

    2017-01-01

    The Safety Management Annex (Annex 19), which became applicable in November 2013, consolidates safety management provisions previously contained in six other International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes, and will serve as a resource for overarching state safety management responsibilities. Through Annex 19, ICAO has required that its member states develop and implement safety management systems (SMS) to improve safety. This mandate includes an approved training organization that i...

  3. ASN guide project. Safety policy and management in INBs (base nuclear installations)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This guide presents the recommendations of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in the field of safety policy and management (PMS) for base nuclear installations (INBs). It gives an overview and comments of some prescriptions of the so-called INB order and PMS decision. These regulatory texts define a framework for provisions any INB operator must implement to establish his safety policy, to define and implement a system which allows the safety to be maintained, the improvement of his INB safety to be permanently looked for. The following issues are addressed: operator's safety policy, identification of elements important for safety, of activities pertaining to safety, and of associated requirements, safety management organization and system, management of activities pertaining to safety, documentation and archiving

  4. Guidance on the implementation of a risk based safety performance monitoring system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sewell, R.T.; Kuritzky, A.S.; Khatib-Rahbar, M.

    1997-05-01

    The principal objective of the present study is to review and evaluate existing Performance Indicator (PI) monitoring programs, and to develop and demonstrate an overall PSA-based methodology and framework for the monitoring and use of risk-based PIs and SIs (Safety Indicator), that would enable: Identification of trends and patterns in safety performance at a specific plant and a population of plants; Assessment of the significance of the trends and patterns; Identification of precursors of accident sequences and safety reductions; Identification of the most critical functional areas of concern, especially as they relate to a defense-in-depth safety philosophy; Comparison of safety performance trends at a plant with those at comparable plants; Incorporation of the PIs and SIs into a risk- and performance-based decision process. To support the overall project objective, it is important that information needs and data collection procedures are clearly outlined. Of key significance in this regard is the premise that a performance monitoring system should not be burdened by an excessive number of low-level PIs that may have only a peripheral relationship to safety. Other supporting objectives of the study include: To identify and discuss other issues pertaining to the practical implementation of a safety performance monitoring system (outlining the databases and algorithms needed); and to demonstrate implementation of the preliminary guidance for monitoring and use of the selected set of PIs and SIs, within the proposed framework, via application to the operating history of a NPP having a PSA and readily available event data

  5. Unresolved safety issues summary: aqua book

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    The unresolved safety issues summary is designed to provide the management of the nuclear regulatory commission with a quarterly overview of the progress and plans for completion of generic tasks addressing unresolved safety issues reported to congress pursuant to section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended. The schedules in this book include a milestone at the end of each action plan which represents the initiation of the implementation process both with respect to incorporation of the technical resolution in the NRC official guidance or requirements and also the application of changes to individual operating plants. The schedule for implementation will not normally be included in the task action plan(s) for the resolution of a USI since the nature and extent of the activities necessary to accomplish the implementation cannot normally be reasonably determined prior to the determination of a technical resolution. The progress and status for implementation of unresolved safety issues for which a technical resolution has been completed are reported specifically in a separate table provided in this summary

  6. Education and training requirements in the revised European Basic Safety Standards Directive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mundigl, S.

    2009-01-01

    The European Commission is currently developing a modified European Basic Safety Standards Directive covering two major objectives: the consolidation of existing European Radiation Protection legislation, and the revision of the European Basic Safety Standards. The consolidation will merge the following five Directives into one single Directive: the Basic Safety Standards Directive, the Medical Exposures Directive, the Public Information Directive, the Outside Workers Directive, and the Directive on the Control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. The revision of the European Basic Safety Standards will take account of the latest recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and shall improve clarity of the requirements where appropriate. It is planned to introduce more binding requirements on natural radiation sources, on criteria for clearance, and on the cooperation between Member States for emergency planning and response, as well as a graded approach for regulatory control. One additional goal is to achieve greater harmonisation between the European BSS and the international BSS. Following a recommendation from the Article 31 Group of Experts, the current draft of the modified BSS will highlight the importance of education and training by dedicating a specific title to radiation protection education, training and information. This title will include a general requirement on the Member States to ensure the establishment of an adequate legislative and administrative framework for providing appropriate radiation protection education, training and information. In addition, there will be specific requirements on training in the medical field, on information and training of workers in general, of workers potentially exposed to orphan sources, and to emergency workers. The revised BSS directive will include requirements on the competence of a radiation protection expert (RPE) and of a radiation protection

  7. Experimental research progress on passive safety systems of Chinese advanced PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xiao Zejun; Zhuo Wenbin; Zheng Hua; Chen Bingde; Zong Guifang; Jia Dounan

    2003-01-01

    TMI and Chernobyl accidents, having pronounced impact on nuclear industries, triggered the governments as well as interested institutions to devote much attention to the safety of nuclear power plant and public's requirements on nuclear power plant safety were also going to be stricter and stricter. It is obvious that safety level of an ordinary light water reactor is no longer satisfactory to these requirements. Recently, the safety authorities have recommended the implementation of passive system to improve the safety of nuclear reactors. Passive safety system is one of the main differences between Chinese advanced PWR and other conventional PWR. The working principle of passive safety system is to utilize the gravity, natural convection (natural circulation) and stored energy to implement the system's safety function. Reactors with passive safety systems are not only safer, but also more economical. The passive safety system of Chinese advanced PWR is composed of three independent systems, i.e. passive containment cooling system, passive residual heat removal system and passive core makeup tank injection system. This paper is a summary of experimental research progress on passive containment cooling system, passive residual heat removal system and passive core makeup tank injection system

  8. Electrical Safety and Arc Flash Protections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. Camp

    2008-03-04

    Over the past four years, the Electrical Safety Program at PPPL has evolved in addressing changing regulatory requirements and lessons learned from accident events, particularly in regards to arc flash hazards and implementing NFPA 70E requirements. This presentation will discuss PPPL's approaches to the areas of electrical hazards evaluation, both shock and arc flash; engineered solutions for hazards mitigation such as remote racking of medium voltage breakers, operational changes for hazards avoidance, targeted personnel training and hazard appropriate personal protective equipment. Practical solutions for nominal voltage identification and zero voltage checks for lockout/tagout will also be covered. Finally, we will review the value of a comprehensive electrical drawing program, employee attitudes expressed as a personal safety work ethic, integrated safety management, and sustained management support for continuous safety improvement.

  9. Electrical Safety and Arc Flash Protections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camp, R.

    2008-01-01

    Over the past four years, the Electrical Safety Program at PPPL has evolved in addressing changing regulatory requirements and lessons learned from accident events, particularly in regards to arc flash hazards and implementing NFPA 70E requirements. This presentation will discuss PPPL's approaches to the areas of electrical hazards evaluation, both shock and arc flash; engineered solutions for hazards mitigation such as remote racking of medium voltage breakers, operational changes for hazards avoidance, targeted personnel training and hazard appropriate personal protective equipment. Practical solutions for nominal voltage identification and zero voltage checks for lockout/tagout will also be covered. Finally, we will review the value of a comprehensive electrical drawing program, employee attitudes expressed as a personal safety work ethic, integrated safety management, and sustained management support for continuous safety improvement.

  10. PSA analysis focused on Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from operational safety point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2001-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing.(author)

  11. Radiation safety management system in a radioactive facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amador, Zayda H.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: This paper illustrates the Cuban experience in implementing and promoting an effective radiation safety system for the Centre of Isotopes, the biggest radioactive facility of our country. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. All those areas of the radiation protection program are considered (e.g. licensing and training of the staff, occupational exposure, authorization of the practices, control of the radioactive material, radiological occurrences, monitoring equipment, radioactive waste management, public exposure due to airborne effluents, audits and safety costs). A set of indicators designed to monitor key aspects of operational safety performance are used. Their trends over a period of time are analyzed with the modern information technologies, because this can provide an early warning to plant management for searching causes behind the observed changes. In addition to analyze the changes and trends, these indicators are compared against identified targets and goals to evaluate performance strengths and weaknesses. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as a basic requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. The integrated safety management system establishment has been identified as a goal and way for the continuous improvement. (author)

  12. A Safety and Health Guide for Vocational Educators. Incorporating Requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Relevant Pennsylvania Requirements with Particular Emphasis for Those Concerned with Cooperative Education and Work Study Programs. Volume 15. Number 1.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wahl, Ray

    Intended as a guide for vocational educators to incorporate the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) and the requirements of various Pennsylvania safety and health regulations with their cooperative vocational programs, the first chapter of this document presents the legal implications of these safety and health…

  13. A PLC generic requirements and specification for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Jea Bok; Lee, C. K.; Lee, D. Y.

    2001-12-01

    This report presents the requirements and specification to be applied to the generic qualification of programmable Logic Controller(PLC), which is being developed as part of the KNICS project, 'Development of the Digital Reactor Safety Systems' of which purpose is the application to safety-related instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. This report defines the essential and critical characteristics that shall be included as part of a PLC design for safety-related application. The characteristics include performance, reliability, accuracy, the overall response time from an input to the PLC exceeding it trip condition to the resulting outputs, and the specification of processors and memories in digital controller. It also specifies the quality assurance process for software development, dealing with executive software, firmware, application software tools for developing the application software, and human machine interface(HMI). In addition, this report reviews the published standards and guidelines that are required for the PLC development and the quality assurance processes such as environment requirements, seismic withstand requirements, EMI/RFI withstand requirements, and isolation test

  14. Safety management - policy, analysis and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, F.R.

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear industry is moving towards a period of ever increasing emphasis on business performance and profitability. Safety has, of course, always been a major concern of management in the nuclear industry and elsewhere. The civil aviation industry , for example, has had a similar concern for safety. Other industry sectors are also developing safety management as a response to events within and outside their sectors. In this paper the way that the risk management process as a whole is being addressed is looked at. Can we use risk management, initially a safety-orientated tool, to improve business performance? (author)

  15. 45 CFR 1356.30 - Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive... ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD AND...

  16. [Implementation of good quality and safety practices. Descriptive study in a occupational mutual health centre].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Manzanera, R; Plana, M; Moya, D; Ortner, J; Mira, J J

    2016-01-01

    To describe the level of implementation of quality and safety good practice elements in a Mutual Society health centre. A Cross-sectional study was conducted to assess the level of implementation of good practices using a questionnaire. Some quality dimensions were also assessed (scale 0 to 10) by a set of 87 quality coordinators of health centres and a random sample of 54 healthcare professionals working in small centres. Seventy quality coordinators and 27 professionals replied (response rates 80% and 50%, respectively. There were no differences in the assessment of quality attributes between both groups. They identified as areas for improvement: use of practice guidelines (7.6/10), scientific and technical skills (7.5/10), and patient satisfaction (7.7/10). Availability and accessibility to clinical reports, informed consent, availability of hydro-alcoholic solution, and to record allergies, were considered of high importance to be implemented, with training and research, improvements in equipment and technology plans, adherence to clinical practice guidelines and the preparation of risk maps, being of less importance. The good practices related to equipment and resources have a higher likelihood to be implemented, meanwhile those related to quality and safety attitudes have more barriers before being implemented. The mutual has a similar behaviour than other healthcare institutions. Copyright © 2015 SECA. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  17. 77 FR 2126 - Pipeline Safety: Implementation of the National Registry of Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-13

    ... Natural Gas Operators AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No...: ``Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements.'' The final rule...

  18. Negotiation as a means of developing and implementing health and safety policy

    OpenAIRE

    Caldart, Charles C.; Ashford, Nicholas Askounes

    1998-01-01

    In the health, safety, and environmental area, negotiated rulemaking, implementation, and compliance are proposed by their advocates as delivering two primary benefits: reduced rulemaking time and decreased litigation over a final agency rule. The experience to date, however, indicates that negotiated rulemaking cannot be relied upon to deliver either of these benefits. Nonetheless, experience indicates that negotiation can, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate a better understanding of i...

  19. Dissemination and Implementation Research for Occupational Safety and Health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dugan, Alicia G; Punnett, Laura

    2017-12-01

    The translation of evidence-based health innovations into real-world practice is both incomplete and exceedingly slow. This represents a poor return on research investment dollars for the general public. U.S. funders of health sciences research (e.g., NIH, CDC, NIOSH) are increasingly calling for dissemination plans, and to a lesser extent for dissemination and implementation (D&I) research, which are studies that examine the effectiveness of D&I efforts and strategies and the predictors of D&I success. For example, rather than merely broadcasting information about a preventable hazard, D&I research in occupational safety and health (OSH) might examine how employers or practitioners are most likely to receive and act upon that information. We propose here that D&I research should be seen as a dedicated and necessary area of study within OSH, as a way to generate new knowledge that can bridge the research-to-practice gap. We present D&I concepts, frameworks, and examples that can increase the capacity of OSH professionals to conduct D&I research and accelerate the translation of research findings into meaningful everyday practice to improve worker safety and health.

  20. Development of an FPGA-based controller for safety critical application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xing, A.; De Grosbois, J.; Sklyar, V.; Archer, P.; Awwal, A.

    2011-01-01

    In implementing safety functions, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) technology offers a distinct combination of benefits and advantages over microprocessor-based systems. FPGAs can be designed such that the final product is purely hardware, without any overhead runtime software, bringing the design closer to a conventional hardware-based solution. On the other hand, FPGAs can implement more complex safety logic that would generally require microprocessor-based safety systems. There are now qualified FPGA-based platforms available on the market with a credible use history in safety applications in nuclear power plants. Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL), in collaboration with RPC Radiy, has initiated a development program to define a vigorous FPGA engineering process suitable for implementing safety critical functions at the application development level. This paper provides an update on the FPGA development program along with the proposed design model using function block diagrams for the development of safety controllers in CANDU applications. (author)