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Sample records for safety analysis psa

  1. State of the art of probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) in the FRG, and principles of a PSA-guideline

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.

    1987-01-01

    Contents of the articles: Survey of PSA performed during licensing procedures of an NPP; German Nuclear Standards' requirements on the reliability of safety systems; PSA-guideline for NPP: Principles and suggestions; Motivation and tasks of PSA; Aspects of the methodology of safety analyses; Structure of event tree and fault tree analyses; Extent of safety analyses; Performance and limits of PSA. (orig./HSCH)

  2. The significance of the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) in administrative procedures under nuclear law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.

    1994-01-01

    The probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is a useful tool for safety relevant evaluation of nuclear power plant designed on the basis of deterministic specifications. The PSA yields data identifying reliable or less reliable systems, or frequent or less frequent failure modes to be taken into account for safety engineering. Performance of a PSA in administrative procedures under nuclear law, e.g. licensing, is an obligation laid down in a footnote to criterion 1.1 of the BMI safety criteria catalogue, which has been in force unaltered since 1977. The paper explains the application and achievements of PSA in the phase of reactor development concerned with the conceptual design basis and design features, using as an example the novel PWR. (orig./HP) [de

  3. Safety Goal, Multi-unit Risk and PSA Uncertainty

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Joon-Eon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The safety goal is an answer of each country to the question 'How safe is safe enough?'. Table 1 shows some examples of the safety goal. However, many countries including Korea do not have the official safety goal for NPPs up to now since the establishment of safety goal is not just a technical issue but a very complex socio-technical issue. In establishing the safety goal for nuclear facilities, we have to consider various factors including not only technical aspects but also social, cultural ones. Recently, Korea is trying to establish the official safety goal. In this paper, we will review the relationship between the safety goal and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). We will also address some important technical issues to be considered in establishing the safety goal for NPPs from PSA point of view, i.e. a multi-unit risk issue and the uncertainty of PSA. In this paper, we reviewed some issues related to the safety goal and PSA. We believe that the safety goal is to be established in Korea considering the multi-unit risk. In addition, the relationship between the safety goal and PSA should be also defined clearly since PSA is the only way to answer to the question 'How safe is safe enough?'.

  4. PSA - a tool for the nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Himanen, R.

    1992-01-01

    The PSA-model for BWR-type reactors of Finnish power company, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) was finished in year 1989. This basic PSA model included all safety systems, normal operating systems and auxiliary systems. Today TVO is working to enlarge the PSA to level 2 (environmental effects, for the fires, for the floodings and the outages). The TVO's experiences has been showed the PSA an useful tool for the developing the safety of BWR's (orig.)

  5. The role of PSA in safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szikszai, T.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation discusses the following issues: defence in depth principle (the role of the barriers, how does PSA represents the barriers?); the safety management and nuclear power plants; the probabilistic and deterministic approaches; the PSA applications and safety management

  6. PSA in design of passive/active safety reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, T.; Tanabe, A.; Kondo, S.

    1995-01-01

    PSAs in the design of advanced reactors are applied mainly in level 1 PSA areas. However, even in level 1 PSA, there are certain areas where special care must be taken depending on plant design concepts. This paper identifies these areas both for passive and active safety reactor concepts. For example, 'long-term PSA' and shutdown PSA are very important for a passive safety reactor concept from the standpoint of effectiveness of a grace period and passive safety systems. External events are also important for an active safety reactor concept. These kinds of special PSAs are difficult to conduct precisely in a conceptual design stage. This paper shows methods of conducting these kinds of special PSAs simply and conveniently and the use of acquired insights for the design of advanced reactors. This paper also clarifies the meaning or definition of a grace period from the standpoint of PSA

  7. One Approach to the Fire PSA Uncertainty Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simic, Z.; Mikulicic, V.; Vukovic, I.

    2002-01-01

    Experienced practical events and findings from the number of fire probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) studies show that fire has high relative importance for nuclear power plant safety. Fire PSA is a very challenging phenomenon and a number of issues are still in the area of research and development. This has a major impact on the conservatism of fire PSA findings. One way to reduce the level of conservatism is to conduct uncertainty analysis. At the top-level, uncertainty of the fire PSA can be separated in to three segments. The first segment is related to fire initiating events frequencies. The second uncertainty segment is connected to the uncertainty of fire damage. Finally, there is uncertainty related to the PSA model, which propagates this fire-initiated damage to the core damage or other analyzed risk. This paper discusses all three segments of uncertainty. Some recent experience with fire PSA study uncertainty analysis, usage of fire analysis code COMPBRN IIIe, and uncertainty evaluation importance to the final result is presented.(author)

  8. Performance indicators at Embalse NPP: PSA and safety system indicators based on PSA models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fornero, D.A.

    2001-01-01

    Several indicators have been implemented at Embalse NPP. The objective was selecting some representative parameters to evaluate the performance of both the plant and the personnel activities, important for safety. A first set of indicators was defined in accordance with plant technical staff criteria. A complementary set of them was addressed later based on WANO guidance. This report presents the set of indicators used at Embalse NPP, centering the description to related to safety systems performance indicators (SSPI). Some considerations are done about the calculation methods, the need for aligning and updating their values following Embalse Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) development, and some pros and cons of using the PSA model for getting systems indicators. Owing to the fact that PSA ownership by utilities is also a subject of the meeting, some characteristics of the organization of the PSA Project are described at the beginning of the report. At Embalse NPP a Level 1 PSA has been developed under the responsibility of its own plant and with an important contribution from the IAEA. PSA was developed at the site, conducting this to a study strongly interactive with the station staff. (author)

  9. Regulatory review of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) Level 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-07-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is increasingly being used as part of the decision making process to assess the level of safety of nuclear power plants. The methodologies in use are maturing and the insights gained from the PSAs are being used along with those from deterministic analysis. Many regulatory authorities consider the current state of the art in PSA to be sufficiently well developed for results to be used centrally in the regulatory decision making process-referred to as risk informed regulation. For these applications to be successful, it will be necessary for the regulatory authority to have a high degree of confidence in the PSA. However, at the 1994 IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on Use of PSA in the Regulatory Process and at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) 'Special Issues' meeting in 1997 on Review Procedures and Criteria for Different Regulatory Applications of PSA, it was recognized that formal regulatory review guidance for PSA did not exist. The senior regulators noted that there was a need to produce some international guidance for reviewing PSAs to establish an agreed basis for assessing whether important technological and methodological issues in PSAs are treated adequately and to verify that conclusions reached are appropriate. In 1997, the IAEA and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency agreed to produce, in cooperation, guidance on Regulatory Review of PSA. This led to the publication of IAEA-TECDOC-1135 on the Regulatory Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Level 1, which gives advice for the review of Level 1 PSA for initiating events occurring at power plants. This TECDOC extends the coverage to address the regulatory review of Level 2 PSA.These publications are intended to provide guidance to regulatory authorities on how to review the PSA for a nuclear power plant to gain confidence that it has been carried out to an acceptable level of quality so that it can be used as the

  10. Quality PSA for PSA applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carska, K.; Rybar, J.

    2012-03-01

    The safety guideline defines with more precision Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic requirements of the quality of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for PSA application. Term of quality of PSA is explained in detail. Procedure for determining the quality of PSA is provided. The categorization of PSA study according the quality of PSA is suggested. A comprehensive list of PSA applications for nuclear facilities is provided. What technical features of a PSA should be satisfied to support the PSA applications of interest is stated. (authors)

  11. Regulatory review of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) level 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-02-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is increasingly being used as part of the decision making process to assess the level of safety of nuclear power plants. The methodologies in use are maturing and the insights gained from the PSAs are being used along with those from the deterministic analysis. Many regulatory authorities consider that the current state of the art in PSA (especially Level 1 PSA) is sufficiently well developed that it can be used centrally in the regulatory decision making process - referred to as 'risk informed regulation'. For these applications to be successful, it will be necessary for regulatory authorities to have a high degree of confidence in PSA. However, at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on Use of PSA in the Regulatory Process in 1994 and at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) 'Special Issues' Meeting in 1997 on Review Procedures and Criteria for Different Regulatory Applications of PSA, it was recognized that formal regulatory review guidance for PSA did not exist. The senior regulators noted that there was a need to produce some international guidance for reviewing PSAs to establish an agreed basis for assessing whether important technological and methodological issues in PSAs are treated adequately and to verify that conclusions reached are appropriate. In 1997 the IAEA and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency agreed to produce in co-operation a technical document on the regulatory review of PSA. This publication is intended to provide guidance to regulatory authorities on how to review the PSA for a nuclear power plant to gain confidence that it has been carried out to an acceptable standard so that it can be used as the basis for taking risk informed decisions within a regulatory decision making process. The document gives guidance on how to set about reviewing a PSA and on the technical issues that need to be addressed. This publication gives guidance for the review of Level 1 PSA for

  12. The PSA of safety-critical digital I and C system: the determination of important factors and sensitivity analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, H. G.; Sung, T. Y.; Eom, H. S.; Jeong, H. S.; Park, J. K.; Lee, K. Y.; Park, J. K.

    2002-01-01

    This report is prepared to suggest a practical Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methodology of safety-critical digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. Even though conventional probabilistic safety assessment methods are immature for applying to microprocessor-based digital systems, practical needs force to apply it because the result of probabilistic safety assessment plays very important role in proving the safety of a designed system. Microprocessors and software technologies make the digital system very complex and hard to analyze the safety of their applications. The aim of this is: (1) To summarize the factors which should be represented by the model for probabilistic safety assessment and to propose a standpoint of evaluation for digital systems. (2) To quantitatively presents the results of a mathematical case study which examines the analysis framework of the safety of digital systems in the context of the PSA. (3) To show the results of a sensitivity study for some critical factors

  13. Design Information from the PSA for Digital Safety-Critical Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Hyun Gook; Jang, Seung Cheol

    2005-01-01

    Many safety-critical applications such as nuclear field application usually adopt a similar design strategy for digital safety-critical systems. Their differences from the normal design for the non-safety-critical applications could be summarized as: multiple-redundancy, highly reliable components, strengthened monitoring mechanism, verified software, and automated test procedure. These items are focusing on maintaining the capability to perform the given safety function when it is requested. For the past several decades, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques are used in the nuclear industry to assess the relative effects of contributing events on plant risk and system reliability. They provide a unifying means of assessing physical faults, recovery processes, contributing effects, human actions, and other events that have a high degree of uncertainty. The applications of PSA provide not only the analysis results of already installed system but also the useful information for the system under design. The information could be derived from the PSA experience of the various safety-critical systems. Thanks to the design flexibility, the digital system is one of the most suitable candidates for risk-informed design (RID). In this article, we will describe the feedbacks for system design and try to develop a procedure for RID. Even though the procedure is not sophisticated enough now, it could be the start point of the further investigation for developing more complete and practical methodology

  14. Use of PSA for improving the safety of French PWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanore, J.M.; Chambon, J.L.

    1994-06-01

    Two French PWR Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) studies were conducted for the standardized PWR series of 900 and 1300 MWe. Both PSA 900 and PSA 1300 are level 1 PSAs, that means their objective is the evaluation of core meltdown frequency. These studies have some specific features, in particular the treatment of shutdown conditions, the treatment of long term post-accidental situations, and a wide use of French experience feedback. The PSAs are used for safety improvements of the French PWRs. Following the PSA results, several modifications to plants concerning the dominant sequences were decided. (R.P.). 2 refs., 4 figs

  15. Review of SFR Design Safety using Preliminary Regulatory PSA Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Na, Hyun Ju; Lee, Yong Suk; Shin, Andong; Suh, Nam Duk

    2013-01-01

    The major objective of this research is to develop a risk model for regulatory verification of the SFR design, and thereby, make sure that the SFR design is adequate from a risk perspective. In this paper, the development result of preliminary regulatory PSA model of SFR is discussed. In this paper, development and quantification result of preliminary regulatory PSA model of SFR is discussed. It was confirmed that the importance PDRC and ADRC dampers is significant as stated in the result of KAERI PSA model. However, the importance can be changed significantly depending on assumption of CCCG and CCF factor of PDRC and ADRC dampers. SFR (sodium-cooled fast reactor) which is Gen-IV nuclear energy system, is designed to accord with the concept of stability, sustainability and proliferation resistance. KALIMER-600, which is under development in Korea, includes passive safety systems (e. g. passive reactor shutdown, passive residual heat removal, and etc.) as well as active safety systems. Risk analysis from a regulatory perspective is needed to support the regulatory body in its safety and licensing review for SFR (KALIMER-600). Safety issues should be identified in the early design phase in order to prevent the unexpected cost increase and delay of the SFR licensing schedule that may be caused otherwise

  16. Applications of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-02-01

    This report, which compiles information on a comprehensive set of PSA applications in the areas of NPP design, operation, and accident mitigation and management, is the culmination of an IAEA project on PSA Applications and Tools to Improve NPP Safety. In this regard, the Technical Committee Meeting (TCM) held in Madrid in February 1998 allowed participants to review and provide very valuable comments for this report. Several important facts related to PSA and its applications were highlighted during this TCM: living PSAs are the basis for the risk informed approach to decision making; development and use of safety/risk monitors as tools for configuration management is spreading fast; the different uses of PSA to support NPP testing and maintenance planning and optimization are amongst the most widespread PSA applications; plant specific PSAs are being used to support the safety upgrading programmes of plants built to earlier standards; not all countries have a regulatory framework for the use of the probabilistic approach in decision making. Some countries are still far from 'risk-informed' regulation, and this means that there is still considerable work ahead, both for regulators and utilities, to clarify approaches, to establish a framework and to reach a common understanding in relation to the use of PSA in decision making. This report is based on the premise that the use of PSA can provide useful information for the decision maker. This report is intended to provide an overview of current PSA applications. Section 2 addresses the PSA application process, outlines the general requirements for PSA tools and provides a discussion on PSA aspects such as PSA level, scope and level of detail, which have to be considered when planning/performing PSA applications. Section 3 discusses the technical aspects of individual applications and is divided into three parts. Section 3.1 is dedicated to the design related PSA applications. The second part of Section 3 considers

  17. PSA in licensing, safety reviews and design as applied in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.; Goertz, R.; Schott, H.; Wendling, R.D.

    1994-01-01

    In this paper, two topics - the application of PSA in the regulatory process and the effort to improve PSA methods and models - are addressed. From the regulators' point of view, the most important application of PSA in Germany is presently within the safety reviews of nuclear power plants in operation. The current status of regulatory guidance which shall be provided to establish a uniform procedure for a periodic safety review is described with special emphasis on the role of PSA. An important goal is to have all plant-specific PSAs comparable as far as possible. Guidance for PSA review is under development likewise. Furthermore, the application of PSA in licensing of nuclear power plants is addressed as well as its use in the design process of future pressurized water reactors. The development of models and methods to be applied in PSA has been and will be supported by a number of studies and investigations. An overview of the main issues of these investigations is provided. A specific task was the elaboration of a proposal for incorporating fire events into the PSA. The status of these efforts is outlined. (author). 7 refs, 3 figs, 2 tabs

  18. Development and application of probabilistic safety assessment PSA in Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang Weigang; Chen Jiefei; Guo Jianbing; Zhen Wei

    2005-01-01

    This paper discusses the development and application of Level 1 PSA used for safety review, risk monitoring and on line maintenance of the nuclear power plant. PSA development includes the analysis of event tree, fault tree, FMEA, PSA quantification and the equipment reliability database. We have collected and processed the reliability data of external power source, the equipment reliability data and the initial event frequency. The thermal-hydraulics analysis of some important events and accidents, human factor analysis, and the calculation of human error probability have been made. During the development of event trees and fault trees, the effect of some support systems such as compressed air distribution system, ventilation system and electrical system have been taken into account. The system manuals, operation procedures and emergency operating procedures of Daya Bay NPP are referred to in this project. The operators of the NPP were involved in the establishment of all event trees and fault trees analysis. Furthermore, we have accepted the suggestion of IAEA experts, completed the logic chart of initial events to the initial events analysis of Daya Bay NPP, and optimized the code system of PSA model again. Together with the development of the reliability database, by absorbing the advanced experience of EDF, we have gained the reports about equipment's classifying, function and experience feedback information of Daya Bay NPP. According to the quantitative calculation of the latest Level 1 PSA Model of Daya Bay NPP, the results of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) is: CDF = 2.13E-5/reactor . year. The latest PSA Model of Daya Bay NPP includes: 1) 12 sorts of initial events, 67 sub-initial events, 70 fault trees; 2) 25 nuclear safety related systems were developed by fault trees and FMEA ; 3) 2609 fault tree logic gates; 4) 2146 basic events; 5) 680 core damage accident sequences. (authors)

  19. The use of living PSA in safety management, a procedure developed in the nordic project ''safety evaluation, NKS/SIK-1''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johanson, G.; Holmberg, J.

    1994-01-01

    The essential objective with the development of a living PSA concept is to bring the use of the plant specific PSA model out to the daily safety work to allow operational risk experience feedback and to increase the risk awareness of the intended users. This paper will present results of the Nordic project ''Safety Evaluation, NKS/SIK-1''. The SIK-1 project has defined and demonstrated the practical use of living PSA for safety evaluation and for identification of possible improvements in operational safety. Subjects discussed in this paper are dealing with the practical implementation and use of PSA to make proper safety related decisions and evaluation. (author). 24 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

  20. Analytical tool for the periodic safety analysis of NPP according to the PSA guideline. Vol. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.; Boehme, E.; Musekamp, W.; Hussels, U.; Becker, G.; Behr, H.; Luettgert, H.

    1994-01-01

    The SAIS (Safety Analysis and Informationssystem) Programme System is based on an integrated data base, which consists of a plant-data and a PSA related data part. Using SAIS analyses can be performed by special tools, which are connected directly to the data base. Two main editors, RISA+ and DEDIT, are used for data base management. The access to the data base is done via different types of pages, which are displayed on a displayed on a computer screen. The pages are called data sheets. Sets of input and output data sheets were implemented, such as system or component data sheets, fault trees or event trees. All input information, models and results needed for updated results of PSA (Living PSA) can be stored in the SAIS. The programme system contains the editor KVIEW which guarantees consistency of the stored data, e.g. with respect to names and codes of components and events. The information contained in the data base are called in by a standardized users guide programme, called Page Editor. (Brunsbuettel on reference NPP). (orig./HP) [de

  1. International survey of living PSA and safety indicators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.; Laakso, K.; Lehtinen, E.; Bjoere, S.

    1992-01-01

    The report contains an international overview of applications of living probabilistic assessment and development of operational safety indicators. Features of an ideal living PSA tool are summarized as well as a limited survey of code systems for managing a living probabilistic safety assessment (living PSA) is included. The international survey is used as an input for planning and performance of related tasks within the nordic NKS/SIK-1 project conducted in 1990-93. The research notes are distributed to the Nordic organizations involved or interested in the subject. The report includes an overview and conclusions from technical reports and articles available and presentations and discussions related to development and use of above methods for the evaluation and management of the operational safety of nuclear power plants. A large part of this material is based on material collected and discussed in connection to international specialist meetings relating to the subject

  2. Relationship between organizational factors, safety culture and PSA in nuclear power plant operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joksimovich, V.; Orvis, D.D.

    1997-01-01

    There are four nuclear safety imperatives or ''4Ms'': machine (hardware, design, QA/QC), milieux (operating conditions, environment, natural phenomena), man (human reliability) and management (organizational and management influences). Nuclear safety evaluations as well as evolution of its most powerful tool, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), followed chronologically the 4M constituents. The nuclear industry worldwide, and the nuclear safety regulators in particular, have been preoccupied with the first M almost to the point of obsession with belated and only intuitive interest in the third and fourth M (human dimension). Human factors or economics in the nuclear industry was an afterthought. Human reliability was essentially born in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. Impact of organizational factors on nuclear safety is only in the early stages of R and D. This paper describes some of the concepts being pursued by APG to link organizational factors and safety culture to Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and to integrate such into probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), e.g. [APG, 1993]. (author). 11 refs, 4 figs, 1 tab

  3. Comparison of global sensitivity analysis techniques and importance measures in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borgonovo, E.; Apostolakis, G.E.; Tarantola, S.; Saltelli, A.

    2003-01-01

    This paper discusses application and results of global sensitivity analysis techniques to probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) models, and their comparison to importance measures. This comparison allows one to understand whether PSA elements that are important to the risk, as revealed by importance measures, are also important contributors to the model uncertainty, as revealed by global sensitivity analysis. We show that, due to epistemic dependence, uncertainty and global sensitivity analysis of PSA models must be performed at the parameter level. A difficulty arises, since standard codes produce the calculations at the basic event level. We discuss both the indirect comparison through importance measures computed for basic events, and the direct comparison performed using the differential importance measure and the Fussell-Vesely importance at the parameter level. Results are discussed for the large LLOCA sequence of the advanced test reactor PSA

  4. System analysis procedures for conducting PSA of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Yoon Hwan; Jeong, Won Dae; Kim, Tae Un; Kim, Kil You; Han, Sang Hoon; Chang, Seung Chul; Sung, Tae Yong; Yang, Jun Eon; Kang, Dae Il; Park, Jin Hee; Hwang, Mi Jeong; Jin, Young Ho.

    1997-03-01

    This document, the Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) procedures guide for system analysis, is intended to provide the guidelines to analyze the target of system consistently and technically in the performance of PSA for nuclear power plants(NPPs). The guide has been prepared in accordance with the procedures and techniques for fault tree analysis(FTA) used in system analysis. Normally the main objective of system analysis is to assess the reliability of system modeled by Event Tree Analysis(ETA). A variety of analytical techniques can be used for the system analysis, however, FTA method is used in this procedures guide. FTA is the method used for representing the failure logic of plant systems deductively using AND, OR or NOT gates. The fault tree should reflect all possible failure modes that may contribute to the system unavailability. This should include contributions due to the mechanical failures of the components, Common Cause Failures (CCFs), human errors and outages for testing and maintenance. After the construction of fault tree is completed, system unavailability is calculated with the CUT module of KIRAP, and the qualitative and quantitative analysis is performed through the process as above stated. As above mentioned, the procedures for system analysis is based on PSA procedures and methods which has been applied to the safety assessments of constructing NPPs in the country. Accordingly, the method of FTA stated in this procedures guide will be applicable to PSA for the NPPs to be constructed in the future. (author). 6 tabs., 11 figs., 7 refs

  5. System analysis procedures for conducting PSA of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Yoon Hwan; Jeong, Won Dae; Kim, Tae Un; Kim, Kil You; Han, Sang Hoon; Chang, Seung Chul; Sung, Tae Yong; Yang, Jun Eon; Kang, Dae Il; Park, Jin Hee; Hwang, Mi Jeong; Jin, Young Ho

    1997-03-01

    This document, the Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) procedures guide for system analysis, is intended to provide the guidelines to analyze the target of system consistently and technically in the performance of PSA for nuclear power plants(NPPs). The guide has been prepared in accordance with the procedures and techniques for fault tree analysis(FTA) used in system analysis. Normally the main objective of system analysis is to assess the reliability of system modeled by Event Tree Analysis(ETA). A variety of analytical techniques can be used for the system analysis, however, FTA method is used in this procedures guide. FTA is the method used for representing the failure logic of plant systems deductively using AND, OR or NOT gates. The fault tree should reflect all possible failure modes that may contribute to the system unavailability. This should include contributions due to the mechanical failures of the components, Common Cause Failures (CCFs), human errors and outages for testing and maintenance. After the construction of fault tree is completed, system unavailability is calculated with the CUT module of KIRAP, and the qualitative and quantitative analysis is performed through the process as above stated. As above mentioned, the procedures for system analysis is based on PSA procedures and methods which has been applied to the safety assessments of constructing NPPs in the country. Accordingly, the method of FTA stated in this procedures guide will be applicable to PSA for the NPPs to be constructed in the future. (author). 6 tabs., 11 figs., 7 refs.

  6. Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis for SBLOCA in OPR1000 and Evaluation of Uncertainty for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Jin; Park, Goon Cherl

    2012-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety assessment (PSA) is a mathematical tool to evaluate numerical estimates of risk for nuclear power plants (NPPs). But PSA has the problems about quality and reliability since the quantification of uncertainties from thermal hydraulic (TH) analysis has not been included in the quantification of overall uncertainties in PSA. From the former research, it is proved that the quantification of uncertainties from best-estimate LBLOCA analysis can improve the PSA quality by modifying the core damage frequency (CDF) from the existing PSA report. Basing on the similar concept, this study considers the quantification of SBLOCA analysis results. In this study, however, operator error parameters are also included in addition to the phenomenon parameters which are considered in LBLOCA analysis

  7. Nuclear power and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA): past through future applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stamatelatos, M. G.; Moieni, P.; Everline, C. J.

    1995-03-01

    Nuclear power reactor safety in the United States is about to enter a new era -- an era of risk- based management and risk-based regulation. First, there was the age of `prescribed safety assessment,' during which a series of design-basis accidents in eight categories of severity, or classes, were postulated and analyzed. Toward the end of that era, it was recognized that `Class 9,' or `beyond design basis,' accidents would need special attention because of the potentially severe health and financial consequences of these accidents. The accident at Three Mile Island showed that sequences of low-consequence, high-frequency events and human errors can be much more risk dominant than the Class 9 accidents. A different form of safety assessment, PSA, emerged and began to gain ground against the deterministic safety establishment. Eventually, this led to the current regulatory requirements for individual plant examinations (IPEs). The IPEs can serve as a basis for risk-based regulation and management, a concept that may ultimately transform the U.S. regulatory process from its traditional deterministic foundations to a process predicated upon PSA. Beyond the possibility of a regulatory environment predicated upon PSA lies the possibility of using PSA as the foundation for managing daily nuclear power plant operations.

  8. Qualification of calculation aids for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goetz, K.; Hennigs, W.; Kirstein, B.M.; Reinhardt, C.

    1998-01-01

    In Germany Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) are part of the evaluation of a nuclear power plants safety. The German PSA guide stipulates that the used software must enable a PSA according to the state of the art. This software must be qualified to assure that its features, mathematic methods and its performance enable a PSA like this. In this research work specifications and requirements are developed, which allow the testing of software. A procedure was developed to qualify PSA software according to the PSA guide and the experiences of users of PSA. Setting up a procedure, a tool for a systematic and uniform examination was crated. Additionally the options, mathematic fundamentals and performance of PSA-programs were analyzed. According to this all programs that were analyzed are capable to sovle their original task, that is the calculation of the safety of high available system based on high available components. Against that the requirements of modern PSA, e.g. to handle less available functions, HRA and fire analyses, based on the use of modern software and the implementation of new developments in the field of PSA are not supported adequately by all programs. (orig.) [de

  9. Assessment of modern methods of human factor reliability analysis in PSA studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holy, J.

    2001-12-01

    The report is structured as follows: Classical terms and objects (Probabilistic safety assessment as a framework for human reliability assessment; Human failure within the PSA model; Basic types of operator failure modelled in a PSA study and analyzed by HRA methods; Qualitative analysis of human reliability; Quantitative analysis of human reliability used; Process of analysis of nuclear reactor operator reliability in a PSA study); New terms and objects (Analysis of dependences; Errors of omission; Errors of commission; Error forcing context); and Overview and brief assessment of human reliability analysis (Basic characteristics of the methods; Assets and drawbacks of the use of each of HRA method; History and prospects of the use of the methods). (P.A.)

  10. Report on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) quality assurance in utilization of risk information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-12-01

    Recently in Japan, introduction of nuclear safety regulations using risk information such as probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been considered and utilization of risk information in the rational and practical measures on safety assurance has made a progress to start with the operation or inspection area. The report compiled results of investigation and studies of PSA quality assurance in risk-informed activities in the USA. Relevant regulatory guide and standard review plan as well as issues and recommendations were reviewed for technical adequacy and advancement of probabilistic risk assessment technology in risk-informed decision making. Useful and important information to be referred as issues in PSA quality assurance was identified. (T. Tanaka)

  11. Programmable automation systems in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pulkkinen, U.

    1997-06-01

    The Finnish safety authority (STUK) requires plant specific PSAs, and quantitative safety goals are set on different levels. The reliability analysis is more problematic when critical safety functions are realized by applying programmable automation systems. Conventional modeling techniques do not necessarily apply to the analysis of these systems, and the quantification seems to be impossible. However, it is important to analyze contribution of programmable automation systems to the plant safety and PSA is the only method with system analytical view over the safety. This report discusses the applicability of PSA methodology (fault tree analyses, failure modes and effects analyses) in the analysis of programmable automation systems. The problem of how to decompose programmable automation systems for reliability modeling purposes is discussed. In addition to the qualitative analysis and structural reliability modeling issues, the possibility to evaluate failure probabilities of programmable automation systems is considered. One solution to the quantification issue is the use of expert judgements, and the principles to apply expert judgements is discussed in the paper. A framework to apply expert judgements is outlined. Further, the impacts of subjective estimates on the interpretation of PSA results are discussed. (orig.) (13 refs.)

  12. Development of multipurpose regulatory PSA model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Ju; Sung, Key Yong; Kim, Hho Jung; Yang, Joon Eon; Ha, Jae Joo

    2004-01-01

    Generally, risk information for nuclear facilities comes from the results of Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). PSA is a systematic tool to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, since it is based on thorough and consistent application of probability models. In particular, the PSA has been widely utilized for risk-informed regulation (RIR), including various licensee-initiated risk-informed applications (RIA). In any regulatory decision, the main goal is to make a sound safety decision based on technically defensible information. Also, due to the increased public requests for giving a safety guarantee, the regulator should provide the visible means of safety. The use of PSA by the regulator can give the answer on this problem. Therefore, in order to study the applicability of risk information for regulatory safety management, it is a demanding task to prepare a well-established regulatory PSA model and tool. In 2002, KINS and KAERI together made a research cooperation to form a working group to develop the regulatory PSA model - so-called MPAS model. The MPAS stands for multipurpose probabilistic analysis of safety. For instance, a role of the MPAS model is to give some risk insights in the preparation of various regulatory programs. Another role of this model is to provide an independent risk information to the regulator during regulatory decision-making, not depending on the licensee's information

  13. Data analysis treatment in the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant preoperational PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valhuerdi Debesa, C.

    1996-01-01

    Data Analysis is an important task within Probabilistic safety Assessment,. which usually determines the level of detail of the analysis, being the way to feed the PSA with the operational experience of the Nuclear Power Plant analysed. In this paper the role of the Data Analysis Task as part of the PSA process and the different kinds of data to be estimated are explained. A description is presented of the organization of the data Analysis in the Juragua NPP Preoperational PSA, the information sources and the criteria handled for the estimation of the different kinds of Data. The Generic Data Base adopted for equipment failures and the state of the generic data issue for VVER reactors and its prospects are also dealt with. The paper concludes with suggestions for the further development of Juragua NPP generic Data Base

  14. Preclosure Safety Analysis Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D.D. Orvis

    2003-01-01

    A preclosure safety analysis (PSA) is a required element of the License Application (LA) for the high- level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain. This guide provides analysts and other Yucca Mountain Repository Project (the Project) personnel with standardized methods for developing and documenting the PSA. The definition of the PSA is provided in 10 CFR 63.2, while more specific requirements for the PSA are provided in 10 CFR 63.112, as described in Sections 1.2 and 2. The PSA requirements described in 10 CFR Part 63 were developed as risk-informed performance-based regulations. These requirements must be met for the LA. The PSA addresses the safety of the Geologic Repository Operations Area (GROA) for the preclosure period (the time up to permanent closure) in accordance with the radiological performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111. Performance objectives for the repository after permanent closure (described in 10 CFR 63.113) are not mentioned in the requirements for the PSA and they are not considered in this guide. The LA will be comprised of two phases: the LA for construction authorization (CA) and the LA amendment to receive and possess (R and P) high-level radioactive waste (HLW). PSA methods must support the safety analyses that will be based on the differing degrees of design detail in the two phases. The methods described herein combine elements of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and deterministic analyses that comprise a risk-informed performance-based safety analysis. This revision to the PSA guide was prepared for the following objectives: (1) To correct factual and typographical errors. (2) To provide additional material suggested from reviews by the Project, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staffs. (3) To update material in accordance with approaches and/or strategies adopted by the Project. In addition, a principal objective for the planned revision was to ensure that the methods and

  15. A PSA study for the SMART basic design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Sang Hoon; Kim, H. C.; Yang, S. H.; Lee, D. J.

    2002-03-01

    SMART (System-Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor) is under development that is an advanced integral type small and medium category nuclear power reactor with the rated thermal power of 330 MW. A Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for the SMART basic design has been performed to evaluate the safety and optimize the design. Currently, the basic design is done and the detailed design is not available for the SMART, we made several assumptions about the system design before performing the PSA. The scope of the PSA was limited to the Level-1 internal full power PSA. The level-2 and 3 PSA, the external PSA, and the low power/shutdown PSA will be performed in the final design stage

  16. Towards a PSA harmonization French-Belgian comparison of the level 1 PSA for two similar PWR types

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupuy, P.; Corenwinder, F.; Lanore, J.M.; Gryffroy, D.; Gelder, P. de; Hulsmans, M.

    2002-06-01

    In the framework of the cooperation between French and Belgian regulatory authorities, a PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) comparison exercise has been carried out for several years. This comparison deals with two PSA level 1 studies for internal events, performed for both power and shutdown states: the French PSA of the 900 MWe-series PWR, and the Belgian PSA of the Tihange 1 PWR, which both concern PWRs with a similar Framatome design. The purpose of this paper is to describe the PSA comparison methodology and to present, in a qualitative way, an overview of the insights obtained up to now. It also shows that such an 'a posteriori' benchmark exercise turns out to be a step towards PSA harmonization, and gives more confidence in the results of plant specific PSA when used for applications like precursor analysis or evaluations of importance to safety. (authors)

  17. Improvement of Level-1 PSA computer code package -A study for nuclear safety improvement-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Kyu; Kim, Tae Woon; Ha, Jae Joo; Han, Sang Hoon; Cho, Yeong Kyun; Jeong, Won Dae; Jang, Seung Cheol; Choi, Young; Seong, Tae Yong; Kang, Dae Il; Hwang, Mi Jeong; Choi, Seon Yeong; An, Kwang Il

    1994-07-01

    This year is the second year of the Government-sponsored Mid- and Long-Term Nuclear Power Technology Development Project. The scope of this subproject titled on 'The Improvement of Level-1 PSA Computer Codes' is divided into three main activities : (1) Methodology development on the under-developed fields such as risk assessment technology for plant shutdown and external events, (2) Computer code package development for Level-1 PSA, (3) Applications of new technologies to reactor safety assessment. At first, in the area of PSA methodology development, foreign PSA reports on shutdown and external events have been reviewed and various PSA methodologies have been compared. Level-1 PSA code KIRAP and CCF analysis code COCOA are converted from KOS to Windows. Human reliability database has been also established in this year. In the area of new technology applications, fuzzy set theory and entropy theory are used to estimate component life and to develop a new measure of uncertainty importance. Finally, in the field of application study of PSA technique to reactor regulation, a strategic study to develop a dynamic risk management tool PEPSI and the determination of inspection and test priority of motor operated valves based on risk importance worths have been studied. (Author)

  18. External hazards analysis approach to level 1 PSA of Mochovce NPP - Slovakia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stojka, Tibor

    2000-01-01

    Analyses of external events had been first time performed at the design stage of the Mochovce NPP showing sufficiently low contribution of external hazards to core damage frequency. But, based on IAEA document 'Safety problems of WWER-440/213 NPPs and the categorization' (IAEA-EBP-WWER-03, 1996), the need of new reassessment arose due to discrepancy of some origin recommendations in compare with present IAEA ones. Mochovce NPP Nuclear Safety Improvements Program elaborated at the same time included the IAEA recommendations and following improvements were proposed to perform in context of external events. 1. Seismic project and new locality seismic evaluation This safety improvement includes also some 'on site' technical improvements in seismic stability of structures and equipment. 2. Unit specific analyses of extreme meteorologic conditions. This safety improvement focuses on impact of feasible extreme conditions on NPP systems caused by rain, snow and hail storms, frost, winds, low and high temperatures. 3. Analyses of external hazards caused by humans. In this safety improvement were specified: feasible sources of explosions; analyses of hydrogen, gas and propane-calor gas depots; air crash risk. The results of these implemented safety improvements were considered in the PSA study. The External hazards analysis is also part of Level 1 PSA Mochovce NPP performed by PSA Department of VUJE Trnava Inc., Engineering, Design and Research Organization, Slovakia. Some partial analyses are performed in cooperation with following companies DS and S - SAIC, USA and Geophysical Institute Academy of Science, Slovakia Relko, Slovakia. Basic documents are: NUREG/CR-2300 'PRA Procedures Guide - A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants' and IAEA SS No. 50-P-7 'Treatment of External Hazards in PSA for NPPs. The external hazards analysis consists of following parts: 1. Geography and plant locality; 2. Nearby industry; 3. Extreme

  19. State of the art on the probabilistic safety assessment (P.S.A.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devictor, N.; Bassi, A.; Saignes, P.; Bertrand, F.

    2008-01-01

    The use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is internationally increasing as a means of assessing and improving the safety of nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. To support the development of a competence on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, a set of states of the art regarding these tools and their use has been made between 2001 and 2005, in particular on the following topics: - Definition of the PSA of level 1, 2 and 3; - Use of PSA in support to design and operation of nuclear plants (risk-informed applications); - Applications to Non Reactor Nuclear Facilities. The report compiled in a single document these states of the art in order to ensure a broader use; this work has been done in the frame of the Project 'Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Facility' of the Nuclear Development and Innovation Division of the Nuclear Energy Division. As some of these states of the art have been made in support to exchanges with international partners and were written in English, a section of this document is written in English. This work is now applied concretely in support to the design of 4. Generation nuclear systems as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors and especially Gas-cooled Fast Reactor, that have been the subject of communications during the conferences ANS (Annual Meeting 2007), PSA'08, ICCAP'08 and in the journal Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations. (authors)

  20. PSA Level 2 as element of an integral safety assessment before plant commissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loeffler, H.; Mildenberger, O.; Sonnenkalb, M.; Steinroetter, T.

    2012-01-01

    In Argentina the Central Nuclear Atucha II is near to completion. This is a pressurized heavy water reactor. PSA (Probability Safety Assessment) level 1, level 2 and level 3 have to be performed in order to show compliance with the Argentinean dose limit. Such studies have been done first by the former KWU in the 1980's to get the construction license (FABIAN 1985). Nowadays the plant owner NA-SA performs PSA level 1 and provides information about the core damage states to GRS, who does the subsequent PSA level 2 part. GRS delivers source terms to the environment and the associated frequencies to the Argentinean research institute CNEA, which performs level 3 together with NA-SA. Since GRS is situated in the middle of the chain, interface definition with both ends has been a significant task of the GRS activities. Experience gained during this process will be highlighted in the presentation. The analysis of PSA level 2 proper follows a traditional approach: -) deterministic accident simulation with integral code MELCOR; -) analyses of specific issues which are not covered by MELCOR; and -) probabilistic accident progression analysis with EVNTRE event tree methodology. It appears that MELCOR and EVNTRE and PSA guidelines in general are flexible enough to analyse new or uncommon reactor designs. It also appears that the plant specific design features may require analyses beyond present code capabilities, calling for expert judgment and they can largely determine PSA results. The behaviour of iodine is not yet covered satisfactorily by state-of-the-art models in MELCOR

  1. Probabilistic safety analysis and human reliability analysis. Proceedings. Working material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    An international meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was jointly organized by Electricite de France - Research and Development (EDF DER) and SRI International in co-ordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The meeting was held in Paris 21-23 November 1994. A group of international and French specialists in PSA and HRA participated at the meeting and discussed the state of the art and current trends in the following six topics: PSA Methodology; PSA Applications; From PSA to Dependability; Incident Analysis; Safety Indicators; Human Reliability. For each topic a background paper was prepared by EDF/DER and reviewed by the international group of specialists who attended the meeting. The results of this meeting provide a comprehensive overview of the most important questions related to the readiness of PSA for specific uses and areas where further research and development is required. Refs, figs, tabs

  2. Probabilistic safety analysis and human reliability analysis. Proceedings. Working material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-31

    An international meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was jointly organized by Electricite de France - Research and Development (EDF DER) and SRI International in co-ordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The meeting was held in Paris 21-23 November 1994. A group of international and French specialists in PSA and HRA participated at the meeting and discussed the state of the art and current trends in the following six topics: PSA Methodology; PSA Applications; From PSA to Dependability; Incident Analysis; Safety Indicators; Human Reliability. For each topic a background paper was prepared by EDF/DER and reviewed by the international group of specialists who attended the meeting. The results of this meeting provide a comprehensive overview of the most important questions related to the readiness of PSA for specific uses and areas where further research and development is required. Refs, figs, tabs.

  3. Methodologies for uncertainty analysis in the level 2 PSA and their implementation procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Kwang Il; Yang, Joon Eun; Kim, Dong Ha

    2002-04-01

    Main purpose of this report to present standardized methodologies for uncertainty analysis in the Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and their implementation procedures, based on results obtained through a critical review of the existing methodologies for the analysis of uncertainties employed in the Level 2 PSA, especially Accident Progression Event Tree (APET). Uncertainties employed in the Level 2 PSA, quantitative expressions of overall knowledge of analysts' and experts' participating in the probabilistic quantification process of phenomenological accident progressions ranging from core melt to containment failure, their numerical values are directly related to the degree of confidence that the analyst has that a given phenomenological event or accident process will or will not occur, or analyst's subjective probabilities of occurrence. These results that are obtained from Level 2 PSA uncertainty analysis, become an essential contributor to the plant risk, in addition to the Level 1 PSA and Level 3 PSA uncertainties. Uncertainty analysis methodologies and their implementation procedures presented in this report was prepared based on the following criteria: 'uncertainty quantification process must be logical, scrutable, complete, consistent and in an appropriate level of detail, as mandated by the Level 2 PSA objectives'. For the aforementioned purpose, this report deals mainly with (1) summary of general or Level 2 PSA specific uncertainty analysis methodologies, (2) selection of phenomenological branch events for uncertainty analysis in the APET, methodology for quantification of APET uncertainty inputs and its implementation procedure, (3) statistical propagation of uncertainty inputs through APET and its implementation procedure, and (4) formal procedure for quantification of APET uncertainties and source term categories (STCs) through the Level 2 PSA quantification codes

  4. Seismic PSA of nuclear power plants a case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hari Prasad, M.; Dubey, P.N.; Reddy, G.R.; Saraf, R.K.; Ghosh, A.K.

    2006-07-01

    Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (Seismic PSA) analysis is an external event PSA analysis. The objective of seismic PSA for the plants is to examine the existence of plant vulnerabilities against postulated earthquakes by numerically assessing the plant safety and to take appropriate measures to enhance the plant safety. Seismic PSA analysis integrates the seismic hazard analysis, seismic response analysis, seismic fragility analysis and system reliability/ accident sequence analysis. In general, the plant consists of normally operating and emergency standby systems and components. The failure during an earthquake (induced directly by excessive inertial stresses or indirectly following the failure of some other item) of an operating component will lead to a change in the state of the plant. In that case, various scenarios can follow depending on the initiating event and the status of other sub-systems. The analysis represents these possible chronological sequences by an event tree. The event trees and the associated fault trees model the sub-systems down to the level of individual components. The procedure has been applied for a typical Indian nuclear power plant. From the internal event PSA level I analysis significant contribution to the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) was found due to the Fire Water System. Hence, this system was selected to establish the procedure of seismic PSA. In this report the different elements that go into seismic PSA analysis have been discussed. Hazard curves have been developed for the site. Fragility curve for the seismically induced failure of Class IV power has been developed. The fragility curve for fire-water piping system has been generated. Event tree for Class IV power supply has been developed and the dominating accident sequences were identified. CDF has been estimated from these dominating accident sequences by convoluting hazard curves of initiating event and fragility curves of the safety systems. (author)

  5. Safety R and D Needs in Multi-Unit PSA from a Regulatory Viewpoint

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heo, Gyunyoung; Yoon, Ji Woong [Kyung Hee University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Man Cheol [Chung-Ang University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) NSSC’s recent approval of the construction permits and operation licenses of Shin Kori units 3 to 6 has brought attention to the multi-unit probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The disaster in Fukushima revealed the risks associated with the use of spent fuel pools (SFPs), and the linear (or non-linear) consequences of radiation leaks from multi-units in particular, has raised concerns. The number of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation will increase to ten at the Kori and Shin Kori sites when the construction of Units 5 and 6 is complete - the highest concentration of power reactors in one region in world history. Nuclear disasters do not happen frequently, but when one does happen, its cascading effects can inflict massive human and environmental loss. Proper safety measures are needed as more nuclear installations are put in place. Nuclear regulators are forced to promptly produce a sufficient degree of realistic and objective risk assessment results to meet the rapidly-increasing demand for multi-unit PSA, while striving to achieve matching levels of technological development. The issues with the technological aspects of PSA would still be inherent even after a few years of research, and ensuring the safety of multi-units would still prove challenging. Experts are however relieved that the general public is now much more familiar with the concept of PSA than in the past, which indicates a rise in the degree of public understanding of technology. More studies should be done on multi-unit regulation and safety so as to steer the government in the proper direction for enacting policies aimed to ensure the health of local residents. In conclusion, the technical problems associated with multi-unit PSA that were not mentioned in this paper are essentially similar to their single-unit counterparts, therefore, reinforcing the base infrastructure of PSAs in general will work towards resolving such technical

  6. Passive safety systems reliability and integration of these systems in nuclear power plant PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    La Lumia, V.; Mercier, S.; Marques, M.; Pignatel, J.F.

    2004-01-01

    Innovative nuclear reactor concepts could lead to use passive safety features in combination with active safety systems. A passive system does not need active component, external energy, signal or human interaction to operate. These are attractive advantages for safety nuclear plant improvements and economic competitiveness. But specific reliability problems, linked to physical phenomena, can conduct to stop the physical process. In this context, the European Commission (EC) starts the RMPS (Reliability Methods for Passive Safety functions) program. In this RMPS program, a quantitative reliability evaluation of the RP2 system (Residual Passive heat Removal system on the Primary circuit) has been realised, and the results introduced in a simplified PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment). The scope is to get out experience of definition of characteristic parameters for reliability evaluation and PSA including passive systems. The simplified PSA, using event tree method, is carried out for the total loss of power supplies initiating event leading to a severe core damage. Are taken into account: failures of components but also failures of the physical process involved (e.g. natural convection) by a specific method. The physical process failure probabilities are assessed through uncertainty analyses based on supposed probability density functions for the characteristic parameters of the RP2 system. The probabilities are calculated by MONTE CARLO simulation coupled to the CATHARE thermalhydraulic code. The yearly frequency of the severe core damage is evaluated for each accident sequence. This analysis has identified the influence of the passive system RP2 and propose a re-dimensioning of the RP2 system in order to satisfy the safety probabilistic objectives for reactor core severe damage. (authors)

  7. Level 1 and 2 PSA methodology taking into account new design, operating and safety factors. Rev. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jirsa, P.; Patrik, M.

    2000-11-01

    The status of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is discussed (i) in relation to the expected nature of 'revolutionary' innovations and (ii) in the light of the EUR document, summarizing requirements put by European NPP operators on the future NPP design. The aims included: (1) analysis of limitations to the current PSA methodology; (2) specification of physical and operation processes the knowledge of which is necessary to ensure the safety criteria of advanced reactors; (3) summarisation of existing knowledge and description formats of the processes; (4) identification of theoretical and experimental work required to address the problem, preparation of data and computer codes, ensuring traceability to EU developmental programs. (P.A.)

  8. PSA LEVEL 3 DAN IMPLEMENTASINYA PADA KAJIAN KESELAMATAN PWR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pande Made Udiyani

    2015-03-01

    series of calculations performed are: calculate the source terms of the core damaged, modeling of meteorological conditions and environmental site, exposure pathway modeling, analysis of radionuclide dispersion and transport phenomena in the environment, radionuclide deposition analysis, analysis of radiation dose, protection & mitigation analysis, and risk analysis. The assessment uses a series of subsystems on PC Cosyma software. The results prove that the safety assessment using Level 3 PSA methodology is very effective and comprehensive estimate the impact, consenquences, risks, nuclear emergency preparedness, and the reactor accident management especially for severe accidents or beyond design basis accidents of nuclear power plants. The results of the assessment can be used as a feedback to safety assessment of Level 1 PSA and Level 2 PSA. Keywords: Level 3 PSA, accident, PWR

  9. Case study on the use of PSA methods: Determining safety importance of systems and components at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    This case study emphasizes the step of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) regarding identification of systems and components important to nuclear plant safety. An importance analysis involves combining information that is both qualitative and probabilistic in nature to generate a numerical ranking to determine the system and/or component failures that dominate the risk. Such a ranking can suggest where hardware, software, human factors and component design changes can be implemented to improve plant safety. Examples of using ranking methodology are described. A qualitative ranking criteria is discussed for components and systems that are not included in a PSA. 18 refs, 7 figs, 18 tabs

  10. PSA Update Procedures, an Ultimate Need for Living PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hegedus, D.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear facilities by their complex nature, change with time. These changes can be both physical (plant modification, etc.), operational (enhanced procedures, etc.) and organizational. In addition, there are also changes in our understanding of the plant, due to operational experience, data collection, technology enhancements, etc. Therefore, it is imperative that PSA model must be frequently up-dated or modified to reflect these changes. Over the last ten years. these has been a remarkable growth of the use of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs). The most rapidly growing area of the PSA Applications is their use to support operational decision-making. Many of these applications are characterized by the potential for not only improving the safety level but also for providing guidance on the optimal use of resources and reducing regulatory burden. To enable a wider use of the PSA model as a tool for safety activities it is essential to maintain the model in a controlled state. Moreover, to fulfill requirements for L iving PSA , the PSA model has to be constantly updated and/or monitored to reflect the current plant configuration. It should be noted that the PSA model should not only represent the plant design but should also represent the operational and emergency procedures. To keep the PSA model up-to-date several issues should be clearly defined including: - Responsibility should be divided among the PSA group, - Procedures for implementing changes should be established, and - QA requirements/program should be established to assure documentation and reporting. (author)

  11. Workshop on PSA for New and Advanced Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This workshop was organized by the NEA Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK). The key objective of the workshop was to share the current state-of-the art on the PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) applied for new reactors and advanced reactors. Fifty experts from 13 countries and one international organization (IAEA) participated in the present workshop, and 35 technical papers were presented. The main topics of interest, discussed during the workshop, included the followings: regulatory aspects, risk-informed methods, technical aspects of the PSA for new and advanced reactors, hazards of PSA (internal and external), severe accident/source term/Level 2 PSA, and consequence analysis/Level 3 PSA. Among the technical aspects of the PSA, the assessment of the reliability of passive safety systems appears to be a recurrent issue

  12. PSA in operator training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nos, V.; Faig, J.; Plesa, P.; Delgado, J. L.

    2000-01-01

    The systematic approach to training is internationally accepted as the best method to achieve and maintain the qualification and competence of power plant personnel and to guarantee the quality of their training. Following the recommendations and guidelines of international organisations competent in the field, TECNATOM SA has developed projects based on the systematic approach to training for all Spanish nuclear power plants. One of the latest projects was the systematic approach to training developed for the operation personnel of ASCO Nuclear Power Plant. In this case, certain results of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) which complement the systematic safety and reliability criteria of the systematic approach to training process have been incorporated in the traditional processes of work and task analysis and training plan design. This incorporation provides the training manager with additional criteria based not only on safety aspects obtained through the statistical treatment of considerations of skilled technical personnel (operators, operation chief supervisors, etc), but also on the independent criterion of the PSA. The inclusion of this approach basically affects all systematics in two of its stages: During the selection process of operating practices in SMR or SGI, the possible scenarios have been associated with all those situations where human actions which lead to an initiating event or human actions to mitigate an initiating event, may take place, as defined in the PSA. During the scenario development process, the instruments involved in the performance of human actions which originate or mitigate an event taking place have been identified. This pakes it possible to reconcile the scenario event sequence with the sequence considered in the PSA study, as the most likely to provoke a more serious accident. The incorporation of these PSA results contributes to the strengthening of safety aspects in training in an objective way, and confirms that

  13. Safety and efficacy of procedural sedation and analgesia (PSA ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Safety and efficacy of procedural sedation and analgesia (PSA) conducted by medical officers in a level 1 hospital in Cape Town. ... Respiratory complications were treated with simple airway manoeuvres; no patient required intubation or experienced respiratory problems after waking up. There was no significant difference ...

  14. PSA application on the Tokai Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishida, Michihiko; Nakano, Takafumi; Morimoto, Kazuyuki; Nojiri, Ichiro

    2003-01-01

    The Periodic Safety Review (PSR) of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) has been carrying out to obtain an overall view of actual plant safety. As a part of the PSR, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methodology has been applied to evaluate the relative importance of safety functions that prevent the progress of events causing to postulated accidents. Based on the results of the safety reassessments of the TRP that was carried out in 1999, event trees were developed to model sequences of postulated accidents. Event trees were quantified by using the results of fault tree analysis and human reliability analysis. In the quantification, the reliability data generally used in PSA of nuclear power plants were mainly used. Operating experiences of the TRP were also utilized to evaluated both component/system reliability and human reliability. The relative importance of safety functions was evaluated by using two major importance measures, Fussell-Vesely and Risk Achievement Worth both generally used in PSA of nuclear power plants. Through these evaluations, some useful insights into the safety of the TRP have been obtained. The results of the relative importance measures would be utilized to qualify TRP component/equipment important to the safety. (author)

  15. Improving PSA quality of KSNP PSA model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Joon Eon; Ha, Jae Joo

    2004-01-01

    In the RIR (Risk-informed Regulation), PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) plays a major role because it provides overall risk insights for the regulatory body and utility. Therefore, the scope, the level of details and the technical adequacy of PSA, i.e. the quality of PSA is to be ensured for the successful RIR. To improve the quality of Korean PSA, we evaluate the quality of the KSNP (Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant) internal full-power PSA model based on the 'ASME PRA Standard' and the 'NEI PRA Peer Review Process Guidance.' As a working group, PSA experts of the regulatory body and industry also participated in the evaluation process. It is finally judged that the overall quality of the KSNP PSA is between the ASME Standard Capability Category I and II. We also derive some items to be improved for upgrading the quality of the PSA up to the ASME Standard Capability Category II. In this paper, we show the result of quality evaluation, and the activities to improve the quality of the KSNP PSA model

  16. Support analysis for safety analysis development for CANDU nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bedreaga, L.; Florescu, Gh.; Apostol, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2004-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment analysis (PSA) is a technique used to assess the safety of a nuclear power plant. Assessments of the nuclear plant systems/components from safety point of view consist in accomplishment of a lot of support analyses that are the base for the main analysis, in order to evaluate the impact of occurrences of abnormal states for these systems. Evaluation of initiating events frequency and components failure rate is based on underlying probabilistic theory and mathematic statistics. Some of these analyses are detailed analyses and are known very well in PSA. There are also some analyses, named support analyses for PSA, which are very important but less applicable because they involve a huge human effort and hardware facilities to accomplish. The usual methods applicable in PSA such as input data extracted from the specific documentation (operation procedures, testing procedures, maintenance procedures and so on) or conservative evaluation provide a high level of uncertainty for both input and output data. The paper describes support analysis required to improve the certainty level in evaluation of reliability parameters and also in the final results (either risk, reliability or safety assessment). (author)

  17. Methodology - PSA Regulatory handbook. Comparisons to a modern PSA study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bostroem, Urban; Jung, Gunnar; Flodin, Yngve

    2003-03-01

    The regulatory handbook is applicable to all types of initiating events and all operating conditions. It should be noted that it does not make the traditional subdivision of PSA into internal and external events, level 1 and level 2 PSA, or power operation and shut-down. The reason for this is that this has given the regulatory handbook a more logical structure, and that this approach underlines the integrated character of PSA when it comes to creating the plan risk profile. The regulatory handbook has been structured following the requirements on a PSA for a nuclear power plant, as this is the most demanding application. However, it is applicable also to the analysis of other nuclear installations. The purpose of the comparative review presented in this report has been to, as part of a quality review establish the PSA Handbook, compare (parts of) the handbook and its criteria with a recent PSA analysis, and to identify major discrepancies. Considerable weight has also been allocated to a review of the plant model (Risk Spectrum event trees and fault trees). The results presented in the report are not based on a complete review of the PSA in question (or of the complete PSA Handbook). Following discussions between the SKI and SwedPower, and based on the experience of the SwedPower reviewers, the following issues were chosen to be the main parts of the project: 1) General comparison according to content and transparency - Levels of ambition in PSA Handbook, PSA method description and actual PSA report. 2) Detailed comparison of: Selected component failure data - Assumptions regarding room events - CCI frequencies, realism, identification, categorisation - Taking credit for non-safety classified systems - Event tree modelling - Presentation of results 3) Fault tree model, specifically - Time frame for crediting of battery capacity - Modelling of regulators - Modelling of dependencies for room events - general quality, like how the paper documentation and the logic

  18. An overview-probabilistic safety analysis for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Jinlin; Peng Changhong

    2015-01-01

    For long-term application, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) has proved to be a valuable tool for improving the safety and reliability of power reactors. In China, 'Nuclear safety and radioactive pollution prevention 'Twelfth Five Year Plan' and the 2020 vision' raises clearly that: to develop probabilistic safety analysis and aging evaluation for research reactors. Comparing with the power reactors, it reveals some specific features in research reactors: lower operating power, lower coolant temperature and pressure, etc. However, the core configurations may be changed very often and human actions play an important safety role in research reactors due to its specific experimental requirement. As a result, there is a necessary to conduct the PSA analysis of research reactors. This paper discusses the special characteristics related to the structure and operation and the methods to develop the PSA of research reactors, including initiating event analysis, event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, dependent failure analysis, human reliability analysis and quantification as well as the experimental and external event evaluation through the investigation of various research reactors and their PSAs home and abroad, to provide the current situation and features of research reactors PSAs. (author)

  19. NRC regulatory uses of PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murley, T.E.

    1991-01-01

    The publication in 1975 of WASH-1400, with its new probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology, had the effect of presenting a pair of eyeglasses to a man with poor eyesight. Suddenly, it gave us a view of nuclear safety with a new clarity, and it allowed us to sort out the important safety issues from the unimportant. In the intervening years, PSA insights have permeated the fabric of nearly all our safety judgments. This acceptance can be seen from the following list of broad areas where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff uses PSA insights and methodology: evaluating the safety significance of operating events and recommending safety improvements where warranted; requesting licensees to systematically look for design vulnerabilities in each operating reactor; evaluating the safety significance of design weaknesses or non-compliances when judging the time frame for necessary improvements; conducting sensitivity analyses to judge where safety improvements are most effective; assessing the relative safety benefits of design features for future reactors. In judging where PSA methodology can be improved to give better safety insights, it is believed that the following areas need more attention: better modeling of cognitive errors; more comprehensive modeling of accident sequences initiated from conditions other than full power; more comprehensive modeling of inter-system loss of coolant accident (ISLOCA) sequences. Although PSA is widely used in the staff's regulatory activities, the NRC deliberately chooses not to include probabilistic prescriptions in regulations or guidance documents. The staff finds the bottom line risk estimates to be one of the least reliable products of a PSA. The reason for this view is that PSA cannot adequately address cognitive errors nor assess the effects of a pervasive poor safety attitude

  20. State of living PSA and further development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    In October 1985 OECD-Principal Working Group (PWG 5) - Risk Assessment has initiated the Task Force 7 'Use of PSA in Nuclear Power Plant Management' to explore and report on the principles, characteristics, requirements and status of PSA oriented safety management. During this study, it became apparent that the utilisation of PSA techniques in nuclear plant safety management requires the development of supporting programmes to ensure that PSA models are being updated to reflect plant changes, and to direct their use towards the evaluation and determination of plant changes. These requirements also influence the software and hardware characteristics necessary to support the programme. This overall process is known as Living PSA. In this context OECD-PWG 5 has arranged international workshops on Living PSA application to support this development, to facilitate exchange of international experience and to summarise the state-of-the-art of L-PSA methodology. These activities were accompanied by following Task Groups of OECD-PWG 5 and the work results were published in state-of-the-art reports. According to the increasing development of Living PSA in the international field and its capacity to support plant safety management in a broad sense, OECD PWG 5 continues its work in setting up the Task Group 96-1 'State of Living PSA and Further Development' to clarify specific aspects of Living PSA. This report summarises the state of Living PSA in the international field based on the four Living PSA Workshops from 1988 to 1994 (Chapter 2) and the state of Reliability Data Collection based on the results of Task Group 12 'Reliability Data Collection and Analysis to Support PSA' and the two Data-Workshops from 1995 and 1998 (Chapter 3). The specific items of further development of Living PSA application as mentioned above are treated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 gives a summary of the current state of Living PSA as well as outlook and recommendations of further development

  1. Methodology for seismic PSA of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jirsa, P.

    1999-09-01

    A general methodology is outlined for seismic PSA (probabilistic safety assessment). The main objectives of seismic PSA include: description of the course of an event; understanding the most probable failure sequences; gaining insight into the overall probability of reactor core damage; identification of the main seismic risk contributors; identification of the range of peak ground accelerations contributing significantly to the plant risk; and comparison of the seismic risk with risks from other events. The results of seismic PSA are typically compared with those of internal PSA and of PSA of other external events. If the results of internal and external PSA are available, sensitivity studies and cost benefit analyses are performed prior to any decision regarding corrective actions. If the seismic PSA involves analysis of the containment, useful information can be gained regarding potential seismic damage of the containment. (P.A.)

  2. NPP Temelin safety analysis reports and PSA status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mlady, O.

    1999-01-01

    To enhance the safety level of Temelin NPP, recommendations of the international reviews were implemented into the design as well as into organization of the plant construction and preparation for operation. The safety assessment of these design changes has been integrated and reflected in the Safety Analysis Reports, which follow the internationally accepted guidelines. All safety analyses within Safety Analysis Reports were repeated carefully considering technical improvements and replacements to complement preliminary safety documentation. These analyses were performed by advanced western computer codes to the depth and in the structure required by western standards. The Temelin NPP followed a systematic approach in the functional design of the Reactor Protection System and related safety analyses. Modifications of reactor protection system increase defense in depth and facilitate demonstrating that LOCA and radiological limits are met for non-LOCA events. The rigorous safety analysis methodology provides assurance that LOCA and radiological limits are met. Established and accepted safety analysis methodology and accepted criteria were applied to Temelin NPP meeting US NRC and Czech Republic requirements. IAEA guidelines and recommendations

  3. Implementation guidelines for seismic PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coman, Ovidiu; Samaddar, Sujit; Hibino, Kenta; )

    2014-01-01

    The presentation was devoted to development of guidelines for implementation of a seismic PSA. If successful, these guidelines can close an important gap. ASME/ANS PRA standards and the related IAEA Safety Guide (IAEA NS-G-2.13) describe capability requirements for seismic PSA in order to support risk-informed applications. However, practical guidance on how to meet these requirements is limited. Such guidelines could significantly contribute to improving risk-informed safety demonstration, safety management and decision making. Extensions of this effort to further PSA areas, particularly to PSA for other external hazards, can enhance risk-informed applications

  4. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Improvement of level 1 PSA computer code package-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Kyoo; Kim, Tae Woon; Kim, Kil Yoo; Han, Sang Hoon; Jung, Won Dae; Jang, Seung Chul; Yang, Joon Un; Choi, Yung; Sung, Tae Yong; Son, Yung Suk; Park, Won Suk; Jung, Kwang Sub; Kang Dae Il; Park, Jin Heui; Hwang, Mi Jung; Hah, Jae Joo

    1995-07-01

    This year is the third year of the Government-sponsored mid- and long-term nuclear power technology development project. The scope of this sub project titled on 'The improvement of level-1 PSA computer codes' is divided into three main activities : (1) Methodology development on the underdeveloped fields such as risk assessment technology for plant shutdown and low power situations, (2) Computer code package development for level-1 PSA, (3) Applications of new technologies to reactor safety assessment. At first, in this area of shutdown risk assessment technology development, plant outage experiences of domestic plants are reviewed and plant operating states (POS) are decided. A sample core damage frequency is estimated for over draining event in RCS low water inventory i.e. mid-loop operation. Human reliability analysis and thermal hydraulic support analysis are identified to be needed to reduce uncertainty. Two design improvement alternatives are evaluated using PSA technique for mid-loop operation situation: one is use of containment spray system as backup of shutdown cooling system and the other is installation of two independent level indication system. Procedure change is identified more preferable option to hardware modification in the core damage frequency point of view. Next, level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutest generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. 48 figs, 15 tabs, 59 refs. (Author)

  5. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Improvement of level 1 PSA computer code package-

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Chang Kyoo; Kim, Tae Woon; Kim, Kil Yoo; Han, Sang Hoon; Jung, Won Dae; Jang, Seung Chul; Yang, Joon Un; Choi, Yung; Sung, Tae Yong; Son, Yung Suk; Park, Won Suk; Jung, Kwang Sub; Kang Dae Il; Park, Jin Heui; Hwang, Mi Jung; Hah, Jae Joo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-07-01

    This year is the third year of the Government-sponsored mid- and long-term nuclear power technology development project. The scope of this sub project titled on `The improvement of level-1 PSA computer codes` is divided into three main activities : (1) Methodology development on the underdeveloped fields such as risk assessment technology for plant shutdown and low power situations, (2) Computer code package development for level-1 PSA, (3) Applications of new technologies to reactor safety assessment. At first, in this area of shutdown risk assessment technology development, plant outage experiences of domestic plants are reviewed and plant operating states (POS) are decided. A sample core damage frequency is estimated for over draining event in RCS low water inventory i.e. mid-loop operation. Human reliability analysis and thermal hydraulic support analysis are identified to be needed to reduce uncertainty. Two design improvement alternatives are evaluated using PSA technique for mid-loop operation situation: one is use of containment spray system as backup of shutdown cooling system and the other is installation of two independent level indication system. Procedure change is identified more preferable option to hardware modification in the core damage frequency point of view. Next, level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutest generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. 48 figs, 15 tabs, 59 refs. (Author).

  6. PSA effect analysis of a design modification of the auxiliary feedwater system for a Westinghouse type plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Yeon Kyoung; Lee, Eun Chan

    2012-01-01

    The auxiliary feedwater system is an important system used to mitigate most accidents considered in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The reference plant has produced electric power for about thirty years. Due to age related deterioration and lack of parts, a turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TD AFWP), some valves, and piping of the auxiliary feedwater system should be replaced. This change includes relocation of some valves, installation of valves for maintenance of the steam generator, and a new cross tie line. According to the design change, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) has been revised. Therefore, this design modification affects the PSA. It is thus necessary to assess the improvement of plant safety. In this paper, the impact of the design change of the auxiliary feedwater system on the PSA is assessed. The results demonstrate that this modification considering the plant safety decreased the total CDF

  7. Human reliability analysis in probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants. A Safety Practice. A publication within the NUSS programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is playing an increasingly important role in the safe operation of nuclear power plants throughout the world. In order to establish a consistent framework for conducting PSA studies, for promoting technology transfer of the state of the art, and for encouraging uniformity in the way PSA is carried out, the IAEA is preparing a set of publications which gives guidance on various aspects of PSA. This document presents a practical approach for incorporating human reliability analysis (HRA) into PSA. It describes the steps needed and the documentation that should be provided both to support the PSA itself and to ensure effective communication of important information arising from the studies. It also describes a framework for analysing those human actions which could affect safety and for relating such human influences to specific parts of a PSA. This Safety Practice also addresses the limitations of PSA in taking account of human factors in relation to safety and risk. Refs, figs and tabs

  8. Severe accident analysis for level 2 PSA of SMART reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jin Yong; Lee, Jeong Hun; Kim, Jong Uk; Yoo, Tae Geun; Chung, Soon Il; Kim, Min Gi [FNC Technology Co., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-12-15

    The objectives of this study are to produce data for level 2 PSA and evaluation results of severe accident by analyzing severe accident sequence of transient events, producing fault tree of containment systems and evaluating direct containment heating of the SMART. In this project, severe accident analysis results were produced for general transient, loss of feedwater, station blackout, and steam line break events, and based on the results, design safety of SMART was verified. Also, direct containment heating phenomenon of the SMART was evaluated using TCE methodology. For level 2 PSA, fault tree of the containment isolation system, reactor cavity flooding system, plant chilled water system, and reactor containment building HVAC system was produced and analyzed

  9. A Methods and procedures to apply probabilistic safety Assessment (PSA) techniques to the cobalt-therapy process. Cuban experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vilaragut Llanes, J.J.; Ferro Fernandez, R.; Lozano Lima, B; De la Fuente Puch, A.; Dumenigo Gonzalez, C.; Troncoso Fleitas, M.; Perez Reyes, Y.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents the results of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) to the Cobalt Therapy Process, which was performed as part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Coordinated Research Project (CRP) to Investigate Appropriate Methods and Procedures to Apply Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Techniques to Large Radiation Sources. The primary methodological tools used in the analysis were Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Event Trees and Fault Trees. These tools were used to evaluate occupational, public and medical exposures during cobalt therapy treatment. The emphasis of the study was on the radiological protection of patients. During the course of the PSA, several findings were analysed concerning the cobalt treatment process. In relation with the Undesired Events Probabilities, the lowest exposures probabilities correspond to the public exposures during the treatment process (Z21); around 10-10 per year, being the workers exposures (Z11); around 10-4 per year. Regarding to the patient, the Z33 probabilities prevail (not desired dose to normal tissue) and Z34 (not irradiated portion to target volume). Patient accidental exposures are also classified in terms of the extent to which the error is likely to affect individual treatments, individual patients, or all the patients treated on a specific unit. Sensitivity analyses were realised to determine the influence of certain tasks or critical stages on the results. As a conclusion the study establishes that the PSA techniques may effectively and reasonably determine the risk associated to the cobalt-therapy treatment process, though there are some weaknesses in its methodological application for this kind of study requiring further research. These weaknesses are due to the fact that the traditional PSA has been mainly applied to complex hardware systems designed to operate with a high automation level, whilst the cobalt therapy treatment is a relatively simple hardware system with a

  10. Probabilistic Safety Assessment: An Effective Tool to Support “Systemic Approach” to Nuclear Safety and Analysis of Human and Organizational Aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuzmina, I.

    2016-01-01

    The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) represents a comprehensive conceptual and analytical tool for quantitative evaluation of risk of undesirable consequences from nuclear facilities and drawing on qualitative insights for nuclear safety. PSA considers various technical, human, and organizational factors in an integral manner thus explicitly pursuing a true ‘systemic approach’ to safety and enabling holistic insights for further safety improvement. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is one of the major tasks within PSA. The poster paper provides an overview of the objectives and scope of PSA and HRA and discusses on further needs in the area of HRA. (author)

  11. Reliability analysis of software based safety functions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pulkkinen, U.

    1993-05-01

    The methods applicable in the reliability analysis of software based safety functions are described in the report. Although the safety functions also include other components, the main emphasis in the report is on the reliability analysis of software. The check list type qualitative reliability analysis methods, such as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), are described, as well as the software fault tree analysis. The safety analysis based on the Petri nets is discussed. The most essential concepts and models of quantitative software reliability analysis are described. The most common software metrics and their combined use with software reliability models are discussed. The application of software reliability models in PSA is evaluated; it is observed that the recent software reliability models do not produce the estimates needed in PSA directly. As a result from the study some recommendations and conclusions are drawn. The need of formal methods in the analysis and development of software based systems, the applicability of qualitative reliability engineering methods in connection to PSA and the need to make more precise the requirements for software based systems and their analyses in the regulatory guides should be mentioned. (orig.). (46 refs., 13 figs., 1 tab.)

  12. Blackpool: More evidence on PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cullingford, M.

    1985-01-01

    PSA is spreading widely throughout the world, with 30 IAEA Member States having active programmes in this area. The main reason for its popularity is that it offers insights critical in the safety decision-making process available from no other method. It allows power plant designers, regulators, and operators to discriminate between issues important to safety and those which are trivial. Although it is beneficial to perform a PSA to utilize the potential products available from such a study, it is especially important to realize that the PSA process itself is a valuable experience. The main points such as potential users of PSA, safety evaluations, treatment of uncertainties as well as future trends are briefly discussed in this paper

  13. Applicability of living PSA in NPP modernization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Himanen, R.

    1999-01-01

    Recently the utility Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) has modernized the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear units and increased the net electric power by 18 per cent. Level 2 PSA was performed during the modernization project and the living level 1 PSA was used to support the design of the plant modifications. The plant specific living PSA model was a powerful tool when evaluating modernization alternatives. Successive support of safety management with the PSA model requires, that both the utility and the Regulatory Body understand capability and limitations of the model in details. TVO has prepared an internal procedure that presents in detail the practices and responsibilities concerning living PSA. The procedure is based on general guidelines and requirements on probabilistic safety analysis of nuclear power plants in Finland, released by the Regulatory Body. Living PSA requires that also the procedure for the use of living PSA is living. The recently published USNRC Regulatory Guides on PSA will be taken into account in the next version of the TVO PSA procedure. The PSA Peer Review Certification Process is one way to evaluate the quality of PSA in general, but also to detect the weaknesses of the PSA. However, the Certification Process cover only limited scope of PSA omitting e.g. all other external events except internal floods. This paper gives an overview on the scope of living PSA for Olkiluoto 1 and 2, and presents some examples on the real use of PSA concerning the modernization of the plant. Definition of quantitative dependability requirements for renovated systems is possible, but on the other hand, proving of these targets is in some cases extremely difficult, because of lacking dependability data. The problems are mainly concerned in systems with of programmable logic control. (au)

  14. Sensitivity Studies on Revised PSA Model of KHNP Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Hyun-Gyo; Hwang, Seok-Won; Shin, Tae-Young

    2016-01-01

    Korea also performed safety revaluation for all nuclear power plants led by Korean regulatory and elicited 49 improvement factor for plants. One of those factors is Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) development, KHNP decided to develop Low Power and Shutdown(LPSD) Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) models and upgrade full power PSA models of all operating plants for enhancement of guideline quality. In this paper we discuss about the effectiveness of post Fukushima equipment and improvements of each plant based on the results of revised full power PSA and newly developed LPSD PSA. Through sensitivity analysis based on revised PSA models we confirmed that the facilities installed or planned to installation as follow-up measures of Fukushima accident helped to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. These results will provide various technical insights to scheduled studies which evaluate effectiveness of Fukushima post action items and develop accident management guideline. Also it will contribute to improve nuclear power plants safety

  15. Sensitivity Studies on Revised PSA Model of KHNP Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Hyun-Gyo; Hwang, Seok-Won; Shin, Tae-Young [KHNP, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Korea also performed safety revaluation for all nuclear power plants led by Korean regulatory and elicited 49 improvement factor for plants. One of those factors is Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) development, KHNP decided to develop Low Power and Shutdown(LPSD) Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) models and upgrade full power PSA models of all operating plants for enhancement of guideline quality. In this paper we discuss about the effectiveness of post Fukushima equipment and improvements of each plant based on the results of revised full power PSA and newly developed LPSD PSA. Through sensitivity analysis based on revised PSA models we confirmed that the facilities installed or planned to installation as follow-up measures of Fukushima accident helped to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. These results will provide various technical insights to scheduled studies which evaluate effectiveness of Fukushima post action items and develop accident management guideline. Also it will contribute to improve nuclear power plants safety.

  16. Operator reliability study for Probabilistic Safety Analysis of an operating research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohamed, F.; Hassan, A.; Yahaya, R.; Rahman, I.; Maskin, M.; Praktom, P.; Charlie, F.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) for Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is performed on research nuclear reactor. • Implemented qualitative HRA framework is addressed. • Human Failure Events of significant impact to the reactor safety are derived. - Abstract: A Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for the TRIGA Mark II research reactor of Malaysian Nuclear Agency has been developed to evaluate the potential risk in its operation. In conjunction to this PSA development, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed in order to determine human contribution to the risk. The aim of this study is to qualitatively analyze human actions (HAs) involved in the operation of this reactor according to the qualitative part of the HRA framework for PSA which is namely the identification, qualitative screening and modeling of HAs. By performing this framework, Human Failure Events (HFEs) of significant impact to the reactor safety are systematically analyzed and incorporated into the PSA structure. A part of the findings in this study will become the input for the subsequent quantitative part of the HRA framework, i.e. the Human Error Probability (HEP) quantification

  17. Human reliability analysis during PSA at Trillo NPP: main characteristics and analysis of diagnostic errors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barquin, M.A.; Gomez, F.

    1998-01-01

    The design difference between Trillo NPP and other Spanish nuclear power plants (basic Westinghouse and General Electric designs) were made clear in the Human Reliability Analysis of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for Trillo NPP. The object of this paper is to describe the most significant characteristics of the Human Reliability Analysis carried out in the PSA, with special emphasis on the possible diagnostic errors and their consequences, based on the characteristics in the Emergency Operations Manual for Trillo NPP. - In the case of human errors before the initiating event (type 1), the existence of four redundancies in most of the plant safety systems, means that the impact of this type or error on the final results of the PSA is insignificant. However, in the case common cause errors, especially in certain calibration errors, some actions are significant in the final equation for core damage - The number of human actions that the operator has to carry out during the accidents (type 3) modelled, is relatively small in comparison with this value in other PSAs. This is basically due to the high level of automation at Rillo NPP - The Plant Operations Manual cannot be strictly considered to be a symptoms-based procedure. The operation Group must select the chapter from the Operations Manual to be followed, after having diagnosed the perturbing event, using for this purpose and Emergency and Anomaly Decision Tree (M.O.3.0.1) based on the different indications, alarms and symptoms present in the plant after the perturbing event. For this reason, it was decided to analyse the possible diagnosis errors. In the bibliography on diagnosis and commission errors available at the present time, there is no precise methodology for the analysis of this type of error and its incorporation into PSAs. The method used in the PSA for Trillo y NPP to evaluate this type of interaction, is to develop a Diagnosis Error Table, the object of which is to identify the situations in

  18. ASAMPSA-E guidance for level 2 PSA Volume 2. Implementing external Events modelling in Level 2 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cazzoli, E.; Vitazkova, J.; Loeffler, H.; Burgazzi, L.

    2016-01-01

    The objective of the present document is to provide guidance on the implementation of external events into an 'extended' L2 PSA. It has to be noted that L2 PSA addresses issues beginning with fuel degradation and ending with the release of radionuclides into the environment. Therefore, the present document may touch upon, but does not evaluate explicitly issues that involve events or phenomena which occur before the fuel begins to degrade. Following the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the nuclear safety community has realized that much attention should be given to the areas of operator interventions and accidents that may develop at the same time in more than one unit if they are initiated by one or more common external events. For this reason and to fulfill the PSA end-users' wish list (as reflected by an ASAMPSA-E survey), the attention is mostly focused on interface between L1 and L2 PSA, fragility analysis, human response analysis and some consideration is given to L2 PSA modeling of severe accidents for multiple unit sites, even though it is premature to provide extensive guidance in this area. The following recommendations, mentioned in various sections within this document, are summarized here: 1. Vulnerability/fragility analyses should be performed with respect to all external hazards and all structures, systems and components potentially affected that could be relevant to L2 PSA, 2. Importance should be given to the assessment of human performance following extreme external events; for extreme circumstances with high stress level, low confidence is justified for SAM human interventions and for such conditions, human interventions could be analyzed as sensitivity cases only in L2 PSA, 3. Results presentation should include assessment of total risk measures compared with risk targets able to assess all contributions to the risk and to judge properly the safety, 4. Total risk measures shall be associated to appropriate information on all

  19. Technical Issues and Proposes on the Legislation of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in Periodic Safety Review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Seok-Won; Jeon, Ho-Jun; Na, Jang-Hwan

    2015-01-01

    Korean Nuclear Power Plants have performed a comprehensive safety assessment reflecting design and procedure changes and using the latest technology every 10 years. In Korea, safety factors of PSR are revised to 14 by revision of IAEA Safety Guidelines in 2003. In the revised safety guidelines, safety analysis field was subdivided into deterministic safety analysis, PSA (Probabilistic safety analysis), and hazard analysis. The purpose to examine PSA as a safety factor on PSR is to make sure that PSA results and assumptions reflect the latest state of NPPs, validate the level of computer codes and analytical models, and evaluate the adequacy of PSA instructions. In addition, its purpose is to derive the plant design change, operating experience of other plants and safety enhancement items as well. In Korea, PSA is introduced as a new factor. Thus, the overall guideline development and long-term implementation strategy are needed. Today in Korea, full-power PSA model revision and low-power and shutdown (LPSD) PSA model development is being performed as a part of the post Fukushima action items for operating plants. The scope of the full-power PSA is internal/external level 1, 2 PSA. But in case of fire PSA, the scope is level 1 PSA using new method, NUREG/CR-6850. In case of LPSD PSA, level 1 PSA for all operating plants, and level 2 PSA for 2 demonstration plants are under development. The result of the LPSD PSA will be used as major input data for plant specific SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guideline). The scope of PSA currently being developed in Korea cannot fulfill 'All Mode, All Scope' requirements recommended in the IAEA Safety Guidelines. Besides the legislation of PSA, step-by-step development strategy for non-performed scopes such as level 3 PSA and new fire PSA is one of the urgent issues in Korea. This paper suggests technical issues and development strategies for each PSA technical elements.

  20. Advanced methods for a probabilistic safety analysis of fires. Development of advanced methods for performing as far as possible realistic plant specific fire risk analysis (fire PSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofer, E.; Roewekamp, M.; Tuerschmann, M.

    2003-07-01

    In the frame of the research project RS 1112 'Development of Methods for a Recent Probabilistic Safety Analysis, Particularly Level 2' funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), advanced methods, in particular for performing as far as possible realistic plant specific fire risk analyses (fire PSA), should be developed. The present Technical Report gives an overview on the methodologies developed in this context for assessing the fire hazard. In the context of developing advanced methodologies for fire PSA, a probabilistic dynamics analysis with a fire simulation code including an uncertainty and sensitivity study has been performed for an exemplary scenario of a cable fire induced by an electric cabinet inside the containment of a modern Konvoi type German nuclear power plant taking into consideration the effects of fire detection and fire extinguishing means. With the present study, it was possible for the first time to determine the probabilities of specified fire effects from a class of fire events by means of probabilistic dynamics supplemented by uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. The analysis applies a deterministic dynamics model, consisting of a dynamic fire simulation code and a model of countermeasures, considering effects of the stochastics (so-called aleatory uncertainties) as well as uncertainties in the state of knowledge (so-called epistemic uncertainties). By this means, probability assessments including uncertainties are provided to be used within the PSA. (orig.) [de

  1. Low Power Shutdown PSA for CANDU Type Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Yeon Kyoung; Kim, Myung Su [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    KHNP also have concentrated on full power PSA. Some recently constructed OPR1000 type plants and APR1400 type plants have performed the low power and shutdown (LPSD) PSA. The purpose of LPSD PSA is to identify the main contributors on the accident sequences of core damage and to find the measure of safety improvement. After the Fukushima accident, Korean regulatory agency required the shutdown severe accident management guidelines (SSAMG) development for safety enhancement. For the reliability of SSAMG, KHNP should develop the LPSD PSA. Especially, the LPSD PSA for CANDU type plant had developed for the first time in Korea. This paper illustrates how the LPSD PSA for CANDU type developed and the core damage frequency (CDF) is different with that of full power PSA. KHNP performed LPSD PSA to develop the SSAMG after the Fukushima accidents. The results show that risk at the specific operation mode during outage is higher than that of full power operation. Also, the results indicated that recovery failure of class 4 power at the POS 5A, 5B contribute dominantly to the total CDF from importances analysis. LPSD PSA results such as CDF with initiating events and POSs, risk results with plant damage state, and containment failure probability and frequency with POSs can be used by inputs for developing the SSAMG.

  2. Comment on 'The meaning of probability in probabilistic safety analysis'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yellman, Ted W.; Murray, Thomas M.

    1995-01-01

    A recent article in Reliability Engineering and System Safety argues that there is 'fundamental confusion over how to interpret the numbers which emerge from a Probabilistic Safety Analysis [PSA]', [Watson, S. R., The meaning of probability in probabilistic safety analysis. Reliab. Engng and System Safety, 45 (1994) 261-269.] As a standard for comparison, the author employs the 'realist' interpretation that a PSA output probability should be a 'physical property' of the installation being analyzed, 'objectively measurable' without controversy. The author finds all the other theories and philosophies discussed wanting by this standard. Ultimately, he argues that the outputs of a PSA should be considered to be no more than constructs of the computational procedure chosen - just an 'argument' or a 'framework for the debate about safety' rather than a 'representation of truth'. He even suggests that 'competing' PSA's be done - each trying to 'argue' for a different message. The commentors suggest that the position the author arrives at is an overreaction to the subjectivity which is part of any complex PSA, and that that overreaction could in fact easily lead to the belief that PSA's are meaningless. They suggest a broader interpretation, one based strictly on relative frequency--a concept which the commentors believe the author abandoned too quickly. Their interpretation does not require any 'tests' to determine whether a statement of likelihood is qualified to be a 'true' probability and it applies equally well in pure analytical models. It allows anyone's proper numerical statement of the likelihood of an event to be considered a probability. It recognizes that the quality of PSA's and their results will vary. But, unlike the author, the commentors contend that a PSA should always be a search for truth--not a vehicle for adversarial pleadings

  3. External Events PSA for the Paks NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bareith, Attila; Karsa, Zoltan; Siklossy, Tamas; Vida, Zoltan

    2014-01-01

    Initially, probabilistic safety assessment of external events was limited to the analysis of earthquakes for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant in Hungary. The level 1 seismic PSA was completed in 2002 showing a significant contribution of seismic failures to core damage risk. Although other external events of natural origin had previously been screened out from detailed plant PSA mostly on the basis of event frequencies, a review of recent experience on extreme weather phenomena made during the periodic safety review of the plant led to the initiation of PSA for external events other than earthquakes in 2009. In the meantime, the accident of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant confirmed further the importance of such an analysis. The external event PSA for the Paks plant followed the commonly known steps: selection and screening of external hazards, hazard assessment for screened-in external events, analysis of plant response and fragility, PSA model development, and risk quantification and interpretation of results. As a result of event selection and screening the following weather related external hazards were subject to detailed analysis: extreme wind, extreme rainfall (precipitation), extreme snow, extremely high and extremely low temperatures, lightning, frost and ice formation. The analysis proved to be a significant challenge due to scarcity of data, lack of knowledge, as well as limitations of existing PSA methodologies. This paper presents an overview of the external events PSA performed for the Paks NPP. Important methodological aspects are summarised. Key analysis findings and unresolved issues that need further elaboration are highlighted. Development of external events PSA for the Paks NPP was completed by the end of 2012. The analysis followed the commonly known steps: selection and screening of external hazards, hazard assessment for screened-in external events, analysis of plant response and fragility, PSA model development, and risk

  4. Human reliability analysis methods for probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pyy, P.

    2000-11-01

    Human reliability analysis (HRA) of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) includes identifying human actions from safety point of view, modelling the most important of them in PSA models, and assessing their probabilities. As manifested by many incidents and studies, human actions may have both positive and negative effect on safety and economy. Human reliability analysis is one of the areas of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) that has direct applications outside the nuclear industry. The thesis focuses upon developments in human reliability analysis methods and data. The aim is to support PSA by extending the applicability of HRA. The thesis consists of six publications and a summary. The summary includes general considerations and a discussion about human actions in the nuclear power plant (NPP) environment. A condensed discussion about the results of the attached publications is then given, including new development in methods and data. At the end of the summary part, the contribution of the publications to good practice in HRA is presented. In the publications, studies based on the collection of data on maintenance-related failures, simulator runs and expert judgement are presented in order to extend the human reliability analysis database. Furthermore, methodological frameworks are presented to perform a comprehensive HRA, including shutdown conditions, to study reliability of decision making, and to study the effects of wrong human actions. In the last publication, an interdisciplinary approach to analysing human decision making is presented. The publications also include practical applications of the presented methodological frameworks. (orig.)

  5. Development of seismic PSA methodology at JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muramatsu, K.; Ebisawa, K.; Matsumoto, K.; Oikawa, T.; Kondo, M.

    1995-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) is developing a methodology for seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants, aiming at providing a set of procedures, computer codes and data suitable for performing seismic PSA in Japan. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of JAERI's methodology and to obtain better understanding on the controlling factors of the results of seismic PSAs, a seismic PSA for a BWR is in progress. In the course of this PSA, various improvements were made on the methodology. In the area of the hazard analysis, the application of the current method to the model plant site is being carried out. In the area of response analysis, the response factor method was modified to consider the non-linear response effect of the building. As for the capacity evaluation of components, since capacity data for PSA in Japan are very scarce, capacities of selected components used in Japan were evaluated. In the systems analysis, the improvement of the SECOM2 code was made to perform importance analysis and sensitivity analysis for the effect of correlation of responses and correlation of capacities. This paper summarizes the recent progress of the seismic PSA research at JAERI with emphasis on the evaluation of component capacity and the methodology improvement of systems reliability analysis. (author)

  6. Study of possibility using LANL PSA-methodology for accident probability RBMK researches

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petrin, S.V.; Yuferev, V.Y.; Zlobin, A.M.

    1995-01-01

    The reactor facility probabilistic safety analysis methodologies are considered which are used at U.S. LANL and RF NIKIET. The methodologies are compared in order to reveal their similarity and differences, determine possibilities of using the LANL technique for RBMK type reactor safety analysis. It is found that at the PSA-1 level the methodologies practically do not differ. At LANL the PHA, HAZOP hazards analysis methods are used for more complete specification of the accounted initial event list which can be also useful at performance of PSA for RBMK. Exchange of information regarding the methodology of detection of dependent faults and consideration of human factor impact on reactor safety is reasonable. It is accepted as useful to make a comparative study result analysis for test problems or PSA fragments using various computer programs employed at NIKIET and LANL

  7. Guideline level-3 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roelofsen, P.M.; Van der Steen, J.

    1993-09-01

    For several applications of radioactive materials calculations must be executed to determine the radiation risk for the population. A guideline for the risk calculation method of two main sources: nuclear power plants, and other intended and unintended activities with radioactive materials, is given. The standards, recommendations and regulations in this report concern mainly the analysis of the radiological (external) consequences of nuclear power plant accidents, classified as level-3 PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis). Level-3 PSA falls within the scales 5-7 of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The standards, etc., focus on the risks for groups of people and the so-called maximum individual risk. In chapter two the standards and regulations are formulated for each part of level-3 PSA: the source term spectrum, atmospheric distribution and deposition, exposure to radiation doses and calculation of radiation doses, dose-response relationships, measures to reduce the effect of radiation doses, design basis accidents, and finally uncertainty analysis. In chapter four, modelled descriptions are given of the standards and regulations, which could or should be used in a calculation program in case of level-3 PSA. In chapter three the practical execution of a probabilistic consequences analysis, the collection of input data and the presentation of the results are dealt with. 2 figs., 14 tabs., 64 refs

  8. Human actions treatment in the Juragua NPP pre-operational PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferro Fernandez, R.

    1996-01-01

    The human reliability analysis is an important part of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). Because Juragua NPP PSA has been accomplished during construction stage of the plant, no specific operational procedures nor experience for human reliability analysis task taking into account the worlds current methodologies in this field and the actual situation of the plant. This papers describes the approach we followed

  9. Probabilistic safety analysis for control rod drive system of ET-RR-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nasr, M.; Nasser, O.

    1988-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) co-ordinated a Research programme on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for research reactors; with the participation of several countries. In the framework of this project (Project Int. 9/063) the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority decided to perform a PSA study on the ET-RR-1 (Egypt Thermal Research Reactor). The study is conducted in collaboration between the nuclear regulatory and safety centre (NRSC) and the reactor department of the nuclear research centre at Inchass. The present work is a part of the PSA study on ET-RR- it is concerning a probabilistic safety analysis of the control rod drive mechanism

  10. Improved methods for dependent failure analysis in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, G.M.; Games, A.M.

    1988-01-01

    The basic design principle used in ensuring the safe operation of nuclear power plant is defence in depth. This normally takes the form of redundant equipment and systems which provide protection even if a number of equipment failures occur. Such redundancy is particularly effective in ensuring that multiple, independent equipment failures with the potential for jeopardising reactor safety will be rare events. However the achievement of high reliability has served to highlight the potentially dominant role of multiple, dependent failures of equipment and systems. Analysis of reactor operating experience has shown that dependent failure events are the major contributors to safety system failures and reactor incidents and accidents. In parallel PSA studies have shown that the results of a safety analysis are sensitive to assumptions made about the dependent failure (CCF) probability for safety systems. Thus a Westinghouse Analysis showed that increasing system dependent failure probabilities by a factor of 5 led to a factor 4 increase in core. This paper particularly refers to the engineering concepts underlying dependent failure assessment touching briefly on aspects of data. It is specifically not the intent of our work to develop a new mathematical model of CCF but to aid the use of existing models

  11. The analysis of pressurizer safety valve stuck open accident for low power and shutdown PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lim, Ho Gon; Park, Jin Hee; Jang, Seong Chul; Kim, Tae Woon

    2005-01-01

    The PSV (Pressurizer Safety Valve) popping test carried out practically in the early phase of a refueling outage has a little possibility of triggering a test-induced LOCA due to a PSV not fully closed or stuck open. According to a KSNP (Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant) low power and shutdown PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment), the failure of a HPSI (High Pressure Safety Injection) following a PSV stuck open was identified as a dominant accident sequence with a significant contribution to low power and shutdown risks. In this study, we aim to investigate the consequences of the NPP for the various accident sequences following the PSV stuck open as an initiating event through the thermal-hydraulic system code calculations. Also, we search the accident mitigation method for the sequence of HPSI failure, then, the applicability of the method is verified by the simulations using T/H system code.

  12. Qualitative uncertainty analysis in probabilistic safety assessment context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apostol, M.; Constantin, M; Turcu, I.

    2007-01-01

    In Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) context, an uncertainty analysis is performed either to estimate the uncertainty in the final results (the risk to public health and safety) or to estimate the uncertainty in some intermediate quantities (the core damage frequency, the radionuclide release frequency or fatality frequency). The identification and evaluation of uncertainty are important tasks because they afford credit to the results and help in the decision-making process. Uncertainty analysis can be performed qualitatively or quantitatively. This paper performs a preliminary qualitative uncertainty analysis, by identification of major uncertainty in PSA level 1- level 2 interface and in the other two major procedural steps of a level 2 PSA i.e. the analysis of accident progression and of the containment and analysis of source term for severe accidents. One should mention that a level 2 PSA for a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) involves the evaluation and quantification of the mechanisms, amount and probabilities of subsequent radioactive material releases from the containment. According to NUREG 1150, an important task in source term analysis is fission products transport analysis. The uncertainties related to the isotopes distribution in CANDU NPP primary circuit and isotopes' masses transferred in the containment, using SOPHAEROS module from ASTEC computer code will be also presented. (authors)

  13. Safety evaluation by living probabilistic safety assessment. Procedures and applications for planning of operational activities and analysis of operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johanson, Gunnar; Holmberg, J.

    1994-01-01

    Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a daily safety management system and it is based on a plant-specific PSA and supporting information systems. In the living use of PSA, plant status knowledge is used to represent actual plant safety status in monitoring or follow-up perspective. The PSA model must be able to express the risk at a given time and plant configuration. The process, to update the PSA model to represent the current or planned configuration and to use the model to evaluate and direct the changes in the configuration, is called living PSA programme. The main purposes to develop and increase the usefulness of living PSA are: Long term safety planning: To continue the risk assessment process started with the basic PSA by extending and improving the basic models and data to provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of changes in plant design and procedures. Risk planning of operational activities: To support the operational management by providing means for searching optimal operational maintenance and testing strategies from the safety point of view. The results provide support for risk decision making in the short term or in a planning mode. The operational limits and conditions given by technical specifications can be analyzed by evaluating the risk effects of alternative requirements in order to balance the requirements with respect to operational flexibility and plant economy. Risk analysis of operating experience: To provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of incidents and plant status changes. The analyses are used to: identify possible high risk situations, rank the occurred events from safety point of view, and get feedback from operational events for the identification of risk contributors. This report describes the methods, models and applications required to continue the process towards a living use of PSA. 19 tabs, 20 figs

  14. Modelling and data prerequisites for specific applications of PSA in the management of nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-04-01

    The IAEA has a programme which supports the performance and use of probabilistic safety assessments (PSAS) to improve nuclear safety internationally. The assistance offered in this areas by the IAEA to Member States has traditionally focused on planning, performance and peer review of PSAs. PSA activities within the IAEA's programme in the area of applications are presently being expanded. The various applications of PSAs require that PSAs being developed have certain characteristics in terms of their scope, the degree of details in the modelling, the flexibility in performing desired calculations, the quality and type of the data used, and the assumptions made in treating safety significant aspects. In many cases, existing PSAs or PSAs being completed can be extended to fulfill the requirements for uses in many applications to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. This report provides information on how to carry such extensions by matching PSA characteristics to various applications that are being considered. This report was prepared by consultants together with the IAEA following the recommendations of a Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Requirements for Use in Safety Management, held by the IAEA in co-operation with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in Stockholm, Sweden, 16-20 September 1991. 42 refs, 1 tab

  15. Core melt progression and consequence analysis methodology development in support of the Savannah River Reactor PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Kula, K.R.; Sharp, D.A.; Amos, C.N.; Wagner, K.C.; Bradley, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    A three-level Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of production reactor operation has been underway since 1985 at the US Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). The goals of this analysis are to: Analyze existing margins of safety provided by the heavy-water reactor (HWR) design challenged by postulated severe accidents; Compare measures of risk to the general public and onsite workers to guideline values, as well as to those posed by commercial reactor operation; and Develop the methodology and database necessary to prioritize improvements to engineering safety systems and components, operator training, and engineering projects that contribute significantly to improving plant safety. PSA technical staff from the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) have performed the assessment despite two obstacles: A variable baseline plant configuration and power level; and a lack of technically applicable code methodology to model the SRS reactor conditions. This paper discusses the detailed effort necessary to modify the requisite codes before accident analysis insights for the risk assessment were obtained

  16. Attributes of Full Scope Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Applications in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-10-01

    This publication supersedes IAEA-TECDOC-1511, Determining the Quality of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Applications in Nuclear Power Plants (published in 2006), which provided detailed information on technical features of a restricted scope PSA aimed at analysing only internal initiating events caused by random component failures and human errors, and accident sequences that may lead to reactor core damage during operation. The present publication extends the scope of the PSA to cover a broader range of internal and external hazards, and low power and shutdown modes of nuclear power plant operation. In addition, some PSA aspects relevant to lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant are also considered

  17. PSA Model Improvement Using Maintenance Rule Function Mapping

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Mi Ro [KHNP-CRI, Nuclear Safety Laboratory, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The Maintenance Rule (MR) program, in nature, is a performance-based program. Therefore, the risk information derived from the Probabilistic Safety Assessment model is introduced into the MR program during the Safety Significance determination and Performance Criteria selection processes. However, this process also facilitates the determination of the vulnerabilities in currently utilized PSA models and offers means of improving them. To find vulnerabilities in an existing PSA model, an initial review determines whether the safety-related MR functions are included in the PSA model. Because safety-related MR functions are related to accident prevention and mitigation, it is generally necessary for them to be included in the PSA model. In the process of determining the safety significance of each functions, quantitative risk importance levels are determined through a process known as PSA model basic event mapping to MR functions. During this process, it is common for some inadequate and overlooked models to be uncovered. In this paper, the PSA model and the MR program of Wolsong Unit 1 were used as references

  18. Risk analysis by flooding in the PSA of Asco Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faig, J.

    1993-01-01

    The scope of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis of the ASCO Nuclear Power Plant included the analysis and evaluation of the probability of situations with core damage because of flood originated by internal sources of the installation. A short description of the systematic and methodology used for the analysis and the results obtained are given. The impact of some improvements introduced on the core damage frequency within the PSA are described as well. Our methodology followed basically the guidelines of NUREG/CR-2815. Analysis procedure was developed according two major steps: Selective Analysis and Detailed Analysis

  19. Methodology for the application of probabilistic safety assessment techniques (PSA) to the cobalt-therapy units in Cuba

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vilaragut Llanes, J.J.; Ferro Fernandez, R.; Troncoso Fleitas, M.; Lozano Lima, B.; Fuente Puch, A. de la; Perez Reyes, Y.; Dumenigo Gonzalez, C.

    2001-01-01

    The applications of PSA techniques in the nuclear power plants during the last two decades and the positive results obtained for decision making in relation with safety, as a complement to deterministic methods, have increased their use in the rest of the nuclear applications. At present a large set of documents from international institutions can be found summarizing the investigations carried out in this field and promoting their use in radioactive facilities. Although still without a mandatory character, the new regulations on radiological safety also promote the complete or partial application of the PSA techniques in the safety assessment of the radiological practices. Also the IAEA, through various programs in which Cuba has been inserted, is taking a group of actions so that the nuclear community will encourage the application of the probabilistic risk methods for the evaluations and decision making with respect to safety. However, the fact that in no radioactive installation has a complete PSA study been carried out, makes that certain methodological aspects require to be improved and modified for the application of these techniques. This work presents the main elements for the use of PSA in the evaluation of the safety of cobalt-therapy units in Cuba. Also presented, as part of the results of the first stage of the Study, are the Guidelines that are being applied in a Research Contract with the Agency by the authors themselves, who belong to the CNSN, together with other specialists from the Cuban Ministry of Public Health. (author) [es

  20. Development of PSA audit guideline and regulatory PSA model for SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Namchul; Lee, Chang-Ju; Kim, I.S.

    2012-01-01

    SMART is under development for dual purposes of power generation and seawater desalination in Korea. It is an integral reactor type with a thermal power output of 330 MW and employs advanced design features such as a passive system for the removal of residual heat and also the setting of all the components of the primary system inside the reactor pressure vessel. It is essential to develop new probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) validation guidance for SMART. For the purpose of regulatory verification to the risk level of SMART, the insights and key issues on the PSA are identified with referring some worldwide safety guides as well as its design characteristics. Regulatory PSA model under the development for the design confirmation and its preliminary result are also described. (authors)

  1. PSA in America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linn, M.A.; Cunningham, M.A.; Johnson, D.H.

    1996-01-01

    Although the concept of acceptable risk has always been the foundation of the nuclear industry design, the use of formal PSA (or PRA-probabilistic risk assessment) in the U.S. nuclear power industry has followed an unusual path in arriving at its current level of notability. Prior to 1975, probabilistic evaluations were limited to a few specific applications such as the evaluation of man-made (i.e., airplane crashes) and natural (i.e., earthquakes) hazards. In 1975, the industry was introduced to comprehensive PSA by the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). However, the study languished in relative obscurity until the accident at Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) in 1979. This event significantly altered the industry's view of severe accidents in the U.S. and worldwide. Investigative committees of TMI-2 recommended that PSA techniques be more widely used to augment the traditional deterministic methods of determining nuclear plant safety. This initiated an unprecedented effort by nuclear regulators and licensees worldwide to significantly improve the state of knowledge of severe accidents at nuclear power plants. In the U.S., use of PSA began to increase as evidenced by its application in the anticipated transient without scram and station blackout rulemakings, generic issue prioritization and resolution, risk-based inspection guidelines, backfit policy, and technical specification improvements. However, broad application of probabilistic techniques to the industry as a whole was initiated in 1986 with the publication of Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plant; Policy Statement. This put PSA front and center in the U.S. regulatory arena by open-quotes establish[ing] goals that broadly define an acceptable level of radiological risk that might be imposed on the public as a result of nuclear power plant operation.close quotes Both qualitative safety goals and quantitative objectives were articulated in this policy statement

  2. Main factors determining the KNP units 5 and 6 safety level according to the PSA level 1 result

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manchev, B.; Marinova, B.; Nenkova, B.

    2004-01-01

    The Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is a powerful tool for ascertainment of the safety level reached at nuclear power plants operation. The results of PSA determine very clearly the functions, systems, equipment or operator actions that have to be improved in order to increase the plant safety level as a whole. The present report presents the main results of the last upgraded revision of PSA level 1 of units 5 and 6 of KNPP. The objective of the report is to lay emphasis on the factors determining the result obtained, i.e. to demonstrate the scopes whose improvement leads to an increase of the safety level reached at the units power operation. In the frame of the study presented the following categories of initiating events are included: Internal initiating events; Initiating events result of internal fires; Initiating events result of seismic action; Floods. Only the reactor core is considered as a source of radioactive contamination. Only initiating events related to the reactor work on power are analyzed. Unit 5 of KNPP is accepted as a basic unit for the study. All modifications and design changes implemented up to year 2000 are taken into account. The results of PSA level 1 for units 5 and 6 of KNPP covering the risk of internal initiators are presented. The assessment of the core damage due to internal initiators is based on the analysis of 18 groups of initiating events. 932 consequences and two groups of initial events are identified, leading to core damage. As a result of the quantitative calculation, over 15000 minimal cuts for the core damage are obtained. The first 80 cuts bear over 75% of the frequency obtained, and the first 700 cuts bear over 90%. Distribution of the core damage frequency by different groups of initiators is presented in tables and diagrams. A comparison of the result obtained for the reactor core damage of KNPP units 5 and 6 with assessment obtained for similar power plants is presented. The data for different NPPs are taken

  3. Development of Integrated PSA Database and Application Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Han, Sang Hoon; Park, Jin Hee; Kim, Seung Hwan; Choi, Sun Yeong; Jung, Woo Sik; Jeong, Kwang Sub; Ha Jae Joo; Yang, Joon Eon; Min Kyung Ran; Kim, Tae Woon

    2005-04-15

    The purpose of this project is to develop 1) the reliability database framework, 2) the methodology for the reactor trip and abnormal event analysis, and 3) the prototype PSA information DB system. We already have a part of the reactor trip and component reliability data. In this study, we extend the collection of data up to 2002. We construct the pilot reliability database for common cause failure and piping failure data. A reactor trip or a component failure may have an impact on the safety of a nuclear power plant. We perform the precursor analysis for such events that occurred in the KSNP, and to develop a procedure for the precursor analysis. A risk monitor provides a mean to trace the changes in the risk following the changes in the plant configurations. We develop a methodology incorporating the model of secondary system related to the reactor trip into the risk monitor model. We develop a prototype PSA information system for the UCN 3 and 4 PSA models where information for the PSA is inputted into the system such as PSA reports, analysis reports, thermal-hydraulic analysis results, system notebooks, and so on. We develop a unique coherent BDD method to quantify a fault tree and the fastest fault tree quantification engine FTREX. We develop quantification software for a full PSA model and a one top model.

  4. PyPSA: Python for Power System Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thomas Brown

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Python for Power System Analysis (PyPSA is a free software toolbox for simulating and optimising modern electrical power systems over multiple periods. PyPSA includes models for conventional generators with unit commitment, variable renewable generation, storage units, coupling to other energy sectors, and mixed alternating and direct current networks. It is designed to be easily extensible and to scale well with large networks and long time series. In this paper the basic functionality of PyPSA is described, including the formulation of the full power flow equations and the multi-period optimisation of operation and investment with linear power flow equations. PyPSA is positioned in the existing free software landscape as a bridge between traditional power flow analysis tools for steady-state analysis and full multi-period energy system models. The functionality is demonstrated on two open datasets of the transmission system in Germany (based on SciGRID and Europe (based on GridKit.   Funding statement: This research was conducted as part of the CoNDyNet project, which is supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research under grant no. 03SF0472C. The responsibility for the contents lies solely with the authors

  5. MMOSA – A new approach of the human and organizational factor analysis in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, M.; Prisecaru, I.

    2014-01-01

    The results of many Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) studies show a very significant contribution of human errors to nuclear installations failure. This paper is intended to analyze both the human performance importance in PSA studies and the elements that influence it. Starting from Man–Machine–Organization System (MMOS) concept a new approach (MMOSA) was developed to allow an explicit incorporation of the human and organizational factor in PSA studies. This method uses old techniques from Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods (THERP, SPAR-H) and new techniques to analyze human performance. The main novelty included in MMOSA is the identification of the machine–organization interfaces (maintenance, modification and aging management plan and state of man–machine interface) and the human performance evaluation based on them. A detailed result of the Human Performance Analysis (HPA) using the MMOSA methodology can identify any serious deficiencies of human performance which can usually be corrected through the improvement of the related MMOS interfaces. - Highlights: • MMOSA allows the incorporation of the human and organizational factor in PSA. • The method uses old techniques and new techniques to analyze human performance. • The main novelty is the identification of the machine–organization interfaces. • The MMOSA methodology identifies any serious deficiencies which can be corrected

  6. Probabilistic safety analysis and interpretation thereof

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steininger, U.; Sacher, H.

    1999-01-01

    Increasing use of the instrumentation of PSA is being made in Germany for quantitative technical safety assessment, for example with regard to incidents which must be reported and forwarding of information, especially in the case of modification of nuclear plants. The Commission for Nuclear Reactor Safety recommends regular execution of PSA on a cycle period of ten years. According to the PSA guidance instructions, probabilistic analyses serve for assessing the degree of safety of the entire plant, expressed as the expectation value for the frequency of endangering conditions. The authors describe the method, action sequence and evaluation of the probabilistic safety analyses. The limits of probabilistic safety analyses arise in the practical implementation. Normally the guidance instructions for PSA are confined to the safety systems, so that in practice they are at best suitable for operational optimisation only to a limited extent. The present restriction of the analyses has a similar effect on power output operation of the plant. This seriously degrades the utilitarian value of these analyses for the plant operators. In order to further develop PSA as a supervisory and operational optimisation instrument, both authors consider it to be appropriate to bring together the specific know-how of analysts, manufacturers, plant operators and experts. (orig.) [de

  7. National Waste Repository Novi Han operational safety analysis report. Safety assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The scope of the safety assessment (SA), presented includes: waste management functions (acceptance, conditioning, storage, disposal), inventory (current and expected in the future), hazards (radiological and non-radiological) and normal and accidental modes. The stages in the development of the SA are: criteria selection, information collection, safety analysis and safety assessment documentation. After the review the facilities functions and the national and international requirements, the criteria for safety level assessment are set. As a result from the 2nd stage actual parameters of the facility, necessary for safety analysis are obtained.The methodology is selected on the base of the comparability of the results with the results of previous safety assessments and existing standards and requirements. The procedure and requirements for scenarios selection are described. A radiological hazard categorisation of the facilities is presented. Qualitative hazards and operability analysis is applied. The resulting list of events are subjected to procedure for prioritization by method of 'criticality analysis', so the estimation of the risk is given for each event. The events that fall into category of risk on the boundary of acceptability or are unacceptable are subjected to the next steps of the analysis. As a result the lists with scenarios for PSA and possible design scenarios are established. PSA logical modeling and quantitative calculations of accident sequences are presented

  8. The state of art of internal fire PSA in nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yu Xinli; Zhao Bo; Zheng Xiangyang

    2010-01-01

    The operational experiences of nuclear power plants (NPPs) show that the internal fires challenge effectively the nuclear safety of NPPs. Thus, the authorities having jurisdiction in the world have enhanced the supervision on fire safety in NPPs, asking the licensees to perform fire hazard analysis and evaluate the fire risk. This article mainly describes the state of art of internal fire probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in the world, and compares the main methods and standards for internal fire PSA. (authors)

  9. PSA Review Handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hallman, Anders; Nyman, Ralph; Knochenhauer, Michael

    2004-05-01

    The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) expresses requirements on the performance of PSAs as well as on PSA activities in general in the the regulatory document 'Regulations Concerning Safety in Certain Nuclear Facilities', SKlFS 1998:1. The follow-up of these activities is part of the inspection tasks of the SKI. In view or this, there is a need for documented guidelines on now to perform these inspections and reviews. The SKI PSA Review Handbook is intended to be a support in the SKI inspection and control of the PSA activities or the licensees. These PSA activities include both the organisation and working procedures of the licensee, the layout and contents of the PSA, and its areas of application. Using the regulation SKIFS 1998:1 as a starting point, the review handbook presents important aspects to be considered when judging whether a licensee fulfils the requirements on PSA activities, including the performance of PSA:s or PSA applications. The handbook shall also be a guidance for the review of PSA:s. However, the intention of the PSA Review Handbook is not to be a handbook for how a PSA is performed. The PSA Review Handbook is applicable to all types or initiating events and all operating conditions, and has been structured in a way, which stresses the integrated characteristics of PSA in the creation of the risk picture of a plant. The PSA Review Handbook has been based on the requirements for PSA of nuclear power plants, as this is the most extensive application. However, the relevant parts of it are also applicable when analysing other nuclear installations. The PSA Review Handbook is published as a research report as its contents are judged to be of general interest, and the SKI welcomes comments to the handbook. An update or the PSA Review Handbook may be required as experience with the use of the handbook is acquired and if general PSA requirements change

  10. The use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) based maintenance indicators to increase the availability of safety related systems in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirchsteiger, C.

    1991-04-01

    This work describes the theoretical development of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) based Performance Indicator (PI) model for a comprehensive Maintenance Efficiency Analysis (MEA) and its practical application to past operational history data of a certain nuclear power plant. Plant specific equipment history and maintenance work on data have been collected and analysed using various advanced statistical procedures (nonparametric methods, multivariate analysis in order to be able to estimate safety system related equipment and maintenance process trends. The main results of such a MEA case study are the trends in the (in)effectiveness of the performance of a selected safety system and its dominant components as well as the detection of the dominant maintenance related causes of its bad (good) equipment performance. Finally, the therefrom gained results are used to propose a new set of safety system-based and maintenance-related performance indicators, including suggestions for a corresponding plant specific maintenance data collection system. (author)

  11. Development of the Level 1 PSA Model for PGSFR Regulatory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Na, Hyun Ju; Lee, Yong Suk; Shin, Andong; Suh, Nam Duk

    2014-01-01

    SFR (sodium-cooled fast reactor) is Gen-IV nuclear energy system, which is designed for stability, sustainability and proliferation resistance. KALIMER-600 and PGSFR (Prototype Gen-IV SFR) are under development in Korea with enhanced passive safety concepts, e.g. passive reactor shutdown, passive residual heat removal, and etc. Risk analysis from a regulatory perspective is necessary for regulatory body to support the safety and licensing review of SFR. Safety issues should be identified in the early design phase in order to prevent the unexpected cost increase and the delay of PGSFR licensing schedule. In this respect, the preliminary PSA Model of KALIMER-600 had been developed for regulatory. In this study, the development of PSA Level 1 Model is presented. The important impact factors in the risk analysis for the PGSFR, such as Core Damage Frequency (CDF), have been identified and the related safety insights have been derived. The PSA level 1 model for PGSFR regulatory is developed and the risk analysis is conducted. Regarding CDF, LOISF frequency, uncertainty parameter for passive system CCF, loss of 125V DC control center bus and damper CCF are identified as the important factors. Sensitivity analyses show that the CDF would be differentiated (lowered) according to their values

  12. Managing risk in healthcare: understanding your safety culture using the Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Parker, Dianne

    2009-03-01

    To provide sufficient information about the Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) to allow healthcare professionals to assess its potential usefulness. The assessment of safety culture is an important aspect of risk management, and one in which there is increasing interest among healthcare organizations. Manchester Patient Safety Framework offers a theory-based framework for assessing safety culture, designed specifically for use in the NHS. The framework covers multiple dimensions of safety culture, and five levels of safety culture development. This allows the generation of a profile of an organization's safety culture in terms of areas of relative strength and challenge, which can be used to identify focus issues for change and improvement. Manchester Patient Safety Framework provides a useful method for engaging healthcare professionals in assessing and improving the safety culture in their organization, as part of a programme of risk management.

  13. PSA methodology development and application in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kazuo Sato; Toshiaki Tobioka; Kiyoharu Abe

    1987-01-01

    The outlines of Japanese activities on development and application of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodologies are described. First the activities on methodology development are described for system reliability analysis, operational data analysis, core melt accident analysis, environmental consequence analysis and seismic risk analysis. Then the methodoligy application examples by the regulatory side and the industry side are described. (author)

  14. Project for the completion of a probabilistic safety analysis of an industrial irradiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferro, R.; Troncoso, M.

    1995-01-01

    The probabilistic safety analysis is a very valuable instrument in safety studies of facilities with potential risk for the personnel, population and environment. One of the possible field of use of PSA techniques in the safety studies for industrial irradiation where serious accidents have occurred. For this reason a project has been undertaken to carry out the PSA in the Irradiation Plant of Research Institute of the Food Industry, which complements the safety studies of this facility

  15. Lessons learned form IRSN review of Flamanville 3 Level PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Georgescu, G.; Corenwinder, F.

    2012-01-01

    In the frame of the construction and licensing of Flamanville 3 NPP the PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment)plays an important role for the EPR Project assessment. The PSA was used for early design verification of EPR Reactor, several design improvement being defined based on these PSA insights and following the discussions with the French and German safety authorities. IRSN, as the French Safety Authority (ASN) technical support organization, performs the review of the PSA developed by the plant operator (EDF). The paper presents the main issues regarding the using of 'design PSA', identified by IRSN following the review of the internal events Level 1 PSA transmitted by EDF in the frame of the anticipated instruction of the application for operating license of the Flamanville 3 reactor. (authors)

  16. Guidance to Risk-Informed Evaluation of Technical Specifications using PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baeckstroem, Ola; Haeggstroem, Anna; Maennistoe, Ilkka

    2010-04-01

    This report presents guidance for evaluation of Technical Specification conditions with PSA. It covers quality in PSA, how to verify that the PSA model is sufficiently robust and sufficiently complete and general requirements on methods. Acceptance criteria for evaluation of changes in the TS conditions are presented. As the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has developed over the years, it has demonstrated to constitute a useful tool for evaluating many aspects of the TS from a risk point of view. and in that way making the PSAs as well as the decision tools better. This also means that it will be possible to take credit for safety system overcapacity as well as inherent safety features and strength of non-safety classed systems. However, PSA is only one of the tools that shall be used in an evaluation process of TS changes (strengthening/relaxation). PSA is an excellent tool to be used to verify the importance, and thereby possibly relaxation, of TS requirements. But, since PSA is only one tool in the evaluation, it is not sufficient in itself for defining which equipment that shall or shall not have TS requirements. The purpose of this guidance document is to provide general requirements, requirements on methods and acceptance criteria on risk-informed evaluation of TS changes based on PSA. The purpose is not to provide a single solution. As part of the review of the TS conditions this guidance specify requirements on: - Quality verification of the PSA model; - Verification that the PSA model is sufficiently robust with regard to SSCs for which requirements both are and are not defined by the TS; - Verification that the SSCs, for which TS demands are to be evaluated, are modelled in a sufficient manner; - Methods for performing the evaluation; - Which evaluation criteria that shall be used (and how that is verified to be correct); - Acceptance criteria: This guidance also briefly discusses the documentation of the analysis of the TS changes. This guidance

  17. Guidance to risk-informed evaluation of technical specifications using PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baeckstroem, O.; Haeggstroem, A.; Maennistoe, I.

    2010-10-01

    This report presents guidance for evaluation of Technical Specification conditions with PSA. It covers quality in PSA, how to verify that the PSA model is sufficiently robust and sufficiently complete and general requirements on methods. Acceptance criteria for evaluation of changes in the TS conditions are presented. As the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has developed over the years, it has demonstrated to constitute a useful tool for evaluating many aspects of the TS from a risk point of view. and in that way making the PSAs as well as the decision tools better. This also means that it will be possible to take credit for safety system overcapacity as well as inherent safety features and strength of non-safety classed systems. However, PSA is only one of the tools that shall be used in an evaluation process of TS changes (strengthening/relaxation). PSA is an excellent tool to be used to verify the importance, and thereby possibly relaxation, of TS requirements. But, since PSA is only one tool in the evaluation, it is not sufficient in itself for defining which equipment that shall or shall not have TS requirements. The purpose of this guidance document is to provide general requirements, requirements on methods and acceptance criteria on risk-informed evaluation of TS changes based on PSA. The purpose is not to provide a single solution. As part of the review of the TS conditions this guidance specify requirements on: - Quality verification of the PSA model; - Verification that the PSA model is sufficiently robust with regard to SSCs for which requirements both are and are not defined by the TS; - Verification that the SSCs, for which TS demands are to be evaluated, are modelled in a sufficient manner; - Methods for performing the evaluation; - Which evaluation criteria that shall be used (and how that is verified to be correct); - Acceptance criteria: This guidance also briefly discusses the documentation of the analysis of the TS changes. This guidance

  18. Guidance to risk-informed evaluation of technical specifications using PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baeckstroem, O.; Haeggstroem, A. (Scandpower AB, Stockholm (Sweden)); Maennistoe, I. (VTT, Helsingfors (Finland))

    2010-04-15

    This report presents guidance for evaluation of Technical Specification conditions with PSA. It covers quality in PSA, how to verify that the PSA model is sufficiently robust and sufficiently complete and general requirements on methods. Acceptance criteria for evaluation of changes in the TS conditions are presented. As the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has developed over the years, it has demonstrated to constitute a useful tool for evaluating many aspects of the TS from a risk point of view. and in that way making the PSAs as well as the decision tools better. This also means that it will be possible to take credit for safety system overcapacity as well as inherent safety features and strength of non-safety classed systems. However, PSA is only one of the tools that shall be used in an evaluation process of TS changes (strengthening/relaxation). PSA is an excellent tool to be used to verify the importance, and thereby possibly relaxation, of TS requirements. But, since PSA is only one tool in the evaluation, it is not sufficient in itself for defining which equipment that shall or shall not have TS requirements. The purpose of this guidance document is to provide general requirements, requirements on methods and acceptance criteria on risk-informed evaluation of TS changes based on PSA. The purpose is not to provide a single solution. As part of the review of the TS conditions this guidance specify requirements on: - Quality verification of the PSA model; - Verification that the PSA model is sufficiently robust with regard to SSCs for which requirements both are and are not defined by the TS; - Verification that the SSCs, for which TS demands are to be evaluated, are modelled in a sufficient manner; - Methods for performing the evaluation; - Which evaluation criteria that shall be used (and how that is verified to be correct); - Acceptance criteria: This guidance also briefly discusses the documentation of the analysis of the TS changes. This guidance

  19. Guidance to Risk-Informed Evaluation of Technical Specifications using PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baeckstroem, Ola; Haeggstroem, Anna (Scandpower AB, Stockholm (Sweden)); Maennistoe, Ilkka (VTT, Helsingfors (Finland))

    2010-04-15

    This report presents guidance for evaluation of Technical Specification conditions with PSA. It covers quality in PSA, how to verify that the PSA model is sufficiently robust and sufficiently complete and general requirements on methods. Acceptance criteria for evaluation of changes in the TS conditions are presented. As the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has developed over the years, it has demonstrated to constitute a useful tool for evaluating many aspects of the TS from a risk point of view. and in that way making the PSAs as well as the decision tools better. This also means that it will be possible to take credit for safety system overcapacity as well as inherent safety features and strength of non-safety classed systems. However, PSA is only one of the tools that shall be used in an evaluation process of TS changes (strengthening/relaxation). PSA is an excellent tool to be used to verify the importance, and thereby possibly relaxation, of TS requirements. But, since PSA is only one tool in the evaluation, it is not sufficient in itself for defining which equipment that shall or shall not have TS requirements. The purpose of this guidance document is to provide general requirements, requirements on methods and acceptance criteria on risk-informed evaluation of TS changes based on PSA. The purpose is not to provide a single solution. As part of the review of the TS conditions this guidance specify requirements on: - Quality verification of the PSA model; - Verification that the PSA model is sufficiently robust with regard to SSCs for which requirements both are and are not defined by the TS; - Verification that the SSCs, for which TS demands are to be evaluated, are modelled in a sufficient manner; - Methods for performing the evaluation; - Which evaluation criteria that shall be used (and how that is verified to be correct); - Acceptance criteria: This guidance also briefly discusses the documentation of the analysis of the TS changes. This guidance

  20. Current status of low power/shutdown PSA and accident sequence analysis for loss of RHR during mid-loop operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Kyu; Choi, Young; Kim, Tae Woon; Jin, Young Ho

    1994-07-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been applied to only full-power operation of nuclear power plant (NPP), but some events which were recently occurred could reach severe plant damage state. Thus, various countries around the world have focused their interests on the evaluation for low power/shutdown (LP/S) operation. This report covers the main stream of LP/S PSA methodology, current status of LP/S PSA practices and results, and accident sequence analysis for loss of RHR during mid-loop operation. Therefore this report would be helpful for us to practice LP/S PSA for YGN 5,6 NPP which will be built in the near future. Also the results of accident sequence analysis show that operator's mis-diagnosis and failure of recovery action would initiate core damage during LP/S operation. In summary, overall environmental improvements (equipments, procedures, Tech Spec, etc, ...) and operating support system will be very useful to reduce risk during LP/S operation. (Author) 5 figs., 9 tabs

  1. PSA-operations synergism for the advanced test reactor shutdown operations PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atkinson, S.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for shutdown operations, cask handling, and canal draining is a successful example of the importance of good PSA-operations synergism for achieving a realistic and accepted assessment of the risks and for achieving desired risk reduction and safety improvement in a best and cost-effective manner. The implementation of the agreed-upon upgrades and improvements resulted in the reductions of the estimated mean frequency for core or canal irradiated fuel uncovery events, a total reduction in risk by a factor of nearly 1000 to a very low and acceptable risk level for potentially severe events

  2. Development of regulatory guidance on safety reviews of nuclear power plants in Germany. A survey on accomplished and current PSA activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.-P.; Froehmel, T.; Goertz, R.; Rehs, B.

    2005-01-01

    The paper describes the key points of the accomplished and current regulatory activities in order to revise PSA guide and the corresponding technical documents in Germany. The regulatory German PSA guide covers the fundamental requirements concerning the performance of PSAs in the frame of comprehensive safety reviews. The technical details regarding the performance of PSA are set out in two technical documents (PSA Methods and PSA Data) that have been developed by a working group of PSA experts (FAK PSA). Based on the experiences from the first series of PSRs, international experiences and the fact that PSR is mandatory since April 2002 revisions of all guides are underway. The first guide to be updated is the PSA guide together with the corresponding technical documents. The working programme and the revision process of FAK PSA was finished at the end of 2004 and the technical documents have recently been republished. (author)

  3. Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for meeting the IAEA safety requirements in performing or managing a level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) project for a nuclear power plant; thus it complements the Safety Guide on level 1 PSA. One of the aims of this Safety Guide is to promote a standard framework, standard terms and a standard set of documents for level 2 PSAs to facilitate regulatory and external peer review of their results. It describes all elements of the level 2 PSA that need to be carried out if the starting point is a fully comprehensive level 1 PSA. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. PSA project management and organization; 3. Identification of design aspects important to severe accidents and acquisition of information; 4. Interface with level 1 PSA: Grouping of sequences; 5. Accident progression and containment analysis; 6. Source terms for severe accidents; 7. Documentation of the analysis: Presentation and interpretation of results; 8. Use and applications of the PSA; Annex I: Example of a typical schedule for a level 2 PSA; Annex II: Computer codes for simulation of severe accidents; Annex III: Sample outline of documentation for a level 2 PSA study.

  4. Experience from the comparison of two PSA-studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.; Pulkkinen, U.

    2001-03-01

    Two probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) made for nearly identical reactors units (Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3) have been compared. Two different analysis teams made the PSAs, and the analyses became quite different. The goal of the study is to identify, clarify and explain differences between PSA-studies. The purpose is to understand limitations and uncertainties in PSA, to explain reasons for differences between PSA-studies, and to give recommendations for comparison of PSA-studies and for improving the PSA-methodology. The reviews have been made by reading PSA-documentation, using the computer model and interviewing persons involved in the projects. The method and findings have been discussed within the project group. Both the PSA-project and various parts in the PSA-model have been reviewed. A major finding was that the two projects had different purpose and thus had different resources, scope and even methods in their study. The study shows that comparison of PSA results from different plants is normally not meaningful. It takes a very deep knowledge of the PSA studies to make a comparison of the results and usually one has to ensure that the compared studies have the same scope and are based on the same analysis methods. Harmonisation of the PSA-methodology is recommended in the presentation of results, presentation of methods, scope main limitation and assumption, and definitions for end states, initiating events and common cause failures. This would facilitate the comparison of the studies. Methods for validation of PSA for different application areas should be developed. The developed PSA review standards can be applied for a general validation of a study. The most important way to evaluate the real feasibility of PSA can take place only with practical applications. The PSA-documentation and models can be developed to facilitate the communication between PSA-experts and users. In any application consultation with the PSA-expert is however needed. Many

  5. Report of a consultants' meeting on insights from PSA results on the programmes for safety upgrading of WWER NPPs. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-11-01

    The objective of the meeting was to compare the insight from plant specific PSA studies with the safety upgrading programme of WWER NPPs. The PSAs were reviewed considering the scope, level and detail of PSA models and results of IAEA peer reviews. Safety improvements which are not normally included in PSAs were also considered. The review specifically considers for each plant specific PSA: the dominant initiating events and accident sequences contributing to core damage; and, the importance of systems, components and human actions to be used for prioritizing actions. 4 refs, tabs

  6. Management and organisational factors in PSA; Organisations- und Management-Faktoren in der PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balfanz, H.P. [TUEV Nord e.V., Hamburg (Germany)

    1999-04-01

    The constraints of PSA are increasingly considered with increasing application of PSA for the safety management of nuclear power plants (see US-NRC, 'Risk Informed Regulation', NRC-1). There is a vivid international discourse about the applicability of the variables of plant management and organisation in PSAs, which has lead to a great variety of research activities into this matter (see PSAM 4). This paper here summarizes the current state of progress of research work and discusses the applicability of results. The studies for comparative assessment of methodology and results were performed by the TUeV Nord under the roof of the BMU/BfS-sponsored project SR 2260, ''Further development of probabilistic methods for nuclear power plant safety assessment. (orig./CB) [German] Mit zunehmender Anwendung der PSA (Probabilistische Sicherheitsanalyse) im Sicherheitsmanagement von KKW (vergl. US-NRC, Einfuehrung des Konzepts 'Risk Informed Regulation' NRC-1) gewinnt die Beachtung der Grenzen der PSA zusaetzliche Bedeutung. International ist eine intensive Diskussion ueber die Moeglichkeiten einer Einbindung der Einflussgroesse von Organisation und Management in der PSA zu verzeichnen und wird belegt durch vielfaeltige Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten (vergl. PSAM 4). Dieser Beitrag setzt sich in erster Linie mit diesem Entwicklungsstand auseinander und diskutiert seinen Anwendungsstand fuer die PSA. Die hierzu vom TUeV Nord durchgefuehrten Arbeiten basieren auf dem BMU/BfS-Vorhaben SR 2260, 'Weiterentwicklung probabilistischer Methoden zur Sicherheitsbeurteilung von KKW'. (orig.)

  7. Design review of SPWR with PSA methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oikawa, Tetsukuni; Muramatsu, Ken; Iwamura, Takamichi; Tone, Tatsuzo; Kasahara, Takeo; Mizuno, Yoshio

    1993-01-01

    This paper presents the procedures and results of a PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) of the SPWR (System-Integrated PWR), which is being developed at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) as a medium sized innovative passive safe reactor, to assist in the design improvement of the SPWR by reviewing the design and identifying the design weaknesses. This PSA was performed in four steps: (1) identification of initiating events by the failure mode effect analysis and other methods, (2) delineation of accident sequences for three selected initiating events using accident progression flow charts and event trees, (3) quantification of event trees based on the review of past PSAs for LWRs, and (4) sensitivity analysis and interpretation of results. Qualitative and quantitative results of PSA provided very useful information for decision makings of design improvement and recommendations for further consideration in the process of detailed design

  8. Comparison and lessons learned from plant specific PSA of German NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, Hans-Peter; Berg, H.P.

    2000-01-01

    PSA are launched in frame of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) in Germany. The aims are to identify overall safety level and relative weak points. Some backfitting measures have been realized for older plants to remove relative weak points and to bring these plants to the state of the art. In this field PSA is well accepted today and is seen as a valuable tool supplementing the deterministic analysis. Main application of PSA within PSR is planned to become mandatory as part of the revision of the German Atomic Energy Act. According to the German PSA Guideline plant specific PSA level 1+ were performed for all 19 In comparison with international practice German PSA are very detailed. Otherwise they do not handle all external events, non-power states and accident management measures as discussed before. The New PSA guideline will cover these aspects and therefore analysts have to take them into account in further PSA. Moreover gathering of plant specific data is needed. The development in this field is driven by the utilities (for instance in frame of their so-called ZEDB project). Public discussion about quantitative risk of industrial hazards is quite limited in Germany and PSA results have only few impacts to this respect. Independent from this PSA for NPP is understood as a diverse tool in supporting the deterministic licensing and supervision process. Risk based decision making as well as informed regulation are just only of the beginning. State of PSA of NPP in Germany, comparison of PSA result of different NPP, German PSA guideline and state of discussion of further development and recommendation of further development of PSA of NPP are discussed in this paper in more detail. (S.Y.)

  9. Comparison and lessons learned from plant specific PSA of German NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balfanz, Hans-Peter [TUEV Nord, Hamburg (Germany); Berg, H.P.

    2000-07-01

    PSA are launched in frame of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) in Germany. The aims are to identify overall safety level and relative weak points. Some backfitting measures have been realized for older plants to remove relative weak points and to bring these plants to the state of the art. In this field PSA is well accepted today and is seen as a valuable tool supplementing the deterministic analysis. Main application of PSA within PSR is planned to become mandatory as part of the revision of the German Atomic Energy Act. According to the German PSA Guideline plant specific PSA level 1+ were performed for all 19 In comparison with international practice German PSA are very detailed. Otherwise they do not handle all external events, non-power states and accident management measures as discussed before. The New PSA guideline will cover these aspects and therefore analysts have to take them into account in further PSA. Moreover gathering of plant specific data is needed. The development in this field is driven by the utilities (for instance in frame of their so-called ZEDB project). Public discussion about quantitative risk of industrial hazards is quite limited in Germany and PSA results have only few impacts to this respect. Independent from this PSA for NPP is understood as a diverse tool in supporting the deterministic licensing and supervision process. Risk based decision making as well as informed regulation are just only of the beginning. State of PSA of NPP in Germany, comparison of PSA result of different NPP, German PSA guideline and state of discussion of further development and recommendation of further development of PSA of NPP are discussed in this paper in more detail. (S.Y.)

  10. PSA kinetics after prostate brachytherapy: PSA bounce phenomenon and its implications for PSA doubling time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciezki, Jay P.; Reddy, Chandana A.; Garcia, Jorge; Angermeier, Kenneth; Ulchaker, James; Mahadevan, Arul; Chehade, Nabil; Altman, Andrew; Klein, Eric A.

    2006-01-01

    Purpose: To analyze prostate-specific antigen (PSA) kinetics in patients treated with prostate brachytherapy (PI) with a minimum of 5 years of PSA follow-up. Methods and Materials: The records of 162 patients treated with PI for localized prostate cancer with a minimum of 5 years of PSA follow-up were reviewed. A variety of pretreatment and posttreatment variables were examined. Patients were coded as having a PSA bounce if their PSA achieved a nadir, elevated at least 0.2 ng/mL greater than that nadir, and decreased to, or below, the initial nadir. Two definitions of biochemical failure (bF) or biochemical relapse-free survival (bRFS) were used: the classic American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology consensus definition of three consecutive rises (bF3) and the nadir plus 2 ng/mL definition (bFn+2). Associations between a PSA bounce and the various pre- and posttreatment factors were assessed with logistic regression analysis, and the association between a PSA bounce and bF was examined with the log-rank test. The Mann-Whitney U test was applied to test for differences in the PSA doubling time (PSADT) and the time to a PSA rise between the PSA bounce patients and the bF patients. PSADT was calculated from the nadir to the time of the first PSA rise, because this point is known first in the clinical setting. Results: The 5-year overall bRFS rate was 87% for the bF3 definition and 96% for the bFn+2 definition. A PSA bounce was experienced by 75 patients (46.3%). Patients who experienced a PSA bounce were less likely to have a bF, regardless of the bRFS definition used (bF3: p = 0.0015; bFn+2: p = 0.0040). Among the pre- and posttreatment factors, only younger age predicted for a PSA bounce on multivariate analysis (p = 0.0018). The use of androgen deprivation had no effect on PSA bounce. No difference was found in the PSADT between patients who had a PSA bounce and those with bF. The median PSADT for those with a PSA bounce was 8.3 months vs. 10.3 months

  11. Review of updated design of SPWR with PSA methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oikawa, Tetsukuni; Muramatsu, Ken

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents the procedures and results of a PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) of the SPWR (System-Integrated PWR), which is being developed at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) as a medium sized innovative passive safe reactor, to assist in the design improvement of the SPWR at the basic or conceptual design phase by reviewing the design and identifying the design vulnerability. The first phase PSA, which was carried out in 1991, was a scoping analysis in order to understand overall plant characteristics and to search for general design weakness. After discussing the results of the first phase PSA, the SPWR designer group changed some designs of the SPWR. The second phase PSA of the SPWR was performed for the modified design in order to identify the design vulnerability as well as to grasp its overall safety level. Special items of these PSAs are as follows: (1) systematic identification of initiating events related to newly designed systems by the failure mode effect analysis (FMEA), (2) delineation of accident sequences for the internal initiating events using accident progression flow charts which is cost effective for conceptual design phase, (3) quantification of event trees based on many engineering judgement, and (4) lots of sensitivity analyses to examine applicability of data assignment. Qualitative and quantitative results of PSA provided very useful information for decision makings of design improvement and recommendations for further consideration in the process of detailed design. (author)

  12. Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis for SGTR by Using Dynamic PSA Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Han Sul; Heo, Gyun Young; Kim, Tae Wan

    2016-01-01

    In order to address this issue, this study suggests the sequence tree model to analyze accident sequence systematically. Using the sequence tree model, all possible scenarios which need a specific safety action to prevent the core damage can be identified and success conditions of safety action under complicated situation such as combined accident will be also identified. Sequence tree is branch model to divide plant condition considering the plant dynamics. Since sequence tree model can reflect the plant dynamics, arising from interaction of different accident timing and plant condition and from the interaction between the operator action, mitigation system, and the indicators for operation, sequence tree model can be used to develop the dynamic event tree model easily. Target safety action for this study is a feed-and-bleed (F and B) operation. A F and B operation directly cools down the reactor cooling system (RCS) using the primary cooling system when residual heat removal by the secondary cooling system is not available. In this study, a TLOFW accident and a TLOFW accident with LOCA were the target accidents. Based on the conventional PSA model and indicators, the sequence tree model for a TLOFW accident was developed. Based on the results of a sampling analysis and data from the conventional PSA model, the CDF caused by Sequence no. 26 can be realistically estimated. For a TLOFW accident with LOCA, second accident timings were categorized according to plant condition. Indicators were selected as branch point using the flow chart and tables, and a corresponding sequence tree model was developed. If sampling analysis is performed, practical accident sequences can be identified based on the sequence analysis. If a realistic distribution for the variables can be obtained for sampling analysis, much more realistic accident sequences can be described. Moreover, if the initiating event frequency under a combined accident can be quantified, the sequence tree model

  13. Improvement of PSA Models Using Monitoring and Prognostics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heo, Gyun Young; Chang, Yoon Suk; Kim, Hyun Dae [Kyung Hee University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-08-15

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has performed a significant role for quantitative decision-making by finding design and operational vulnerability and evaluating cost-benefit in improving such weak points. Especially, it has been widely used as the core methodology for Risk-Informed Applications (RIAs). Even though the nature of PSA seeks realistic results, there are still 'conservative' aspects. The sources for the conservatism come from the assumption of safety analysis and the estimation of failure frequency. Surveillance, Diagnosis, and Prognosis (SDP) utilizing massive database and information technology is worthwhile to be highlighted in terms of the capability of alleviating the conservatism in the conventional PSA. This paper provides enabling techniques to concretize the method to provide time- and condition-dependent risk by integrating a conventional PSA model with condition monitoring and prognostics techniques. We will discuss how to integrate the results with frequency of initiating events (IEs) and failure probability of basic events (BEs). Two illustrative examples will be introduced: how the failure probability of a passive system can be evaluated under different plant conditions and how the IE frequency for Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) can be updated in terms of operating time. We expect that the proposed PSA model can take a role of annunciator to show the variation of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) in terms of time and operational conditions.

  14. Model engineering in a modular PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Friedlhuber, Thomas

    2014-01-01

    For the purpose of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis) for complex industrial systems, often PSA models in the form of fault and event trees are developed to model the risk of unwanted situations (hazards). While the recent decades, PSA models have gained high acceptance and have been developed massively. This lead to an increase in model sizes and complexity. Today, PSA models are often difficult to understand and maintain. This manuscript presents the concept of a modular PSA. A modular PSA tries to cope with the increased complexity by the techniques of modularization and instantiation. Modularization targets to treat a model by smaller pieces (the 'modules') to regain control over models. Instantiation aims to configure a generic model to different contexts. Both try to reduce model complexity. A modular PSA proposes new functionality to manage PSA models. Current model management is rather limited and not efficient. This manuscript shows new methods to manage the evolutions (versions) and deviations (variants) of PSA models in a modular PSA. The concepts of version and variant management are presented in this thesis. In this context, a model comparison and fusion of PSA models is precised. Model comparison provides important feedback to model engineers and model fusion kind of combines the work from different model engineers (concurrent model engineering). Apart from model management, methods to understand the content of PSA models are presented. The methods focus to highlight the dependencies between modules rather than their contents. Dependencies are automatically derived from a model structure. They express relations between model objects (for example a fault tree may have dependencies to basic events). To visualize those dependencies (for example in form of a model cartography) can constitute a crucial aid to model engineers for understanding complex interrelations in PSA models. Within the scope of this thesis, a software named 'Andromeda' has been

  15. IC modelling in the IRSN EPR level 1 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delache, J.

    2012-01-01

    Today in France, an EPR (European Pressurized Water Reactor) Unit is under construction at the Flamanville site. The creation authorization was granted in April 2007 and the plant commissioning is planned for 2012. The plant operator (EDF) provided for the construction license several PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) studies. IRSN, as TSO (Technical Safety Organisation), wishes to dispose of the appropriate knowledge and tools for the independent verification of the operator studies and so developed its own model of PSA level 1. The goal is not to rebuild the plant operator PSA (with a full scope...) but to dispose of a simplified model able to clearly point out specific important issues. In the IRSN model a particular effort has recently been done on the Digital IC modelling. The IC (Instrumentation and Control) is modelled in the IRSN EPR PSA by using Fault Trees. Instead, EDF EPR PSA applies the COMPACT model to simplify the command and instrumentation logics. The IRSN model is more detailed in order to be more accurate in the global analysis of the Digital IC. For instance the communication ways between automates are considered as well as the failure of support systems. The model is still under development mainly in order to define the CCF (Common Cause Failure) which may be considered. (authors)

  16. Upgrade of internal events PSA model using the AESJ level-1 PSA standard for operating state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Teruyoshi; Yoneyama, Mitsuru; Hirokawa, Naoki; Sato, Chikahiro; Sato, Eisuke; Tomizawa, Shigeatsu

    2009-01-01

    In 2003, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) started to develop the Level-1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) standard of internal events for operating state (AESJ standard). The AESJ standard has been finished to be asked for public comment. Using the AESJ standard (draft version), the authors have upgraded the PSA model for Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) BWR-5 plant not only to reflect latest knowledge but also to ensure high quality of PSA model (not yet peer-reviewed) for the purpose of better operation and maintenance management of TEPCO BWR plants. For example, the categorization of structures, systems and components (SSCs) will be performed to improve nuclear reactor safety using information of risk importance. (author)

  17. Insights of PSA studies made for operating nuclear power stations in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laaksonen, J.; Virolainen, R.

    1991-01-01

    In 1984 the Finnish regulatory authority (STUK) required the utilities to make plant specific probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) studies for each plant. It was also strongly recommended that most of the work be made by plant personnel. This advice was well observed by both utilities. Results of level 1 PSA studies were submitted for regulatory review in June 1989. Only internal initiating events, including loss-of-offsite power and human errors, were considered at this stage. Each study took an effort of 12 to 20 man years. A thorough regulatory review, about two man years per plant, is currently underway, and will cause some changes in the initial results of the studies. The utilities are continuing their PSA work with the fire and flood analysis, and then with the analysis of risks during start-up and shutdown conditions. As soon as a level 1 PSA study has been reviewed, and a common understanding of the models and data has been reached between the utility and the STUK, this basic PSA version will be the first element of a living PSA. The second element is a user friendly PSA code that can rapidly run through the quantitative part of the study and thus easily indicate the influence of any deviation from the basic version. The third element is plant specific data collection and processing system. The living PSA for the first plant is expected to be fully operational sometime next year. The first use of the living PSA will be the safety assessment of proposed plant modifications and a systematic re-evaluation of technical specifications

  18. Development of PSA workstation KIRAP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Tae Un; Han, Sang Hoon; Kim, Kil You; Yang, Jun Eon; Jeong, Won Dae; Chang, Seung Cheol; Sung, Tae Yong; Kang, Dae Il; Park, Jin Hee; Lee, Yoon Hwan; Hwang, Mi Jeong

    1997-01-01

    Advanced Research Group of Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing the Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) workstation KIRAP from 1992. This report describes the recent development activities of PSA workstation KIRAP. The first is to develop and improve the methodologies for PSA quantification, that are the incorporation of fault tree modularization technique, the improvement of cut set generation method, the development of rule-based recovery, the development of methodology to solve a fault tree which has the logical loops and to handle a fault tree which has several initiators. These methodologies are incorporated in the PSA quantification software KIRAP-CUT. The second is to convert PSA modeling softwares for Windows, which have been used on the DOS environment since 1987. The developed softwares are the fault tree editor KWTREE, the event tree editor CONPAS, and Data manager KWDBMAN for event data and common cause failure (CCF) data. With the development of PSA workstation, it makes PSA modeling and PSA quantification and automation easier and faster. (author). 8 refs.

  19. Development of PSA workstation KIRAP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Un; Han, Sang Hoon; Kim, Kil You; Yang, Jun Eon; Jeong, Won Dae; Chang, Seung Cheol; Sung, Tae Yong; Kang, Dae Il; Park, Jin Hee; Lee, Yoon Hwan; Hwang, Mi Jeong.

    1997-01-01

    Advanced Research Group of Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing the Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) workstation KIRAP from 1992. This report describes the recent development activities of PSA workstation KIRAP. The first is to develop and improve the methodologies for PSA quantification, that are the incorporation of fault tree modularization technique, the improvement of cut set generation method, the development of rule-based recovery, the development of methodology to solve a fault tree which has the logical loops and to handle a fault tree which has several initiators. These methodologies are incorporated in the PSA quantification software KIRAP-CUT. The second is to convert PSA modeling softwares for Windows, which have been used on the DOS environment since 1987. The developed softwares are the fault tree editor KWTREE, the event tree editor CONPAS, and Data manager KWDBMAN for event data and common cause failure (CCF) data. With the development of PSA workstation, it makes PSA modeling and PSA quantification and automation easier and faster. (author). 8 refs

  20. Survey of Dynamic PSA Methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Hansul; Kim, Hyeonmin; Heo, Gyunyoung; Kim, Taewan

    2015-01-01

    Event Tree(ET)/Fault Tree(FT) are significant methodology in Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants(NPPs). ET/FT methodology has the advantage for users to be able to easily learn and model. It enables better communication between engineers engaged in the same field. However, conventional methodologies are difficult to cope with the dynamic behavior (e.g. operation mode changes or sequence-dependent failure) and integrated situation of mechanical failure and human errors. Meanwhile, new possibilities are coming for the improved PSA by virtue of the dramatic development on digital hardware, software, information technology, and data analysis.. More specifically, the computing environment has been greatly improved with being compared to the past, so we are able to conduct risk analysis with the large amount of data actually available. One method which can take the technological advantages aforementioned should be the dynamic PSA such that conventional ET/FT can have time- and condition-dependent behaviors in accident scenarios. In this paper, we investigated the various enabling techniques for the dynamic PSA. Even though its history and academic achievement was great, it seems less interesting from industrial and regulatory viewpoint. Authors expect this can contribute to better understanding of dynamic PSA in terms of algorithm, practice, and applicability. In paper, the overview for the dynamic PSA was conducted. Most of methodologies share similar concepts. Among them, DDET seems a backbone for most of methodologies since it can be applied to large problems. The common characteristics sharing the concept of DDET are as follows: • Both deterministic and stochastic approaches • Improves the identification of PSA success criteria • Helps to limit detrimental effects of sequence binning (normally adopted in PSA) • Helps to avoid defining non-optimal success criteria that may distort the risk • Framework for comprehensively considering

  1. Survey of Dynamic PSA Methodologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Hansul; Kim, Hyeonmin; Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyung Hee University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Taewan [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    Event Tree(ET)/Fault Tree(FT) are significant methodology in Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants(NPPs). ET/FT methodology has the advantage for users to be able to easily learn and model. It enables better communication between engineers engaged in the same field. However, conventional methodologies are difficult to cope with the dynamic behavior (e.g. operation mode changes or sequence-dependent failure) and integrated situation of mechanical failure and human errors. Meanwhile, new possibilities are coming for the improved PSA by virtue of the dramatic development on digital hardware, software, information technology, and data analysis.. More specifically, the computing environment has been greatly improved with being compared to the past, so we are able to conduct risk analysis with the large amount of data actually available. One method which can take the technological advantages aforementioned should be the dynamic PSA such that conventional ET/FT can have time- and condition-dependent behaviors in accident scenarios. In this paper, we investigated the various enabling techniques for the dynamic PSA. Even though its history and academic achievement was great, it seems less interesting from industrial and regulatory viewpoint. Authors expect this can contribute to better understanding of dynamic PSA in terms of algorithm, practice, and applicability. In paper, the overview for the dynamic PSA was conducted. Most of methodologies share similar concepts. Among them, DDET seems a backbone for most of methodologies since it can be applied to large problems. The common characteristics sharing the concept of DDET are as follows: • Both deterministic and stochastic approaches • Improves the identification of PSA success criteria • Helps to limit detrimental effects of sequence binning (normally adopted in PSA) • Helps to avoid defining non-optimal success criteria that may distort the risk • Framework for comprehensively considering

  2. Development of the fire PSA methodology and the fire analysis computer code system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katsunori, Ogura; Tomomichi, Ito; Tsuyoshi, Uchida; Yusuke, Kasagawa

    2009-01-01

    Fire PSA methodology has been developed and was applied to NPPs in Japan for power operation and LPSD states. CDFs of preliminary fire PSA for power operation were the higher than that of internal events. Fire propagation analysis code system (CFAST/FDS Network) was being developed and verified thru OECD-PRISME Project. Extension of the scope for LPSD state is planned to figure out the risk level. In order to figure out the fire risk level precisely, the enhancement of the methodology is planned. Verification and validation of phenomenological fire propagation analysis code (CFAST/FDS Network) in the context of Fire PSA. Enhancement of the methodology such as an application of 'Electric Circuit Analysis' in NUREG/CR-6850 and related tests in order to quantify the hot-short effect precisely. Development of seismic-induced fire PSA method being integration of existing seismic PSA and fire PSA methods is ongoing. Fire PSA will be applied to review the validity of fire prevention and mitigation measures

  3. Regulatory requirements on PSA level 2: Review, aspects and applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarcek, J.

    2003-01-01

    The general requirements concerning utility obligations, probabilistic safety criteria (CDF should not exceed 1.0E-4/reactor year and LERF should not exceed 1.0E-5/reactor year), documentation and results, living PSA requirements and major steps in level 2 PSA are presented. PSA developments in Slovakia, collection and assembly of information, plant damage states, containment performance and failure modes, severe accident progression analyses, containment failure modes and source terms as a part of performed level 2 PSA are discussed. The PSA applications in design and operation evaluation, support to plant upgrade and modifications are also described. At the end, the following conclusion is made: more extensive PSA application needs to foster the exchange of experience and communication between PSA specialists, non-PSA engineers, designers, and the regulatory body staff responsible for safety assessment, inspection and enforcement

  4. Improved Monte Carlo Method for PSA Uncertainty Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jongsoo

    2016-01-01

    The treatment of uncertainty is an important issue for regulatory decisions. Uncertainties exist from knowledge limitations. A probabilistic approach has exposed some of these limitations and provided a framework to assess their significance and assist in developing a strategy to accommodate them in the regulatory process. The uncertainty analysis (UA) is usually based on the Monte Carlo method. This paper proposes a Monte Carlo UA approach to calculate the mean risk metrics accounting for the SOKC between basic events (including CCFs) using efficient random number generators and to meet Capability Category III of the ASME/ANS PRA standard. Audit calculation is needed in PSA regulatory reviews of uncertainty analysis results submitted for licensing. The proposed Monte Carlo UA approach provides a high degree of confidence in PSA reviews. All PSA needs accounting for the SOKC between event probabilities to meet the ASME/ANS PRA standard

  5. Improved Monte Carlo Method for PSA Uncertainty Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Jongsoo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The treatment of uncertainty is an important issue for regulatory decisions. Uncertainties exist from knowledge limitations. A probabilistic approach has exposed some of these limitations and provided a framework to assess their significance and assist in developing a strategy to accommodate them in the regulatory process. The uncertainty analysis (UA) is usually based on the Monte Carlo method. This paper proposes a Monte Carlo UA approach to calculate the mean risk metrics accounting for the SOKC between basic events (including CCFs) using efficient random number generators and to meet Capability Category III of the ASME/ANS PRA standard. Audit calculation is needed in PSA regulatory reviews of uncertainty analysis results submitted for licensing. The proposed Monte Carlo UA approach provides a high degree of confidence in PSA reviews. All PSA needs accounting for the SOKC between event probabilities to meet the ASME/ANS PRA standard.

  6. Application of PSA in risk informed decision making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hari Prasad, M.; Vinod, Gopika; Saraf, R.K.; Ghosh, A.K.; Kushwaha, H.S.

    2006-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) models have been successfully employed during design evaluation to assess weak links and carry out design modifications to improve system reliability and safety. Recently, studies are directed towards applying PSA in various decision making issues concerned with plant operations and safety regulations. This necessitates development of software tools like Living PSA, Risk Monitor etc. Risk Monitor is a PC based tool developed to assess the risk, based on the actual status of systems and components. Such tools find wide application with plant personnel and regulatory authorities since they can provide solutions to various plant issues and regulatory decision making issues respectively. (author)

  7. Incorporating Level-2 PSA Feature of CONPAS into AIMS-PSA Software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Sang Hoon; Lim, Hogon; Ahn, Kwang Il

    2014-01-01

    CONPAS (CONtainment Performance Analysis System) utilizes a methodology to treat containment phenomena in detail like APET but in simple way. In mid 2000's, KAERI has developed very fast cut set generator FTREX and PC's OS (Operating system) has changed into Windows 95. Thus, KAERI has developed new Level-1 PSA software, called AIMS-PSA (Advanced Information Management System for PSA) to replace KIRAP. Recently, KAERI has been developing an integrated PSA platform, called OCEANS (On-line Consolidator and Evaluator of All mode risk for Nuclear System), for the risk assessment of all power modes and all hazards. CONPAS for Level-2 PSA was developed in 1990's using the Visual Basic 6.0 compiler which is not supported any more. It needs to be updated for the integrated PSA software framework. This paper describes a study to incorporate the features of CONPAS into AIMS-PSA. The basic idea is to follow the approach of CONPAS, but in the integrated way. Various approaches for Level-2 PSA have been used since WASH-1400. APET approach of NUREG-1150 study would be most comprehensive and complex methodology for containment event tree analysis. CONPAS is the Level-2 PSA software to utilize an approach to treat containment phenomena in detail like APET but in simple way. But, new Level-2 PSA software is required to develop more integrated PSA framework. A modified approach of CONPAS is developed and incorporated in AIMS-PSA software that can handle Level-1 and Level-2 PSA in the integrated way (from the viewpoint of event tree and fault tree). AIMS-PSA combines whole Level-2 PSA model to produce a One Top fault tree and to generate cut sets in the same way as Level-1 PSA. Quantification results of Level-2 PSA such as frequency for each STC can be calculated from the minimal cut sets

  8. Application and Use of PSA-based Event Analysis in Belgium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulsmans, M.; De Gelder, P.

    2003-01-01

    The paper describes the experiences of the Belgian nuclear regulatory body AVN with the application and the use of the PSAEA guidelines (PSA-based Event Analysis). In 2000, risk-based precursor analysis has increasingly become a part of the AVN process of feedback of operating experience, and constitutes in fact the first PSA application for the Belgian plants. The PSAEA guidelines were established by a consultant in the framework of an international project. In a first stage, AVN applied the PSAEA guidelines to two test cases in order to explore the feasibility and the interest of this type of probabilistic precursor analysis. These pilot studies demonstrated the applicability of the PSAEA method in general, and its applicability to the computer models of the Belgian state-of-the- art PSAs in particular. They revealed insights regarding the event analysis methodology, the resulting event severity and the PSA model itself. The consideration of relevant what-if questions allowed to identify - and in some cases also to quantify - several potential safety issues for improvement. The internal evaluation of PSAEA was positive and AVN decided to routinely perform several PSAEA studies per year. During 2000, PSAEA has increasingly become a part of the AVN process of feedback of operating experience. The objectives of the AVN precursor program have been clearly stated. A first pragmatic set of screening rules for operational events has been drawn up and applied. Six more operational events have been analysed in detail (initiating events as well as condition events) and resulted in a wide spectrum of event severity. In addition to the particular conclusions for each event, relevant insights have been gained regarding for instance event modelling and the interpretation of results. Particular attention has been devoted to the form of the analysis report. After an initial presentation of some key concepts, the particular context of this program and of AVN's objectives, the

  9. PSA applications: combination of probabilistic and deterministic techniques during the decision making process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morales, M.D.; Gutierrez, E.; Fuente, I.; Perez, F.

    1993-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is a complete, systematic and reproducible method to analyze the evolution of transients and accidents in a Nuclear Power Plant, so too the behaviour and importance of mitigation system in each case .This serves to evaluate the impact of any design modification or procedure (components, system, accident sequence or core damage). Under this assumption, it is possible to carry out multiple applications of PSAs that can be useful to keep or improve the Safety. The safety focusses on the study performed for the Almaraz Nuclear Power Plants in Spain. Almaraz has finished a PSA level 1 study which afterwards has been used for different applications like training, new procedures for maintenance, data acquisition and analysis, optimization of technical specifications, protocol of tests and maintenance, analysis of fires, definition of strategies to improve safety and modifications of design

  10. Perspectives of Living PSA in NPP Krsko

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vrbanic, I.; Kastelan, M.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear power plant Krsko has completed the Level 1/Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for internal initiating events and is in the process of completing the same for the external initiators. The analysis completed up to now has provided a valuable insight into a plant risk profile. In NPP Krsko there is a plan to use the PSA model as a permanent tool for the risk based applications and incorporate it into a decision making process. In order to achieve this there is a need to permanently maintain the PSA model in a manner that it reflects both the plan configuration/design at a time point and the operational experience up to the time point. All the activities aimed toward keeping the PSA model up-to-dated in this sense are usually referred to as a Living PSA (LPSA) program. NPP Krsko is in the process of defining and proceduralizing a LPSA program that would be plant specific and based on known world practices. Further, in order to be suitable for risk based applications the PSA model must be flexible in a sense that modifications to the base case model may be done easily and requantifications performed quickly as to evaluate various conditions imposed by real or hypothetical situations. NPP Krsko PSA model has been based on licensing type software. The requirements specified above dictate the transfer of the overall model to an application oriented software of newer generation with larger capabilities. The transfer becomes a part of a mentioned ongoing effort aimed at establishing LPSA model and concept. The paper present this effort and the perspectives of LPSA concept and risk based applications in NPP Krsko. (author)

  11. EOP Improvement Proposal for SGTR based on The OPR PSA Update

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jin Hee; Cho, Jae Hyun; Kim, Dong San; Yang, Joon Eon [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This updating process was also focused to enhance the PSA quality and to respect the as built and as operated conditions of target plants. For this purpose, the EOP(Emergency Operating Procedure) and AOP(Abnormal Operating Procedure) of target plant were reviewed in detail and various thermal hydraulic(T/H) analysis were also performed to analyze the realistic PSA accident sequence model. In this paper, the unreasonable point of SGTR (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) EOP based on PSA perspective was identified and the initial proposal for EOP change items from PSA insight was proposed. In this paper, the unreasonable point of SGTR EOP based on PSA perspective was identified and the EOP improvement items are proposed to enhance safety and operator's convenience for the target plant.

  12. Estimation of Internal Flooding Frequency for Screening Analysis of Flooding PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Sun Yeong; Yang, Jun Eon

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to estimate the internal frequency for the quantitative screening analysis of the flooding PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) with the appropriate data and estimation method. In the case of the existing flood PSA for domestic NPPs (Nuclear Power Plant), the screening analysis was performed firstly and then detailed analysis was performed for the area not screened out. For the quantitative screening analysis, the plant area based flood frequency by MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) method was used, while the component based flood frequency is used for the detailed analysis. The existing quantitative screening analysis for domestic NPPs have used data from all LWRs (Light Water Reactor), namely PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) and BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) for the internal flood frequency of the auxiliary building and turbine building. However, in the case of the primary auxiliary building, the applicability of the data from all LWRs needs to be examined carefully because of the significant difference in equipments between the PWR and BWR structure. NUREG/CR-5750 suggested the Bayesian update method with Jeffrey's noninformative prior to estimate the initiating event frequency for the flood. It, however, did not describe any procedure of the flood PSA. Recently, Fleming and Lydell suggested the internal flooding frequency in the unit of the plant operation year-pipe length (in meter) by pipe size of each specific system which is susceptible to the flooding such as the service water system and the circulating water system. They used the failure rate, the rupture conditional probability given the failure to estimate the internal flooding frequency, and the Bayesian update to reduce uncertainties. To perform the quantitative screening analysis with the method, it requires pipe length by each pipe size of the specific system per each divided area to change the concept of the component based frequency to the concept of the plant area

  13. Comparative evaluation of PSA-Density, percent free PSA and total PSA

    OpenAIRE

    Ströbel, Greta

    2010-01-01

    BACKGROUND The objective of this study was to evaluate the prostate specific antigen (PSA) density (PSAD) (the quotient of PSA and prostate volume) compared with the percent free PSA (%fPSA) and total PSA (tPSA) in different total PSA (tPSA) ranges from 2 ng/mL to 20 ng/mL. Possible cut-off levels depending on the tPSA should be established. METHODS In total, 1809 men with no pretreatment of the prostate were enrolled between 1996 and 2004. Total and free PSA were measured with t...

  14. Multi-Unit Initiating Event Analysis for a Single-Unit Internal Events Level 1 PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Dong San; Park, Jin Hee; Lim, Ho Gon [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 highlighted the importance of considering the risks from multi-unit accidents at a site. The ASME/ANS probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard also includes some requirements related to multi-unit aspects, one of which (IE-B5) is as follows: 'For multi-unit sites with shared systems, DO NOT SUBSUME multi-unit initiating events if they impact mitigation capability [1].' However, the existing single-unit PSA models do not explicitly consider multi-unit initiating events and hence systems shared by multiple units (e.g., alternate AC diesel generator) are fully credited for the single unit and ignores the need for the shared systems by other units at the same site [2]. This paper describes the results of the multi-unit initiating event (IE) analysis performed as a part of the at-power internal events Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for an OPR1000 single unit ('reference unit'). In this study, a multi-unit initiating event analysis for a single-unit PSA was performed, and using the results, dual-unit LOOP initiating event was added to the existing PSA model for the reference unit (OPR1000 type). Event trees were developed for dual-unit LOOP and dual-unit SBO which can be transferred from dual- unit LOOP. Moreover, CCF basic events for 5 diesel generators were modelled. In case of simultaneous SBO occurrences in both units, this study compared two different assumptions on the availability of the AAC D/G. As a result, when dual-unit LOOP initiating event was added to the existing single-unit PSA model, the total CDF increased by 1∼ 2% depending on the probability that the AAC D/G is available to a specific unit in case of simultaneous SBO in both units.

  15. Comparative Study on Atmospheric Dispersion Module of Level 3 PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kwon, Dahye; Jang, Misuk; Kang, Hyun Sik; Kim, Seoung Rae [NESS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Some regulation documents such as Regulatory Guides and NUREG publications from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have influences on domestic radiation environmental analyses. As renewal versions of NUREG-0800 and NUREG-1555 have issued lately, the assessment for Severe Accident (SA) with Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) should be added to Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Radiation Environmental Report (RER). Because these reports are the required documents for obtaining the construction permit and operating license, it is important to understand the PSA methodology and it needs to improve the site-specific input data of L3PSA codes for SA. First, our review focuses on the atmospheric dispersion and deposition related input data of L3PSA code in this paper. Then we will continue to review the improvements of other input data. Two atmospheric dispersion models, which are PAVAN developed for design basis accident and ATMOS of MACCS2 code developed for SA, were reviewed in this paper. L3PSA deals with the effects of severe accidents and basically includes the evaluation of both short- and long-term effects. Therefore, both the deposition effects and nuclide information(type, amount, and chemical characteristics of released radionuclide) would be considered as the input parameters of atmospheric dispersion model for L3PSA. Additionally, the meteorological data would be sampled randomly to meet the purpose of probabilistic method. However, the sampling method would be selected according to analysis purpose. After review, ATMOS module and its input data are suitably developed for the atmospheric dispersion analysis of L3PSA. However, ATMOS module was developed using the site-specific terrain and environment characteristics. For the domestic application, it needs to study the input data reflecting the Korean terrain and environment characteristics. It would be also continuously improved in response to the time- and site-specific changes of weather

  16. A method for using expert judgement in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pulkkinen, U.; Holmberg, J.

    1997-03-01

    The report discusses an expert judgement methodology development for applications at all levels of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The main applications are expected to be at PSA-levels 1 and 2. The method consists of several phases, including the selection and training of the experts, elicitation of experts' judgements, probabilistic modeling and combination of experts' judgements and documentation of the judgement process. The expert training and elicitation process is rather similar to that applied in the NUREG-1150 study. The combination of experts judgements is based on a Bayesian framework utilizing hierarchic models. The posterior distributions of the variables under analysis can be interpreted as a Bayesian counterpart of the combined or aggregated (consensus) distributions, and they are determined by applying Markov chain Monte-Carlo methods. The properties of the method are illustrated by some simple examples. The method is tested in a case study belonging to the benchmark exercise on the use of expert judgement in level 2 PSA, organized as a concerted action of European Commission Fourth Framework Programme on Nuclear Fission Safety. (14 refs.)

  17. Application of dynamic probabilistic safety assessment approach for accident sequence precursor analysis: Case study for steam generator tube rupture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Han Sul; Heo, Gyun Young [Kyung Hee University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Tae Wan [Incheon National University, Incheon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-03-15

    The purpose of this research is to introduce the technical standard of accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis, and to propose a case study using the dynamic-probabilistic safety assessment (D-PSA) approach. The D-PSA approach can aid in the determination of high-risk/low-frequency accident scenarios from all potential scenarios. It can also be used to investigate the dynamic interaction between the physical state and the actions of the operator in an accident situation for risk quantification. This approach lends significant potential for safety analysis. Furthermore, the D-PSA approach provides a more realistic risk assessment by minimizing assumptions used in the conventional PSA model so-called the static-PSA model, which are relatively static in comparison. We performed risk quantification of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident using the dynamic event tree (DET) methodology, which is the most widely used methodology in D-PSA. The risk quantification results of D-PSA and S-PSA are compared and evaluated. Suggestions and recommendations for using D-PSA are described in order to provide a technical perspective.

  18. Application of dynamic probabilistic safety assessment approach for accident sequence precursor analysis: Case study for steam generator tube rupture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Han Sul; Heo, Gyun Young; Kim, Tae Wan

    2017-01-01

    The purpose of this research is to introduce the technical standard of accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis, and to propose a case study using the dynamic-probabilistic safety assessment (D-PSA) approach. The D-PSA approach can aid in the determination of high-risk/low-frequency accident scenarios from all potential scenarios. It can also be used to investigate the dynamic interaction between the physical state and the actions of the operator in an accident situation for risk quantification. This approach lends significant potential for safety analysis. Furthermore, the D-PSA approach provides a more realistic risk assessment by minimizing assumptions used in the conventional PSA model so-called the static-PSA model, which are relatively static in comparison. We performed risk quantification of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident using the dynamic event tree (DET) methodology, which is the most widely used methodology in D-PSA. The risk quantification results of D-PSA and S-PSA are compared and evaluated. Suggestions and recommendations for using D-PSA are described in order to provide a technical perspective

  19. Procedure for conducting probabilistic safety assessment: level 1 full power internal event analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Won Dae; Lee, Y. H.; Hwang, M. J. [and others

    2003-07-01

    This report provides guidance on conducting a Level I PSA for internal events in NPPs, which is based on the method and procedure that was used in the PSA for the design of Korea Standard Nuclear Plants (KSNPs). Level I PSA is to delineate the accident sequences leading to core damage and to estimate their frequencies. It has been directly used for assessing and modifying the system safety and reliability as a key and base part of PSA. Also, Level I PSA provides insights into design weakness and into ways of preventing core damage, which in most cases is the precursor to accidents leading to major accidents. So Level I PSA has been used as the essential technical bases for risk-informed application in NPPs. The report consists six major procedural steps for Level I PSA; familiarization of plant, initiating event analysis, event tree analysis, system fault tree analysis, reliability data analysis, and accident sequence quantification. The report is intended to assist technical persons performing Level I PSA for NPPs. A particular aim is to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for PSAs. On the other hand, this report would be useful for the managers or regulatory persons related to risk-informed regulation, and also for conducting PSA for other industries.

  20. Current activities and future trends in reliability analysis and probabilistic safety assessment in Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollo, E.; Toth, J.

    1986-01-01

    In Hungary reliability analysis (RA) and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants was initiated 3 years ago. First, computer codes for automatic fault tree analysis (CAT, PREP) and numerical evaluation (REMO, KITT1,2) were adapted. Two main case studies - detailed availability/reliability calculation of diesel sets and analysis of safety systems influencing event sequences induced by large LOCA - were performed. Input failure data were taken from publications, a need for failure and reliability data bank was revealed. Current and future activities involves: setup of national data bank for WWER-440 units; full-scope level-I PSA of PAKS NPP in Hungary; operational safety assessment of particular problems at PAKS NPP. In the present article the state of RA and PSA activities in Hungary, as well as the main objectives of ongoing work are described. A need for international cooperation (for unified data collection of WWER-440 units) and for IAEA support (within Interregional Program INT/9/063) is emphasized. (author)

  1. Risk-based configuration control: Application of PSA in improving technical specifications and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samanta, P.K.; Kim, I.S.; Vesely, W.E.

    1992-01-01

    Risk-based configuration control is the management of component configurations using a risk perspective to control risk and assure safety. A configuration, as used here, is a set of component operability statuses that define the state of a nuclear power plant. If the component configurations that have high risk implications do not occur, then the risk from the operation of nuclear power plants would be minimal. The control of component configurations, i.e., the management of component statuses, to minimize the risk from components being unavailable, becomes difficult, because the status of a standby safety system component is often not apparent unless it is tested. Controlling plant configuration from a risk-perspective can provide more direct risk control and also more operational flexibility by allowing looser controls in areas unimportant to risk. Risk-based configuration control approaches can be used to replace parts of nuclear power plant Technical Specifications. With the advances in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology, such approaches to improve Technical Specifications and operational safety are feasible. In this paper, we present an analysis of configuration risks, and a framework for risk-based configuration control to achieve the desired control of risk-significant configurations during plant operation

  2. Prospects for probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirschberg, S.

    1992-01-01

    This article provides some reflections on future developments of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in view of the present state of the art and evaluates current trends in the use of PSA for safety management. The main emphasis is on Level 1 PSA, although Level 2 aspects are also highlighted to some extent. As a starting point, the role of PSA is outlined from a historical perspective, demonstrating the rapid expansion of the uses of PSA. In this context the wide spectrum of PSA applications and the associated benefits to the users are in focus. It should be kept in mind, however, that PSA, in spite of its merits, is not a self-standing safety tool. It complements deterministic analysis and thus improves understanding and facilitating prioritization of safety issues. Significant progress in handling PSA limitations - such as reliability data, common-cause failures, human interactions, external events, accident progression, containment performance, and source-term issues - is described. This forms a background for expected future developments of PSA. Among the most important issues on the agenda for the future are PSA scope extensions, methodological improvements and computer code advancements, and full exploitation of the potential benefits of applications to operational safety management. Many PSA uses, if properly exercised, lead to safety improvements as well as major burden reductions. The article provides, in addition, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) perspective on the topics covered, as reflected in the current PSA programs of the agency. 74 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab

  3. Study of methodology for low power/shutdown fire PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Zhen; Li Zhaohua; Li Lin; Song Lei

    2014-01-01

    As a risk assessment technology based on probability, the fire PSA is accepted abroad by nuclear industry in its application in the risk assessment for nuclear power plants. Based on the industry experience, the fire-induced impact on the plant safety during low power and shutdown operation cannot be neglected, therefore fire PSA can be used to assess the corresponding fire risk. However, there is no corresponding domestic guidance/standard as well as accepted analysis methodology up to date. Through investigating the latest evolvement on fire PSA during low power and shutdown operation, and integrating its characteristic with the corresponding engineering experience, an engineering methodology to evaluate the fire risk during low power and shutdown operation for nuclear power plant is established in this paper. In addition, an analysis demonstration as an example is given. (authors)

  4. Ascertaining the international state of the art of PSA methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linden, J. von

    1998-01-01

    Plant-specific PSAs, to be performed within the framework of the Periodic Safety Review of German Nuclear Power Plants require further development of the methodology. For that purpose foreign PSA-guidelines and PSA-reviewes as well as relevant literature are examined and appropriate insights are adopted within task A.2 of project SR 2096. The main goal of these activities is to achieve a comparison of the state of the art of PSA-methodologies applied abroad and in Germany. The German state of the art refers to the extent as is documented in the German PSA Guide (Leitfaden Probabilistische Sicherheitsanalyse /PSUe97/) which has to be used for the Periodic Safety Review of German Nuclear Power Plants. The structure for the evaluation is based on the working steps of a PSA. In total, according to the objectives of the Periodic Safety Review the German approach for plant-specific PSAs based on the German PSA Guide is conform to the state of the art abroad. Identified deviations in some details are evaluated reflecting the view of GRS. Particular aspects resulting from the evaluation should be considered for further development of the German PSA Guide. (orig.) [de

  5. PSA data base, comparison of the German and French approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreuser, A.; Tirira, J.

    2001-01-01

    The results of probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) of nuclear power plants strongly depend on the reliability data used. This report describes coarsely the general process to generate reliability data for components and resumes the differences between the German and French approaches. As has been shown in former studies which compared international PSA data, PSA data are closely related to the model definitions of the PSA. Therefore single PSA data cannot be compared directly without regard e.g. to the corresponding fault trees. These findings are confirmed by this study. The comparison of German and French methods shows a lot of differences concerning various details of the data generation process. Some differences between single reliability data should be eliminated when taking into account the complete fault tree analysis. But there are some other differences which have a direct impact on the obtained results of a PSA. In view of the all differences between both approaches concerning the definition of data and the data collection process, it is not possible to compare directly German and French PSA data. However, the database differences give no indication on the influence on the PSA results. Therefore, it is a need to perform a common IPSN/GRS assessment on how the different databases impact the PSA results. (orig.)

  6. Review process of PSA level 2 of KBR - Concept and Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andernacht, M.; Glaser, H.; Sonnenkalb, M.

    2013-01-01

    In Germany, a periodic safety review (PSR) has to be performed every ten years by the utility. In the past, a PSR only included a plant-specific probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) Level 1 study. Since a revised version of the German PSA guideline has been released in 2005, these plant-specific PSAs have to include a PSA Level 2, too. For the NPP Brokdorf (KBR) PSA Level 2 project, an agreement was reached between all parties involved that the study will be performed not as a part of the PSR process, but supplementary to it. This paper will focus on conclusions and findings from an ongoing parallel review process of the first full scope PSA Level 2 performed by the utility for KBR, a typical German PWR-1300. The responsible authority 'Ministerium fuer Soziales, Gesundheit, Familie, Jugend und Senioren des Landes Schleswig- Holstein' (MSGF) initiated this parallel review process in agreement with the utility KBR and the E.ON Kernkraft in 2006. The project will be completed soon. Such a review process allows that essential steps of the PSA will be reviewed and commented before the PSA Level 2 will be finished. So the benefit from this parallel review process is a significant enhancement of the quality and completeness of the PSA Level 2 study as the majority of the recommendations given by the review team has been taken over by the utility and the developer of the PSA, the AREVA NP company. Further, a common understanding and agreement will be reached at the end between all parties involved on the major topics of the PSA Level 2 study. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  7. Review process of PSA Level 2 of KBR. Concept and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andernacht, Martin; Glaser, Hendrik; Sonnenkalb, Martin

    2009-01-01

    In Germany, a periodic safety review (PSR) has to be performed every 10 years by the utility. In the past, a PSR only included a plant-specific probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) Level 1 study. For the NPP Brokdorf (KBR) PSA Level 2 project, an agreement was reached between all parties involved that the study will be performed not as a part of the PSR process, but supplementary to it. Since a revised version of the German PSA guideline has been released in 2005, these plant-specific PSAs have to include a PSA Level 2, too. This paper will focus on conclusions and findings from a ongoing parallel review process of the first full scope PSA Level 2 performed by the utility for KBR, a typical German PWR-1300. The responsible authority 'Ministerium fuer Soziales, Gesundheit, Familie, Jugend und Senioren des Landes Schleswig-Holstein (MSGF)' (Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Family, Youth and Senior Citizens of Schleswig-Holstein) initiated this parallel review process in agreement with the utility KBR and the E.ON Kernkraft in 2006. The project will be completed soon. Such a review process allows that essential steps of the PSA will be reviewed and commented before the PSA Level 2 will be finished. So the benefit from this parallel review process is a significant enhancement of the quality and completeness of the PSA Level 2 study as the majority of the recommendations given by the review team has been taken over by the utility and the developer of the PSA, the Areva NP company. Further, a common understanding and agreement will be reached at the end between all parties involved on the major topics of the PSA Level 2 study. (orig.)

  8. Challenges and status of multi-unit PSA development in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yalaoui, Smain

    2015-01-01

    Firstly, this paper discusses the issues and challenges related to the development of a Multi-Unit PSA (MU-PSA) and the general recommendations and conclusions from the MU-PSA Workshop organized by the CNSC in Ottawa, November 2014. This includes a discussion regarding the issue related to the methodological challenges in performing MU-PSA, the site-based risk metrics to be adopted, and the issue of risk aggregation across all hazards and all units. The paper also addresses the challenges for establishing site-based safety goals as the current safety goals were established on a per-unit basis. CNSC Staff efforts, both at the national and international level, on developing whole-site safety goals and guidance on MU-PSA and risk aggregation methodologies will also be discussed. Finally, the paper will provide a summary of the industry effort and road map for completing the pilot Whole-site PSA project for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, as requested by the Commission following to the public hearing for licence renewal in February 20 and May 29-31, 2013. (author)

  9. Development of PSA procedure for a criticality in reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Endo, Shigeki; Takanashi, Mitsuhiro; Ueda, Yoshinori

    2012-08-01

    Utilization of risk information for the nuclear safety regulation is being discussed in Japan. The development of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) procedure is indispensable for the utilization of risk information. The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) has been conducting trial PSA to a model plant for major events, i.e. hydrogen explosion, solution boiling, rapid decomposition of TBP complexes, criticality, solvent fire, leakage of molten glass, leakage of high active concentrated liquid waste, loss of all AC electricity, drop of a fuel assembly, for the purpose of developing the PSA procedure for reprocessing facilities. For criticality events results of trial PSA were summarized as a report in which how to evaluate an amount of radioactive materials released from a facility and a health effect on the public were emphasized. Therefore, for criticality events the results of trial PSA were summarized in this report to emphasize procedures from making event progression scenarios to quantifying event sequences, which were not handled in the previous report, in a style of a document describing PSA procedures. (author)

  10. Status of the PSA use in the Czech regulatory process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dusek, J.

    1994-01-01

    A review of previous probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) activities initiated by regulatory body and preparation of the preliminary PSA study and final PSA study (released in January 1994) for the nuclear power plant Dukovany with WWER-440 type 213 reactor is described. A brief information about the NPP Temelin (with WWER-1000) PSA Study, shutdown and PSA risk monitor current activities for the NPP Dukovany, next PSA activities in 1994 and about planned PSA activities in future is attached. (author). 21 refs

  11. Summary report for the second TUV-workshop proceedings on living PSA application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This workshop on living PSA Application was organized to support the OECD/NEA CSNI-Principal Working Group No.5 on Risk Assessment for an international exchange of experience on living PSA application. The first session was devoted to Living PSA Applications and the second session to Tools for Living PSA. Living PSA Applications: Reasons for performing PSA (regulatory requirement, targets; corporate requirement, targets; safety related activity prioritization; other); Logistic of Living PSA Management (Corporate management involvement, Decision making levels and guidance, Plant level involvement, Required personnel commitment, Frequency and extent of re-quantification of PSA, Types of safety/risk parameters to be monitored, Quality assurance on maintaining Living PSA); Examples of Application (Experiences of application, State of Living PSA/e.g. all accident sequences involved, Details of component level involvement). Tools for Living PSA: Data Collection Systems and Codes (Source and type of data collected, Probabilistic parameter quantification, Interface to basic event data, Data code systems). An executive summary of the workshop is given

  12. Probabilistic safety analysis for fire events for the NPP Isar 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmaltz, H.; Hristodulidis, A.

    2007-01-01

    The 'Probabilistic Safety Analysis for Fire Events' (Fire-PSA KKI2) for the NPP Isar 2 was performed in addition to the PSA for full power operation and considers all possible events which can be initiated due to a fire. The aim of the plant specific Fire-PSA was to perform a quantitative assessment of fire events during full power operation, which is state of the art. Based on simplistic assumptions referring to the fire induced failures, the influence of system- and component-failures on the frequency of the core damage states was analysed. The Fire-PSA considers events, which will result due to fire-induced failures of equipment on the one hand in a SCRAM and on the other hand in events, which will not have direct operational effects but because of the fire-induced failure of safety related installations the plant will be shut down as a precautionary measure. These events are considered because they may have a not negligible influence on the frequency of core damage states in case of failures during the plant shut down because of the reduced redundancy of safety related systems. (orig.)

  13. A Tsunami PSA for Nuclear Power Plants in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Kyu; Choi, In Kil; Park, Jin Hee; Seo, Kyung Suk; Seo, Jeong Moon; Yang, Joon Eon

    2010-06-01

    For the evaluation of safety of NPP caused by Tsunami event, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) method was applied in this study. At first, an empirical tsunami hazard analysis performed for an evaluation of tsunami return period. A procedure for tsunami fragility methodology was established, and target equipment and structures for investigation of Tsunami Hazard assessment were selected. A several fragility calculations were performed for equipment in Nuclear Power Plant and finally accident scenario of tsunami event in NPP was presented. Finally, a system analysis performed in the case of tsunami event for an evaluation of a CDF of Ulchin 56 NPP site. For the evaluation of safety of NPP caused by Tsunami event, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) method was applied. A procedure for tsunami fragility methodology was established, and target equipment and structures for investigation of Tsunami Hazard assessment were selected. A several fragility calculations were performed for equipment in Nuclear Power Plant and finally accident scenario of tsunami event in NPP was presented. As a result, in the case of tsunami event, functional failure is mostly governed total failure probability of facilities in NPP site

  14. Impact of Pre-Initiators on PSA in Research Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ochirbat, Chimedtseren [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Sok Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Most of nuclear power plants had already conducted PSA work to examine their plant safety for identifying vulnerability and preparing the mitigating strategies for severe accident. However, the PSA for research reactor has been conducted limitedly comparing with nuclear power plants due to lack of awareness and resources. Most of PSA results demonstrated that human failure events (HFEs) take a major role of risk contributor in terms of core damage frequency. HFEs are categorized as the following three types: pre-initiating event interaction (e.g., maintenance of errors, testing errors, calibration errors), initiating event related interactions (e.g., human error causing loss of power, human error causing system trip), and post-initiating event (e.g., all action actuating manual safety system backup of an automatic system). Lack of resources and utilization of research reactor calls a vicious circle in terms of safety degradation. The safety degradation poses the vulnerability of human failure during research reactor utilization process. Typically, evaluation of pre-initiators related to test and maintenance are not taking into account in PSA for research reactors. This paper aims to investigate the impact of pre-initiating events related to test and maintenance activities on PSA results in terms of core damage frequency for a research reactor.

  15. Impact of Pre-Initiators on PSA in Research Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ochirbat, Chimedtseren; Kim, Sok Chul

    2014-01-01

    Most of nuclear power plants had already conducted PSA work to examine their plant safety for identifying vulnerability and preparing the mitigating strategies for severe accident. However, the PSA for research reactor has been conducted limitedly comparing with nuclear power plants due to lack of awareness and resources. Most of PSA results demonstrated that human failure events (HFEs) take a major role of risk contributor in terms of core damage frequency. HFEs are categorized as the following three types: pre-initiating event interaction (e.g., maintenance of errors, testing errors, calibration errors), initiating event related interactions (e.g., human error causing loss of power, human error causing system trip), and post-initiating event (e.g., all action actuating manual safety system backup of an automatic system). Lack of resources and utilization of research reactor calls a vicious circle in terms of safety degradation. The safety degradation poses the vulnerability of human failure during research reactor utilization process. Typically, evaluation of pre-initiators related to test and maintenance are not taking into account in PSA for research reactors. This paper aims to investigate the impact of pre-initiating events related to test and maintenance activities on PSA results in terms of core damage frequency for a research reactor

  16. A methodology for PSA model validation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Unwin, S.D.

    1995-09-01

    This document reports Phase 2 of work undertaken by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in support of the Atomic Energy Control Board's Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) review. A methodology is presented for the systematic review and evaluation of a PSA model. These methods are intended to support consideration of the following question: To within the scope and depth of modeling resolution of a PSA study, is the resultant model a complete and accurate representation of the subject plant? This question was identified as a key PSA validation issue in SAIC's Phase 1 project. The validation methods are based on a model transformation process devised to enhance the transparency of the modeling assumptions. Through conversion to a 'success-oriented' framework, a closer correspondence to plant design and operational specifications is achieved. This can both enhance the scrutability of the model by plant personnel, and provide an alternative perspective on the model that may assist in the identification of deficiencies. The model transformation process is defined and applied to fault trees documented in the Darlington Probabilistic Safety Evaluation. A tentative real-time process is outlined for implementation and documentation of a PSA review based on the proposed methods. (author). 11 refs., 9 tabs., 30 refs

  17. Procedure for Application of Software Reliability Growth Models to NPP PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Son, Han Seong; Kang, Hyun Gook; Chang, Seung Cheol

    2009-01-01

    As the use of software increases at nuclear power plants (NPPs), the necessity for including software reliability and/or safety into the NPP Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) rises. This work proposes an application procedure of software reliability growth models (RGMs), which are most widely used to quantify software reliability, to NPP PSA. Through the proposed procedure, it can be determined if a software reliability growth model can be applied to the NPP PSA before its real application. The procedure proposed in this work is expected to be very helpful for incorporating software into NPP PSA

  18. Use of plant specific PSA to evaluate incidents at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-06-01

    One of the possible applications of the plant specific probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is its use in the analysis of operational events at the plant. The methodological development in that area was initiated recently in the framework of the IAEA's Incident Reporting System where determination of the safety significance of the event is essential for optimizing feedback of operating experience. This report provides details of the methodology and procedures to be used in event analysis. The report also contains three case studies which have been performed and summarizes lessons learned from those case studies. The results (event probabilities) obtained using plant specific PSA and the results of the analysis of the same events in the framework of the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) programmes (generic models) were compared and commented on. 6 refs, figs and tabs

  19. Lesson learned from PSA in the design improvement program of KSNP+

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, M.R.; Lim, H.K.; Kang, S.K.; Park, K.S.

    2001-01-01

    KOPEC (Korea Power Engineering Co.) in conjunction with the client KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corp.) has been developing a highly competitive Improved Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant named KSNP+. From the beginning of Design Improvement Program, PSA was carried out to assure that the safety level of KSNP+ is maintained or improved in comparison with that of KSNP, the Korean Standard NPP. To achieve the safety goal of KSNP+, PSA team reviewed all design changes that might affect the plant safety. Design vulnerabilities were identified from the PSA results and safety improvement items were recommended to the system designers. Through the Design Improvement Program, KSNP+ became more reliable, safer and economically competitive than KSNP. This was achieved by systematic approach for design optimization and effective use of PSA technology based on past experience and expertise of nuclear power plant. (author)

  20. Putting PSA to work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubler, R.; Gomez-Cobo, A.

    1998-01-01

    The IAEA has, during the last three years, been working intensively on PSA applications. The draft TECDOC prepared during these activities, ''PSA Applications'' is summarized in this paper. Actual events at nuclear facilities provide an important basis to compare PSAs with reality. PSA based operational event analysis therefore can be used to evaluate the importance of operational events from a risk perspective but also can contribute to validating and enhancing PSAs and to continuously check whether or not the PSA models are adequate, appropriate and complete. The work of the IAEA in this area is therefore summarized as well. In a companion paper, titled ''Towards a credible PSA fit for applications'', two specific aspects regarding the quality of the PSA to be used are discussed in detail, namely the Living PSA concept, which ensures that the PSA reflects actual design and operational features and Quality Assurance for PSA. (author)

  1. Proceedings of the 10th Korea-Japan joint workshop on PSA. For Asian PSA network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Joon-Eon; Homma, Toshimitsu

    2009-12-01

    The tenth Korea-Japan Joint Workshop on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was held in the Jeju island of Korea, on May 18-20, 2009 organized by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The purpose of the workshop was to provide a forum for presentation and discussions on experiences and technical achievements related to PSA, risk-informed and performance-based approach, and other relevant issues in both countries. Since the first Korea-Japan Joint Workshop on PSA started in 1992, the workshops have provided an important and timely opportunity for exchange and discussion of the relevant information to all PSA practitioners and users of risk information in the industry, research, academia and regulatory arena. This was the tenth anniversary of the Joint Workshop with the main theme of 'For Asian PSA Network' and participants included those from China, Taiwan and the United States of America besides Korea and Japan. Two keynote speeches were presented by the former chairmen of this workshop, Prof. Chang-Sun Kang of Seoul National University and Prof. emeritus Shunsuke Kondo of Tokyo University. We had two special lectures, 70 papers presented by experts at 10 technical sessions related PSA, the special session on the status of PSA in Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan and panel discussion on their cooperation in PSA. This report provides the summary of each session, and all the presentation materials presented in the 10th Korea-Japan Joint Workshop on PSA. (author)

  2. Most significant preliminary results of the probabilistic safety analysis on the Juragua nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perdomo, Manuel

    1995-01-01

    Since 1990 the Group for PSA Development and Applications (GDA/APS) is working on the Level-1 PSA for the Juragua-1 NPP, as a part of an IAEA Technical Assistance Project. The main objective of this study, which is still under way, is to assess, in a preliminary way, the Reactor design safety to find its potential 'weak points' at the construction stage, using a eneric data base. At the same time, the study allows the PSA team to familiarize with the plant design and analysis techniques for the future operational PSA of the plant. This paper presents the most significant preliminary results of the study, which reveal some advantages of the safety characteristics of the plant design in comparison with the homologous VVER-440 reactors and some areas, where including slight modifications would improve the plant safety, considering the level of detail at which the study is carried out. (author). 13 refs, 1 fig, 2 tabs

  3. Precursor analyses - The use of deterministic and PSA based methods in the event investigation process at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-09-01

    The efficient feedback of operating experience (OE) is a valuable source of information for improving the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It is therefore essential to collect information on abnormal events from both internal and external sources. Internal operating experience is analysed to obtain a complete understanding of an event and of its safety implications. Corrective or improvement measures may then be developed, prioritized and implemented in the plant if considered appropriate. Information from external events may also be analysed in order to learn lessons from others' experience and prevent similar occurrences at our own plant. The traditional ways of investigating operational events have been predominantly qualitative. In recent years, a PSA-based method called probabilistic precursor event analysis has been developed, used and applied on a significant scale in many places for a number of plants. The method enables a quantitative estimation of the safety significance of operational events to be incorporated. The purpose of this report is to outline a synergistic process that makes more effective use of operating experience event information by combining the insights and knowledge gained from both approaches, traditional deterministic event investigation and PSA-based event analysis. The PSA-based view on operational events and PSA-based event analysis can support the process of operational event analysis at the following stages of the operational event investigation: (1) Initial screening stage. (It introduces an element of quantitative analysis into the selection process. Quantitative analysis of the safety significance of nuclear plant events can be a very useful measure when it comes to selecting internal and external operating experience information for its relevance.) (2) In-depth analysis. (PSA based event evaluation provides a quantitative measure for judging the significance of operational events, contributors to

  4. Development of safety analysis technology for LMR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hahn, Do Hee; Kwon, Y. M.; Kim, K. D.

    2000-05-01

    The analysis methodologies as well as the analysis computer code system for the transient, HCDA, and containment performance analyses, which are required for KALIMER safety analyses, have been developed. The SSC-K code has been developed based on SSC-L which is an analysis code for loop type LMR, by improving models necessary for the KALIMER system analysis, and additional models have been added to the code. In addition, HCDA analysis model has been developed and the containment performance analysis code has been also improved. The preliminary basis for the safety analysis has been established, and the preliminary safety analyses for the key design features have been performed. In addition, a state-of-art analysis for LMR PSA and overseas safety and licensing requirements have been reviewed. The design database for the systematic management of the design documents as well as design processes has been established as well

  5. Development of safety analysis technology for LMR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hahn, Do Hee; Kwon, Y. M.; Kim, K. D. [and others

    2000-05-01

    The analysis methodologies as well as the analysis computer code system for the transient, HCDA, and containment performance analyses, which are required for KALIMER safety analyses, have been developed. The SSC-K code has been developed based on SSC-L which is an analysis code for loop type LMR, by improving models necessary for the KALIMER system analysis, and additional models have been added to the code. In addition, HCDA analysis model has been developed and the containment performance analysis code has been also improved. The preliminary basis for the safety analysis has been established, and the preliminary safety analyses for the key design features have been performed. In addition, a state-of-art analysis for LMR PSA and overseas safety and licensing requirements have been reviewed. The design database for the systematic management of the design documents as well as design processes has been established as well.

  6. Development of a PSA information management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ho, Seok; Dong Kyu, Kim; Sun Koo, Kang

    2007-01-01

    In general, Probabilistic Safety Agreement (PSA) is a very complicated work that uses and generates a lot of resources such as reports, procedures, drawings, assumptions, calculation sheets, PSA model, and so on. In many PSAs, however, the data, materials and knowledge considered and generated during performing PSA are scattered in many documents so that overall structure of PSA and information relationship between documents and models cannot easily be understood. To organize and manage all documents related to PSA, to capture knowledge of analysts, and finally to improve the quality of PSA, a PSA information management system (PIMS) was developed. The PIMS can manage all the documents of a PSA in a database and connect the causal relation between one information to another in the scattered documents via link. The PIMS can manage all the assumptions and technical basis used in PSA, and it can keep the record of the design changes the revision of PSA model. It can also control the review results of PSA models. The link of the PIMS can explicitly describe and reveal the expertise of the PSA analysts, and it enables the users to capture the knowledge and to understand the structure and contents of a PSA with ease. We are planning to apply the PIMS to the PSA of Shin Kori Units 1 and 2 as feasibility study and then to all the PSAs of the nuclear power plants in Korea. The PIMS is expected to contribute to enhancing the quality and confidence of PSA and reducing the efforts and costs of maintenance and update of PSA. (authors)

  7. Development of a PSA information management system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ho, Seok; Dong Kyu, Kim; Sun Koo, Kang [Korea Power Engineering Company, Inc (Korea, Republic of)

    2007-07-01

    In general, Probabilistic Safety Agreement (PSA) is a very complicated work that uses and generates a lot of resources such as reports, procedures, drawings, assumptions, calculation sheets, PSA model, and so on. In many PSAs, however, the data, materials and knowledge considered and generated during performing PSA are scattered in many documents so that overall structure of PSA and information relationship between documents and models cannot easily be understood. To organize and manage all documents related to PSA, to capture knowledge of analysts, and finally to improve the quality of PSA, a PSA information management system (PIMS) was developed. The PIMS can manage all the documents of a PSA in a database and connect the causal relation between one information to another in the scattered documents via link. The PIMS can manage all the assumptions and technical basis used in PSA, and it can keep the record of the design changes the revision of PSA model. It can also control the review results of PSA models. The link of the PIMS can explicitly describe and reveal the expertise of the PSA analysts, and it enables the users to capture the knowledge and to understand the structure and contents of a PSA with ease. We are planning to apply the PIMS to the PSA of Shin Kori Units 1 and 2 as feasibility study and then to all the PSAs of the nuclear power plants in Korea. The PIMS is expected to contribute to enhancing the quality and confidence of PSA and reducing the efforts and costs of maintenance and update of PSA. (authors)

  8. Prioritization of design changes based on PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krajnc, B.; Mavko, B.

    1996-01-01

    Effective use of Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) in the day to day plant operation is subject of intensive discussions among plant operators and regulators. There are several possible applications in which the PSA can be used, among those also to use the PSA approach for the quantification of influence of different proposed design changes to nuclear safety - influence on public safety - health. NPP Krsko is one of those plants that successfully completed its PSA project, with Level 1 and Level 2 analyses and effective know-how transfer. It also faces a number of regulatory and internally generated requirements for different design changes, mainly due to the fact that the plant is committed to continuous augmentation of nuclear safety. It is considered that the available tools and knowledge should be used and therefore applicable methodology should be developed for effective prioritization of proposed design changes by performing cost-benefit analyses for all major modifications - focusing on their influence on nuclear safety. Based on the above a new method for prioritization of design changes is proposed. The method uses Level 1 results (in the sense of plant damage states and their frequencies) directly as an input for further processing - first decision step to decide whether the proposed modification has or has no influence on nuclear safety. In Level 2 analyses the combination of probabilistic and deterministic approach was adopted. In fact the results of the deterministic analyses of severe accidents are treated in probabilistic manner due to large uncertainty of results. Finally to be able to perform plant specific cost benefit analyses so called partial Level 3 was defined. The proposed methods was preliminary tested and it gave favorable results. (author)

  9. PSA Level 2:Scope And Method Of PSA Level 2 For Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Widodo, Surip; Antariksawan, Anhar R.

    2001-01-01

    A study of scope and method of PSA Level 2 had been conducted. The background of the study is the need to gain the capability to well perform PSA Level 2 for nuclear facilities. This study is a literature survey. The scope of PSA Level 2 consists of generating plant damage states, accident progression analysis, and grouping source terms. Concerning accident progression analysis, several methods are used, among others event tree method, named accident progression event tree (APET) or containment event tree (CET), and fault tree method. The end result of PSA Level 2 is release end states which is grouped into release bins. The results will be used for PSA Level 3

  10. PSA based vulnerability and protectability analysis for NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gopika, V.; Sanyasi Rao, V.V.S.; Ghosh, A.K.; Kushwaha, H.S.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► The paper describes the generation of location sets and protection sets. ► Vulnerability and protectability used to rank location sets and protection sets. ► Ranking helps in adequacy of protection measures employed in various locations. ► The procedure for PSA based vital area identification is demonstrated. ► This method has found practical applicability for Indian NPP. -- Abstract: Identification of vital areas in a facility involves assessing the facility and the locations, whose sabotage can result in undesirable (radiological) consequences. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) technique can find the component failures leading to core damage (a surrogate for radiological consequence) in a systematic manner, which can be extended to identification of vital areas. This paper describes the procedure for the generation of location sets (set of locations whose sabotage can lead to possible core damage) and protection sets (set of locations that must be protected to prevent possible core damage). In addition, measures such as vulnerability and protectability have been introduced, which can be used to rank location sets and protection sets.

  11. The PSA assessment of Defense in Depth Memorandum and proposals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, Gian-Luigi; La Rovere, Stefano

    2016-01-01

    This report concerns the peculiar roles of the Defence-in-Depth (DiD) concept and the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) approach for the optimization of the safety performances of the nuclear installation. It proposes a conceptual framework and related process for the assessment of the 'safety architecture' implementing DiD, which is articulated in four main steps devoted to (1) the formulation of the safety objectives, (2) the identification of loads and environmental conditions, (3) the representation of the safety architecture and (4) the evaluation of the physical performance and reliability of the levels of DiD. A final additional step achieves the practical assessment of the safety architecture and the corresponding DiD with the support of the PSA. The comprehensive safety assessment of the implemented architecture needs its multi-dimensional representation, i.e. for given initiating event, sequence of possible failures, affected safety function and level of DiD. The risk space (frequency/probability of occurrence, versus consequences) is the framework for the integration between the DiD concept and the PSA approach. Additional qualitative key-notions are introduced in order to address the compliance of the safety architecture with a number of international safety requirements. In this context, the role of the PSA is no longer limited to the verification of the fulfilment of probabilistic targets but includes different contributions to the assessment of the DiD identified in this report. (authors)

  12. Probabilistic safety assessment - regulatory perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.B.; Paul, U.K.; Hajra, P.; Agarwal, S.K.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been designed, constructed and operated mainly based on deterministic safety analysis philosophy. In this approach, a substantial amount of safety margin is incorporated in the design and operational requirements. Additional margin is incorporated by applying the highest quality engineering codes, standards and practices, and the concept of defence-in-depth in design and operating procedures, by including conservative assumptions and acceptance criteria in plant response analysis of postulated initiating events (PIEs). However, as the probabilistic approach has been improved and refined over the years, it is possible for the designer, operator and regulator to get a more detailed and realistic picture of the safety importance of plant design features, operating procedures and operational practices by using probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) along with the deterministic methodology. At present, many countries including USA, UK and France are using PSA insights in their decision making along with deterministic basis. India has also made substantial progress in the development of methods for carrying out PSA. However, consensus on the use of PSA in regulatory decision-making has not been achieved yet. This paper emphasises on the requirements (e.g.,level of details, key modelling assumptions, data, modelling aspects, success criteria, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis) for improving the quality and consistency in performance and use of PSA that can facilitate meaningful use of the PSA insights in the regulatory decision-making in India. This paper also provides relevant information on international scenario and various application areas of PSA along with progress made in India. The PSA perspective presented in this paper may help in achieving consensus on the use of PSA for regulatory / utility decision-making in design and operation of NPPs

  13. Review of APR+ Level 2 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehner, J.R.; Mubayi, V.; Pratt, W.T.

    2012-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) assisted the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) in reviewing the Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of the APR+ Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) prepared by the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd (KHNP) and KEPCO Engineering and Construction Co., Inc. (KEPCO-E and C). The work described in this report involves a review of the APR+ Level 2 PSA submittal (Ref. 1). The PSA and, therefore, the review is limited to consideration of accidents initiated by internal events. As part of the review process, the review team also developed three sets of Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). These RAIs were provided to KHNP and KEPCO-E and C for their evaluation and response. This final detailed report documents the review findings for each technical element of the PSA and includes consideration of all of the RAIs made by the reviewers as well as the associated responses. This final report was preceded by an interim report (Ref. 2) that focused on identifying important issues regarding the PSA. In addition, a final meeting on the project was held at BNL on November 21-22, 2011, where BNL and KINS reviewers discussed their preliminary review findings with KHNP and KEPCO-E and C staffs. Additional information obtained during this final meeting was also used to inform the review findings of this final report. The review focused not only on the robustness of the APR+ design to withstand severe accidents, but also on the capability and acceptability of the Level 2 PSA in terms of level of detail and completeness. The Korean nuclear regulatory authorities will decide whether the PSA is acceptable and the BNL review team is providing its comments for KINS consideration. Section 2.0 provides the basis for the BNL review. Section 3.0 presents the review of each technical element of the PSA. Conclusions and a summary are presented in Section 4.0. Section 5.0 contains the references.

  14. Ignalina Safety Analysis Group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ushpuras, E.

    1995-01-01

    The article describes the fields of activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Analysis Group (ISAG) in the Lithuanian Energy Institute and overview the main achievements gained since the group establishment in 1992. The group is working under the following guidelines: in-depth analysis of the fundamental physical processes of RBMK-1500 reactors; collection, systematization and verification of the design and operational data; simulation and analysis of potential accident consequences; analysis of thermohydraulic and neutronic characteristics of the plant; provision of technical and scientific consultations to VATESI, Governmental authorities, and also international institutions, participating in various projects aiming at Ignalina NPP safety enhancement. The ISAG is performing broad scientific co-operation programs with both Eastern and Western scientific groups, supplying engineering assistance for Ignalina NPP. ISAG is also participating in the joint Lithuanian - Swedish - Russian project - Barselina, the first Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) study of Ignalina NPP. The work is underway together with Maryland University (USA) for assessment of the accident confinement system for a range of breaks in the primary circuit. At present the ISAG personnel is also involved in the project under the grant from the Nuclear Safety Account, administered by the European Bank for reconstruction and development for the preparation and review of an in-depth safety assessment of the Ignalina plant

  15. Probabilistic safety analysis for nuclear fuel cycle facilities, an exemplary application for a fuel fabrication plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmal, B.; Gaenssmantel, G.; Mayer, G.; Moser, E.F.

    2013-01-01

    In order to assess the risk of complex technical systems, the application of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in addition to the Deterministic Safety Analysis becomes of increasing interest. Besides nuclear installations this applies to e. g. chemical plants. A PSA is capable of expanding the basis for the risk assessment and of complementing the conventional deterministic analysis, by which means the existing safety standards of that facility can be improved if necessary. In the available paper, the differences between a PSA for a nuclear power plant and a nuclear fuel cycle facility (NFCF) are discussed in shortness and a basic concept for a PSA for a nuclear fuel cycle facility is described. Furthermore, an exemplary PSA for a partial process in a fuel assembly fabrication facility is described. The underlying data are partially taken from an older German facility, other parts are generic. Moreover, a selected set of reported events corresponding to this partial process is taken as auxiliary data. The investigation of this partial process from the fuel fabrication as an example application shows that PSA methods are in principle applicable to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Here, the focus is on preventing an initiating event, so that the system analysis is directed to the modeling of fault trees for initiating events. The quantitative results of this exemplary study are given as point values for the average occurrence frequencies. They include large uncertainties because of the limited documentation and data basis available, and thus have only methodological character. While quantitative results are given, further detailed information on process components and process flow is strongly required for robust conclusions with respect to the real process. (authors)

  16. Safety system consideration of a supercritical-water cooled fast reactor with simplified PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.H.; Oka, Y.; Koshizuka, S.

    1999-01-01

    The probabilistic safety of the supercritical-water cooled fast reactor (SCFR) is evaluated with the simplified probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology. SCFR has a once-through direct cycle where all feedwater flows through the core to the turbine at supercritical pressure. There are no recirculation loops in the once-through direct cycle system, which is the most important difference from the current light water reactor (LWR). The main objective of the present study is to assess the effect of this difference on the safety in the stage of conceptual design study. A safety system configuration similar to the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) is employed. At loss of flow events, no natural recirculation occurs. Thus, emergency core flow should be quickly supplied before the completion of the feedwater pump coastdown at a loss of flow accident. The motor-driven high pressure coolant injection (MD-HPCI) system cannot be used for the quick core cooling due to the delay of the emergency diesel generator (D/G) start-up. Accordingly, an MD-HPCI system in an ABWR is substituted by a turbine-driven (TD-) HPCI system for the SCFR. The calculated core damage frequency (CDF) is a little higher than that of the Japanese ABWR and a little lower than that of the Japanese BWR when Japanese data are employed for initiating event frequencies. Four alternatives to the safety system configurations are also examined as a sensitivity analysis. This shows that the balance of the safety systems designed here is adequate. Consequently, though the SCFR has a once-through coolant system, the CDF is not high due to the diversity of feedwater systems as the direct cycle characteristics

  17. Procedures and Techniques for the PSA of Digital I and C System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Hyun Gook; Eom, Heung Sup; Jang, Seung Cheol

    2006-01-01

    UCN 5 and 6 nuclear units (OPR-1000) are being constructed and the Korean Next Generation Reactor (APR-1400) is being designed by using digital I and C equipment for the safety functions such as a reactor protection system, an engineered safety feature actuation system, and a safety equipment control system. Even though the use of digital equipment for safety-related functions provides many advantageous features, there are still many arguable safety issues remaining. Design, configuration management and maintenance are important application areas for the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Digital I and C systems are natural candidates for PSA applications. From the viewpoint of the PSA, the digital techniques are very different from the conventional techniques of analog I and C systems because of some unique features. This article aims at giving an overview for the important issues of digital system PSA and at presenting the current status of technology development for each issue. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has performed an initiative research in order to meet risk information needs for digitalized safety-critical systems in Korea. The technologies presented in this article especially focusing on those developed in the KAERI

  18. Determining if pretreatment PSA doubling time predicts PSA trajectories after radiation therapy for localized prostate cancer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soto, Daniel E.; Andridge, Rebecca R.; Pan, Charlie C.; Williams, Scott G.; Taylor, Jeremy M.G.; Sandler, Howard M.

    2009-01-01

    Introduction: To determine if pretreatment PSA doubling time (PSA-DT) can predict post-radiation therapy (RT) PSA trajectories for localized prostate cancer. Materials and methods: Three hundred and seventy-five prostate cancer patients treated with external beam RT without androgen deprivation therapy (ADT) were identified with an adequate number of PSA values. We utilized a linear mixed model (LMM) analysis to model longitudinal PSA data sets after definitive treatment. Post-treatment PSA trajectories were allowed to depend on the pre-RT PSA-DT, pre-RT PSA (iPSA), Gleason score (GS), and T-stage. Results: Pre-RT PSA-DT had a borderline impact on predicting the rate of PSA rise after nadir (p = 0.08). For a typical low risk patient (T1, GS ≤ 6, iPSA 10), the predicted PSA-DT post-nadir was 21% shorter for pre-RT PSA-DT 24 month (19 month vs. 24 month). Additional significant predictors of post-RT PSA rate of rise included GS (p < 0.0001), iPSA (p < 0.0001), and T-stage (p = 0.02). Conclusions: We observed a trend between rapidly rising pre-RT PSA and the post-RT post-nadir PSA rise. This effect appeared to be independent of iPSA, GS, or T-stage. The results presented suggest that pretreatment PSA-DT may help predict post-RT PSA trajectories

  19. Time from first detectable PSA following radical prostatectomy to biochemical recurrence: A competing risk analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Boo, Leonora; Pintilie, Melania; Yip, Paul; Baniel, Jack; Fleshner, Neil; Margel, David

    2015-01-01

    Introduction: In this study, we estimated the time from first detectable prostate-specific antigen (PSA) following radical prostatectomy (RP) to commonly used definitions of biochemical recurrence (BCR). We also identified the predictors of time to BCR. Methods: We identified subjects who underwent a RP and had an undetectable PSA after surgery followed by at least 1 detectable PSA between 2000 and 2011. The primary outcome was time to BCR (PSA ≥0.2 and successive PSA ≥0.2) and prediction of the rate of PSA rise. Outcomes were calculated using a competing risk analysis, with univariable and multivariable Fine and Grey models. We employed a mixed effect model to test clinical predictors that are associated with the rate of PSA rise. Results: The cohort included 376 patients. The median follow-up from surgery was 60.5 months (interquartile range [IQR] 40.8–91.5) and from detectable PSA was 18 months (IQR 11–32). Only 45.74% (n = 172) had PSA values ≥0.2 ng/mL, while 15.16% (n = 57) reached the PSA level of ≥0.4 ng/mL and rising. On multivariable analysis, the values of the first detectable PSA and pathologic Gleason grade 8 or higher were consistently independent predictors of time to BCR. In the mixed effect model rate, the PSA rise was associated with time from surgery to first detectable PSA, Gleason score, and prostate volume. The main limitation of this study is the large proportion of patients that received treatment without reaching BCR. It is plausible that shorter estimated median times would occur at a centre that does not use salvage therapy at such an early state. Conclusion: The time from first detectable PSA to BCR may be lengthy. Our analyses of the predictors of the rate of PSA rise can help determine a personalized approach for patients with a detectable PSA after surgery. PMID:25624961

  20. Workshop on PSA applications, Sofia, Bulgaria, 7-11 October 1996. Lecturing materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The objective of this workshop was to present detailed, systematic and useful information about PSA-based tools and PSA applications. The first presentation of the workshop was titled ''The role of PSA in safety management''. This topic served to introduce the workshop and to highlight several concepts that were afterwards stressed during the week, i.e. the defence in depth principle and the use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches in a complementary way. This presentation provided a basis for the discussion of ''PSA applications''. As a complement to the theoretical lectures, there was a workshop during which three different exercises were run in parallel. For two of these, computer-based PSA tools were used. One of them was focused towards the analysis of design modifications and the other one towards demonstrating configuration control strategies. The objective of the third practice was to obtain Allowed Outage Times using different PSA-based approaches and to discuss the differences observed and the insights obtained. To conclude the workshop, stress was put on the importance of the quality of the PSA (the development of a high quality Living PSA should be the first step), the necessity to be cautious (before taking decisions both the qualitative and numerical results should be carefully analyzed), and the logical order for the implementation of PSA applications. Refs, figs, tabs

  1. PSA use in accident management studies in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirano, Mitsumasa

    1994-01-01

    The safety of NPPs in Japan is secured by stringent safety regulations based on the deterministic method, minimizing the possibility a severe accident to a technologically negligible level. PSA is not required in the current regulatory procedures. Accident management based on PSA is a 'knowledge-based' action dependent on utilities' technical knowledge aimed at further reduction of the risk which is kept small enough by existing measures. The paper discusses the following three kinds of PSAs that have been conducted practically and efficiently on NPPs to provide supplemental information about their safety characteristics in addition to the deterministic evaluation used in the regulatory safety review: PSAs on typical NPPs, PSAs on all NPPs to examine candidates for accident management, and PSAs as part of periodic safety review (PSR). 1 fig., 5 tabs

  2. Living PSA issues in France on pressurized water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewailly, J.; Deriot, S.; Dubreuil Chambardel, A.; Francois, P.; Magne, L.

    1993-09-01

    Two Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) carried out in France on 900 and 1300 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor units ended in 1990. These PSAs determined the core damage frequency for all plant operating conditions ranging from cold shutdown for refuelling to full power operation. Since 1990, these PSAs have been used increasingly as tools for applications such as accident precursor analysis, risk-based Technical Specifications, and maintenance optimization. In turn, these applications are used to enhance the initial PSAs. The notion of a ''living'' PSA which can be used and updated is slowly taking form. The accident precursor analysis consists in applying PSA event trees to obtain quick information on the potential consequences of a precursor event and on the corresponding probabilities of occurrence. A feedback on PSAs is provided by comparing them with actual operating incidents. The computation of the allowed outage time during power operation, based on the computerized models of Probabilistic Safety Assessments, requires adjustments: calculation of hourly risk of core damage under different reactor conditions without equipment unavailabilities. The proposed method also turns out to be an aid in determining the safe shutdown condition and procedure. Furthermore, when introducing a sufficient level of detail, PSA reliability models make it possible to compute contributions and to perform sensitivity studies in order to highlight those components for which a maintenance effort should be made. From the experience acquired up to now, there was felt to be a strong need to create guidelines for using PSAs that would simplify their implementation by the experts in charge of determining Technical Specifications, of maintenance programs, etc. who are not generally specialists in PSAs. For this purpose, it is necessary to improve the intelligibility of the models made in order for them to be used and to offer user's guides adapted to each application. Documents

  3. Use of PSA in the development of SMRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maioli, A.; Finnicum, D.J.; Lichtenstein, R.H.; Harsche, S.Y.

    2012-01-01

    This paper reviews the potential new scenarios where PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) may be of significant support to design and operation of SMRs (Small Modular Reactors); it reviews Westinghouse's experience and lessons learned in this endeavour and will discuss related challenges and what the PSA community is currently developing to address them. (authors)

  4. Use of simplified PSA studies in support of the ASTRID design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauthe, P.; Curnier, F.; Bertrand, F.; Vincon, L.; Jouve, S.; Balmain, M.; Rychkov, V.; Banchieri, Y.

    2012-01-01

    In the framework of the French Act of 28 June 2006 about nuclear materials and waste management, a GEN IV and actinides incineration demonstration prototype is to be commissioned in the 2020 decade. In this objective a prototype called ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration) is proposed to demonstrate the progress made in SFR technology at an industrial scale by qualifying innovative options, some of which still remain open in the areas requiring improvements, especially safety and operability. More specifically, we aim for a level of safety that is at least equivalent to that of the EPR (third generation), with improvements made in SFR-specific fields. The integration of safety issues in the early phase of the design of ASTRID is necessarily expected. For this purpose, CEA and its partners AREVA and EDF have planned to perform a level-1 PSA to support and orientate the preliminary design of ASTRID reactor. This paper presents the PSA approach and current studies for the assessment of safety systems and the future work to be done for the 2012-2014 period. The preliminary preparation of PSA studies is presented: objectives and scope of the early design phase PSA, definition of core damage states, selection and grouping of initiating events, assessment of safety functions and related systems. Work under progress is also presented: modelling of event trees, construction of fault trees of safety systems, transient calculations of accident sequences with the CATHARE2 code and reliability data assessment. Main objectives of a level-1 PSA performed at conceptual design stage are an early assessment of the safety architecture of the reactor and findings about the most effective areas for improvement, but also the identification of dominant accident sequences and comparison with alternative designs. After the elaboration of a simplified level-1 PSA model for nominal state and main internal initiators, various design alternatives will be

  5. Correlative study of SPECT bone scan, serum tPSA and fPSA/tPSA ratio and the pathological grade of prostate cancer with bone metastasis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu Haiqing; Duan Jun

    2011-01-01

    Objective: To study the rules and characteristics of SPECT bone scan, serum TPSA, fPSA/tPSA ratio and the pathological grade of prostate cancer with bone metastasis. Methods: Nuclear medicine SPECT bone scan as the gold standard, retrospective analysis of the in vitro radioimmunoassay in 107 patients with prostate cancer serum PSA (prostate specific antigen) levels, serum fPSA/tPSA ratio and whole body bone imaging studies and pathological classification. Results: 107 patients with prostate cancer : 49 patients had bone metastases, accounting for 45.8% (49/107), in which groups of different pathological comparison between the incidence of bone metastasis significantly, the lower the degree of differentiation, the more the incidence of bone metastases high; with elevated levels of tPSA, the incidence of bone metastasis increased significantly; serum tPSA 4 - 40 ng/ml, the use of fPSA/tPSA ratio may improve the diagnostic specificity of prostate cancer. Conclusion: Patients with bone metastases of prostate cancer incidence and degree of differentiation of prostate cancer, serum PSA levels and fPSA/tPSA ratio of a certain relationship. The lower degree of differentiation,the higher the incidence of bone metastasis. (authors)

  6. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of Natural External Hazards Including Earthquakes. Workshop Proceedings, Prague, Czech Republic, 17-20 June 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident triggered discussions about the significance of external hazards and their treatment in safety analyses. In addition, stress tests results have shown vulnerabilities and potential of cliff-edge effects in plant responses to external hazards and have identified possibilities and priorities for improvements and safety measures' implementation at specific sites and designs. In order to address these issues and provide relevant conclusions and recommendations to CSNI and CNRA, the CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK) directed, in cooperation with the CSNI Working Group on Integrity and Ageing of Components and Structures (WGIAGE), a workshop hosted by UJV Rez. The key objectives of the workshop were to collect information from the OECD member states on methods and approaches being used, and experience gained in probabilistic safety assessment of natural external hazards, as well as to support the fulfillment of the CSNI task on 'PSA of natural external hazards including earthquakes'. These objectives are described more in detail in the introduction in Chapter 1 of this report. The WGRISK activities preceding the workshop and leading to the decision to organize it are described in Chapter 2 of this report. The focus of the workshop was on external events PSA for nuclear power plants, including all modes of operation. The workshop scope was generally limited to external, natural hazards, including those hazards where the distinction between natural and man-made hazards is not sharp. The detailed information about the presentations, discussions, and results of the workshop is presented in Chapter 3 of this report. Some general conclusions were agreed on during the workshop, which are presented in the following paragraphs. - The lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents and related actions at the national, regional, and global level have emphasized the importance to assess risks associated (authors) with

  7. Safety Effect Analysis of the Large-Scale Design Changes in a Nuclear Power Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Eun-Chan; Lee, Hyun-Gyo [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    These activities were predominantly focused on replacing obsolete systems with new systems, and these efforts were not only to prolong the plant life, but also to guarantee the safe operation of the units. This review demonstrates the safety effect evaluation using the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the design changes, system improvements, and Fukushima accident action items for Kori unit 1 (K1). For the large scale of system design changes for K1, the safety effects from the PSA perspective were reviewed using the risk quantification results before and after the system improvements. This evaluation considered the seven significant design changes including the replacement of the control building air conditioning system and the performance improvement of the containment sump using a new filtering system as well as above five system design changes. The analysis results demonstrated that the CDF was reduced by 12% overall from 1.62E-5/y to 1.43E-5/y. The CDF reduction was larger in the transient group than in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) group. In conclusion, the analysis using the K1 PSA model supports that the plant safety has been appropriately maintained after the large-scale design changes in consideration of the changed operation factors and failure modes due to the system improvements.

  8. PSA, PSA derivatives, proPSA and prostate health index in the diagnosis of prostate cancer

    OpenAIRE

    Ayyıldız, Sema Nur; Ayyıldız, Ali

    2014-01-01

    Currently, prostate- specific antigen (PSA) is the most common oncological marker used for prostate cancer screening. However, high levels of PSA in benign prostatic hyperplasia and prostatitis decrease the specificity of PSA as a cancer marker. To increase the specificity of PSA, PSA derivatives and PSA kinetics have been used. However, these new techniques were not able to increase the diagnostic specificity for prostate cancer. Therefore, the search for new molecules and derivatives of PSA...

  9. Present and future of probabilistic safety analysis of Juragua Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salomon, J.; Rivero, J.J.

    1993-01-01

    This work present the main conditions of probabilistic safety analysis of Juragua Nuclear Power Plant, which includes the following aspects: Staff preparedness; Creation of ANCON code; Analysis activity; IAEA technical assistance project. The present situation of PSA National Project and its perspectives development are reported

  10. Development of system design in recent Siemens/KWU PWR influenced by PSA results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feigel, A.; Fabian, H.

    1989-01-01

    This paper reports on the design of the latest Siemens/KWU PWRs (Convoy plants) which is checked by a PSA, performed as a Δ-analysis to the German Risk Study (GPRA), which used a PWR 1300 MW in commercial operation since 1977 as a reference plant. The 10 years difference in the design between the reference plant and the Convoy plants, led to design changes, due to operational experience and findings from GPRA, Phase A. These are evaluated quantitatively by a PSA with respect to plat safety level and balance of the safety concept. The results gained from the Convoy PSA showed the importance and appropriateness of these modifications. Even if the latest results from GPRA, Phase B are considered with respect to additional accident sequences, it can be demonstrated that the new design is balanced with respect to these additional sequences. So no need exists to improve the new design any more

  11. Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context. Phase 1 status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Authen, S.; Larsson, J.; Bjoerkman, K.; Holmberg, J.-E.

    2010-12-01

    Digital protection and control systems are appearing as upgrades in older nuclear power plants (NPPs) and are commonplace in new NPPs. To assess the risk of NPP operation and to determine the risk impact of digital system upgrades on NPPs, quantitative reliability models are needed for digital systems. Due to the many unique attributes of these systems, challenges exist in systems analysis, modeling and in data collection. Currently there is no consensus on reliability analysis approaches. Traditional methods have clearly limitations, but more dynamic approaches are still in trial stage and can be difficult to apply in full scale probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). The number of PSAs worldwide including reliability models of digital I and C systems are few. A comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review on main international references have been performed in this pre-study project. The study shows a wide range of approaches, and also indicates that no state-of-the-art currently exists. The study shows areas where the different PSAs agree and gives the basis for development of a common taxonomy for reliability analysis of digital systems. It is still an open matter whether software reliability needs to be explicitly modelled in the PSA. The most important issue concerning software reliability is proper descriptions of the impact that software-based systems has on the dependence between the safety functions and the structure of accident sequences. In general the conventional fault tree approach seems to be sufficient for modelling reactor protection system kind of functions. The following focus areas have been identified for further activities: 1. Common taxonomy of hardware and software failure modes of digital components for common use 2. Guidelines regarding level of detail in system analysis and screening of components, failure modes and dependencies 3. Approach for modelling of CCF between components (including software). (Author)

  12. Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context. Phase 1 status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Authen, S.; Larsson, J. (Risk Pilot AB, Stockholm (Sweden)); Bjoerkman, K.; Holmberg, J.-E. (VTT, Helsingfors (Finland))

    2010-12-15

    Digital protection and control systems are appearing as upgrades in older nuclear power plants (NPPs) and are commonplace in new NPPs. To assess the risk of NPP operation and to determine the risk impact of digital system upgrades on NPPs, quantitative reliability models are needed for digital systems. Due to the many unique attributes of these systems, challenges exist in systems analysis, modeling and in data collection. Currently there is no consensus on reliability analysis approaches. Traditional methods have clearly limitations, but more dynamic approaches are still in trial stage and can be difficult to apply in full scale probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). The number of PSAs worldwide including reliability models of digital I and C systems are few. A comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review on main international references have been performed in this pre-study project. The study shows a wide range of approaches, and also indicates that no state-of-the-art currently exists. The study shows areas where the different PSAs agree and gives the basis for development of a common taxonomy for reliability analysis of digital systems. It is still an open matter whether software reliability needs to be explicitly modelled in the PSA. The most important issue concerning software reliability is proper descriptions of the impact that software-based systems has on the dependence between the safety functions and the structure of accident sequences. In general the conventional fault tree approach seems to be sufficient for modelling reactor protection system kind of functions. The following focus areas have been identified for further activities: 1. Common taxonomy of hardware and software failure modes of digital components for common use 2. Guidelines regarding level of detail in system analysis and screening of components, failure modes and dependencies 3. Approach for modelling of CCF between components (including software). (Author)

  13. Ringhals 1 PSA - Evaluation of safety raising measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hellstroem, P.; Enerholm, A.; Holmgren, P.

    1995-09-01

    A PSA-study of the BWR-reactor has been evaluated, and the following comments are made: The objectives of the study have been reached, but an overview is lacking. Means for verifying the functional demands at primary events should have a very high priority. A deeper analysis is needed to verify that overpressurizing and overfilling not cause HS. The analysis should include a report on dynamic effects at a LOCA. The level of detail in modelling functional dependencies should be increased. The low probabilities for faults caused by the operating personnel should be explained and possible defaults in instructions etc. documented. The results of the study should be analyzed deeper in comparison with other studies. Suggestions for improvement of the plant and priorities for these are missing. The documentation should be improved

  14. Level 2 PSA methodology and severe accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The objective of the work was to review current Level 2-PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) methodologies and practices and to investigate how Level 2-PSA can support severe accident management programmes, i.e. the development, implementation, training and optimisation of accident management strategies and measures. For the most part, the presented material reflects the state in 1996. Current Level 2 PSA results and methodologies are reviewed and evaluated with respect to plant type specific and generic insights. Approaches and practices for using PSA results in the regulatory context and for supporting severe accident management programmes by input from level 2 PSAs are examined. The work is based on information contained in: PSA procedure guides, PSA review guides and regulatory guides for the use of PSA results in risk informed decision making; plant specific PSAs and PSA related literature exemplifying specific procedures, methods, analytical models, relevant input data and important results, use of computer codes and results of code calculations. The PSAs are evaluated with respect to results and insights. In the conclusion section, the present state of risk informed decision making, in particular in the level 2 domain, is described and substantiated by relevant examples

  15. A framework for a quality assurance programme for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Reviews organized by the IAEA of probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) of nuclear facilities have, in the past years, shown significant progress in the technical methods and data used for these studies. The IAEA has made a considerable effort to support the development of technical capabilities for PSA in Member States and in writing technical procedures for carrying out PSAs. However, the reviews have also shown significant deficiencies in quality assurance (QA) for PSAs, ranging from no QA at all to inappropriate, inefficient or unbalanced QA. As a PSA represents a very complex model which describes the risk associated with a nuclear facility, an appropriate and efficient QA programme is crucial to obtain a quality PSA. Historically, in the first integral PSAs, many of the PSA elements were handled by independent groups. These elements were finally integrated and put together in the overall model. Many of the interfaces between the elements or tasks were handled as appropriate by exchanging information in oral or written form. Since WASH-1400, the first integral PSA, the process of constructing the PSA model has been further developed. PSA elements previously considered separately can now be handled together with the capable software developed in recent years. Software has made interface control and data transfer easier to perform, but also permits the development of more detailed and complex models. Previously, QA for PSA projects was organized in an ad hoc manner and was sometimes very limited. In recent years, increasingly comprehensive QA programmes have been developed and implemented for PSA projects. Today, a comprehensive, effective and performance-oriented QA is considered to be essential for a reliable and credible PSA. This report describes the framework for developing an adequate QA programme for PSA studies. The framework is based on and is in accordance with the related QA guidelines of the IAEA for safety in nuclear power plants and other nuclear

  16. An approach to develop a PSA workstation in KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, T. W.; Han, S. H.; Park, C. K.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes three kinds of efforts for the development of PSA workstation in KAERI; Development of a PSA tool, KIRAP, Reliability Database Development, Living PSA tool development. Korea has 9 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation and 9 NPPs under design or construction. For the NPPs recently constructed or designed, the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) have been performed by the Government requirements. For these PSAs, the MSDOS version of KIRAP has been used. For the consistent data management and the easiness of information handling needed in PSA, APSA workstation, KIRAP-Win is under development under Windows environment. For the reliability database on component failure rate, human error rate, and common cause failure rate, data used in international PSA or reliability data handbook are collected and processed to use in Korean new plants' PSAs. Finally, an effort for the development of a living PSA tool in KAERI based on dynamic PSA concept is described

  17. Management and organisational factors in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.

    1999-01-01

    The constraints of PSA are increasingly considered with increasing application of PSA for the safety management of nuclear power plants (see US-NRC, 'Risk Informed Regulation', NRC-1). There is a vivid international discourse about the applicability of the variables of plant management and organisation in PSAs, which has lead to a great variety of research activities into this matter (see PSAM 4). This paper here summarizes the current state of progress of research work and discusses the applicability of results. The studies for comparative assessment of methodology and results were performed by the TUeV Nord under the roof of the BMU/BfS-sponsored project SR 2260, ''Further development of probabilistic methods for nuclear power plant safety assessment. (orig./CB) [de

  18. Level-1 PSA to support the design of the KALIMER-600 Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Sang Hoon; Kim, Tae-Woon; Jeong, Hae-Yong; Han, Seok Joong; Ahn, Kwang-Il; Yang, Joon-Eon

    2012-01-01

    A sodium-cooled fast reactor, KALIMER-600, is under development. Its fuel is the metal fuel of U-TRU-Zr and it uses sodium as a coolant. KALIMER-600 has passive safety features such as passive shutdown functions, passive pump coast-down features, and passive decay heat removal systems. It has inherent reactivity feedback effects. The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) will be one of the initiating subjects for designing KALIMER-600 from the aspects of risk informed design. A preliminary level-1 internal full power PSA has been performed to evaluate the safety level and its applicability for the KALIMER-600 conceptual design. Various design alternatives are evaluated from the viewpoint of PSA in order to support the design of the KALIMER-600. Sensitivity studies are also performed to evaluate the assumptions made for the PSA. The applicability and weakness of the KALIMER-600 PSA are discussed. The technical issues to be solved in performing the PSA will be discussed. (authors)

  19. Computer codes for level 1 probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-06-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) entails several laborious tasks suitable for computer codes assistance. This guide identifies these tasks, presents guidelines for selecting and utilizing computer codes in the conduct of the PSA tasks and for the use of PSA results in safety management and provides information on available codes suggested or applied in performing PSA in nuclear power plants. The guidance is intended for use by nuclear power plant system engineers, safety and operating personnel, and regulators. Large efforts are made today to provide PC-based software systems and PSA processed information in a way to enable their use as a safety management tool by the nuclear power plant overall management. Guidelines on the characteristics of software needed for management to prepare a software that meets their specific needs are also provided. Most of these computer codes are also applicable for PSA of other industrial facilities. The scope of this document is limited to computer codes used for the treatment of internal events. It does not address other codes available mainly for the analysis of external events (e.g. seismic analysis) flood and fire analysis. Codes discussed in the document are those used for probabilistic rather than for phenomenological modelling. It should be also appreciated that these guidelines are not intended to lead the user to selection of one specific code. They provide simply criteria for the selection. Refs and tabs

  20. Regulatory approaches to, and practice of, PSA in Finland, France, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baier, M.; Schaefer, A.

    2005-01-01

    Performing level-1 probabilistic safety analyses (PSA) is the established standard in most countries using nuclear power. In addition, level-2 PSA has become more and more widespread over the past few years. However, regulatory requirements and practice differ from country to country, especially with respect to level-2 analyses. In an effort to determine these differences more precisely, the ISaR Institute for Safety and Reliability, on behalf of VGB PowerTech Service GmbH, conducted a study of these seven countries: Finland, France, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The study focused on level-2 PSA carried out by plant operators within the framework of periodic safety reviews. The findings of the study are based on extensive interviews of at least one expert each on the operators' and the authorities' side for each of the seven countries. Points taken into account in particular included the criteria imposed by regulators on PSA carried out by operators; the rank of PSA within the regulatory framework; the required versus the actual scopes of analysis; the objectives and uses of PSA; reviews of the analyses; the methods employed. (orig.)

  1. PSA results and trends for Spain's NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carretero, J.A.

    1993-01-01

    The Spain regulatory authority CSN demanded performance of PSA for all Spain nuclear power plants. The specific data analysis carried out as a part of the PSA has contributed to the realistic view on the results which could be achieved by the PSA. The main characteristics of the PSA in Spain and PSA trends in the development are presented in the paper

  2. Study on communicating risk information obtained from PSA within nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nunogane, Nobuaki; Onoue, Akira; Kojima, Shigeo

    2000-01-01

    In this study, the communication of PSA information in nuclear power plants (NPPs), namely, how the risk information obtained from the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) should be presented and communicated to plant personnel, was examined assuming that the safety management system based on the risk information was introduced to NPPs. This is called PSA communication. First, when risk-informed safety management is to be introduced into NPPs, plant personnel should have sufficient related knowledge. In order to provide such knowledge to the personnel through training, risk information is classified into three types: basic information, detailed information and task information. A hierarchical risk information summary for reporting, coordinating and communicating tasks is proposed. In this summary, the concerns of those who have received the information are placed at the top and the related risk information positioned below. At the same time, and by way of a trial, the risk information relating to on-line maintenance (OLM) is prepared. In order to enhance the safety-consciousness and the safety of the entire plant, specific plans such as 'risk tags' which indicate the safety significance of equipment is proposed. Finally, a guideline providing examination procedures for developing detailed PSA communication plans is introduced. (author)

  3. Severe accident management at the Loviisa NPP - Application of integrated ROAAM and PSA level 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siltanen, S.; Routamo, T.; Tuomisto, H.; Lundstrom, P.

    2007-01-01

    The Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology (ROAAM) was developed for assessment and management of rare, high consequence hazards. The purpose of most ROAAM applications has been to solve major, isolated severe accident issues related to early containment failure such as Mark-I Liner Attack and Direct Containment Heating. In addition to ROAAM in the issue resolution context, the so called Integrated ROAAM approach can be used to provide an overall frame of safety evaluation that allows determination of whether an adequate level of safety has been achieved for a plant. Integrated ROAAM approach brings together quantifications of probabilistic elements based on statistical inference and treatment of deterministic elements based on identification of dominant physics, for severe accident phenomenology, in a well defined and clearly structured way. Fortum, as an owner of the Loviisa NPP, used the Integrated ROAAM approach when developing and implementing a comprehensive severe accident management (SAM) strategy for the Loviisa NPP. The SAM strategy is based on unique features of this VVER-440 plant with ice condenser containment and it includes hardware modifications at the plant, substantial new I and C qualified for severe accident conditions, new SAM guidelines, a SAM Handbook, revision of emergency preparedness organization, and versatile training approaches. It could be argued that the resolution of individual severe accident issues is not sufficient for assessing the overall safety of a nuclear power plant, and thus the ROAAM (in an issue resolution context) is not performing the same function as a PSA study (level 2 included). Actually the Integrated ROAAM approach takes on even a more ambitious task than the PSA, since it determines how a balance can be achieved between accident prevention and mitigation of containment-threatening physical phenomena. Thus it provides a tool for implementing a sound diverse defence-in-depth strategy at a plant. Integrated

  4. Experience in PSA fault tree modularization at the ASCO NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nos Llorens, V.; Frances Urmeneta, M.; Fraig Sureda, J.

    1995-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is a basic tool in decision-making for the optimization of back fittings, procedures and maintenance practices. ASCO NPP PSA was developed with a high level of detail in the models. This required considerable computer resources (long running time) to carry out the quantification. The quantification time had therefore to be flexible to allow continuous evaluation of the impact on the estimation and reduction of risk in the plant, and also to facilitate post-PSA applications. The most suitable way of achieving this flexibility was by compacting and reducing the detailed fault trees of the project by means of a modularization process. The purpose of the paper is to present the practical experience acquired with modularization carried out in the UTE UNITEC-INYPSA-EMPRESARIOS AGRUPADOS framework and the method applied, the support computer programs devised and their degree of effectiveness. (Author)

  5. MODIFICATION OF THE SPAR-H METHOD TO SUPPORT HRA FOR LEVEL 2 PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    St. Germain, S.; Boring, R.; Banaseanu, G.; Akl, Y.; Xu, M.

    2016-10-01

    Currently, available Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods were generally developed to support Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) models. There has been an increased emphasis placed on Level 2 PSA in recent years; however, the currently used HRA methods are not ideal for this application, including the SPAR-H method. Challenges that will likely be present during a severe accident such as degraded or hazardous operating conditions, shift in control from the main control room to the technical support center, unavailability of instrumentation, and others are not routinely considered for Level 1 HRA analysis. These factors combine to create a much more uncertain condition to be accounted for in the HRA analysis. While the SPAR-H shaping factors were established to support Level 1 HRA, previous studies have shown it may be used for Level 2 HRA analysis as well. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a joint project are investigating modifications to the SPAR-H method to create more consistency in applying the performance shaping factors used in the method for Level 2 analysis.

  6. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoo, Keon Joong; Kim, Dong Soo; Kim, Hui Dong; Park, Chang Kyu

    1993-06-01

    To improve the nuclear safety, this project is divided into three areas which are the development of safety analysis technology, the development of severe accident analysis technology and the development of integrated safety assessment technology. 1. The development of safety analysis technology. The present research aims at the development of necessary technologies for nuclear safety analysis in Korea. Establishment of the safety analysis technologies enables to reduce the expenditure both by eliminating excessive conservatisms incorporated in nuclear reactor design and by increasing safety margins in operation. It also contributes to improving plant safety through realistic analyses of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP). 2. The development of severe accident analysis technology. By the computer codes (MELCOR and CONTAIN), the in-vessel and the ex-vessel severe accident phenomena are simulated. 3. The development of integrated safety assessment technology. In the development of integrated safety assessment techniques, the included research areas are the improvement of PSA computer codes, the basic study on the methodology for human reliability analysis (HRA) and common cause failure (CCF). For the development of the level 2 PSA computer code, the basic research for the interface between level 1 and 2 PSA, the methodology for the treatment of containment event tree are performed. Also the new technologies such as artificial intelligence, object-oriented programming techniques are used for the improvement of computer code and the assessment techniques

  7. Generation of risk importance information from severe accident PSA model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Mi Ro; Kim, Hyeong Taek; Moon, Chan Kook

    2012-01-01

    One of the important objects conducting Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is the relative evaluation of importance of the component or function that is greatly affected to the plant safety. This evaluation is performed by the importance assessment methods such as Risk Reduction Worth, Risk Achievement Worth, and Fuss el Vessley method from the aspect of core damage frequency (CDF). In the Level 1 PSA model, the importance of each component can be evaluated since the CDF is calculated by the combination of the branch probability of event tree and the component failure probability in the fault tree. But, the Level 2 PSA model in order to assess the containment integrity cannot evaluate the risk importance by the above methods because the model is consisted of 3 parts, plant damage status, containment event tree, and source term category. So, in the field that the Level 2 PSA risk importance information should be reflected, such as maintenance rule program, risk importance has been determined by the subjective judgment of the model developer. This study was performed in order to generate the risk importance information more objectively and systematically in the Level 2 PSA model, focused on the containment event tree in the domain PHWR Level 2 PSA model

  8. A preliminary investigation of PSA validation methods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Unwin, S D [Science Applications International Corp., (United States)

    1995-09-01

    This document has been prepared to support the initial phase of the Atomic Energy Control Board`s program to review and evaluate Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) studies conducted by nuclear generating station designers and licensees. The document provides (1) a review of current and prospective applications of PSA technology in the Canadian nuclear power industry; (2) an assessment of existing practices and techniques for the review or risk and hazard identification studies in the international nuclear power sector and other technological sectors; and (3) proposed analytical framework in which to develop systematic techniques for the scrutiny and evaluation of a PSA model. These frameworks are based on consideration of the mathematical structure of a PSA model and are intended to facilitate the development of methods to evaluate a model relative to intended end-uses. (author). 34 refs., 10 tabs., 3 figs.

  9. A preliminary investigation of PSA validation methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Unwin, S.D.

    1995-09-01

    This document has been prepared to support the initial phase of the Atomic Energy Control Board's program to review and evaluate Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) studies conducted by nuclear generating station designers and licensees. The document provides (1) a review of current and prospective applications of PSA technology in the Canadian nuclear power industry; (2) an assessment of existing practices and techniques for the review or risk and hazard identification studies in the international nuclear power sector and other technological sectors; and (3) proposed analytical framework in which to develop systematic techniques for the scrutiny and evaluation of a PSA model. These frameworks are based on consideration of the mathematical structure of a PSA model and are intended to facilitate the development of methods to evaluate a model relative to intended end-uses. (author). 34 refs., 10 tabs., 3 figs

  10. State of the art on the probabilistic safety assessment (P.S.A.); Etat de l'art sur les etudes probabilistes de surete (E.P.S.)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Devictor, N.; Bassi, A.; Saignes, P.; Bertrand, F

    2008-07-01

    The use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is internationally increasing as a means of assessing and improving the safety of nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. To support the development of a competence on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, a set of states of the art regarding these tools and their use has been made between 2001 and 2005, in particular on the following topics: - Definition of the PSA of level 1, 2 and 3; - Use of PSA in support to design and operation of nuclear plants (risk-informed applications); - Applications to Non Reactor Nuclear Facilities. The report compiled in a single document these states of the art in order to ensure a broader use; this work has been done in the frame of the Project 'Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Facility' of the Nuclear Development and Innovation Division of the Nuclear Energy Division. As some of these states of the art have been made in support to exchanges with international partners and were written in English, a section of this document is written in English. This work is now applied concretely in support to the design of 4. Generation nuclear systems as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors and especially Gas-cooled Fast Reactor, that have been the subject of communications during the conferences ANS (Annual Meeting 2007), PSA'08, ICCAP'08 and in the journal Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations. (authors)

  11. Swiss-Slovak cooperation program: a training strategy for safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarcek, J.

    2000-01-01

    During the 1996-1999 period, a new training strategy for safety analyses was implemented at the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority (UJD) within the Swiss-Slovak cooperation programme in nuclear safety (SWISSLOVAK). The SWISSLOVAK project involved the recruitment, training, and integration of the newly established team into UJD's organizational structure. The training strategy consisted primarily of the following two elements: a) Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) applications (regulatory review and technical evaluation of Level-1/Level-2 PSAs; PSA-based operational events analysis, PSA applications to assessment of Technical Specifications; and PSA-based hardware and/or procedure modifications) and b) Deterministic accident analyses (analysis of accidents and regulatory review of licensee Safety Analysis Reports; analysis of severe accidents/radiological releases and the potential impact of the containment and engineered safety systems, including the development of technical bases for emergency response planning; and application of deterministic methods for evaluation of accident management strategies/procedure modifications). The paper discusses the specific aspects of the training strategy performed at UJD in both the probabilistic and deterministic areas. The integration of team into UJD's organizational structure is described and examples of contributions of the team to UJD's statutory responsibilities are provided. (author)

  12. An Initiating-Event Analysis for PSA of Hanul Units 3 and 4: Results and Insights

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Dong-San; Park, Jin Hee

    2015-01-01

    As a part of the PSA, an initiating-event (IE) analysis was newly performed by considering the current state of knowledge and the requirements of the ASME/ANS probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard related to IE analysis. This paper describes the methods of, results and some insights from the IE analysis for the PSA of the Hanul units 3 and 4. In this study, as a part of the PSA for the Hanul units 3 and 4, an initiating-event (IE) analysis was newly performed by considering the current state of knowledge and the requirements of the ASME/ANS probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard. In comparison with the previous IE analysis, this study performed a more systematic and detailed analysis to identify potential initiating events, and calculated the IE frequencies by using the state-of-the-art methods and the latest data. As a result, not a few IE frequencies are quite different from the previous frequencies, which can change the major accident sequences obtained from the quantification of the PSA model

  13. Qualitative safety analysis in accelerator based systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sarkar, P.K.; Chowdhury, Lekha M.

    2006-01-01

    In recent developments connected to high energy and high current accelerators, the accelerator driven systems (ADS) and the Radioactive Ion Beam (RIB) facilities come in the forefront of application. For medical and industrial applications high current accelerators often need to be located in populated areas. These facilities pose significant radiological hazard during their operation and accidental situations. We have done a qualitative evaluation of radiological safety analysis using the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) methods for accelerator-based systems. The major contribution to hazard comes from a target rupture scenario in both ADS and RIB facilities. Other significant contributors to hazard in the facilities are also discussed using fault tree and event tree methodologies. (author)

  14. Influence of Non-safety Important Component on Maintenance Rule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ju, Tae Young; Kim, Wang Bae

    2016-01-01

    The Maintenance Rule (MR) programs in KHNP have been implemented since Jan 2009. KHNP is currently developing MR program for new built plant which has been constructed from December 2011. It is required to utilize plant-specific probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) result as risk significant criteria to determine which components are significantly important to safety. The criteria consist of three PSA risk values which are risk reduction worth (RRW), risk achievement worth (RAW) and core damage frequency (CDF) contribution. Most safety related components are classified as high risk significant, and non-safety related components as low safety significant in MR program. This paper presents the influence of the non-safety related component which has high PSA risk value on MR program of new built plant. It is considered that safety related system has at least one or more safety functions and some non-safety functions, but non-safety system doesn't have any safety function. The safety functions are defined as three functions which are required to maintain 1) integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary, 2) capability to shut-down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown, and 3) capability to prevent or mitigate the accident that could result in potential offsite exposure. The Maintenance Rule program is developed based on PSA result. Safety functions have high risk value in PSA program and considered HSS function in MR program. On the contrary, non-safety functions are generally has low risk value in PSA program and they are determined as LSS function in MR program. The AAC DG and its supporting systems are designed as non-safety systems which mean they don't have any safety function. But, AAC DG is treated as an important measure to mitigate accident in PSA program. It is determined as HSS function in MR program because it has high risk value in PSA program. AAC DG supporting systems does not have high risk value in operating plant's PSA program

  15. A design-phase PSA of a nuclear-powered hydrogen plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, Pamela F.; Flores, Alain; Francois, Juan Luis

    2007-01-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is being developed for a steam-methane reforming hydrogen production plant linked to a high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactor (HTGR). This work is based on the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute's (JAERI) High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR) prototype in Japan. The objective of this paper is to show how the PSA can be used for improving the design of the coupled plants. A simplified HAZOP study was performed to identify initiating events, based on existing studies. The results of the PSA show that the average frequency of an accident at this complex that could affect the population is 7 x 10 -8 year -1 which is divided into the various end states. The dominant sequences are those that result in a methane explosion and occur with a frequency of 6.5 x 10 -8 year -1 , while the other sequences are much less frequent. The health risk presents itself if there are people in the vicinity who could be affected by the explosion. This analysis also demonstrates that an accident in one of the plants has little effect on the other. This is true given the design base distance between the plants, the fact that the reactor is underground, as well as other safety characteristics of the HTGR

  16. Insights from the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Application to Subsurface Operations at the Preclosure Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Mee Jeong; Jung, Jong Tae

    2009-01-01

    In this paper, we present the insights obtained through the PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) application to subsurface operation at the preclosure facilities of the repository. At present, medium-low level waste repository has been constructed in Korea, and studies for disposal of high level wastes are under way. Also, safety analysis for repository operation has been performed. Thus, we performed a probabilistic safety analysis for surface operation at the preclosure facilities with PSA methodology for a nuclear power plant. Since we don't have a code to analyze the waste repository safety analysis, we used the codes, AIMS (Advanced Information Management System for PSA) and FTREX (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) which are developed for a nuclear power plant's PSA to develop ET (Event Tree) and FT (Fault Tree), and to quantify for an example analysis

  17. Probabilistic safety assessment for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    Increasing interest in using Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods for research reactor safety is being observed in many countries throughout the world. This is mainly because of the great ability of this approach in achieving safe and reliable operation of research reactors. There is also a need to assist developing countries to apply Probabilistic Safety Assessment to existing nuclear facilities which are simpler and therefore less complicated to analyse than a large Nuclear Power Plant. It may be important, therefore, to develop PSA for research reactors. This might also help to better understand the safety characteristics of the reactor and to base any backfitting on a cost-benefit analysis which would ensure that only necessary changes are made. This document touches on all the key aspects of PSA but placed greater emphasis on so-called systems analysis aspects rather than the in-plant or ex-plant consequences

  18. Applicability of PSA Issues for Risk Assessment during Optimisation of In-Service Inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kolykhanov, V.; Skalozubov, V.; Kovrigkin, Y.

    2006-01-01

    The current codes determining periodicity of in-service inspection of the NPP equipment have been formed using deterministic approaches and have an unnecessary degree of conservatism. A perspective direction of perfection of normative base is decision making on a basis of risk-informed methodologies. It allows to increase safety of NPP equipment's operation and to optimise programs on inspection of the equipment subject to limited resources by focusing efforts on the most safety significant elements of the equipment. It is internationally accepted that methodology of the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is the most universal and comprehensive tool focused on the general assessment of safety of NPP as a whole. By now, PSA Level 1 is fulfilled for all pilot units of the Ukrainian NPPs that is a valuable result, which should be taken into account at an assessment of reliability of the equipment. However, specificity of PSA methodology should be taken into account at the decision of the particular tasks aimed at optimisation of maintenance of the equipment within individual systems. The estimation of the contribution to core damage frequency (CDF) is a PSA issue usually used to assess the significance of consequences of failure of a system/equipment during risk-informed decision-making. This work shows that above factor is only a part of assessment of the significance of consequences as core damage can be expressed in different amount of the damaged fuel elements and, hence, severity of consequences. Besides CDF is directly affected only by active elements which failure can be an initiating event. PSA methodology uses averaged reliability factors of the equipment for all possible operating modes occurring at transitive accident process. Here, there are limited opportunities to account impact of periodicity of maintenance of the equipment on reliability and to predict impact of change of the inspection program. PSA methodology does not allow taking into account

  19. Evaluating the Phoenix definition of biochemical failure after (125)I prostate brachytherapy: Can PSA kinetics distinguish PSA failures from PSA bounces?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, Anna; Keyes, Mira; Pickles, Tom; Palma, David; Moravan, Veronika; Spadinger, Ingrid; Lapointe, Vincent; Morris, W James

    2010-10-01

    To evaluate the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) kinetics of PSA failure (PSAf) and PSA bounce (PSAb) after permanent (125)I prostate brachytherapy (PB). The study included 1,006 consecutive low and "low tier" intermediate-risk patients treated with (125)I PB, with a potential minimum follow-up of 4 years. Patients who met the Phoenix definition of biochemical failure (nadir + 2 ng/mL(-1)) were identified. If the PSA subsequently fell to ≤0.5 ng/mL(-1)without intervention, this was considered a PSAb. All others were scored as true PSAf. Patient, tumor and dosimetric characteristics were compared between groups using the chi-square test and analysis of variance to evaluate factors associated with PSAf or PSAb. Median follow-up was 54 months. Of the 1,006 men, 57 patients triggered the Phoenix definition of PSA failure, 32 (56%) were true PSAf, and 25 PSAb (44%). The median time to trigger nadir + 2 was 20.6 months (range, 6-36) vs. 49 mo (range, 12-83) for PSAb vs. PSAf groups (p < 0.001). The PSAb patients were significantly younger (p < 0.0001), had shorter time to reach the nadir (median 6 vs. 11.5 months, p = 0.001) and had a shorter PSA doubling time (p = 0.05). Men younger than age 70 who trigger nadir +2 PSA failure within 38 months of implant have an 80% likelihood of having PSAb and 20% chance of PSAf. With adequate follow-up, 44% of PSA failures by the Phoenix definition in our cohort were found to be benign PSA bounces. Our study reinforces the need for adequate follow-up when reporting PB PSA outcomes, to ensure accurate estimates of treatment efficacy and to avoid unnecessary secondary interventions. 2010. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Evaluating the Phoenix Definition of Biochemical Failure After 125I Prostate Brachytherapy: Can PSA Kinetics Distinguish PSA Failures From PSA Bounces?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, Anna; Keyes, Mira; Pickles, Tom

    2010-01-01

    Purpose: To evaluate the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) kinetics of PSA failure (PSAf) and PSA bounce (PSAb) after permanent 125 I prostate brachytherapy (PB). Methods and Materials: The study included 1,006 consecutive low and 'low tier' intermediate-risk patients treated with 125 I PB, with a potential minimum follow-up of 4 years. Patients who met the Phoenix definition of biochemical failure (nadir + 2 ng/mL -1 ) were identified. If the PSA subsequently fell to ≤0.5 ng/mL -1 without intervention, this was considered a PSAb. All others were scored as true PSAf. Patient, tumor and dosimetric characteristics were compared between groups using the chi-square test and analysis of variance to evaluate factors associated with PSAf or PSAb. Results: Median follow-up was 54 months. Of the 1,006 men, 57 patients triggered the Phoenix definition of PSA failure, 32 (56%) were true PSAf, and 25 PSAb (44%). The median time to trigger nadir + 2 was 20.6 months (range, 6-36) vs. 49 mo (range, 12-83) for PSAb vs. PSAf groups (p < 0.001). The PSAb patients were significantly younger (p < 0.0001), had shorter time to reach the nadir (median 6 vs. 11.5 months, p = 0.001) and had a shorter PSA doubling time (p = 0.05). Men younger than age 70 who trigger nadir +2 PSA failure within 38 months of implant have an 80% likelihood of having PSAb and 20% chance of PSAf. Conclusions: With adequate follow-up, 44% of PSA failures by the Phoenix definition in our cohort were found to be benign PSA bounces. Our study reinforces the need for adequate follow-up when reporting PB PSA outcomes, to ensure accurate estimates of treatment efficacy and to avoid unnecessary secondary interventions.

  1. Effect Analysis of Digital I and C Systems on Plant Safety based on Fault-Tree Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Seung Jun; Jung, Wondea

    2014-01-01

    Deterioration and an inadequate supply of components of analog I and C systems have led to inefficient and costly maintenance. Moreover, since the fast evolution of digital technology has enabled more reliable functions to be designed for NPP safety, the transition from analog to digital has been accelerated. Owing to the distinguishable characteristics of digital I and C systems, a reliability analysis of digital systems has become an important element of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Digital I and C systems have unique characteristics such as fault-tolerant techniques and software. However, these features have not been properly considered yet in most NPP PSA models. The effect of digital I and C systems should be evaluated by comparing them to that of analog I and C systems. Before installing a digital I and C system, even though it is expected that the plant safety can be improved through the advantageous features of digital I and C systems, it should be validated whether the total NPP safety is better than analog systems or is the same at least. In this work, the fault-tree (FT) technique, which is most widely used in a PSA, was used to compare the effects of analog and digital I and C systems. From a case study, the results of plant safety were compared. In this work, the effect of a digital RPS was evaluated by comparing it to that of an analog RPS based on the FT models. In the evaluation results, it was observed that digital RPS has a positive effect on reducing the system unavailability. The analysis results can be used for the development of a guide for evaluating digital I and C systems and reliability requirements

  2. Review of probabilistic safety assessments by regulatory bodies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This report provides guidance to assist regulatory bodies in carrying out reviews of the PSAs produced by utilities. In following this guidance, it is important that the regulatory body is able to satisfy itself that the PSA has been carried out to an acceptable standard and that it can be used for its intended applications. The review process becomes an important phase in determining the acceptability of the PSA since this provides a degree of assurance of the PSA scope, validity and limitations, as well as a better understanding of plants themselves. This report is also intended to assist technical experts managing or performing PSA reviews. A particular aim is to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for the results of PSA reviews. The information presented in this report supports IAEA Safety Guide No. GS-G-1.2. Recommendations on the scope and methods to be used by the utility in the preparation of a PSA study is provided in IAEA Safety Guide No. NSG- 1.2. Information on these Safety Guides and other IAEA safety standards for nuclear power plants can be found on the following Internet site: http://www.iaea.org/ns/coordinet. The scope of this report covers the review of Level 1, 2 and 3 PSAs for event sequences occurring in all modes of plant operation (including full power, low power and shutdown). Where the scope of the analysis is narrower than this, a subset of the guidance can be identified and used. Information is provided on carrying out the review of a PSA throughout the PSA production process, i.e. from the initial decision to carry out the PSA through to the completion of the study and the production of the final PSA report. However, the same procedure can be applied to a completed PSA or to one already in progress. As a result of the performance of a PSA, changes to the design or operation of the plant are often identified that would increase the level of safety. This might include the addition of further safety

  3. The percentage of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) isoform [-2]proPSA and the Prostate Health Index improve the diagnostic accuracy for clinically relevant prostate cancer at initial and repeat biopsy compared with total PSA and percentage free PSA in men aged ≤65 years.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boegemann, Martin; Stephan, Carsten; Cammann, Henning; Vincendeau, Sébastien; Houlgatte, Alain; Jung, Klaus; Blanchet, Jean-Sebastien; Semjonow, Axel

    2016-01-01

    To prospectively test the diagnostic accuracy of the percentage of prostate specific antigen (PSA) isoform [-2]proPSA (%p2PSA) and the Prostate Health Index (PHI), and to determine their role for discrimination between significant and insignificant prostate cancer at initial and repeat prostate biopsy in men aged ≤65 years. The diagnostic performance of %p2PSA and PHI were evaluated in a multicentre study. In all, 769 men aged ≤65 years scheduled for initial or repeat prostate biopsy were recruited in four sites based on a total PSA (t-PSA) level of 1.6-8.0 ng/mL World Health Organization (WHO) calibrated (2-10 ng/mL Hybritech-calibrated). Serum samples were measured for the concentration of t-PSA, free PSA (f-PSA) and p2PSA with Beckman Coulter immunoassays on Access-2 or DxI800 instruments. PHI was calculated as (p2PSA/f-PSA × √t-PSA). Uni- and multivariable logistic regression models and an artificial neural network (ANN) were complemented by decision curve analysis (DCA). In univariate analysis %p2PSA and PHI were the best predictors of prostate cancer detection in all patients (area under the curve [AUC] 0.72 and 0.73, respectively), at initial (AUC 0.67 and 0.69) and repeat biopsy (AUC 0.74 and 0.74). t-PSA and %f-PSA performed less accurately for all patients (AUC 0.54 and 0.62). For detection of significant prostate cancer (based on Prostate Cancer Research International Active Surveillance [PRIAS] criteria) the %p2PSA and PHI equally demonstrated best performance (AUC 0.70 and 0.73) compared with t-PSA and %f-PSA (AUC 0.54 and 0.59). In multivariate analysis PHI we added to a base model of age, prostate volume, digital rectal examination, t-PSA and %f-PSA. PHI was strongest in predicting prostate cancer in all patients, at initial and repeat biopsy and for significant prostate cancer (AUC 0.73, 0.68, 0.78 and 0.72, respectively). In DCA for all patients the ANN showed the broadest threshold probability and best net benefit. PHI as single parameter

  4. Real-life experience of using conventional disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs (DMARDs) in psoriatic arthritis (PsA). Retrospective analysis of the efficacy of methotrexate, sulfasalazine, and leflunomide in PsA in comparison to spondyloarthritides other than PsA and literature review of the use of conventional DMARDs in PsA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roussou, Euthalia; Bouraoui, Aicha

    2017-01-01

    Objective With the aim of assessing the response to treatment with conventional disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs (DMARDs) used in patients with psoriatic arthritis (PsA), data on methotrexate, sulfasalazine (SSZ), and leflunomide were analyzed from baseline and subsequent follow-up (FU) questionnaires completed by patients with either PsA or other spondyloarthritides (SpAs). Material and Methods A single-center real-life retrospective analysis was performed by obtaining clinical data via questionnaires administered before and after treatment. The indices used were erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR), C-reactive protein (CRP) level, Bath Ankylosing Spondylitis Disease Activity Index (BASDAI), Bath Ankylosing Spondylitis Function Index (BASFI), wellbeing (WB), and treatment effect (TxE). The indices measured at baseline were compared with those measured on one occasion in a FU visit at least 1 year later. Results A total of 73 patients, 51 with PsA (mean age 49.8±12.8 years; male-to-female ratio [M:F]=18:33) and 22 with other SpAs (mean age 50.6±16 years; M:F=2:20), were studied. BASDAI, BASFI, and WB displayed consistent improvements during FU assessments in both PsA patients and controls in comparison to baseline values. SSZ exhibited better efficacy as confirmed by TxE in both PsA patients and controls. ESR and CRP displayed no differences in either the PsA or the SpA group between the cases before and after treatment. Conclusion Real-life retrospective analysis of three DMARDs used in PsA (and SpAs other than PsA) demonstrated that all three DMARDs that were used brought about improvements in BASDAI, BASFI, TxE, and WB. However, the greatest improvements at FU were seen with SSZ use in both PsA and control cohorts. PMID:28293446

  5. A Joint Report on PSA for New and Advanced Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This report addresses the application of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to new and advanced nuclear reactors. As far as advanced reactors are concerned, the objectives were to characterize the ability of current PSA technology to address key questions regarding the development, acceptance and licensing of advanced reactor designs, to characterize the potential value of advanced PSA methods and tools for application to advanced reactors, and to develop recommendations for any needed developments regarding PSA for these reactors. As far as the design and commissioning of new nuclear power plants is concerned, the objectives were to identify and characterize current practices regarding the role of PSA, to identify key technical issues regarding PSA, lessons learned and issues requiring further work; to develop recommendations regarding the use of PSA, and to identify future international cooperative work on the identified issues. In order to reach these objectives, questionnaires had been sent to participating countries and organisations

  6. Problems of probabilistic safety assessment after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugiyama, Naoki

    2011-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology to assure nuclear safety is had great expectations of lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident and on the other hand this accident made actualized technical problems of PSA. Effectiveness of current PSA methodology for risk assessment was confirmed by comparing the accident development with accident scenario of PSA and equipment failure rate. From a viewpoint of nuclear safety objective and defense in depth approach of IAEA, technical problems of PSA were (1) extension of PSA for spent fuel pool and waste disposal system as well as level 3PSA for broader environmental contamination and (2) overlapping of accident scenario of plural unit site, balance of high quality plant management and preceding negation, treatment of uncertainty of external events, severe accident measure and human reliability analysis and reflection of disaster prevention capability to level 3PSA. In order to upgrade PSA technology, six proposals were described for nuclear safety and defense in depth, comprehensive evaluation scope and catch-up of latest technology, necessity of strategic preparation of PSA standard, human resources fostering and risk communication. (T. Tanaka)

  7. Proposed Regulatory Guideline on the PSA Quality for Risk-informed Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Ju; Choi, Jong Soo

    2005-01-01

    In the policy statement on nuclear safety issued by the Korean government in 1994, the introduction of risk-informed regulations in licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants was emphasized for the first time. It also describes the implementation of comprehensive safety assessment utilizing PSA (probabilistic safety assessment). Since then, because risk-informed environment and fundamentals had not been strong, several R and D on PSA and risk-informed regulation have been done even though their application has been delayed. However, today it is not the case. Since the follow-up policy statement (called Severe Accident Policy) was issued, which prescribes strong items such as PSA implementation and its periodic reassessment, reliability database, and risk monitoring program to the utility, we have a chance to easily get all kinds of risk information for improving current regulatory framework. In addition, with the overall availability of PSA results for all operating nuclear power plants, it is expected that many risk-informed applications (RIAs) will be submitted to the regulatory authority. In general, there are a lot of regulatory concerns associated with the quality assurance of licensee's submittals for RIA. It is also noted that making general requirements and touching specific check points are essential for the regulatory decision making process. This paper summarizes the structure and contents of our regulatory guideline for assuring PSA quality

  8. Results of level 1 PSA in Trillo 1 NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gomez, F.; Lopez, C.

    1998-01-01

    In July 1991, C. N. Trillo I was requested by the Spanish Regulatory Body (CSN) to perform a PSA that should include: - Level 1 PSA at power - Internal flooding analysis - Level 2 PSA including containment capacity analysis. - External event analyses (fires, external flooding, seismic events and other external events) - Risk analysis for off power conditions (shutdown and low power) - Risk analysis due to other sources of radioactivity In 1992 the Project Plan was issued and the PSA team for the performance of Level 1 PSA was established. Before finishing the Project, it was decided to develop a Phase B to take into account some important modifications that had been accomplished in the Plant and that, probably, could affect the results. Level 1 PSA was finished in March 1998. Both the results of the study and the main conclusions derived from the importance, uncertainty and sensibility analysis performed are presented in this paper. These results de not include the internal flooding analysis conclusions and correspond to PSA revision 0 that is currently being evaluated by the Spanish Regulatory Body. (Author)

  9. Plant Operation Station for HTR-PM Low Power and Shutdown operation Probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Tao; Tong Jiejuan

    2014-01-01

    Full range Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is one of key conditions for nuclear power plant (NPP) licensing according to the requirement of nuclear safety regulatory authority. High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor Pebble-bed Module (HTR-PM) has developed construction design and prepared for the charging license application. So after the normal power operation PSA submitted for review, the Low power and Shutdown operation Probabilistic safety analysis (LSPSA) also begin. The results of LSPSA will together with prior normal power PSA results to demonstrate the safety level of HTR-PM NPP Plant Operation Station (POS) is one of important terms in LSPSA. The definition of POS lays the foundation for LSPSA modeling. POS provides initial and boundary conditions for the following event tree and fault tree model development. The aim of this paper is to describe the state-of-the-art of POS definition for HTR-PM LSPSA. As for the first attempt to the high temperature gas cooled reactor module plant, the methodology and procedure of POS definition refers to the LWR LSPSA guidance, and adds to plant initial status analysis due to the HTR-PM characteristics. A specific set of POS grouping vectors is investigate and suggested for HTR-PM NPP, which reflects the characteristics of plant modularization and on-line refueling. As a result, seven POSs are given according to the grouping vectors at the end of the paper. They will be used to the LSPSA modelling and adjusted if necessary. The papers ’work may provide reference to the analogous NPP LSPSA. (author)

  10. Tolerability of risk, safety assessment principles and their implications for probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, D.J.F.; Campbell, J.F.

    1994-01-01

    This paper gives a regulatory view of probabilistic safety assessment as seen by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and in the light of the general regulatory risk aims set out in the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations (TOR) and in Safety assessment principles for nuclear plants (SAPs), prepared by NII on behalf of the HSE. Both of these publications were revised and republished in 1992. This paper describes the SAPs, together with the historical background, the motivation for review, the effects of the Sizewell and Hinkley Point C public inquiries, changes since the original versions, comparison with international standards and use in assessment. For new plant, probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is seen as an essential tool in balancing the safety of the design and in demonstrating compliance with TOR and the SAPs. (Author)

  11. Methodology for fire PSA during design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kollasko, Heiko; Blombach, Joerg

    2009-01-01

    Fire PSA is an essential part of a full scope level 1 PSA. Cable fires play an important role in fire PSA. Usually, cable routing is therefore modeled in detail. During the design of new nuclear power plants the information on cable routing is not yet available. However, for the use of probabilistic safety insights during the design and for licensing purposes a fire PSA may be requested. Therefore a methodology has been developed which makes use of the strictly divisional separation of redundancies in the design of modern nuclear power plants: cable routing is not needed within one division but replaced by the conservative assumption that all equipment fails due to a fire in the concerned division; critical fire areas are defined where components belonging to different divisions may be affected by a fire. For the determination of fire frequencies a component based approach is proposed. The resulting core damage frequencies due to fire are conservative. (orig.)

  12. PSA methodology including new design, operational and safety factors, 'Level of recognition of phenomena with a presumed dominant influence upon operational safety' (failures of conventional as well as non-conventional passive components, dependent failures, influence of operator, fires and external threats, digital control, organizational factors)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jirsa, P.

    2001-10-01

    The document represents a specific type of discussion of existing methodologies for the creation and application of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in light of the EUR document summarizing requirements placed by Western European NPP operators on the future design of nuclear power plants. A partial goal of this discussion consists in mapping, from the PSA point of view, those selected design, operational and/or safety factors of future NPPs that may be entirely new or, at least, newly addressed. Therefore, the terms of reference for this stage were formulated as follows: Assess current level of knowledge and procedures in the analysis of factors and phenomena with a dominant influence upon operational safety of new generation reactors, especially in the following areas: (1) Phenomenology of failure types and mechanisms and reliability of conventional passive safety system components; (2) Phenomenology of failure types and mechanisms and reliability of non-conventional passive components of newly designed safety systems; (3) Phenomenology of types and mechanisms of dependent failures; (4) Human factor role in new generation reactors and its effect upon safety; (5) Fire safety and other external threats to new nuclear installations; (6) Reliability of the digital systems of the I and C system and their effect upon safety; and (7) Organizational factors in new nuclear installations. (P.A.)

  13. State-of-the-art report on the current status of methodologies for seismic PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    There has never been an earthquake sufficiently damaging to any operating U.S. nuclear power station to cause safety concerns. In the past decade, there have been two very destructive earthquakes that were near enough to nuclear power stations to have caused at least temporary world-wide concern: the large Armenian earthquake of November, 1988, and the large Japanese earthquake near Kobe in January, 1995. However, in each case, these earthquakes produced only minor ground motion at the operating nuclear stations located close enough to merit some examination: in each case, inspections revealed essentially no damage, because the actual ground motions at the nuclear-plant sites were in both cases quite small and well within the design basis. Nor has there ever been any other earthquake known to have damaged a nuclear power station. Therefore, the published historical record is not adequate for the analysis discussed here. The frequency of potential earthquake-initiated core-damage accidents at a given nuclear-power station can only be known from calculations, using a combination of real-earthquake data, test data, models of various phenomena, and systems analysis. Despite the lack of actual earthquake experience at nuclear-power stations, almost every full-scope probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) that has examined earthquake-initiated accidents at nuclear power stations has found that this category represents one of the important initiator groups. Occasionally, one of the earthquake-initiated sequences is among the few largest contributors to calculated core-damage frequency and/or off-site risk. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that PSAs calculate a residual risk, which is judged to be acceptable by the regulatory authorities, and that the seismic contribution to this residual risk is what is being discussed here. Usually the potential accident sequences identified in the PSAs are very plant-specific in character, such that the specific vulnerability is

  14. Most significant preliminary results of the probabilistic safety analysis on the Juragua nuclear power plant; Resultados preliminares mas significativos del analysis probabilista de seguridad de la Central Nuclear de Juragua

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Perdomo, Manuel [Instituto Superior de Ciencia y Tecnologia Nuclear (ISCTN), La Habana (Cuba)

    1995-12-31

    Since 1990 the Group for PSA Development and Applications (GDA/APS) is working on the Level-1 PSA for the Juragua-1 NPP, as a part of an IAEA Technical Assistance Project. The main objective of this study, which is still under way, is to assess, in a preliminary way, the Reactor design safety to find its potential `weak points` at the construction stage, using a eneric data base. At the same time, the study allows the PSA team to familiarize with the plant design and analysis techniques for the future operational PSA of the plant. This paper presents the most significant preliminary results of the study, which reveal some advantages of the safety characteristics of the plant design in comparison with the homologous VVER-440 reactors and some areas, where including slight modifications would improve the plant safety, considering the level of detail at which the study is carried out. (author). 13 refs, 1 fig, 2 tabs.

  15. Identification of the vital digital assets based on PSA results analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Moon Kyoung; Seong, Poong Hyun [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Son, Han Seong [Joongbu Univiersity, Geumsan (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Hyundoo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    As the main systems for managing totally about the operation, control, monitoring, measurement, and safety function in an emergency, instrumentation and control systems (I and C) in nuclear power plants have been digitalized gradually for the precise operation and its convenience. The digitalization of infrastructure makes systems vulnerable to cyber threats and hybrid attacks. According to ICS-CERT report, as time goes by, the number of vulnerabilities in ICS industries increases rapidly. Recently, due to the digitalization of I and C, it has begun to rise the need of cyber security in the digitalized I and C in NPPs. However, there are too many critical digital assets (CDAs) in NPPs. More than 60% of the total critical systems are digital system. Addressing more than 100 security controls for each CDA needs too much effort for both licensee and inspector. It is necessary to focus on more significant CDAs for effective regulation. Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) results are analyzed in order to identify more significant CDAs which could evoke an accident of NPPs by digital malfunction or cyber-attacks. By eliciting minimal cut sets using fault tree analyses, accident-related CDAs are drawn. Also the CDAs that must be secured from outsiders are elicited in case of some accident scenario. It is expected that effective cyber security regulation based on the graded approach can be implemented. Furthermore, defense-in-depth of digital assets for NPPs safety can be built up. Digital technologies such as computers, control systems, and data networks currently play essential roles in modern NPPs. Further, the introduction of new digitalized technologies is also being considered. These digital technologies make the operation of NPPs more convenient and economical; however, they are inherently susceptible to problems such as digital malfunction of components or cyber-attacks. Recently, needs for cyber security on digitalized nuclear Instrumentation and Control (I and C

  16. Identification of the vital digital assets based on PSA results analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Moon Kyoung; Seong, Poong Hyun; Son, Han Seong; Kim, Hyundoo

    2016-01-01

    As the main systems for managing totally about the operation, control, monitoring, measurement, and safety function in an emergency, instrumentation and control systems (I and C) in nuclear power plants have been digitalized gradually for the precise operation and its convenience. The digitalization of infrastructure makes systems vulnerable to cyber threats and hybrid attacks. According to ICS-CERT report, as time goes by, the number of vulnerabilities in ICS industries increases rapidly. Recently, due to the digitalization of I and C, it has begun to rise the need of cyber security in the digitalized I and C in NPPs. However, there are too many critical digital assets (CDAs) in NPPs. More than 60% of the total critical systems are digital system. Addressing more than 100 security controls for each CDA needs too much effort for both licensee and inspector. It is necessary to focus on more significant CDAs for effective regulation. Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) results are analyzed in order to identify more significant CDAs which could evoke an accident of NPPs by digital malfunction or cyber-attacks. By eliciting minimal cut sets using fault tree analyses, accident-related CDAs are drawn. Also the CDAs that must be secured from outsiders are elicited in case of some accident scenario. It is expected that effective cyber security regulation based on the graded approach can be implemented. Furthermore, defense-in-depth of digital assets for NPPs safety can be built up. Digital technologies such as computers, control systems, and data networks currently play essential roles in modern NPPs. Further, the introduction of new digitalized technologies is also being considered. These digital technologies make the operation of NPPs more convenient and economical; however, they are inherently susceptible to problems such as digital malfunction of components or cyber-attacks. Recently, needs for cyber security on digitalized nuclear Instrumentation and Control (I and C

  17. Human performance analysis in the frame of probabilistic safety assessment of research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, Mita; Nitoi, Mirela; Apostol, Minodora; Turcu, I.; Florescu, Gh.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The analysis of operating experience has identified the importance of human performance in reliability and safety of research reactors. In Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of nuclear facilities, human performance analysis (HPA) is used in order to estimate human error contribution to the failure of system components or functions. HPA is a qualitative and quantitative analysis of human actions identified for error-likely situations or accident-prone situations. Qualitative analysis is used to identify all man-machine interfaces that can lead to an accident, types of human interactions which may mitigate or exacerbate the accident, types of human errors and performance shaping factors. Quantitative analysis is used to develop estimates of human error probability as effects of human performance in reliability and safety. The goal of this paper is to accomplish a HPA in the PSA frame for research reactors. Human error probabilities estimated as results of human actions analysis could be included in system event tree and/or system fault tree. The achieved sensitivity analyses determine human performance sensibility at systematically variations both for dependencies level between human actions and for operator stress level. The necessary information was obtained from operating experience of research reactor TRIGA from INR Pitesti. The required data were obtained from generic data bases. (authors)

  18. A review of the South Texas Project probabilistic safety analysis for accident frequency estimates and containment binning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wheeler, T.A.; Lambright, J.A.; Sype, T.T.; Darby, J.L.; Walsh, B.

    1991-08-01

    The objective of this review is to evaluate the South Texas Project (STP) Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for the USNRC. The PSA was reviewed for thoroughness of analysis, accuracy in plant modeling, legitimacy of assumptions, and overall quality of the work. The review is limited to the internal event analysis and the fire sequence analysis. This review is not a quantitative evaluation of the adequacy of the PSA. The adequacy of the PSA depends on the intended uses and must be addressed on a case-by-case basis by the licensee and the NRC. This review identifies strengths, weakness, and areas where additional clarification would assist the NRC in evaluating the PSA for specific regulatory purposes. The licensee, Houston Lighting and Power (HL ampersand P), reviewed a draft version of this report prior to its final release to the USNRC. The responses provided by HL ampersand P are provided in detail in appendices to this report, and they are summarized in the main body of the report. All issues raised during the review were adequately addressed by HL ampersand P in the responses. 27 refs., 4 tabs

  19. Comparison of SKIFS 2004:1 and Tillsynshandbok PSA against the ASME PRA Standard and European requirements on PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hellstroem, Per

    2005-04-01

    Requirements on PSA for risk informed applications are expressed in different international documents. The ASME PRA standard published in spring 2002 is one such document, PSA requirements are also expressed in the European Utility Requirements (EUR) for new reactors. The Swedish PSA requirements are provided in the Swedish regulators (SKI) statutes SKIFS 2004:1. SKI also has a review handbook for PSA activities (SKI report 2003:48). The review handbook is a support during review of the utilities PSA activities and the PSAs themselves. The review handbook expresses SKIs expectations by providing so called important aspects for both the PSA work and the PSAs, A comparison of SKIFS requirements and the important aspects in the Review handbook, on one side, and the requirements on PSA in EUR and ASME on the other side, is presented. The comparison shows a large difference in the level of detail in the different documents, where ASME is most detailed and specific. This is expected since the SKI review handbook not is a 'PSA guide' in the same way as the ASME PRA standard. A direct comparison of the ASME PRA standard requirements with the important aspects in the review handbook cannot answer the question which ASME capacity level that is achieved by a PSA meeting all important aspects. The conclusion is that it is not likely to achieve capacity level 2 and 3, since very few ASME level 3 attributes are explicitly expressed as important aspects, though many are expressed in general terms. The review handbook important aspects that are most similar to the ASME capacity level 1 attributes are initiating events, sequence analysis, and system analysis while less similarity is found for analysis of operator actions data analysis, quantification and containment analysis (level 2). Less similarity is found for capacity level 2 and 3. However, the number of additional ASME attributes on capacity level 2 and 3 are few. There are also important aspects in the review handbook that

  20. Standardization of domestic human reliability analysis and experience of human reliability analysis in probabilistic safety assessment for NPPs under design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, D. I.; Jung, W. D.

    2002-01-01

    This paper introduces the background and development activities of domestic standardization of procedure and method for Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) to avoid the intervention of subjectivity by HRA analyst in Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) as possible, and the review of the HRA results for domestic nuclear power plants under design studied by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. We identify the HRA methods used for PSA for domestic NPPs and discuss the subjectivity of HRA analyst shown in performing a HRA. Also, we introduce the PSA guidelines published in USA and review the HRA results based on them. We propose the system of a standard procedure and method for HRA to be developed

  1. OECD/NEA WGRisk CAPS on PSA for Advanced Reactors: a summary of questionnaires and answers report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, K.I.; Han, S.J.; Han, S.H.; Yang, J.E.

    2012-01-01

    Main objectives of the WGRisk CAPS on the probabilistic safety analysis for advanced reactors which was approved by the OECD/NEA CSNI in June 2008, are to 1) characterize the ability of current PSA (Probability Safety Assessment) technology to address key questions regarding the development and licensing of advanced reactor designs; 2) characterize the potential value of advanced PSA methods and tools; and 3) develop recommendations to CSNI for any needed developments. For this purpose, the two following sub-tasks have been set up: -) A survey of participating countries regarding the state of PSA technologies for advanced reactors and -) Organization of an international workshop for detailed follow-up discussions related to the topic. In order to meet the objectives of the CAPS (CSNI Activity Proposal Sheet), the questionnaires to elicit the respondents' viewpoints had been distributed to the WGRisk member countries during the period of 2009 to 2010, and answers from the 12 countries (13 organizations) have been collected until February 2010. This paper summarizes the current status of the answers to the questionnaires and the international status and insights into PSA technologies for advanced reactors. (authors)

  2. Probabilistic safety analysis second level of WWER-TOI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chekin, A.A.; Bajkova, E.V.; Levin, V.N.; Shishina, E.S.

    2015-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of Level-1 and Level-2 gives a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the safety of the project. The operation of the unit at rated power is considered. As sources of radioactivity in the development of the second-level PSA, nuclear fuel in the core of the reactor is considered. As initiating events, internal initiating events (including de-energizing) are considered, which may arise due to failures of NPP systems, equipment or components, or due to erroneous actions of personnel. In general, an assessment of the level of project safety shows that the WWER-TOI project complies with the requirements of the TOR, as well as all the requirements of modern Russian and foreign regulatory documents in the field of security [ru

  3. A review of the probabilistic safety assessment application to the TR-2 research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goektepe, G.; Adalioglu, U.; Anac, H.; Sevdik, B.; Menteseoglu, S.

    2001-01-01

    A review of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to the TR-2 Research Reactor is presented. The level 1 PSA application involved: selection of accident initiators, mitigating functions and system definitions, event tree constructions and quantification, fault tree constructions and quantification, human reliability, component failure data base development, dependent failure analysis. Each of the steps of the analysis given above is reviewed briefly with highlights from the selected results. PSA application is found to be a practical tool for research reactor safety due to intense involvement of human interactions in an experimental facility. Insights gained from the application of PSA methodology to the TR-2 research reactor led to a significant safety review of the system

  4. Seismic PSA method for multiple nuclear power plants in a site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakata, Tadakuni [Nuclear Safety Commission, Tokyo (Japan)

    2007-07-15

    The maximum number of nuclear power plants in a site is eight and about 50% of power plants are built in sites with three or more plants in the world. Such nuclear sites have potential risks of simultaneous multiple plant damages especially at external events. Seismic probabilistic safety assessment method (Level-1 PSA) for multi-unit sites with up to 9 units has been developed. The models include Fault-tree linked Monte Carlo computation, taking into consideration multivariate correlations of components and systems from partial to complete, inside and across units. The models were programmed as a computer program CORAL reef. Sample analysis and sensitivity studies were performed to verify the models and algorithms and to understand some of risk insights and risk metrics, such as site core damage frequency (CDF per site-year) for multiple reactor plants. This study will contribute to realistic state of art seismic PSA, taking consideration of multiple reactor power plants, and to enhancement of seismic safety. (author)

  5. The application of new mathematical structures to safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, J.A.; Ross, T.J.

    1997-10-01

    Probabilistic safety analyses (PSAs) often depend on significant subjectivity. The recent successes of fuzzy logic and fuzzy and hybrid mathematics in portraying subjectivity is a reminder that a selection made from the most applicable mathematical tools is more important than forced adaptation of conventional tools. In this paper, the authors consider new approaches that enhance conventional and fuzzy PSA by improved handling of subjectivity. The most significant of the mathematical structures were have investigated (from a standpoint of safety analysis applications) will be described, and the general types of applications will be outlined

  6. Quality of the current low power and shutdown PSA practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Seung Cheol; Park, Jin Hee; Lim, Ho Gon; Kim, Tae Woon

    2004-01-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for the low-power and shutdown (LPSD) modes in a Korea standard nuclear power plant (KSNP) has been performed for the purpose of estimating the LPSD risk and identifying the vulnerabilities of LPSD operations. Both the operational experience and PSA results indicate that the risks from LPSD operations could be comparable with those from power operations. However, the application of the LPSD risk insights to risk-informed decision making has been slow to be adopted in practice. It is largely due to the question of whether the current LPSD PSA practice is appropriate for application to risk-informed decision making or not. Such a question has to do with the quality of the current LPSD PSA practice. In this paper, we have performed self-assessment of the KSNP LPSD PSA quality based on the ANS Standard (draft as of 13 Sep. 2002). The aims of the work are to find the LPSD PSA technical areas insufficient for application to risk-informed decision making and to efficiently allocate the limited research resources to improve the LPSD PSA model quality. Many useful findings regarding the current LPSD PSA quality are presented in this paper

  7. Tools for PSA reviews

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linden, J. von

    1998-01-01

    It is desirable to have a uniform and competent procedure for the review of PSAs which are performed within the framework of the Periodic Safety Review of German Nuclear Power Plants. Guidelines for the review process should therefore be evaluated within task A. 1 of project SR 2096. The basis for this work is the experience and knowledge within GRS derived from PSA-related work and from several review projects as well as the German PSA Guide with its appendices. Furthermore, the review processes in the USA, Switzerland and Sweden and the Guidelines for the International Peer Review Service (IPERS Guidelines) were utilized. As a result, recommendations are given for the review process, with individual recommendations concerning the organization of the review, task allocation between the reviewers, interface problems, assessment criteria, the scope and depth of the review as well as the supporting documents. An additional result are checklists for the technical elements of the PSA, which are listed to facilicate the review work. It is not the intention of this report to work out complete review guidelines. Its aims is rather more to give recommondations and support for the review in addition to what can be derived from the existing documents that should be used for the review. The recommendations reflect the view of GRS and go beyond the statements given in the German PSA Guide (Leitfaden Probabilistische Sicherheitsanalyse /PSUe97/) in some points. (orig.) [de

  8. Integrated framework for dynamic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Wan; Karanki, Durga R.

    2012-01-01

    In the conventional PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment), detailed plant simulations by independent thermal hydraulic (TH) codes are used in the development of accident sequence models. Typical accidents in a NPP involve complex interactions among process, safety systems, and operator actions. As independent TH codes do not have the models of operator actions and full safety systems, they cannot literally simulate the integrated and dynamic interactions of process, safety systems, and operator responses. Offline simulation with pre decided states and time delays may not model the accident sequences properly. Moreover, when stochastic variability in responses of accident models is considered, defining all the combinations for simulations will be cumbersome task. To overcome some of these limitations of conventional safety analysis approach, TH models are coupled with the stochastic models in the dynamic event tree (DET) framework, which provides flexibility to model the integrated response due to better communication as all the accident elements are in the same model. The advantages of this framework also include: Realistic modeling in dynamic scenarios, comprehensive results, integrated approach (both deterministic and probabilistic models), and support for HRA (Human Reliability Analysis)

  9. Report 5: Guidance document. Implementation of biological infestation hazards in extended PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Georgescu, G.; Joel, P.; Sperbeck, S.; Kollasko, H.; Kumar, M.

    2016-01-01

    This report covers the assessment of biological hazards with PSA. It provides an overview of the available data and available practices in modelling this type of hazard. First researches in the national and international literature regarding PSA for external and internal hazards shows that probabilistic analyses were very rarely carried out in order to quantify the risk induced by biological hazards. Nevertheless, Section 3 provides some data from some countries. History has shown that this hazard can happened and can be highly safety significant. Screening out this event must be done with great care. The overall analysis approach for Level 1 PSA for internal events can be used for the biological hazards with some care to take into impact the nature of the hazard as it impacts many systems at different times and duration. A proposed detailed methodology is described in Section 4. Still some open issues remain: the methodology must also consider event combination of biological infestation with other external hazards wind or flooding or rainfall and multi-units impact. These aspects present still a lot of challenges to PSA developers. The ASAMPSA-E report recommends that further emphasis shall be put on these two aspects of PSA modelling: multi-units site impact and hazards combinations. (authors)

  10. Engineering safety review mission Krsko NPP external events PSA. Ljubljana, Slovenia 19-23 February 1996. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budnitz, R.J.; Smith, P.

    1996-01-01

    Within the scope of the TC Project RER/9/035, a review mission visited Ljubljana, Slovenia, 19-23 February 1996. Two outside experts, Messrs. R.J. Budnitz (USA) and Paul Smith (USA), as well as a staff member, A. Guerpinar (ESS-NSNI) took part in the review. The purpose of the mission was to assist the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration to review the external events PSA prepared by Krsko NPP consultants Westinghouse Energy Systems Europe and EQE International. Another seismic safety review was performed concurrently in Ljubljana involving the investigations in relation to the tectonic stability and reassessment of the design basis ground motion characterization for the Krsko NPP site

  11. The design and verification of probabilistic safety analysis platform NFRisk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hu Wenjun; Song Wei; Ren Lixia; Qian Hongtao

    2010-01-01

    To increase the technical ability in Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) field in China,it is necessary and important to study and develop indigenous professional PSA platform. Following such principle as 'from structure simplification to modulization to production of cut sets to minimum of cut sets', the algorithms, including simplification algorithm, modulization algorithm, the algorithm of conversion from fault tree to binary decision diagram (BDD), the solving algorithm of cut sets, the minimum algorithm of cut sets, and so on, were designed and developed independently; the design of data management and operation platform was completed all alone; the verification and validation of NFRisk platform based on 3 typical fault trees was finished on our own. (authors)

  12. A Preliminary Fire PSA on PGSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Han, Sanghoon; Lee, KwiLim

    2017-01-01

    A Prototype Generation IV Sodium Fast Reactor (PGSFR) is under design with defense in depth concept with active, passive, and inherent safety features to acquire a design approval for PGSFR from Korean regulatory authority by around 2017. A preliminary fire PSA on PGSFR is done in 2016 and a final fire PSA of PGSFR will be done in 2017. The characteristics of the preliminary fire PSA on PGSFR are described in this paper. Since PGSFR is very safe reactor, it is not bad approach to use a conservative assumption in the preliminary PSA. In addition, several drawings including cable routing are not yet issued, a conservative calculation for CDF is performed. As shown in Table 2, the CDF caused by the fire in the control room takes 89% portion of total CDF. Thus, a detailed fire modeling for control room is necessary for the final fire PSA on PGSFR. Also, the increased ignition frequency due to sodium leak would be derived by considering the sodium piping complexity in the final fire PSA on PGSFR. The 4th column of Table 2 is derived the 3rd column by multiplying the factor (592/1177). The 5th column is the ignition frequency caused by the sodium leak. The 6th column is derived by summing the 4th column and the 5th column. The 7th column is the CDF portion of each fire area. The control room (fire area F-A404A) is the most important area since the control room fire takes 89% portion of total CDF.

  13. Opium consumption is negatively associated with serum prostate-specific antigen (PSA), free PSA, and percentage of free PSA levels.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Safarinejad, Mohammad Reza; Asgari, Seyyed Alaeddin; Farshi, Alireza; Iravani, Shahrokh; Khoshdel, Alireza; Shekarchi, Babak

    2013-01-01

    Addiction to opium continues to be a major worldwide medical and social problem. The study addressing the association between opium consumption and serum prostate-specific antigen (PSA) level is lacking. We determined the effects of opium consumption on serum PSA levels in opium-addict men. Our study subjects comprised 438 opium-addict men with a mean age of 52.2 ± 6.4 years (group 1). We compared these men with 446 men who did not indicate current or past opium use (group 2). Serum total PSA (tPSA), free PSA (fPSA), % fPSA, and sex hormones were compared between the 2 groups. The mean serum tPSA level was significantly lower in group 1 (1.05 ng/mL) than in controls (1.45 ng/mL) (P = 0.001). Opium consumption was also associated with lower fPSA (P = 0.001) and % fPSA (P = 0.001). Serum free testosterone level in opium-addict patients (132.5 ± 42 pg/mL) was significantly lower than that in controls (156.2 ± 43 pg/mL) (P = 0.03). However, no significant correlation existed between tPSA and free testosterone levels (r = 0.28, 95% CI, -0.036 to 0.51, P = 0.34). Among the patients with cancer in group 1, 35% were found to have high-grade tumor (Gleason score ≥ 7) compared with 26.7% in group 2 (P = 0.02). Total PSA and fPSA were strongly correlated with duration of opium use (r = -0.06, 95% CI, -0.04 to -0.08, P = 0.0001; and r = -0.05, 95% CI, -0.03 to -0.07, P = 0.0001, respectively). Opium consumption is independently and negatively associated with serum tPSA, fPSA, and % fPSA levels.

  14. Applying the results of probablistic safety analysis of nuclear power plants: a survey of experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrews, W.B.; Herttrich, M.; Koeberlein, K.; Schwager.

    1985-01-01

    To date, discussions of the many different types of potential applications of PRA/PSA results and insights to safety-decision-making have been mainly theoretical. Various safety goals have been proposed as decision criteria. However, the discussion on the role of PRA/PSA and Safety Goals in safety-decision-making, especially in licensing, is controversial. A Working Group of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency is completing a compilation and evaluation of real examples of past and present practical experience with the application of probabilistic methods in reactor safety decision-making, with the idea of developing a common understanding in this area. More than fifty different cases where PRA has influenced decision-making have been surveyed. These include, for example, regulatory changes, fixing of licensing requirements, plant specific modifications of design of operation, prioritization of safety issues and emergency planning. This feedback of experience - both positive and negative - with PRA/PSA applications is considered to provide guidance on how probabilistic approaches can be introduced into current safety practices, and on desirable future developments in probabilistic methods and specific PSA/PRA studies. Generic insights from the survey are given

  15. Development of reliability and probabilistic safety assessment program RiskA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Yican

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • There are four parts in the structure of RiskA. User input part lets users input the PSA model and some necessary data by GUI or model transformation tool. In calculation engine part, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, importance analysis and failure mode and effects analysis are supplied. User output part outputs the analysis results, user customized reports and some other data. The last part includes reliability database, some other common tools and help documents. • RiskA has several advanced features. Extensible framework makes it easy to add any new functions, making RiskA to be a large platform of reliability and probabilistic safety assessment. It is very fast to analysis fault tree in RiskA because many advanced algorithm improvement were made. Many model formats can be imported and exported, which made the PSA model in the commercial software can be easily transformed to adapt RiskA platform. Web-based co-modeling let several users in different places work together whenever they are online. • The comparison between RiskA and other mature PSA codes (e.g. CAFTA, RiskSpectrum, XFTA) has demonstrated that the calculation and analysis of RiskA is correct and efficient. Based on the development of this code package, many applications of safety and reliability analysis of some research reactors and nuclear power plants were performed. The development of RiskA appears to be of realistic and potential value for academic research and practical operation safety management of nuclear power plants in China and abroad. - Abstract: PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) software, the indispensable tool in nuclear safety assessment, has been widely used. An integrated reliability and PSA program named RiskA has been developed by FDS Team. RiskA supplies several standard PSA modules including fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, uncertainty analysis, failure mode and effect analysis and reliability

  16. A study on the methodology of probabilistic safety assessment for KALIMER

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Kwan Seong; Kwon, Young Min; Lee, Yong Bum; Jeong, Hae Yong; Yang, Joon Eon; Ha, Kyu Suk; Hahn, Do Hee [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2002-03-01

    Existing Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) is a method for Light Water Reactor or Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor. Because KALIMER is different from these reactor, the new methodology of PSA need to be developed. In this paper, the PSA of Power Reactor Inherently Safety Module(PRISM) is analyzed, and Initiating Event such as Experiential Assessment, Logical Assessment and Failure Mode Effect Analysis(FMEA) is reviewed. Also, Pipe Damage Frequency Method is suggested for KALIMER. And the Reliability Physical method of Passive System, which is a chief safety system of KALIMER, is reviewed and its applicability is investigated. Finally, for the Preliminary PSA of KALIMER, Intermediate Heat Transfer System is analyzed. 23 refs., 10 figs., 13 tabs. (Author)

  17. The Role of Level-3 PSA in the Regulatory Structure for the Licensing of Future NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Jong Tae; Han, Sang Hoon

    2008-01-01

    The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) provides a systematic analysis to identify and quantify all risks that the plant imposed to the operators, general public and the environment and thus demonstrates compliance to regulatory risk criteria. Therefore, the PSA has been being played an important role in the development of safety requirements for the existing plants, mainly reactors using light water technology. However, the existing safety requirements may not be fully applicable to the future reactors due to the advances in technology, new safety options, and new strategies for managing abnormal plant conditions. Therefore, a comprehensive set of technology-neutral safety requirements are being developed by the IAEA and USNRC. Especially, USNRC is developing a basis for a regulatory structure that is applicable to all types of reactor designs, including gas-cooled, liquid metal, and heavy and light water-moderated reactors because metrics such as core damage and large early release may not be applicable to some advanced reactor designs. They are developing this kind of basis for a regulatory structure in order to provide a technology neutral safety approach that will guide the design, construction and operation, as well as safety assessment, of innovative reactors. They are using the quantitative safety goals expressed by means of a frequency-consequence diagram. Within this approach, the scope of the PSA needs to encompass a whole spectrum of off-normal events including frequent, infrequent, and rare initiating events and event sequences. These events include a spectrum of releases from minor to major, and sequences that address conditions less than the core damage sequences. It also needs to address the dose consequences of these event sequences as measured at the exclusion area boundary (EAB). In order to obtain dose consequences for the whole spectrum of off-normal events, the dose evaluation by using the deterministic and probabilistic approaches has to be

  18. Summary report of seismic PSA of BWR model plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-05-01

    This report presents a seismic PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) methodology developed at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) for evaluating risks of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the results from an application of the methodology to a BWR plant in Japan, which is termed Model Plant'. The seismic PSA procedures developed at JAERI are to evaluate core damage frequency (CDF) and have the following four steps: (1) evaluation of seismic hazard, (2) evaluation of realistic response, (3) evaluation of component capacities and failure probabilities, and (4) evaluation of conditional probability of system failure and CDF. Although these procedures are based on the methodologies established and used in the United States, they include several unique features: (1) seismic hazard analysis is performed with use of available knowledge and database on seismological conditions in Japan; (2) response evaluation is performed with a response factor method which is cost effective and associated uncertainties can be reduced with use of modern methods of design calculations; (3) capacity evaluation is performed with use of test results available in Japan in combination with design information and generic capacity data in the U.S.A.; (4) systems reliability analysis, performed with use of the computer code SECOM-2 developed at JAERI, includes identification of dominant accident sequences, importance analysis of components and systems as well as the CDF evaluation with consideration of the effect of correlation of failures by a newly developed method based on the Monte Carlo method. The effect of correlation has been recognized as an important issue in seismic PSAs. The procedures was used to perform a seismic PSA of a 1100 MWe BWR plant. Results are shown as well as the insights derived and future research needs identified in this seismic PSA. (J.P.N.)

  19. Literature Survey on Technical Issues and Insights of Multi-Unit PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Sejin; Park, Soyoung; Heo, Gyunyoung

    2016-01-01

    The need consider the risk impact in case of multi-unit in a single site increased after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in March 2011. This means that we have to consider the single-unit initiators impacting the other units and the simultaneous accidents of the multi-unit on the same site. Particularly, this kind of technical concern is serious in case of the Republic of Korea where multi-units had to be located in high-density population area due to geographical features. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in the Republic of Korea has been trying to identify the state of the art of international and domestic regulations and techniques on multi-unit risk assessment and planning the road map for the safety researches. However, we have to say that finding a common accepted methodology along with safety criteria for multi-unit PSA was not an easy task up to now. This paper summarizes and analyzes related international and domestic journals' papers, conferences' papers and reports about the multi-unit PSA classifying categories with themes to understand the technical tendency of multi-unit PSA. In addition, some insights that were obtained from this classification have been arranged too. This paper investigated the technical trend of the multi-unit PSA as collecting of the international and domestic journals' papers, conferences papers and reports, and analyzing them. Upon the literature survey, a few statistics, technical issues, and insights were summarized. Both of the fundamental and practical researches need to find a globally accepted methodology to calculate and determine quantitative objectives for a multi-unit PSA. We want to expect that this paper can be shared to understand the current status of multi-unit PSA

  20. Literature Survey on Technical Issues and Insights of Multi-Unit PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baek, Sejin; Park, Soyoung; Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyung Hee Univ., Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The need consider the risk impact in case of multi-unit in a single site increased after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in March 2011. This means that we have to consider the single-unit initiators impacting the other units and the simultaneous accidents of the multi-unit on the same site. Particularly, this kind of technical concern is serious in case of the Republic of Korea where multi-units had to be located in high-density population area due to geographical features. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in the Republic of Korea has been trying to identify the state of the art of international and domestic regulations and techniques on multi-unit risk assessment and planning the road map for the safety researches. However, we have to say that finding a common accepted methodology along with safety criteria for multi-unit PSA was not an easy task up to now. This paper summarizes and analyzes related international and domestic journals' papers, conferences' papers and reports about the multi-unit PSA classifying categories with themes to understand the technical tendency of multi-unit PSA. In addition, some insights that were obtained from this classification have been arranged too. This paper investigated the technical trend of the multi-unit PSA as collecting of the international and domestic journals' papers, conferences papers and reports, and analyzing them. Upon the literature survey, a few statistics, technical issues, and insights were summarized. Both of the fundamental and practical researches need to find a globally accepted methodology to calculate and determine quantitative objectives for a multi-unit PSA. We want to expect that this paper can be shared to understand the current status of multi-unit PSA.

  1. PSA-based optimization of technical specifications for the Borssele nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seebregts, A.J.; Schoonakker, H.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Borssele Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is a Siemens/KWU 472 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor which has been in operation since 1973. In 1989, a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) program was initiated to complement deterministic safety studies and operational experience in forming a plant safety concept. In 1993, the PSA-MER model was completed and used to determine the effects a package of proposed modifications would have on plant safety and risks to the environment. This model was used to start retrospective risks profile and allowed outage times (AOTs) analyses, which both concerned the calculation of the change in total core damage frequency (TCDF) given a change in configuration. The main problems identified and reported in this paper are: (i) How to calculate the change in TCDF (ΔTCDF)? (section 3); and (ii) How to set practical decision criteria and how to use the PSA as extension to Technical Specifications (TS) AOTs? (section 4). Finally, a pilot study was conducted in order to optimize surveillance test intervals (STIs) which are also part of the TS (section 5). (orig.)

  2. Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the radiotherapy treatment process with an Electron Linear Accelerator (LINAC) for medical uses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vilaragut Llanes, J.J.; Ferro Fernandez, R.; Rodriguez Marti, M.; Ramirez, M.L.; Perez Mulas, A.; Barrientos Montero, M.; Ortiz Lopez, P.; Somoano, F.; Delgado Rodriguez, J.M.; Papadopulos, S.B.; Pereira, P.P. Jr.; Lopez Morones, R.; Larrinaga Cortinai, E.; Rivero Oliva, J.J.; Alemany, J.

    2008-01-01

    This paper presents the results of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to the radiotherapy treatment process with an Electron Linear Accelerator (LINAC) for Medical Uses, which was conducted in the framework of the Extra budgetary Programme on Nuclear and Radiological Safety in Iberian-America. The PSA tools were used to evaluate occupational, public and medical exposures during treatment. The study focused on the radiological protection of patients. Equipment Failure Modes and Human Errors were evaluated for each system and treatment phase by FMEA. It was aimed at obtaining an exhaustive list of deviations with a reasonable probability of occurrence and which might produce significant adverse outcomes. Separate events trees were constructed for each initiating event group. Each event tree had a different structure since the initiating events were grouped according to mitigation requirements. Fault tree models were constructed for each top event. The fault trees were developed up to the level of components. In addition to hardware faults, the fault trees included human errors associated with the response to accidents, and human errors associated with the treatment. Each accident sequence was quantified. The combination of the initiating event and top events through one fault tree was the method used to analyse the accident sequences. After combining the appropriate models, a Boolean reduction was conducted by computer software to produce sequence cut sets. Several findings were analysed concerning the treatment process and the study proposed safety recommendations to avoid them. (author)

  3. External events analysis in PSA studies for Czech NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holy, J.; Hustak, S.; Kolar, L.; Jaros, M.; Hladky, M.; Mlady, O.

    2014-01-01

    The purpose of the paper is to summarize current status of natural external hazards analysis in the PSA projects maintained in Czech Republic for both Czech NPPs - Dukovany and Temelin. The focus of the presentation is put upon the basic milestones in external event analysis effort - identification of external hazards important for Czech NPPs sites, screening out of the irrelevant hazards, modeling of plant response to the initiating events, including the basic activities regarding vulnerability and fragility analysis (supported with on-site analysis), quantification of accident sequences, interpretation of results and development of measures decreasing external events risk. The following external hazards are discussed in the paper, which have been addressed during several last years in PSA projects for Czech NPPs: 1)seismicity, 2)extremely low temperature 3)extremely high temperature 4)extreme wind 5)extreme precipitation (water, snow) 6)transport of dangerous substances (as an example of man-made hazard with some differences identified in comparison with natural hazards) 7)other hazards, which are not considered as very important for Czech NPPs, were screened out in the initial phase of the analysis, but are known as potential problem areas abroad. The paper is a result of coordinated effort with participation of experts and staff from engineering support organization UJV Rez, a.s. and NPPs located in Czech Republic - Dukovany and Temelin. (authors)

  4. Risk analysis by flooding in the PSA of Asco Nuclear Power Plant. Analisis de riesgo por inundaciones en el APS de C. N. Asco

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Faig, J.

    1993-06-01

    The scope of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis of the ASCO Nuclear Power Plant included the analysis and evaluation of the probability of situations with core damage because of flood originated by internal sources of the installation. A short description of the systematic and methodology used for the analysis and the results obtained are given. The impact of some improvements introduced on the core damage frequency within the PSA are described as well. Our methodology followed basically the guidelines of NUREG/CR-2815. Analysis procedure was developed according two major steps: Selective Analysis and Detailed Analysis.

  5. Porous Silicon Antibody Microarrays for Quantitative Analysis: Measurement of Free and Total PSA in Clinical Plasma Samples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tojo, Axel; Malm, Johan; Marko-Varga, György; Lilja, Hans; Laurell, Thomas

    2014-01-01

    The antibody microarrays have become widespread, but their use for quantitative analyses in clinical samples has not yet been established. We investigated an immunoassay based on nanoporous silicon antibody microarrays for quantification of total prostate-specific-antigen (PSA) in 80 clinical plasma samples, and provide quantitative data from a duplex microarray assay that simultaneously quantifies free and total PSA in plasma. To further develop the assay the porous silicon chips was placed into a standard 96-well microtiter plate for higher throughput analysis. The samples analyzed by this quantitative microarray were 80 plasma samples obtained from men undergoing clinical PSA testing (dynamic range: 0.14-44ng/ml, LOD: 0.14ng/ml). The second dataset, measuring free PSA (dynamic range: 0.40-74.9ng/ml, LOD: 0.47ng/ml) and total PSA (dynamic range: 0.87-295ng/ml, LOD: 0.76ng/ml), was also obtained from the clinical routine. The reference for the quantification was a commercially available assay, the ProStatus PSA Free/Total DELFIA. In an analysis of 80 plasma samples the microarray platform performs well across the range of total PSA levels. This assay might have the potential to substitute for the large-scale microtiter plate format in diagnostic applications. The duplex assay paves the way for a future quantitative multiplex assay, which analyses several prostate cancer biomarkers simultaneously. PMID:22921878

  6. Prevalence and causes of abnormal PSA recovery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lautenbach, Noémie; Müntener, Michael; Zanoni, Paolo; Saleh, Lanja; Saba, Karim; Umbehr, Martin; Velagapudi, Srividya; Hof, Danielle; Sulser, Tullio; Wild, Peter J; von Eckardstein, Arnold; Poyet, Cédric

    2018-01-26

    Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test is of paramount importance as a diagnostic tool for the detection and monitoring of patients with prostate cancer. In the presence of interfering factors such as heterophilic antibodies or anti-PSA antibodies the PSA test can yield significantly falsified results. The prevalence of these factors is unknown. We determined the recovery of PSA concentrations diluting patient samples with a standard serum of known PSA concentration. Based on the frequency distribution of recoveries in a pre-study on 268 samples, samples with recoveries 120% were defined as suspect, re-tested and further characterized to identify the cause of interference. A total of 1158 consecutive serum samples were analyzed. Four samples (0.3%) showed reproducibly disturbed recoveries of 10%, 68%, 166% and 4441%. In three samples heterophilic antibodies were identified as the probable cause, in the fourth anti-PSA-autoantibodies. The very low recovery caused by the latter interference was confirmed in serum, as well as heparin- and EDTA plasma of blood samples obtained 6 months later. Analysis by eight different immunoassays showed recoveries ranging between PSA which however did not show any disturbed PSA recovery. About 0.3% of PSA determinations by the electrochemiluminescence assay (ECLIA) of Roche diagnostics are disturbed by heterophilic or anti-PSA autoantibodies. Although they are rare, these interferences can cause relevant misinterpretations of a PSA test result.

  7. Pattern of Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Failure Dictates the Probability of a Positive Bone Scan in Patients With an Increasing PSA After Radical Prostatectomy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dotan, Zohar A.; Bianco, Fernando J.; Rabbani, Farhang; Eastham, James A.; Fearn, Paul; Scher, Howard I.; Kelly, Kevin W.; Chen, Hui-Ni; Schöder, Heiko; Hricak, Hedvig; Scardino, Peter T.; Kattan, Michael W.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose Physicians often order periodic bone scans (BS) to check for metastases in patients with an increasing prostate-specific antigen (PSA; biochemical recurrence [BCR]) after radical prostatectomy (RP), but most scans are negative. We studied patient characteristics to build a predictive model for a positive scan. Patients and Methods From our prostate cancer database we identified all patients with detectable PSA after RP. We analyzed the following features at the time of each bone scan for association with a positive BS: preoperative PSA, time to BCR, pathologic findings of the RP, PSA before the BS (trigger PSA), PSA kinetics (PSA doubling time, PSA slope, and PSA velocity), and time from BCR to BS. The results were incorporated into a predictive model. Results There were 414 BS performed in 239 patients with BCR and no history of androgen deprivation therapy. Only 60 (14.5%) were positive for metastases. In univariate analysis, preoperative PSA (P = .04), seminal vesicle invasion (P = .02), PSA velocity (P < .001), and trigger PSA (P < .001) predicted a positive BS. In multivariate analysis, only PSA slope (odds ratio [OR], 2.71; P = .03), PSA velocity (OR, 0.93; P = .003), and trigger PSA (OR, 1.022; P < .001) predicted a positive BS. A nomogram for predicting the bone scan result was constructed with an overfit-corrected concordance index of 0.93. Conclusion Trigger PSA, PSA velocity, and slope were associated with a positive BS. A highly discriminating nomogram can be used to select patients according to their risk for a positive scan. Omitting scans in low-risk patients could reduce substantially the number of scans ordered. PMID:15774789

  8. Application of PSA to Assess the Safety Level of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H. P.; Goertz, R.

    2000-01-01

    This paper reviews the application of PSA in German nuclear power plant regulation. From a fundamental point of view, it has to be mentioned that as stipulated in the corresponding requirements, regulatory decision making in Germany is primarily based on deterministic analyses and evaluations. Therefore, PSA is not used as a stand alone but as a supplementary basis. In this context PSA has developed a valuable tool with continuously growing importance. Level 1+ PSAs are now elaborated for all German nuclear power plants in operation, most of them are already reviewed by the competent supervisory authority and its experts. Current research activities on the federal level primarily concentrate on the further development of the methodology in the areas human factor, common cause failures, accident management measures and reduction of uncertainties in methods and data. (author)

  9. Residual Heat Removal System qualitative probabilistic safety analysis before and after auto closure interlock removal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mikulicic, V.; Simic, Z.

    1992-01-01

    The analysis evaluates the consequences of the removal of the auto closure interlock (ACI) on the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) suction/isolation valves at the nuclear power plant. The deletion of the RHRS ACI is in part based on a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) which justifies the removal based on a criterion of increased availability and reliability. Three different areas to be examined in PSA: the likelihood of an interfacing system LOCA; RHRS availability and reliability; and low temperature overpressurization control. The paper emphasizes particularly the RHRS unavailability and reliability evaluation utilizing the current control circuitry configuration and then with the proposed modification to the control circuitry. (author)

  10. A Bayesian belief nets based quantitative software reliability assessment for PSA: COTS case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eom, H. S.; Sung, T. Y.; Jeong, H. S.; Park, J. H.; Kang, H. G.; Lee, K. Y.; Park, J. K

    2002-03-01

    Current reliability assessments of safety critical software embedded in the digital systems in nuclear power plants are based on the rule-based qualitative assessment methods. Then recently practical needs require the quantitative features of software reliability for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) that is one of important methods being used in assessing the whole safety of nuclear power plant. But conventional quantitative software reliability assessment methods are not enough to get the necessary results in assessing the safety critical software used in nuclear power plants. Thus, current reliability assessment methods for these digital systems exclude the software part or use arbitrary values for the software reliability in the assessment. This reports discusses a Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) based quantification method that models current qualitative software assessment in formal way and produces quantitative results required for PSA. Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software dedication process that KAERI developed was applied to the discussed BBN based method for evaluating the plausibility of the proposed method in PSA

  11. Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    publication is not necessary for all types of facility or PSA applications. In fact, it is anticipated that for many facilities, a 'streamlined' or 'simplified' interpretation of the information presented in this TECDOC will be acceptable. The appropriate level and form of streamlining is dependent upon the specific objectives of the analysis and the magnitude of the hazard that the facility represents. Facility hazard can drive the depth of analysis, as it may well be appropriate to analyse a lower hazard facility to less depth than higher hazard facilities (i.e., the depth of analysis is commensurate with the risk). Thus, the concept of hazard-graded depth of probabilistic safety analysis is considered as appropriate for non-reactor nuclear facilities

  12. Impact of the specialization from failures data in probability safety analysis for process plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ribeiro, Antonio C.O.; Melo, P.F. Frutuoso e

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The aim of this paper is to show the Bayesian inference in reliability studies, which are used to failures, rates updating in safety analyses. It is developed the impact of its using in quantitative risk assessments (QRA) for industrial process plants. With this approach we find a structured and auditable way of showing the difference between an industrial installation with a good project and maintenance structure from another one that shows a low level of quality in these areas. In general the evidence from failures rates and as follow the frequency of occurrence from scenarios, which the risks taken in account in ERA, are taken from generics data banks, instead of, the installation in analysis. The use of this methodology in probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) for nuclear plants is commonly used when you need to find the final fault tree event evaluation applied to a scenario, but it is not showed in a PSA level III. (author)

  13. Framework for applying probabilistic safety analysis in nuclear regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dimitrijevic, V.B.

    1997-01-01

    The traditional regulatory framework has served well to assure the protection of public health and safety. It has been recognized, however, that in a few circumstances, this deterministic framework has lead to an extensive expenditure on matters hat have little to do with the safe and reliable operation of the plant. Developments of plant-specific PSA have offered a new and powerful analytical tool in the evaluation of the safety of the plant. Using PSA insights as an aid to decision making in the regulatory process is now known as 'risk-based' or 'risk-informed' regulation. Numerous activities in the U.S. nuclear industry are focusing on applying this new approach to modify regulatory requirements. In addition, other approaches to regulations are in the developmental phase and are being evaluated. One is based on the performance monitoring and results and it is known as performance-based regulation. The other, called the blended approach, combines traditional deterministic principles with PSA insights and performance results. (author)

  14. Human behaviour in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schott, H.

    1999-01-01

    Based on the current international state of the art of methodology for evaluation of human errors for PSA, many research projects have been initiated by the competent departments of the BMU and the BfS (Federal Min. of the Environment and Reactor Safety, Federal Radiation Protection Office). Three major areas of the research activities are discussed: Database: - Specific investigations into the applicability of generic data (THERP) to other than the original cases, possibly elaboration of approaches for application-specific modification, further evaluation of operating results; - general enhancement of insight into human performance and errors, e.g. with respect to causes of error and application areas (influence of organisation, cognitive performance); interviews with experts as a supplementary approach for data verification and database enhancement. Sensitivity analysis: - Identification of information describing human errors essentially contributing to frequency of occurrence of incidents and system non-availability; - establishment of relevance rating system, methodology for uncertainty analysis. Further development of methodology: - Modelling of repair activities and knowledge-based behaviour. (orig./CB) [de

  15. Probabilistic safety analysis and risk-based inspection of nuclear research reactors: state-of-the-art and implementation proposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marques, Raíssa O.; Vasceoncelos, Vanderley de; Soares, Wellington A.; Silva Júnior, Silvério F.; Raso, Amanda L.; Mesquita, Amir Z., E-mail: raissaomarques@gmail.com, E-mail: vasconv@cdtn.br, E-mail: soaresw@cdtn.br, E-mail: silvasf@cdtn.br, E-mail: amandaraso@hotmail.com, E-mail: amir@cdtn.br [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN/CNEN-MG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    Industrial facilities systems deteriorate over time during operation, thus increasing the possibility of accidents. Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) classifies such systems by their risk information with the purpose of prioritizing inspection efforts. RBI can reduce inspection activities, resulting in lower risk levels, and maintaining reliability and safety in acceptable levels. Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) is a RBI approach used in nuclear industry. RI-ISI uses outcomes from Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to plan In-Service Inspections (ISI). Despite nuclear research reactors are simpler and have lower risks than power reactors, the application of PSA to them may be useful for safety improvements once they are more flexible, provide easier access to its core, and allow changes in fuel configurations in case of experimental tests. Ageing management of structures, systems and components important to safety of a nuclear research reactor throughout its lifetime is also required to assure continued adequacy of safety levels, reliable operation, and compliance with operational limits and conditions. This includes periodic review of ISI programs in which monitoring of material deterioration and aging effects are considered, and that can be supported by the RBI approach. A review of state-of-the-art of PSA and RBI applications to nuclear reactors is presented in this work. Advantages to apply these methodologies are also analyzed. PSA and RBI implementation proposal applied to nuclear research reactors is also presented, as well as its application to a TRIGA research nuclear reactor using computer codes developed by ReliaSoft® Corporation. (author)

  16. Probabilistic safety analysis and risk-based inspection of nuclear research reactors: state-of-the-art and implementation proposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marques, Raíssa O.; Vasceoncelos, Vanderley de; Soares, Wellington A.; Silva Júnior, Silvério F.; Raso, Amanda L.; Mesquita, Amir Z.

    2017-01-01

    Industrial facilities systems deteriorate over time during operation, thus increasing the possibility of accidents. Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) classifies such systems by their risk information with the purpose of prioritizing inspection efforts. RBI can reduce inspection activities, resulting in lower risk levels, and maintaining reliability and safety in acceptable levels. Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) is a RBI approach used in nuclear industry. RI-ISI uses outcomes from Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to plan In-Service Inspections (ISI). Despite nuclear research reactors are simpler and have lower risks than power reactors, the application of PSA to them may be useful for safety improvements once they are more flexible, provide easier access to its core, and allow changes in fuel configurations in case of experimental tests. Ageing management of structures, systems and components important to safety of a nuclear research reactor throughout its lifetime is also required to assure continued adequacy of safety levels, reliable operation, and compliance with operational limits and conditions. This includes periodic review of ISI programs in which monitoring of material deterioration and aging effects are considered, and that can be supported by the RBI approach. A review of state-of-the-art of PSA and RBI applications to nuclear reactors is presented in this work. Advantages to apply these methodologies are also analyzed. PSA and RBI implementation proposal applied to nuclear research reactors is also presented, as well as its application to a TRIGA research nuclear reactor using computer codes developed by ReliaSoft® Corporation. (author)

  17. Development of a fully-coupled, all atates, all hazards level 2 PSA at leibstadt nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zvoncek, Pavol; Nusbaumer, Olivier [Safety Compliance and Technical Support Department, Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant, Leibstadt (Sweden); Torri, Alfred [Risk Management Associates, Inc., Encinitas (United States)

    2017-03-15

    This paper describes the development process, the innovative techniques used and insights gained from the latest integrated, full scope, multistate Level 2 PSA analysis conducted at the Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant (KKL), Switzerland. KKL is a modern single-unit General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/6) with Mark III Containment, and a power output of 3600MWth/1200MWe, the highest among the five operating reactors in Switzerland. A Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analyses accident phenomena in nuclear power plants, identifies ways in which radioactive releases from plants can occur and estimates release pathways, magnitude and frequency. This paper attempts to give an overview of the advanced modeling techniques that have been developed and implemented for the recent KKL Level 2 PSA update, with the aim of systematizing the analysis and modeling processes, as well as complying with the relatively prescriptive Swiss requirements for PSA. The analysis provides significant insights into the absolute and relative importance of risk contributors and accident prevention and mitigation measures. Thanks to several newly developed techniques and an integrated approach, the KKL Level 2 PSA report exhibits a high degree of reviewability and maintainability, and transparently highlights the most important risk contributors to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) with respect to initiating events, components, operator actions or seismic component failure probabilities (fragilities)

  18. Probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants: a monograph

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.B.; Prasad, Mahendra

    2007-11-01

    This monograph on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is addressed to the wide community of professionals engaged in the nuclear industry and concerned with the safety issues of nuclear power plants (NPPs). While the monograph describes PSA of NPPs, the principles described in this monograph can be extended to other facilities like spent fuel storage, fuel reprocessing plants and non-nuclear facilities like chemical plants, refineries etc. as applicable. The methodology for risk assessment in chemical plants or refineries is generally known as quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The fundamental difference between NPP and chemical plant is that in NPPs the hazardous material (fuel and fission products) are contained at a single location (i.e. inside containment), whereas in a chemical plant and reprocessing plants, the hazardous material is present simultaneously at many places, like pipelines, reaction towers, storage tanks, etc. Also unlike PSA, QRA does not deal with levels; it uses an integrated approach combining all the levels. The monograph covers the areas of broad interest in the field of PSA such as historical perspective, fundamentals of PSA, strengths and weaknesses of PSA, applications of PSA, role of PSA in the regulatory decision making and issues for advancement of PSA

  19. Detection of prostate cancer with complexed PSA and complexed/total PSA ratio - is there any advantage?

    OpenAIRE

    Strittmatter, F; Stieber, P; Nagel, D; Füllhase, C; Walther, S; Stief, CG; Waidelich, R

    2011-01-01

    Abstract Objective To evaluate the performance of total PSA (tPSA), the free/total PSA ratio (f/tPSA), complexed PSA (cPSA) and the complexed/total PSA ratio (c/tPSA) in prostate cancer detection. Methods Frozen sera of 442 patients have been analysed for tPSA, free PSA (fPSA) and cPSA. 131 patients had prostate cancer and 311 patients benign prostatic hyperplasia. Results Differences in the distribution of the biomarkers were seen as follows: tPSA, cPSA and c/tPSA were significantly higher i...

  20. The role of probabilistic safety assessment and probabilistic safety criteria in nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Report is to provide guidelines on the role of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and a range of associated reference points, collectively referred to as probabilistic safety criteria (PSC), in nuclear safety. The application of this Safety Report and the supporting Safety Practice publication should help to ensure that PSA methodology is used appropriately to assess and enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. The guidelines are intended for use by nuclear power plant designers, operators and regulators. While these guidelines have been prepared with nuclear power plants in mind, the principles involved have wide application to other nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In Section 2 of this Safety Report guidelines are established on the role PSA can play as part of an overall safety assurance programme. Section 3 summarizes guidelines for the conduct of PSAs, and in Section 4 a PSC framework is recommended and guidance is provided for the establishment of PSC values

  1. Regulatory requirement of the Juragua nuclear Power Plant PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valhuerdi Debesa, C.

    1996-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment has proved to be a powerful tool for improving the knowledge of the safety insides of Nuclear Power Plants and increasing the efficiency of the safety measures adopted by both operators and regulators. In this paper the regulatory approach adopted in Cuba with regard to the PSA , the scope of the requirement and the basis and proposal of this decision are presented

  2. Utilization of a risk matrix based on Probabilistic Safety Analysis to improve nuclear safety in NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stubbe, Gerald

    2010-01-01

    The Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is a systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with a complex engineered technological entity. Risk in a PSA is defined as a feasible detrimental outcome of an initiator. Those initiators can be 'classical' transient as the loss of main feedwater, loss of the secondary heat sink, etc.. or accident (LOCA - Loss Of Coolant Accident, SGTR - Steam Generator Tube Rupture, LOOP - Loss Of Offsite Power, etc..) In a PSA, risk is characterized by two quantities: the magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence, the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence. Consequences are expressed numerically (for this purpose: the core damage) and their likelihoods of occurrence are expressed as probabilities or frequencies (i.e., the number of occurrences or the probability of occurrence per unit time). The total risk is the expected loss: the sum of the products of the consequences multiplied by their probabilities. This lead to the parameter CDF: The Core Damage Frequency, which is expressed by unit of time. The main advantage of this risk calculation is to have a global, integrated, overview of the plants and their systems. This allows to have an objective and quantitative point of view on the importance of the equipments, human action, or common cause failures that can challenge the plant's safety. A total PSA model is divided in three levels: Level one, which consider the core damage; Level two, which consider the robustness of the containment; Level three, which consider the impact of the radiological release on the public. For the purpose of the risk matrix, a level one PSA is needed. The scope of a PSA model is important to have a good characterization of the plant's risk. The matrix makes more sense if you have a full scope level one model, containing, furthermore the internal events, the fire and flooding, but also seismic event (if relevant). Asymmetries are also classical in the

  3. Application of PSA techniques to synchrotron radiation source facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanyasi Rao, V.V.S.; Vinod, G.; Vaze, K.K.; Sarkar, P.K.

    2011-01-01

    Synchrotron radiation sources are increasingly being used in research and medical applications. Various instances of overexposure in these facilities have been reported in literature. These instances have lead to the investigation of the risks associated with them with a view to minimise the risks and thereby increasing the level of safety. In nuclear industry, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods are widely used to assess the risk from nuclear power plants. PSA presents a systematic methodology to evaluate the likelihood of various accident scenarios and their possible consequences using fault/event tree techniques. It is proposed to extend similar approach to analyse the risk associated with synchrotron radiation sources. First step for such an analysis is establishing the failure criteria, considering the regulatory stipulations on acceptable limits of dose due to ionization radiation from normal as well as beam loss scenarios. Some possible scenarios considered in this study are (1) excessive Bremsstrahlung in the ring due to loss of vacuum, (2) Target failure due to excessively focused beam (3) mis-directed/mis-steered beam (4) beam loss and sky shine. Hazard analysis needs to cover the beam transfer line, storage ring and experimental beam line areas. Various safety provisions are in place to minimize the hazards from these facilities such as access control interlock systems, radiation shielding for storage ring and beam lines and safety shutters (for beam lines). Experimental beam line area is the most vulnerable locations that need to be critically analysed. There are multiple beam lines, that have different safety provisions and consequences from postulated beam strikes will also be different and this increases the complexity of analysis. Similar studies conducted for such experimental facilities have identified that the radiation safety interlock system, used to control access to areas inside ring and the hutches of beamline facilities has an

  4. French 900 MWe PWR PSA preliminary results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanore, J.M.; Brisbois, J.

    1988-10-01

    A PSA is performed by the Safety Assessment Department of CEA for a 900 MWe standardized plant. The paper presents the objectives, the scope of the study and the relative preliminary results. Some general insights are drawn, especially the benefit related to the implementation of emergency procedures

  5. Analysis of area events as part of probabilistic safety assessment for Romanian TRIGA SSR 14 MW reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladin, D.; Stefan, I.

    2005-01-01

    The international experience has shown that the external events could be an important contributor to plant/ reactor risk. For this reason such events have to be included in the PSA studies. In the context of PSA for nuclear facilities, external events are defined as events originating from outside the plant, but with the potential to create an initiating event at the plant. To support plant safety assessment, PSA can be used to find methods for identification of vulnerable features of the plant and to suggest modifications in order to mitigate the impact of external events or the producing of initiating events. For that purpose, probabilistic assessment of area events concerning fire and flooding risk and impact is necessary. Due to the relatively large power level amongst research reactors, the approach to safety analysis of Romanian 14 MW TRIGA benefits from an ongoing PSA project. In this context, treatment of external events should be considered. The specific tasks proposed for the complete evaluation of area event analysis are: identify the rooms important for facility safety, determine a relative area event risk index for these rooms and a relative area event impact index if the event occurs, evaluate the rooms specific area event frequency, determine the rooms contribution to reactor hazard state frequencies, analyze power supply and room dependencies of safety components (as pumps, motor operated valves). The fire risk analysis methodology is based on Berry's method [1]. This approach provides a systematic procedure to carry out a relative index of different rooms. The factors, which affect the fire probability, are: personal presence in the room, number and type of ignition sources, type and area of combustibles, fuel available in the room, fuel location, and ventilation. The flooding risk analysis is based on the amount of piping in the room. For accuracy of the information regarding piping a facility walk-about is necessary. In case of flooding risk

  6. Categorization of safety related motor operated valve safety significance for Ulchin Unit 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, D. I.; Kim, K. Y.

    2002-03-01

    We performed a categorization of safety related Motor Operated Valve (MOV) safety significance for Ulchin Unit 3. The safety evaluation of MOV of domestic nuclear power plants affects the generic data used for the quantification of MOV common cause failure ( CCF) events in Ulchin Units 3 PSA. Therefore, in this study, we re-estimated the MGL(Multiple Greek Letter) parameter used for the evaluation of MOV CCF probabilities in Ulchin Units 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and performed a classification of the MOV safety significance. The re-estimation results of the MGL parameter show that its value is decreased by 30% compared with the current value in Ulchin Unit 3 PSA. The categorization results of MOV safety significance using the changed value of MGL parameter shows that the number of HSSCs(High Safety Significant Components) is decreased by 54.5% compared with those using the current value of it in Ulchin Units 3 PSA

  7. PSA results for Hanford high level waste Tank 101-SY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J. [PLG, Inc., Newport Beach, CA (United States)

    1993-10-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) that includes consideration of external events for the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (``burps``) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is underway in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. This PSA for Tank 101-SY, which did not consider the pump experiment or future tank-remediation activities, involved three distinct tasks. First, the accident sequence analysis identified and quantified those potential accidents whose consequences result in tank material release. Second, characteristics and release paths for the airborne and liquid radioactive source terms were determined. Finally, the consequences, primarily onsite and offsite potential health effects resulting from radionuclide release, were estimated, and overall risk curves were constructed. An overview of each of these tasks and a summary of the overall results of the analysis are presented in the following sections.

  8. PSA results for Hanford high level waste Tank 101-SY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W.; Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J.

    1993-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) that includes consideration of external events for the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (''burps'') a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is underway in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. This PSA for Tank 101-SY, which did not consider the pump experiment or future tank-remediation activities, involved three distinct tasks. First, the accident sequence analysis identified and quantified those potential accidents whose consequences result in tank material release. Second, characteristics and release paths for the airborne and liquid radioactive source terms were determined. Finally, the consequences, primarily onsite and offsite potential health effects resulting from radionuclide release, were estimated, and overall risk curves were constructed. An overview of each of these tasks and a summary of the overall results of the analysis are presented in the following sections

  9. Development of Tsunami PSA method for Korean NPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Kyu; Choi, In Kil; Park, Jin Hee

    2010-01-01

    A methodology of tsunami PSA was developed in this study. A tsunami PSA consists of tsunami hazard analysis, tsunami fragility analysis and system analysis. In the case of tsunami hazard analysis, evaluation of tsunami return period is major task. For the evaluation of tsunami return period, numerical analysis and empirical method can be applied. The application of this method was applied to a nuclear power plant, Ulchin 56 NPP, which is located in the east coast of Korean peninsula. Through this study, whole tsunami PSA working procedure was established and example calculation was performed for one of real nuclear power plant in Korea

  10. Application of PSA in Designing New Third-Generation NPPs Equipped with VVE Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuchumov, A. Yu.; Morozov, V.B., E-mail: morozov-sloboda@mail.ru [JSC Atomenergoproekt, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2014-10-15

    The projects of new third-generation NPPs shall meet more stringent safety requirements. A proper balance between a high level of safety and modern requirements for power unit availability indicators cannot be achieved without applying a probabilistic approach in the course of designing, central to which is probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The report presents the main results from application of PSA in working out new projects of NPPs equipped with VVER reactors, as well as the obtained quantitative results reflecting the entire spectrum of operational states and initiating events. It is shown that by using an efficient combination of active and passive safety systems it is possible to achieve a safety level in the projects complying with the latest requirements, including those following from the lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident. (author)

  11. Short overview of PSA quantification methods, pitfalls on the road from approximate to exact results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banov, Reni; Simic, Zdenko; Sterc, Davor

    2014-01-01

    Over time the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) models have become an invaluable companion in the identification and understanding of key nuclear power plant (NPP) vulnerabilities. PSA is an effective tool for this purpose as it assists plant management to target resources where the largest benefit for plant safety can be obtained. PSA has quickly become an established technique to numerically quantify risk measures in nuclear power plants. As complexity of PSA models increases, the computational approaches become more or less feasible. The various computational approaches can be basically classified in two major groups: approximate and exact (BDD based) methods. In recent time modern commercially available PSA tools started to provide both methods for PSA model quantification. Besides availability of both methods in proven PSA tools the usage must still be taken carefully since there are many pitfalls which can drive to wrong conclusions and prevent efficient usage of PSA tool. For example, typical pitfalls involve the usage of higher precision approximation methods and getting a less precise result, or mixing minimal cuts and prime implicants in the exact computation method. The exact methods are sensitive to selected computational paths in which case a simple human assisted rearrangement may help and even switch from computationally non-feasible to feasible methods. Further improvements to exact method are possible and desirable which opens space for a new research. In this paper we will show how these pitfalls may be detected and how carefully actions must be done especially when working with large PSA models. (authors)

  12. A probabilistic safety analysis of incidents in nuclear research reactors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lopes, Valdir Maciel; Agostinho Angelo Sordi, Gian Maria; Moralles, Mauricio; Filho, Tufic Madi

    2012-06-01

    This work aims to evaluate the potential risks of incidents in nuclear research reactors. For its development, two databases of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were used: the Research Reactor Data Base (RRDB) and the Incident Report System for Research Reactor (IRSRR). For this study, the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) was used. To obtain the result of the probability calculations for PSA, the theory and equations in the paper IAEA TECDOC-636 were used. A specific program to analyse the probabilities was developed within the main program, Scilab 5.1.1. for two distributions, Fischer and chi-square, both with the confidence level of 90 %. Using Sordi equations, the maximum admissible doses to compare with the risk limits established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) were obtained. All results achieved with this probability analysis led to the conclusion that the incidents which occurred had radiation doses within the stochastic effects reference interval established by the ICRP-64.

  13. A probabilistic safety analysis of incidents in nuclear research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopes, V. M.; Sordi, G. M. A. A.; Moralles, M.; Filho, T. M.

    2012-01-01

    This work aims to evaluate the potential risks of incidents in nuclear research reactors. For its development, two databases of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were used: the Research Reactor Data Base (RRDB) and the Incident Report System for Research Reactor (IRSRR). For this study, the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) was used. To obtain the result of the probability calculations for PSA, the theory and equations in the paper IAEA TECDOC-636 were used. A specific program to analyse the probabilities was developed within the main program, Scilab 5.1.1. for two distributions, Fischer and chi-square, both with the confidence level of 90 %. Using Sordi equations, the maximum admissible doses to compare with the risk limits established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) were obtained. All results achieved with this probability analysis led to the conclusion that the incidents which occurred had radiation doses within the stochastic effects reference interval established by the ICRP-64. (authors)

  14. Vergleichende Einschätzung der diagnostischen Aussagekraft der Kenngrößen freies PSA, Alpha1-Antichymotrypsin-PSA und komplexiertes PSA in der Diagnostik des Prostatakarzinoms

    OpenAIRE

    Baumgart E; Deger S; Jung K; Lein M; Loening SA; Schnorr D

    2001-01-01

    Ziel der Studie war die vergleichende Einschätzung der diagnostischen Aussagekraft von Gesamt-PSA (tPSA), freiem PSA (fPSA), alpha1-Antichymotrypsin-PSA (ACT-PSA) und komplexiertem PSA (cPSA) sowie der entsprechenden Quotienten zur Differenzierung zwischen einem Prostatakarzinom (PCa) und einer Benignen Prostatahyperplasie (BPH). Die Bestimmung erfolgte bei insgesamt 324 Männern (PCa: n = 144; BPH: n = 89; Kontrollen: n = 91). Die tPSA- und cPSA-Konzentrationen wurden mit dem Bayer Immuno 1 S...

  15. Development of probabilistic methods for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schott, H.; Berg, H.P.

    1998-01-01

    Since its introduction by the German Risk Study, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has developed in Germany to a valuable tool in regulatory decision-making. Plant specific PSAs of Level 1+ are now conducted for all nuclear power plants in the frame of Periodic Safety Reviews. This paper is devoted to the description or key elements set out in the regulatory guidelines for PSA-Level 1+ and the corresponding technical documents and the further development of PSA methodology in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the course of the next years it is intended to make progress in the modeling of common cause failures, human reliability evaluation, reduction of uncertainties in PSA modeling techniques and data estimation, analysis of low power and shut down states as well as in reaching a mature methodology for inclusion of external events into the analysis. (author)

  16. Flooding PSA by considering the operating experience data of Korean PWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Sun Yeong; Yang, Joon Eon

    2007-01-01

    The existing flooding Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) was updated to reflect the Korean plant specific operating experience data into the flooding frequency to improve the PSA quality. Both the Nuclear Power Experience (NPE) database and the Korea Nuclear PIPE Failure Database (NuPIPE) databases were used in this study, and from these databases, only the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) data were used for the flooding frequencies of the flooding areas in the primary auxiliary building. With these databases and a Bayesian method, the flooding frequencies for the flooding areas were estimated. Subsequently, the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) for the flooding PSA of the UlChiN (UCN) unit 3 and 4 plants based on the Korean Standard Nuclear power Plant (KSNP) internal full-power PSA model was recalculated. The evaluation results showed that sixteen flooding events are potentially significant according to the screening criterion, while there were two flooding events exceeding the screening criterion of the existing UCN 3 and 4 flooding PSA. The result was compared with two kinds of cases: 1) the flooding frequency and CDF from the method of the existing flooding PSA with the PWR and Boiled Water Reactor (BWR) data of the NPE database and the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) method and 2) the flooding frequency and CDF with the NPE database (PWR and BWR data), NuPIPE database, and a Bayesian method. From the comparison, a difference in CDF results was revealed more clearly between the CDF from this study and case 2) than between case 1) and case 2). That is, the number of flooding events exceeding the screen criterion further increased when only the PWR data were used for the primary auxiliary building than when the Korean specific data were used

  17. Probabilistic safety assessment past, present and future. An IAEA perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lederman, L.; Niehaus, F.; Tomic, B.

    1996-01-01

    Despite the high level of development that probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methods have reached, a number of issues place constraints on its use in supporting decision making on safety matters. A recent publication of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) represents an important step in reaching international consensus on the use of PSA. PSA is ''strongly encouraged'' by INSAG; however, it is noted that ''PSA methodology is not sufficiently mature for its present status to be frozen''. The main aspects of the report are discussed in this paper. The paper next discusses three main categories of PSA application, namely the adequacy of design and procedures, optimization of operational activities and regulatory applications. For each of the applications, the objectives, specific modelling requirements and the prospects for implementation are presented. Consistent with its statutory functions, an important aspect of the work of the IAEA is to reach international consensus on the possibilities of and limitations on the use of PSA methods. Whereas past efforts have been concentrated on promotion and assistance to perform Level 1 PSAs, work is now extending with emphasis on PSA applications, Level 2 and Level 3 analysis, external events and shutdown risks. The main elements of IAEA's PSA Programme are discussed. Finally some challenges related to the use of PSA in the backfitting of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former USSR are addressed. (orig.)

  18. The LaSalle probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frederick, L.G.; Massin, H.L.; Crane, G.R.

    1987-01-01

    A probabilistic safety analysis has been performed for LaSalle County Station, a twin-unit General Electric BWR5 Mark II nuclear power plant. A primary objective of this PSA is to provide engineers with a useful and useable tool for making design decisions, performing technical specification optimization, evaluating proposed regulatory changes to equipment and procedures, and as an aid in operator training. Other objectives are to identify the hypothetical accident sequences that would contribute to core damage frequency, and to provide assurance that the total expected frequency of core-damaging accidents is below 10 -4 per reactor-year in response to suggested goals. (orig./HSCH)

  19. Re-examining Prostate-specific Antigen (PSA) Density: Defining the Optimal PSA Range and Patients for Using PSA Density to Predict Prostate Cancer Using Extended Template Biopsy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jue, Joshua S; Barboza, Marcelo Panizzutti; Prakash, Nachiketh S; Venkatramani, Vivek; Sinha, Varsha R; Pavan, Nicola; Nahar, Bruno; Kanabur, Pratik; Ahdoot, Michael; Dong, Yan; Satyanarayana, Ramgopal; Parekh, Dipen J; Punnen, Sanoj

    2017-07-01

    To compare the predictive accuracy of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) density vs PSA across different PSA ranges and by prior biopsy status in a prospective cohort undergoing prostate biopsy. Men from a prospective trial underwent an extended template biopsy to evaluate for prostate cancer at 26 sites throughout the United States. The area under the receiver operating curve assessed the predictive accuracy of PSA density vs PSA across 3 PSA ranges (10 ng/mL). We also investigated the effect of varying the PSA density cutoffs on the detection of cancer and assessed the performance of PSA density vs PSA in men with or without a prior negative biopsy. Among 1290 patients, 585 (45%) and 284 (22%) men had prostate cancer and significant prostate cancer, respectively. PSA density performed better than PSA in detecting any prostate cancer within a PSA of 4-10 ng/mL (area under the receiver operating characteristic curve [AUC]: 0.70 vs 0.53, P PSA >10 mg/mL (AUC: 0.84 vs 0.65, P PSA density was significantly more predictive than PSA in detecting any prostate cancer in men without (AUC: 0.73 vs 0.67, P PSA increases, PSA density becomes a better marker for predicting prostate cancer compared with PSA alone. Additionally, PSA density performed better than PSA in men with a prior negative biopsy. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Analysis of urinary PSA glycosylation is not indicative of high-risk prostate cancer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barrabés, Sílvia; Llop, Esther; Ferrer-Batallé, Montserrat; Ramírez, Manel; Aleixandre, Rosa N; Perry, Antoinette S; de Llorens, Rafael; Peracaula, Rosa

    2017-07-01

    The levels of core fucosylation and α2,3-linked sialic acid in serum Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA), using the lectins Pholiota squarrosa lectin (PhoSL) and Sambucus nigra agglutinin (SNA), can discriminate between Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH) and indolent prostate cancer (PCa) from aggressive PCa. In the present work we evaluated whether these glycosylation determinants could also be altered in urinary PSA obtained after digital rectal examination (DRE) and could also be useful for diagnosis determinations. For this purpose, α2,6-sialic acid and α1,6-fucose levels of urinary PSA from 53 patients, 18 biopsy-negative and 35 PCa patients of different aggressiveness degree, were analyzed by sandwich ELLA (Enzyme Linked Lectin Assay) using PhoSL and SNA. Changes in the levels of specific glycosylation determinants, that in serum PSA samples were indicative of PCa aggressiveness, were not found in PSA from DRE urine samples. Although urine is a simpler matrix for analyzing PSA glycosylation compared to serum, an immunopurification step was necessary to specifically detect the glycans on the PSA molecule. Those specific glycosylation determinants on urinary PSA were however not useful to improve PCa diagnosis. This could be probably due to the low proportion of PSA from the tumor in urine samples, which precludes the identification of aberrantly glycosylated PSA. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  1. Preliminary Consideration for the Development of Regulatory Level 2 PSA Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang-Ju

    2006-01-01

    In order to assess the validity of PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) results and to establish regulatory requirements for relevant safety issues most of the regulators want to develop an independent and convenient risk assessment model including Level 2 PSA area. As this model and framework should be implicitly independent on the licensee's PSA model, it has a primary objective directly for applying to the risk-informed regulatory affairs and for supporting those kinds of works. According this, the regulator can take an objective view for the uncertainty of risk information made by the licensee and keep up the capability and decision-making framework for overall risk assessment results. In addition, the regulatory model may be used to verify and validate the operational risk levels of all engineered safety features of nuclear power plants (NPPs). An issue for plant-specific application of safety goals was previously identified in the US NRC's risk-informed regulatory guidance development activities, and discussed in many Commission papers, e. g. SECY-97-287, which identifies the goal for large early release frequency (LERF). LERF defines a containment performance criteria derived from the quantitative health objectives. As we know, the LERF was chosen to assess risk significance in Regulatory Guide 1.174 (2002) again, which provides one measure of the performance of the containment barrier, and represents a surrogate for early health effects

  2. Risk assessment methods in radiotherapy: Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA); Los metodos de analisis de riesgo en radioterapia: Analisis Probabilistico de seguridad (APS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ramirez Vera, M. L.; Perez Mulas, A.; Delgado, J. M.; Barrientos Ontero, M.; Somoano, F.; Alvarez Garcia, C.; Rodriguez Marti, M.

    2011-07-01

    The understanding of accidents that have occurred in radiotherapy and the lessons learned from them are very useful to prevent repetition, but there are other risks that have not been detected to date. With a view to identifying and preventing such risks, proactive methods successfully applied in other fields, such as probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), have been developed. (Author)

  3. Modeling PSA Problems - II: A Cell-to-Cell Transport Theory Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Labeau, P.E.; Izquierdo, J.M.

    2005-01-01

    In the first paper of this series, we presented an extension of the classical theory of dynamic reliability in which the actual occurrence of an event causing a change in the system dynamics is possibly delayed. The concept of stimulus activation, which triggers the realization of an event after a distributed time delay, was introduced. This gives a new understanding of competing events in the sequence delineation process.In the context of the level-2 probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), the information on stimulus activation mainly consists of regions of the process variables space where the activation can occur with a given probability. The evolution equations of the extended theory of probabilistic dynamics are therefore particularized to a transport process between discrete cells defined in phase-space on this basis. Doing so, an integrated and coherent approach to level-2 PSA problems is propounded. This amounts to including the stimulus concept and the associated stochastic delays discussed in the first paper in the frame of a cell-to-cell transport process.In addition, this discrete model provides a theoretical basis for the definition of appropriate numerical schemes for integrated level-2 PSA applications

  4. A Methodology To Incorporate The Safety Culture Into Probabilistic Safety Assessments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Sunghyun; Kim, Namyeong; Jae, Moosung [Hanyang University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    In order to incorporate organizational factors into PSA, a methodology needs to be developed. Using the AHP to weigh organizational factors as well as the SLIM to rate those factors, a methodology is introduced in this study. The safety issues related to nuclear safety culture have occurred increasingly. The quantification tool has to be developed in order to include the organizational factor into Probabilistic Safety Assessments. In this study, the state-of-the-art for the organizational evaluation methodologies has been surveyed. This study includes the research for organizational factors, maintenance process, maintenance process analysis models, a quantitative methodology using Analytic Hierarchy Process, Success Likelihood Index Methodology. The purpose of this study is to develop a methodology to incorporate the safety culture into PSA for obtaining more objective risk than before. The organizational factor considered in nuclear safety culture might affect the potential risk of human error and hardware-failure. The safety culture impact index to monitor the plant safety culture can be assessed by applying the developed methodology into a nuclear power plant.

  5. A Methodology To Incorporate The Safety Culture Into Probabilistic Safety Assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Sunghyun; Kim, Namyeong; Jae, Moosung

    2015-01-01

    In order to incorporate organizational factors into PSA, a methodology needs to be developed. Using the AHP to weigh organizational factors as well as the SLIM to rate those factors, a methodology is introduced in this study. The safety issues related to nuclear safety culture have occurred increasingly. The quantification tool has to be developed in order to include the organizational factor into Probabilistic Safety Assessments. In this study, the state-of-the-art for the organizational evaluation methodologies has been surveyed. This study includes the research for organizational factors, maintenance process, maintenance process analysis models, a quantitative methodology using Analytic Hierarchy Process, Success Likelihood Index Methodology. The purpose of this study is to develop a methodology to incorporate the safety culture into PSA for obtaining more objective risk than before. The organizational factor considered in nuclear safety culture might affect the potential risk of human error and hardware-failure. The safety culture impact index to monitor the plant safety culture can be assessed by applying the developed methodology into a nuclear power plant

  6. Probabilistic safety analysis forecast for Trillo 1 NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carretero Fernandino, J.A.; Martin Alvarez, L.; gomez, F.; Cuallado, G.

    1995-01-01

    The performance of Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) at Trillo 1 NPP is facing a number of challenges, unprecedented in previous PSAs carried out in Spain, due to the particular design characteristics of the plant. On account of this, it has been necessary to implemented specific approaches and methodological alternatives to perform a PSA which, while maintaining detail level and requirements in line with PSAs carried out previously in Spain, offers a solution technically adapted to the characteristics of the SIEMENS-KWU design as opposed to other Spanish reactors with a basic Westinghouse-General Electric design, which are based on standard US design. The purpose of this paper is to describe the most significant characteristics of the PSA at Trillo 1 NPP and the methodology used to date, taking into account current project progress

  7. Influence of PSA, PSA velocity and PSA doubling time on contrast-enhanced 18F-choline PET/CT detection rate in patients with rising PSA after radical prostatectomy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schillaci, Orazio; Calabria, Ferdinando; Tavolozza, Mario; Caracciolo, Cristiana Ragano; Orlacchio, Antonio; Danieli, Roberta; Simonetti, Giovanni; Agro, Enrico Finazzi; Miano, Roberto

    2012-01-01

    To evaluate the accuracy of contrast-enhanced 18 F-choline PET/CT in restaging patients with prostate cancer after radical prostatectomy in relation to PSA, PSA velocity (PSAve) and PSA doubling time (PSAdt). PET/CT was performed in 49 patients (age range 58-87 years) with rising PSA (mean 4.13 ng/ml) who were divided in four groups according to PSA level: ≤1 ng/ml, 1 to ≤2 ng/ml, 2 to ≤4 ng/ml, and >4 ng/ml. PSAve and PSAdt were measured. PET and CT scans were interpreted separately and then together. PET/CT diagnosed relapse in 33 of the 49 patients (67%). The detection rates were 20%, 55%, 80% and 87% in the PSA groups ≤1, 1 to ≤2, 2 to ≤4 and >4 ng/ml, respectively. PET/CT was positive in 7 of 18 patients (38.9%) with a PSA ≤2 ng/ml, and in 26 of 31 (83.9%) with a PSA >2 ng/ml. PET/CT was positive in 7 of 25 patients (84%) with PSAdt ≤6 months, and in 12 of 24 patients (50%) with PSAdt >6 months, and was positive in 26 of 30 patients (86%) with a PSAve >2 ng/ml per year, and in 7 of 19 patients (36.8%) with PSAve ≤2 ng/ml per year. PET alone was positive in 31 of 49 patients (63.3%), and of these 31 patients, CT was negative in 14 but diagnosed bone lesions in 2 patients in whom PET alone was negative. CT with the administration of intravenous contrast medium did not provide any further information. Detection rate of 18 F-choline imaging is closely related to PSA and PSA kinetics. In particular, 18 F-choline PET/CT is recommended in patients with PSA >2 ng/ml, PSAdt ≤6 months and PSAve >2 ng/ml per year. CT is useful for detecting bone metastases that are not 18 F-choline-avid. The use of intravenous contrast agent seems unnecessary. (orig.)

  8. Presentation of common cause failures in fault tree structure of Krsko PSA : an historical overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vrbanic, I.; Kosutic, I.; Vukovic, I.; Simic, Z.

    2003-01-01

    Failure of multiple components due to a common cause represents one of the most important issues in evaluation of system reliability or unavailability. The frequency of such events has relatively low expectancy, when compared to random failures, which affect individual components. However, in many cases the consequence is a direct loss of safety system or mitigative safety function. For this reason, the modeling of a common cause failure (CCF) and its presentation in fault tree structure is of the uttermost importance in probabilistic safety analyses (PSA). During the past decade, PSA model of Krsko NPP has undergone many small changes and a couple of major ones in fulfilling its basic purpose, which was serving as a tool for providing an appropriate information on the risk associated with actual plant design and operation. All changes to Krsko PSA model were undertaken in order to make it a better tool and / or to make it represent the plant in more accurate manner. The paper provides an overview of changes in CCF modeling in the fault tree structure from the initial PSA model development till present. (author)

  9. PSA modeling of long-term accident sequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Georgescu, Gabriel; Corenwinder, Francois; Lanore, Jeanne-Marie

    2014-01-01

    In the context of the extension of PSA scope to include external hazards, in France, both operator (EDF) and IRSN work for the improvement of methods to better take into account in the PSA the accident sequences induced by initiators which affect a whole site containing several nuclear units (reactors, fuel pools,...). These methodological improvements represent an essential prerequisite for the development of external hazards PSA. However, it has to be noted that in French PSA, even before Fukushima, long term accident sequences were taken into account: many insight were therefore used, as complementary information, to enhance the safety level of the plants. IRSN proposed an external events PSA development program. One of the first steps of the program is the development of methods to model in the PSA the long term accident sequences, based on the experience gained. At short term IRSN intends to enhance the modeling of the 'long term' accident sequences induced by the loss of the heat sink or/and the loss of external power supply. The experience gained by IRSN and EDF from the development of several probabilistic studies treating long term accident sequences shows that the simple extension of the mission time of the mitigation systems from 24 hours to longer times is not sufficient to realistically quantify the risk and to obtain a correct ranking of the risk contributions and that treatment of recoveries is also necessary. IRSN intends to develop a generic study which can be used as a general methodology for the assessment of the long term accident sequences, mainly generated by external hazards and their combinations. This first attempt to develop this generic study allowed identifying some aspects, which may be hazard (or combinations of hazards) or related to initial boundary conditions, which should be taken into account for further developments. (authors)

  10. Seismic Level 2 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dirksen, Gerben; Pellissetti, Manuel; Duncan-Whiteman, Paul

    2014-01-01

    For most external events, the calculation of the core damage frequency (CDF) in Level 1 PSA is sufficient to be able to show that the contribution of the event to the plant risk is negligible. However, it is not sufficient to compare the CDF due to the external event to the total plant CDF; instead the Level 1 PSA result for the event should be compared to the large early release frequency (LERF), or alternatively arguments should be given why the CDF from the external event will not contribute mostly to LERF. For seismic events in particular, it can often not be easily excluded that sequences leading to core damage would not also result in LERF. Since the confinement function is one of the most essential functions for Level 2 PSA, special care must be taken of the containment penetrations. For example systems with containment penetrations that are normally closed during operation or are designed to withstand more than the maximum containment pressure are normally screened out in the Level 2 PSA for the containment isolation function, however the possibility of LOCA in such systems due to an earthquake may nevertheless lead to containment bypass. Additionally, the functionality of passive features may be compromised in case of a beyond design earthquake. In the present paper, we present crucial ingredients of a methodology for a Level 2 seismic PSA. This methodology consists of the following steps: Extension of the seismic equipment list (SEL) to include Level 2 PSA relevant systems (e.g. containment isolation system, features for core melt stabilization, hydrogen mitigation systems), Determination of the systems within the existing SEL with increased demands in case of severe accidents, Determination of essential components for which a dedicated fragility analysis needs to be performed. (author)

  11. Level II Probabilistic Safety Analysis Methodology for the Application to GEN-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. Y.; Kim, T. W.; Han, S. H.; Jeong, H. Y.

    2010-03-01

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing liquid metal reactor (LMR) design technologies under a National Nuclear R and D Program. Nevertheless, there is no experience of the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) domestically for a fast reactor with the metal fuel. Therefore, the objective of this study is to establish the methodologies of risk assessment for the reference design of GEN-IV sodium fast reactor (SFR). An applicability of the PSA methodology of U. S. NRC and PRISM plant to the domestic GEN-IV SFR has been studied. The study contains a plant damage state analysis, a containment event tree analysis, and a source-term release category binning process

  12. Importance of the multi-modules study in PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez R, V. J.; Nelson E, P. F.

    2015-09-01

    The current approach that has taken the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) consists of doing all the APS analysis including the existence of multi-units in the nuclear power plants (NPP), this new approach seeks to analyze the risk of site, evaluating all reactors together. The main reasons for this trend are: the accident occurred on March 2011 in Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, with serious consequences in more than one reactor of the NPP and the current planning and construction of new Small Modular Reactors, which host more than one module on the same NPP and are connected to a single control room. This study analyzes how to model the risk of a multi-module NPP. In 2013, the ASME/ANS standard for advanced reactors that are not light-water reactors was published, in which the requirements to realize a PSA including multi-units or modules are shown; however, does not describe the methodology to do that. This article presents a methodology to calculate the risk of the site in a PBMR plant with two modules. This methodology consists of two models of trees of different events, one that evaluates to a single PBMR module and another that evaluates the two modules together. Both models are responsible to show their differences and compare results to finally demonstrate the need for new methodologies for risk analysis site in multi-modules and units. (Author)

  13. Best-practices guidelines for L2PSA development and applications. Volume 1 - General

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raimond, E.; Pichereau, F.; Durin, T.; Rahni, N.; Loeffler, H.; Roesch, O.; Lajtha, G.; Santamaria, C.S.; Dienstbier, J.; Rydl, A.; Holmberg, J.E.; Lindholm, I.; Maennistoe, I.; Pauli, E.M.; Dirksen, G.; Grindon, L.; Peers, K.; Bassi, C.; Hulqvist, G.; Parozzi, F.; Polidoro, F.; Cazzoli, E.; Vitazkova, J.; Burgazzi, L.; Brinkman, H.; Seidel, A.; Schubert, B.; Wohlstein, R.; Guentay, S.; Oury, L.; Ngatchou, C.; Siltanen, S.; Niemela, I.; Routamo, T.; Vincon, L.; Helstroem, P.

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this coordinated action was to develop best practice guidelines for the performance and application of Level 2 PSA with a view to achieve harmonisation at EU level and to allow a meaningful and practical uncertainty evaluation in a Level 2 PSA. Specific relationships with communities in charge of nuclear reactor safety (utilities, safety authorities, vendors, and research or services companies) have been established in order to define the current needs in terms of guidelines for Level 2 PSA development and application. An international workshop was organised in Hamburg, with the support of VATTENFALL, in November 2008. The Level 2 PSA experts from ASAMPSA2 project partners have proposed some guidelines for the development and application of L2PSA based on their experience, open literature, and on information available from international cooperation (EC Severe Accident network of Excellence - SARNET, IAEA standards, OECD-NEA publications and workshop). There are a large number of technical issues addressed in the guideline which are not all covered with the same level of detail in the first version of the guideline. This version was submitted for external review in November 2010 by severe accident and PSA experts (especially from SARNET and OECD-NEA members). The feedback of the external review will be dis cussed during an international open works hop planned for March 2011 and all outcomes will be taken into consideration in the final version of this guideline (June 2011). The guideline includes 3 volumes: - Volume 1 - General considerations on L2PSA. - Volume 2 - Technical recommendations for Gen II and III reactors. - Volume 3 - Specific considerations for future reactors (Gen IV). The recommendations formulated in the guideline should not be considered as 'mandatory' but should help Level 2 PSA developers to achieve high quality studies with limited time and resources. It may also help Level 2 PSA reviewers by positioning one specific study in

  14. Key Characteristics of Combined Accident including TLOFW accident for PSA Modeling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Bo Gyung; Kang, Hyun Gook [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Yoon, Ho Joon [Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)

    2015-05-15

    The conventional PSA techniques cannot adequately evaluate all events. The conventional PSA models usually focus on single internal events such as DBAs, the external hazards such as fire, seismic. However, the Fukushima accident of Japan in 2011 reveals that very rare event is necessary to be considered in the PSA model to prevent the radioactive release to environment caused by poor treatment based on lack of the information, and to improve the emergency operation procedure. Especially, the results from PSA can be used to decision making for regulators. Moreover, designers can consider the weakness of plant safety based on the quantified results and understand accident sequence based on human actions and system availability. This study is for PSA modeling of combined accidents including total loss of feedwater (TLOFW) accident. The TLOFW accident is a representative accident involving the failure of cooling through secondary side. If the amount of heat transfer is not enough due to the failure of secondary side, the heat will be accumulated to the primary side by continuous core decay heat. Transients with loss of feedwater include total loss of feedwater accident, loss of condenser vacuum accident, and closure of all MSIVs. When residual heat removal by the secondary side is terminated, the safety injection into the RCS with direct primary depressurization would provide alternative heat removal. This operation is called feed and bleed (F and B) operation. Combined accidents including TLOFW accident are very rare event and partially considered in conventional PSA model. Since the necessity of F and B operation is related to plant conditions, the PSA modeling for combined accidents including TLOFW accident is necessary to identify the design and operational vulnerabilities.The PSA is significant to assess the risk of NPPs, and to identify the design and operational vulnerabilities. Even though the combined accident is very rare event, the consequence of combined

  15. Examination of risk significant configuration during low power and shutdown with ORION and PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Chul Kyu; Oh, Seung Jong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    This paper suggests an approach to calculate the increased CDF corresponding to Orange and Red states in ORION program and analyzed the result of calculation. This approach is expected to be useful for checking the adequacy of the LPSD PSA. And also, the result of this calculation can provide the information about which SSCs for certain SF are more sensitive to risk in particular POS. Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which multiple lines of defense and conservative design and evaluation methods are applied to ensure the safety of the public. Based on this philosophy EPRI developed Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM) program as a qualitative assessment to better manage the risk during low power and shutdown event after the Vogtle loss of vital AC power and RHR event in 1990. Each risk level of RED, ORANGE color status caused by the degradation of each key safety function might be different depend on the importance of each key safety function. However we can't know how much different. If we know the quantitative information about the risk level represented by color, we can take and prepare concrete actions to reduce the risk level of the plant with rescheduling maintenance, strengthen surveillance for important safety function, and developing outage management strategy. The probabilistic safety analysis for low power and shutdown period can provide risk information with quantitative value related on the degradation of redundancy and diversity level for the safety functions during outage. In this study, we calculated the increased Core Damage frequency (CDF) of each RED and ORANGE states in ORION program caused by the degradation of each key safety function by modifying LPSD PSA model. The result of calculation and analysis could be effective to check adequacy and find improvement for these two methods.

  16. The managerial dilemma between the prescribed task and the real activity of operators: some trends for research for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montmayeul, R.; Mosneron Dupin, F.; LLory, M.

    1993-11-01

    Whatever the level in an organization, the management needs safety indicators to assist decision making on safety. As an indicator, PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) through PHRA (Probabilistic Human Reliability Assessment) accounts for some aspects of human reality. In spite of the limitations of PSAs as a tool in assisting the processing of safety problems, three possible channels for development and progress are suggested ''internal'' improvement of PSAs, by enhancing data and human-behaviour models; extension of the classical applications of PSAs for the purpose of reflection and speculation, and for querying the potential influence of a certain number of factors concerning human behaviour; the extension of PSAs themselves, by developing organizational indicators. Research has been undertaken to evaluate the feasibility of using methods developed for analysis of the psychosocial climate of a company to set up a ''safety culture'' or ''safety climate'' indicator. Such an organizational indicator would reflect perception and opinion of the personnel at a given time, and make it possible to follow their evolutions; effective interpretation of the results needs to be done with the staff concerned. PSA and other indicators are only tools for analysis and aids for decision making, they cannot replace any part of the technical and scientific debate which must be on-going for all aspects of safety. (authors). 20 refs

  17. The diagnostic value of PSA, cPSA and bone scintigraphy for early skeletal metastasis of prostate cancer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xue Zhongguang

    2007-01-01

    Objective: To evaluate the value of prostate specific antigen (PSA), complexed prostate specific antigen (cPSA) and bone scintigraphic imaging in diagnosis of early skeletal metastasis of prostate cancer. Methods: 152 patients (74 with prostate cancer, 78 with benign prostate disease) and 90 controls were examined for the serum concentrations of PSA and cPSA. At the same time, the 74 patients with PCa were examined with bone scintigraphy. The cPSA/PSA ratio was calculated. Results: Serum PSA, cPSA levels and cPSA/PSA ratio of patients with prostate cancer were significantly higher than those in benign prostate patients and controls. In addition, the serum PSA, cPSA levels and cPSA/PSA ratio in prostate cancer patients with skeletal metastasis were remarkably higher than those in patients without skeletal metastasis, and the differences were significant (P 20 μg/L, cPSA>10 μg/L, cPSA/PSA>0.80, there is a high probability that skeletal metastasis of prostate cancer would be present and bone scintigraphy should be performed. (authors)

  18. Influence of PSA, PSA velocity and PSA doubling time on contrast-enhanced {sup 18}F-choline PET/CT detection rate in patients with rising PSA after radical prostatectomy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schillaci, Orazio [University ' ' Tor Vergata' ' , Department of Biopathology and Diagnostic Imaging, Interventional, Rome (Italy); IRCCS Neuromed, Department of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, Pozzilli (Italy); Calabria, Ferdinando [IRCCS Neuromed, Department of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, Pozzilli (Italy); Tavolozza, Mario; Caracciolo, Cristiana Ragano; Orlacchio, Antonio; Danieli, Roberta; Simonetti, Giovanni [University ' ' Tor Vergata' ' , Department of Biopathology and Diagnostic Imaging, Interventional, Rome (Italy); Agro, Enrico Finazzi; Miano, Roberto [University Hospital ' ' Tor Vergata' ' , Department of Urology, Rome (Italy)

    2012-04-15

    To evaluate the accuracy of contrast-enhanced {sup 18}F-choline PET/CT in restaging patients with prostate cancer after radical prostatectomy in relation to PSA, PSA velocity (PSAve) and PSA doubling time (PSAdt). PET/CT was performed in 49 patients (age range 58-87 years) with rising PSA (mean 4.13 ng/ml) who were divided in four groups according to PSA level: {<=}1 ng/ml, 1 to {<=}2 ng/ml, 2 to {<=}4 ng/ml, and >4 ng/ml. PSAve and PSAdt were measured. PET and CT scans were interpreted separately and then together. PET/CT diagnosed relapse in 33 of the 49 patients (67%). The detection rates were 20%, 55%, 80% and 87% in the PSA groups {<=}1, 1 to {<=}2, 2 to {<=}4 and >4 ng/ml, respectively. PET/CT was positive in 7 of 18 patients (38.9%) with a PSA {<=}2 ng/ml, and in 26 of 31 (83.9%) with a PSA >2 ng/ml. PET/CT was positive in 7 of 25 patients (84%) with PSAdt {<=}6 months, and in 12 of 24 patients (50%) with PSAdt >6 months, and was positive in 26 of 30 patients (86%) with a PSAve >2 ng/ml per year, and in 7 of 19 patients (36.8%) with PSAve {<=}2 ng/ml per year. PET alone was positive in 31 of 49 patients (63.3%), and of these 31 patients, CT was negative in 14 but diagnosed bone lesions in 2 patients in whom PET alone was negative. CT with the administration of intravenous contrast medium did not provide any further information. Detection rate of {sup 18}F-choline imaging is closely related to PSA and PSA kinetics. In particular, {sup 18}F-choline PET/CT is recommended in patients with PSA >2 ng/ml, PSAdt {<=}6 months and PSAve >2 ng/ml per year. CT is useful for detecting bone metastases that are not {sup 18}F-choline-avid. The use of intravenous contrast agent seems unnecessary. (orig.)

  19. Living PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, M.G.K.

    1997-01-01

    The aim of this presentation is to gain an understanding of the requirements for a PSA to be considered a Living PSA. The presentation is divided into the following topics: Definition; Planning/Documentation; Task Performance; Maintenance; Management. 4 figs

  20. A probabilistic analysis method to evaluate the effect of human factors on plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ujita, H.

    1987-01-01

    A method to evaluate the effect of human factors on probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is developed. The main features of the method are as follows: 1. A time-dependent multibranch tree is constructed to treat time dependency of human error probability. 2. A sensitivity analysis is done to determine uncertainty in the PSA due to branch time of human error occurrence, human error data source, extraneous act probability, and human recovery probability. The method is applied to a large-break, loss-of-coolant accident of a boiling water reactor-5. As a result, core melt probability and risk do not depend on the number of time branches, which means that a small number of branches are sufficient. These values depend on the first branch time and the human error probability

  1. Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context - Phase 2 Status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Authen, S.; Gustafsson, J.; Holmberg, J.-E.

    2012-02-01

    The OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) has set up a task group called DIGREL to develop a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). A parallel Nordic activity carried out a pre-study where a comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review were performed. The study showed a wide range of approaches and solutions to the challenges given by digital I and C. In 2011, a proposal for the failure modes taxonomy was defined. This is based on a set of requirements agreed on the purpose of the taxonomy. The following levels of details can be distinguished from the hardware point of view: (1) the entire system, (2) a division, (3) processing units (and cabinets), (4) modules, i.e. subcomponents of processing units and (5) generic components, i.e. subcomponents of modules. Module level seems to be the most appropriate from the PSA modelling point of view. The software failure modes taxonomy is still an open issue. An existing simplified PSA model has been complemented with fault tree models for a four-redundant distributed protection system in order to study and demonstrate the effect of design features and modelling approaches. The example shows that even rather simple I and C design leads to rather complex model despite of the fact that many things have been simplified and only a few protection signals are considered. One lesson from the example is that the Alpha factor model should be used to model common cause failures instead of the Beta factor model. Two options were developed to the comparison of different fail-safe principles. The role of detectable and undetectable failure modes with respect to the failed versus spurious actuations can be clearly seen in the results, showing the importance to model these features in PSA. (Author)

  2. Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context - Phase 2 Status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Authen, S. (Risk Pilot AB, Stockholm (Sweden)); Gustafsson, J. (Royal Institute of Technology (Sweden)); Holmberg, J.-E. (VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Finland))

    2012-02-15

    The OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) has set up a task group called DIGREL to develop a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). A parallel Nordic activity carried out a pre-study where a comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review were performed. The study showed a wide range of approaches and solutions to the challenges given by digital I and C. In 2011, a proposal for the failure modes taxonomy was defined. This is based on a set of requirements agreed on the purpose of the taxonomy. The following levels of details can be distinguished from the hardware point of view: (1) the entire system, (2) a division, (3) processing units (and cabinets), (4) modules, i.e. subcomponents of processing units and (5) generic components, i.e. subcomponents of modules. Module level seems to be the most appropriate from the PSA modelling point of view. The software failure modes taxonomy is still an open issue. An existing simplified PSA model has been complemented with fault tree models for a four-redundant distributed protection system in order to study and demonstrate the effect of design features and modelling approaches. The example shows that even rather simple I and C design leads to rather complex model despite of the fact that many things have been simplified and only a few protection signals are considered. One lesson from the example is that the Alpha factor model should be used to model common cause failures instead of the Beta factor model. Two options were developed to the comparison of different fail-safe principles. The role of detectable and undetectable failure modes with respect to the failed versus spurious actuations can be clearly seen in the results, showing the importance to model these features in PSA. (Author)

  3. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Development of level 2 PSA technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jin, Yung Hoh; Park, Soo Yong; Kim, Si Dal; Song, Yong Man; An, Kwang Il

    1995-07-01

    The objective of this project is the development of the computer code system for level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants. The scope of the project can be divided into three areas. The first area is to develop the computer code (CONPAS) which can quantify the accident progression event trees. CONPAS beta version has been developed this year and it is comprised of two modules: (1) EDITOR for generating the event tree logic diagrams and (2) QUANTIFICATION for event tree quantification and for additional use of the calculated results. Comparing with the existing computer code, the present code provides a flexible code reusability and user interface, convenient edition of logic diagram, data operation, and systematic quantification of the results. The methodology development of containment structural analysis is the second area. Over twenty large dry PWR containments, the database for containment failure mode and pressure has been constructed and the simplified fragility model has been proposed to calculate the containment failure probability. They will be used as an important input not only in the containment analysis but also in the source term analysis. The last one is to develop the source term analysis methodology which will be used to characterize the source term release for various accidents. One generic parametric equation for PWR and BWR has been composed and parametric database of 6 nuclear plants (4 PWR plants and 2 BWR plants) has been established whose characteristics is then analyzed through the comparison of parameter and data difference among plants. In addition, the characteristics of parameters themselves have been also investigated and the complemental idea of the parametric data base has been briefly suggested. 50 figs, 43 tabs, 50 refs. (Author)

  4. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Development of level 2 PSA technology-

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jin, Yung Hoh; Park, Soo Yong; Kim, Si Dal; Song, Yong Man; An, Kwang Il [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-07-01

    The objective of this project is the development of the computer code system for level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants. The scope of the project can be divided into three areas. The first area is to develop the computer code (CONPAS) which can quantify the accident progression event trees. CONPAS beta version has been developed this year and it is comprised of two modules: (1) EDITOR for generating the event tree logic diagrams and (2) QUANTIFICATION for event tree quantification and for additional use of the calculated results. Comparing with the existing computer code, the present code provides a flexible code reusability and user interface, convenient edition of logic diagram, data operation, and systematic quantification of the results. The methodology development of containment structural analysis is the second area. Over twenty large dry PWR containments, the database for containment failure mode and pressure has been constructed and the simplified fragility model has been proposed to calculate the containment failure probability. They will be used as an important input not only in the containment analysis but also in the source term analysis. The last one is to develop the source term analysis methodology which will be used to characterize the source term release for various accidents. One generic parametric equation for PWR and BWR has been composed and parametric database of 6 nuclear plants (4 PWR plants and 2 BWR plants) has been established whose characteristics is then analyzed through the comparison of parameter and data difference among plants. In addition, the characteristics of parameters themselves have been also investigated and the complemental idea of the parametric data base has been briefly suggested. 50 figs, 43 tabs, 50 refs. (Author).

  5. Estimation Procedure of Common Cause Failure Parameters for CAFE-PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Dae Il; Hwang, M. J.; Han, S. H.

    2009-03-01

    Detailed common cause failure (CCF) analysis generally needs the data for CCF events from other nuclear power plants because the CCF events rarely occur. Since 2002, KAERI has participated in the international common cause failure data exchange (ICDE) project to get data for CCF events. The operation office of the ICDE project sent about 400 CCF event data for emergency diesel generators, motor operated valves, check valves, pumps, and breakers to KAERI in 2009. However, there was no program available to analyze the ICDE CCF event data. Therefore, we developed the CAFE-PSA (common CAuse Failure Event analysis program for PSA) to estimate CCF parameters by using the ICDE CCF event data. With CAFE-PSA, the CCF events in the ICDE database can be qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed. The qualitative analysis results of the ICDE CCF data, by using the CAFE-PSA, showed that the major root cause of CCF events, for motor operated valves, check valves, and pumps, was the fault of their internal parts, and that for emergency diesel generators and breakers was the inadequacy of design/manufacture or construction. The quantitative analysis results of the ICDE CCF data, by using the CAFE-PSA, showed that the estimated Alpha Factors of components, mentioned above, were lower than those previously used in the PSA for domestic nuclear power plants, but were higher than those in USNRC 2007 CCF data. Through performing qualitative and quantitative analysis of the ICDE CCF data, by using the CAFE-PSA, a plan for coping with CCF events for design and operation of nuclear power plants can be produced and reasonable values for CCF parameters can be estimated. In addition, it is expected that the technical adequacy of PSA can be improved

  6. Thermal hydraulic analysis of aggressive secondary cooldown in a small break loss of coolant accident with a total loss of high pressure safety injection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Seok Jung; Lim, Ho Gon; Yang, Joon Eon

    2003-01-01

    To support the development of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model usable in Riskinformed Applications (RIA) for Korea Standard Nuclear power Plants (KSNP), we have performed a thermal hydraulic analysis of Aggressive Secondary Cooldown (ASC) in a 2-inch Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) with a total loss of High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI). The present study focuses on the estimation of the success criteria of ASC, and the enhanced understanding of the detailed thermal hydraulic behavior and phenomena. The results have shown that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure can be reduced to the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) operation conditions without core damage. It was also shown that more relaxed success criteria compared to those in the previous PSA models of KSNP could be used in the new PSA model. However, it was found that the results could be affected by various parameters related with ASC operation, i.e., reference temperature for the calculation of the cooldown rate and its control method

  7. The clinical study of serum PSA and fPSA assayed by CLIA in diagnosing prostate disease

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xiong Jiang; Qian Xiaoyu; Ji Hong; Yang Su; Ding Ying; Zhu Ruisen; Chen Zhong

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to evaluate the clinical value of PSA (prostate specific antigen) and fPSA(free prostate specific antigen) in differentiating prostate disease. CLIA was used to quantitatively assay PSA, fPSA and fPSA/PSA in 30 cases of normal controls, 32 cases of prostate cancer patients and 76 cases of BPH patients. The result showed that if liminal value of PSA was set at 4 ng/mL, the diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of prostate cancer were 100% and 50.6% respectively. Meanwhile, if liminal value of fPSA/PSA set at 16% was added, the diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of prostate cancer were 100% and 85.3% respectively. It was concluded that the combining assay of PSA and fPSA could increase the diagnostic specificity of prostate cancer in a certain degree

  8. Can PSA Reflex Algorithm be a valid alternative to other PSA-based prostate cancer screening strategies?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Caldarelli, G; Troiano, G; Rosadini, D; Nante, N

    2017-01-01

    The available laboratory tests for the differential diagnosis of prostate cancer, are represented by the total PSA, the free PSA, and the free/total PSA ratio. In Italy most of doctors tend to request both total and free PSA for their patients even in cases where the total PSA doesn't justify the further request of free PSA, with a consequent growth of the costs for the National Health System. The aim of our study was to predict the saving in Euro (due to reagents) and reduction in free PSA tests, applying the "PSA Reflex" algorithm. We calculated the number of total PSA and free PSA exams performed in 2014 in the Hospital of Grosseto and, simulating the application of the "PSA Reflex" algorithm in the same year, we calculated the decrease in the number of free PSA requests and we tried to predict the Euro savings in reagents, obtained from this reduction. In 2014 in the Hospital of Grosseto 25,955 total PSA tests have been performed: 3,631 (14%) resulted greater than 10 ng / ml; 7,686 (29.6%) between 2 and 10 ng / ml; 14,638 (56.4%) lower than 2 ng / ml. The performed free PSA tests were 16904. Simulating the use of "PSA Reflex" algorithm, the free PSA tests would be performed only in cases with total PSA values between 2 and 10 ng / mL with a saving of 54.5% of free PSA exams and of 8,971 euros, only for reagents. Our study showed that the "PSA Reflex" algorithm is a valid alternative leading to a reduction of the costs. The estimated intralaboratory savings, due to the reagents, seem to be modest, however, they are followed by the additional savings due to the other diagnostic processes for prostate cancers.

  9. Post treatment PSA nadirs support continuing dose escalation study in patients with pretreatment PSA levels >10 ng/ml, but not in those with PSA <10 NG/ML

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herold, D.H.; Hanlon, A.L.; Movsas, B.; Hanks, G.E.

    1996-01-01

    Purpose: We have recently shown that ICRU reporting point radiation doses above 71 Gy are not associated with improved bNED survival in prostate cancer patients with pretreatment PSA level 20 ng/ml we found a strong correlation between dose and nadir values < 1.0 ng/ml (p=.003) as well as for nadir's < 0.5 ng/ml (p=.04). This dose/nadir effect held at several dose levels, but 74 Gy for nadir values < 1.0 ng/ml and 72 Gy for nadir's < 0.5 ng/ml remained the most significant. 32% of these patients achieved a nadir < 1.0ng/ml and 15% < 0.5ng/ml. Conclusions: This analysis provides strong additional support that patients with pretreatment PSA values of < 10 ng/ml do not benefit from dose escalation beyond an ICRU reporting point dose of 71 Gy. For patients with pretreatment PSA's of 10-19.9 ng/ml there is no dose/nadir response evaluated at a nadir of 1.0 ng/ml; however, there is a borderline effect observed at a nadir of 0.5 ng/ml. Patients with pretreatment PSA's of 20 ng/ml or greater clearly benefit from higher doses as evaluated by PSA nadirs of 1.0 ng/ml, and 0.5 ng/ml. These studies support the continued investigation of dose escalation in treating patients with PSA levels over 10 ng/ml, they do not support continued investigation of dose escalation beyond 71 Gy in patients with pretreatment PSA levels < 10 ng/ml. The failure to demonstrate any dose response for the low PSA group and the finding of only a borderline effect for the intermediate PSA group may be influenced by the relatively small number of patients in our series treated to doses < 70 Gy and the fact that none of our patients were treated to doses below 65.98 Gy. The lower limit of acceptible dose has yet to be defined

  10. Analysis of Paks NPP Personnel Activity during Safety Related Event Sequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bareith, A.; Hollo, Elod; Karsa, Z.; Nagy, S.

    1998-01-01

    Within the AGNES Project (Advanced Generic and New Evaluation of Safety) the Level-1 PSA model of the Paks NPP Unit 3 was developed in form of a detailed event tree/fault tree structure (53 initiating events, 580 event sequences, 6300 basic events are involved). This model gives a good basis for quantitative evaluation of potential consequences of actually occurred safety-related events, i.e. for precursor event studies. To make these studies possible and efficient, the current qualitative event analysis practice should be reviewed and a new additional quantitative analysis procedure and system should be developed and applied. The present paper gives an overview of the method outlined for both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the operator crew activity during off-normal situations. First, the operator performance experienced during past operational events is discussed. Sources of raw information, the qualitative evaluation process, the follow-up actions, as well as the documentation requirements are described. Second, the general concept of the proposed precursor event analysis is described. Types of modeled interactions and the considered performance influences are presented. The quantification of the potential consequences of the identified precursor events is based on the task-oriented, Level-1 PSA model of the plant unit. A precursor analysis system covering the evaluation of operator activities is now under development. Preliminary results gained during a case study evaluation of a past historical event are presented. (authors)

  11. Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Bounce After Dose-Escalated External Beam Radiation Therapy Is an Independent Predictor of PSA Recurrence, Metastasis, and Survival in Prostate Adenocarcinoma Patients.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Romesser, Paul B; Pei, Xin; Shi, Weiji; Zhang, Zhigang; Kollmeier, Marisa; McBride, Sean M; Zelefsky, Michael J

    2018-01-01

    To evaluate the difference in prostate-specific antigen (PSA) recurrence-free, distant metastasis-free, overall, and cancer-specific survival between PSA bounce (PSA-B) and non-bounce patients treated with dose-escalated external beam radiation therapy (DE-EBRT). During 1990-2010, 1898 prostate adenocarcinoma patients were treated with DE-EBRT to ≥75 Gy with ≥5 years follow-up. Patients receiving neoadjuvant/concurrent androgen-deprivation therapy (n=1035) or with fewer than 4 PSA values obtained 6 months or more after post-EBRT completion (n=87) were excluded. The evaluable 776 patients were treated (median, 81.0 Gy). Prostate-specific antigen bounce was defined as a ≥0.2-ng/mL increase above the interval PSA nadir, followed by a decrease to nadir or below. Prostate-specific antigen relapse was defined as post-radiation therapy PSA nadir + 2 ng/mL. Median follow-up was 9.2 years (interquartile range, 6.9-11.3 years). One hundred twenty-three patients (15.9%) experienced PSA-B after DE-EBRT at a median of 24.6 months (interquartile range, 16.1-38.5 months). On multivariate analysis, younger age (P=.001), lower Gleason score (P=.0003), and higher radiation therapy dose (P=.0002) independently predicted PSA-B. Prostate-specific antigen bounce was independently associated with decreased risk for PSA relapse (hazard ratio [HR] 0.53; 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.33-0.85; P=.008), distant metastatic disease (HR 0.34; 95% CI 0.12-0.94; P=.04), and all-cause mortality (HR 0.53; 95% CI 0.29-0.96; P=.04) on multivariate Cox analysis. Because all 50 prostate cancer-specific deaths in patients without PSA-B were in the non-bounce cohort, competing-risks analysis was not applicable. A nonparametric competing-risks test demonstrated that patients with PSA-B had superior cancer-specific survival compared with patients without PSA-B (P=.004). Patients treated with dose-escalated radiation therapy for prostate adenocarcinoma who experience posttreatment PSA-B have

  12. PSA applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dubreuil Chambardel, A.

    1996-01-01

    The IAEA now defines three types of PSA applications: Validation of design and of operation procedures; optimization of plant operation; and regulatory applications. The applications of PSA are manifold: only a few are dealt with here (precursor analysis is dealt with in session 3, topic 4). For each of them, we will do the utmost to demonstrate the main difficulties encountered, EDF's viewpoint on the matter, and the points remaining to be solved. In what follows, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we have made every effort to represent the different applications as they are practiced by all concerned in the international community, and to describe the inherent difficulties the international community has encountered with these applications with all objectivity. It goes without saying that the comments below are simply those of the ESF department, and are submitted here for discussion by the experts. 13 refs

  13. PSA applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dubreuil Chambardel, A

    1997-12-31

    The IAEA now defines three types of PSA applications: Validation of design and of operation procedures; optimization of plant operation; and regulatory applications. The applications of PSA are manifold: only a few are dealt with here (precursor analysis is dealt with in session 3, topic 4). For each of them, we will do the utmost to demonstrate the main difficulties encountered, EDF`s viewpoint on the matter, and the points remaining to be solved. In what follows, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we have made every effort to represent the different applications as they are practiced by all concerned in the international community, and to describe the inherent difficulties the international community has encountered with these applications with all objectivity. It goes without saying that the comments below are simply those of the ESF department, and are submitted here for discussion by the experts. 13 refs.

  14. Risk measures in living probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.; Niemelae, I.

    1993-05-01

    The main objectives of the study are: to define risk measures and suggested uses of them in various living PSA applications for the operational safety management and to describe specific model features required for living PSA applications. The report is based on three case studies performed within the Nordic research project Safety Evaluation by Use of Living PSA and Safety Indicators. (48 refs., 11 figs., 17 tabs.)

  15. Probabilistic safety assessment activities at Ignalina NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagdonas, A.

    1999-01-01

    The Barselina Project was initiated in the summer 1991. The project was a multilateral co-operation between Lithuania, Russia and Sweden up until phase 3, and phase 4 has been performed as a bilateral between Lithuania and Sweden. The long-range objective is to establish common perspectives and unified bases for assessment of severe accident risks and needs for remedial measures for the RBMK reactors. During phase 3, from 1993 to 1994, a full scope Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) model of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant unit 2 was developed to identify possible safety improvement of risk importance. The probabilistic methodology was applied on a plant specific basis for a channel type reactor of RBMK design. During phase 4, from 1994 to 1996, the PSA was further developed, taking into account plant changes, improved modelling methods and extended plant information concerning dependencies (area events, dynamic effects, electrical and signal dependencies). The model reflected the plant status before the outage 1996. During phase 4+, 1998 to 1999 the PSA model was upgraded taking into account the newest plant modifications. The new PSA model of CPS/AZRT was developed. Modelling was based on the Single Failure Analysis

  16. Overview on the different applications of probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, Heinz-Peter

    2009-01-01

    Worldwide it can be recognised that the use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in regulatory as well as operational decision-making is state of the art and seen as a successful development. Therefore, in most cases the regulator encourages the performance of PSAs to provide information to complement and support the defence in depth philosophy as well as operational configuration decisions. The main application of the PSA is still as part of integrated safety reviews, in particular in the frame of comprehensive (periodic) safety reviews. Other more specific applications areas of PSA are, among others, design evaluation, event analysis with aid of PSA, evaluation of technical specifications; risk-informed in-service inspection, risk monitoring and accident management. The extent of these applications vary from country to country but has been increasing during the last years. (orig.)

  17. Molecular Form Differences Between Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Standards Create Quantitative Discordances in PSA ELISA Measurements

    Science.gov (United States)

    McJimpsey, Erica L.

    2016-02-01

    The prostate-specific antigen (PSA) assays currently employed for the detection of prostate cancer (PCa) lack the specificity needed to differentiate PCa from benign prostatic hyperplasia and have high false positive rates. The PSA calibrants used to create calibration curves in these assays are typically purified from seminal plasma and contain many molecular forms (intact PSA and cleaved subforms). The purpose of this study was to determine if the composition of the PSA molecular forms found in these PSA standards contribute to the lack of PSA test reliability. To this end, seminal plasma purified PSA standards from different commercial sources were investigated by western blot (WB) and in multiple research grade PSA ELISAs. The WB results revealed that all of the PSA standards contained different mass concentrations of intact and cleaved molecular forms. Increased mass concentrations of intact PSA yielded higher immunoassay absorbance values, even between lots from the same manufacturer. Standardization of seminal plasma derived PSA calibrant molecular form mass concentrations and purification methods will assist in closing the gaps in PCa testing measurements that require the use of PSA values, such as the % free PSA and Prostate Health Index by increasing the accuracy of the calibration curves.

  18. Clinical performance of serum prostate-specific antigen isoform [-2]proPSA (p2PSA) and its derivatives, %p2PSA and the prostate health index (PHI), in men with a family history of prostate cancer: results from a multicentre European study, the PROMEtheuS project.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lazzeri, Massimo; Haese, Alexander; Abrate, Alberto; de la Taille, Alexandre; Redorta, Joan Palou; McNicholas, Thomas; Lughezzani, Giovanni; Lista, Giuliana; Larcher, Alessandro; Bini, Vittorio; Cestari, Andrea; Buffi, Nicolòmaria; Graefen, Markus; Bosset, Olivier; Le Corvoisier, Philippe; Breda, Alberto; de la Torre, Pablo; Fowler, Linda; Roux, Jacques; Guazzoni, Giorgio

    2013-08-01

    To test the sensitivity, specificity and accuracy of serum prostate-specific antigen isoform [-2]proPSA (p2PSA), %p2PSA and the prostate health index (PHI), in men with a family history of prostate cancer (PCa) undergoing prostate biopsy for suspected PCa. To evaluate the potential reduction in unnecessary biopsies and the characteristics of potentially missed cases of PCa that would result from using serum p2PSA, %p2PSA and PHI. The analysis consisted of a nested case-control study from the PRO-PSA Multicentric European Study, the PROMEtheuS project. All patients had a first-degree relative (father, brother, son) with PCa. Multivariable logistic regression models were complemented by predictive accuracy analysis and decision-curve analysis. Of the 1026 patients included in the PROMEtheuS cohort, 158 (15.4%) had a first-degree relative with PCa. p2PSA, %p2PSA and PHI values were significantly higher (P PHI (AUC: 0.733) to be the most accurate predictors of PCa at biopsy, significantly outperforming total PSA ([tPSA] AUC: 0.549), free PSA ([fPSA] AUC: 0.489) and %fPSA (AUC: 0.600) (P ≤ 0.001). For %p2PSA a threshold of 1.66 was found to have the best balance between sensitivity and specificity (70.4 and 70.1%; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 58.4-80.7 and 59.4-79.5 respectively). A PHI threshold of 40 was found to have the best balance between sensitivity and specificity (64.8 and 71.3%, respectively; 95% CI 52.5-75.8 and 60.6-80.5). At 90% sensitivity, the thresholds for %p2PSA and PHI were 1.20 and 25.5, with a specificity of 37.9 and 25.5%, respectively. At a %p2PSA threshold of 1.20, a total of 39 (24.8%) biopsies could have been avoided, but two cancers with a Gleason score (GS) of 7 would have been missed. At a PHI threshold of 25.5 a total of 27 (17.2%) biopsies could have been avoided and two (3.8%) cancers with a GS of 7 would have been missed. In multivariable logistic regression models, %p2PSA and PHI achieved independent predictor status and

  19. Risk-based safety indicators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szikszai, T.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation discusses the following issues: The objectives of the risk-based indicator programme. The characteristics of the risk-based indicators. The objectives of risk-based safety indicators - in monitoring safety; in PSA applications. What indicators? How to produce the risk based indicators? PSA requirements

  20. PET/CT with (18)F-choline after radical prostatectomy in patients with PSA ≤2 ng/ml. Can PSA velocity and PSA doubling time help in patient selection?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chiaravalloti, Agostino; Di Biagio, Daniele; Tavolozza, Mario; Calabria, Ferdinando; Schillaci, Orazio

    2016-07-01

    To investigate the performance of (18)F-fluorocholine ((18)F-FCH) PET/CT in relation to the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) kinetic indexes, PSA doubling time (PSAdt) and PSA velocity (PSAve), in detecting recurrent prostate cancer (PC) in a selected population of patients treated with radical prostatectomy and with PSA ≤2 ng/ml. The study group comprised 79 patients (mean age 70 ± 7 years, range 58 - 77 years) who had been treated with radical surgery 30 to 90 months previously and with biochemical failure (defined as a measurable serum PSA level) who were evaluated with (18)F-FCH PET/CT. In order to establish the optimal threshold for PSAdt and PSAve, the diagnostic performance of PSA, PSAdt and PSAve were compared by receiver operating characteristic analysis. In the population examined, PSA (mean ± SD) was 1.37 ± 0.44 ng/ml (range 0.21 - 2 ng/ml) before PET/CT examination, PSAdt was 10.04 ± 16.67 months and PSAve was 2.75 ± 3.11 ng/ml per year. (18)F-FCH PET/CT was positive in 44 patients (55 %). PSAve and PSAdt were significantly different between patients with a positive and a negative (18)F-FCH PET/CT scan. Thresholds of 6 months for PSAdt and 1 ng/ml per year for PSAve were selected. For PSAdt ≤6 months the detection rate (DR) was 65 %, and for PSAve >1 ng/ml per year the DR was 67 %. PSA values were not significantly different between patients with a positive and a negative PET/CT scan. The results of our study suggest that (18)F-FCH PET/CT could be considered for the evaluation of patients with biochemical recurrence of PC and with low PSA levels. Fast PSA kinetics could be useful in the selection of these patients.

  1. Probabilistic safety assessment for food irradiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.B.; Prasad, M.; Sonawane, A.U.; Gupta, S.K.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► Different considerations are required in PSA for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities. ► We carried out PSA for food irradiation facility as a part of safety evaluation. ► The results indicate that the fatal exposure risk is below the ‘acceptable risk’. ► Adequate operator training and observing good safety culture would reduce the risk. - Abstract: Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is widely used for safety evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) worldwide. The approaches and methodologies are matured and general consensus exists on using these approaches in PSA applications. However, PSA applications for safety evaluation for non-reactor facilities are limited. Due to differences in the processes in nuclear reactor facilities and non-reactor facilities, the considerations are different in application of PSA to these facilities. The food irradiation facilities utilize gamma irradiation sources, X-ray machines and electron accelerators for the purpose of radiation processing of variety of food items. This is categorized as Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility. In this paper, the application of PSA to safety evaluation of food irradiation facility is presented considering the ‘fatality due to radiation overexposure’ as a risk measure. The results indicate that the frequency of the fatal exposure is below the numerical acceptance guidance for the risk to the individual. Further, it is found that the overall risk to the over exposure can be reduced by providing the adequate operator training and observing good safety culture.

  2. Evaluation of total PSA assay on vitros ECi and correlation with Kryptor-PSA assay.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cassinat, B; Wacquet, M; Toubert, M E; Rain, J D; Schlageter, M H

    2001-01-01

    An increasing number of multiparametric immuno-analysers for PSA assays are available. As different immuno-assays may vary in their analytical quality and their accuracy for the follow-up of patients, expertise is necessary for each new assay. The PSA assay on the Vitros-ECi analyser has been evaluated and compared with the PSA assay from the Kryptor analyser. Variation coefficients were 0.91 to 1.98% for within-run assays, and 4.2% to 5.4% for interassay (PSA levels = 0.8 microgram/L to 33.6 micrograms/L). Dilution tests showed 93 to 136% recovery until 70 micrograms/L PSA. Functional sensitivity was estimated at 0.03 microgram/L. Equimolarity of the test was confirmed. Correlation of PSA levels measured with Vitros-ECi and Kryptor analysers displayed a correlation coefficient r2 of 0.9716. The half-lives and doubling times of PSA were similar using both methods. Vitros-ECi PSA assay meets the major criteria for the management of prostate cancer patients.

  3. PSA based plant modifications and back-fits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The mandate of Principal Working Group No. 5 - Risk Assessment states that 'The group should deal with the technology and methods for identifying contributors to risk and assessing their importance, and appropriate exchanges of information on current research'. Since being formulated in 1982, along with this mandate, the group has also endeavored to develop a common understanding of the different approaches taken in risk assessment. The focus of this report is to provide knowledge to experts on the role Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has had in safety decision making. PSA is a powerful tool for improving Nuclear Power Plant safety by identifying weaknesses in design or operation and setting priorities for plant modifications and back-fits. While the use is well recognised, it is also true that any safety decision is generally based on several elements, both probabilistic and deterministic. This document provides a general overview of insights gained from the representative set of examples collected from Member countries (Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States). The report starts with basic types of plant modifications which were carried out (e.g. hardware or software, important or minor, etc.) and the characteristics of the PSAs used in the examples (e.g. level and scope, specific or generic, on-going or terminated, etc.). The insights gained from this small collection are then reviewed. The appendix gives a full text version of the Member country contributions

  4. SERIAL PERCENT-FREE PSA IN COMBINATION WITH PSA FOR POPULATION-BASED EARLY DETECTION OF PROSTATE CANCER

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ankerst, Donna Pauler; Gelfond, Jonathan; Goros, Martin; Herrera, Jesus; Strobl, Andreas; Thompson, Ian M.; Hernandez, Javier; Leach, Robin J.

    2016-01-01

    PURPOSE To characterize the diagnostic properties of serial percent-free prostate-specific antigen (PSA) in relation to PSA in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial cohort of healthy men. MATERIALS AND METHODS 6,982 percent-free PSA and PSA measures were obtained from participants in a 12 year+ Texas screening study comprising 1625 men who never underwent biopsy, 497 who underwent one or more biopsies negative for prostate cancer, and 61 diagnosed with prostate cancer. Area underneath the receiver-operating-characteristic-curve (AUC) for percent-free PSA, and the proportion of patients with fluctuating values across multiple visits were determined according to two thresholds (under 15% versus 25%) were evaluated. The proportion of cancer cases where percent-free PSA indicated a positive test before PSA > 4 ng/mL did and the number of negative biopsies that would have been spared by percent-free PSA testing negative were computed. RESULTS Percent-free PSA fluctuated around its threshold of PSA tested positive earlier than PSA in 71.4% (34.2%) of cancer cases, and among men with multiple negative biopsies and a PSA > 4 ng/mL, percent-free PSA would have tested negative in 31.6% (65.8%) instances. CONCLUSIONS Percent-free PSA should accompany PSA testing in order to potentially spare unnecessary biopsies or detect cancer earlier. When near the threshold, both tests should be repeated due to commonly observed fluctuation. PMID:26979652

  5. Level 1 PSA study of Mochovce unit 1 NPP (SM AA 10 and 08)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents genesis of Level 1 PSA project preparation for all operational modes of Mochovce NPP unit 1 including the description of its' main objectives, scope and working method. The PSA study which includes full power (FPSA) as well as shutdown and low power conditions (SPSA) Level 1 PSA has to support the nuclear safety improvements of the unit. They evaluate the basic design and the benefits of all improvements, which were found necessary to be incorporated before the start-up of the unit. The study includes internal events (transients and under-loss of coolant accident, LOCAs), internal hazards as fires and floods and selected external hazards as earthquake, influence of external industry, extreme meteorological conditions and aircraft crash.The PSA (both FPSA and SPSA) models is developed using the RISK SPECTRUM PSA code. (author)

  6. Probability of an Abnormal Screening PSA Result Based on Age, Race, and PSA Threshold

    Science.gov (United States)

    Espaldon, Roxanne; Kirby, Katharine A.; Fung, Kathy Z.; Hoffman, Richard M.; Powell, Adam A.; Freedland, Stephen J.; Walter, Louise C.

    2014-01-01

    Objective To determine the distribution of screening PSA values in older men and how different PSA thresholds affect the proportion of white, black, and Latino men who would have an abnormal screening result across advancing age groups. Methods We used linked national VA and Medicare data to determine the value of the first screening PSA test (ng/mL) of 327,284 men age 65+ who underwent PSA screening in the VA healthcare system in 2003. We calculated the proportion of men with an abnormal PSA result based on age, race, and common PSA thresholds. Results Among men age 65+, 8.4% had a PSA >4.0ng/mL. The percentage of men with a PSA >4.0ng/mL increased with age and was highest in black men (13.8%) versus white (8.0%) or Latino men (10.0%) (PPSA >4.0ng/mL ranged from 5.1% of Latino men age 65–69 to 27.4% of black men age 85+. Raising the PSA threshold from >4.0ng/mL to >10.0ng/mL, reclassified the greatest percentage of black men age 85+ (18.3% absolute change) and the lowest percentage of Latino men age 65–69 (4.8% absolute change) as being under the biopsy threshold (PPSA threshold together affect the pre-test probability of an abnormal screening PSA result. Based on screening PSA distributions, stopping screening among men whose PSA 10ng/ml has the greatest effect on reducing the number of older black men who will face biopsy decisions after screening. PMID:24439009

  7. Molecular Form Differences Between Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Standards Create Quantitative Discordances in PSA ELISA Measurements

    Science.gov (United States)

    McJimpsey, Erica L.

    2016-01-01

    The prostate-specific antigen (PSA) assays currently employed for the detection of prostate cancer (PCa) lack the specificity needed to differentiate PCa from benign prostatic hyperplasia and have high false positive rates. The PSA calibrants used to create calibration curves in these assays are typically purified from seminal plasma and contain many molecular forms (intact PSA and cleaved subforms). The purpose of this study was to determine if the composition of the PSA molecular forms found in these PSA standards contribute to the lack of PSA test reliability. To this end, seminal plasma purified PSA standards from different commercial sources were investigated by western blot (WB) and in multiple research grade PSA ELISAs. The WB results revealed that all of the PSA standards contained different mass concentrations of intact and cleaved molecular forms. Increased mass concentrations of intact PSA yielded higher immunoassay absorbance values, even between lots from the same manufacturer. Standardization of seminal plasma derived PSA calibrant molecular form mass concentrations and purification methods will assist in closing the gaps in PCa testing measurements that require the use of PSA values, such as the % free PSA and Prostate Health Index by increasing the accuracy of the calibration curves. PMID:26911983

  8. International network on incorporation of ageing effects into PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirchsteiger, C.; Patrik, M.

    2006-01-01

    This paper describes the background and status of a new International Network on ''Incorporating Ageing Effects into Probabilistic Safety Assessment''. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission organized in September 2004 the kickoff meeting of this Network at JRC's Institute for Energy in Petten, Netherlands, with the aims to open the APSA Network, to start discussion of ageing issues in relation to incorporating ageing effects into PSA tools and to come to consensus on objectives and work packages of the Network, taking into account the specific expectations of potential Network partners. The presentations and discussions at the meeting confirmed the main conclusion from the previously organized PSAM 7 pre-conference workshop on ''Incorporating PSA into Ageing Management'', Budapest, June 2004, namely that incorporating ageing effects into PSA seems to be more and more a hot topic particularly for risk assessment and ageing management of nuclear power plants operating at advanced age (more than 25-30 years) and for the purpose of plant life extension. However, it also appeared that, especially regarding the situation in Europe, at present there are several on-going feasibility or full studies in this area, but not yet a completed Ageing PSA leading to applications. The project's working method is a NETWORK of operators, industry, research, academia and consultants with an active interest in the area (physical networking via a series of workshops and virtual networking via the Internet). The resulting knowledge should help PSA developers and users to incorporate the effects of equipment ageing into current PSA tools and models, to identify and/or develop most effective corresponding methods, to focus on dominant ageing contributors and components and to promote the use of PSA for ageing management of Nuclear Power Plants. (orig.)

  9. Reviewing PSA-based analyses to modify technical specifications at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samanta, P.K.; Martinez-Guridi, G.; Vesely, W.E.

    1995-12-01

    Changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) at nuclear power plants (NPPs) require review and approval by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Currently, many requests for changes to TSs use analyses that are based on a plant's probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). This report presents an approach to reviewing such PSA-based submittals for changes to TSs. We discuss the basic objectives of reviewing a PSA-based submittal to modify NPP TSs; the methodology of reviewing a TS submittal, and the differing roles of a PSA review, a PSA Computer Code review, and a review of a TS submittal. To illustrate this approach, we discuss our review of changes to allowed outage time (AOT) and surveillance test interval (STI) in the TS for the South Texas Project Nuclear Generating Station. Based on this experience gained, a check-list of items is given for future reviewers; it can be used to verify that the submittal contains sufficient information, and also that the review has addressed the relevant issues. Finally, recommended steps in the review process and the expected findings of each step are discussed

  10. Plant operational states analysis in low power and shutdown PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    He Jiandong; Qiu Yongping; Zhang Qinfang; An Hongzhen; Li Maolin

    2013-01-01

    The purpose of Plant Operational States (POS) analysis is to disperse the continuous and dynamic process of low power and shutdown operation, which is the basis of developing event tree models for accident sequence analysis. According to the design of a 300 MW Nuclear Power Plant Project, operating experience and procedures of the reference plant, a detailed POS analysis is carried out based on relative criteria. Then, several kinds of POS are obtained, and the duration of each POS is calculated according to the operation records of the reference plant. The POS analysis is an important element in low power and shutdown PSA. The methodology and contents provide reference for POS analysis. (authors)

  11. Development of safety analysis technology for integral reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hee Cheol; Kim, K. K.; Kim, S. H.

    2002-04-01

    The state-of-the-arts for the integral reactor was performed to investigate the safety features. The safety and performance of SMART were assessed using the technologies developed during the study. For this purpose, the computer code system and the analysis methodology were developed and the safety and performance analyses on SMART basic design were carried out for the design basis event and accident. The experimental facilities were designed for the core flow distribution test and the self-pressurizing pressurizer performance test. The tests on the 2-phase critical flow with non-condensable gas were completed and the results were used to assess the critical flow model. Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) was carried out to evaluate the safety level and to optimize the design by identifying and remedying any weakness in the design. A joint study with KINS was carried out to promote licensing environment. The generic safety issues of integral reactors were identified and the solutions were formulated. The economic evaluation of the SMART desalination plant and the activities related to the process control were carried out in the scope of the study

  12. Rate of PSA rise predicts metastatic versus local recurrence after definitive radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sartor, C.I.; Strawderman, M.H.; Lin, X.; Kish, K.E.; McLaughlin, P.W.; Lichter, A.S.; Sandler, H.S.

    1995-01-01

    Objective: A rising PSA following treatment for adenocarcinoma of the prostate indicates eventual clinical failure, but the rate of rise can be quite different from patient to patient, as can the pattern of clinical failure. We sought to determine whether the rate of PSA rise could differentiate future local vs. metastatic failure. Materials and Methods: PSA values from our series of 671 patients treated between 1987 and 1994 with 3-D conformal radiotherapy for localized adenocarcinoma were analyzed. Patients who had a pre-treatment PSA and >4 post-treatment PSA values available, had received no hormonal therapy, and had information detailing clinical outcome were used in this analysis. First site of failure was determined by abnormal DRE or biopsy, abnormal bone scan or radiographic evidence of metastasis as directed by clinical symptoms or follow-up clinical exam. Each patient's PSA pattern was defined by the function PSA(t)=C 1 e - a 1 (t) + C 2 e a 2 (t) where -a 1 relates to the rate of decline and a 2 to the rate of rise, if any. Univariate analysis was used to determine the correlation between initial PSA or rising PSA and clinical failure. Adjacent category logistic regression analysis was used to analyze the rate of rise and pattern of clinical failure. Results: 671 patients were reviewed; 401 patients met the requirements and 2667 PSA values were analyzed. We confirmed the finding of others that pre-treatment PSA is a prognostic indicator: patients presenting with PSA 3-20ng/ml had a relative risk of 9 (p=0.03) and PSA>20ng/ml had a RR of 26 (p=0.002) for clinical failure when compared to presenting PSA 2 >1.5/year predicted metastatic as opposed to local failure when compared to PSA rise with a 2 between 0.5-1.5/yr or 1.5 log(ng/ml)/year vs. 0.5-1.5 log(ng/ml)/yr or <0.5 log(ng/ml)/yr. Conclusions: The rate of rise of PSA following definitive radiotherapy can predict clinical failure patterns, with a rapidly rising PSA indicating metastatic as opposed to

  13. The use of living PSA for on-line risk management by plant operators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moir, Gordon R.

    2004-01-01

    The concept of Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA) has existed for several years and reflects the desire to utilise the knowledge gained in producing PSAs for nuclear power plants. In most countries the regulator requires that PSA are performed on all new nuclear power plants in order to demonstrate that the design and operation of the plant will meet the required safety standards. In the past, having satisfied the regulator, these PSAs were then regarded as having served their purpose and 'put on the shelf'. In the course of time all plants undergo modification, operational procedures change and develop, and plant specific reliability data becomes available throughout the lifetime of the plant. The original plant specific PSA will therefore rapidly become outdated and need revision. The concept of LPSA is therefore to provide a vehicle for evaluating the effect of plant changes throughout the plant's lifetime. Within the framework of LPSA 'living' can mean anything from updating the PSA infrequently, e.g. as and when major design changes are implemented, to updating the PSA in real time as plant is made unavailable due to maintenance or failure. Constructing and analysing plant specific PSA takes man years of effort in analysing all safety related systems. The result is a very detailed model of the interactions between systems and how they can fail. In order to gain the maximum benefit from this extensive and detailed knowledge base. Nuclear Electric has been involved in the development of PSA codes which enable rapid assessment of PSA. The development of such a code, the Essential Systems Status Monitor (ESSM), has allowed interactive use of the PSA and has maximised the benefit of the knowledge held in the PSA to plan and manage low risk maintenance strategies. The paper describes how the emphasis in the development of the ESSM has been to provide the operator with an interactive LPSA facility to maximise the use and benefits of the original PSA model

  14. Impact of total PSA, PSA doubling time and PSA velocity on detection rates of 11C-Choline positron emission tomography in recurrent prostate cancer

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rybalov, Maxim; Breeuwsma, Anthonius J.; Leliveld, Anna M.; Pruim, Jan; Dierckx, Rudi A.; de Jong, Igle J.

    PURPOSE: To evaluate the effect of total PSA (tPSA) and PSA kinetics on the detection rates of (11)C-Choline PET in patients with biochemical recurrence (BCR) after radical prostatectomy (RP) or external beam radiotherapy (EBRT). METHODS: We included 185 patients with BCR after RP (PSA >0.2 ng/ml)

  15. Developing a Vital Area Identification in Nuclear Power Plants Using PSA Results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Jung, Woosik; Yang, Juneon

    2008-01-01

    After 9/11, a physical protection and vital area identification (VAI) became important. In the well known VAI methodology, fault trees (FTs) to mitigate the initiating events caused by sabotage or terror should be prepared for the VAI. The KAERI VAI method is to develop FTs by using Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Risk Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI) results. In this paper, how to develop a VAI model by using PSA and RI-ISI results is described

  16. NPP Krsko Living PSA Concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vrbanic, I.; Spiler, J.

    2000-01-01

    NPP Krsko developed PSA model of internal and external initiators within the frame of the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) project. Within this project PSA model was used to examine the existing plant design features. In order to continue with use of this PSA model upon the completion of IPE in various risk-informed applications in support of plant operation and evaluations of design changes, an appropriate living PSA concept needed to be defined. The Living PSA concept is in NPP Krsko considered as being a set of activities pursued in order to update existing PSA model in a manner that it appropriately represents the plant design, operation practice and history. Only a PSA model which is being updated in this manner can serve as a platform for plant-specific risk informed applications. The NPP Krsko living PSA concept is based on the following major ponts. First, the baseline PSA model is defined, which is to be maintained and updated and which is to be reference point for any risk-informed application. Second, issues having a potential for impact on baseline PSA model are identified and procedure and responsibilities for their permanent monitoring and evaluation are established. Third, manner is defined in which consequential changes to baseline PSA model are implemented and controlled, together with associated responsibilities. Finally, the process is defined by which the existing version of baseline PSA model is superseded by a new one. Each time a new version of baseline PSA model is released, it would be re-quantified and the results evaluated and interpreted. By documenting these re-quantifications and evaluations of results in a sequence, the track is being kept of changes in long-term averaged risk perspective, represented by long-term averaged frequencies of core damage and pre-defined release categories. These major topics of NPP Krsko living PSA concept are presented and discussed in the paper. (author)

  17. Antigenic determinants of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) and development of assays specific for different forms of PSA.

    OpenAIRE

    Nilsson, O.; Peter, A.; Andersson, I.; Nilsson, K.; Grundstr?m, B.; Karlsson, B.

    1997-01-01

    Monoclonal antibodies were raised against prostate-specific antigen (PSA) by immunization with purified free PSA, i.e. not in complex with any protease inhibitor (F-PSA) and PSA in complex with alpha1-anti-chymotrypsin (PSA-ACT). Epitope mapping of PSA using the established monoclonal antibody revealed a complex pattern of independent and partly overlapping antigenic domains in the PSA molecule. Four independent antigenic domains and at least three partly overlapping domains were exposed both...

  18. A Review of PSA Technology Applications according to the Development of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors in the World

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Woon; Lee, Yong Bum; Jung, Hae Yong; Kim, Sang Ji; Hahn, Do Hee; Yang, Joon Eon

    2008-12-01

    The international nuclear societies request to perform Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) according to the development of Gen IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR). One of the major tasks of the PSA is to identify various sequences of events which could lead to the release of radioactivity. However, due to the limited operating and SFR PSA experiences, it will be difficult to derive and to quantify core damage frequency for SFR under development in Korea, so called KALIMER. Hence, in this report, the foreign PSA results, such as USA and Japan, are analyzed based on the obtained documents. Finally an approach on how to perform PSA for KALIMER is suggested

  19. Method comparison for determination of the tumor markers AFP, CEA, PSA and free PSA between Immulite 2000 XPI and Dimension Vista 1500.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zur, Berndt; Holdenrieder, Stefan; Walgenbach-Brünagel, Gisela; Albers, Eike; Stoffel-Wagner, Birgit

    2012-01-01

    For the Luminescent Oxygen Channeling Immunoassay (LOCI) technology as established for Dimension Vista 1500, assays have been developed for the serum tumor markers AFP, CEA, PSA and free PSA. We performed a method analysis for these parameters using the Immulite 2000 XPI. Determination of within-day and total imprecision of the methods was carried out according to CLSI guidelines with three serum pools. In addition, parallel measurements were performed with both systems in 1,871 routine serum samples and correlations were calculated. Calculated total imprecision of the three serum pools for AFP was 3.8 - 4.3%, for CEA 3.3 - 4.3%, for tPSA 3.6 - 4.0% and for fPSA it was 3.5 - 8.2%. Correlations of these markers across the entire value range were very good with the following correlation coefficients: 0.997 for AFP, 0.996 for CEA, 0.971 for tPSA and 0.988 for fPSA. While values for AFP and tPSA from both methods were comparable (slopes 1.02 and 1.01), lower values were measured for CEA and fPSA with the Dimension Vista (slopes 0.83 and 0.91). For AFP, a sample cluster with considerably higher values than with Dimension Vista was observed in the lower measurement range (CEA, tPSA and fPSA, as developed with the LOCI technology for the Dimension Vista, show good comparability with results obtained from the Immulite 2000 XPI. However, lower measurement ranges for CEA and fPSA as well as individual divergences, especially with AFP, must be taken into consideration in the event of method changeover.

  20. Research on consequence analysis method for probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear fuel facilities (4). Investigation of safety evaluation method for fire and explosion incidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abe, Hitoshi; Tashiro, Shinsuke; Ueda, Yoshinori

    2010-01-01

    A special committee on 'Research on the analysis methods for accident consequence of nuclear fuel facilities (NFFs)' was organized by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) under the entrustment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The committee aims to research on the state-of-the-art consequence analysis method for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of NFFs, such as fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities. The objective of this research is to obtain the useful information related to the establishment of quantitative performance objectives and to risk-informed regulation through qualifying issues needed to be resolved for applying PSA to NFFs. The research activities of the committee were mainly focused on the analysis method of consequences for postulated accidents with potentially large consequences in NFFs, e.g., events of criticality, spill of molten glass, hydrogen explosion, boiling of radioactive solution, and fire (including rapid decomposition of TBP complexes), resulting in the release of radio active materials into the environment. The results of the research were summarized in a series of six reports, which consist of a review report and five technical ones. In this technical report, the research results about basic experimental data and the method for safety evaluation of fire and explosion incidents were summarized. (author)

  1. Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis methodology in a level-I PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nunez McLeod, J.E.; Rivera, S.S.

    1997-01-01

    This work presents a methodology for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis, applicable to a probabilistic safety assessment level I. The work contents are: correct association of distributions to parameters, importance and qualification of expert opinions, generations of samples according to sample sizes, and study of the relationships among system variables and system response. A series of statistical-mathematical techniques are recommended along the development of the analysis methodology, as well different graphical visualization for the control of the study. (author) [es

  2. Application of PSA level 1 for the Fugen prototype ATR plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, H.; Iguchi, Y.; Sotsu, M.; Seki, O.; Satou, S.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents application of PSA Level-1 for Prototype Advanced Thermal Reactor Plant ''Fugen'' in consideration of the design characteristics of such reactor and verify the safety aspect of Fugen using thus established procedure, ATR resembles the boiling water reactor (BWR) in a number of points, but there are also some differences between the ATR and the BWR. Therefore. PSA procedure have been established by taking such difference into consideration and by referring to experience of PSA in USA and Japan. Moreover, the core damage frequency was calculated on Fugen by using thus established procedure. As a result, it was verified that results including the maximum value of the uncertainty estimation were found to be quite satisfactory against the target value of reactor damage frequency defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (author)

  3. Living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Over the past few years many nuclear power plant organizations have performed probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) to identify and understand key plant vulnerabilities. As a result of the availability of these PSA studies, there is a desire to use them to enhance plant safety and to operate the nuclear stations in the most efficient manner. PSA is an effective tool for this purpose as it assists plant management to target resources where the largest benefit to plant safety can be obtained. However, any PSA which is to be used in this way must have a credible and defensible basis. Thus, it is very important to have a high quality 'living PSA' accepted by the plant and the regulator. With this background in mind, the IAEA has prepared this report on Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA) which addresses the updating, documentation, quality assurance, and management and organizational requirements for LPSA. Deficiencies in the areas addressed in this report would seriously reduce the adequacy of the LPSA as a tool to support decision making at NPPs. This report was reviewed by a working group during a Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications to Improve NPP Safety held in Madrid, Spain, from 23 to 27 February 1998

  4. Prediction of PSA bounce after permanent prostate brachytherapy for localized prostate cancer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanai, Kunimitsu; Nakashima, Jun; Sugawara, Akitomo

    2009-01-01

    We aimed to calculate the frequency and features of the development of a prostate-specific antigen (PSA) bounce after prostate brachytherapy alone, to correlate the bounce with clinical and dosimetric factors and to identify factors that predict PSA bounce. PSA bounce was evaluated in 86 patients with T1-T2 prostate cancer who underwent radioactive seed implantation using iodine-125 (I-125) without hormonal therapy or external-beam radiation therapy (EBRT) from September 2004 to December 2007. A PSA bounce was defined as a rise of at least 0.4 ng/ml greater than a previous PSA level with a subsequent decline equal to, or less than, the initial nadir. Calculated by the Kaplan-Meier method, the incidence of PSA bounce at a 2-year follow-up was 26%. Median time to the PSA bounce was 15 months. Univariate analysis demonstrated that age, dose received by 90% of the prostate gland (D90), volume of gland receiving 100% of the prescribed dose (V100), and V150 were significantly associated with the PSA bounce, while pretreatment PSA level, Gleason score, pretreatment prostate volume, clinical T stage, and V200 were not. In multivariate analysis, age 67 years or less and D90 more than 180 Gy were identified as independent factors for predicting the PSA bounce (P<0.05). PSA bounce is not a rare phenomenon after prostate brachytherapy. It is more common in younger patients and patients receiving higher doses of radiation. (author)

  5. Use of PSA for the analysis of operational events in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulsmans, M.

    2006-01-01

    An operational event is a safety-relevant incident that occurred in an industrial installation like a nuclear power plant (NPP). The probabilistic approach to event analysis focuses on the potential consequences of an operational event. Within its scope of application, it provides a quantitative assessment of the risk significance of this event (and similar events): it calculates the risk increase induced by the event. Such analyses may result in a more objective and a more accurate event severity measure than those provided by commonly used qualitative methods. Probabilistic event analysis complements the traditional event analysis approaches that are oriented towards the understanding of the (root) causes of an event. In practice, risk-based precursor analysis consists of the mapping of an operational event on a risk model of the installation, such as a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) model. Precursor analyses result in an objective risk ranking of safety-significant events, called accident precursors. An unexpectedly high (or low) risk increase value is in itself already an important finding. This assessment also yields a lot of information on the structure of the risk, since the underlying dominant factors can easily be determined. Relevant 'what if' studies on similar events and conditions can be identified and performed (which is generally not considered in conventional event analysis), with the potential to yield even broader findings. The findings of such a structured assessment can be used for other purposes than merely risk ranking. The operational experience feedback process can be improved by helping to identify design measures and operational practices in order to prevent re-occurrence or in order to mitigate future consequences, and even to evaluate their expected effectiveness, contributing to the validation and prioritization of corrective measures. Confirmed and re-occurring precursors with correlated characteristics may point out opportunities

  6. Analysis of Serum Total and Free PSA Using Immunoaffinity Depletion Coupled to SRM: Correlation with Clinical Immunoassay Tests

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Tao; Hossain, Mahmud; Schepmoes, Athena A.; Fillmore, Thomas L.; Sokoll, Lori J.; Kronewitter, Scott R.; Izmirlian, Grant; Shi, Tujin; Qian, Wei-Jun; Leach, Robin J.; Thompson, Ian M.; Chan, Daniel W.; Smith, Richard D.; Kagan, Jacob; Srivastava, Sudhir; Rodland, Karin D.; Camp, David G.

    2012-01-01

    Recently, selected reaction monitoring mass spectrometry (SRM-MS) has been more frequently applied to measure low abundance biomarker candidates in tissues and biofluids, owing to its high sensitivity and specificity, simplicity of assay configuration, and exceptional multiplexing capability. In this study, we report for the first time the development of immunoaffinity depletion-based workflows and SRM-MS assays that enable sensitive and accurate quantification of total and free prostate-specific antigen (PSA) in serum without the requirement for specific PSA antibodies. Low ng/mL level detection of both total and free PSA was consistently achieved in both PSA-spiked female serum samples and actual patient serum samples. Moreover, comparison of the results obtained when SRM PSA assays and conventional immunoassays were applied to the same samples showed good correlation in several independent clinical serum sample sets. These results demonstrate that the workflows and SRM assays developed here provide an attractive alternative for reliably measuring candidate biomarkers in human blood, without the need to develop affinity reagents. Furthermore, the simultaneous measurement of multiple biomarkers, including the free and bound forms of PSA, can be performed in a single multiplexed analysis using high-resolution liquid chromatographic separation coupled with SRM-MS. PMID:22846433

  7. Proteolytic Activity of Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) towards Protein Substrates and Effect of Peptides Stimulating PSA Activity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mattsson, Johanna M.; Ravela, Suvi; Hekim, Can; Jonsson, Magnus; Malm, Johan; Närvänen, Ale; Stenman, Ulf-Håkan; Koistinen, Hannu

    2014-01-01

    Prostate-specific antigen (PSA or kallikrein-related peptidase-3, KLK3) exerts chymotrypsin-like proteolytic activity. The main biological function of PSA is the liquefaction of the clot formed after ejaculation by cleavage of semenogelins I and II in seminal fluid. PSA also cleaves several other substrates, which may explain its putative functions in prostate cancer and its antiangiogenic activity. We compared the proteolytic efficiency of PSA towards several protein and peptide substrates and studied the effect of peptides stimulating the activity of PSA with these substrates. An endothelial cell tube formation model was used to analyze the effect of PSA-degraded protein fragments on angiogenesis. We showed that PSA degrades semenogelins I and II much more efficiently than other previously identified protein substrates, e.g., fibronectin, galectin-3 and IGFBP-3. We identified nidogen-1 as a new substrate for PSA. Peptides B2 and C4 that stimulate the activity of PSA towards small peptide substrates also enhanced the proteolytic activity of PSA towards protein substrates. Nidogen-1, galectin-3 or their fragments produced by PSA did not have any effect on endothelial cell tube formation. Although PSA cleaves several other protein substrates, in addition to semenogelins, the physiological importance of this activity remains speculative. The PSA levels in prostate are very high, but several other highly active proteases, such as hK2 and trypsin, are also expressed in the prostate and may cleave protein substrates that are weakly cleaved by PSA. PMID:25237904

  8. Methodology and results of the seismic probabilistic safety assessment of Krsko nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vermaut, M.K.; Monette, P.; Campbell, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    A seismic IPEEE (Individual Plant Examination for External Events) was performed for the Krsko plant. The methodology adopted is the seismic PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment). The Krsko NPP is located on a medium to high seismicity site. The PSA study described here includes all the steps in the PSA sequence, i.e. reassessment of the site hazard, calculation of plant structures response including soil-structure interaction, seismic plant walkdowns, probabilistic seismic fragility analysis of plant structures and components, and quantification of seismic core damage frequency (CDF). Also relay chatter analysis and soil stability studies were performed. The seismic PSA described here is limited to the analysis of CDF (level I PSA). The subsequent determination and quantification of plant damage states, containment behaviour and radioactive releases to the outside (level 2 PSA) have been performed for the Krsko NPP but are not further described in this paper. The results of the seismic PSA study indicate that, with some upgrades suggested by the PSA team, the seismic induced CDF is comparable to that of most US and Western Europe NPPs. (author)

  9. Advancement of the methodology for automated integration of external hazards into level 1 PSA modeling. Technical report; Weiterentwicklung der Methodik zur automatisierten Integration uebergreifender Einwirkungen in PSA-Modelle der Stufe 1. Technischer Fachbericht

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berner, Nadine; Herb, Joachim

    2017-03-15

    have been used to pursue a continuous convergence towards methodologically structured function classes. The performed developments provide the framework to investigate relevant scenarios that need to be addressed in the context of periodic safety reviews and that may require an adequate modelling at a high level of detail. The analysis tool pyRiskRobot provides the necessary methods and practical strategies in order to integrate hazards and hazard combinations in PSA plant models of realistic complexity.

  10. Improvement of level-1 PSA computer code package

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Tae Woon; Park, C. K.; Kim, K. Y.; Han, S. H.; Jung, W. D.; Chang, S. C.; Yang, J. E.; Sung, T. Y.; Kang, D. I.; Park, J. H.; Lee, Y. H.; Kim, S. H.; Hwang, M. J.; Choi, S. Y.

    1997-07-01

    This year the fifth (final) year of the phase-I of the Government-sponsored Mid- and Long-term Nuclear Power Technology Development Project. The scope of this subproject titled on `The improvement of level-1 PSA Computer Codes` is divided into two main activities : (1) improvement of level-1 PSA methodology, (2) development of applications methodology of PSA techniques to operations and maintenance of nuclear power plant. Level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-Windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutset generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. Using about 30 foreign generic data sources, generic component reliability database (GDB) are developed considering dependency among source data. A computer program which handles dependency among data sources are also developed based on three stage bayesian updating technique. Common cause failure (CCF) analysis methods are reviewed and CCF database are established. Impact vectors can be estimated from this CCF database. A computer code, called MPRIDP, which handles CCF database are also developed. A CCF analysis reflecting plant-specific defensive strategy against CCF event is also performed. A risk monitor computer program, called Risk Monster, are being developed for the application to the operation and maintenance of nuclear power plant. The PSA application technique is applied to review the feasibility study of on-line maintenance and to the prioritization of in-service test (IST) of motor-operated valves (MOV). Finally, the root cause analysis (RCA) and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) technologies are adopted and applied to the improvement of reliability of emergency diesel generators (EDG) of nuclear power plant. To help RCA and RCM analyses, two software programs are developed, which are EPIS and RAM Pro. (author). 129 refs., 20 tabs., 60 figs.

  11. Improvement of level-1 PSA computer code package

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Woon; Park, C. K.; Kim, K. Y.; Han, S. H.; Jung, W. D.; Chang, S. C.; Yang, J. E.; Sung, T. Y.; Kang, D. I.; Park, J. H.; Lee, Y. H.; Kim, S. H.; Hwang, M. J.; Choi, S. Y.

    1997-07-01

    This year the fifth (final) year of the phase-I of the Government-sponsored Mid- and Long-term Nuclear Power Technology Development Project. The scope of this subproject titled on 'The improvement of level-1 PSA Computer Codes' is divided into two main activities : 1) improvement of level-1 PSA methodology, 2) development of applications methodology of PSA techniques to operations and maintenance of nuclear power plant. Level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-Windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutset generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. Using about 30 foreign generic data sources, generic component reliability database (GDB) are developed considering dependency among source data. A computer program which handles dependency among data sources are also developed based on three stage bayesian updating technique. Common cause failure (CCF) analysis methods are reviewed and CCF database are established. Impact vectors can be estimated from this CCF database. A computer code, called MPRIDP, which handles CCF database are also developed. A CCF analysis reflecting plant-specific defensive strategy against CCF event is also performed. A risk monitor computer program, called Risk Monster, are being developed for the application to the operation and maintenance of nuclear power plant. The PSA application technique is applied to review the feasibility study of on-line maintenance and to the prioritization of in-service test (IST) of motor-operated valves (MOV). Finally, the root cause analysis (RCA) and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) technologies are adopted and applied to the improvement of reliability of emergency diesel generators (EDG) of nuclear power plant. To help RCA and RCM analyses, two software programs are developed, which are EPIS and RAM Pro. (author). 129 refs., 20 tabs., 60 figs

  12. Evaluation of [-2] proPSA and Prostate Health Index (phi) for the detection of prostate cancer: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Filella, Xavier; Giménez, Nuria

    2013-04-01

    The usefulness of %[-2] proPSA and Prostate Health Index (phi) in the detection of prostate cancer are currently unknown. It has been suggested that these tests can distinguish prostate cancer from benign prostatic diseases better than PSA or %fPSA. We performed a systematic review and meta-analysis of the available scientific evidence to evaluate the clinical usefulness of %[-2] proPSA and phi. Relevant published papers were identified by searching computerized bibliographic systems. Data on sensitivity and specificity were extracted from 12 studies: 10 studies about %[-2] proPSA (3928 patients in total, including 1762 with confirmed prostate cancer) and eight studies about phi (2919 patients in total, including 1515 with confirmed prostate cancer). The sensitivity for the detection of prostate cancer was 90% for %[-2] proPSA and phi, while the pooled specificity was 32.5% (95% CI 30.6-34.5) and 31.6% (95% CI 29.2-34.0) for %[-2] proPSA and phi, respectively. The measurement of %[-2] proPSA improves the accuracy of prostate cancer detection in comparison with PSA or %fPSA, particularly in the group of patients with PSA between 2 μg/L and 10 μg/L. Similar results were obtained measuring phi. Using these tests, it is possible to reduce the number of unnecessary biopsies, maintaining a high cancer detection rate. Published results also showed that %[-2] proPSA and phi are related to the aggressiveness of the tumor.

  13. Automatic fault tree generation in the EPR PSA project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villatte, N; Nonclercq, P.; Taupy, S.

    2012-01-01

    Tools (KB3 and Atelier EPS) have been developed at EDF to assist the analysts in building fault trees for PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) and importing them into RiskSpectrum (RiskSpectrum is a Swedish code used at EDF for PSA). System modelling is performed using KB3 software with a knowledge base describing generic classes of components with their behaviour and failure modes. Using these classes of components, the analyst can describe (using a graphical system editor): a simplified system diagram from the mechanical system drawings and functional descriptions, the missions of the studied system (in a form of high level fault trees) and its different configurations for the missions. He can also add specific knowledge about the system. Then, the analyst chooses missions and configurations to specify and launch fault trees generations. From the system description, KB3 produces by backward-chaining on rules, detailed system fault trees. These fault trees are finally imported into RiskSpectrum (they are converted by Atelier EPS into a format readable by RiskSpectrum). KB3 and Atelier EPS have been used to create the majority of the fault trees for the EDF EPR Probabilistic Safety Analysis conducted from November 2009 to March 2010. 25 systems were modelled, and 127 fault trees were automatically generated in a rather short time by different analysts with the help of these tools. A feedback shows a lot of advantages to use KB3 and Atelier EPS: homogeneity and consistency between the different generated fault trees, traceability of modelling, control of modelling and last but not least: the automation of detailed fault tree creation relieves the human analyst of this tedious task so that he can focus his attention on more important tasks: modelling the failure of a function. This industrial application has also helped us gather an interesting feedback from the analysts that should help us improve the handling of the tools. We propose in this paper indeed some

  14. Estimation of component failure rates for PSA on nuclear power plants 1982-1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirimoto, Yukihiro; Matsuzaki, Akihiro; Sasaki, Atsushi

    2001-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) on nuclear power plants has been studied for many years by the Japanese industry. The PSA methodology has been improved so that PSAs for all commercial LWRs were performed and used to examine for accident management.On the other hand, most data of component failure rates in these PSAs were acquired from U.S. databases. Nuclear Information Center (NIC) of Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) serves utilities by providing safety- , and reliability-related information on operation and maintenance of the nuclear power plants, and by evaluating the plant performance and incident trends. So, NIC started a research study on estimating the major component failure rates at the request of the utilities in 1988. As a result, we estimated the hourly-failure rates of 47 component types and the demand-failure rates of 15 component types. The set of domestic component reliability data from 1982 to 1991 for 34 LWRs has been evaluated by a group of PSA experts in Japan at the Nuclear Safety Research Association (NSRA) in 1995 and 1996, and the evaluation report was issued in March 1997. This document describes the revised component failure rate calculated by our re-estimation on 49 Japanese LWRs from 1982 to 1997. (author)

  15. Integration of the functional reliability of two passive safety systems to mitigate a SBLOCA+BO in a CAREM-like reactor PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mezio, Federico, E-mail: federico.mezio@cab.cnea.gov.ar [CNEA, Sede Central, Av. Del Libertador 8250, CABA (Argentina); Grinberg, Mariela [CNEA, Centro Atómico Bariloche, S.C. de Bariloche, Río Negro (Argentina); Lorenzo, Gabriel [CNEA, Sede Central, Av. Del Libertador 8250, CABA (Argentina); Giménez, Marcelo [CNEA, Centro Atómico Bariloche, S.C. de Bariloche, Río Negro (Argentina)

    2014-04-01

    Highlights: • An estimation of the Functional Unreliability was performed using RMPS methodology. • The methodology uses an improved response surface in order to estimate the FU. • The FU may become relevant to be analyzed in the Passive Safety Systems. • There were proposed two ways to incorporate the FU into an APS. - Abstract: This paper describes a case study of a methodological approach for assessing the functional reliability of passive safety systems (PSS) and its treatment within a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The functional unreliability (FU) can be understood as the failure probability of PSS to fulfill its mission due to the impairment of the related passive safety function. The safety function accomplishment is characterized and quantified by a performance indicator (PI), which is a measure of how far the system is from verifying its mission. PI uncertainties are estimated from uncertainty propagation of selected parameters. A methodology based on the reliability methodology for passive system (RMPS) one is used to estimate the FU associated to the isolation condensers (ICs) in combination with the accumulators (medium pressure injection system) of a CAREM-like integral advanced reactor. A small break loss of coolant accident with black-out is selected as an evaluation case. This implies success of reactor shut-down (inherent) and failure of residual heat removal by active systems. The safety function to accomplish is to refill the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in order to avoid core damage. For this case, to allow the discharge of accumulators into RPV, the pressure must be reduced by the IC. The methodology for passive safety function assessment considers uncertainties in code parameters, besides uncertainties in engineering parameters (design, construction, operation and maintenance), in order to perform Monte Carlo simulations based on best estimate (B-E) plant model. Then, response surfaces based on PI are used for improving the

  16. Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grabaskas, D.; Brunett, A.; Passerini, S.; Grelle, A.; Bucknor, M.

    2017-06-26

    Beginning in 2015, a project was initiated to update and modernize the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the GE-Hitachi PRISM sodium fast reactor. This project is a collaboration between GE-Hitachi and Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and funded in part by the U.S. Department of Energy. Specifically, the role of Argonne is to assess the reliability of passive safety systems, complete a mechanistic source term calculation, and provide component reliability estimates. The assessment of passive system reliability focused on the performance of the Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) and the inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms of the metal fuel core. The mechanistic source term assessment attempted to provide a sequence specific source term evaluation to quantify offsite consequences. Lastly, the reliability assessment focused on components specific to the sodium fast reactor, including electromagnetic pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, the steam generator, and sodium valves and piping.

  17. Proteolytic activity of prostate-specific antigen (PSA towards protein substrates and effect of peptides stimulating PSA activity.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Johanna M Mattsson

    Full Text Available Prostate-specific antigen (PSA or kallikrein-related peptidase-3, KLK3 exerts chymotrypsin-like proteolytic activity. The main biological function of PSA is the liquefaction of the clot formed after ejaculation by cleavage of semenogelins I and II in seminal fluid. PSA also cleaves several other substrates, which may explain its putative functions in prostate cancer and its antiangiogenic activity. We compared the proteolytic efficiency of PSA towards several protein and peptide substrates and studied the effect of peptides stimulating the activity of PSA with these substrates. An endothelial cell tube formation model was used to analyze the effect of PSA-degraded protein fragments on angiogenesis. We showed that PSA degrades semenogelins I and II much more efficiently than other previously identified protein substrates, e.g., fibronectin, galectin-3 and IGFBP-3. We identified nidogen-1 as a new substrate for PSA. Peptides B2 and C4 that stimulate the activity of PSA towards small peptide substrates also enhanced the proteolytic activity of PSA towards protein substrates. Nidogen-1, galectin-3 or their fragments produced by PSA did not have any effect on endothelial cell tube formation. Although PSA cleaves several other protein substrates, in addition to semenogelins, the physiological importance of this activity remains speculative. The PSA levels in prostate are very high, but several other highly active proteases, such as hK2 and trypsin, are also expressed in the prostate and may cleave protein substrates that are weakly cleaved by PSA.

  18. The role of sensitivity analysis in probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirschberg, S.; Knochenhauer, M.

    1987-01-01

    The paper describes several items suitable for close examination by means of application of sensitivity analysis, when performing a level 1 PSA. Sensitivity analyses are performed with respect to; (1) boundary conditions, (2) operator actions, and (3) treatment of common cause failures (CCFs). The items of main interest are identified continuously in the course of performing a PSA, as well as by scrutinising the final results. The practical aspects of sensitivity analysis are illustrated by several applications from a recent PSA study (ASEA-ATOM BWR 75). It is concluded that sensitivity analysis leads to insights important for analysts, reviewers and decision makers. (orig./HP)

  19. The organizational factor in PSA framework

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farcasiu, Mita, E-mail: mmfarcasiu@yahoo.com; Nitoi, Mirela

    2015-11-15

    The goals of the Man–Machine–Organization system analysis are to develop the suitable studies and techniques to identify, prevent and predict the cause of system unavailability. A descriptive concept of man–machine–organization system was developed. MMOS is defined in probability theory in the attempt to find ways for its qualitative and quantitative quantification in a PSA framework. The need for this study was demonstrated by analysis of variance of the complex system unavailability in relation to human error probability (HEP) and organizational error probability (OMP). The PSA model proposed in this paper assesses the organizational factor in MMOS by observing its influence on the human factor and equipment. Thus the influence of organizational factors is evaluated not only on component but also on the human performance. The study highlights the need to improve the understanding of the influence of organizational factors on the safe operation of nuclear installations. Using MMOS concept in PSA could identify any serious deficiencies of human and equipment performance which can sometime be corrected by improvement of the organizational factor.

  20. The organizational factor in PSA framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, Mita; Nitoi, Mirela

    2015-01-01

    The goals of the Man–Machine–Organization system analysis are to develop the suitable studies and techniques to identify, prevent and predict the cause of system unavailability. A descriptive concept of man–machine–organization system was developed. MMOS is defined in probability theory in the attempt to find ways for its qualitative and quantitative quantification in a PSA framework. The need for this study was demonstrated by analysis of variance of the complex system unavailability in relation to human error probability (HEP) and organizational error probability (OMP). The PSA model proposed in this paper assesses the organizational factor in MMOS by observing its influence on the human factor and equipment. Thus the influence of organizational factors is evaluated not only on component but also on the human performance. The study highlights the need to improve the understanding of the influence of organizational factors on the safe operation of nuclear installations. Using MMOS concept in PSA could identify any serious deficiencies of human and equipment performance which can sometime be corrected by improvement of the organizational factor.

  1. Report 5: Guidance document Implementation of lightning hazards in extended PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivanov, I.; Simurka, P.; Prochaska, J.; Brac, P.; Vasseur, D.; Duquerroy, P.; Trouilloud, C.; Kumar, M.; Potempski, S.; Vinot, T.

    2016-01-01

    The lightning (including the electromagnetic interference) is indicated with no. 39 in the exhaustive list of external hazards posing potential threats to nuclear installations, in particular in the list of the Meteorological events considered in ASAMPSA-E. The survey performed in the framework of ASAMPSA-E (WP10) to collect interests of the PSA the end users showed that the lightning is amongst the ten external hazards most often considered by the respondents. Thence the attention to the lightning hazard is within the scope of the extended PSA and its role in the safety of the nuclear power plant is underlined in this report. This report is a joint deliverable of ASAMPSA-E WP21 (Initiating events modelling) and WP22 (How to introduce hazards in L1 PSA and all possibilities of events combinations), which are intended: - to examine characteristics and modelling of lightning in PSA, - to identify and promote exchanges of some good practices on the implementation of lightning in L1 PSA. This report includes the End-Users recommendations given in WP10 and results from discussions at the first End- Users Workshop, Uppsala, Sweden, May 2014, questionnaire survey and discussions at the Final End-Users Workshop, Vienna, Austria- September 2016. (authors)

  2. Computerized systems for high level information processing and decision making in the field of PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kafka, P.; Kunitz, H.

    1990-01-01

    A comprehensive review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) related program packages is made. Three fields in methodological succession are covered: plant modeling, data quantification procedures and decision-making support. Packages for fault tree construction and minimal cut sets evaluation are referred to and the performances of three of them: RALLY, ORCHARD and SALP-PC, are discussed and compared. Notions on the raw data sources are presented and the Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR) is given as an example for data base management system generating PSA data. Aggregated risk models for support in safety assessment, plant operation and accident management (SARA, ESSM, PRISIM) are cited. Examples of systems supporting 'living PSA' (SAIS, SUPER-NET, LESSEPS 1300, NUPRA, SPSA) are given. The concluding remarks outline the state-of-the-art developments of computerized systems for reliability analyses. 1 fig., 1 tab., 51 refs. (R.Ts)

  3. Development of PSA module for computerized accident management support (CAMS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iguchi, Yukihiro

    1996-10-01

    CAMS (Computerised Accident Management Support) is a system that will provide assistance in case of the accidents in a nuclear power plant. The PSA module was developed in order to give useful information in this situation applying the PSA method, which is a comprehensive source of safety knowledge. This module contains plant-specific PSA data, comprising event trees, failure probabilities etc. It has several event trees categorised according to the initiating events. Each event tree has an initiating event frequency and branching probabilities. The various support systems for branches are considered and their dependencies are calculated logically. This module can be activated by data from the state identification (SI) module of CAMS. If an initiating event occurs, the event tree is re-calculated and the PSA module shows which systems of the plant should be activated to bring the plant to a safe state. If the plant responds to the event in the normal way, the plant will be shut down and come to a safe state. However, if some functions do not work, the PSA module generates another path and gives information about the critical systems. If the state of the plant is changed, either by the operators or automatically by the control system, the PSA module follows the new path. Because the estimation of the core damage frequency should be very quick in the accident situation, a simplified model of the event tree and fault trees was adopted. It enabled the PSA module to calculates the CDF within 5 seconds on a standard type work station. The development of the module has been successful. However, further development of the functionality of the module is suggested like real connection to a plant and to the strategy generator module of CAMS, applications for operational support, low power operation optimisation, etc. (author)

  4. The correlation of PSA nadir and biochemical freedom from cancer after external beam treatment: effects of stage, grade and pretreatment PSA groupings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinover, W.H.; Hanlon, A.L.; Lee, W.R.; Hanks, G.E.

    1996-01-01

    Purpose: This study demonstrates the correlation of various post-irradiation PSA nadirs with long term biochemical freedom from disease (bNED) survival in patients treated mainly with conformal external beam radiation therapy. It also shows the effects of various groupings of pretreatment (prerx) PSA level, stage, and Gleason score on the rate of achieving a favorable PSA nadir. Materials and Methods: Three hundred forty patients with known pretreatment PSA, >2 years followup treated with radiation alone (278 conformal, 62 conventional) are reported. The median followup is 41 months (range 24 to 96 mos.). Patient grouping by pretreatment PSA levels are <10 ng/ml (143 patients), 10-19.9 ng/ml (108 patients), ≥20 ng/ml (89 patients); by palpation stage are T1C,2AB (240 patients) and T2C,3,4 (100 patients); and by differentiation are Gleason 2-4 (108 patients), Gleason 5-7 (221 patients), Gleason 8-10 (11 patients). The PSA nadir response is given for all patients, and for each of the above prerx groupings. The 5 year actuarial bNED survival is determined for all patients by PSA nadir. Biochemical failure is a PSA ≥1.5 ng/ml and rising on two consecutive measures. Multivariate analysis (MVA) is performed to determine factors predictive of favorable PSA nadir response and predictive of bNED survival. Results: The PSA nadir responses and 5 year bNED survival rates are shown in the table for all patients according to PSA nadir. 66% of patients achieved a favorable nadir (<1.0 ng/ml) which was associated with a 75%-87% 5 year bNED rate, while 34% achieved an unfavorable nadir associated with an 18-32% bNED survival rate at 5 years. The figure illustrates the dramatic separation in outcome associated with the nadir response. The table also illustrates the fraction of patients that achieve various nadir levels subdivided by prerx PSA level, palpation stage and Gleason score. A favorable PSA nadir is obtained in 90%, 63%, and 31% of patients with a prerx PSA <10, 10

  5. IAEA Review for Gap Analysis of Safety Analysis Capability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basic, Ivica; Kim, Manwoong; Huges, Peter; Lim, B-K; D'Auria, Francesco; Louis, Vidard Michael

    2014-01-01

    improvement of nuclear safety in the participating host organization and host member countries. To achieve this goal, the EM is to establish a process of discussion and comparison of gap findings, which will lead to sharing of information, experience, strengths and weaknesses among the participants, and foster regional cooperation to improve the weaknesses and improve safety generally. The pilot mission was conducted from 28 October to 1 November for one week at the National Nuclear Agency (BATAN) in Indonesia by the mission team formulated with 6 international experts who have considerable knowledge and experience in the field of safety analysis such as the deterministic safety analysis (DSA) and probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). Some comments and recommendations were given to BATAN management to support the establishment and maintenance of safety analysis capability and human resource, organizational and training aspects. Those aspects are important as a measure of the progress being made and an indicator of areas in SATG within the framework of the Extra-budgetary Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and Far East Countries (the EBP-Asia) or other cooperation programme, such as the IAEA Technical Cooperation programme. Provided in 2013 the Review of Gap Analysis for BATAN (Indonesian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Body) could be good reference for all other newcomer countries which started or plans nuclear power plant installation. (authors)

  6. Prostate specific antigen (PSA) kinetic as a prognostic factor in metastatic prostate cancer receiving androgen deprivation therapy: systematic review and meta-analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Afriansyah, Andika; Hamid, Agus Rizal Ardy Hariandy; Mochtar, Chaidir Arif; Umbas, Rainy

    2018-01-01

    Aim: Metastatic prostate cancer (mPCa) has a poor outcome with median survival of two to five years. The use of androgen deprivation therapy (ADT) is a gold standard in management of this stage.  Aim of this study is to analyze the prognostic value of PSA kinetics of patient treated with hormonal therapy related to survival from several published studies Method: Systematic review and meta-analysis was performed using literature searching in the electronic databases of MEDLINE, Science Direct, and Cochrane Library. Inclusion criteria were mPCa receiving ADT, a study analyzing Progression Free Survival (PFS), Overall Survival (OS), or Cancer Specific Survival (CSS) and prognostic factor of survival related to PSA kinetics (initial PSA, PSA nadir, and time to achieve nadir (TTN)). The exclusion criteria were metastatic castration resistant of prostate cancer (mCRPC) and non-metastatic disease. Generic inverse variance method was used to combine hazard ratio (HR) within the studies. Meta-analysis was performed using Review Manager 5.2 and a p-value PSA and PFS. In addition, there was no association between initial PSA and CSS/ OS. We found association of reduced PFS (HR 2.22; 95% CI 1.82 to 2.70) and OS/ CSS (HR 3.31; 95% CI 2.01-5.43) of patient with high PSA nadir. Shorter TTN was correlated with poor result of survival either PFS (HR 2.41; 95% CI 1.19 - 4.86) or CSS/ OS (HR 1.80; 95%CI  1.42 - 2.30) Conclusion: Initial PSA before starting ADT do not associated with survival in mPCa.  There is association of PSA nadir and TTN with survival.

  7. Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Test

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Cancer Prostate Cancer Screening Research Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Test On This Page What is the PSA ... parts of the body before being detected. The PSA test may give false-positive or false-negative ...

  8. A Human Reliability Analysis of Post- Accident Human Errors in the Low Power and Shutdown PSA of KSNP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kang, Daeil; Kim, J. H.; Jang, S. C

    2007-03-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, using the ANS low power and shutdown (LPSD) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) Standard, evaluated the LPSD PSA model of the KSNP, Yonggwang Units 5 and 6, and identified the items to be improved. The evaluation results of human reliability analysis (HRA) of the post-accident human errors in the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP showed that 10 items among 19 items of supporting requirements for those in the ANS PRA Standard were identified as them to be improved. Thus, we newly carried out a HRA for post-accident human errors in the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP. Following tasks are the improvements in the HRA of post-accident human errors of the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP compared with the previous one: Interviews with operators in the interpretation of the procedure, modeling of operator actions, and the quantification results of human errors, site visit. Applications of limiting value to the combined post-accident human errors. Documentation of information of all the input and bases for the detailed quantifications and the dependency analysis using the quantification sheets The assessment results for the new HRA results of post-accident human errors using the ANS LPSD PRA Standard show that above 80% items of its supporting requirements for post-accident human errors were graded as its Category II. The number of the re-estimated human errors using the LPSD Korea Standard HRA method is 385. Among them, the number of individual post-accident human errors is 253. The number of dependent post-accident human errors is 135. The quantification results of the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP with new HEPs show that core damage frequency (CDF) is increased by 5.1% compared with the previous baseline CDF It is expected that this study results will be greatly helpful to improve the PSA quality for the domestic nuclear power plants because they have sufficient PSA quality to meet the Category II of Supporting Requirements for the post

  9. A Human Reliability Analysis of Post- Accident Human Errors in the Low Power and Shutdown PSA of KSNP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Daeil; Kim, J. H.; Jang, S. C.

    2007-03-01

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, using the ANS low power and shutdown (LPSD) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) Standard, evaluated the LPSD PSA model of the KSNP, Yonggwang Units 5 and 6, and identified the items to be improved. The evaluation results of human reliability analysis (HRA) of the post-accident human errors in the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP showed that 10 items among 19 items of supporting requirements for those in the ANS PRA Standard were identified as them to be improved. Thus, we newly carried out a HRA for post-accident human errors in the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP. Following tasks are the improvements in the HRA of post-accident human errors of the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP compared with the previous one: Interviews with operators in the interpretation of the procedure, modeling of operator actions, and the quantification results of human errors, site visit. Applications of limiting value to the combined post-accident human errors. Documentation of information of all the input and bases for the detailed quantifications and the dependency analysis using the quantification sheets The assessment results for the new HRA results of post-accident human errors using the ANS LPSD PRA Standard show that above 80% items of its supporting requirements for post-accident human errors were graded as its Category II. The number of the re-estimated human errors using the LPSD Korea Standard HRA method is 385. Among them, the number of individual post-accident human errors is 253. The number of dependent post-accident human errors is 135. The quantification results of the LPSD PSA model for the KSNP with new HEPs show that core damage frequency (CDF) is increased by 5.1% compared with the previous baseline CDF It is expected that this study results will be greatly helpful to improve the PSA quality for the domestic nuclear power plants because they have sufficient PSA quality to meet the Category II of Supporting Requirements for the post

  10. IAEA work with guides for PSA quality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hellstroem, Per

    2004-09-01

    IAEA has a project on development of a TECDOC 'PSA Quality for Various Applications'. The project develops the guidance document in stages with intermediate meetings with exchange of ideas, thoughts and experience. Draft versions are being produced successively. The objective with the project is to use attributes to describe the quality of different elements of a PSA (Analysis of initiating events, accident progression, system, data, human reliability, etc) making the PSA suitable for application in various risk informed activities. Two of the meetings in this project took place in February 2004 and in July 2004. The February meeting discussed different aspects of PSA quality in relation to applications and a draft of the TECDOC was reviewed. The meeting made recommendations for preparation of a final document and set priorities for further work in the area. The July meeting elaborated the document further in a small working group and a new draft version was prepared. A final version is expected to be published during 2005. The project has come to the conclusion that it is a limited number of PSA element attributes that are specific for a certain application. Most of the attributes concern plant specificity, realism and level of detail in a general manner, how plant specific is the model, how realistic and how detailed? Many attributes have the characteristic that they are good to have, but not necessarily needed to do the job. This last statement is valid both for a baseline PSA and a PSA application. The IAEA project has identified a limited number of attributes that are necessary to describe characteristics needed for specific applications. The PSA scope needed for a specific application is not covered by the project/document, even though it is obvious that different applications will need different scope or approaches to handle scope limitations. The guidance on performing a PSA available today is old. It is a need to review these guides and update with regard

  11. The role of probabilistic safety assessment in the design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, A.; Ingham, E.L.

    1989-01-01

    The use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for Heysham 2 and Torness marked a major change in the design approach to nuclear safety within the U.K. Design Safety Guidelines incorporating probabilistic safety targets required that design justification would necessitate explicit consideration of the consequence of accidents in relation to their frequency. The paper discusses these safety targets and their implications, the integration of PSA into the design process and an outline of the methodology. The influence of PSA on the design is discussed together with its role in the overall demonstration of reactor safety. (author)

  12. Probabilistic safety assessment framework of pebble-bed modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Tao; Tong Jiejuan; Zhao Jun; Cao Jianzhu; Zhang Liguo

    2009-01-01

    After an investigation of similar reactor type probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) framework, Pebble-bed Modular High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTR-PM) PSA framework was presented in correlate with its own design characteristics. That is an integral framework which spreads through event sequence structure with initiating events at the beginning and source term categories in the end. The analysis shows that it is HTR-PM design feature that determines its PSA framework. (authors)

  13. A national multicenter phase 2 study of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) pox virus vaccine with sequential androgen ablation therapy in patients with PSA progression: ECOG 9802.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DiPaola, Robert S; Chen, Yu-Hui; Bubley, Glenn J; Stein, Mark N; Hahn, Noah M; Carducci, Michael A; Lattime, Edmund C; Gulley, James L; Arlen, Philip M; Butterfield, Lisa H; Wilding, George

    2015-09-01

    E9802 was a phase 2 multi-institution study conducted to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of vaccinia and fowlpox prostate-specific antigen (PSA) vaccine (step 1) followed by combination with androgen ablation therapy (step 2) in patients with PSA progression without visible metastasis. To test the hypothesis that vaccine therapy in this early disease setting will be safe and have a biochemical effect that would support future studies of immunotherapy in patients with minimal disease burden. Patients who had PSA progression following local therapy were treated with PROSTVAC-V (vaccinia)/TRICOM on cycle 1 followed by PROSTVAC-F (fowlpox)/TRICOM for subsequent cycles in combination with granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor (step 1). Androgen ablation was added on progression (step 2). Step 1 primary end points included progression at 6 mo and characterization of change in PSA velocity pretreatment to post-treatment. Step 2 end points included PSA response with combined vaccine and androgen ablation. In step 1, 25 of 40 eligible patients (63%) were progression free at 6 mo after registration (90% confidence interval [CI], 48-75). The median pretreatment PSA velocity was 0.13 log(PSA)/mo, in contrast to median postregistration velocity of 0.09 log(PSA)/mo (p=0.02), which is an increase in median PSA doubling time from 5.3 mo to 7.7 mo. No grade ≥4 treatment-related toxicity was observed. In the 27 patients eligible and treated for step 2, 20 patients achieved a complete response (CR) at 7 mo (CR rate: 74%; 90% CI, 57-87). Although supportive of larger studies in the cooperative group setting, this study is limited by the small number of patients and the absence of a control group as in a phase 3 study. A viral PSA vaccine can be administered safely in the multi-institutional cooperative group setting to patients with minimal disease volume alone and combined with androgen ablation, supporting the feasibility of future phase 3 studies in this

  14. Clinical outcomes and nadir prostate-specific antigen (PSA) according to initial PSA levels in primary androgen deprivation therapy for metastatic prostate cancer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kitagawa, Yasuhide; Ueno, Satoru; Izumi, Kouji; Kadono, Yoshifumi; Mizokami, Atsushi; Hinotsu, Shiro; Akaza, Hideyuki; Namiki, Mikio

    2016-03-01

    To investigate the clinical outcomes of metastatic prostate cancer patients and the relationship between nadir prostate-specific antigen (PSA) levels and different types of primary androgen deprivation therapy (PADT). This study utilized data from the Japan Study Group of Prostate Cancer registry, which is a large, multicenter, population-based database. A total of 2982 patients treated with PADT were enrolled. Kaplan-Meier analysis was used to compare progression-free survival (PFS) and overall survival (OS) in patients treated using combined androgen blockade (CAB) and non-CAB therapies. The relationships between nadir PSA levels and PADT type according to initial serum PSA levels were also investigated. Among the 2982 enrolled patients, 2101 (70.5 %) were treated with CAB. Although CAB-treated patients had worse clinical characteristics, their probability of PFS and OS was higher compared with those treated with a non-CAB therapy. These results were due to a survival benefit with CAB in patients with an initial PSA level of 500-1000 ng/mL. Nadir PSA levels were significantly lower in CAB patients than in non-CAB patients with comparable initial serum PSA levels. A small survival benefit for CAB in metastatic prostate cancer was demonstrated in a Japanese large-scale prospective cohort study. The clinical significance of nadir PSA levels following PADT was evident, but the predictive impact of PSA nadir on OS was different between CAB and non-CAB therapy.

  15. Strain-specific impact of PsaR of Streptococcus pneumoniae on global gene expression and virulence

    OpenAIRE

    Hendriksen, Wouter T.; Bootsma, Hester J.; van Diepen, Angela; Estevao, Silvia; Kuipers, Oscar P.; de Groot, Ronald; Hermans, Peter W. M.

    2009-01-01

    Previous studies have indicated that PsaR of Streptococcus pneumoniae is a manganese-dependent regulator, negatively affecting the expression of at least seven genes. Here, we extended these observations by transcriptome and proteome analysis of psaR mutants in strains D39 and TIGR4. The microarray analysis identified three shared PsaR targets: the psa operon, pcpA and prtA. In addition, we found 31 genes to be regulated by PsaR in D39 only, most strikingly a cellobiose-specific phosphotrains...

  16. Generation of monoclonal antibodies against prostate specific antigen (PSA) for the detection of PSA and its purification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acevedo Castro, Boris Ernesto

    2012-01-01

    The prostate cancer in Cuba is a problem of health (2672 diagnosed cases and 2769 deaths in 2007). Various diagnostic methods have been implemented for the detection and management of this disease, emphasizing among them (PSA) prostate-specific antigen serological determination. At this work was generated and characterized a panel of 11 antibodies (AcMs) monoclonal IgG1 detected with high affinity described major epitopes of the PSA, both in solution and attached to the test plate. From the panel obtained AcMs was the standardization of an essay type ELISA for the detection of serum total PSA (associated and free) equimolar, based on antibody monoclonal CB-PSA.4 in the coating and the CB-PSA.9 coupled with biotin as liner, with a detection limit of 0.15 ng/mL. Similarly, standardized system for detection in serum free PSA, based on the AcMs CB-PSA.4 (coating) and CB-PSA.2 coupled with biotin (liner), with a detection limit of 0.5 ng/mL. Finally, with the purpose of using PSA as standard in trials type ELISA, developed a simple method of inmunopurificación based on the AcM, CB-PSA.2, which was obtained the PSA with a purity exceeding 90%. Immunoassay Centre on the basis of the AcMs panel and the results of this study, developed and recorded two diagnostic systems for the detection of PSA in human serum. (author)

  17. Peer review of the Barselina Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKay, S.L.; Coles, G.A.

    1995-01-01

    The Barselina Project is a Swedish-funded, cooperative effort among Lithuania, Russia and Sweden to transfer Western probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology to the designers/operators of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). The overall goal is to use the PSA as a tool for assessing plant operational safety. The INPP is a two-unit, Former Soviet Union-designed nuclear facility located in Lithuania. The results of this PSA will ultimately be used to identify plant-specific improvements in system design and the conduct of facility operations, allowing improved operational safety. Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to perform an independent expert peer review of the Barselina PSA. This report documents the findings of this review. This review, financed with nuclear safety assistance funds through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of Energy (DOE), satisfies Task II of the PNL peer review of the Barselina project. The objective is to provide an independent, in-proce ss examination of the Barselina Level 1 PSA of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2. The review consisted of an investigation of the project documentation, interviews, and extensive discussions with the PSA staff during critical stages of the project. PNL assessed the readability, completeness, consistency, validity, and applicability of the PSA. The major aspects explored were its purpose, major assumptions, analysis/modeling, results, and interpretation. It was not within the scope of this review to perform plant walkdowns or to review material other than the PSA documentation

  18. Cutset Quantification Error Evaluation for Shin-Kori 1 and 2 PSA model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jong Soo

    2009-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) are based on the minimal cut set (MCS) quantification method. In PSAs, the risk and importance measures are computed from a cutset equation mainly by using approximations. The conservatism of the approximations is also a source of quantification uncertainty. In this paper, exact MCS quantification methods which are based on the 'sum of disjoint products (SDP)' logic and Inclusion-exclusion formula are applied and the conservatism of the MCS quantification results in Shin-Kori 1 and 2 PSA is evaluated

  19. PSA analysis focused on Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from operational safety point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2001-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing.(author)

  20. Serum PSA levels in the Indian population: Is it different?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Agrawal, Amit; Karan, Shailesh Chandra

    2017-04-01

    Serum prostate-specific antigen (PSA) is an important tumour, marker which is widely used to trigger trans-rectal ultrasound (TRUS)-guided prostate biopsy. However, the PSA levels vary with race and ethnicity. Therefore, there is a need to have an Indian reference range. All adult male patients meeting the inclusion and exclusion criteria were enrolled in this study. They were subjected to assessment of serum total PSA, digital rectal examination and trans-abdominal ultrasound. If any one or more of these were found abnormal, then a TRUS-guided 12-core prostate biopsy was done. Patients who were detected to have prostatic cancer were excluded from the final analysis. The data so obtained was grouped among the following three age groups: 40-49, 50-59 and 60-70 years, and the age-specific PSA values, prostatic volume and PSA density were found. A total of 1772 patients were analysed. The mean serum total PSA was 1.76 ng/ml with a standard deviation of 2.566 ng/ml. Group-wise age distribution of the mean serum total PSA was 1.22, 1.97 and 2.08 ng/ml in 40-49, 50-59 and 60-70 years age groups. The mean total PSA and the age-specific PSA range tend to be lower in the Indians than the Western population.

  1. Flooding risk reduction for the ASCO NPP PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nos Llorens, V.; Faig Sureda, J.

    1993-01-01

    Developed within the framework of the UTE (INITEC-INYPSA-Empresarios Agrupados), the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of the Asco Nuclear Power Plant has served both as a basic tool in reducing the risk of potential internal flooding at the plant, and as a guideline for studying the optimization and feasibility of necessary plant design modifications and changes to procedures. During execution of the work, and in view of the results, a series of improvements were proposed which gave rise to design modification studies. The paper seeks to describe the effect of these modifications on reducing core damage frequency, it also includes a general description of the methodology used. Finally, it compares the results obtained in the context of similar studies performed in other PSAs. (author)

  2. Development of advanced methods and related software for human reliability evaluation within probabilistic safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosmowski, K.T.; Mertens, J.; Degen, G.; Reer, B.

    1994-06-01

    Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is an important part of Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). The first part of this report consists of an overview of types of human behaviour and human error including the effect of significant performance shaping factors on human reliability. Particularly with regard to safety assessments for nuclear power plants a lot of HRA methods have been developed. The most important of these methods are presented and discussed in the report, together with techniques for incorporating HRA into PSA and with models of operator cognitive behaviour. Based on existing HRA methods the concept of a software system is described. For the development of this system the utilization of modern programming tools is proposed; the essential goal is the effective application of HRA methods. A possible integration of computeraided HRA within PSA is discussed. The features of Expert System Technology and examples of applications (PSA, HRA) are presented in four appendices. (orig.) [de

  3. Development of a PSA information database system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Seung Hwan

    2005-01-01

    The need to develop the PSA information database for performing a PSA has been growing rapidly. For example, performing a PSA requires a lot of data to analyze, to evaluate the risk, to trace the process of results and to verify the results. PSA information database is a system that stores all PSA related information into the database and file system with cross links to jump to the physical documents whenever they are needed. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute is developing a PSA information database system, AIMS (Advanced Information Management System for PSA). The objective is to integrate and computerize all the distributed information of a PSA into a system and to enhance the accessibility to PSA information for all PSA related activities. This paper describes how we implemented such a database centered application in the view of two areas, database design and data (document) service

  4. An estimation of the accident sequence of the LOCA groups for the PSA model of the KSNP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Seok Jung; Yang, Joon Eon

    2004-01-01

    A new trend of the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology is to improve and enhance the current PSA model to be adequate for risk-informed applications (RIA). Requirements of a PSA model for the RIA are summarized as (1) reduction of the conservatism in the model utilizing all available information and (2) consideration of the specific features of a plant as designed, as operated. This is because the PSA based on conservatism and insufficient consideration of the plant-specific features resulted in a shadow effect on the assessment results. When a PSA model is used in a risk-informed application, more precise risk-information is more helpful to decision making process, so the reduction of the conservatism and the consideration of the plant-specific features in a PSA model are the most essential elements. Recently, an effort has been performed to modify the current PSA model for the Korea Standard Nuclear Power plant (KSNP) to be used in risk-informed applications. A re-estimation of the accident sequence of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) groups for the PSA model of the KSNP has been performed

  5. Risk evaluations of aging: Procedures guide for an age-dependent PSA with emphasis on prioritization and sensitivity studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vesely, W.E.

    1991-01-01

    Based on the previous work which has been performed in the project, a procedures guide is being developed for carrying out an age-dependent probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for evaluating the core damage frequency with aging effects explicitly treated. A PSA is basically a Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The emphasis of the guide is on prioritization and sensitivity studies. Focus is also on active components although consideration of aging effects in passive components is also treated. The guide is intended to become a NUREG/CR and is the first of three volumes which are being developed. The following topics with demonstrations and applications are described in the presentation: (1) the age-dependent PSA versus the standard PSA; (2) component reliability models used in an age-dependent PSA; (3) approaches for transforming a PSA into an age-dependent PSA; (4) application of an age-dependent PSA; (5) using a PSA to evaluate the risk effects from aging passive components; (6) evaluation of the risk importance of passive components; (7) prioritizations of aging contributors; (8) evaluations of test and maintenance effectiveness; and (9) sensitivity studies and uncertainty analyses of aging effects

  6. Controversies in using urine samples for prostate cancer detection: PSA and PCA3 expression analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. Fontenete

    2011-12-01

    Full Text Available PURPOSE: Prostate cancer (PCa is one of the most commonly diagnosed malignancies in the world. Although PSA utilization as a serum marker has improved prostate cancer detection it still presents some limitations, mainly regarding its specificity. The expression of this marker, along with the detection of PCA3 mRNA in urine samples, has been suggested as a new approach for PCa detection. The goal of this work was to evaluate the efficacy of the urinary detection of PCA3 mRNA and PSA mRNA without performing the somewhat embarrassing prostate massage. It was also intended to optimize and implement a methodological protocol for this kind of sampling. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Urine samples from 57 patients with suspected prostate disease were collected, without undergoing prostate massage. Increased serum PSA levels were confirmed by medical records review. RNA was extracted by different methods and a preamplification step was included in order to improve gene detection by Real-Time PCR. RESULTS: An increase in RNA concentration with the use of TriPure Isolation Reagent. Despite this optimization, only 15.8% of the cases showed expression of PSA mRNA and only 3.8% of prostate cancer patients presented detectable levels of PCA3 mRNA. The use of a preamplification step revealed no improvement in the results obtained. CONCLUSION: This work confirms that prostate massage is important before urine collection for gene expression analysis. Since PSA and PCA3 are prostate specific, it is necessary to promote the passage of cells from prostate to urinary tract, in order to detect these genetic markers in urine samples.

  7. Use of probabilistic safety assessment in supporting regulatory authority`s work; Todennaekoeisyyspohjaisen turvallisuusanalyysin kaeyttoe viranomaistyoen tukena

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Julin, A

    1995-11-01

    The aim of the study was to examine possibilities to use probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) more effectively in regulatory control of nuclear power plants. The structure, results and evaluation methods of PSA along with the necessary equations and principles, which could be used in utilising level 1 PSA results in decision making, have been introduced. The presented examples describe the ways PSA has been utilised abroad and particularly in Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK). The examples calculated in the study are based on the SPSA code and the PSA model of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (TVO). The examples compare component safety classes versus safety importance and the risk of continued operation versus shutdown alternative in residual heat removal system failures. In addition to this allowed outage times, as calculated by PSA, were compared to allowed outage times according to technical specifications. The last 9 years operating experiences of TVO II was also examined by analysing the risk importance of significant component failures and operational disturbances. The analysis showed that the contribution of component failures and operational disturbances to the overall core damage risk during the studied time period was only 5 per cent. It appeared that the rare, significant initiating events provide the main contribution to the total cumulative risk. (57 refs., 22 figs., 17 tabs.).

  8. Analysis of Serum Total and Free PSA Using Immunoaffinity Depletion Coupled to SRM: Correlation with Clinical Immunoassay Tests

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Tao; Hossain, Mahmud; Schepmoes, Athena A.; Fillmore, Thomas L.; Sokoll, Lori J.; Kronewitter, Scott R.; Izmirlian, Grant; Shi, Tujin; Qian, Weijun; Leach, Robin; Thompson, Ian M.; Chan, Daniel W.; Smith, Richard D.; Kagan, Jacob; Srinivastava, Sudhir; Rodland, Karin D.; Camp, David G.

    2012-08-03

    Sandwich immunoassay is the standard technique used in clinical labs for quantifying protein biomarkers for disease detection, monitoring and therapeutic intervention. Albeit highly sensitive, the development of a specific immunoassay is rather time-consuming and associated with extremely high cost due to the requirement for paired immunoaffinity reagents of high specificity. Recently, mass spectrometry-based methods, specifically selected reaction monitoring mass spectrometry (SRM-MS), have been increasingly applied to measure low abundance biomarker candidates in tissue and biofluids, owing to high sensitivity and specificity, simplicity of assay configuration, and great multiplexing capability. In this study, we report for the first time the development of immunoaffinity depletion-based workflows and SRM-MS assays that enable sensitive and accurate quantification of total and free prostate-specific antigen (PSA) in serum without the requirement for specific PSA antibodies. With stable isotope dilution and external calibration, low ng/mL level detection of both total and free PSA was consistently achieved in both PSA-spiked female serum samples and actual patient serum samples. Moreover, comparison of the results obtained when SRM PSA assays and conventional immunoassays were applied to the same samples showed very good correlation (R2 values ranging from 0.90 to 0.99) in several independent clinical serum sample sets, including a set of 33 samples assayed in a blinded test. These results demonstrate that the workflows and SRM assays developed here provide an attractive alternative for reliably measuring total and free PSA in human blood. Furthermore, simultaneous measurement of free and total PSA and many other biomarkers can be performed in a single analysis using high-resolution liquid chromatographic separation coupled with SRM-MS.

  9. Clinical performance of serum [-2]proPSA derivatives, %p2PSA and PHI, in the detection and management of prostate cancer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Ya-Qiang; Sun, Tong; Zhong, Wei-De; Wu, Chin-Lee

    2014-01-01

    Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) has been widely used as a serum marker for prostate cancer (PCa) screening or progression monitoring, which dramatically increased rate of early detection while significantly reduced PCa-specific mortality. However, a number of limitations of PSA have been noticed. Low specificity of PSA may lead to overtreatment in men who presenting with a total PSA (tPSA) level of PHI) and %p2PSA, which were defined as [(p2PSA/fPSA) × √ tPSA] and [(p2PSA/fPSA) × 100] respectively, have been suggested to be increased in PCa and can better distinguish PCa from benign prostatic diseases than tPSA or fPSA. We performed a systematic review of the available scientific evidences to evaluate the potentials of %p2PSA and PHI in clinical application. Mounting evidences suggested that both %p2PSA and PHI possess higher area under the ROC curve (AUC) and better specificity at a high sensitivity for PCa detection when compare with tPSA and %fPSA. It indicated that measurements of %p2PSA and PHI significantly improved the accuracy of PCa detection and diminished unnecessary biopsies. Furthermore, elevations of %p2PSA and PHI are related to more aggressive diseases. %p2PSA and PHI might be helpful in reducing overtreatment on indolent cases or assessing the progression of PCa in men who undergo active surveillance. Further studies are needed before being applied in routine clinical practice.

  10. Light water reactor sequence timing: its significance to probabilistic safety assessment modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bley, D.C.; Buttemer, D.R.; Stetkar, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    This paper examines event sequence timing in light water reactor plants from the viewpoint of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The analytical basis for the ideas presented here come primarily from the authors' work in support of more than 20 PSA studies over the past several years. Timing effects are important for establishing success criteria for support and safety system response and for identifying the time available for operator recovery actions. The principal results of this paper are as follows: 1. Analysis of event sequence timing is necessary for meaningful probabilistic safety assessment - both the success criteria for systems performance and the probability of recovery are tightly linked to sequence timing. 2. Simple engineering analyses based on first principles are often sufficient to provide adequate resolution of the time available for recovery of PSA scenarios. Only those parameters that influence sequence timing and its variability and uncertainty need be examined. 3. Time available for recovery is the basic criterion for evaluation of human performance, whether time is an explicit parameter of the operator actions analysis or not. (author)

  11. PSA applications. Good practices and documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewailly, J.; Magne, L.

    1997-10-01

    In this paper, it is shown what the condensed documentation of the main strategic choices and technical assumptions related to a PSA could contain: how to select the internal and external initiating events, how the detail the plant configuration and the general organization of the plant and operating staff, how to highlight the assumptions related to physical models, etc. The proposals in this documentation are based on the R and D D's experience with PSA (construction of PSA models, use of PSA models for operation or maintenance, PSA tools). This document also presents different types of rules or recommendations related to PSA modelling for various applications involved in nuclear power plant operating. Finally, the paper stresses the main difficulties encountered (appropriate use of uncertainties, communication of PSA results to non-specialist users) and it also outlines some prospects for the future. (author)

  12. Radiographic progression with nonrising PSA in metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer: post hoc analysis of PREVAIL.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bryce, A H; Alumkal, J J; Armstrong, A; Higano, C S; Iversen, P; Sternberg, C N; Rathkopf, D; Loriot, Y; de Bono, J; Tombal, B; Abhyankar, S; Lin, P; Krivoshik, A; Phung, D; Beer, T M

    2017-06-01

    Advanced prostate cancer is a phenotypically diverse disease that evolves through multiple clinical courses. PSA level is the most widely used parameter for disease monitoring, but it has well-recognized limitations. Unlike in clinical trials, in practice, clinicians may rely on PSA monitoring alone to determine disease status on therapy. This approach has not been adequately tested. Chemotherapy-naive asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic men (n=872) with metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC) who were treated with the androgen receptor inhibitor enzalutamide in the PREVAIL study were analyzed post hoc for rising versus nonrising PSA (empirically defined as >1.05 vs ⩽1.05 times the PSA level from 3 months earlier) at the time of radiographic progression. Clinical characteristics and disease outcomes were compared between the rising and nonrising PSA groups. Of 265 PREVAIL patients with radiographic progression and evaluable PSA levels on the enzalutamide arm, nearly one-quarter had a nonrising PSA. Median progression-free survival in this cohort was 8.3 months versus 11.1 months in the rising PSA cohort (hazard ratio 1.68; 95% confidence interval 1.26-2.23); overall survival was similar between the two groups, although less than half of patients in either group were still at risk at 24 months. Baseline clinical characteristics of the two groups were similar. Non-rising PSA at radiographic progression is a common phenomenon in mCRPC patients treated with enzalutamide. As restaging in advanced prostate cancer patients is often guided by increases in PSA levels, our results demonstrate that disease progression on enzalutamide can occur without rising PSA levels. Therefore, a disease monitoring strategy that includes imaging not entirely reliant on serial serum PSA measurement may more accurately identify disease progression.

  13. Use and development of probabilistic safety assessment - CSNI WGRISK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siu, Nathan; Monninger, John; Gomez-Cobo, Ana; Kao, Tsu-Mu; Schoen, Gerhard; Gunsell, Lars; Nyman, Ralph; Jelinek, Tomas; Hultquist, Goeran; Rapp, Anders; Eriksson, Stefan; Lantaron, Alfredo; Vojnovic, Djordje; Husarcek, Jan; Kovacs, Zoltan; Versteeg, M.F.; Lopez Morones, Ramon; Lee, Chang-Ju; Fukuda, Mamoru; Burgazzi, Luciano; Caporali, Rino; RoeWEKAMP, Marina; MACSUGA, Geza; Bareith, Attila; Lanore, J.M.; Sorel, Vincent; Virolainen, Reino; Patrik, Milan; Mlady, Ondrej; Raducu, Gheorghe; De Gelder, Pieter; Hendrickx, Isabelle; Lanore, Jeanne-Marie; Murphy, Joseph A.; Shepherd, Charles; Pyy, Pekka T.; Mauny, Elisabeth

    2007-01-01

    The CSNI WGRISK produced a report in July 2002 on 'The Use and Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in NEA Member Countries'. This provides a description of the PSA programmes in the member countries at the time that the report was produced. However, there have been significant developments in PSA since 2002. Consequently, a decision was made at the WGRISK meeting in October 2005 to produce an updated version of the report. The aim was to produce an updated, stand alone version of the report that presents an analysis of the position on the use and development of PSA in the WGRISK member countries as of spring 2006. A detailed questionnaire was circulated to WGRISK members and to the IAEA to ascertain the state of the art in PSA use and development at the end of 2006. Detailed responses were prepared by 20 countries totalling several hundred pages of information. After first compilation of information, an updating round was organized by showing to the countries all the answers and the summary made of them by a small group of experts. The process led to some clarifications and more consistency in the report. The collected information was finally analyzed and summarized to reach the conclusions presented in this report. The set of section headings in the report is as follows: Executive summary. 1. Introduction. 2. PSA Framework and Environment. 3. Numerical Safety Criteria. 4. PSA Standards and Guidance. 5. Status and Scope of PSA Programmes. 6. PSA Methodology and Data. 7. PSA Applications. 8. Results and Insights from the PSAs. 9. Future Developments. Appendix A: Overview of the Status of PSA Programmes. Appendix B: Contact information. Appendix C: Questionnaire and Guidance to authors

  14. Temelin safety monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mlady, O.

    2000-01-01

    Temelin NPP is a WWER-1000/320 two unit plant under construction, originally designed according to the standards of the former Soviet Union. After a series of reviews in the 80s, a decision was taken to upgrade the design of Temelin, including the supply of fuel and instrumentation and instrumentation and control system (I and C). Details on the current design and other related safety matters were presented to the nuclear community in a meeting organized by the IAEA in November 1994. Based upon recommendations of IAEA OSART missions, post TMI requirements and Temelin Risk Audit recommendations it was decided to perform a Probabilistic Safety Assessment within the Temelin PSA Project. The general purpose of this project was to perform systematic examination of the Temelin Unit 1 NPP for severe accident vulnerabilities by performance of a Level 1 and 2 PSA study. In addition to the completion of Temelin documented living PSA model, the decision was to develop and implement a PSA based software tool able to analyze real and scheduled plant conditions for determining the risk impact of plant configurations and on-line maintenance activities. This paper provides an overview of the key features of the Temelin Safety Monitor, describes its development activities and its current status and intended use at Temelin NPP for PSA applications. (author)

  15. Seismic PSA implementation standards by AESJ and the utilization of the advanced safety examination guideline for seismic design for nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebisawa, Katsumi; Hibino, Kenta

    2008-01-01

    The Advanced Safety Examination Guideline for Seismic Design for Nuclear Power Plant (the advanced safety examination guideline) was worked out on September 19, 2006. In this paper, a summary of the method of probability theory in the advanced safety examination guideline and the Seismic PSA Implementation Standards is stated. On utilization of the probability theory for the advanced safety examination guideline, the uncertainty resulting from the process of the decision of the basic design earthquake ground motion (Ss) is stated to be considered using the proper method. The references of the extra probability for evaluation of earthquake hazard and combination of the working load and the earthquake load are stated. Definition, evaluation method and effort to lower the 'residual risks', and relation between the residual risks and the extra probability of Ss are described. A summary of the earthquake-resistant design for nuclear power facilities is explained by the old guideline. (S.Y.)

  16. The Use and Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in NEA Member Countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The mission of the CSNI is to assist Member countries in maintaining and further developing the scientific and technical knowledge base required to assess the safety of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities. The mission of the Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) is to advance the understanding and utilisation of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in ensuring continued safety of nuclear installations in Member countries. In pursuing this goal, the Working Group shall recognize the different methodologies for identifying contributors to risk and assessing their importance. While the Working Group shall continue to focus on the more mature PSA methodologies for Level 1, Level 2, internal, external, shutdown, etc. It shall also consider the applicability and maturity of PSA methods for considering evolving issues such as human reliability, software reliability, ageing issues, etc., as appropriate. This report provides descriptions of the current status of PSA programmes in Member countries including basic background information, guidelines, various PSA applications, major results in recent studies, PSA based plant modifications and research and development topics. While the compilation is a not complete compilation it provides a 'snapshot' of the current situation in the Member countries and hence it provides reference information and various insights to both the PSA practician and others involved in the nuclear industry. The terms PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) and PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) are utilised to denote this subject. In each of the chapters the objective is to present a 'snapshot' of the current status. The main issues considered in the different chapters are Background Information, Quantitative Safety Guidelines, Status of PSA Programmes, PSA Applications, PSA Related Research and Development and PSA Based Plant Modifications. It is important to note that the information contained in this report represents current practices in

  17. The application of PSA techniques to the vital area identification of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jae Joo; Jung, Woo Sik; Park, Chang Kue

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents a Vital Area Identification (VAI) method based on the current Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. A structured framework of a Top Event Prevention set Analysis (TEPA) application to the VAI of nuclear power plants is also delineated. One of the important processes for physical protection in a nuclear power plant is VIA that is a process for identifying areas containing nuclear materials, Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) to be protected from sabotage, which could directly or indirectly lead to core damage and unacceptable radiological consequences. A software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on the PSA method) is being developed by KAERI for the VAI of nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the KAERI fault tree solver FTREX (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) is specialized for the VIP to generate the candidates of the vital areas. FTREX can generate numerous MCSs for a huge fault tree with the lowest truncation limit and all possible prevention sets

  18. [PSA interest and prostatitis: literature review].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bruyère, F; Amine Lakmichi, M

    2013-12-01

    Prostatitis is easily diagnosed but sometimes associated with PSA measurement. An increased PSA in an asymptomatic patient may be associated with antibiotic use to eliminate the inflammatory part and to confirm prostate biopsy. It seems interesting to confirm or infirm these attitudes with a systematic review of the literature We performed a literature review using the words [prostatitis], [acute prostatitis], [prostate specific antigen], [PSA], in the MEDLINE, Pubmed and AMBASE database searching for articles in French or English published in the past 20 years. PSA is not always increased during an acute prostatitis episode. An increased PSA in an asymptomatic man does not seem to be systematically correlated to prostate inflammation. Analyzing the studies, it seems inaccurate to measure PSA value during a febrile urinary infection episode in men. Systematic use of antibiotic to decrease PSA and not performing prostate biopsy is not relevant and may induce resistance to antibiotic and doesn't induce a reduction risk of having prostate biopsy. PSA is unnecessary in case of febrile urinary tract infection in men. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  19. Final guidance document for extended Level 2 PSA Volume 1. Summary report for external hazards implementation in extended L2 PSA, validation of SAMG strategy and complement of ASAMPSA2 L2PSA guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loeffler, H.; Raimond, E.

    2016-01-01

    The present document is a summary of the deliverables produced within the ASAMPSA-E project for extended L2 PSA. These deliverables are: D30.7 vol. 2, 'Implementing external Events modelling in Level 2 PSA': D30.7 vol. 3: 'Verification and improvement of SAM strategy: D30.7 vol. 4: 'Consideration of shutdown states, spent fuel pools and recent R and D results'. Among many others, the following summary statements are provided: Analyses of external events: - No need for new methodology, - It is necessary to develop L1 PSA first and then clearly defined boundary conditions for the L2 PSA must be generated, - The remaining challenge is how to address adverse environmental conditions due to external hazards. Multi units: - No practical methodology exists to treat the problem, - A new methodology is necessary to be developed first for the L1 PSA. This should, from the beginning, take into account the specific needs of L2 PSA so that the boundary conditions for subsequent level 2 analysis can be generated adequately. SAM strategies verification and improvement: - L2 PSA methodology can usefully by applied and experience exists for internal initiating events L2 PSA, - How to address adverse environmental conditions due to external hazards - needs for new methodology or examples of experience, - How to model the decision process when there is a conflict of interest - needs for new methodology or examples of experience. For L2 PSA in shutdown states with open RPV, some new technical issues (fission product release, thermal load to structures above RPV) have to be addressed. Spent fuel pool issues have been developed, in particular: - Heat load from the melting spent fuel to structures above (e.g. to the containment roof) is a severe challenge for the plant and for the present-day, methodology is missing. Recent R and D achievements with relevance for L2 PSA: - Basic research has been continued in the radiochemistry (iodine and ruthenium chemistry) field, but the existing

  20. Performance of serum prostate-specific antigen isoform [-2]proPSA (p2PSA) and the prostate health index (PHI) in a Chinese hospital-based biopsy population.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Na, Rong; Ye, Dingwei; Liu, Fang; Chen, Haitao; Qi, Jun; Wu, Yishuo; Zhang, Guiming; Wang, Meilin; Wang, Wenying; Sun, Jielin; Yu, Guopeng; Zhu, Yao; Ren, Shancheng; Zheng, S Lilly; Jiang, Haowen; Sun, Yinghao; Ding, Qiang; Xu, Jianfeng

    2014-11-01

    The use of serum [-2]proPSA (p2PSA) and its derivative, the prostate health index (PHI), in detecting prostate cancer (PCa) have been consistently shown to have better performance than total prostate-specific antigen (tPSA) in discriminating biopsy outcomes in western countries. However, little is known about their performance in Chinese men. Our objective is to test the performance of p2PSA and PHI and their added value to tPSA in discriminating biopsy outcomes in Chinese men. Consecutive patients who underwent prostate biopsy in three tertiary hospitals in Shanghai, China during 2012-2013 were recruited. Serum tPSA, free PSA (fPSA), and p2PSA were measured centrally using Beckman Coulter's DxI 800 Immunoassay System. The primary outcome is PCa and the secondary outcome is high-grade PCa (Gleason Score of 4 + 3 or worse). Discriminative performance was assessed using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), detection rate and Decision Curve Analysis (DCA). Among 636 patients who underwent prostate biopsy, PHI was a significant predictor of biopsy outcomes, independent of other clinical variables. The AUC in discriminating PCa from non-PCa was consistently higher for PHI than tPSA in the entire cohort (0.88 vs. 0.81) as well as in patients with tPSA at 2-10 ng/ml (0.73 vs. 0.53), at 10.1-20 ng/ml (0.81 vs. 0.58), and at tPSA >20 ng/ml (0.90 vs. 0.80). The differences were statistically significant in all comparisons, P prostate biopsy in China. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  1. Development of the SKI Handbook for reviewing PSA after the review of the of a PSA level 2 study; Utveckling av SKIs Tillsynshandbok foer PSA utifraan granskningen av en PSA Nivaa-2 studie

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lindholm, Ilona; Sairanen, Risto [VTT Processes, Helsinki (Finland)

    2003-02-01

    A review of the Oskarshamn 2 Level 2 PSA has been conducted by VTT Processes. One objective of the review was validation and development of Tillsynshandbok PSA applying it to Oskarshamn 2 PSA Level 2 study. The review was based on the PSA Level 2 documentation: the main report, the supporting reports on containment success criteria and release calculations with the MAAP4 code, and five phenomenological reports for selected specific questions. The main result of the phenomenological analyses is that none of the phenomena considered contributes to the conditional failure probability of the Oskarshamn 2 containment in severe accidents. The project was conducted as a set of separate studies and the project quality assurance has also focused on one part at the time. As such, the quality assurance is adequate. A high level QA ensuring that all separate studies and analysis steps use same assumptions seems to be missing. Results from the phenomenology reports are not always transferred to accident analyses and vice versa. There is no specific discussion of uncertainty or sensitivity analyses. In general, the number of sensitivity analyses could be larger. Such should have been provided for sequences or phenomena that could result in early or unmitigated release. Examples are pressure vessel failure at high pressure, the effect of larger hydrogen production, and the key assumptions used for steam explosion and direct containment heating. Suggestions for additional sensitivity studies have been given in discussion of phenomenological reports. The project documentation is generally good. Missing information is usually associated with transfer of results from one study to another. It can be assumed that the information exists also in this cases but has not been documented in the reports above. Documentation of the containment event trees and the assumptions used for them could be more detailed, maybe similar to the approach used in the Appendix of this report. More effort

  2. The inverse relationship between prostate-specific antigen (PSA) and obesity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aref, Adel; Vincent, Andrew D; O'Callaghan, Michael; Martin, Sean; Sutherland, Peter; Hoy, Andrew; Butler, Lisa M; Wittert, Gary

    2018-06-25

    Obese men have lower serum prostate-specific antigen (PSA) than comparably aged lean men, but the underlying mechanism remains unclear. The aim of this study was to determine the effect of obesity on PSA and the potential contributing mechanisms. A cohort of 1195 men aged 35 years and over at recruitment, with demographic, anthropometric (body mass index (BMI), waist circumference (WC)) and serum hormone (serum testosterone (T), estradiol (E2)), PSA and hematology assessments obtained over two waves was assessed. Men with a history of prostate cancer or missing PSA were excluded, leaving 970 men for the final analysis. Mixed-effects regressions and mediation analyses adjusting for hormonal and volumetric factors explore the potential mechanisms relating obesity to PSA. After adjusting for age, PSA levels were lower in men with greater WC (p=0.001). In a multivariable model including WC, age, E2/T and PlasV as predictors, no statistically significant associations were observed between with PSA and either WC (p=0.36) or PlasV (p=0.49), while strong associations were observed with both E2/T (pPSA (p=0.31), while when E2/T is a mediator; the ACME explained roughly 0.5 of the effect (pPSA levels in obese men, as compared to normal weight men, can be explained both by hormonal changes (elevated E2/T ratio) and haemodilution. Hormonal factors therefore represent a substantial but underappreciated mediating pathway.

  3. Trends in development of probability assessment of nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dach, K.

    1989-01-01

    A complete study of probability safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants is a multidisciplinary endeavor, requiring a qualified decision-making team composed of experienced professionals in individual disciplines and requiring good coordination of effort. The main concerns for the execution of a PSA study and related tasks are schematically presented. Also shown is a summary of the main steps for a PSA study at all three levels, with the incorporation of analysis of external events and the reliability of humans, including the necessary uncertainty analyses. 1 ref., 2 figs., 3 tabs

  4. Importance measures in nuclear PSA: how to control their uncertainty and develop new applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duflot, N.

    2007-01-01

    This PhD thesis deals with the importance measures based on nuclear probabilistic safety analyses (PSA). With these indicators, the importance towards risk of the events considered in the PSA models can be measured. The first part of this thesis sets out the framework in which they are currently used. The information extracted from importance measures evaluation is used in industrial decision-making processes that may impact the safety of nuclear plants. In the second part of the thesis, we thus try to meet the requirements of reliability and simplicity with an approach minimising the uncertainties due to modelling. We also lay out a new truncation process of the set of the minimal cut set (MCS) corresponding to the baseline case which allows a quick, automatic and precise calculation of the importance measures. As PSA are increasingly used in risk-informed decision-making approaches, we have examined the extension of importance measures to groups of basic events. The third part of the thesis therefore presents the definition of the importance of events such as the failure of a system or the loss of a function, as well as their potential applications. PSA being considered to be a useful tool to design new nuclear power plants, the fourth part of the thesis sketches out a design process based both on classical importance measures and on new ones. (author)

  5. Variability of assay methods for total and free PSA after WHO standardization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Foj, L; Filella, X; Alcover, J; Augé, J M; Escudero, J M; Molina, R

    2014-03-01

    The variability of total PSA (tPSA) and free PSA (fPSA) results among commercial assays has been suggested to be decreased by calibration to World Health Organization (WHO) reference materials. To characterize the current situation, it is necessary to know its impact in the critical cutoffs used in clinical practice. In the present study, we tested 167 samples with tPSA concentrations of 0 to 20 μg/L using seven PSA and six fPSA commercial assays, including Access, ARCHITECT i2000, ADVIA Centaur XP, IMMULITE 2000, Elecsys, and Lumipulse G1200, in which we only measured tPSA. tPSA and fPSA were measured in Access using the Hybritech and WHO calibrators. Passing-Bablok analysis was performed for PSA, and percentage of fPSA with the Hybritech-calibrated access comparison assay. For tPSA, relative differences were more than 10 % at 0.2 μg/L for ARCHITECT i2000, and at a critical concentration of 3, 4, and 10 μg/L, the relative difference was exceeded by ADVIA Centaur XP and WHO-calibrated Access. For percent fPSA, at a critical concentration of 10 %, the 10 % relative difference limit was exceeded by IMMULITE 2000 assay. At a critical concentration of 20 and 25 %, ADVIA Centaur XP, ARCHITECT i2000, and IMMULITE 2000 assays exceeded the 10 % relative difference limit. We have shown significant discordances between assays included in this study despite advances in standardization conducted in the last years. Further harmonization efforts are required in order to obtain a complete clinical concordance.

  6. Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 - Status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.-E.; Bjoerkman, K.; Rossi, J.; Knochenhauer, M.; Xuhong He; Persson, A.; Gustavsson, H.

    2008-07-01

    The second phase of the project, the outcome of which is described in this project report has mainly dealt with four issues: 1) Consistency in the usage of safety goals 2) Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2 3) Overview of international safety goals and experiences from their use 4) Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society. Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety goals. Safety goals defined in the 80ies were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today's state of the art. This issue was investigated by performing a comparative review was performed of three generations of the same PSA, focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, IE frequency, and modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes turned out to combined and difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is especially important in order to differentiate 'real' differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues). (au)

  7. Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 - Status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Holmberg, J.-E.; Bjoerkman, K. Rossi, J. (VTT (Finland)); Knochenhauer, M.; Xuhong He; Persson, A.; Gustavsson, H. (Relcon Scandpower AB, Sundbyberg (Sweden))

    2008-07-15

    The second phase of the project, the outcome of which is described in this project report has mainly dealt with four issues: 1) Consistency in the usage of safety goals 2) Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2 3) Overview of international safety goals and experiences from their use 4) Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society. Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety goals. Safety goals defined in the 80ies were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today's state of the art. This issue was investigated by performing a comparative review was performed of three generations of the same PSA, focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, IE frequency, and modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes turned out to combined and difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is especially important in order to differentiate 'real' differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues). (au)

  8. A survey of dynamic methodologies for probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aldemir, Tunc

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: ► Dynamic methodologies for probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) are surveyed. ► These methodologies overcome the limitations of the traditional approach to PSA. ► They are suitable for PSA using a best estimate plus uncertainty approach. ► They are highly computation intensive and produce very large number of scenarios. ► Use of scenario clustering can assist the analysis of the results. -- Abstract: Dynamic methodologies for probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) are defined as those which use a time-dependent phenomenological model of system evolution along with its stochastic behavior to account for possible dependencies between failure events. Over the past 30 years, numerous concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the capability of the traditional static modeling approaches such as the event-tree/fault-tree methodology to adequately account for the impact of process/hardware/software/firmware/human interactions on the stochastic system behavior. A survey of the types of dynamic PSA methodologies proposed to date is presented, as well as a brief summary of an example application for the PSA modeling of a digital feedwater control system of an operating pressurized water reactor. The use of dynamic methodologies for PSA modeling of passive components and phenomenological uncertainties are also discussed.

  9. Formulation and use of reliability data for probabilistic safety assessment. Working material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    In this case study the PSA had examined the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, owned by Long Island Lightning Company, the PSA sponsoring Utility on the North Shore of Long Island, New York. The case study references other PSA literature on peer review which helps put this case study in perspective. One such reference, An Intensive Peer Review for PRA in fact contains a fully-documented case study of a peer review for a level 3 PSA. The reader is encouraged to refer to this Nuclear Safety Analysis Center report, available through the Electric Power Research Institute as the NSAC-67 report. 20 refs, 17 figs

  10. Formulation and use of reliability data for probabilistic safety assessment. Working material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1992-12-31

    In this case study the PSA had examined the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, owned by Long Island Lightning Company, the PSA sponsoring Utility on the North Shore of Long Island, New York. The case study references other PSA literature on peer review which helps put this case study in perspective. One such reference, An Intensive Peer Review for PRA in fact contains a fully-documented case study of a peer review for a level 3 PSA. The reader is encouraged to refer to this Nuclear Safety Analysis Center report, available through the Electric Power Research Institute as the NSAC-67 report. 20 refs, 17 figs.

  11. Status and use of PSA in Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knochenhauer, M.

    1996-05-01

    The performance and use of PSA:s in Sweden goes back about two decades. During all of this time, the field of PSA has been developing intensively, both internationally and within Sweden. The latest years have been characterised by an increased use of PSA models and results, and by major extensions of existing PSA models. The aim of this document is to describe PSA in Sweden with respect to development, scope and maturity, as well as to the contents of the analyses and the use of results. PSA activities will be described from the point of view of both the authorities and the utilities. The report gives an overview of the development within the area of PSA in Sweden both its history and current trends. The aim has been to include a reasonable amount of detail, both on the methods and results in PSA:s performed and on the numerous supporting research programs dealing with various aspects of PSA. 39 refs 39 refs

  12. Status and use of PSA in Sweden

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Knochenhauer, M

    1996-05-01

    The performance and use of PSA:s in Sweden goes back about two decades. During all of this time, the field of PSA has been developing intensively, both internationally and within Sweden. The latest years have been characterised by an increased use of PSA models and results, and by major extensions of existing PSA models. The aim of this document is to describe PSA in Sweden with respect to development, scope and maturity, as well as to the contents of the analyses and the use of results. PSA activities will be described from the point of view of both the authorities and the utilities. The report gives an overview of the development within the area of PSA in Sweden both its history and current trends. The aim has been to include a reasonable amount of detail, both on the methods and results in PSA:s performed and on the numerous supporting research programs dealing with various aspects of PSA. 39 refs 39 refs.

  13. Early detection of prostate cancer in Syria using T.PSA and F.PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adel, M.; Abu Daher, D.

    2009-12-01

    The aim of the current study is performing an initial prostate cancer screening test using PSA and F PSA tumour markers. A total of 3000 men in 40-75 years of age were participated in this study. Demographic and clinical data for subjects were collected by the programme staff. Total PSA and free PSA assays were determined using the ImunoTech total and free PSA assay kits, based on IRMA technique (kindly provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency). Criteria for participating in this study included : 1) men of age 50-75 (men of age as low as 40 were included in case of positive family history). 2) No previous history of prostate cancer. The following parameters were followed to refer the suspicious cases to a specialized hospital specific tests: 1)PSA>3 ng/ml . 2)High PSA value according to the participant age group. 3) Low F/TPSA ratio. In the hospital the following tests were performed:1) Complete clinical exam including DRE.2)TRUS in some cases.3) Biopsy for highly suspicious cases. 4)The low suspicious cases were retested in six months. Out of 338 cases referred to a specialized hospital, 264 cases were shown prostatic benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH),while 36 cases proved to be prostatic cancer. However, the contact was lost in 36 cases because of changing the phone number or travelling outside the country . The detection rate of prostate cancer among all participating cases in this study was 1.2%, while this ratio was 10.7% among the referred cases. F/TPSA ratio has shown a good ability to discriminate between prostate cancer and benign prostatic hyperplasia. (author)

  14. Strategies for reactor safety. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, K

    1997-12-01

    The NKS/RAK-1 project formed part of a four-year nuclear research program (1994-1997) in the Nordic countries, the NKS Programme. The project aims were to investigate and evaluate the safety work, to increase realism and reliability of the safety analysis, and to give ideas for how safety can be improved in selected areas. An evaluation of the safety work in nuclear installations in Finland and Sweden was made, and a special effort was devoted to plant modernisation and to see how modern safety standards can be met up with. A combination of more resources and higher efficiency is recommended to meet requirements from plant modernisation and plant renovations. Both the utilities and the safety authorities are recommended to actively follow the evolving safety standards for new reactors. Various approaches to estimating LOCA frequencies have been explored. In particular, a probabilistic model for pipe ruptures due to intergranular stress corrosion has been developed. A survey has been done over methodologies for integrated sequence analysis (ISA), and different approaches have been developed and tested on four sequences. Structured frameworks for integration between PSA and behavioural sciences have been developed, which e.g. have improved PSA. The status of maintenance strategies in Finland and Sweden has been studied and a new maintenance data information system has been developed. (au) 41 refs.

  15. Strategies for reactor safety. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, K.

    1997-12-01

    The NKS/RAK-1 project formed part of a four-year nuclear research program (1994-1997) in the Nordic countries, the NKS Programme. The project aims were to investigate and evaluate the safety work, to increase realism and reliability of the safety analysis, and to give ideas for how safety can be improved in selected areas. An evaluation of the safety work in nuclear installations in Finland and Sweden was made, and a special effort was devoted to plant modernisation and to see how modern safety standards can be met up with. A combination of more resources and higher efficiency is recommended to meet requirements from plant modernisation and plant renovations. Both the utilities and the safety authorities are recommended to actively follow the evolving safety standards for new reactors. Various approaches to estimating LOCA frequencies have been explored. In particular, a probabilistic model for pipe ruptures due to intergranular stress corrosion has been developed. A survey has been done over methodologies for integrated sequence analysis (ISA), and different approaches have been developed and tested on four sequences. Structured frameworks for integration between PSA and behavioural sciences have been developed, which e.g. have improved PSA. The status of maintenance strategies in Finland and Sweden has been studied and a new maintenance data information system has been developed. (au)

  16. PSA for the shutdown mode for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-06-01

    The meeting, which was attended by more than 75 participants from 20 countries, provided a broad discussion forum where all the currently active major shutdown PSA programmes were reviewed. The meeting also addressed the issues related to actual performance of shutdown PSA studies as well as insight gained from the studies. This document, which was prepared during the TCM, contains the results of extensive discussions which were held in specific working groups. The papers presented at the meeting provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the art of shutdown risk assessment and remedial measures taken to reduce the risk in outages. It is hoped that this document will be very useful to all individuals with interest in increasing safety during outages at NPPs. Refs, figs and tabs

  17. Safety, danger and catastrophe inevitability in operation of safety-critical software algorithms: a possible new look at software safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Povyakalo, A.A.

    2000-01-01

    The paper provides basic definitions and describes the basic procedure of the Formal Qualitative Safety Analysis (FQSA) of critical software algorithms. The procedure is described by C-based pseudo-code. It uses the notion of weakest precondition and representation of a given critical algorithm by a Gurevich's Abstract State Mashine (GASM). For a given GASM and a given Catastrophe Condition the procedure results in a Catastrophe Inevitability Condition (it means that every sequence of algorithm steps lead to a catastrophe early or late), Danger Condition (it means that next step may lead to a catastrophe or make a catastrophe to be inevitable, but a catastrophe may be prevented yet), Safety Condition (it means that a next step can not lead to a catastrophe or make a catastrophe to be inevitable). The using of proposed procedure is illustrated by a simplest test example of algorithm. The FQSA provides a logical basis for PSA of critical algorithm. (author)

  18. Clinical performance of serum [-2]proPSA derivatives, %p2PSA and PHI, in the detection and management of prostate cancer

    OpenAIRE

    Huang, Ya-Qiang; Sun, Tong; Zhong, Wei-De; Wu, Chin-Lee

    2014-01-01

    Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) has been widely used as a serum marker for prostate cancer (PCa) screening or progression monitoring, which dramatically increased rate of early detection while significantly reduced PCa-specific mortality. However, a number of limitations of PSA have been noticed. Low specificity of PSA may lead to overtreatment in men who presenting with a total PSA (tPSA) level of < 10 ng/mL. As a type of free PSA (fPSA), [-2]proPSA is differentially expressed in peripheral ...

  19. UV/EB curable psa's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glotfelter, C.A.

    1995-01-01

    The author describe both water-based and 100% solids UV/EB curable PSA's (Pressure Sensitive Adhesives) and their properties. A new acrylate monomer, ethoxylated nonyl phenol acrylate, has great utility in the formulation of water-based PSA's

  20. Predictive value of [-2]propsa (p2psa and its derivatives for the prostate cancer detection in the 2.0 to 10.0ng/mL PSA range

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    I. Vukovic

    Full Text Available ABSTRACT Introduction To assess predictive value of new tumor markers, precursor of prostate specific antigen (p2PSA and its derivates-%p2PSA and prostate health index (PHI in detection of patients with indolent and aggressive prostate cancer (PC in a subcohort of man whose total PSA ranged from 2 to 10ng/mL. Materials and Methods This cross-sectional study included 129 consecutive male patients aged over 50 years, with no previous history of PC and with normal digital rectal examination findings, but with serum PSA in interval between 2 and 10ng/mL. All patients underwent standard transrectal ultrasonography guided prostate biopsy for the first time. For all patients, serum PSA, free PSA (fPSA and p2PSA were measured and PHI and %p2PSA were calculated. Results PHI and %p2PSA levels were significanlty higher in patients with PC compared to those without this malignancy. The same findings have been observed in group of patients with Gleason score ≥7 compared to those with Gleason score <7. ROC analysis reveled the highest area under the curve with these two markers. Multivariate logistic regression showed significant improvement in PC detection and its agressive form (assumed as Gleason score ≥7. Conclusions New markers, derivates of p2PSA (especially %p2PSA and PHI, represente potentially very important clinical tool for predicting presence of PC, and even more important, to discriminate patients with Gleason score <7 from those with Gleason score ≥7 with total PSA in range from 2 to 10ng/mL.

  1. Predictive value of [-2]propsa (p2psa) and its derivatives for the prostate cancer detection in the 2.0 to 10.0ng/mL PSA range.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vukovic, I; Djordjevic, D; Bojanic, N; Babic, U; Soldatovic, I

    2017-01-01

    To assess predictive value of new tumor markers, precursor of prostate specific antigen (p2PSA) and its derivates-%p2PSA and prostate health index (PHI) in detection of patients with indolent and aggressive prostate cancer (PC) in a subcohort of man whose total PSA ranged from 2 to 10ng/mL. This cross-sectional study included 129 consecutive male patients aged over 50 years, with no previous history of PC and with normal digital rectal examination findings, but with serum PSA in interval between 2 and 10ng/mL. All patients underwent standard transrectal ultrasonography guided prostate biopsy for the first time. For all patients, serum PSA, free PSA (fPSA) and p2PSA were measured and PHI and %p2PSA were calculated. PHI and %p2PSA levels were significanlty higher in patients with PC compared to those without this malignancy. The same findings have been observed in group of patients with Gleason score ≥7 compared to those with Gleason score <7. ROC analysis reveled the highest area under the curve with these two markers. Multivariate logistic regression showed significant improvement in PC detection and its agressive form (assumed as Gleason score ≥7). New markers, derivates of p2PSA (especially %p2PSA and PHI), represente potentially very important clinical tool for predicting presence of PC, and even more important, to discriminate patients with Gleason score <7 from those with Gleason score ≥7 with total PSA in range from 2 to 10ng/mL. Copyright® by the International Brazilian Journal of Urology.

  2. Risk-based safety indicators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sedlak, J.

    2001-12-01

    The report is structured as follows: 1. Risk-based safety indicators: Typology of risk-based indicators (RBIs); Tools for defining RBIs; Requirements for the PSA model; Data sources for RBIs; Types of risks monitored; RBIs and operational safety indicators; Feedback from operating experience; PSO model modification for RBIs; RBI categorization; RBI assessment; RBI applications; Suitable RBI applications. 2. Proposal for risk-based indicators: Acquiring information from operational experience; Method of acquiring safety relevance coefficients for the systems from a PSA model; Indicator definitions; On-line indicators. 3. Annex: Application of RBIs worldwide. (P.A.)

  3. Use of PSA and PSC in the regulatory process in The Netherlands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Versteeg, M.F.; Vos, D.

    1994-01-01

    The paper presents the regulatory requirements, thinking, and plans regarding the use of plant specific PSAs in the Netherlands, the actual use of probabilistic safety criteria (PSC) in the existing regulations and the PSA based plant modifications and backfits. 1 fig., 6 tabs

  4. Probabilistic safety analysis using microcomputer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Futuro Filho, F.L.F.; Mendes, J.E.S.; Santos, M.J.P. dos

    1990-01-01

    The main steps of execution of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) are presented in this report, as the study of the system description, construction of event trees and fault trees, and the calculation of overall unavailability of the systems. It is also presented the use of microcomputer in performing some tasks, highlightning the main characteristics of a software to perform adequately the job. A sample case of fault tree construction and calculation is presented, using the PSAPACK software, distributed by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) for training purpose. (author)

  5. THE DISCRIMINATIVE ABILITY OF PERCENT FREE PSA IN ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Blood samples were collected from all patients, and total PSA, free PSA and % free PSA were calculated in all specimens. Total PSA was measured using the Imx ... Un prélèvement de sang a été réalisé chez tous les patients avec un dosage du PSA total et de la fraction libre de PSA. Le PSA total a été mesuré par un kit ...

  6. Insulin promotes cell migration by regulating PSA-NCAM

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Monzo, Hector J.; Coppieters, Natacha [Centre for Brain Research, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Department of Anatomy and Medical Imaging, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Park, Thomas I.H. [Centre for Brain Research, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Department of Pharmacology, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Dieriks, Birger V.; Faull, Richard L.M. [Centre for Brain Research, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Department of Anatomy and Medical Imaging, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Dragunow, Mike [Centre for Brain Research, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Department of Pharmacology, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Curtis, Maurice A., E-mail: m.curtis@auckland.ac.nz [Centre for Brain Research, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand); Department of Anatomy and Medical Imaging, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland (New Zealand)

    2017-06-01

    Cellular interactions with the extracellular environment are modulated by cell surface polysialic acid (PSA) carried by the neural cell adhesion molecule (NCAM). PSA-NCAM is involved in cellular processes such as differentiation, plasticity, and migration, and is elevated in Alzheimer's disease as well as in metastatic tumour cells. Our previous work demonstrated that insulin enhances the abundance of cell surface PSA by inhibiting PSA-NCAM endocytosis. In the present study we have identified a mechanism for insulin-dependent inhibition of PSA-NCAM turnover affecting cell migration. Insulin enhanced the phosphorylation of the focal adhesion kinase leading to dissociation of αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters, and promoted cell migration. Our results show that αv-integrin plays a key role in the PSA-NCAM turnover process. αv-integrin knockdown stopped PSA-NCAM from being endocytosed, and αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters co-labelled intracellularly with Rab5, altogether indicating a role for αv-integrin as a carrier for PSA-NCAM during internalisation. Furthermore, inhibition of p-FAK caused dissociation of αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters and counteracted the insulin-induced accumulation of PSA at the cell surface and cell migration was impaired. Our data reveal a functional association between the insulin/p-FAK-dependent regulation of PSA-NCAM turnover and cell migration through the extracellular matrix. Most importantly, they identify a novel mechanism for insulin-stimulated cell migration. - Highlights: • Insulin modulates PSA-NCAM turnover through upregulation of p-FAK. • P-FAK modulates αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clustering. • αv-integrin acts as a carrier for PSA-NCAM endocytosis. • Cell migration is promoted by cell surface PSA. • Insulin promotes PSA-dependent migration in vitro.

  7. Insulin promotes cell migration by regulating PSA-NCAM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Monzo, Hector J.; Coppieters, Natacha; Park, Thomas I.H.; Dieriks, Birger V.; Faull, Richard L.M.; Dragunow, Mike; Curtis, Maurice A.

    2017-01-01

    Cellular interactions with the extracellular environment are modulated by cell surface polysialic acid (PSA) carried by the neural cell adhesion molecule (NCAM). PSA-NCAM is involved in cellular processes such as differentiation, plasticity, and migration, and is elevated in Alzheimer's disease as well as in metastatic tumour cells. Our previous work demonstrated that insulin enhances the abundance of cell surface PSA by inhibiting PSA-NCAM endocytosis. In the present study we have identified a mechanism for insulin-dependent inhibition of PSA-NCAM turnover affecting cell migration. Insulin enhanced the phosphorylation of the focal adhesion kinase leading to dissociation of αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters, and promoted cell migration. Our results show that αv-integrin plays a key role in the PSA-NCAM turnover process. αv-integrin knockdown stopped PSA-NCAM from being endocytosed, and αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters co-labelled intracellularly with Rab5, altogether indicating a role for αv-integrin as a carrier for PSA-NCAM during internalisation. Furthermore, inhibition of p-FAK caused dissociation of αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clusters and counteracted the insulin-induced accumulation of PSA at the cell surface and cell migration was impaired. Our data reveal a functional association between the insulin/p-FAK-dependent regulation of PSA-NCAM turnover and cell migration through the extracellular matrix. Most importantly, they identify a novel mechanism for insulin-stimulated cell migration. - Highlights: • Insulin modulates PSA-NCAM turnover through upregulation of p-FAK. • P-FAK modulates αv-integrin/PSA-NCAM clustering. • αv-integrin acts as a carrier for PSA-NCAM endocytosis. • Cell migration is promoted by cell surface PSA. • Insulin promotes PSA-dependent migration in vitro.

  8. Probability safety assessment of LOOP accident to molten salt reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mei Mudan; Shao Shiwei; Yu Zhizhen; Chen Kun; Zuo Jiaxu

    2013-01-01

    Background: Loss of offsite power (LOOP) is a possible accident to any type of reactor, and this accident can reflect the main idea of reactor safety design. Therefore, it is very important to conduct a study on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the molten salt reactor that is under LOOP circumstance. Purpose: The aim is to calculate the release frequency of molten salt radioactive material to the core caused by LOOP, and find out the biggest contributor to causing the radioactive release frequency. Methods: We carried out the PSA analysis of the LOOP using the PSA process risk spectrum, and assumed that the primary circuit had no valve and equipment reliability data based on the existing mature power plant equipment reliability data. Results: Through the PSA analysis, we got the accident sequences of the release of radioactive material to the core caused by LOOP and its frequency. The results show that the release frequency of molten salt radioactive material to the core caused by LOOP is about 2×10 -11 /(reactor ·year), which is far below that of the AP1000 LOOP. In addition, through the quantitative analysis, we obtained the point estimation and interval estimation of uncertainty analysis, and found that the biggest contributor to cause the release frequency of radioactive material to the core is the reactor cavity cooling function failure. Conclusion: This study provides effective help for the design and improvement of the following molten salt reactor system. (authors)

  9. Example Plant Model for an International Benchmark Study on DI and C PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Sung Min; Park, Jinkyun; Jang, Wondea; Kang, Hyun Gook

    2016-01-01

    In this context the risk quantification due to these digitalized safety systems became more important. Although there are many challenges to address about this issue, many countries agreed with the necessity of research on reliability quantification of DI and C system. Based on the agreement of several countries, one of internal research association is planning a benchmark study on this issue by sharing an example digitalized plant model and let each participating member develop its own probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model of digital I and C systems. Although the DI and C systems are being applied to NPPs, of which modeling method to quantify its reliability still ambiguous. Therefore, an internal research association is planning a benchmark study to address this issue by sharing an example digitalized plant model and let each member develop their own PSA model for DI and C systems

  10. The dialectical thinking about deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Yongbai; Tong Jiejuan; Zhang Zuoyi; He Xuhong

    2005-01-01

    There are two methods in designing and analysing the safety performance of a nuclear power plant, the traditional deterministic method and the probabilistic method. To date, the design of nuclear power plant is based on the deterministic method. It has been proved in practice that the deterministic method is effective on current nuclear power plant. However, the probabilistic method (Probabilistic Safety Assessment - PSA) considers a much wider range of faults, takes an integrated look at the plant as a whole, and uses realistic criteria for the performance of the systems and constructions of the plant. PSA can be seen, in principle, to provide a broader and realistic perspective on safety issues than the deterministic approaches. In this paper, the historical origins and development trend of above two methods are reviewed and summarized in brief. Based on the discussion of two application cases - one is the changes to specific design provisions of the general design criteria (GDC) and the other is the risk-informed categorization of structure, system and component, it can be concluded that the deterministic method and probabilistic method are dialectical and unified, and that they are being merged into each other gradually, and being used in coordination. (authors)

  11. The use of probabilistic safety analysis in design and operation -- Lessons learned from Sizewell B. Annex 14

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buttery, N.E.

    2002-01-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) have been used extensively in the design and licensing of Sizewell B. This paper outlines the role of PSA in the UK licensing process and describes how it has been applied to Sizewell B during both the pre-construction and pre-operational phases. From this experience a 'Living PSA' has been formulated which continues be used to support operation. The application of PSA to Sizewell B has demonstrated that it is a powerful tool with potential for future use. Its strengths and limitations as a tool need to recognised by both users and regulators. It is not a fully mechanistic means of ensuring design safety, but is an important aid to decision making. It also has the potential to allow risk judgements to be taken in conjunction with commercial and environmental issues. (author)

  12. Incidents in nuclear research reactor examined by deterministic probability and probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopes, Valdir Maciel

    2010-01-01

    This study aims to evaluate the potential risks submitted by the incidents in nuclear research reactors. For its development, two databases of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, were used, the Incident Report System for Research Reactor and Research Reactor Data Base. For this type of assessment was used the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), within a confidence level of 90% and the Deterministic Probability Analysis (DPA). To obtain the results of calculations of probabilities for PSA, were used the theory and equations in the paper IAEA TECDOC - 636. The development of the calculations of probabilities for PSA was used the program Scilab version 5.1.1, free access, executable on Windows and Linux platforms. A specific program to get the results of probability was developed within the main program Scilab 5.1.1., for two distributions Fischer and Chi-square, both with the confidence level of 90%. Using the Sordi equations and Origin 6.0 program, were obtained the maximum admissible doses related to satisfy the risk limits established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP, and were also obtained these maximum doses graphically (figure 1) resulting from the calculations of probabilities x maximum admissible doses. It was found that the reliability of the results of probability is related to the operational experience (reactor x year and fractions) and that the larger it is, greater the confidence in the outcome. Finally, a suggested list of future work to complement this paper was gathered. (author)

  13. Probabilistic safety assessment of the dual-cooled waste transmutation blanket for the FDS-I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hu, L.; Wu, Y.

    2006-01-01

    The subcritical dual-cooled waste transmutation (DWT) blanket is one of the key components of fusion-driven subcritical system (FDS-I). The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) can provide valuable information on safety characteristics of FDS-I to give recommendations for the optimization of the blanket concepts and the improvement of the design. Event tree method has been adopted to probabilistically analyze the safety of the DWT blanket for FDS-I using the home-developed PSA code RiskA. The blanket melting frequency has been calculated and compared with the core melting frequencies of PWRs and a fast reactor. Sensitivity analysis of the safety systems has been performed. The results show that the current preliminary design of the FDS-I is very attractive in safety

  14. Time to PSA rise differentiates the PSA bounce after HDR and LDR brachytherapy of prostate cancer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burchardt, Wojciech; Skowronek, Janusz

    2018-02-01

    To investigate the differences in prostate-specific antigen (PSA) bounce (PB) after high-dose-rate (HDR-BT) or low-dose-rate (LDR-BT) brachytherapy alone in prostate cancer patients. Ninety-four patients with localized prostate cancer (T1-T2cN0), age ranged 50-81 years, were treated with brachytherapy alone between 2008 and 2010. Patients were diagnosed with adenocarcinoma, Gleason score ≤ 7. The LDR-BT total dose was 144-145 Gy, in HDR-BT - 3 fractions of 10.5 or 15 Gy. The initial PSA level (iPSA) was assessed before treatment, then PSA was rated every 3 months over the first 2 years, and every 6 months during the next 3 years. Median follow-up was 3.0 years. Mean iPSA was 7.8 ng/ml. In 58 cases, PSA decreased gradually without PB or biochemical failure (BF). In 24% of patients, PB was observed. In 23 cases (24%), PB was observed using 0.2 ng/ml definition; in 10 cases (11%), BF was diagnosed using nadir + 2 ng/ml definition. The HDR-BT and LDR-BT techniques were not associated with higher level of PB (26 vs. 22%, p = 0.497). Time to the first PSA rise finished with PB was significantly shorter after HDR-BT then after LDR-BT (median, 10.5 vs. 18.0 months) during follow-up. Predictors for PB were observed only after HDR-BT. Androgen deprivation therapy (ADT) and higher Gleason score decreased the risk of PB (HR = 0.11, p = 0.03; HR = 0.51, p = 0.01). The higher PSA nadir and longer time to PSA nadir increased the risk of PB (HR 3.46, p = 0.02; HR 1.04, p = 0.04). There was no predictors for PB after LDR-BT. HDR-BT and LDR-BT for low and intermediate risk prostate cancer had similar PB rate. The PB occurred earlier after HDR-BT than after LDR-BT. ADT and higher Gleason score decreased, and higher PSA nadir and longer time to PSA nadir increased the risk of PB after HDR-BT.

  15. Involvement of Union Fenosa skills in the thermohydraulic area of the Jose Cabrera NPP PSA. Applications of the RELAPS5/MOD2 Code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, L.; Saenz Tejada, P.

    1993-01-01

    When performing a level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) on a standard power plant, in order to model plant response to the potential occurrence of the various initiating events postulated in a PSA, reference documentation applicable to the type of plant in question is frequently consulted. Because of the specific design characteristics of the Jose Cabrera NPP, most of the reference documentation for the W-PWR-type power plants is not applicable to this plant. To fill in these gaps in the documentation and to construct the most realistic model of plant behaviour possible, assistance was sought from Union Fenosa by way of infrastructure, capabilities and thermohydraulic experience of the Nuclear Engineering and Fuel Group, and especially the use of calculations performed with the RELAP5/ MOD2 code. This paper will provide an overview of the general assistance rendered to the PSA by the technical experts in thermohydraulics, the calculations performed with RELAP5/MOD2 and the influence all of this has had on the development, quality and results of the Jose Cabrera NPP level 1 PSA Project. (author)

  16. Age-Specific Cutoff Value for the Application of Percent Free Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) in Chinese Men with Serum PSA Levels of 4.0–10.0 ng/ml

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xie, Liping; He, Dalin; Zhou, Liqun; Xu, Chuanliang; Gao, Xu; Ren, Shancheng; Wang, Fubo; Ma, Lulin; Wei, Qiang; Yin, Changjun; Tian, Ye; Sun, Zhongquan; Fu, Qiang; Ding, Qiang; Zheng, Junhua; Ye, Zhangqun; Ye, Dingwei; Xu, Danfeng; Hou, Jianquan; Xu, Kexin; Yuan, Jianlin; Gao, Xin; Liu, Chunxiao; Pan, Tiejun; Sun, Yinghao

    2015-01-01

    Objective The influence of age on the performance of percent free prostate-specific antigen (%fPSA) in diagnosing prostate cancer (PCa) in East Asians is controversial. We tested the diagnostic performance of %fPSA in a multi-center biopsy cohort in China and identified the proper age-specific cutoff values to avoid unnecessary biopsies. Methods Consecutive patients with a prostate-specific antigen (PSA) level of 4.0–10.0 ng/ml or 10.1–20.0 ng/ml who underwent transrectal ultrasound-guided or transperineal prostate biopsy were enrolled from 22 Chinese medical centers from Jan 1, 2010 to Dec 31, 2013. The diagnostic accuracy of PSA and %fPSA was determined using the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC). Age-specific cutoff values were calculated using ROC curve analysis. Results The median %fPSA was much lower in younger patients compared with older patients with a PSA level of 4.0–10.0 ng/ml or 10.1–20.0 ng/ml. The AUC of %fPSA was higher than PSA only in older patients. In patients aged 50 to 59 years, %fPSA failed to improve the diagnosis compared with PSA in these two PSA ranges. Age-specific cutoff values were 24%, 27% and 32% for patients aged 60–69, 70–79 and ≥80 years, respectively, to reduce unnecessary biopsies in men with PSA levels of 4.0–10.0 ng/ml to detect 90% of all PCa. Conclusions The effectiveness of %fPSA is correlated with age in the Chinese population. Age-specific cutoff values would help avoid unnecessary biopsies in the Chinese population. PMID:26091007

  17. The Barselina Project Phase 4 Summary report. Ignalina Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johansson, Gunnar [ES-Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden); Hellstroem, P. [RELCON AB, Solna (Sweden); Zheltobriuch, G.; Bagdonas, A. [Ignalina Power Plant, Visaginas (Lithuania)

    1996-12-01

    The Barselina Project was initiated in the summer of 1991. The project is a multilateral co-operation between Lithuania, Russia and Sweden. The long range objective is to establish common perspectives and unified bases for assessment of severe accident risks and needs for remedial measures for the RBMK reactors. The Swedish BWR Barsebaeck is used as reference plant and the Lithuanian RBMK Ignalina as application plant. During phase 3, from March, 1993 to June, 1994, a full scope Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) model of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant unit 2 (INPP-2) was developed to identify possible safety improvement of risk importance. The probabilistic methodology was applied on a plant specific basis for a channel type reactor of RBMK design. To increase the realism of the risk model a set of deterministic analyses were performed and plant/RBMK-specific data bases were developed and used. A general concept for analysing this type of reactor was developed. During phase 4, July 1994 to September 1996, the PSA was further developed, taking into account plant changes, improved modeling methods and extended plant information concerning dependencies (area events, dynamic effects, electrical and signal dependencies). The updated model is quantified and new results and conclusions are evaluated.

  18. PSA predicts development of incident lower urinary tract symptoms: results from the REDUCE study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patel, Devin N; Feng, Tom; Simon, Ross M; Howard, Lauren E; Vidal, Adriana C; Moreira, Daniel M; Castro-Santamaria, Ramiro; Roehrborn, Claus; Andriole, Gerald L; Freedland, Stephen J

    2018-05-23

    The relationship between baseline prostate-specific antigen (PSA) and development of lower urinary tract symptoms (LUTS) in asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic men is unclear. We sought to determine if PSA predicts incident LUTS in these men. A post-hoc analysis of the 4-year REDUCE study was performed to assess for incident LUTS in 1534 men with mild to no LUTS at baseline. The primary aim was to determine whether PSA independently predicted incident LUTS after adjusting for the key clinical variables of age, prostate size, and baseline International prostate symptom score (IPSS). Incident LUTS was defined as the first report of medical treatment, surgery, or sustained clinically significant symptoms (two IPSS >14). Cox proportional hazards, cumulative incidence curves, and the log-rank test were used to test our hypothesis. A total of 1534 men with baseline IPSS PSA 2.5-4 ng/mL, 589 with PSA 4.1-6 ng/mL, and 610 with PSA 6-10 ng/mL. During the 4-year study, 196 men progressed to incident LUTS (50.5% medical treatment, 9% surgery, and 40.5% new symptoms). As a continuous variable, higher PSA was associated with increased incident LUTS on univariable (HR 1.09, p = 0.019) and multivariable (HR 1.08, p = 0.040) analysis. Likewise, baseline PSA 6-10 ng/mL was associated with increased incident LUTS vs. PSA 2.5-4 ng/mL in adjusted models (HR 1.68, p = 0.016). This association was also observed in men with PSA 4.1-6 ng/mL vs. PSA 2.5-4 ng/mL (HR 1.60, p = 0.032). Men with mild to no LUTS but increased baseline PSA are at increased risk of developing incident LUTS presumed due to benign prostatic hyperplasia.

  19. Quality assurance in the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant preoperational PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valhuerdi Debesa, C.

    1996-01-01

    Quality Assurance (QA) is nowadays an important requirement for the competence of any production or service, making possible to get the desired quality at the lowest cost In the case of PSA, which are multidisciplinary, very detailed and complex analysis, with many interfaces between analyst tasks, QA plays an important role as a tool for the analytical process management, and it is recognized as one of the PSA issues which require additional development In this paper the QA system developed for the Juragua NPP preoperational PSA, its antecedents and the experiences of its application are described

  20. Development of Safety Significance Evaluation Program for Accidents and Events in NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Hui Chang; Hong, Seok Jin; Cho, Nam Chul; Chung, Dae Wook; Lee, Chang Joo

    2010-01-01

    To evaluate the significance in terms of safety for the accidents and events occurred in nuclear power plants using probabilistic safety assessment techniques can provide useful insights to the regulator. Based on the quantified risk information of accident or event occurred, regulators can decide which regulatory areas should be focused than the others. To support these regulatory analysis activities, KINS-ASP program was developed. KINS-ASP program can supports the risk increase due to the occurred accidents or events by providing the graphic interfaces and linked quantification engines for the PSA experts and non- PSA acquainted regulators both

  1. Current status and issues of external event PSA for extreme natural hazards after Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, In-Kil; Hahm, Daegi; Kim, Min Kyu

    2014-01-01

    Extreme external events is emerged as significant risk contributor to the nuclear power plants after Fukushima Daiichi accident due to the catastrophic earthquake followed by great tsunami greater than a design basis. This accident shows that the extreme external events have the potential to simultaneously affect redundant and diverse safety systems and thereby induce common cause failure or common cause initiators. The probabilistic risk assessment methodology has been used for the risk assessment and safety improvement against the extreme natural hazards. The earthquake and tsunami hazard is an important issue for the nuclear industry in Korea. In this paper, the role and application of probabilistic safety assessment for the post Fukushima action will be introduced. For the evaluation of the extreme natural hazard, probabilistic seismic and tsunami hazard analysis is being performed for the safety enhancement. The research activity on the external event PSA and its interim results will be introduced with the issues to be solved in the future for the reliability enhancement of the risk analysis results. (authors)

  2. Assuring PSA technical adequacy for new advanced light water reactor designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lutz, R.J.; Detar, H.L.; Schneider, R.E.

    2012-01-01

    The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for an Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) must exhibit a high level of technical adequacy, or technical quality, in order to be used as a reliable tool for making risk informed decisions concerning design and eventual operation of the plant. During the design phase, decisions on some design features may use the PSA as an input. Also, the PSA may be used as input to other operational decisions during plant design and construction including the development of procedures, development of technical specification limiting conditions for operation and scheduling of preventive maintenance activities. For the existing fleet of light water reactors (LWRs), PSA technical adequacy can be judged from wide ranging acceptance criteria such as the PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) Standard in the United States of America that was developed jointly by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS). However, the requirements for PRA technical adequacy in this PRA Standard assumes that the plant is built and has operation experience. Some of the requirements cannot be met for ALWRs in the design or construction phase and with no operational history. Key elements of a high level of technical adequacy include procedures, operator interviews, plant walk-downs and equipment reliability histories. The ability to include these key elements into the ALWR PSA to improve technical adequacy will progress as the ALWR progresses from the design stage through the construction stage and finally to the fuel load / pre-operational stage. As the technical adequacy becomes more robust, more confidence can be placed on risk-informed decisions that are made with the PSA. To assist in using the PSA as input to design and operational decisions in the design and construction stages of an ALWR, an addition to the ASME/ANS PRA Standard is being developed. The intent of this addition to the Standard is to provide

  3. Application of PSA to reduce frequency of unplanned shutdown of the reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanipanichskul, P.

    1988-08-01

    The relative importance of all the operating and safety systems of the reactor TRR-1/M1 as well as the major failure modes of the systems are pointed out. The average unavailability of the reactor is 3·3 E-2 per cycle of operation which is in the range value of the actual reactor shutdown recorded during normal operation. Some guidance for annual maintenance and also suggestions for system development to increase safety systems reliability are determined. PSA was applied to improve the safety systems reliability of an operating research reactor. Refs, tabs

  4. Probabilistic safety assessment; actions and priorities in the EC-frame

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amendola, A.; Mancini, G.; Volta, G.

    1987-01-01

    An overview is given of PSA research activities at the JRC and through shared cost actions with national laboratories under the nuclear reactor safety and major hazards of industrial installations programmes. These activities are directed towards the development of methods for PSA, the validation methods and the setting up of appropriate data bases. PSA is also directly or indirectly an emerging theme for the coordination activities in the area of nuclear safety criteria and safety objectives. Finally probabilistic techniques being increasing by being used for safety and reliability in various industrial sectors the CEC supported the preparation and setting up of a European Safety and Reliability Association that carries different types of actions. (orig.)

  5. MAPLE-X10 reactor safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cotnam, K.D.; Lounsbury, R.I.; Gillespie, G.E.

    1990-01-01

    This paper reports on the safety assessment of the 10 MW MAPLE-X10 reactor which has involved a substantial component of PSA analysis to supplement deterministic analysis. Initiating events are identified through the use of a master logic diagram. The events are then examined through event sequence diagrams, at the concept design stage, followed by a set of reliability analyses that are coordinated with the event sequence diagrams. Improvements identified through the reliability analyses are incorporated into the design to ensure that safety objectives are attained

  6. Human actions in the pre-operational probabilistic safety analysis of Juragua Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferro, R.

    1995-01-01

    Human error is one of the main contributors to the biggest industrial disasters that the world has suffered in the last years. Safety probabilistic analysis techniques allow to consider, in the some study, the contribution of a facility's mechanical and human components safety, this guaranteeing a move integral assessment of these two factors although the PSA study of Juragua Nuclear Power Plant is carried out at a preoperational stage which causes important information limitations fos assessment of human reliability some considerations and suppositions in order to conduct treatment of human actions this stage were adopted. The present work describes the projected targets, approach applied and results obtained from the lakes of human reliability of this study

  7. A living PSA based on use of expert systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ancelin, C.; Bouissou, M.; Le, P.; De Saint-Quentin, S.; Villatte, N.

    1989-01-01

    This paper presents the expert systems that are developed by EDF in the framework of the French PSA. Aimed at automatically generating reliability models (fault trees, state graphs....), these expert systems are used for the reliability studies of safety systems in the Paluel nuclear power plant. Beyond the description of the implemented method, this paper insists on the new approach proposed to the reliability engineer, when using artificial intelligence techniques

  8. Development Of Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment: The Accident Dynamic Simulator (ADS) Tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Y.H.; Mosleh, A.; Dang, V.N.

    2003-01-01

    The development of a dynamic methodology for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) addresses the complex interactions between the behaviour of technical systems and personnel response in the evolution of accident scenarios. This paper introduces the discrete dynamic event tree, a framework for dynamic PSA, and its implementation in the Accident Dynamic Simulator (ADS) tool. Dynamic event tree tools generate and quantify accident scenarios through coupled simulation models of the plant physical processes, its automatic systems, the equipment reliability, and the human response. The current research on the framework, the ADS tool, and on Human Reliability Analysis issues within dynamic PSA, is discussed. (author)

  9. Development Of Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment: The Accident Dynamic Simulator (ADS) Tool

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chang, Y.H.; Mosleh, A.; Dang, V.N

    2003-03-01

    The development of a dynamic methodology for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) addresses the complex interactions between the behaviour of technical systems and personnel response in the evolution of accident scenarios. This paper introduces the discrete dynamic event tree, a framework for dynamic PSA, and its implementation in the Accident Dynamic Simulator (ADS) tool. Dynamic event tree tools generate and quantify accident scenarios through coupled simulation models of the plant physical processes, its automatic systems, the equipment reliability, and the human response. The current research on the framework, the ADS tool, and on Human Reliability Analysis issues within dynamic PSA, is discussed. (author)

  10. Murine polyomavirus virus-like particles carrying full-length human PSA protect BALB/c mice from outgrowth of a PSA expressing tumor.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mathilda Eriksson

    Full Text Available Virus-like particles (VLPs consist of capsid proteins from viruses and have been shown to be usable as carriers of protein and peptide antigens for immune therapy. In this study, we have produced and assayed murine polyomavirus (MPyV VLPs carrying the entire human Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA (PSA-MPyVLPs for their potential use for immune therapy in a mouse model system. BALB/c mice immunized with PSA-MPyVLPs were only marginally protected against outgrowth of a PSA-expressing tumor. To improve protection, PSA-MPyVLPs were co-injected with adjuvant CpG, either alone or loaded onto murine dendritic cells (DCs. Immunization with PSA-MPyVLPs loaded onto DCs in the presence of CpG was shown to efficiently protect mice from tumor outgrowth. In addition, cellular and humoral immune responses after immunization were examined. PSA-specific CD4(+ and CD8(+ cells were demonstrated, but no PSA-specific IgG antibodies. Vaccination with DCs loaded with PSA-MPyVLPs induced an eight-fold lower titre of anti-VLP antibodies than vaccination with PSA-MPyVLPs alone. In conclusion, immunization of BALB/c mice with PSA-MPyVLPs, loaded onto DCs and co-injected with CpG, induces an efficient PSA-specific tumor protective immune response, including both CD4(+ and CD8(+ cells with a low induction of anti-VLP antibodies.

  11. Murine Polyomavirus Virus-Like Particles Carrying Full-Length Human PSA Protect BALB/c Mice from Outgrowth of a PSA Expressing Tumor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eriksson, Mathilda; Andreasson, Kalle; Weidmann, Joachim; Lundberg, Kajsa; Tegerstedt, Karin

    2011-01-01

    Virus-like particles (VLPs) consist of capsid proteins from viruses and have been shown to be usable as carriers of protein and peptide antigens for immune therapy. In this study, we have produced and assayed murine polyomavirus (MPyV) VLPs carrying the entire human Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) (PSA-MPyVLPs) for their potential use for immune therapy in a mouse model system. BALB/c mice immunized with PSA-MPyVLPs were only marginally protected against outgrowth of a PSA-expressing tumor. To improve protection, PSA-MPyVLPs were co-injected with adjuvant CpG, either alone or loaded onto murine dendritic cells (DCs). Immunization with PSA-MPyVLPs loaded onto DCs in the presence of CpG was shown to efficiently protect mice from tumor outgrowth. In addition, cellular and humoral immune responses after immunization were examined. PSA-specific CD4+ and CD8+ cells were demonstrated, but no PSA-specific IgG antibodies. Vaccination with DCs loaded with PSA-MPyVLPs induced an eight-fold lower titre of anti-VLP antibodies than vaccination with PSA-MPyVLPs alone. In conclusion, immunization of BALB/c mice with PSA-MPyVLPs, loaded onto DCs and co-injected with CpG, induces an efficient PSA-specific tumor protective immune response, including both CD4+ and CD8+ cells with a low induction of anti-VLP antibodies. PMID:21858228

  12. Decision-making Processes among Prostate Cancer Survivors with Rising PSA Levels: Results from a Qualitative Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shen, Megan Johnson; Nelson, Christian J; Peters, Ellen; Slovin, Susan F; Hall, Simon J; Hall, Matt; Herrera, Phapichaya Chaoprang; Leventhal, Elaine A; Leventhal, Howard; Diefenbach, Michael A

    2015-05-01

    Prostate cancer survivors with a rising prostate-specific antigen (PSA) level have few treatment options, experience a heightened state of uncertainty about their disease trajectory that might include the possibility of cancer metastasis and death, and often experience elevated levels of distress as they have to deal with a disease they thought they had conquered. Guided by self-regulation theory, the present study examined the cognitive and affective processes involved in shared decision making between physicians and patients who experience a rising PSA after definitive treatment for prostate cancer. In-depth interviews were conducted with 34 prostate cancer survivors who had been diagnosed with a rising PSA (i.e., biochemical failure) within the past 12 months. Survivors were asked about their experiences and affective responses after being diagnosed with a rising PSA and while weighing potential treatment options. In addition, patients were asked about their decision-making process for the initial prostate cancer treatment. Compared with the initial diagnosis, survivors with a rising PSA reported increased negative affect following their diagnosis, concern about the treatability of their disease, increased planning and health behavior change, heightened levels of worry preceding doctor appointments (especially prior to the discussion of PSA testing results), and a strong reliance on physicians' treatment recommendations. Prostate cancer survivors' decision-making processes for the treatment of a rising PSA are markedly different from those of the initial diagnosis of prostate cancer. Because patients experience heightened distress and rely more heavily on their physicians' recommendations with a rising PSA, interactions with the health care provider provide an excellent opportunity to address and assist patients with managing the uncertainty and distress inherent with rising PSA levels. © The Author(s) 2014.

  13. Issues reporting PSA in prostate cancer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, Paul H.

    1996-01-01

    The National Cancer Institute Prostate; Lung; Colon; Ovarian Cancer Screening (PLCO) project is a multi-center trial developed to investigate the effectiveness of DRE and PSA testing in the early detection and outcome of patients with prostate cancer. Accordingly, the Prostate Cancer Intervention versus Observation Trial (PIVOT) has been launched and is a randomized trial comparing radical prostatectomy versus expectant management for ALCaP. PSA: Initially PSA was thought to be of little value for diagnosis because 20% of men undergoing radical prostatectomy have 'normal' PSA and patients with apparently only symptomatic BPH have 'elevated' levels as follows: 4-10 ng/ml (Tandem-R) - 20%, >10 ng/ml -3%. Yet, PSA has looked attractive as a diagnostic tool in many studies; for example, when PSA was used in a screening approach as the first test which then drove further evaluation (Catalona, Brawer). It was shown that the positive predictive value for PSA's between 4 and 10 is approximately 20% and > 10 approximately 55%. The value of serial PSA's (velocity) is unknown but is under intense study: one major issue is determination of what represents a significant rise (details to be presented). Studies have also revealed that a DRE and PSA are important for optimal results. About 18% of clinically detectable cancers are only DRE positive while about 25 - 30% are only PSA positive. When both a DRE and PSA are used together, very few clinically apparent cancers are missed (3-5%). Recent ROC curves suggest that 4 ng/ml is reasonable. Recently, PSA values for men without apparent cancer were stratified by age, and taking the 2SD, age specific reference values were generated as follows: age 40-49 (0-2.5 ng/ml), 50-59 (0-3.5), 60-69 (0-4.5), 70-70 (0-6.5). Finally, there is the issue about different PSA assays regarding the compatabilities/reliability of the upper limit of normal and serial values. Much of the confusion is because there is no international PSA standard and

  14. Evaluation of PSA-age volume score in predicting prostate cancer in Chinese populationArticle Subject.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Yi-Shuo; Wu, Xiao-Bo; Zhang, Ning; Jiang, Guang-Liang; Yu, Yang; Tong, Shi-Jun; Jiang, Hao-Wen; Mao, Shan-Hua; Na, Rong; Ding, Qiang

    2018-02-06

    This study was performed to evaluate prostate-specific antigen-age volume (PSA-AV) scores in predicting prostate cancer (PCa) in a Chinese biopsy population. A total of 2355 men who underwent initial prostate biopsy from January 2006 to November 2015 in Huashan Hospital were recruited in the current study. The PSA-AV scores were calculated and assessed together with PSA and PSA density (PSAD) retrospectively. Among 2133 patients included in the analysis, 947 (44.4%) were diagnosed with PCa. The mean age, PSA, and positive rates of digital rectal examination result and transrectal ultrasound result were statistically higher in men diagnosed with PCa (all P PSA-AV were 0.864 and 0.851, respectively, in predicting PCa in the entire population, both performed better than PSA (AUC = 0.805; P PSA-AV was more obvious in subgroup with PSA ranging from 2.0 ng ml-1 to 20.0 ng ml-1. A PSA-AV score of 400 had a sensitivity and specificity of 93.7% and 40.0%, respectively. In conclusion, the PSA-AV score performed equally with PSAD and was better than PSA in predicting PCa. This indicated that PSA-AV score could be a useful tool for predicting PCa in Chinese population.

  15. Use of PSA in a regulatory framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ross, P.J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper will briefly describe the use of PSA in the licensing process for the Sizewell 'B' PWR Power Station currently under construction in the U.K. There are two distinct phases in the licensing process - (i) A PSA has been performed to support the application to construct Sizewell 'B'. At that stage the PSA was used as a design tool (along with deterministic design requirements) for Sizewell 'B' and as such lead to a number of significant design changes in the early design process. (ii) A PSA is currently being performed to support the application to operate Sizewell 'B'. The PSA is required to support the claim that the design has included all reasonably practical measures to prevent and mitigate accidents. The comprehensive PSA being produced for the second phase of the licensing process will be described. The way the regulators/designer/analysts have interacted over the years has affected the scope, complexity, detail and bias of the comprehensive PSA. The paper will discuss these issues and highlight some of the more significant ones. The benefits and drawbacks of providing a PSA in a regulatory framework will be discussed. One of the conclusions of the paper is that the use of true ''best-estimates'' in the PSA is difficult to achieve in a regulatory framework where persistent bias to the conservative side is apparent in the designers, analysts and regulators judgements. The usefulness of the PSA is therefore, potentially, compromised by giving misleading outputs or diverting resources to unnecessary areas. (author)

  16. PSA methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magne, L.

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of this text is first to ask a certain number of questions on the methods related to PSAs. Notably we will explore the positioning of the French methodological approach - as applied in the EPS 1300 1 and EPS 900 2 PSAs - compared to other approaches (Part One). This reflection leads to more general reflection: what contents, for what PSA? This is why, in Part Two, we will try to offer a framework for definition of the criteria a PSA should satisfy to meet the clearly identified needs. Finally, Part Three will quickly summarize the questions approached in the first two parts, as an introduction to the debate. 15 refs

  17. The open PSA standard as a framework for migration of probabilistic models. Experiences with the KKB PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, G.; Hussels, U.; Epstein, S.; Rauzy, A.; Schubert, B.

    2008-01-01

    In its present state, the open PSA standard is helpful to determine capabilities of PSA approaches, which have been taken into account by those who formulated it. As soon, as tools come up, which can automatically bring a given PSA into the standard form, the data will be accessible by other software tools, which either are supplementary to the original one, or they may act in the context of quality control. Taking into account, that a PSA model represents a value of some two to ten person years (dependent on level of completeness and level of detail), it is important to have the data in a transparent way, which does not depend on proprietary formats, and can thus be used for more purposes than those, which are implemented in given PSA codes. (orig.)

  18. Clinical diagnostic value of combined determination of serum tPSA, cPSA and IGF-I levels in patients with prostatic disorders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Bashan; Zhang Zigang; Lai Fudi

    2008-01-01

    Objective: To investigate the diagnostic value of combined determination of serum total prostatic specific antigen (tPSA), complex prostatic specific antigen (cPSA) and IGF-I levels in patients with prostatic disorders. Methods: Serum tPSA, cPSA (with CLIA) and IGF-I (with IRMA) levels were determined in 41 patients with prostatic carcinoma, 60 patients with benign prosta- tic hypertrophy (BPH) and 55 controls. Results: The serum tPSA, cPSA and IGF-I levels in patients with prostatic cancer were significantly higher than those in patients with BPH and controls (P<0.01). Taking the cut-off values of 4ng/ml, 3.6ng/ml and 150 for tPSA, cPSA and IGF-I respectively, the combined determination of these three items would yield a sensitivity of 88.6%, specificity of 84.9%, positive predicative value of 83% and negative predicative value of 90.0% for diagnosis of prostatic cancer. Conclusion: Combined determination of tPSA, cPSA and IGF-I would yield better sensitive and accurate diagnostic rate in patients with prostatic cancer, especially in those with laboratory values within the 'grey zone'. (authors)

  19. A tsunami PSA methodology and application for NPP site in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Kyu; Choi, In-Kil

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► A methodology of tsunami PSA was developed in this study. ► Tsunami return period was evaluated by empirical method using historical tsunami record and tidal gauge record. ► Procedure of tsunami fragility analysis was established and target equipments and structures for investigation of tsunami fragility assessment were selected. ► A sample fragility calculation was performed for the equipment in Nuclear Power Plant. ► Accident sequence of tsunami event is developed by according to the tsunami run-up and draw down, and tsunami induced core damage frequency (CDF) is determined. - Abstract: A methodology of tsunami PSA was developed in this study. A tsunami PSA consists of tsunami hazard analysis, tsunami fragility analysis and system analysis. In the case of tsunami hazard analysis, evaluation of tsunami return period is a major task. For the evaluation of tsunami return period, numerical analysis and empirical method can be applied. In this study, tsunami return period was evaluated by empirical method using historical tsunami record and tidal gauge record. For the performing a tsunami fragility analysis, procedure of tsunami fragility analysis was established and target equipments and structures for investigation of tsunami fragility assessment were selected. A sample fragility calculation was performed for the equipment in Nuclear Power Plant. In the case of system analysis, accident sequence of tsunami event is developed by according to the tsunami run-up and draw down, and tsunami induced core damage frequency (CDF) is determined. For the application to the real Nuclear Power Plant, the Ulchin 56 NPP which located in east coast of Korean peninsula was selected. Through this study, whole tsunami PSA working procedure was established and example calculation was performed for one of real Nuclear Power Plant in Korea. But for more accurate tsunami PSA result, there are many researches needed for evaluation of hydrodynamic force, effect of

  20. Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context. Phase 3. Status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Authen, S. [Risk Pilot AB, Stockholm (Sweden); Holmberg, J.-E. [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland)

    2013-03-15

    Digital protection and control systems appear as upgrades in older plants, and are commonplace in new nuclear power plants. To assess the risk of nuclear power plant operation and to determine the risk impact of digital systems, there is a need to quantitatively assess the reliability of the digital systems in a justifiable manner. In 2007, the OECD/NEA CSNI directed the Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) to set up a task group to coordinate an activity in this field. One of the recommendations was to develop a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), resulting in a follow-up task group called DIGREL. The taxonomy will be the basis of future modelling and quantification efforts. It will also help define a structure for data collection and to review PSA studies. This an interim report of the project. A draft guidelines document on the failure modes taxonomy has been developed. The taxonomy is rather complete covering all levels from the system level down to module and basic component level failure modes, including hardware and software aspects. There are still open issues to be resolved by the task group, especially related to I and C unit and module level taxonomy. In a parallel Nordic activity, a comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review on main international references has been performed. The study showed a wide range of approaches and solutions to the challenges given by digital I and C, and also indicated that no state-of-the-art currently exists. An existing simplified PSA model has been complemented with fault tree models for a four-redundant distributed protection system in order to study and demonstrate the effect of design features and modelling approaches. The model has been used to test the effect of CCF modelling, fail-safe principle and voting logic. A comparison has been made between unit-level and module-level modelling. (Author)