WorldWideScience

Sample records for safeguards verification method

  1. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D.

    2009-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF 6 cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  2. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D. [Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, A1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2009-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF{sub 6} cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  3. EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P. [Euratom, Communaute europeenne de l' energie atomique - CEEA (European Commission (EC))

    2015-07-01

    The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

  4. Spent fuel verification options for final repository safeguards in Finland. A study on verification methods, their feasibility and safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautamaeki, J.; Tiitta, A.

    2000-12-01

    The verification possibilities of the spent fuel assemblies from the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs and the fuel rods from the research reactor of VTT are contemplated in this report. The spent fuel assemblies have to be verified at the partial defect level before the final disposal into the geologic repository. The rods from the research reactor may be verified at the gross defect level. Developing a measurement system for partial defect verification is a complicated and time-consuming task. The Passive High Energy Gamma Emission Tomography and the Fork Detector combined with Gamma Spectrometry are the most potential measurement principles to be developed for this purpose. The whole verification process has to be planned to be as slick as possible. An early start in the planning of the verification and developing the measurement devices is important in order to enable a smooth integration of the verification measurements into the conditioning and disposal process. The IAEA and Euratom have not yet concluded the safeguards criteria for the final disposal. E.g. criteria connected to the selection of the best place to perform the verification. Measurements have not yet been concluded. Options for the verification places have been considered in this report. One option for a verification measurement place is the intermediate storage. The other option is the encapsulation plant. Crucial viewpoints are such as which one offers the best practical possibilities to perform the measurements effectively and which would be the better place in the safeguards point of view. Verification measurements may be needed both in the intermediate storages and in the encapsulation plant. In this report also the integrity of the fuel assemblies after wet intermediate storage period is assessed, because the assemblies have to stand the handling operations of the verification measurements. (orig.)

  5. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  6. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  7. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  8. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  9. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  10. From safeguards to treaty verification and the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.

    1997-01-01

    Changes in safeguards techniques and changes in the context in which it has to be applied have led to a continuous evolution of safeguards. Nuclear material accountancy and its verification is still the basis of safeguards. But also other, less technical, tools are developed for the future. Will safeguards not become an idle story but continue to lay effectively and efficiently a concrete foundation for international trust and peace, there is a need for more investment in new methods and techniques to allow safeguards to keep pace with the developments, both politically and technically. Safeguards serves the international community by enhancing the mutual trust that leads to national security. That also enabled the rapid growth of international co-operation on the applications of nuclear energy. But international security is based on confidence. It is not a priori the technique that creates that sphere of confidence, the human and political interactions are at least equally important. In different cultures there are marked differences in behaviour and such differences can be easily misinterpreted. Therefore also the new safeguards has to be equally objectively established and critically executed under the close attention of all parties concerned

  11. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  12. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  13. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  14. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation

  15. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation Refs, figs, tabs

  16. Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

  17. Neutron spectrometric methods for core inventory verification in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellinger, A.; Filges, U.; Hansen, W.; Knorr, J.; Schneider, R.

    2002-01-01

    In consequence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards, inspections are periodically made in nuclear facilities by the IAEA and the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate. The inspection methods are permanently improved. Therefore, the Core Inventory Verification method is being developed as an indirect method for the verification of the core inventory and to check the declared operation of research reactors

  18. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  19. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  20. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  1. Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kadner, Steven P.; Turpen, Elizabeth

    2001-01-01

    In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

  2. Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

    2009-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

  3. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  4. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-16

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  5. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent

    2010-01-01

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  6. Working Group 2: Future Directions for Safeguards and Verification, Technology, Research and Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zykov, S.; Blair, D.

    2013-01-01

    For traditional safeguards it was recognized that the hardware presently available is, in general, addressing adequately fundamental IAEA needs, and that further developments should therefore focus mainly on improving efficiencies (i.e. increasing cost economies, reliability, maintainability and user-friendliness, keeping abreast of continual advancements in technologies and of the evolution of verification approaches). Specific technology areas that could benefit from further development include: -) Non-destructive measurement systems (NDA), in particular, gamma-spectroscopy and neutron counting techniques; -) Containment and surveillance tools, such as tamper indicating seals, video-surveillance, surface identification methods, etc.; -) Geophysical methods for design information verification (DIV) and safeguarding of geological repositories; and -) New tools and methods for real-time monitoring. Furthermore, the Working Group acknowledged that a 'building block' (or modular) approach should be adopted towards technology development, enabling equipment to be upgraded efficiently as technologies advance. Concerning non-traditional safeguards, in the area of satellite-based sensors, increased spatial resolution and broadened spectral range were identified as priorities. In the area of wide area surveillance, the development of LIDAR-like tools for atmospheric sensing was discussed from the perspective of both potential benefits and certain limitations. Recognizing the limitations imposed by the human brain in terms of information assessment and analysis, technologies are needed that will enable the more effective utilization of all information, regardless of its format and origin. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  7. Using LIBS Method in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacs-Szeles, E.; Almasi, I.

    2015-01-01

    Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) is a type of atomic emission spectroscopic technique which is capable to detect almost all the elements from the periodic table in different sample types (solid, liquid or gas). Other advantage of the technique is that a LIBS analysis is much faster than a conventional laboratory technique. Beside the easy usability and fastness of the system the main advantages of the technique is that portable systems are also available. Using a so-called ''backpack'' version in-field analysis can be carried out. Therefore, LIBS is a more and more popular technique also e.g., in the nuclear analytics due to its several advantages. It is also tested for Safeguards purposes as a novel technology. In this work development and test of a portable LIBS system is discussed in detail. Detector system with higher resolution and specific software for evaluation of uranium isotope composition has been developed. Different kind of uranium fuel pellets with various enrichments was analyzed as test samples. Concerning the test measurements the developed LIBS instrument was found well-applicable for analysis of Safeguards samples and determination of higher enrichment of uranium in-field. The method is rapid and simple enough for short in-field sample analysis. (author)

  8. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  9. Methods of Software Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. E. Gurin

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available This article is devoted to the problem of software verification (SW. Methods of software verification designed to check the software for compliance with the stated requirements such as correctness, system security and system adaptability to small changes in the environment, portability and compatibility, etc. These are various methods both by the operation process and by the way of achieving result. The article describes the static and dynamic methods of software verification and paid attention to the method of symbolic execution. In its review of static analysis are discussed and described the deductive method, and methods for testing the model. A relevant issue of the pros and cons of a particular method is emphasized. The article considers classification of test techniques for each method. In this paper we present and analyze the characteristics and mechanisms of the static analysis of dependencies, as well as their views, which can reduce the number of false positives in situations where the current state of the program combines two or more states obtained both in different paths of execution and in working with multiple object values. Dependences connect various types of software objects: single variables, the elements of composite variables (structure fields, array elements, the size of the heap areas, the length of lines, the number of initialized array elements in the verification code using static methods. The article pays attention to the identification of dependencies within the framework of the abstract interpretation, as well as gives an overview and analysis of the inference tools.Methods of dynamic analysis such as testing, monitoring and profiling are presented and analyzed. Also some kinds of tools are considered which can be applied to the software when using the methods of dynamic analysis. Based on the work a conclusion is drawn, which describes the most relevant problems of analysis techniques, methods of their solutions and

  10. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  11. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  12. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  13. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-12-15

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  14. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  15. Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramirez, R.

    2010-01-01

    Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

  16. Environmental technology verification methods

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Szewczuk, S

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) is a tool that has been developed in the United States of America, Europe and many other countries around the world to help innovative environmental technologies reach the market. Claims about...

  17. Balance between qualitative and quantitative verification methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nidaira, Kazuo

    2012-01-01

    The amount of inspection effort for verification of declared nuclear material needs to be optimized in the situation where qualitative and quantitative measures are applied. Game theory was referred to investigate the relation of detection probability and deterrence of diversion. Payoffs used in the theory were quantified for cases of conventional safeguards and integrated safeguards by using AHP, Analytical Hierarchy Process. Then, it became possible to estimate detection probability under integrated safeguards which had equivalent deterrence capability for detection probability under conventional safeguards. In addition the distribution of inspection effort for qualitative and quantitative measures was estimated. Although the AHP has some ambiguities in quantifying qualitative factors, its application to optimization in safeguards is useful to reconsider the detection probabilities under integrated safeguards. (author)

  18. Update on Monitoring Technologies for International Safeguards and Fissile Material Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Croessmann, C. Dennis; Glidewell, Don D.; Mangan, Dennis L.; Smathers, Douglas C.

    1999-01-01

    Monitoring technologies are playing an increasingly important part in international safeguards and fissile material verification. The developments reduce the time an inspector must spend at a site while assuring continuity of knowledge. Monitoring technologies' continued development has produced new seal systems and integrated video surveillance advances under consideration for Trilateral Initiative use. This paper will present recent developments for monitoring systems at Embalse, Argentina, VNHEF, Sarov, Russian, and Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina

  19. The Efficacy of Social Media as a Research Tool and Information Source for Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skoeld, T.; Feldman, Y.

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA Department of Safeguards aims to provide credible assurances to the international community that States are fulfiling their safeguards obligations in that all nuclear material remains in peaceful use. In order to draw a soundly-based safeguards conclusion for a State that has a safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA, the Department establishes a knowledge base of the State's nuclear-related infrastructure and activities against which a State's declarations are evaluated for correctness and completeness. Open source information is one stream of data that is used in the evaluation of nuclear fuel cycle activities in the State. The Department is continuously working to ensure that it has access to the most up-to-date, accurate, relevant and credible open source information available, and has begun to examine the use of social media as a new source of information. The use of social networking sites has increased exponentially in the last decade. In fact, social media has emerged as the key vehicle for delivering and acquiring information in near real-time. Therefore, it has become necessary for the open source analyst to consider social media as an essential element in the broader concept of open source information. Characteristics, such as ''immediacy'', ''recency'', ''interractiveness'', which set social networks apart from the ''traditional media'', are also the same attributes that present a challenge for using social media as an efficient information-delivery platform and a credible source of information. New tools and technologies for social media analytics have begun to emerge to help systematically monitor and mine this large body of data. The paper will survey the social media landscape in an effort to identify platforms that could be of value for safeguards verification purposes. It will explore how a number of social networking sites, such as Twitter

  20. Isotope correlations for safeguards surveillance and accountancy methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Kalimullah.

    1982-01-01

    Isotope correlations corroborated by experiments, coupled with measurement methods for nuclear material in the fuel cycle have the potential as a safeguards surveillance and accountancy system. The ICT allows the verification of: fabricator's uranium and plutonium content specifications, shipper/receiver differences between fabricator output and reactor input, reactor plant inventory changes, reprocessing batch specifications and shipper/receiver differences between reactor output and reprocessing plant input. The investigation indicates that there exist predictable functional relationships (i.e. correlations) between isotopic concentrations over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial fuel assembly-averaged compositions. The selection of the more effective correlations will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors through the correlations have been examined to identify the sensitivity of the isotope correlations to measurement errors, and to establish criteria for measurement accuracy in the development and selection of measurement methods. 6 figures, 3 tables

  1. The use of the hybrid K-edge densitometer for routine analysis of safeguards verification samples of reprocessing input liquor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ottmar, H.; Eberle, H.

    1991-01-01

    Following successful tests of a hybrid K-edge instrument at TUI Karlsruhe and the routine use of a K-edge densitometer for safeguards verification at the same laboratory, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities decided to install the first such instrument into a large industrial reprocessing plant for the routine verification of samples taken from the input accountancy tanks. This paper reports on the installation, calibration, sample handling procedure and the performance of this instrument after one year of routine operation

  2. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  3. A safeguards verification technique for solution homogeneity and volume measurements in process tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suda, S.; Franssen, F.

    1987-01-01

    A safeguards verification technique is being developed for determining whether process-liquid homogeneity has been achieved in process tanks and for authenticating volume-measurement algorithms involving temperature corrections. It is proposed that, in new designs for bulk-handling plants employing automated process lines, bubbler probes and thermocouples be installed at several heights in key accountability tanks. High-accuracy measurements of density using an electromanometer can now be made which match or even exceed analytical-laboratory accuracies. Together with regional determination of tank temperatures, these measurements provide density, liquid-column weight and temperature gradients over the fill range of the tank that can be used to ascertain when the tank solution has reached equilibrium. Temperature-correction algorithms can be authenticated by comparing the volumes obtained from the several bubbler-probe liquid-height measurements, each based on different amounts of liquid above and below the probe. The verification technique is based on the automated electromanometer system developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The IAEA has recently approved the purchase of a stainless-steel tank equipped with multiple bubbler and thermocouple probes for installation in its Bulk Calibration Laboratory at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. The verification technique is scheduled for preliminary trials in late 1987

  4. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation

  5. Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Finch, Robert J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Smartt, Heidi A. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Haddal, Risa [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-10-01

    Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

  6. Data Collection Guidelines for Consistent Evaluation of Data from Verification and Monitoring Safeguard Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Castleberry, K.; Lenarduzzi, R.; Whitaker, M.

    1999-01-01

    One of the several activities the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors perform in the verification process of Safeguard operations is the review and correlation of data from different sources. This process is often complex due to the different forms in which the data is presented. This paper describes some of the elements that are necessary to create a ''standardized'' structure for the verification of data. When properly collected and formatted, data can be analyzed with off-the shelf software applications using customized macros to automate the commands for the desired analysis. The standardized-data collection methodology is based on instrumentation guidelines as well as data structure elements, such as verifiable timing of data entry, automated data logging, identification codes, and others. The identification codes are used to associate data items with their sources and to correlate them with items from other data logging activities. The addition of predefined parameter ranges allows automated evaluation with the capability to provide a data summary, a cross-index of all data related to a specific event. Instances of actual databases are used as examples. The data collection guidelines described in this paper facilitate the use of data from a variety of instrumentation platforms and also allow the instrumentation itself to be more easily applied in subsequent monitoring applications

  7. Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.

    1984-01-01

    Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

  8. Technology transfer - insider protection workshop (Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    The Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is a field-applicable tool to evaluate facility safeguards against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by nonviolent insiders. To ensure successful transfer of this technology from the laboratory to DOE field offices and contractors, LLNL developed a three-part package. The package includes a workbook, user-friendly microcomputer software, and a three-day training program. The workbook guides an evaluation team through the Safeguards Evaluation Method and provides forms for gathering data. The microcomputer software assists in the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness. The software is designed for safeguards analysts with no previous computer experience. It runs on an IBM Personal Computer or any compatible machine. The three-day training program is called the Insider Protection Workshop. The workshop students learn how to use the workbook and the computer software to assess insider vulnerabilities and to evaluate the benefits and costs of potential improvements. These activities increase the students' appreciation of the insider threat. The workshop format is informal and interactive, employing four different instruction modes: classroom presentations, small-group sessions, a practical exercise, and ''hands-on'' analysis using microcomputers. This approach to technology transfer has been successful: over 100 safeguards planners and analysts have been trained in the method, and it is being used at facilities through the DOE complex

  9. HTGR analytical methods and design verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neylan, A.J.; Northup, T.E.

    1982-05-01

    Analytical methods for the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) include development, update, verification, documentation, and maintenance of all computer codes for HTGR design and analysis. This paper presents selected nuclear, structural mechanics, seismic, and systems analytical methods related to the HTGR core. This paper also reviews design verification tests in the reactor core, reactor internals, steam generator, and thermal barrier

  10. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  11. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  12. Identification of uranium signatures in swipe samples on verification of nuclear activities for nuclear safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pestana, Rafael Cardoso Baptistini

    2013-01-01

    The use of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes, has been applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency–IAEA since 1996 and are routinely used as a complementary measure to strengthen the traditional nuclear safeguards procedures. The aim is verify if the states signatory to the safeguards agreements are not diverging their peaceful nuclear activities for undeclared nuclear activities. This work describes a new protocol of collect and analysis of the swipe samples for identification of nuclear signatures that may be related to the nuclear activities developed in the inspected facility. This work was used as a case of study a real uranium conversion plant of the nuclear fuel cycle of IPEN. The strategy proposed uses different analytical techniques, such as alpha radiation meter, SEM-EDX and ICP-MS to identify signatures of uranium adhered to the swipe samples. In the swipe samples analysis, it was possible to identify particles of UO 2 F 2 and UF4 through the morphological comparison and semi-quantitative analyses performed by SEM-EDX technique. In this work, methods were used that as a result has the average isotopic composition of the sample, in which the enrichment ranged from 1.453 ± 0.023 to 18.24 % ± 0.15 % in the 235 U isotope. Through these externally collections, a non-intrusive sampling, it was possible to identify enriched material handling activities with enrichment of 1.453 % ± 0.023 % to 6.331 ± 0.055 % in the isotope 235 U, as well as the use of reprocessed material, through the identification of the 236 U isotope. The uncertainties obtained for the n( 235 U)/n( 238 U) ratio varied from 0.40% to 0.86 % for the internal swipe samples. (author)

  13. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  14. The application of probability methods for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rumyantsev, A.N.

    1976-01-01

    The authors consider possible ways of applying probability methods to solve problems involved in accounting for nuclear materials. The increase in the flow of nuclear materials subject to IAEA safeguards makes it necessary to increase the accuracy of determination of the actual quantities of nuclear materials at all stages of their processing and use. It is proposed that the IAEA's automated system of accounting for nuclear materials, based on accounting information for each material balance zone and the results of random experimental checks performed by IAEA inspectors, be supplemented with mathematical models of the flow of nuclear materials in each balance zone based on the data supplied for each facility in the balance zone when it was placed under safeguards. The statistical error in determining the material balance and the material unaccounted for can be considerably reduced in this way even if the experimental control methods are retained. (author)

  15. FY2017 Final Report: Power of the People: A technical ethical and experimental examination of the use of crowdsourcing to support international nuclear safeguards verification.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gastelum, Zoe Nellie [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sentz, Kari [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Swanson, Meili Claire [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rinaudo, Cristina [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-01

    Recent advances in information technology have led to an expansion of crowdsourcing activities that utilize the “power of the people” harnessed via online games, communities of interest, and other platforms to collect, analyze, verify, and provide technological solutions for challenges from a multitude of domains. To related this surge in popularity, the research team developed a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities as they relate to international nuclear safeguards, evaluated the potential legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of crowdsourcing to support safeguards, and proposed experimental designs to test the capabilities and prospect for the use of crowdsourcing to support nuclear safeguards verification.

  16. Handbook of nuclear safeguards measurement methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rogers, D.R.

    1983-09-01

    This handbook is intended to be a guide to the selection of methods for meeting specific measurement requirements. The information was compiled from a survey of production facilities, the literature, and current exchange programs. The survey included bulk measurements, chemical assay, sampling techniques, isotopic measurements, passive NDA, and active NDA

  17. Addressing verification challenges, 16 October 2006, Vienna, Austria, Symposium on International Safeguards (16-20 October 2006)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    In his talk about Verification Challenges Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, welcomed the participants of the Symposium on International Safeguards. He stated that safeguards is probably the most difficult task entrusted to an international organization and that a major increase in nuclear energy around the globe is expected which means that nuclear know-how is spread to more and more countries and can be applied to both peaceful purposes and also non-peaceful purposes. More and more countries want to go in for the nuclear fuel cycle including sensitive fuel cycle activities like enrichment and reprocessing, they become so-called 'virtual nuclear weapons States. There is the need to develop a new international or multinational approach to the fuel cycle so as to avoid ending up with not just nine nuclear weapon States but another 20 or 30 States which have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short span of time. He stressed the important linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation and remembered the audience that safeguards, although very much a technical activity, operates in a politically charged environment. The IAEA's job is to make sure that countries with comprehensive safeguards are conducting all their activities exclusively for peaceful purposes. The ability to discover possible undeclared activities is a key challenge the IAEA is facing. He mentioned that the IAEA does not get all the information they would need, for example the IAEA does not get systematic information from the Nuclear Suppliers Group on exports and imports. Without the Additional Protocol the IAEA is also hampered in its ability to detect undeclared activities, e.g in the R and D activities that do not directly involve nuclear material. Another key issue are financial resources. Transparency measures in certain situations are under considerations including interviewing people, having access to documents, things that are not strictly required by the

  18. Certified reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jakopič, R; Sturm, M; Kraiem, M; Richter, S; Aregbe, Y

    2013-11-01

    Confidence in comparability and reliability of measurement results in nuclear material and environmental sample analysis are established via certified reference materials (CRMs), reference measurements, and inter-laboratory comparisons (ILCs). Increased needs for quality control tools in proliferation resistance, environmental sample analysis, development of measurement capabilities over the years and progress in modern analytical techniques are the main reasons for the development of new reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) prepares and certifices large quantities of the so-called "large-sized dried" (LSD) spikes for accurate measurement of the uranium and plutonium content in dissolved nuclear fuel solutions by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and also develops particle reference materials applied for the detection of nuclear signatures in environmental samples. IRMM is currently replacing some of its exhausted stocks of CRMs with new ones whose specifications are up-to-date and tailored for the demands of modern analytical techniques. Some of the existing materials will be re-measured to improve the uncertainties associated with their certified values, and to enable laboratories to reduce their combined measurement uncertainty. Safeguards involve the quantitative verification by independent measurements so that no nuclear material is diverted from its intended peaceful use. Safeguards authorities pay particular attention to plutonium and the uranium isotope (235)U, indicating the so-called 'enrichment', in nuclear material and in environmental samples. In addition to the verification of the major ratios, n((235)U)/n((238)U) and n((240)Pu)/n((239)Pu), the minor ratios of the less abundant uranium and plutonium isotopes contain valuable information about the origin and the 'history' of material used for commercial or possibly clandestine purposes, and

  19. Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

  20. Core seismic methods verification report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, B.E.; Shatoff, H.D.; Rakowski, J.E.; Rickard, N.D.; Thompson, R.W.; Tow, D.; Lee, T.H.

    1979-12-01

    This report presents the description and validation of the analytical methods for calculation of the seismic loads on an HTGR core and the core support structures. Analytical modeling, integration schemes, parameter assignment, parameter sensitivity, and correlation with test data are key topics which have been covered in detail. Much of the text concerns the description and the results of a series of scale model tests performed to obtain data for code correlation. A discussion of scaling laws, model properties, seismic excitation, instrumentation, and data reduction methods is also presented, including a section on the identification and calculation of statistical errors in the test data

  1. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  2. Sasset: Attribute verification of accountancy records in nuclear safeguards Pt.1: Theoretical basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, K.H.

    1980-01-01

    This study demonstrates the construction of a sampling plan to be followed by the inspector during the statical verification (in attribute mode) of the accountancy records of a nuclear fuel fabrication plant. It presents the instructions defining inspector's tasks and guiding his actions; it permits to validate his decisions. Part I deals with the statistical fundaments of the verification technique in attribute mode. Part II is a manual for the corresponding computer code SASSET developed at JRC Ispra

  3. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  4. Evaluating methods to improve safeguards training courses of ISCN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okumura, Yukiko; Nakamura, Yo; Kawata, Norio

    2014-01-01

    Although questionnaires were used to receive feedbacks from participants at the end of each training course, Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) did not establish a structured evaluation method. To this end, ISCN has started to study on methods to accurately evaluate the courses since April and started to introduce the evaluation method on trial, according to the Donald Kirkpatrick's Four-Level Training Evaluation Model, so as to better develop and conduct more effective courses. This paper will focus on how ISCN has modified the Kirkpatrick's Four-level to adapt to its safeguards training courses. This will then be followed by two particular cases of how the evaluation method functioned for the Additional Protocol training courses held in Malaysia in 2014, and the feedbacks received to improve future training courses. (author)

  5. Methods of Verification, Accountability and Control of Special Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, J.E.

    1999-01-01

    This session demonstrates nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement, surveillance and analysis technology required to protect, control and account (MPC and A) for special nuclear materials (SNM) in sealed containers. These measurements, observations and analyses comprise state-of-the art, strengthened, SNM safeguards systems. Staff member specialists, actively involved in research, development, training and implementation worldwide, will present six NDA verification systems and two software tools for integration and analysis of facility MPC and A data

  6. In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Technique: Cost-Effective Tool for NDA Verification in IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braverman, E.; Lebrun, A.; Nizhnik, V.; Rorif, F.

    2010-01-01

    Uranium materials measurements using the ISOCS technique play an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. This methodology provides high uranium/plutonium sensitivity and a low detection limit together with the capability to measure items with different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector which is used by the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. ISOCS modelling software allows performing absolute efficiency calibration for items of arbitrary container shape and wall material, matrix chemical composition, material fill-height, uranium or plutonium weight fraction inside the matrix and even nuclear material/matrix non-homogeneous distribution. Furthermore, in a number of cases, some key parameters such as matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction can be determined along with analysis of nuclear material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Today, the basic tool for uranium and plutonium mass measurement used in Safeguards verification activities is the neutron counting technique which employs neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters. In respect to the neutron counting technique, ISOCS calibrated detectors have relatively low cost. Taking into account its advantages, this methodology becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material NDA verification. At present, the Agency uses ISOCS for quantitative analysis in a wide range of applications: - Uranium scrap materials; - Uranium contaminated solid wastes; - Uranium fuel elements; - Some specific verification cases like measurement of Pu-Be neutron sources, quantification of fission products in solid wastes etc. For uranium hold-up measurements, ISOCS the only available methodology for quantitative and isotopic composition analysis of nuclear materials deposited

  7. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  8. Achievements and questions in the accountability of nuclear materials and their verification for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deron, S.

    1990-01-01

    A very accurate accountability of nuclear materials is required throughout the industrial nuclear fuel cycle for technical reasons and safety purposes but also for commercial, physical protection and safeguards objectives. The present note intends to illustrate with a few samples the performance presently achieved and the major questions which the analysts are facing in these areas. The examples taken concern the accountability of feed and product materials at LWR nuclear fuel fabrication plants and spent fuel reprocessing plants. They were selected because they constitute major components of the flow and inventory of the nuclear fuel materials at key measurement points in nuclear industry. The factors limiting the quality of the assays and accountability of these industrial materials and some observations regarding the need and use of reference materials and quality control programmes in support of accurate accounting are presented. 7 refs

  9. Accuracy verification methods theory and algorithms

    CERN Document Server

    Mali, Olli; Repin, Sergey

    2014-01-01

    The importance of accuracy verification methods was understood at the very beginning of the development of numerical analysis. Recent decades have seen a rapid growth of results related to adaptive numerical methods and a posteriori estimates. However, in this important area there often exists a noticeable gap between mathematicians creating the theory and researchers developing applied algorithms that could be used in engineering and scientific computations for guaranteed and efficient error control.   The goals of the book are to (1) give a transparent explanation of the underlying mathematical theory in a style accessible not only to advanced numerical analysts but also to engineers and students; (2) present detailed step-by-step algorithms that follow from a theory; (3) discuss their advantages and drawbacks, areas of applicability, give recommendations and examples.

  10. Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gartner, K.J.

    1986-01-01

    Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

  11. Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pamela Jagger

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

  12. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  13. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1980-01-01

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  14. Isotope correlations for safeguards surveillance and accountancy methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Kalimullah.

    1983-01-01

    Isotope correlations corroborated by experiments, coupled with measurement methods for nuclear material in the fuel cycle have the potential as a safeguards surveillance and accountancy system. The US/DOE/OSS Isotope Correlations for Surveillance and Accountancy Methods (ICSAM) program has been structured into three phases: (1) the analytical development of Isotope Correlation Technique (ICT) for actual power reactor fuel cycles; (2) the development of a dedicated portable ICT computer system for in-field implementation, and (3) the experimental program for measurement of U, Pu isotopics in representative spent fuel-rods of the initial 3 or 4 burnup cycles of the Commonwealth Edison Zion -1 and -2 PWR power plants. Since any particular correlation could generate different curves depending upon the type and positioning of the fuel assembly, a 3-D reactor model and 2-group cross section depletion calculation for the first cycle of the ZION-2 was performed with each fuel assembly as a depletion block. It is found that for a given PWR all assemblies with a unique combination of enrichment zone and number of burnable poison rods (BPRs) generate one coincident curve. Some correlations are found to generate a single curve for assemblies of all enrichments and number of BPRs. The 8 axial segments of the 3-D calculation generate one coincident curve for each correlation. For some correlations the curve for the full assembly homogenized over core-height deviates from the curve for the 8 axial segments, and for other correlations coincides with the curve for the segments. The former behavior is primarily based on the transmutation lag between the end segment and the middle segments. The experimental implication is that the isotope correlations exhibiting this behavior can be determined by dissolving a full assembly but not by dissolving only an axial segment, or pellets

  15. Knowledge-based inspection:modelling complex processes with the integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abazi, F.

    2011-01-01

    Increased level of complexity in almost every discipline and operation today raises the demand for knowledge in order to successfully run an organization whether to generate profit or to attain a non-profit mission. Traditional way of transferring knowledge to information systems rich in data structures and complex algorithms continue to hinder the ability to swiftly turnover concepts into operations. Diagrammatic modelling commonly applied in engineering in order to represent concepts or reality remains to be an excellent way of converging knowledge from domain experts. The nuclear verification domain represents ever more a matter which has great importance to the World safety and security. Demand for knowledge about nuclear processes and verification activities used to offset potential misuse of nuclear technology will intensify with the growth of the subject technology. This Doctoral thesis contributes with a model-based approach for representing complex process such as nuclear inspections. The work presented contributes to other domains characterized with knowledge intensive and complex processes. Based on characteristics of a complex process a conceptual framework was established as the theoretical basis for creating a number of modelling languages to represent the domain. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) is formalized through an integrated meta-model. The diagrammatic modelling languages represent the verification domain and relevant nuclear verification aspects. Such a meta-model conceptualizes the relation between practices of process management, knowledge management and domain specific verification principles. This fusion is considered as necessary in order to create quality processes. The study also extends the formalization achieved through a meta-model by contributing with a formalization language based on Pattern Theory. Through the use of graphical and mathematical constructs of the theory, process structures are formalized enhancing

  16. The application of gamma and isotopic correlation techniques for safeguards identification and verification purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valovic, J.

    1976-05-01

    The report contains the method of measurement of burn-up and isotopic composition of spent fuel by the non-destructive gamma spectrometry method developed for the fuel elements of the Bohunice A-1 power plant. Results obtained for samples of spent fuel as well as fuel assemblies are shown. The method of measuring the radial distribution of the radioactive fission products is briefly described and examples demonstrating its use are given. In-core neutron flux mapping with self-powered detectors and burn-up determination by detector signal integration are also described

  17. Monitoring, controlling and safeguarding radiochemical streams at spent fuel reprocessing facilities with optical and gamma-ray spectroscopic methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwantes, J.M.; Bryan, S.A.; Orton, C.R.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Fraga, C.G.

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MCA) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop

  18. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  19. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  20. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  1. Heavy water physical verification in power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morsy, S.; Schuricht, V.; Beetle, T.; Szabo, E.

    1986-01-01

    This paper is a report on the Agency experience in verifying heavy water inventories in power plants. The safeguards objectives and goals for such activities are defined in the paper. The heavy water is stratified according to the flow within the power plant, including upgraders. A safeguards scheme based on a combination of records auditing, comparing records and reports, and physical verification has been developed. This scheme has elevated the status of heavy water safeguards to a level comparable to nuclear material safeguards in bulk facilities. It leads to attribute and variable verification of the heavy water inventory in the different system components and in the store. The verification methods include volume and weight determination, sampling and analysis, non-destructive assay (NDA), and criticality check. The analysis of the different measurement methods and their limits of accuracy are discussed in the paper

  2. Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefanka, Z.; Vincze, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

  3. Advanced verification methods for OVI security ink

    Science.gov (United States)

    Coombs, Paul G.; McCaffery, Shaun F.; Markantes, Tom

    2006-02-01

    OVI security ink +, incorporating OVP security pigment* microflakes, enjoys a history of effective document protection. This security feature provides not only first-line recognition by the person on the street, but also facilitates machine-readability. This paper explores the evolution of OVI reader technology from proof-of-concept to miniaturization. Three different instruments have been built to advance the technology of OVI machine verification. A bench-top unit has been constructed which allows users to automatically verify a multitude of different banknotes and OVI images. In addition, high speed modules were fabricated and tested in a state of the art banknote sorting machine. Both units demonstrate the ability of modern optical components to illuminate and collect light reflected from the interference platelets within OVI ink. Electronic hardware and software convert and process the optical information in milliseconds to accurately determine the authenticity of the security feature. Most recently, OVI ink verification hardware has been miniaturized and simplified providing yet another platform for counterfeit protection. These latest devices provide a tool for store clerks and bank tellers to unambiguously determine the validity of banknotes in the time period it takes the cash drawer to be opened.

  4. Algebraic Verification Method for SEREs Properties via Groebner Bases Approaches

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ning Zhou

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available This work presents an efficient solution using computer algebra system to perform linear temporal properties verification for synchronous digital systems. The method is essentially based on both Groebner bases approaches and symbolic simulation. A mechanism for constructing canonical polynomial set based symbolic representations for both circuit descriptions and assertions is studied. We then present a complete checking algorithm framework based on these algebraic representations by using Groebner bases. The computational experience result in this work shows that the algebraic approach is a quite competitive checking method and will be a useful supplement to the existent verification methods based on simulation.

  5. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  6. In-core Instrument Subcritical Verification (INCISV) - Core Design Verification Method - 358

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prible, M.C.; Heibel, M.D.; Conner, S.L.; Sebastiani, P.J.; Kistler, D.P.

    2010-01-01

    According to the standard on reload startup physics testing, ANSI/ANS 19.6.1, a plant must verify that the constructed core behaves sufficiently close to the designed core to confirm that the various safety analyses bound the actual behavior of the plant. A large portion of this verification must occur before the reactor operates at power. The INCISV Core Design Verification Method uses the unique characteristics of a Westinghouse Electric Company fixed in-core self powered detector design to perform core design verification after a core reload before power operation. A Vanadium self powered detector that spans the length of the active fuel region is capable of confirming the required core characteristics prior to power ascension; reactivity balance, shutdown margin, temperature coefficient and power distribution. Using a detector element that spans the length of the active fuel region inside the core provides a signal of total integrated flux. Measuring the integrated flux distributions and changes at various rodded conditions and plant temperatures, and comparing them to predicted flux levels, validates all core necessary core design characteristics. INCISV eliminates the dependence on various corrections and assumptions between the ex-core detectors and the core for traditional physics testing programs. This program also eliminates the need for special rod maneuvers which are infrequently performed by plant operators during typical core design verification testing and allows for safer startup activities. (authors)

  7. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  8. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  9. IDEF method for designing seismic information system in CTBT verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zheng Xuefeng; Shen Junyi; Jin Ping; Zhang Huimin; Zheng Jiangling; Sun Peng

    2004-01-01

    Seismic information system is of great importance for improving the capability of CTBT verification. A large amount of money has been appropriated for the research in this field in the U.S. and some other countries in recent years. However, designing and developing a seismic information system involves various technologies about complex system design. This paper discusses the IDEF0 method to construct function models and the IDEF1x method to make information models systemically, as well as how they are used in designing seismic information system in CTBT verification. (authors)

  10. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  11. Verification and disarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H. [IAEA, Vienna (Austria)

    1998-07-01

    The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed.

  12. Verification and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1998-01-01

    The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed

  13. SNF verification requirements imposed through 10 CFR Part 961: Interrelationship with MC ampersand A requirements for the OCRWM safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slater, N.; Vance, S.

    1994-01-01

    Article VI.B.2 of the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (10 CFR Part 961, Standard Contract) provides that spent nuclear fuel shall be subject to verification prior to acceptance by the Department of Energy. As part of the overall process for scheduling deliveries of spent nuclear fuel, the Standard Contract requires contract holders to submit detailed descriptions of the spent nuclear fuel they intend to deliver. Thus, the provision for verification in the Standard contract allows the Department the opportunity to ensure that the spent nuclear fuel intended for deliver is consistent with the description provided, and that the material is properly loaded, packaged, marked, and labeled. The Department is currently evaluating the verification requirements for spent nuclear fuel that it will establish pursuant to Article VI.B.2 of the Standard Contract. The Department recognizes that there may be significant overlap between these verification requirements and the requirements established for material control and accountability (MC ampersand A). Therefore, the Department may recommend modifications to the process established in the Standard Contract to ensure that the verification and MC ampersand A functions and activities are fully integrated

  14. Dynamic Frames Based Verification Method for Concurrent Java Programs

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Mostowski, Wojciech

    2016-01-01

    In this paper we discuss a verification method for concurrent Java programs based on the concept of dynamic frames. We build on our earlier work that proposes a new, symbolic permission system for concurrent reasoning and we provide the following new contributions. First, we describe our approach

  15. Evaluation of verification methods for input-accountability measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maeck, W.J.

    1980-01-01

    As part of TASTEX related programs two independent methods have been evaluated for the purpose of providing verification of the amount of Pu charged to the head-end of a nuclear fuel processing plant. The first is the Pu/U (gravimetric method), TASTEX Task-L, and the second is the Tracer Method, designated Task-M. Summaries of the basic technology, results of various studies under actual plant conditions, future requirements, are given for each of the Tasks

  16. Improved verification methods for OVI security ink

    Science.gov (United States)

    Coombs, Paul G.; Markantes, Tom

    2000-04-01

    Together, OVP Security Pigment in OVI Security Ink, provide an excellent method of overt banknote protection. The effective use of overt security feature requires an educated public. The rapid rise in computer-generated counterfeits indicates that consumers are not as educate das to banknote security features as they should be. To counter the education issue, new methodologies have been developed to improve the validation of banknotes using the OVI ink feature itself. One of the new methods takes advantage of the overt nature of the product's optically variable effect. Another method utilizes the unique optical interference characteristics provided by the OVP platelets.

  17. In situ object counting system (ISOCSi3TM) technique: A cost-effective tool for NDA verification in IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nizhnik, V.; Belian, A.; Shephard, A.; Lebrun, A.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear material measurements using the ISOCS technique are playing an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. The ISOCS capabilities include: a high sensitivity to the presence of U and Pu; the ability to detect very small amounts of material; and the ability to measure items of different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector used in the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. The ISOCS modelling software performs an absolute efficiency calibration for items with various container shapes, container wall materials, material compositions, material fill-heights, U/Pu weight fractions and even heterogeneously distributed emitting materials. In a number of cases, some key parameters, such as the matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction, can be determined in addition to the emitting material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Taking into account these advantages, the technique becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material non-destructive assay (NDA) verification. At present, the IAEA uses the ISOCS for a wide range of applications including the quantitative analysis of U scrap materials, U/Pu contaminated solid wastes, U fuel elements, U hold-up materials. Additionally, the ISOCS is also applied to some specific verification cases such as the measurement of PuBe neutron sources and the quantification of fission products in solid wastes. In reprocessing facilities with U/Pu waste compaction or facilities with item re-batching, the continuity-of-knowledge can be assured by applying either video surveillance systems together with seals (requiring attaching/detaching and verification activities for each seal) or verification of operator declarations using quantitative measurements for items selected on a random basis

  18. Palmprint Verification Using Time Series Method

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. A. Ketut Agung Cahyawan Wiranatha

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available The use of biometrics as an automatic recognition system is growing rapidly in solving security problems, palmprint is one of biometric system which often used. This paper used two steps in center of mass moment method for region of interest (ROI segmentation and apply the time series method combined with block window method as feature representation. Normalized Euclidean Distance is used to measure the similarity degrees of two feature vectors of palmprint. System testing is done using 500 samples palms, with 4 samples as the reference image and the 6 samples as test images. Experiment results show that this system can achieve a high performance with success rate about 97.33% (FNMR=1.67%, FMR=1.00 %, T=0.036.

  19. Pointing Verification Method for Spaceborne Lidars

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Axel Amediek

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available High precision acquisition of atmospheric parameters from the air or space by means of lidar requires accurate knowledge of laser pointing. Discrepancies between the assumed and actual pointing can introduce large errors due to the Doppler effect or a wrongly assumed air pressure at ground level. In this paper, a method for precisely quantifying these discrepancies for airborne and spaceborne lidar systems is presented. The method is based on the comparison of ground elevations derived from the lidar ranging data with high-resolution topography data obtained from a digital elevation model and allows for the derivation of the lateral and longitudinal deviation of the laser beam propagation direction. The applicability of the technique is demonstrated by using experimental data from an airborne lidar system, confirming that geo-referencing of the lidar ground spot trace with an uncertainty of less than 10 m with respect to the used digital elevation model (DEM can be obtained.

  20. Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

    1975-01-01

    The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

  1. Fast critical assembly safeguards: NDA methods for highly enriched uranium. Summary report, October 1978-September 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bellinger, F.O.; Winslow, G.H.

    1980-12-01

    Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods, principally passive gamma measurements and active neutron interrogation, have been studied for their safeguards effectiveness and programmatic impact as tools for making inventories of highly enriched uranium fast critical assembly fuel plates. It was concluded that no NDA method is the sole answer to the safeguards problem, that each of those emphasized here has its place in an integrated safeguards system, and that each has minimum facility impact. It was found that the 185-keV area, as determined with a NaI detector, was independent of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plate irradiation history, though the random neutron driver methods used here did not permit accurate assay of irradiated plates. Containment procedures most effective for accurate assaying were considered, and a particular geometry is recommended for active interrogation by a random driver. A model, pertinent to that geometry, which relates the effects of multiplication and self-absorption, is described. Probabilities of failing to detect that plates are missing are examined

  2. A study of compositional verification based IMA integration method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Hui; Zhang, Guoquan; Xu, Wanmeng

    2018-03-01

    The rapid development of avionics systems is driving the application of integrated modular avionics (IMA) systems. But meanwhile it is improving avionics system integration, complexity of system test. Then we need simplify the method of IMA system test. The IMA system supports a module platform that runs multiple applications, and shares processing resources. Compared with federated avionics system, IMA system is difficult to isolate failure. Therefore, IMA system verification will face the critical problem is how to test shared resources of multiple application. For a simple avionics system, traditional test methods are easily realizing to test a whole system. But for a complex system, it is hard completed to totally test a huge and integrated avionics system. Then this paper provides using compositional-verification theory in IMA system test, so that reducing processes of test and improving efficiency, consequently economizing costs of IMA system integration.

  3. Numerical Verification Methods for Spherical $t$-Designs

    OpenAIRE

    Chen, Xiaojun

    2009-01-01

    The construction of spherical $t$-designs with $(t+1)^2$ points on the unit sphere $S^2$ in $\\mathbb{R}^3$ can be reformulated as an underdetermined system of nonlinear equations. This system is highly nonlinear and involves the evaluation of a degree $t$ polynomial in $(t+1)^4$ arguments. This paper reviews numerical verification methods using the Brouwer fixed point theorem and Krawczyk interval operator for solutions of the underdetermined system of nonlinear equations...

  4. Machine learning techniques for the verification of refueling activities in CANDU-type nuclear power plants (NPPs) with direct applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budzinski, J.

    2006-06-01

    the Viterbi algorithm is applied for the state sequence decoding, which allows for physical constraints derived from simulation models to be efficiently incorporated into the overall recognition scheme by appropriately rescoring the resulting n-best hypothesis lists. The physical constraints are derived from the local balance equation for precursors produced in fuel during discharge and the corresponding log-likelihood scores on the physical model are given by the negative chi-squared between the model predictions and data measurements. The proposed hybrid recognition algorithm is finally implemented in an automated fuel-handling verification system (AVER), the parameters of which are then optimized for maximum performance. This thesis also gives a dynamic, functional validation framework for such verification systems in nuclear safeguards, including the developed AVER system. The system's conclusions on random test data from both historical and synthesized data sets are compared against the relevant expert knowledge, and various metrics and risk measures are computed to judge the system's performance and reliability of its conclusions. The validation tests have shown that the developed verification system meets the desired competency requirements on its entire prespecified input domain of CANDU-6 data. Results on simulated data have also demonstrated the ability of the proposed system to detect radiation signatures corresponding to abnormal and rare events that normally do not appear in data. Throughout all the tests, AVER greatly outperformed an existing rudimentary verification system, consistently producing a reduction in the misclassification rate of about 170 %. The expected risk of undetected fuel discharge was estimated to be a hundred thousand times less than one significant quantity (SQ) of irradiated direct-use material (IDU) per unit per year, which is much below the acceptable limits and hence may be subject to no or only less intrusive safeguards

  5. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  6. CFD code verification and the method of manufactured solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelletier, D.; Roache, P.J.

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents the Method of Manufactured Solutions (MMS) for CFD code verification. The MMS provides benchmark solutions for direct evaluation of the solution error. The best benchmarks are exact analytical solutions with sufficiently complex solution structure to ensure that all terms of the differential equations are exercised in the simulation. The MMS provides a straight forward and general procedure for generating such solutions. When used with systematic grid refinement studies, which are remarkably sensitive, the MMS provides strong code verification with a theorem-like quality. The MMS is first presented on simple 1-D examples. Manufactured solutions for more complex problems are then presented with sample results from grid convergence studies. (author)

  7. Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

  8. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

    2001-01-01

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  9. A Formal Verification Method of Function Block Diagram

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Kwang Yong; Seong, Poong Hyun; Jee, Eun Kyoung; Jeon, Seung Jae; Park, Gee Yong; Kwon, Kee Choon

    2007-01-01

    Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), an industrial computer specialized for real-time applications, is widely used in diverse control systems in chemical processing plants, nuclear power plants or traffic control systems. As a PLC is often used to implement safety, critical embedded software, rigorous safety demonstration of PLC code is necessary. Function block diagram (FBD) is a standard application programming language for the PLC and currently being used in the development of a fully-digitalized reactor protection system (RPS), which is called the IDiPS, under the KNICS project. Therefore, verification issue of FBD programs is a pressing problem, and hence is of great importance. In this paper, we propose a formal verification method of FBD programs; we defined FBD programs formally in compliance with IEC 61131-3, and then translate the programs into Verilog model, and finally the model is verified using a model checker SMV. To demonstrate the feasibility and effective of this approach, we applied it to IDiPS which currently being developed under KNICS project. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes Verilog and Cadence SMV. In Section 3, we introduce FBD2V which is a tool implemented to support the proposed FBD verification framework. A summary and conclusion are provided in Section 4

  10. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  11. Technical basis of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1975-01-01

    Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP) [de

  12. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  13. Destructive and nondestructive methods for controlling nuclear materials for the purpose of safeguards in the CSSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krivanek, M.; Krtil, J.; Moravec, J.; Pacak, P.; Sus, F.

    1977-01-01

    Central Control Laboratory (CCL) of the Nuclear Research Institute was charged with the control of nuclear materials in CSSR within the framework of the safeguards system. The CCL has been directed by the Department of nuclear safety and safeguards of CAEC according to a long-term plan, elaborated for controlling nuclear material in CSSR. The CCL has mainly been performing independent, rapid, accurate, and reliable analyses of nuclear materials, using destructive as well as non-destructive methods; the analyses of samples taken in MBA's in CSSR are mentioned, concerning the determinations of U, Pu, and Th contents, isotopic compositions of U and Pu, and burn up. The results of the analyses have served for the material and isotopic balances of fissile materials and the control of fuel reprocessing under laboratory conditions. The methods for sampling and sample transport as well as sample treatment before the analysis are described. The experience is given, obtained at CCL during a routine application of chemical methods for highly precise determinations of U, Pu, and Th (titration-based methods), mass-spectrometric determinations of U and Pu (isotopic composition, IDA using 233 U and 242 Pu), and burn-up determinations based on radioactive fissile products (Cs, Ru, Ce) and stable Nd isotopes. Some non-destructive methods for controlling nuclear materials (passive gamma-spectrometry) are discussed

  14. Independent verification of a material balance at a LEU fuel fabrication plant. Program for technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sorenson, R.J.; McSweeney, T.I.; Hartman, M.G.; Brouns, R.J.; Stewart, K.B.; Granquist, D.P.

    1977-11-01

    This report describes the application of methodology for planning an inspection according to the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an example evaluation of data representative of low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Included are the inspection plan test criteria, the inspection sampling plans, the sample data collected during the inspection, acceptance testing of physical inventories with test equipment, material unaccounted for (MUF) evaluation, and quantitative statements of the results and conclusions that could be derived from the inspection. The analysis in this report demonstrates the application of inspection strategies which produce quantitative results. A facility model was used that is representative of large low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication plants with material flows, inventory sizes, and compositions of material representative of operating commercial facilities. The principal objective was to determine and illustrate the degree of assurance against a diversion of special nuclear materials (SNM) that can be achieved by an inspection and the verification of material flows and inventories. This work was performed as part of the USA program for technical assistance to the IAEA. 10 figs, 14 tables

  15. A simple reliability block diagram method for safety integrity verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo Haitao; Yang Xianhui

    2007-01-01

    IEC 61508 requires safety integrity verification for safety related systems to be a necessary procedure in safety life cycle. PFD avg must be calculated to verify the safety integrity level (SIL). Since IEC 61508-6 does not give detailed explanations of the definitions and PFD avg calculations for its examples, it is difficult for common reliability or safety engineers to understand when they use the standard as guidance in practice. A method using reliability block diagram is investigated in this study in order to provide a clear and feasible way of PFD avg calculation and help those who take IEC 61508-6 as their guidance. The method finds mean down times (MDTs) of both channel and voted group first and then PFD avg . The calculated results of various voted groups are compared with those in IEC61508 part 6 and Ref. [Zhang T, Long W, Sato Y. Availability of systems with self-diagnostic components-applying Markov model to IEC 61508-6. Reliab Eng System Saf 2003;80(2):133-41]. An interesting outcome can be realized from the comparison. Furthermore, although differences in MDT of voted groups exist between IEC 61508-6 and this paper, PFD avg of voted groups are comparatively close. With detailed description, the method of RBD presented can be applied to the quantitative SIL verification, showing a similarity of the method in IEC 61508-6

  16. Concepts for inventory verification in critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Sapir, J.L.; Kern, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.

    1978-12-01

    Materials measurement and inventory verification concepts for safeguarding large critical facilities are presented. Inspection strategies and methods for applying international safeguards to such facilities are proposed. The conceptual approach to routine inventory verification includes frequent visits to the facility by one inspector, and the use of seals and nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements to verify the portion of the inventory maintained in vault storage. Periodic verification of the reactor inventory is accomplished by sampling and NDA measurement of in-core fuel elements combined with measurements of integral reactivity and related reactor parameters that are sensitive to the total fissile inventory. A combination of statistical sampling and NDA verification with measurements of reactor parameters is more effective than either technique used by itself. Special procedures for assessment and verification for abnormal safeguards conditions are also considered. When the inspection strategies and inventory verification methods are combined with strict containment and surveillance methods, they provide a high degree of assurance that any clandestine attempt to divert a significant quantity of fissile material from a critical facility inventory will be detected. Field testing of specific hardware systems and procedures to determine their sensitivity, reliability, and operational acceptability is recommended. 50 figures, 21 tables

  17. Methods and practices for verification and validation of programmable systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heimbuerger, H.; Haapanen, P.; Pulkkinen, U.

    1993-01-01

    The programmable systems deviate by their properties and behaviour from the conventional non-programmable systems in such extent, that their verification and validation for safety critical applications requires new methods and practices. The safety assessment can not be based on conventional probabilistic methods due to the difficulties in the quantification of the reliability of the software and hardware. The reliability estimate of the system must be based on qualitative arguments linked to a conservative claim limit. Due to the uncertainty of the quantitative reliability estimate other means must be used to get more assurance about the system safety. Methods and practices based on research done by VTT for STUK, are discussed in the paper as well as the methods applicable in the reliability analysis of software based safety functions. The most essential concepts and models of quantitative reliability analysis are described. The application of software models in probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is evaluated. (author). 18 refs

  18. Novel Verification Method for Timing Optimization Based on DPSO

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chuandong Chen

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Timing optimization for logic circuits is one of the key steps in logic synthesis. Extant research data are mainly proposed based on various intelligence algorithms. Hence, they are neither comparable with timing optimization data collected by the mainstream electronic design automation (EDA tool nor able to verify the superiority of intelligence algorithms to the EDA tool in terms of optimization ability. To address these shortcomings, a novel verification method is proposed in this study. First, a discrete particle swarm optimization (DPSO algorithm was applied to optimize the timing of the mixed polarity Reed-Muller (MPRM logic circuit. Second, the Design Compiler (DC algorithm was used to optimize the timing of the same MPRM logic circuit through special settings and constraints. Finally, the timing optimization results of the two algorithms were compared based on MCNC benchmark circuits. The timing optimization results obtained using DPSO are compared with those obtained from DC, and DPSO demonstrates an average reduction of 9.7% in the timing delays of critical paths for a number of MCNC benchmark circuits. The proposed verification method directly ascertains whether the intelligence algorithm has a better timing optimization ability than DC.

  19. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

    1991-05-01

    The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

  20. Survey and assessment of conventional software verification and validation methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, L.A.; Groundwater, E.; Mirsky, S.M.

    1993-04-01

    By means of a literature survey, a comprehensive set of methods was identified for the verification and validation of conventional software. The 134 methods so identified were classified according to their appropriateness for various phases of a developmental lifecycle -- requirements, design, and implementation; the last category was subdivided into two, static testing and dynamic testing methods. The methods were then characterized in terms of eight rating factors, four concerning ease-of-use of the methods and four concerning the methods' power to detect defects. Based on these factors, two measurements were developed to permit quantitative comparisons among methods, a Cost-Benefit metric and an Effectiveness Metric. The Effectiveness Metric was further refined to provide three different estimates for each method, depending on three classes of needed stringency of V ampersand V (determined by ratings of a system's complexity and required-integrity). Methods were then rank-ordered for each of the three classes in terms of their overall cost-benefits and effectiveness. The applicability was then assessed of each method for the four identified components of knowledge-based and expert systems, as well as the system as a whole

  1. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  2. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  3. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  4. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  5. Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

    2015-01-01

    The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

  6. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  7. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  8. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  9. Verification of spectrophotometric method for nitrate analysis in water samples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kurniawati, Puji; Gusrianti, Reny; Dwisiwi, Bledug Bernanti; Purbaningtias, Tri Esti; Wiyantoko, Bayu

    2017-12-01

    The aim of this research was to verify the spectrophotometric method to analyze nitrate in water samples using APHA 2012 Section 4500 NO3-B method. The verification parameters used were: linearity, method detection limit, level of quantitation, level of linearity, accuracy and precision. Linearity was obtained by using 0 to 50 mg/L nitrate standard solution and the correlation coefficient of standard calibration linear regression equation was 0.9981. The method detection limit (MDL) was defined as 0,1294 mg/L and limit of quantitation (LOQ) was 0,4117 mg/L. The result of a level of linearity (LOL) was 50 mg/L and nitrate concentration 10 to 50 mg/L was linear with a level of confidence was 99%. The accuracy was determined through recovery value was 109.1907%. The precision value was observed using % relative standard deviation (%RSD) from repeatability and its result was 1.0886%. The tested performance criteria showed that the methodology was verified under the laboratory conditions.

  10. VISA-2 - a general, vulnerability-oriented method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards/security systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs

  11. Fast film dosimetry calibration method for IMRT treatment plan verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwob, N.; Wygoda, A.

    2004-01-01

    Intensity-Modulated Radiation Therapy (IMRT) treatments are delivered dynamically and as so, require routinely performed verification measurements [1]. Radiographic film dosimetry is a well-adapted method for integral measurements of dynamic treatments fields, with some drawbacks related to the known problems of dose calibration of films. Classically, several films are exposed to increasing doses, and a Net Optical Density (N.O.D) vs. dose sensitometric curve (S.C.) is generated. In order to speed up the process, some authors have developed a method based on the irradiation of a single film with a non-uniform pattern of O.D., delivered with a dynamic MLC. However, this curve still needs to be calibrated to dose by the means of measurements in a water phantom. It is recommended to make a new calibration for every series of measurements, in order to avoid the processing quality dependence of the film response. These frequent measurements are very time consuming. We developed a simple method for quick dose calibration of films, including a check of the accuracy of the calibration curve obtained

  12. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  13. Assessment of Automated Measurement and Verification (M&V) Methods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Granderson, Jessica [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Touzani, Samir [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Custodio, Claudine [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Sohn, Michael [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Fernandes, Samuel [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Jump, David [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2015-07-01

    This report documents the application of a general statistical methodology to assess the accuracy of baseline energy models, focusing on its application to Measurement and Verification (M&V) of whole-building energy savings.

  14. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  15. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  16. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  17. VISA: a method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, H.; Fullwood, R.; Glancy, J.

    1977-06-01

    This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3

  18. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  19. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  20. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1993; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1993 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1994-03-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

  1. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1992; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1992 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1993-04-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

  2. Probabilistic Requirements (Partial) Verification Methods Best Practices Improvement. Variables Acceptance Sampling Calculators: Derivations and Verification of Plans. Volume 1

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Kenneth L.; White, K, Preston, Jr.

    2012-01-01

    The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to improve on the Best Practices document produced for the NESC assessment, Verification of Probabilistic Requirements for the Constellation Program, by giving a recommended procedure for using acceptance sampling by variables techniques. This recommended procedure would be used as an alternative to the potentially resource-intensive acceptance sampling by attributes method given in the document. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

  3. Stabilization of uranium hexafluoride by hydrolysis method for decommissioning of safeguard laboratory facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Inagawa, Jun; Hotoku, Shinobu; Oda, Tetsuzo; Aoyagi, Noboru; Magara, Masaaki [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Science and Engineering Directorate, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2014-03-15

    In safeguard laboratory (SGL) facility of Nuclear Science Research Institute of JAEA , uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) of enriched uranium of various enrichment was used for research and development of a spectrometric method for the determination of the enrichment of uranium in April 1983 through March 1993. After completion of this R and D, the UF{sub 6} has been stored in SGL facility. It was decided that the UF{sub 6} is carried to out of the facility, because the SGL facility will be decommissioning until March 2015. To transport and store in safety after transportation, it is necessary that the UF{sub 6} should be converted to stable chemical form. Hydrolysis of UF{sub 6} to uranyl fluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}) and evaporation to solid state were selected for the stabilization method. The equipment for hydrolysis and evaporation was installed in the SGL facility. Stabilization was operated in this equipment, and all of the UF{sub 6} in the SGL facility was converted to UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solid state in October 2012 through August 2013. In this report, results of examination and operation for stabilization of UF{sub 6} were reported. (author)

  4. Tools and Methods for RTCP-Nets Modeling and Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Szpyrka Marcin

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available RTCP-nets are high level Petri nets similar to timed colored Petri nets, but with different time model and some structural restrictions. The paper deals with practical aspects of using RTCP-nets for modeling and verification of real-time systems. It contains a survey of software tools developed to support RTCP-nets. Verification of RTCP-nets is based on coverability graphs which represent the set of reachable states in the form of directed graph. Two approaches to verification of RTCP-nets are considered in the paper. The former one is oriented towards states and is based on translation of a coverability graph into nuXmv (NuSMV finite state model. The later approach is oriented towards transitions and uses the CADP toolkit to check whether requirements given as μ-calculus formulae hold for a given coverability graph. All presented concepts are discussed using illustrative examples

  5. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  6. International comparison of product certification and verification methods for appliances

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhou, Nan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Romankiewicz, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Fridley, David [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Zheng, Nina [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2012-06-01

    Enforcement of appliance standards and consumer trust in appliance labeling are important foundations of growing a more energy efficient economy. Product certification and verification increase compliance rates which in turn increase both energy savings and consumer trust. This paper will serve two purposes: 1) to review international practices for product certification and verification as they relate to the enforcement of standards and labeling programs in the U.S., E.U., Australia, Japan, Canada, and China; and 2) to make recommendations for China to implement improved certification processes related to their mandatory standards and labeling program such as to increase compliance rates and energy savings potential.

  7. International Comparison of Product Certification and Verification Methods for Appliances

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhou, Nan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Romankiewicz, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Fridley, David [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Zheng, Nina [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2012-06-01

    Enforcement of appliance standards and consumer trust in appliance labeling are important foundations of growing a more energy efficient economy. Product certification and verification increase compliance rates which in turn increase both energy savings and consumer trust. This paper will serve two purposes: 1) to review international practices for product certification and verification as they relate to the enforcement of standards and labeling programs in the U.S., E.U., Australia, Japan, Canada, and China; and 2) to make recommendations for China to implement improved certification processes related to their mandatory standards and labeling program such as to increase compliance rates and energy savings potential.

  8. Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

    1997-01-01

    Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

  9. VERIFICATION HPLC METHOD OF QUANTITATIVE DETERMINATION OF AMLODIPINE IN TABLETS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Khanin V. A

    2014-10-01

    a volume of 100.0 ml. Preparation of the working standard solution sample amlodipine besylate. 50.0 mg of amlodipine RCC dissolved in methanol and dilute with the same solvent to 50.0 ml. 5.0 ml of this solution argue with methanol to volume 100.0 ml. Before the major controlled trials validated the existence of documents certifying the suitability vykorystovanoho equipment, raw materials and chemicals. Validation of the methodology was carried out in accordance with the requirements of SPhU. Results & discussion. Linearity methods defined within 80-120% of nominal concentrations. The linearity of the methods supported by the entire range of concentrations studied (b=0.9845, Sb=0,01473, a=1.5282, Sa=1.4956, S0=0.5486, r=0.9992. It is proved that the validated method characterized by sufficient convergence and accuracy over the entire range of concentrations (ΔZ=1.03, δ%=0.09. Conclusion. During verification methods of quantitative determination of amlodipine besylate tablets were studied characteristics validated HPLC method: accuracy, linearity, precision, specificity, and internal laboratory precision. Validation technique characteristics do not exceed the critical value of error (1.6% and characterized by qualitative analytical indicators. This technique can be correctly reproduced in the laboratory conditions, and is independent of the excipients.

  10. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  11. Development and evaluation of methods for safeguards use of solution monitoring data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01

    This report describes the effort to develop, implement, and evaluate data analysis methods for solution-monitoring measurements in the plutonium nitrate storage at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). The intent is to address TRP-specific issues to some extent, as well as to anticipate the data analysis needs at future reprocessing plants (especially the new Rokkasho reprocessing plant (RRP)) in Japan. The essential difference between a plant like TRP and a more modern plant like RRP is that one expects more and better instrumentation in the tanks in a modern plant. Because the TRP solution monitoring hardware is scheduled to be upgraded, the authors de-emphasized the effort to handle information-poor plants like TRP. This report mostly describes the analysis methods and software for finding and identifying all key tank events. To a large extent they have to experiment with several candidate methods for implementing their analysis objectives. Therefore, they chose to use a prototyping software system called S-PLUS, which is an object-oriented statistical programming and graphics package. The intent is to eventually implement selected portions of their current solution-monitoring toolkit in a more robust and user-friendly system. The authors describe their current software system as being far more than they needed for their own in-house use (menus are provided for the user who doesn't want to type any S-PLUS commands), but less than is needed for a fieldable system. Mostly as a result of working on this project, they have come to conclude that solution monitoring is a potentially very valuable asset to nuclear safeguards at a modern reprocessing plant

  12. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  13. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  14. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  15. Wu’s Characteristic Set Method for SystemVerilog Assertions Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xinyan Gao

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available We propose a verification solution based on characteristic set of Wu’s method towards SystemVerilog assertion checking over digital circuit systems. We define a suitable subset of SVAs so that an efficient polynomial modeling mechanism for both circuit descriptions and assertions can be applied. We present an algorithm framework based on the algebraic representations using characteristic set of polynomial system. This symbolic algebraic approach is a useful supplement to the existent verification methods based on simulation.

  16. Enrichment plant management and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1978-01-01

    The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

  17. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  18. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  19. Enrichment Assay Methods Development for the Integrated Cylinder Verification System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, Leon E.; Misner, Alex C.; Hatchell, Brian K.; Curtis, Michael M.

    2009-01-01

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: (1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, (2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and (3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed.

  20. Enrichment Assay Methods Development for the Integrated Cylinder Verification System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Misner, Alex C.; Hatchell, Brian K.; Curtis, Michael M.

    2009-10-22

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: (1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, (2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and (3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed.

  1. Reactor antineutrino monitoring with a plastic scintillator array as a new safeguards method

    OpenAIRE

    Oguri, S.; Kuroda, Y.; Kato, Y.; Nakata, R.; Inoue, Y.; Ito, C.; Minowa, M.

    2014-01-01

    We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintillators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.

  2. International safeguards for fast critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gunderson, D.O.; Todd, J.L.

    1978-12-01

    It was concluded that practical routine inventory verification techniques can be effective in detecting protracted diversion but will not meet the seven-day timeliness criteria either for protracted or large one-time diversions. An effective international safeguards system requires a method of continuously monitoring facility activities either with instrumentation, inspectors, or a combination thereof. It was also concluded that a resident inspector is required at this type of facility because of the many nonroutine operations. However, a single inspector cannot adequately monitor all activities to assure that no diversion is taking place. The use of existing structural features and unattended monitoring at portals as well as surveillance by a resident inspector can provide an effective detection capability. A rapid special inventory verification is required following detection to verify any suspected diversion

  3. Establishment of Accurate Calibration Curve for National Verification at a Large Scale Input Accountability Tank in RRP - For Strengthening State System for Meeting Safeguards Obligation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goto, Y.; Kato, T.; Nidaira, K.

    2010-01-01

    Tanks are installed in a reprocessing plant for spent fuel in order to account solution of nuclear material. The careful measurement of volume in tanks is crucial to implement accurate accounting of nuclear material. The calibration curve related with the volume and level of solution needs to be constructed, where the level is determined by differential pressure of dip tubes in tanks. More than one calibration curves depending on the height are commonly applied for each tank, but it's not explicitly decided how many segments are used, where to select segment, or what order of polynomial curve. Here we present the rational construction technique of giving optimum calibration curves and their characteristics. The tank calibration work has been conducted in the course of contract with Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) about safeguards information treatment. (author)

  4. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  5. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  6. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  7. Digital system verification a combined formal methods and simulation framework

    CERN Document Server

    Li, Lun

    2010-01-01

    Integrated circuit capacity follows Moore's law, and chips are commonly produced at the time of this writing with over 70 million gates per device. Ensuring correct functional behavior of such large designs before fabrication poses an extremely challenging problem. Formal verification validates the correctness of the implementation of a design with respect to its specification through mathematical proof techniques. Formal techniques have been emerging as commercialized EDA tools in the past decade. Simulation remains a predominantly used tool to validate a design in industry. After more than 5

  8. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997). And IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

  9. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997). And IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

  10. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997); and IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

  11. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997); and IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

  12. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  13. Study of applicable methods on safety verification of disposal facilities and waste packages

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    Three subjects about safety verification on the disposal of low level radioactive waste were investigated in FY. 2012. For radioactive waste disposal facilities, specs and construction techniques of covering with soil to prevent possible destruction caused by natural events (e.g. earthquake) were studied to consider verification methods for those specs. For waste packages subject to near surface pit disposal, settings of scaling factor and average radioactivity concentration (hereafter referred to as ''SF'') on container-filled and solidified waste packages generated from Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1-5, setting of cesium residual ratio of molten solidified waste generated from Tokai and Tokai No.2 Power Stations, etc. were studied. Those results were finalized in consideration of the opinion from advisory panel, and publicly opened as JNES-EV reports. In FY 2012, five JNES reports were published and these have been used as standards of safety verification on waste packages. The verification method of radioactive wastes subject to near-surface trench disposal and intermediate depth disposal were also studied. For radioactive wastes which will be returned from overseas, determination methods of radioactive concentration, heat rate and hydrogen generation rate of CSD-C were established. Determination methods of radioactive concentration and heat rate of CSD-B were also established. These results will be referred to verification manuals. (author)

  14. Inspector measurement verification activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, R.S.; Crouch, R.

    e most difficult and complex activity facing a safeguards inspector involves the verification of measurements and the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurement is the key to measurement verification activities. Remeasurerements using the facility's measurement system provide the bulk of the data needed for determining the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurements by reference laboratories are also important for evaluation of the measurement system and determination of systematic errors. The use of these measurement verification activities in conjunction with accepted inventory verification practices provides a better basis for accepting or rejecting an inventory. (U.S.)

  15. The inverse method parametric verification of real-time embedded systems

    CERN Document Server

    André , Etienne

    2013-01-01

    This book introduces state-of-the-art verification techniques for real-time embedded systems, based on the inverse method for parametric timed automata. It reviews popular formalisms for the specification and verification of timed concurrent systems and, in particular, timed automata as well as several extensions such as timed automata equipped with stopwatches, linear hybrid automata and affine hybrid automata.The inverse method is introduced, and its benefits for guaranteeing robustness in real-time systems are shown. Then, it is shown how an iteration of the inverse method can solv

  16. A Feature Subtraction Method for Image Based Kinship Verification under Uncontrolled Environments

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Duan, Xiaodong; Tan, Zheng-Hua

    2015-01-01

    The most fundamental problem of local feature based kinship verification methods is that a local feature can capture the variations of environmental conditions and the differences between two persons having a kin relation, which can significantly decrease the performance. To address this problem...... the feature distance between face image pairs with kinship and maximize the distance between non-kinship pairs. Based on the subtracted feature, the verification is realized through a simple Gaussian based distance comparison method. Experiments on two public databases show that the feature subtraction method...

  17. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  18. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  19. Safeguards aspects for future fuel management alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Gerstler, R.

    1987-01-01

    In the future, more flexible fuel management strategies will be realized in light-water reactor power stations. The incentives for this development are based on considerations related to safe and economic plant operation, e.g. improved fuel strategies can save fuel resources and waste management efforts. A further important aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle deals with recycling strategies. At the back-end of the fuel cycle, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will have to be assessed as an alternative to recycling strategies. These major development fields will also have consequences for international safeguards. In particular, reactor fuel strategies may involve higher burn-up, conditioning of spent fuel directly in the power plant, gadolinium-poisoned fuel and different levels of enrichment. These strategies will have an impact on inspection activities, especially on the applicability of NDA techniques. The inspection frequency could also be affected in recycling strategies using MOX fuel. There may be problems with NDA methods if reprocessed feed is used in enrichment plants. On the other hand, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will raise safeguards problems regarding design verification, long-term safeguarding and the very feasibility of inaccessible nuclear material

  20. Discussion on verification criterion and method of human factors engineering for nuclear power plant controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Hualong; Liu Yanzi; Jia Ming; Huang Weijun

    2014-01-01

    In order to prevent or reduce human error and ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants, control device should be verified from the perspective of human factors engineering (HFE). The domestic and international human factors engineering guidelines about nuclear power plant controller were considered, the verification criterion and method of human factors engineering for nuclear power plant controller were discussed and the application examples were provided for reference in this paper. The results show that the appropriate verification criterion and method should be selected to ensure the objectivity and accuracy of the conclusion. (authors)

  1. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  2. Getting ready for final disposal in Finland - Independent verification of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, Matti; Honkamaa, Tapani; Martikka, Elina; Varjoranta, Tero; Hautamaeki, Johanna; Tiitta, Antero

    2001-01-01

    based on the active independent verification of declared data One of the difficulties that may be related to the final disposal will be old fuel, especially fuel with missing verified knowledge or fuel with poorly maintained continuity of knowledge. The Finnish SSAC has avoided this potential future problem in time by carrying out NDA verification measurements of spent fuel in a systematic manner since the beginning of the interim storing 1987. Data and spectra of the measurements have been stored into a spent fuel measurement database FISDAM (Finnish Safeguards Database of Measurements) maintained by the safeguards office of STUK. The NDA methods used are based on the detection of spent fuel specific signals i.e. fission product gamma rays or passive neutron emission from actinides. Final verification of spent fuel upon the final disposal is planned to be based on the FISDAM data followed by partial defect/rod level verification of all declared irradiated nuclear material. This will allow the SSAC to gain very high assurance that the data of the disposed material will be correct and complete. The SSAC verification activities may also form of close future cooperation with the IAEA and Euratom according to the principles of the Additional Protocol. Systematic and accurate measurements are an essential feature of the Finnish SSAC understanding of good safeguards. All present and future questions concerning declared data will be verified in time. The approach selected ensures that no undue burden is transferred to the future generations due to partially or poorly filled safeguards obligations The paper discusses the activities and results gained by the SSAC in addition to the programs and plans related to preparing for the final disposal safeguards needs, with special emphasis on the spent fuel NDA verification issues. (author)

  3. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  4. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  5. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  6. Verification of chemistry reference ranges using a simple method in sub-Saharan Africa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Irith De Baetselier

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Background: Chemistry safety assessments are interpreted by using chemistry reference ranges (CRRs. Verification of CRRs is time consuming and often requires a statistical background. Objectives: We report on an easy and cost-saving method to verify CRRs. Methods: Using a former method introduced by Sigma Diagnostics, three study sites in sub- Saharan Africa, Bondo, Kenya, and Pretoria and Bloemfontein, South Africa, verified the CRRs for hepatic and renal biochemistry assays performed during a clinical trial of HIV antiretroviral pre-exposure prophylaxis. The aspartate aminotransferase/alanine aminotransferase, creatinine and phosphorus results from 10 clinically-healthy participants at the screening visit were used. In the event the CRRs did not pass the verification, new CRRs had to be calculated based on 40 clinically-healthy participants. Results: Within a few weeks, the study sites accomplished verification of the CRRs without additional costs. The aspartate aminotransferase reference ranges for the Bondo, Kenya site and the alanine aminotransferase reference ranges for the Pretoria, South Africa site required adjustment. The phosphorus CRR passed verification and the creatinine CRR required adjustment at every site. The newly-established CRR intervals were narrower than the CRRs used previously at these study sites due to decreases in the upper limits of the reference ranges. As a result, more toxicities were detected. Conclusion: To ensure the safety of clinical trial participants, verification of CRRs should be standard practice in clinical trials conducted in settings where the CRR has not been validated for the local population. This verification method is simple, inexpensive, and can be performed by any medical laboratory.

  7. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powers, J.A.

    1983-03-01

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  8. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  9. Verification of chemistry reference ranges using a simple method in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Baetselier, Irith; Taylor, Douglas; Mandala, Justin; Nanda, Kavita; Van Campenhout, Christel; Agingu, Walter; Madurai, Lorna; Barsch, Eva-Maria; Deese, Jennifer; Van Damme, Lut; Crucitti, Tania

    2016-01-01

    Chemistry safety assessments are interpreted by using chemistry reference ranges (CRRs). Verification of CRRs is time consuming and often requires a statistical background. We report on an easy and cost-saving method to verify CRRs. Using a former method introduced by Sigma Diagnostics, three study sites in sub-Saharan Africa, Bondo, Kenya, and Pretoria and Bloemfontein, South Africa, verified the CRRs for hepatic and renal biochemistry assays performed during a clinical trial of HIV antiretroviral pre-exposure prophylaxis. The aspartate aminotransferase/alanine aminotransferase, creatinine and phosphorus results from 10 clinically-healthy participants at the screening visit were used. In the event the CRRs did not pass the verification, new CRRs had to be calculated based on 40 clinically-healthy participants. Within a few weeks, the study sites accomplished verification of the CRRs without additional costs. The aspartate aminotransferase reference ranges for the Bondo, Kenya site and the alanine aminotransferase reference ranges for the Pretoria, South Africa site required adjustment. The phosphorus CRR passed verification and the creatinine CRR required adjustment at every site. The newly-established CRR intervals were narrower than the CRRs used previously at these study sites due to decreases in the upper limits of the reference ranges. As a result, more toxicities were detected. To ensure the safety of clinical trial participants, verification of CRRs should be standard practice in clinical trials conducted in settings where the CRR has not been validated for the local population. This verification method is simple, inexpensive, and can be performed by any medical laboratory.

  10. A feasible method for clinical delivery verification and dose reconstruction in tomotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kapatoes, J.M.; Olivera, G.H.; Ruchala, K.J.; Smilowitz, J.B.; Reckwerdt, P.J.; Mackie, T.R.

    2001-01-01

    Delivery verification is the process in which the energy fluence delivered during a treatment is verified. This verified energy fluence can be used in conjunction with an image in the treatment position to reconstruct the full three-dimensional dose deposited. A method for delivery verification that utilizes a measured database of detector signal is described in this work. This database is a function of two parameters, radiological path-length and detector-to-phantom distance, both of which are computed from a CT image taken at the time of delivery. Such a database was generated and used to perform delivery verification and dose reconstruction. Two experiments were conducted: a simulated prostate delivery on an inhomogeneous abdominal phantom, and a nasopharyngeal delivery on a dog cadaver. For both cases, it was found that the verified fluence and dose results using the database approach agreed very well with those using previously developed and proven techniques. Delivery verification with a measured database and CT image at the time of treatment is an accurate procedure for tomotherapy. The database eliminates the need for any patient-specific, pre- or post-treatment measurements. Moreover, such an approach creates an opportunity for accurate, real-time delivery verification and dose reconstruction given fast image reconstruction and dose computation tools

  11. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  12. Max-out-in pivot rule with Dantzig's safeguarding rule for the simplex method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tipawanna, Monsicha; Sinapiromsaran, Krung

    2014-01-01

    The simplex method is used to solve linear programming problem by improving the current basic feasible solution. It uses a pivot rule to guide the search in the feasible region. The pivot rule is used to select an entering index in simplex method. Nowadays, many pivot rule have been presented, but no pivot rule shows superior performance than other. Therefore, this is still an active research in linear programming. In this research, we present the max-out-in pivot rule with Dantzig's safeguarding for simplex method. This rule is based on maximum improvement of objective value of the current basic feasible point similar to the Dantzig's rule. We can illustrate by Klee and Minty problems that our rule outperforms that of Dantzig's rule by the number of iterations for solving linear programming problems

  13. Methods and procedures for the verification and validation of artificial neural networks

    CERN Document Server

    Taylor, Brian J

    2006-01-01

    Neural networks are members of a class of software that have the potential to enable intelligent computational systems capable of simulating characteristics of biological thinking and learning. This volume introduces some of the methods and techniques used for the verification and validation of neural networks and adaptive systems.

  14. Validation of the implementation of IMRT with three dosimetric methods of independent verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tortosa Oliver, R. A.; Chinillach ferrando, N.; Alonso Arrizabalaga, S.; Campayo Esteban, J. M.; Morales Marco, J. C.; Soler Catalan, P.; Andreu Martinez, F. J.

    2013-01-01

    The TG119 is a simple and clear framework to verify the implementation of IMRT technique in a radiotherapy service. Verifications of this document recommended tests conducted with the three dosimetric methods listed above, allow to affirm that our Center is within the margins of tolerance considered suitable in the TG119 for the clinical implementation of IMRT. (Author)

  15. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  16. BWR SFAT, gross-defect verification of spent BWR fuel. Final report on Task FIN A563 on the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards including BWR SFAT User Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, M.; Paakkunainen, M.; Tiitta, A.; Sarparanta, K.

    1994-04-01

    A measurement instrument called Spent Fuel Attribute Tester, SFAT, has been designed, fabricated and taken into use by the IAEA in gross defect verification of spent BWR fuel assemblies. The equipment consists of an underwater measurement head connected with cables to a control unit on the bridge of the fuel handling machine as well as to a PMCA for measurement of the gamma spectra. The BWR SFAT is optimized for the AFR interim storage, TVO KPA-STORE, of the TVO Power Company in Olkiluoto, Finland. It has a shape and it is moved like a fuel assembly using the fuel handling machine. No fuel movements are needed. Spent fuel specific radiation from the fission product 137 Cs at the gamma-ray energy of 662 keV is detected above the assemblies in the storage rack using a NaI(Tl) detector. In the design and in licensing the requirements of the IAEA, operator and the safety authority have been taken into account. The BWR SFAT allows modifications for other LWR fuel types with minor changes. The work has been carried out under the task FIN A 563 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. (orig.) (9 refs., 22 figs.)

  17. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  18. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rockwood, Laura

    2001-01-01

    The legal framework of IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements, not at all of which are documents. These elements include the Statute of the IAEA; treaties and supply agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings; the basic safeguards documents, the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements; and finally, the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Board of Governors. After a discussion of these elements the major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Finally the procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguards agreements are described. (author)

  19. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rames, J.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation discusses the legal framework of IAEA Safeguards which consists of a number of elements, including agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings, basic safeguards documents (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, INFCIRC/153 (Corr..), INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, GC(V)/INF/39), the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements, and finally the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Boards of Governors. Major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguard agreements are described

  20. VHTRC experiment for verification test of H∞ reactivity estimation method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujii, Yoshio; Suzuki, Katsuo; Akino, Fujiyoshi; Yamane, Tsuyoshi; Fujisaki, Shingo; Takeuchi, Motoyoshi; Ono, Toshihiko

    1996-02-01

    This experiment was performed at VHTRC to acquire the data for verifying the H∞ reactivity estimation method. In this report, the experimental method, the measuring circuits and data processing softwares are described in details. (author)

  1. National safeguard systems - Inspector formation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1986-01-01

    The safeguards' inspector profile, in consequence of the tasks to be performed is described. An activities'hierarchy which will lead, to the structure and content of an introductory course's curriculum is established. The auditing activity as well as the material verification are described in details. Complementary resources for the upgrading the inspector's knowledge and skills are analised and the paper concludes presenting the training period, its dinamics as well as the recrutment criterium for the candidates. (Author) [pt

  2. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-01-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

  3. Evaluation of the results from uranium chemical analysis by potentiometric tritation method for safeguards utilization through intercomparison programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, R.M.S. de; Almeida, S.G. de; Bezerra, J.H.B.; Silva, S.P. da

    1990-01-01

    It was analysed three samples of uranium, two of them of UO 2 -powder, provided by IAEA and one of UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 - solution, provided by ECN. The goal was to verify the accuracy and precision of the method used in the routine determinations carried out at the laboratories who participate of the intercomparison exercises. The method used in the analyses performed at Laboratorio de Salvaguardas of CNEN was the potentiometric titration of Davies and Gray/NBL. It was concluded that the precisions lied in the range suitable to finalities of safeguards which are of the order of 0,05% or better. The accuracies were suitable to these purposes too. The larger deviation in relation to the certified value was equal to 0,062 of uranion and the minor equal to 0,0117% of the element. These values are comparable to which obtained by the best international laboratories which carried out this kind of analyses. (author) [pt

  4. Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

  5. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  6. Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

    2015-01-01

    The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

  7. ESARDA approach to facility oriented safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, R.

    1979-01-01

    The paper outlines the brief history of a Working Group composed of nuclear fuel plant operators, safeguards research workers and safeguards inspectors who are examining facility orientated problems of nuclear materials control and verification activities. The working program is reviewed together with some examples of various problems and the way the group is collaborating to develop solutions by pooling resources and effort. Work in European low enriched uranium fabrication plants from UF 6 to finished fuel is discussed in connection with mesurement practices, real time accounting, error propagation and analysis, verification and surveillance

  8. Validation, verification and comparison: Adopting new methods in ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    2005-07-03

    Jul 3, 2005 ... chemical analyses can be assumed to be homogeneously distrib- uted. When introduced ... For water microbiology this has been resolved with the publication of .... tion exercise can result in a laboratory adopting the method. If, however, the new ... For methods used for environmental sam- ples, a range of ...

  9. Formal methods in design and verification of functional specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaelisuo, H.

    1995-01-01

    It is claimed that formal methods should be applied already when specifying the functioning of the control/monitoring system, i.e. when planning how to implement the desired operation of the plant. Formal methods are seen as a way to mechanize and thus automate part of the planning. All mathematical methods which can be applied on related problem solving should be considered as formal methods. Because formal methods can only support the designer, not replace him/her, they must be integrated into a design support tool. Such a tool must also aid the designer in getting the correct conception of the plant and its behaviour. The use of a hypothetic design support tool is illustrated to clarify the requirements such a tool should fulfill. (author). 3 refs, 5 figs

  10. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  11. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  12. Euratom experience in safeguarding reprocessing and thermal reactor mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities within the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The legal basis and instruments for the application of safeguards in the European Community are described. Euratom safeguards apply throughout the fuel cycle starting at the ore stage. Euratom has had experience in the application of safeguards to small and medium size reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In reprocessing plants accountancy, containment and surveillance methods are applied and the plant is divided into three material balance areas. Similar procedures are applied at fabrication plants. Euratom inspectors apply their main verification activities at strategic points but have the right of access at any time to all places which contain nuclear material. Under the Euratom-IAEA Agreements 'Joint Teams' of Euratom and IAEA inspectors will operate together to minimise the burden on operators and to avoid duplication of effort while enabling both organisations to achieve their safeguards objectives

  13. Identification of uranium signatures in swipe samples on verification of nuclear activities for nuclear safeguards purposes; Identificacao de assinaturas de uranio em amostras de esfregacos (swipe samples) para verificacao de atividades nucleares para fins de salvaguardas nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pestana, Rafael Cardoso Baptistini

    2013-07-01

    The use of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes, has been applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency–IAEA since 1996 and are routinely used as a complementary measure to strengthen the traditional nuclear safeguards procedures. The aim is verify if the states signatory to the safeguards agreements are not diverging their peaceful nuclear activities for undeclared nuclear activities. This work describes a new protocol of collect and analysis of the swipe samples for identification of nuclear signatures that may be related to the nuclear activities developed in the inspected facility. This work was used as a case of study a real uranium conversion plant of the nuclear fuel cycle of IPEN. The strategy proposed uses different analytical techniques, such as alpha radiation meter, SEM-EDX and ICP-MS to identify signatures of uranium adhered to the swipe samples. In the swipe samples analysis, it was possible to identify particles of UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} and UF4 through the morphological comparison and semi-quantitative analyses performed by SEM-EDX technique. In this work, methods were used that as a result has the average isotopic composition of the sample, in which the enrichment ranged from 1.453 ± 0.023 to 18.24 % ± 0.15 % in the {sup 235}U isotope. Through these externally collections, a non-intrusive sampling, it was possible to identify enriched material handling activities with enrichment of 1.453 % ± 0.023 % to 6.331 ± 0.055 % in the isotope {sup 235}U, as well as the use of reprocessed material, through the identification of the {sup 236}U isotope. The uncertainties obtained for the n({sup 235}U)/n({sup 238}U) ratio varied from 0.40% to 0.86 % for the internal swipe samples. (author)

  14. Thermal test requirements and their verification by different test methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Droste, B.; Wieser, G.; Probst, U.

    1993-01-01

    The paper discusses the parameters influencing the thermal test conditions for type B-packages. Criteria for different test methods (by analytical as well as by experimental means) will be developed. A comparison of experimental results from fuel oil pool and LPG fire tests will be given. (J.P.N.)

  15. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  16. A method of knowledge base verification for nuclear power plant expert systems using extended Petri Nets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, I. W.; Seong, P. H.

    1996-01-01

    The adoption of expert systems mainly as operator supporting systems is becoming increasingly popular as the control algorithms of system become more and more sophisticated and complicated. The verification phase of knowledge base is an important part for developing reliable expert systems, especially in nuclear industry. Although several strategies or tools have been developed to perform potential error checking, they often neglect the reliability of verification methods. Because a Petri net provides a uniform mathematical formalization of knowledge base, it has been employed for knowledge base verification. In this work, we devise and suggest an automated tool, called COKEP(Checker of Knowledge base using Extended Petri net), for detecting incorrectness, inconsistency, and incompleteness in a knowledge base. The scope of the verification problem is expended to chained errors, unlike previous studies that assume error incidence to be limited to rule pairs only. In addition, we consider certainty factor in checking, because most of knowledge bases have certainly factors. 8 refs,. 2 figs,. 4 tabs. (author)

  17. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

  18. The study of necessity of verification-methods for Depleted Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, J. B.; Ahn, S. H.; Ahn, G. H.; Chung, S. T.; Shin, J. S.

    2006-01-01

    ROK has tried to establish management system for depleted uranium from 2004, and ROK achieved some results in this field including management software, management skill, and the list of company using the nuclear material. But, the studies for the depleted uranium are insufficient exclude the studies of KAERI. In terms of SSAC, we have to study more about whether the depleted uranium is really dangerous material or not and how is the depleted uranium diverted to the nuclear weapon. The depleted uranium was controlled by the item counting in the national system for the small quantity nuclear material. We don't have unique technical methods to clarify the depleted uranium on-the-spot inspection not laboratory scale. Therefore, I would like to suggest of the necessity of the verification methods for depleted uranium. Furthermore, I would like to show you the methods of the verification of the depleted uranium in national system up to now

  19. A simple method for validation and verification of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Stangegaard, Michael; Hansen, Anders Johannes; Frøslev, Tobias Guldberg

     We have implemented a simple method for validation and verification of the performance of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers as necessary for laboratories accredited under ISO 17025. An 8-step serial dilution of Orange G was prepared in quadruplicates in a flat bottom 96-well microtit...... available. In conclusion, we have set up a simple solution for the continuous validation of automated liquid handlers used for accredited work. The method is cheap, simple and easy to use for aqueous solutions but requires a spectrophotometer that can read microtiter plates....... We have implemented a simple method for validation and verification of the performance of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers as necessary for laboratories accredited under ISO 17025. An 8-step serial dilution of Orange G was prepared in quadruplicates in a flat bottom 96-well microtiter...

  20. Potential development of non-destructive assay for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.

    1983-01-01

    After a brief summary on the role of non-destructive assay in safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, its evolution from NDA methods development to other areas is illustrated. These areas are essentially: a) the evaluation of the performances of NDA techniques in field conditions; b) introduction of full automation of measurement instrument operation, using interactive microprocessors and of measurement data handling evaluation and retrieval features; c) introduction of the adequate link and compatibility to assure NDA measurement data transfer in an integrated safeguards data evaluation scheme. In this field, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is developing and implementing a number of techniques and methodologies allowing an integrated and rational treatment of the large amount of safeguards data produced. In particular for the non-destructive assay measurements and techniques, the JRC has studied and tested methodologies for the automatic generation and validation of data of inventory verification. In order to apply these techniques successfully in field, the JRC has studied the design requirements of NDA data management and evaluation systems. This paper also discusses the functional requirements of an integrated system for NDA safeguards data evaluation

  1. Designation and verification of road markings detection and guidance method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Runze; Jian, Yabin; Li, Xiyuan; Shang, Yonghong; Wang, Jing; Zhang, JingChuan

    2018-01-01

    With the rapid development of China's space industry, digitization and intelligent is the tendency of the future. This report is present a foundation research about guidance system which based on the HSV color space. With the help of these research which will help to design the automatic navigation and parking system for the frock transport car and the infrared lamp homogeneity intelligent test equipment. The drive mode, steer mode as well as the navigation method was selected. In consideration of the practicability, it was determined to use the front-wheel-steering chassis. The steering mechanism was controlled by the stepping motors, and it is guided by Machine Vision. The optimization and calibration of the steering mechanism was made. A mathematical model was built and the objective functions was constructed for the steering mechanism. The extraction method of the steering line was studied and the motion controller was designed and optimized. The theory of HSV, RGB color space and analysis of the testing result will be discussed Using the function library OPENCV on the Linux system to fulfill the camera calibration. Based on the HSV color space to design the guidance algorithm.

  2. Method for verification of constituents of a process stream

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baylor, L.C.; Buchanan, B.R.; O`Rourke, P.E.

    1993-01-01

    This invention is comprised of a method for validating a process stream for the presence or absence of a substance of interest such as a chemical warfare agent; that is, for verifying that a chemical warfare agent is present in an input line for feeding the agent into a reaction vessel for destruction, or, in a facility for producing commercial chemical products, that a constituent of the chemical warfare agent has not been substituted for the proper chemical compound. The method includes the steps of transmitting light through a sensor positioned in the feed line just before the chemical constituent in the input line enters the reaction vessel, measuring an optical spectrum of the chemical constituent from the light beam transmitted through it, and comparing the measured spectrum to a reference spectrum of the chemical agent and preferable also reference spectra of surrogates. A signal is given if the chemical agent is not entering a reaction vessel for destruction, or if a constituent of a chemical agent is added to a feed line in substitution of the proper chemical compound.

  3. Bridging nuclear safety, security and safeguards at geological disposl of high level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, Irmgard; Deissmann, Guido; Bosbach, Dirk

    2016-01-01

    Findings and recommendations: • Further R&D needed to identify concepts, methods and technologies that would be best suited for the holistic consideration of safety, security and safeguards provisions of geological disposal. • 3S ‘toolbox’, including concepts, methods and technologies for: ■ material accountancy, ■ measurement techniques for spent fuel verification, ■ containment and surveillance, ■ analysis of open source information, ■ environmental sampling and monitoring, ■ continuity of knowledge, ■ design implications. •: Bridging safety, security and safeguards in research funding and research activities related to geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

  4. A method for online verification of adapted fields using an independent dose monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang Jina; Norrlinger, Bernhard D.; Heaton, Robert K.; Jaffray, David A.; Cho, Young-Bin; Islam, Mohammad K.; Mahon, Robert

    2013-01-01

    Purpose: Clinical implementation of online adaptive radiotherapy requires generation of modified fields and a method of dosimetric verification in a short time. We present a method of treatment field modification to account for patient setup error, and an online method of verification using an independent monitoring system.Methods: The fields are modified by translating each multileaf collimator (MLC) defined aperture in the direction of the patient setup error, and magnifying to account for distance variation to the marked isocentre. A modified version of a previously reported online beam monitoring system, the integral quality monitoring (IQM) system, was investigated for validation of adapted fields. The system consists of a large area ion-chamber with a spatial gradient in electrode separation to provide a spatially sensitive signal for each beam segment, mounted below the MLC, and a calculation algorithm to predict the signal. IMRT plans of ten prostate patients have been modified in response to six randomly chosen setup errors in three orthogonal directions.Results: A total of approximately 49 beams for the modified fields were verified by the IQM system, of which 97% of measured IQM signal agree with the predicted value to within 2%.Conclusions: The modified IQM system was found to be suitable for online verification of adapted treatment fields

  5. Verification methods for treaties limiting and banning nuclear tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voloshin, N.P.

    1998-01-01

    Treaty on limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and treaty on world banning of nuclear tests contribute to and accompany the process of nuclear disarmament. Test ban in three (Moscow treaty of 1963) as well as the Threshold Test Ban up to 1991 was controlled only with national means. But since 1991 nuclear test threshold of 150 kt has been measured with hydrodynamic and tele seismic methods and checked by the inspection. Distinctive feature of this control is that control is that it is bilateral. This conforms to Treaty on limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests signed by two countries - USA and USSR. The inspection at the place of tests requires monitoring of the test site of the party conducting a test and geological information of rock in the area of explosion. In the treaty of the World Nuclear Test Ban the following ways of international control are provided for: - seismologic measurements; - radionuclide measurements; - hydro-acoustics measurements; - infra-sound measurements; - inspection at the place of the tests conduction

  6. Taiwan Power Company's power distribution analysis and fuel thermal margin verification methods for pressurized water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang, P.H.

    1995-01-01

    Taiwan Power Company's (TPC's) power distribution analysis and fuel thermal margin verification methods for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) are examined. The TPC and the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research started a joint 5-yr project in 1989 to establish independent capabilities to perform reload design and transient analysis utilizing state-of-the-art computer programs. As part of the effort, these methods were developed to allow TPC to independently perform verifications of the local power density and departure from nucleate boiling design bases, which are required by the reload safety evaluation for the Maanshan PWR plant. The computer codes utilized were extensively validated for the intended applications. Sample calculations were performed for up to six reload cycles of the Maanshan plant, and the results were found to be quite consistent with the vendor's calculational results

  7. Probabilistic Requirements (Partial) Verification Methods Best Practices Improvement. Variables Acceptance Sampling Calculators: Empirical Testing. Volume 2

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Kenneth L.; White, K. Preston, Jr.

    2012-01-01

    The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to improve on the Best Practices document produced for the NESC assessment, Verification of Probabilistic Requirements for the Constellation Program, by giving a recommended procedure for using acceptance sampling by variables techniques as an alternative to the potentially resource-intensive acceptance sampling by attributes method given in the document. In this paper, the results of empirical tests intended to assess the accuracy of acceptance sampling plan calculators implemented for six variable distributions are presented.

  8. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  9. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  10. Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Jin Ho

    2016-01-01

    The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs

  11. Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Jin Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs.

  12. J. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

  13. A simple method for validation and verification of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Stangegaard, Michael; Hansen, Anders Johannes; Frøslev, Tobias G

    2011-01-01

    We have implemented a simple, inexpensive, and fast procedure for validation and verification of the performance of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers (ALHs) as necessary for laboratories accredited under ISO 17025. A six- or seven-step serial dilution of OrangeG was prepared in quadru......We have implemented a simple, inexpensive, and fast procedure for validation and verification of the performance of pipettes mounted on automated liquid handlers (ALHs) as necessary for laboratories accredited under ISO 17025. A six- or seven-step serial dilution of OrangeG was prepared...... are freely available. In conclusion, we have set up a simple, inexpensive, and fast solution for the continuous validation of ALHs used for accredited work according to the ISO 17025 standard. The method is easy to use for aqueous solutions but requires a spectrophotometer that can read microtiter plates....

  14. Research on Linux Trusted Boot Method Based on Reverse Integrity Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chenlin Huang

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Trusted computing aims to build a trusted computing environment for information systems with the help of secure hardware TPM, which has been proved to be an effective way against network security threats. However, the TPM chips are not yet widely deployed in most computing devices so far, thus limiting the applied scope of trusted computing technology. To solve the problem of lacking trusted hardware in existing computing platform, an alternative security hardware USBKey is introduced in this paper to simulate the basic functions of TPM and a new reverse USBKey-based integrity verification model is proposed to implement the reverse integrity verification of the operating system boot process, which can achieve the effect of trusted boot of the operating system in end systems without TPMs. A Linux operating system booting method based on reverse integrity verification is designed and implemented in this paper, with which the integrity of data and executable files in the operating system are verified and protected during the trusted boot process phase by phase. It implements the trusted boot of operation system without TPM and supports remote attestation of the platform. Enhanced by our method, the flexibility of the trusted computing technology is greatly improved and it is possible for trusted computing to be applied in large-scale computing environment.

  15. Verification of statistical method CORN for modeling of microfuel in the case of high grain concentration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chukbar, B. K., E-mail: bchukbar@mail.ru [National Research Center Kurchatov Institute (Russian Federation)

    2015-12-15

    Two methods of modeling a double-heterogeneity fuel are studied: the deterministic positioning and the statistical method CORN of the MCU software package. The effect of distribution of microfuel in a pebble bed on the calculation results is studied. The results of verification of the statistical method CORN for the cases of the microfuel concentration up to 170 cm{sup –3} in a pebble bed are presented. The admissibility of homogenization of the microfuel coating with the graphite matrix is studied. The dependence of the reactivity on the relative location of fuel and graphite spheres in a pebble bed is found.

  16. Comparison of the methods for determination of calibration and verification intervals of measuring devices

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Toteva Pavlina

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The paper presents different determination and optimisation methods for verification intervals of technical devices for monitoring and measurement based on the requirements of some widely used international standards, e.g. ISO 9001, ISO/IEC 17020, ISO/IEC 17025 etc., maintained by various organizations implementing measuring devices in practice. Comparative analysis of the reviewed methods is conducted in terms of opportunities for assessing the adequacy of interval(s for calibration of measuring devices and their optimisation accepted by an organization – an extension or reduction depending on the obtained results. The advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed methods are discussed, and recommendations for their applicability are provided.

  17. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

  18. Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1984-01-01

    The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

  19. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  20. Method Verification Requirements for an Advanced Imaging System for Microbial Plate Count Enumeration.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, David; Cundell, Tony

    2018-01-01

    The Growth Direct™ System that automates the incubation and reading of membrane filtration microbial counts on soybean-casein digest, Sabouraud dextrose, and R2A agar differs only from the traditional method in that micro-colonies on the membrane are counted using an advanced imaging system up to 50% earlier in the incubation. Based on the recommendations in USP Validation of New Microbiological Testing Methods , the system may be implemented in a microbiology laboratory after simple method verification and not a full method validation. LAY ABSTRACT: The Growth Direct™ System that automates the incubation and reading of microbial counts on membranes on solid agar differs only from the traditional method in that micro-colonies on the membrane are counted using an advanced imaging system up to 50% earlier in the incubation time. Based on the recommendations in USP Validation of New Microbiological Testing Methods , the system may be implemented in a microbiology laboratory after simple method verification and not a full method validation. © PDA, Inc. 2018.

  1. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  2. Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

  3. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  4. Is flow verification necessary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beetle, T.M.

    1986-01-01

    Safeguards test statistics are used in an attempt to detect diversion of special nuclear material. Under assumptions concerning possible manipulation (falsification) of safeguards accounting data, the effects on the statistics due to diversion and data manipulation are described algebraically. A comprehensive set of statistics that is capable of detecting any diversion of material is defined in terms of the algebraic properties of the effects. When the assumptions exclude collusion between persons in two material balance areas, then three sets of accounting statistics are shown to be comprehensive. Two of the sets contain widely known accountancy statistics. One of them does not require physical flow verification - comparisons of operator and inspector data for receipts and shipments. The third set contains a single statistic which does not require physical flow verification. In addition to not requiring technically difficult and expensive flow verification, this single statistic has several advantages over other comprehensive sets of statistics. This algebraic approach as an alternative to flow verification for safeguards accountancy is discussed in this paper

  5. Paying tribute to 25 years of safeguards leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    After phases of intensive development in the 1970s and consolidation in the 1980s, the IAEA's international safeguards system is now in a phase of transition. The 1990s look to be a time when verification activities are further expanded in response to global developments and challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. How far have safeguards come, and where are they headed? This article offers some thoughts and perspectives on the main challenges and opportunities facing IAEA safeguards, in the context of some recent developments and the overall evolution of the safeguards system

  6. Development for ultra-trace analysis method of U and Pu in safeguards environmental samples at the clean facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, Masato; Magara, Masaaki; Sakurai, Satoshi

    2002-01-01

    Based on the strengthen safeguard program of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities and nuclear materials, the method of precise and accurate isotope ratio determination for uranium and plutonium in the environmental samples (cotton swipes) has been developed at JAERI. The samples should be treated in clean environment in order to secure the analytical reliability by eliminating external contamination from the samples containing trace amount of uranium and plutonium. Since the measurement by ICP-MS is favorable to bulk analysis from view points of analytical capacity and operation simplicity, we have studied sample preparation procedures for the trace amount of uranium and plutonium to be applied to ICP-MS. Up to the present, interfering factors involved during analytical processes and the ICP-MS measurement of uranium and plutonium were examined. As a result, uranium isotope measurement more than 100 pg became possible at JAERI clean facility by diminishing uranium blank introduced in the entire sample treatment procedure. And also, the estimation of plutonium recovery yield and uranium decontamination factor suggested the possibility in plutonium isotope measurement more than 100 fg. (author)

  7. Complementary technologies for verification of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langner, D.G.; Nicholas, N.J.; Ensslin, N.; Fearey, B.L.; Mitchell, D.J.; Marlow, K.W.; Luke, S.J.; Gosnell, T.B.

    1998-01-01

    Three complementary measurement technologies have been identified as candidates for use in the verification of excess plutonium of weapons origin. These technologies: high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, neutron multiplicity counting, and low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, are mature, robust technologies. The high-resolution gamma-ray system, Pu-600, uses the 630--670 keV region of the emitted gamma-ray spectrum to determine the ratio of 240 Pu to 239 Pu. It is useful in verifying the presence of plutonium and the presence of weapons-grade plutonium. Neutron multiplicity counting is well suited for verifying that the plutonium is of a safeguardable quantity and is weapons-quality material, as opposed to residue or waste. In addition, multiplicity counting can independently verify the presence of plutonium by virtue of a measured neutron self-multiplication and can detect the presence of non-plutonium neutron sources. The low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopic technique is a template method that can provide continuity of knowledge that an item that enters the a verification regime remains under the regime. In the initial verification of an item, multiple regions of the measured low-resolution spectrum form a unique, gamma-radiation-based template for the item that can be used for comparison in subsequent verifications. In this paper the authors discuss these technologies as they relate to the different attributes that could be used in a verification regime

  8. The IAEA`s safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century; Le systeme de garanties de l`AIEA au seuil du 21e siecle; El sistema de salvaguardias del OIEA a punto para el siglo 21; Sistema garantij magateh gotova vstupleniyu v 21-j vek

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-10-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA`s safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  9. Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2007-01-01

    The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

  10. Optimization of Davies and Gray/NBL method used for determination of total uranium concentration in the safeguards destructive analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silva, Jose Wanderley S. da; Viana, Aline Gonzalez; Barros, Pedro Dionisio de; Cristiano, Barbara Fernandes G., E-mail: wanderley@ird.gov.br, E-mail: agonzalez@ird.gov.br, E-mail: pedrodio@ird.gov.br, E-mail: barbara@ird.gov.br [Instituto de Radioprotecao e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2013-07-01

    One important activity conducted by the Brazilian State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials - SSAC is to verify inventories of the nuclear facilities by nondestructive analysis and destructive analysis. For destructive analysis, the Safeguards Laboratory of Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - LASAL/CNEN has been applying the 'Davies and Gray/NBL' method in samples taken during inspections at nuclear facilities since 1984 in Brazil and Argentina. This method consists of the determination of total uranium concentration by potentiometric titration of uranium (IV) with a standard solution of potassium dichromate as oxidizing agent. This solution is prepared using a K{sub 2}Cr{sub 2}O{sub 7} SRM 136e standard reference material (99.984 ±0.010) wt% certified by National Institute of Standard and Technology - NIST. The procedure also includes the calibration with primary uranium standards reference material (NBL CRM 112A). In order to reduce the consumption of K{sub 2}Cr{sub 2}O{sub 7} and the other reagent involved in the procedure, without any loss in the performance of the method, a K{sub 2}Cr{sub 2}O{sub 7} solution with half the regular concentration was prepared and used to test the uranium concentration in several aliquots with a content between 30 mg to 40 mg of uranium per gram of solution. After optimizing the parameters and procedure, it was possible to get the same performance as well. As a consequence, decreasing of the cost, the amount of waste and also a reduction in the titration time of each aliquot was achieved. Thus, this work describes all details in this research as well as the results and its evaluation. (author)

  11. Optimization of Davies and Gray/NBL method used for determination of total uranium concentration in the safeguards destructive analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Jose Wanderley S. da; Viana, Aline Gonzalez; Barros, Pedro Dionisio de; Cristiano, Barbara Fernandes G.

    2013-01-01

    One important activity conducted by the Brazilian State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials - SSAC is to verify inventories of the nuclear facilities by nondestructive analysis and destructive analysis. For destructive analysis, the Safeguards Laboratory of Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - LASAL/CNEN has been applying the 'Davies and Gray/NBL' method in samples taken during inspections at nuclear facilities since 1984 in Brazil and Argentina. This method consists of the determination of total uranium concentration by potentiometric titration of uranium (IV) with a standard solution of potassium dichromate as oxidizing agent. This solution is prepared using a K 2 Cr 2 O 7 SRM 136e standard reference material (99.984 ±0.010) wt% certified by National Institute of Standard and Technology - NIST. The procedure also includes the calibration with primary uranium standards reference material (NBL CRM 112A). In order to reduce the consumption of K 2 Cr 2 O 7 and the other reagent involved in the procedure, without any loss in the performance of the method, a K 2 Cr 2 O 7 solution with half the regular concentration was prepared and used to test the uranium concentration in several aliquots with a content between 30 mg to 40 mg of uranium per gram of solution. After optimizing the parameters and procedure, it was possible to get the same performance as well. As a consequence, decreasing of the cost, the amount of waste and also a reduction in the titration time of each aliquot was achieved. Thus, this work describes all details in this research as well as the results and its evaluation. (author)

  12. Overview of IAEA guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: objectives, diversion of nuclear material, and the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1984-01-01

    Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification

  13. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab

  14. Safeguards approach for irradiated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

    1987-03-01

    IAEA verification of irradiated fuel has become more complicated because of the introduction of variations in what was once presumed to be a straightforward flow of fuel from reactors to reprocessing plants, with subsequent dissolution. These variations include fuel element disassembly and reassembly, rod consolidation, double-tiering of fuel assemblies in reactor pools, long term wet and dry storage, and use of fuel element containers. This paper reviews future patterns for the transfer and storage of irradiated LWR fuel and discusses appropriate safeguards approaches for at-reactor storage, reprocessing plant headend, independent wet storage, and independent dry storage facilities

  15. Engineered safeguards systems and method in nuclear power plant training simulator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desalu, A.A.

    1977-01-01

    A method and system is disclosed for simulating the dynamic realtime operation of a nuclear power plant wherein a plurality of remote control devices provide input data to a digital computer to calculate physical values corresponding to plant operation to operate indicating devices for monitoring the physical operation of the plant. 24 claims, 29 figures

  16. Formal Verification Method for Configuration of Integrated Modular Avionics System Using MARTE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lisong Wang

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The configuration information of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA system includes almost all details of whole system architecture, which is used to configure the hardware interfaces, operating system, and interactions among applications to make an IMA system work correctly and reliably. It is very important to ensure the correctness and integrity of the configuration in the IMA system design phase. In this paper, we focus on modelling and verification of configuration information of IMA/ARINC653 system based on MARTE (Modelling and Analysis for Real-time and Embedded Systems. Firstly, we define semantic mapping from key concepts of configuration (such as modules, partitions, memory, process, and communications to components of MARTE element and propose a method for model transformation between XML-formatted configuration information and MARTE models. Then we present a formal verification framework for ARINC653 system configuration based on theorem proof techniques, including construction of corresponding REAL theorems according to the semantics of those key components of configuration information and formal verification of theorems for the properties of IMA, such as time constraints, spatial isolation, and health monitoring. After that, a special issue of schedulability analysis of ARINC653 system is studied. We design a hierarchical scheduling strategy with consideration of characters of the ARINC653 system, and a scheduling analyzer MAST-2 is used to implement hierarchical schedule analysis. Lastly, we design a prototype tool, called Configuration Checker for ARINC653 (CC653, and two case studies show that the methods proposed in this paper are feasible and efficient.

  17. Multi-resistance strategy for viral diseases and short hairpin RNA verification method in pigs

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jong-nam Oh

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available Objective Foot and mouth disease (FMD and porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS are major diseases that interrupt porcine production. Because they are viral diseases, vaccinations are of only limited effectiveness in preventing outbreaks. To establish an alternative multi-resistant strategy against FMD virus (FMDV and PRRS virus (PRRSV, the present study introduced two genetic modification techniques to porcine cells. Methods First, cluster of differentiation 163 (CD163, the PRRSV viral receptor, was edited with the clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats-CRISPR-associated protein 9 technique. The CD163 gene sequences of edited cells and control cells differed. Second, short hairpin RNA (shRNAs were integrated into the cells. The shRNAs, targeting the 3D gene of FMDV and the open reading frame 7 (ORF7 gene of PRRSV, were transferred into fibroblasts. We also developed an in vitro shRNA verification method with a target gene expression vector. Results shRNA activity was confirmed in vitro with vectors that expressed the 3D and ORF7 genes in the cells. Cells containing shRNAs showed lower transcript levels than cells with only the expression vectors. The shRNAs were integrated into CD163-edited cells to combine the two techniques, and the viral genes were suppressed in these cells. Conclusion We established a multi-resistant strategy against viral diseases and an in vitro shRNA verification method.

  18. Challenges for effective WMD verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andemicael, B.

    2006-01-01

    Effective verification is crucial to the fulfillment of the objectives of any disarmament treaty, not least as regards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The effectiveness of the verification package depends on a number of factors, some inherent in the agreed structure and others related to the type of responses demanded by emerging challenges. The verification systems of three global agencies-the IAEA, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO, currently the Preparatory Commission), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-share similarities in their broad objectives of confidence-building and deterrence by assuring members that rigorous verification would deter or otherwise detect non-compliance. Yet they are up against various constraints and other issues, both internal and external to the treaty regime. These constraints pose major challenges to the effectiveness and reliability of the verification operations. In the nuclear field, the IAEA safeguards process was the first to evolve incrementally from modest Statute beginnings to a robust verification system under the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear non-proliferation regime is now being supplemented by a technology-intensive verification system of the nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), a product of over three decades of negotiation. However, there still remain fundamental gaps and loopholes in the regime as a whole, which tend to diminish the combined effectiveness of the IAEA and the CTBT verification capabilities. He three major problems are (a) the lack of universality of membership, essentially because of the absence of three nuclear weapon-capable States-India, Pakistan and Israel-from both the NPT and the CTBT, (b) the changes in US disarmament policy, especially in the nuclear field, and (c) the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty. The world is

  19. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  20. FMCT verification: Case studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hui Zhang

    2001-01-01

    Full text: How to manage the trade-off between the need for transparency and the concern about the disclosure of sensitive information would be a key issue during the negotiations of FMCT verification provision. This paper will explore the general concerns on FMCT verification; and demonstrate what verification measures might be applied to those reprocessing and enrichment plants. A primary goal of an FMCT will be to have the five declared nuclear weapon states and the three that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities become parties. One focus in negotiating the FMCT will be verification. Appropriate verification measures should be applied in each case. Most importantly, FMCT verification would focus, in the first instance, on these states' fissile material production facilities. After the FMCT enters into force, all these facilities should be declared. Some would continue operating to produce civil nuclear power or to produce fissile material for non- explosive military uses. The verification measures necessary for these operating facilities would be essentially IAEA safeguards, as currently being applied to non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. However, some production facilities would be declared and shut down. Thus, one important task of the FMCT verifications will be to confirm the status of these closed facilities. As case studies, this paper will focus on the verification of those shutdown facilities. The FMCT verification system for former military facilities would have to differ in some ways from traditional IAEA safeguards. For example, there could be concerns about the potential loss of sensitive information at these facilities or at collocated facilities. Eventually, some safeguards measures such as environmental sampling might be seen as too intrusive. Thus, effective but less intrusive verification measures may be needed. Some sensitive nuclear facilities would be subject for the first time to international inspections, which could raise concerns

  1. Implementation of 'Davies and Gray/NBL Method' for potentiometric titration of uranium in the Safeguards Laboratory of CNEN by the use of a DL-67 mettler titrator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, Radier Mario Silveira de; Barros, Pedro Dionisio de

    2005-01-01

    To meet the requirements of the Brazilian State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials - SSAC, the Safeguards Laboratory of CNEN - LASAL has been applying the 'Davies and Gray/NBL' method for potentiometric determination of total uranium concentration in uranium samples taken during safeguards inspections at nuclear facilities since 1984, using a Radiometer ETS 822 titrator. In order to improve the analytical capability and the procedures related to the titration methodology, the same method was also implemented by using a METTLER DL - 67 titrator. This equipment is microprocessor - controlled and can be connected to additional devices such as printers, analytical balances, etc. It also provides accurate and reproducible results for end-point titrations, providing analytical performance according to the current international safeguards requirements. The implementation of the method in such equipment included the addition of analytical data as well as the improvement of the equipment parameters for uranium determination. Parameters like predispensing volume; titrant data and end-point value were studied. Some uranium samples (solids and solutions) were used during the initial tests with the titrator. A solution of pure uranyl nitrate was used as reference sample for this paper. From this, aliquots were analyzed in both Radiometer ETS-822 and METTLER DL-67. Results obtained from each equipment were compared with the reference value of the sample. The comparison showed that results from METTLER DL-67 meets the precision and accuracy requirements for this kind of analysis and led to the conclusion that the performance of this titrator is adequate for the determination of total uranium content in samples of nuclear materials for safeguards purposes. (author)

  2. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  3. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  4. A method of knowledge base verification and validation for nuclear power plants expert systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Il Won

    1996-02-01

    The adoption of expert systems mainly as operator supporting systems is becoming increasingly popular as the control algorithms of system become more and more sophisticated and complicated. As a result of this popularity, a large number of expert systems are developed. The nature of expert systems, however, requires that they be verified and validated carefully and that detailed methodologies for their development be devised. Therefore, it is widely noted that assuring the reliability of expert systems is very important, especially in nuclear industry, and it is also recognized that the process of verification and validation is an essential part of reliability assurance for these systems. Research and practices have produced numerous methods for expert system verification and validation (V and V) that suggest traditional software and system approaches to V and V. However, many approaches and methods for expert system V and V are partial, unreliable, and not uniform. The purpose of this paper is to present a new approach to expert system V and V, based on Petri nets, providing a uniform model. We devise and suggest an automated tool, called COKEP (Checker Of Knowledge base using Extended Petri net), for checking incorrectness, inconsistency, and incompleteness in a knowledge base. We also suggest heuristic analysis for validation process to show that the reasoning path is correct

  5. Fluid history computation methods for reactor safeguards problems using MNODE computer program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang, Y.S.; Savery, C.W.

    1976-10-01

    A method for predicting the pressure-temperature histories of air, water liquid, and vapor flowing in a zoned containment as a result of high energy pipe rupture is described. The computer code, MNODE, has been developed for 12 connected control volumes and 24 inertia flow paths. Predictions by the code are compared with the results of an analytical gas dynamic problem, semiscale blowdown experiments, full scale MARVIKEN test results, Battelle-Frankfurt model PWR containment test data. The MNODE solutions to NRC/AEC subcompartment benchmark problems are also compared with results predicted by other computer codes such as RELAP-3, FLASH-2, CONTEMPT-PS. The analytical consideration is consistent with Section 6.2.1.2 of the Standard Format (Rev. 2) issued by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in September 1975

  6. Efficiency of material accountability verification procedures: A case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.

    1976-01-01

    In the model agreement INFCIRC/153 the international nuclear materials safeguards system has been established such that the material accountability principle is the main safeguards tool, with containment and surveillance as complementary measures. In addition, it has been agreed that the plant operator generates all data necessary for the material balance establishment and reports them to the safeguards authority and furthermore, that these data are verified by representatives of the safeguards authority with the help of independent measurements. In this paper, the problem of the determination of the efficiency of the combined system - data verification and material balance establishment - is analysed. Here, the difficulty arises that the two statistical procedures used are not independent because part of the operator's data are used in both cases. It is the purpose of this paper to work out the procedure for calculating the systems efficiency, i.e. the overall guaranteed probability of detection for the whole system for an assumed diversion and a given false alarm rate as a function of the safeguards effort spent over a given interval of time. Simplified formulae are derived which allow for a quick determination of the whole system efficiency: it is shown that the correlation between the two parts of the total system can be neglected. Therefore, the total systems efficiency can be represented as the product of the efficiencies of the two subsystems. The method developed is applied to a concrete case of a chemical reprocessing plant for irradiated fuels on the basis of data collected earlier. (author)

  7. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  8. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

  9. The NRC measurement verification program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pham, T.N.; Ong, L.D.Y.

    1995-01-01

    A perspective is presented on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach for effectively monitoring the measurement methods and directly testing the capability and performance of licensee measurement systems. A main objective in material control and accounting (MC and A) inspection activities is to assure the accuracy and precision of the accounting system and the absence of potential process anomalies through overall accountability. The primary means of verification remains the NRC random sampling during routine safeguards inspections. This involves the independent testing of licensee measurement performance with statistical sampling plans for physical inventories, item control, and auditing. A prospective cost-effective alternative overcheck is also discussed in terms of an externally coordinated sample exchange or ''round robin'' program among participating fuel cycle facilities in order to verify the quality of measurement systems, i.e., to assure that analytical measurement results are free of bias

  10. Assessment of ambient-temperature, high-resolution detectors for nuclear safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruhter, W.D.; McQuaid, J.H.; Lavietes, A.

    1993-01-01

    High-resolution, gamma- and x-ray spectrometry are used routinely in nuclear safeguards verification measurements of plutonium and uranium in the field. These measurements are now performed with high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors that require cooling liquid-nitrogen temperatures, thus limiting their utility in field and unattended safeguards measurement applications. Ambient temperature semiconductor detectors may complement HPGe detectors for certain safeguards verification applications. Their potential will be determined by criteria such as their performance, commercial availability, stage of development, and costs. We have conducted as assessment of ambient temperature detectors for safeguards measurement applications with these criteria in mind

  11. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W S; Cha, H R; Ham, Y S; Lee, Y G; Kim, K P; Hong, Y D

    1999-04-01

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  12. Verification and Validation of a Coordinate Transformation Method in Axisymmetric Transient Magnetics.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ashcraft, C. Chace [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Niederhaus, John Henry [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Robinson, Allen C. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-01-29

    We present a verification and validation analysis of a coordinate-transformation-based numerical solution method for the two-dimensional axisymmetric magnetic diffusion equation, implemented in the finite-element simulation code ALEGRA. The transformation, suggested by Melissen and Simkin, yields an equation set perfectly suited for linear finite elements and for problems with large jumps in material conductivity near the axis. The verification analysis examines transient magnetic diffusion in a rod or wire in a very low conductivity background by first deriving an approximate analytic solution using perturbation theory. This approach for generating a reference solution is shown to be not fully satisfactory. A specialized approach for manufacturing an exact solution is then used to demonstrate second-order convergence under spatial refinement and tem- poral refinement. For this new implementation, a significant improvement relative to previously available formulations is observed. Benefits in accuracy for computed current density and Joule heating are also demonstrated. The validation analysis examines the circuit-driven explosion of a copper wire using resistive magnetohydrodynamics modeling, in comparison to experimental tests. The new implementation matches the accuracy of the existing formulation, with both formulations capturing the experimental burst time and action to within approximately 2%.

  13. Content-based Image Hiding Method for Secure Network Biometric Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xiangjiu Che

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available For secure biometric verification, most existing methods embed biometric information directly into the cover image, but content correlation analysis between the biometric image and the cover image is often ignored. In this paper, we propose a novel biometric image hiding approach based on the content correlation analysis to protect the network-based transmitted image. By using principal component analysis (PCA, the content correlation between the biometric image and the cover image is firstly analyzed. Then based on particle swarm optimization (PSO algorithm, some regions of the cover image are selected to represent the biometric image, in which the cover image can carry partial content of the biometric image. As a result of the correlation analysis, the unrepresented part of the biometric image is embedded into the cover image by using the discrete wavelet transform (DWT. Combined with human visual system (HVS model, this approach makes the hiding result perceptually invisible. The extensive experimental results demonstrate that the proposed hiding approach is robust against some common frequency and geometric attacks; it also provides an effective protection for the secure biometric verification.

  14. NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring. Report on activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR). Finnish support programme to the IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Helsinki (Finland); Levai, F [Technical Univ., Budabest (Hungary); Valentine, T E [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Abhold, M [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Moran, B [USNRC, Washington, DC (United States)

    1997-08-01

    A variety of NDA methods exist for measurement of spent fuel at various stages of the disposition process. Each of the methods has weaknesses and strengths that make them applicable to one or more stages in disposition. Both passive and active methods are, under favorable conditions, capable of providing either a mapping of an assembly to identify missing fuel pins or a measurement of the fissile content and some are capable of providing a mapping of a canister to identify missing assemblies or a measurement of the fissile content. However, a spent fuel measurement system capable of making routine partial defect tests of spent fuel assemblies is missing. The active NDA methods, in particular, the active neutron methods, hold the most promise for providing quantitative measurements on fuel assemblies and canisters. Application of NDA methods to shielded casks may not be practical or even possible due to the extent of radiation attenuation by the shielding materials, and none of these methods are considered to have potential for quantitative measurements once the spent fuel cask has been placed in a repository. The most practical approach to spent fuel verification is to confirm the characteristics of the spent fuel prior to loading in a canister or cask at the conditioning facility. Fissile material tracking systems in addition to containment and surveillance methods have the capability to assure continuity of the verified knowledge of the sample from loading of the canisters to final disposal and closing of the repository. (orig.). 49 refs.

  15. NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring. Report on activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR). Finnish support programme to the IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, M.; Levai, F.; Valentine, T.E.; Abhold, M.; Moran, B.

    1997-08-01

    A variety of NDA methods exist for measurement of spent fuel at various stages of the disposition process. Each of the methods has weaknesses and strengths that make them applicable to one or more stages in disposition. Both passive and active methods are, under favorable conditions, capable of providing either a mapping of an assembly to identify missing fuel pins or a measurement of the fissile content and some are capable of providing a mapping of a canister to identify missing assemblies or a measurement of the fissile content. However, a spent fuel measurement system capable of making routine partial defect tests of spent fuel assemblies is missing. The active NDA methods, in particular, the active neutron methods, hold the most promise for providing quantitative measurements on fuel assemblies and canisters. Application of NDA methods to shielded casks may not be practical or even possible due to the extent of radiation attenuation by the shielding materials, and none of these methods are considered to have potential for quantitative measurements once the spent fuel cask has been placed in a repository. The most practical approach to spent fuel verification is to confirm the characteristics of the spent fuel prior to loading in a canister or cask at the conditioning facility. Fissile material tracking systems in addition to containment and surveillance methods have the capability to assure continuity of the verified knowledge of the sample from loading of the canisters to final disposal and closing of the repository. (orig.)

  16. Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, T.

    2001-01-01

    Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

  17. A fast online hit verification method for the single ion hit system at GSI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Du, G.; Fischer, B.; Barberet, P.; Heiss, M.

    2006-01-01

    For a single ion hit facility built to irradiate specific targets inside biological cells, it is necessary to prove that the ions hit the selected targets reliably because the ion hits usually cannot be seen. That ability is traditionally tested either indirectly by aiming at pre-etched tracks in a nuclear track detector or directly by making the ion tracks inside cells visible using a stain coupled to special proteins produced in response to ion hits. However, both methods are time consuming and hits can be verified only after the experiment. This means that targeting errors in the experiment cannot be corrected during the experiment. Therefore, we have developed a fast online hit verification method that measures the targeting accuracy electronically with a spatial resolution of ±1 μm before cell irradiation takes place. (authors)

  18. On the pinned field image binarization for signature generation in image ownership verification method

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chang Hsuan

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract The issue of pinned field image binarization for signature generation in the ownership verification of the protected image is investigated. The pinned field explores the texture information of the protected image and can be employed to enhance the watermark robustness. In the proposed method, four optimization schemes are utilized to determine the threshold values for transforming the pinned field into a binary feature image, which is then utilized to generate an effective signature image. Experimental results show that the utilization of optimization schemes can significantly improve the signature robustness from the previous method (Lee and Chang, Opt. Eng. 49 (9, 097005, 2010. While considering both the watermark retrieval rate and the computation speed, the genetic algorithm is strongly recommended. In addition, compared with Chang and Lin's scheme (J. Syst. Softw. 81 (7, 1118-1129, 2008, the proposed scheme also has better performance.

  19. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

    2014-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA

  20. Model-based verification method for solving the parameter uncertainty in the train control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheng, Ruijun; Zhou, Jin; Chen, Dewang; Song, Yongduan

    2016-01-01

    This paper presents a parameter analysis method to solve the parameter uncertainty problem for hybrid system and explore the correlation of key parameters for distributed control system. For improving the reusability of control model, the proposed approach provides the support for obtaining the constraint sets of all uncertain parameters in the abstract linear hybrid automata (LHA) model when satisfying the safety requirements of the train control system. Then, in order to solve the state space explosion problem, the online verification method is proposed to monitor the operating status of high-speed trains online because of the real-time property of the train control system. Furthermore, we construct the LHA formal models of train tracking model and movement authority (MA) generation process as cases to illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method. In the first case, we obtain the constraint sets of uncertain parameters to avoid collision between trains. In the second case, the correlation of position report cycle and MA generation cycle is analyzed under both the normal and the abnormal condition influenced by packet-loss factor. Finally, considering stochastic characterization of time distributions and real-time feature of moving block control system, the transient probabilities of wireless communication process are obtained by stochastic time petri nets. - Highlights: • We solve the parameters uncertainty problem by using model-based method. • We acquire the parameter constraint sets by verifying linear hybrid automata models. • Online verification algorithms are designed to monitor the high-speed trains. • We analyze the correlation of key parameters and uncritical parameters. • The transient probabilities are obtained by using reliability analysis.

  1. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    agreements. Agency is currently preparing a manual which will describe the methods of accounting , stock-taking, storehousing and measuring nuclear material that may be in various plants under Agency direction. The general principles for control of the hazards to health and safety at the plants due to radiation, radioactive contamination, criticality, or fire, will also be discussed. This manual is expected to become a valuable source book on internal safeguards procedures for all countries embarking on atomic energy programmes. France and the United States for the development of techniques for the non-destructive analysis of irradiated fuel elements

  2. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    agreements. Agency is currently preparing a manual which will describe the methods of accounting , stock-taking, storehousing and measuring nuclear material that may be in various plants under Agency direction. The general principles for control of the hazards to health and safety at the plants due to radiation, radioactive contamination, criticality, or fire, will also be discussed. This manual is expected to become a valuable source book on internal safeguards procedures for all countries embarking on atomic energy programmes. France and the United States for the development of techniques for the non-destructive analysis of irradiated fuel elements

  3. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

    2002-05-01

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

  4. Automation and uncertainty analysis of a method for in-vivo range verification in particle therapy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frey, K; Unholtz, D; Bauer, J; Debus, J; Min, C H; Bortfeld, T; Paganetti, H; Parodi, K

    2014-10-07

    We introduce the automation of the range difference calculation deduced from particle-irradiation induced β(+)-activity distributions with the so-called most-likely-shift approach, and evaluate its reliability via the monitoring of algorithm- and patient-specific uncertainty factors. The calculation of the range deviation is based on the minimization of the absolute profile differences in the distal part of two activity depth profiles shifted against each other. Depending on the workflow of positron emission tomography (PET)-based range verification, the two profiles under evaluation can correspond to measured and simulated distributions, or only measured data from different treatment sessions. In comparison to previous work, the proposed approach includes an automated identification of the distal region of interest for each pair of PET depth profiles and under consideration of the planned dose distribution, resulting in the optimal shift distance. Moreover, it introduces an estimate of uncertainty associated to the identified shift, which is then used as weighting factor to 'red flag' problematic large range differences. Furthermore, additional patient-specific uncertainty factors are calculated using available computed tomography (CT) data to support the range analysis. The performance of the new method for in-vivo treatment verification in the clinical routine is investigated with in-room PET images for proton therapy as well as with offline PET images for proton and carbon ion therapy. The comparison between measured PET activity distributions and predictions obtained by Monte Carlo simulations or measurements from previous treatment fractions is performed. For this purpose, a total of 15 patient datasets were analyzed, which were acquired at Massachusetts General Hospital and Heidelberg Ion-Beam Therapy Center with in-room PET and offline PET/CT scanners, respectively. Calculated range differences between the compared activity distributions are reported in a

  5. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  6. SU-E-I-24: Method for CT Automatic Exposure Control Verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gracia, M; Olasolo, J; Martin, M; Bragado, L; Gallardo, N; Miquelez, S; Maneru, F; Lozares, S; Pellejero, S; Rubio, A [Complejo Hospitalario de Navarra, Pamplona, Navarra (Spain)

    2015-06-15

    Purpose: Design of a phantom and a simple method for the automatic exposure control (AEC) verification in CT. This verification is included in the computed tomography (CT) Spanish Quality Assurance Protocol. Methods: The phantom design is made from the head and the body phantom used for the CTDI measurement and PMMA plates (35×35 cm2) of 10 cm thickness. Thereby, three different thicknesses along the longitudinal axis are obtained which permit to evaluate the longitudinal AEC performance. Otherwise, the existent asymmetry in the PMMA layers helps to assess angular and 3D AEC operation.Recent acquisition in our hospital (August 2014) of Nomex electrometer (PTW), together with the 10 cm pencil ionization chamber, led to register dose rate as a function of time. Measurements with this chamber fixed at 0° and 90° on the gantry where made on five multidetector-CTs from principal manufacturers. Results: Individual analysis of measurements shows dose rate variation as a function of phantom thickness. The comparative analysis shows that dose rate is kept constant in the head and neck phantom while the PMMA phantom exhibits an abrupt variation between both results, being greater results at 90° as the thickness of the phantom is 3.5 times larger than in the perpendicular direction. Conclusion: Proposed method is simple, quick and reproducible. Results obtained let a qualitative evaluation of the AEC and they are consistent with the expected behavior. A line of future development is to quantitatively study the intensity modulation and parameters of image quality, and a possible comparative study between different manufacturers.

  7. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  8. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  9. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  10. Five-equation and robust three-equation methods for solution verification of large eddy simulation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutta, Rabijit; Xing, Tao

    2018-02-01

    This study evaluates the recently developed general framework for solution verification methods for large eddy simulation (LES) using implicitly filtered LES of periodic channel flows at friction Reynolds number of 395 on eight systematically refined grids. The seven-equation method shows that the coupling error based on Hypothesis I is much smaller as compared with the numerical and modeling errors and therefore can be neglected. The authors recommend five-equation method based on Hypothesis II, which shows a monotonic convergence behavior of the predicted numerical benchmark ( S C ), and provides realistic error estimates without the need of fixing the orders of accuracy for either numerical or modeling errors. Based on the results from seven-equation and five-equation methods, less expensive three and four-equation methods for practical LES applications were derived. It was found that the new three-equation method is robust as it can be applied to any convergence types and reasonably predict the error trends. It was also observed that the numerical and modeling errors usually have opposite signs, which suggests error cancellation play an essential role in LES. When Reynolds averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) based error estimation method is applied, it shows significant error in the prediction of S C on coarse meshes. However, it predicts reasonable S C when the grids resolve at least 80% of the total turbulent kinetic energy.

  11. Tokai advanced safeguards technology exercise task T-F: study of selected capabilities needed to apply DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, L.L.; Augustson, R.H.

    1979-10-01

    Selected technical capabilities needed to apply the DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reproprocessing plant are presented. The measurements needed to close the mass balance around the process line and the analysis methods for assessing the results were investigated. Process conditions at the Tokai plant were used when numerical values were needed to assist the analyis. A rationale is presented for the selection of instruments (x-ray fluorescence spectrometers, x-ray densitometers, and gamma-ray spectrometers) best suited to establishing plutonium concentrations and inventories in the feed tanks. The current state of the art in estimating inventory in contactors is reviewed and profitable directions for further work are recommended. A generalized performance surface has been developed that can measure the diversion sensitivity of the safeguard system when the instrument performance levels, the number of measurements made, and the false alarm probability are specified. An analysis of its application to the Tokai plant is given. Finally, a conceptual approach to the problem of IAEA safeguards verification is discussed. It appears possible that, in the process of verifying, the full power of the plant operator's safeguard system can be brought to the service of the IAEA

  12. Solution verification, goal-oriented adaptive methods for stochastic advection–diffusion problems

    KAUST Repository

    Almeida, Regina C.

    2010-08-01

    A goal-oriented analysis of linear, stochastic advection-diffusion models is presented which provides both a method for solution verification as well as a basis for improving results through adaptation of both the mesh and the way random variables are approximated. A class of model problems with random coefficients and source terms is cast in a variational setting. Specific quantities of interest are specified which are also random variables. A stochastic adjoint problem associated with the quantities of interest is formulated and a posteriori error estimates are derived. These are used to guide an adaptive algorithm which adjusts the sparse probabilistic grid so as to control the approximation error. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the methodology for a specific model problem. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

  13. Solution verification, goal-oriented adaptive methods for stochastic advection–diffusion problems

    KAUST Repository

    Almeida, Regina C.; Oden, J. Tinsley

    2010-01-01

    A goal-oriented analysis of linear, stochastic advection-diffusion models is presented which provides both a method for solution verification as well as a basis for improving results through adaptation of both the mesh and the way random variables are approximated. A class of model problems with random coefficients and source terms is cast in a variational setting. Specific quantities of interest are specified which are also random variables. A stochastic adjoint problem associated with the quantities of interest is formulated and a posteriori error estimates are derived. These are used to guide an adaptive algorithm which adjusts the sparse probabilistic grid so as to control the approximation error. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the methodology for a specific model problem. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

  14. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  15. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  16. Neutron techniques in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zucker, M.S.

    1982-01-01

    An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

  17. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  18. International Atomic Energy Agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McRae, L.P.; Delegard, C.H.; Hamilton, R.A.; Westsik, G.A.; Moriarty, T.F.; Lemaire, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses qualitative and quantitative techniques to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. The Agency uses weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses to obtain the most accurate verification measurements of containers of plutonium powders. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator''s calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically, with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses. Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator''s calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of, calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed

  19. Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, J S; Kim, H D; Lee, Y G; Kang, H Y; Cha, H R; Byeon, K H; Park, Y S; Choi, H N [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

  20. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  1. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  2. RELAP-7 Software Verification and Validation Plan: Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM) Part 1 – Physics and numerical methods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Yong Joon [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Yoo, Jun Soo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Smith, Curtis Lee [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-09-01

    This INL plan comprehensively describes the Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM) on main physics and numerical method of the RELAP-7. The plan also describes the testing-based software verification and validation (SV&V) process—a set of specially designed software models used to test RELAP-7.

  3. A safeguards approach for a closed geological repository for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meer, K. van der; Carchon, R.

    1999-01-01

    After closure of a geological repository a diversion of fissile material can only take place by excavating spent fuel containers and bringing them to the surface. Therefore mining activities are required, either by reopening the original shaft, by creating a new shaft or by approaching the containers underground via a neighbouring mine The recovery time of the stored spent fuel plays an important role in the determination of the timeliness criterion and, therefore, the inspection frequency of the site. Obviously, this frequency can create a financial constraint due to the infinite character of the spent fuel storage in a geological repository. Anomalies for detection of a possible diversion are undeclared mining activities. The safeguards approach has to assure Continuity Of Knowledge (COK) of the fissile material. By consequence, a safeguards approach that is developed for a closed repository, is influenced by the safeguards approach applied to an open. repository and a conditioning facility. A closed repository is verified by DIV. To perform the DIV satellite monitoring could be performed for surface verification and e.g. seismic techniques could be used for verification that no undeclared mining activities underground take place. Visual inspections of the site by inspectors have to reveal concealment methods used by a potential diverter. These measures should guarantee that the disposed spent fuel remains untouched. (author)

  4. Spent fuel encapsulation and verification. Safequards workshop in Helsinki, Finland, 19-20 December 2000. Phase II interim report on Task FIN C1184 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Honkamaa, T. (ed.)

    2001-03-01

    According the present plans the final disposal of spent fuel will begin in Finland in 2020. The construction of the encapsulation facility will begin five years earlier. Preliminary design of encapsulation facility has already been presented by Finnish nuclear waste management company Posiva ltd. In order to avoid unnecessary costs and delays in implementation of safeguards regime in the facility, the safeguards-related aspects should be taken into account in early phase. This requires open communication between the operator, regulators and expert bodies. In December 2000, Finnish Support Programme to IAEA safeguards arranged a workshop to facilitate the communication between the operators, regulators and experts. Due to the new concept, the open discussion is beneficial and necessary for all parties. One goal of the workshop was also to provide basis for further designing of the facility. The goals for the meeting were achieved. The discussions were conducted in very good and fruitful atmosphere. The conclusions and recommendations of the workshop were discussed and written down by the chair of the final session. The draft document was distributed to the participants and all comments were taken into account, This report, representing the views of the participants, gives also recommendations for further work. It was tentatively agreed that parties will meet again in 2001 to review and discuss, in an informal atmosphere, facility design developments and potential safeguards measures. Action to convene the meeting is on the FINSP (orig.)

  5. Practical experience with a local verification system for containment and surveillance sensors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1984-01-01

    With the growing number of nuclear facilities and a number of large commercial bulk handling facilities steadily coming into operation the International Atomic Energy Agency is faced with increasing requirements as to reducing its inspection efforts. One means of meeting these requirements will be to deploy facility based remote interrogation methods for its containment and surveillance instrumentation. Such a technical concept of remote interrogation was realized through the so-called LOVER system development, a local verification system for electronic safeguards seal systems. In the present investigations the application was extended to radiation monitoring by introducing an electronic interface between the electronic safeguards seal and the neutron detector electronics of a waste monitoring system. The paper discusses the safeguards motivation and background, the experimental setup of the safeguards system and the performance characteristics of this LOVER system. First conclusions can be drawn from the performance results with respect to the applicability in international safeguards. This comprises in particular the definition of design specifications for an integrated remote interrogation system for various types of containment and surveillance instruments and the specifications of safeguards applications employing such a system

  6. Development of optical ground verification method for μm to sub-mm reflectors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stockman, Y.; Thizy, C.; Lemaire, P.; Georges, M.; Mazy, E.; Mazzoli, A.; Houbrechts, Y.; Rochus, P.; Roose, S.; Doyle, D.; Ulbrich, G.

    2017-11-01

    develop and realise suitable verification tools based on infrared interferometry and other optical techniques for testing large reflector structures, telescope configurations and their performances under simulated space conditions. Two methods and techniques are developed at CSL. The first one is an IR-phase shifting interferometer with high spatial resolution. This interferometer shall be used specifically for the verification of high precision IR, FIR and sub-mm reflector surfaces and telescopes under both ambient and thermal vacuum conditions. The second one presented hereafter is a holographic method for relative shape measurement. The holographic solution proposed makes use of a home built vacuum compatible holographic camera that allows displacement measurements from typically 20 nanometres to 25 microns in one shot. An iterative process allows the measurement of a total of up to several mm of deformation. Uniquely the system is designed to measure both specular and diffuse surfaces.

  7. Assessing data quality and the variability of source data verification auditing methods in clinical research settings.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Houston, Lauren; Probst, Yasmine; Martin, Allison

    2018-05-18

    Data audits within clinical settings are extensively used as a major strategy to identify errors, monitor study operations and ensure high-quality data. However, clinical trial guidelines are non-specific in regards to recommended frequency, timing and nature of data audits. The absence of a well-defined data quality definition and method to measure error undermines the reliability of data quality assessment. This review aimed to assess the variability of source data verification (SDV) auditing methods to monitor data quality in a clinical research setting. The scientific databases MEDLINE, Scopus and Science Direct were searched for English language publications, with no date limits applied. Studies were considered if they included data from a clinical trial or clinical research setting and measured and/or reported data quality using a SDV auditing method. In total 15 publications were included. The nature and extent of SDV audit methods in the articles varied widely, depending upon the complexity of the source document, type of study, variables measured (primary or secondary), data audit proportion (3-100%) and collection frequency (6-24 months). Methods for coding, classifying and calculating error were also inconsistent. Transcription errors and inexperienced personnel were the main source of reported error. Repeated SDV audits using the same dataset demonstrated ∼40% improvement in data accuracy and completeness over time. No description was given in regards to what determines poor data quality in clinical trials. A wide range of SDV auditing methods are reported in the published literature though no uniform SDV auditing method could be determined for "best practice" in clinical trials. Published audit methodology articles are warranted for the development of a standardised SDV auditing method to monitor data quality in clinical research settings. Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  8. Guidelines for the verification and validation of expert system software and conventional software: Survey and assessment of conventional software verification and validation methods. Volume 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mirsky, S.M.; Groundwater, E.H.; Hayes, J.E.; Miller, L.A. [Science Applications International Corp., McLean, VA (United States)

    1995-03-01

    By means of a literature survey, a comprehensive set of methods was identified for the verification and validation of conventional software. The 153 methods so identified were classified according to their appropriateness for various phases of a developmental life-cycle -- requirements, design, and implementation; the last category was subdivided into two, static testing and dynamic testing methods. The methods were then characterized in terms of eight rating factors, four concerning ease-of-use of the methods and four concerning the methods` power to detect defects. Based on these factors, two measurements were developed to permit quantitative comparisons among methods, a Cost-Benefit metric and an Effectiveness Metric. The Effectiveness Metric was further refined to provide three different estimates for each method, depending on three classes of needed stringency of V&V (determined by ratings of a system`s complexity and required-integrity). Methods were then rank-ordered for each of the three classes by terms of their overall cost-benefits and effectiveness. The applicability was then assessed of each for the identified components of knowledge-based and expert systems, as well as the system as a whole.

  9. Guidelines for the verification and validation of expert system software and conventional software: Survey and assessment of conventional software verification and validation methods. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsky, S.M.; Groundwater, E.H.; Hayes, J.E.; Miller, L.A.

    1995-03-01

    By means of a literature survey, a comprehensive set of methods was identified for the verification and validation of conventional software. The 153 methods so identified were classified according to their appropriateness for various phases of a developmental life-cycle -- requirements, design, and implementation; the last category was subdivided into two, static testing and dynamic testing methods. The methods were then characterized in terms of eight rating factors, four concerning ease-of-use of the methods and four concerning the methods' power to detect defects. Based on these factors, two measurements were developed to permit quantitative comparisons among methods, a Cost-Benefit metric and an Effectiveness Metric. The Effectiveness Metric was further refined to provide three different estimates for each method, depending on three classes of needed stringency of V ampersand V (determined by ratings of a system's complexity and required-integrity). Methods were then rank-ordered for each of the three classes by terms of their overall cost-benefits and effectiveness. The applicability was then assessed of each for the identified components of knowledge-based and expert systems, as well as the system as a whole

  10. An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

    1976-01-01

    Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

  11. A new verification method for vehicle electronics; Ein neues Testverfahren zur Verifikation der Fahrzeugelektrik/-elektronik

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sigwart, A.; Bockemuehl, P. [Ford-Werke AG, Koeln (Germany)

    2001-07-01

    A reliable and durable design of electronic and electrical components of a vehicle is without an adequate verification method inconceivable. Until now the supplier were responsible to verify their components on test benches. Later in the development process the durability is being tested on the proving ground or on hot/cold climate trips. This has been found as not robust enough to deliver high quality to our customer. Due to complex relation between the subsystems and various failure modes a new verification method has been developed. To overcome quality issues a project has been initiated to combine road load conditions, full environmental conditions with driverless actuation. Central part of the project is a small handling robot positioned in the car instead of the driver simulating the customer behaviors by actuating all electrical switches, while the vehicle is in an environmental test chamber (temperature, humidity and sunload) and on a 4-poster road simulator. With an automated procedure the road loads and environmental conditions are combined with the actuation of all electrical components. With this method more complex tasks can be realized. It is now possible to simulate real world customer usage within a short time frame. (orig.) [German] Ein ausfallsicheres Design elektrischer / elektronischer Komponenten im Fahrzeug kann ohne einen Versuch mit kundenrelevanten Parametern nicht realisiert werden. Bisher wurden diese Komponenten beim Lieferanten als Einzelteil und spaeter im Entwicklungsprozess dann im Fahrzeug waehrend der Dauerlauferprobung getestet. Aufgrund der komplexen Zusammenhaenge aller Teilsysteme und der Vielfalt von Versagensarten wurde bei Ford ein neues Testverfahren, ein sog. Key Life Test, entwickelt. Key Life Tests konzentrieren sich auf die wichtigsten Beanspruchungen, die fuer den Funktionsverlust und/oder die im realen Einsatz auftretenden Ausfallarten verantwortlich sind. Die Basis hierfuer bildet ein klimatisierter Testroboter, der

  12. Novel method based on Fricke gel dosimeters for dose verification in IMRT techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aon, E.; Brunetto, M.; Sansogne, R.; Castellano, G.; Valente, M.

    2008-01-01

    Modern radiotherapy is becoming increasingly complex. Conformal and intensity modulated (IMRT) techniques are nowadays available for achieving better tumour control. However, accurate methods for 3D dose verification for these modern irradiation techniques have not been adequately established yet. Fricke gel dosimeters consist, essentially, in a ferrous sulphate (Fricke) solution fixed to a gel matrix, which enables spatial resolution. A suitable radiochromic marker (xylenol orange) is added to the solution in order to produce radiochromic changes within the visible spectrum range, due to the chemical internal conversion (oxidation) of ferrous ions to ferric ions. In addition, xylenol orange has proved to slow down the internal diffusion effect of ferric ions. These dosimeters suitably shaped in form of thin layers and optically analyzed by means of visible light transmission imaging have recently been proposed as a method for 3D absorbed dose distribution determinations in radiotherapy, and tested in several IMRT applications employing a homogeneous plane (visible light) illuminator and a CCD camera with a monochromatic filter for sample analysis by means of transmittance images. In this work, the performance of an alternative read-out method is characterized, consisting on visible light images, acquired before and after irradiation by means of a commercially available flatbed-like scanner. Registered images are suitably converted to matrices and analyzed by means of dedicated 'in-house' software. The integral developed method allows performing 1D (profiles), 2D (surfaces) and 3D (volumes) dose mapping. In addition, quantitative comparisons have been performed by means of the Gamma composite criteria. Dose distribution comparisons between Fricke gel dosimeters and traditional standard dosimetric techniques for IMRT irradiations show an overall good agreement, supporting the suitability of the method. The agreement, quantified by the gamma index (that seldom

  13. Role of materials accounting in integrated safeguards systems for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.

    1981-01-01

    Integration of materials accounting and containment/surveillance techniques for international safeguards requires careful examination and definition of suitable inspector activities for verification of operator's materials accounting data. The inspector's verification procedures are designed to protect against data falsification and/or the use of measurement uncertainties to conceal missing material. Materials accounting activities are developed to provide an effective international safeguards system when combined with containment/surveillance activities described in a companion paper

  14. The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.H.F.

    1982-09-01

    In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

  15. INF and IAEA: A comparative analysis of verification strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Kratzer, M.

    1992-07-01

    This is the final report of a study on the relevance and possible lessons of Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) verification to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards activities

  16. How regional non-proliferation arrangements complement international verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation focuses on international verification in the form of IAEA Safeguards, and discusses the relationship between IAEA safeguards and the relevant regional arrangements, both the existing and the future. For most States the political commitment against acquisition of nuclear weapons has been carefully reached and strongly held. Their observance of treaty commitments does not depend on the deterrent effect of verification activities. Safeguards serve to assist States who recognise it is in their own interest to demonstrate their compliance to others. Thus safeguards are a vital confidence building measure in their own right, as well as being a major complement to the broader range of international confidence building measures. Safeguards can both complement other confidence building measures and in turn be complemented by them. Within consideration of how it could work it is useful to consider briefly current developments of IAEA safeguards, i.e. existing regional arrangements and nuclear weapon free zones

  17. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  18. Against the spread of nuclear weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    This booklet describes the role of IAEA verification activities, or safeguards, in the non-proliferation regime and shows how safeguards provide confidence that States fulfill the obligations they have undertaken in relation to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It also describes ways in which this role could develop in the future

  19. Practical approach to a procedure for judging the results of analytical verification measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beyrich, W.; Spannagel, G.

    1979-01-01

    For practical safeguards a particularly transparent procedure is described to judge analytical differences between declared and verified values based on experimental data relevant to the actual status of the measurement technique concerned. Essentially it consists of two parts: Derivation of distribution curves for the occurrence of interlaboratory differences from the results of analytical intercomparison programmes; and judging of observed differences using criteria established on the basis of these probability curves. By courtesy of the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg, the applicability of this judging procedure has been checked in practical data verification for safeguarding; the experience gained was encouraging and implementation of the method is intended. Its reliability might be improved further by evaluation of additional experimental data. (author)

  20. Experience of Integrated Safeguards Approach for Large-scale Hot Cell Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyaji, N.; Kawakami, Y.; Koizumi, A.; Otsuji, A.; Sasaki, K.

    2010-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been operating a large-scale hot cell laboratory, the Fuels Monitoring Facility (FMF), located near the experimental fast reactor Joyo at the Oarai Research and Development Center (JNC-2 site). The FMF conducts post irradiation examinations (PIE) of fuel assemblies irradiated in Joyo. The assemblies are disassembled and non-destructive examinations, such as X-ray computed tomography tests, are carried out. Some of the fuel pins are cut into specimens and destructive examinations, such as ceramography and X-ray micro analyses, are performed. Following PIE, the tested material, in the form of a pin or segments, is shipped back to a Joyo spent fuel pond. In some cases, after reassembly of the examined irradiated fuel pins is completed, the fuel assemblies are shipped back to Joyo for further irradiation. For the IAEA to apply the integrated safeguards approach (ISA) to the FMF, a new verification system on material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF has been established by the IAEA under technical collaboration among the Japan Safeguard Office (JSGO) of MEXT, the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) and the JAEA. The main concept of receipt/shipment verification under the ISA for JNC-2 site is as follows: under the IS, the FMF is treated as a Joyo-associated facility in terms of its safeguards system because it deals with the same spent fuels. Verification of the material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF can only be applied to the declared transport routes and transport casks. The verification of the nuclear material contained in the cask is performed with the method of gross defect at the time of short notice random interim inspections (RIIs) by measuring the surface neutron dose rate of the cask, filled with water to reduce radiation. The JAEA performed a series of preliminary tests with the IAEA, the JSGO and the NMCC, and confirmed from the standpoint of the operator that this

  1. Verification of Bioanalytical Method for Quantification of Exogenous Insulin (Insulin Aspart) by the Analyser Advia Centaur® XP.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mihailov, Rossen; Stoeva, Dilyana; Pencheva, Blagovesta; Pentchev, Eugeni

    2018-03-01

    In a number of cases the monitoring of patients with type I diabetes mellitus requires measurement of the exogenous insulin levels. For the purpose of a clinical investigation of the efficacy of a medical device for application of exogenous insulin aspart, a verification of the method for measurement of this synthetic analogue of the hormone was needed. The information in the available medical literature for the measurement of the different exogenous insulin analogs is insufficient. Thus, verification was required to be in compliance with the active standards in Republic of Bulgaria. A manufactured method developed for ADVIA Centaur XP Immunoassay, Siemens Healthcare, was used which we verified using standard solutions and a patient serum pool by adding the appropriate quantity exogenous insulin aspart. The method was verified in accordance with the bioanalytical method verification criteria and regulatory requirements for using a standard method: CLIA chemiluminescence immunoassay ADVIA Centaur® XP. The following parameters are determined and monitored: intra-day precision and accuracy, inter-day precision and accuracy, limit of detection and lower limit of quantification, linearity, analytical recovery. The routine application of the method for measurement of immunoreactive insulin using the analyzer ADVIA Centaur® XP is directed to the measurement of endogenous insulin. The method is applicable for measuring different types of exogenous insulin, including insulin aspart.

  2. Use of (D, MUF) and maximum-likelihood methods for detecting falsification and diversion in data-verification problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, A.S.; Beedgen, R.

    1982-01-01

    The investigation of data falsification and/or diversion is of major concern in nuclear materials accounting procedures used in international safeguards. In this paper, two procedures, denoted by (D,MUF) and LR (Likelihood Ratio), are discussed and compared when testing the hypothesis that neither diversion nor falsification has taken place versus the one-sided alternative that at least one of these parameters is positive. Critical regions and detection probabilities are given for both tests. It is shown that the LR method outperforms (D,MUF) when diversion and falsification take place

  3. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  4. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  5. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  6. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  7. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  8. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  9. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  10. Theoretical model and experimental verification on the PID tracking method using liquid crystal optical phased array

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Xiangru; Xu, Jianhua; Huang, Ziqiang; Wu, Liang; Zhang, Tianyi; Wu, Shuanghong; Qiu, Qi

    2017-02-01

    Liquid crystal optical phased array (LC-OPA) has been considered with great potential on the non-mechanical laser deflector because it is fabricated using photolithographic patterning technology which has been well advanced by the electronics and display industry. As a vital application of LC-OPA, free space laser communication has demonstrated its merits on communication bandwidth. Before data communication, ATP (acquisition, tracking and pointing) process costs relatively long time to result in a bottle-neck of free space laser communication. Meanwhile, dynamic real time accurate tracking is sensitive to keep a stable communication link. The electro-optic medium liquid crystal with low driving voltage can be used as the laser beam deflector. This paper presents a fast-track method using liquid crystal optical phased array as the beam deflector, CCD as a beacon light detector. PID (Proportion Integration Differentiation) loop algorithm is introduced as the controlling algorithm to generate the corresponding steering angle. To achieve the goal of fast and accurate tracking, theoretical analysis and experimental verification are demonstrated that PID closed-loop system can suppress the attitude random vibration. Meanwhile, theoretical analysis shows that tracking accuracy can be less than 6.5μrad, with a relative agreement with experimental results which is obtained after 10 adjustments that the tracking accuracy is less than12.6μrad.

  11. [The role of neurovisualization methods in diagnosis and verification of vertigo etiology].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alekseeva, N S; Krotenkova, M V; Konovalov, R N; Kirichenko, I M; Baev, A A; Petrova, E I

    2006-01-01

    Roentgen computed tomography (RCT) and MR-imaging (MRI) were used in investigation of vertigo etiology and affection of the cochleovestibular analyzer in 130 patients aged 28 to 74 years with recurrent systemic rotatory vertigo or its other symptoms. All the patients have undergone comprehensive otoneurological examination, RCT and MRI which showed that peripheral cochleovestibular syndromes (PCVS) caused by arterial hypertension (AH), atherosclerosis (AS), vascular dystonia (VD) are rarely characterized by focal alterations in the brain. PCVS comparison with blood flow in the vertebral arteries (VA) detected most frequently anomalies and asymmetries of the diameters. MR-angiography plays an important role in verification of pathology of intracranial VA. In central cochleovestibular syndrome (CCVS) with AH, AS, VD, principal pathological changes were registered in the brain trunk and cerebellum by MRI. Vestibulometry and otoneurological method detect not only vascular cochleovestibular peripheral and central syndromes but also to make differential diagnosis. RCT and MRI verify cochleovestibular syndromes in patients with multiple encephalomyelitis, VIII nerve neurinoma and tumors of the posterior cranial fossa.

  12. Simple thermal to thermal face verification method based on local texture descriptors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grudzien, A.; Palka, Norbert; Kowalski, M.

    2017-08-01

    Biometrics is a science that studies and analyzes physical structure of a human body and behaviour of people. Biometrics found many applications ranging from border control systems, forensics systems for criminal investigations to systems for access control. Unique identifiers, also referred to as modalities are used to distinguish individuals. One of the most common and natural human identifiers is a face. As a result of decades of investigations, face recognition achieved high level of maturity, however recognition in visible spectrum is still challenging due to illumination aspects or new ways of spoofing. One of the alternatives is recognition of face in different parts of light spectrum, e.g. in infrared spectrum. Thermal infrared offer new possibilities for human recognition due to its specific properties as well as mature equipment. In this paper we present the scheme of subject's verification methodology by using facial images in thermal range. The study is focused on the local feature extraction methods and on the similarity metrics. We present comparison of two local texture-based descriptors for thermal 1-to-1 face recognition.

  13. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  14. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  15. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  16. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  17. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The 1990s saw significant non-proliferation related developments in the world, resulting in a new period of safeguards development. Over several years an assessment was made of how to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In May 1997 this culminated in the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements which significantly broadens the role of IAEA safeguards. As a consequence, the IAEA safeguards system entered a new era. In 1997 the IAEA began to publish a new series of booklets on safeguards, called the International Nuclear Verification Series (NVS). The objective of these booklets was to help in explaining IAEA safeguards, especially the new developments in safeguards, particularly for facility operators and government officers involved with these topics. The current booklet, which is a revision and update of IAEA/NVS/1, is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. A completely new section on data security has been added to describe the specific features that are included in installed equipment systems in order to ensure the authenticity and confidentiality of information. As new verification measures continue to be developed the material in this booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. The basic verification measure used by the IAEA is nuclear material accountancy. In applying nuclear material accountancy, IAEA safeguards inspectors make independent measurements to verify quantitatively the amount of nuclear material presented in the State's accounts. For this purpose, inspectors count items (e.g. fuel assemblies, bundles or rods, or containers of powdered compounds of uranium or plutonium) and measure attributes of these items during their inspections using non

  18. Technical Note: Range verification system using edge detection method for a scintillator and a CCD camera system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saotome, Naoya, E-mail: naosao@nirs.go.jp; Furukawa, Takuji; Hara, Yousuke; Mizushima, Kota; Tansho, Ryohei; Saraya, Yuichi; Shirai, Toshiyuki; Noda, Koji [Department of Research Center for Charged Particle Therapy, National Institute of Radiological Sciences, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage-ku, Chiba 263-8555 (Japan)

    2016-04-15

    Purpose: Three-dimensional irradiation with a scanned carbon-ion beam has been performed from 2011 at the authors’ facility. The authors have developed the rotating-gantry equipped with the scanning irradiation system. The number of combinations of beam properties to measure for the commissioning is more than 7200, i.e., 201 energy steps, 3 intensities, and 12 gantry angles. To compress the commissioning time, quick and simple range verification system is required. In this work, the authors develop a quick range verification system using scintillator and charge-coupled device (CCD) camera and estimate the accuracy of the range verification. Methods: A cylindrical plastic scintillator block and a CCD camera were installed on the black box. The optical spatial resolution of the system is 0.2 mm/pixel. The camera control system was connected and communicates with the measurement system that is part of the scanning system. The range was determined by image processing. Reference range for each energy beam was determined by a difference of Gaussian (DOG) method and the 80% of distal dose of the depth-dose distribution that were measured by a large parallel-plate ionization chamber. The authors compared a threshold method and a DOG method. Results: The authors found that the edge detection method (i.e., the DOG method) is best for the range detection. The accuracy of range detection using this system is within 0.2 mm, and the reproducibility of the same energy measurement is within 0.1 mm without setup error. Conclusions: The results of this study demonstrate that the authors’ range check system is capable of quick and easy range verification with sufficient accuracy.

  19. Technical Note: Range verification system using edge detection method for a scintillator and a CCD camera system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saotome, Naoya; Furukawa, Takuji; Hara, Yousuke; Mizushima, Kota; Tansho, Ryohei; Saraya, Yuichi; Shirai, Toshiyuki; Noda, Koji

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: Three-dimensional irradiation with a scanned carbon-ion beam has been performed from 2011 at the authors’ facility. The authors have developed the rotating-gantry equipped with the scanning irradiation system. The number of combinations of beam properties to measure for the commissioning is more than 7200, i.e., 201 energy steps, 3 intensities, and 12 gantry angles. To compress the commissioning time, quick and simple range verification system is required. In this work, the authors develop a quick range verification system using scintillator and charge-coupled device (CCD) camera and estimate the accuracy of the range verification. Methods: A cylindrical plastic scintillator block and a CCD camera were installed on the black box. The optical spatial resolution of the system is 0.2 mm/pixel. The camera control system was connected and communicates with the measurement system that is part of the scanning system. The range was determined by image processing. Reference range for each energy beam was determined by a difference of Gaussian (DOG) method and the 80% of distal dose of the depth-dose distribution that were measured by a large parallel-plate ionization chamber. The authors compared a threshold method and a DOG method. Results: The authors found that the edge detection method (i.e., the DOG method) is best for the range detection. The accuracy of range detection using this system is within 0.2 mm, and the reproducibility of the same energy measurement is within 0.1 mm without setup error. Conclusions: The results of this study demonstrate that the authors’ range check system is capable of quick and easy range verification with sufficient accuracy.

  20. Statistical methods to correct for verification bias in diagnostic studies are inadequate when there are few false negatives: a simulation study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vickers Andrew J

    2008-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background A common feature of diagnostic research is that results for a diagnostic gold standard are available primarily for patients who are positive for the test under investigation. Data from such studies are subject to what has been termed "verification bias". We evaluated statistical methods for verification bias correction when there are few false negatives. Methods A simulation study was conducted of a screening study subject to verification bias. We compared estimates of the area-under-the-curve (AUC corrected for verification bias varying both the rate and mechanism of verification. Results In a single simulated data set, varying false negatives from 0 to 4 led to verification bias corrected AUCs ranging from 0.550 to 0.852. Excess variation associated with low numbers of false negatives was confirmed in simulation studies and by analyses of published studies that incorporated verification bias correction. The 2.5th – 97.5th centile range constituted as much as 60% of the possible range of AUCs for some simulations. Conclusion Screening programs are designed such that there are few false negatives. Standard statistical methods for verification bias correction are inadequate in this circumstance.

  1. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  2. Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, D.R.; Huebel, J.G.; Poggio, A.J.

    1980-01-01

    The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

  3. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  4. A Verification Method of Inter-Task Cooperation in Embedded Real-time Systems and its Evaluation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yoshida, Toshio

    In software development process of embedded real-time systems, the design of the task cooperation process is very important. The cooperating process of such tasks is specified by task cooperation patterns. Adoption of unsuitable task cooperation patterns has fatal influence on system performance, quality, and extendibility. In order to prevent repetitive work caused by the shortage of task cooperation performance, it is necessary to verify task cooperation patterns in an early software development stage. However, it is very difficult to verify task cooperation patterns in an early software developing stage where task program codes are not completed yet. Therefore, we propose a verification method using task skeleton program codes and a real-time kernel that has a function of recording all events during software execution such as system calls issued by task program codes, external interrupts, and timer interrupt. In order to evaluate the proposed verification method, we applied it to the software development process of a mechatronics control system.

  5. Overview of safeguards aspects related to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.J.; Murakami, K.; Shea, T.

    2000-01-01

    Recent developments in the light of the IAEA verification requirements for MOX fuel at reactors and bulk handling facilities are discussed. Impact of the Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards System is briefly addressed. Agency's work undertaken with regard to the nuclear arms control and reduction is presented. (author)

  6. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, M.

    1995-05-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English

  7. A Systematic Method for Verification and Validation of Gyrokinetic Microstability Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bravenec, Ronald [Fourth State Research, Austin, TX (United States)

    2017-11-14

    My original proposal for the period Feb. 15, 2014 through Feb. 14, 2017 called for an integrated validation and verification effort carried out by myself with collaborators. The validation component would require experimental profile and power-balance analysis. In addition, it would require running the gyrokinetic codes varying the input profiles within experimental uncertainties to seek agreement with experiment before discounting a code as invalidated. Therefore, validation would require a major increase of effort over my previous grant periods which covered only code verification (code benchmarking). Consequently, I had requested full-time funding. Instead, I am being funded at somewhat less than half time (5 calendar months per year). As a consequence, I decided to forego the validation component and to only continue the verification efforts.

  8. Seismic verification methods for structures and equipment of VVER-type and RBMK-type NPPs (summary of experiences)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masopust, R.

    2003-01-01

    The main verification methods for structures and equipment of already existing VVER-type and RBMK-type NPPs are briefly described. The following aspects are discussed: fundamental seismic safety assessment principles for VVER/RBMK-type NPPs (seismic safety assessment procedure, typical work plan for seismic safety assessment of existing NPPs, SMA (HCLPF) calculations, modified GIP (GIP-VVER) procedure, similarity of VVER/RBMK equipment to that included in the SQUG databases and seismic interactions

  9. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  10. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  11. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  12. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  13. An in vivo dose verification method for SBRT–VMAT delivery using the EPID

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McCowan, P. M., E-mail: peter.mccowan@cancercare.mb.ca [Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2 (Canada); Medical Physics Department, CancerCare Manitoba, 675 McDermot Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3E 0V9 (Canada); Van Uytven, E.; Van Beek, T.; Asuni, G. [Medical Physics Department, CancerCare Manitoba, 675 McDermot Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3E 0V9 (Canada); McCurdy, B. M. C. [Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2 (Canada); Medical Physics Department, CancerCare Manitoba, 675 McDermot Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3E 0V9 (Canada); Department of Radiology, University of Manitoba, 820 Sherbrook Street, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3A 1R9 (Canada)

    2015-12-15

    Purpose: Radiation treatments have become increasingly more complex with the development of volumetric modulated arc therapy (VMAT) and the use of stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT). SBRT involves the delivery of substantially larger doses over fewer fractions than conventional therapy. SBRT–VMAT treatments will strongly benefit from in vivo patient dose verification, as any errors in delivery can be more detrimental to the radiobiology of the patient as compared to conventional therapy. Electronic portal imaging devices (EPIDs) are available on most commercial linear accelerators (Linacs) and their documented use for dosimetry makes them valuable tools for patient dose verification. In this work, the authors customize and validate a physics-based model which utilizes on-treatment EPID images to reconstruct the 3D dose delivered to the patient during SBRT–VMAT delivery. Methods: The SBRT Linac head, including jaws, multileaf collimators, and flattening filter, were modeled using Monte Carlo methods and verified with measured data. The simulation provides energy spectrum data that are used by their “forward” model to then accurately predict fluence generated by a SBRT beam at a plane above the patient. This fluence is then transported through the patient and then the dose to the phosphor layer in the EPID is calculated. Their “inverse” model back-projects the EPID measured focal fluence to a plane upstream of the patient and recombines it with the extra-focal fluence predicted by the forward model. This estimate of total delivered fluence is then forward projected onto the patient’s density matrix and a collapsed cone convolution algorithm calculates the dose delivered to the patient. The model was tested by reconstructing the dose for two prostate, three lung, and two spine SBRT–VMAT treatment fractions delivered to an anthropomorphic phantom. It was further validated against actual patient data for a lung and spine SBRT–VMAT plan. The

  14. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1994 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1995-05-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English.

  15. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  16. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  17. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  18. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-07-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

  19. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-01-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

  20. Material integrity verification radar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koppenjan, S.K.

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the need for verification of 'as-built' spent fuel-dry storage containers and other concrete structures. The IAEA has tasked the Special Technologies Laboratory (STL) to fabricate, test, and deploy a stepped-frequency Material Integrity Verification Radar (MIVR) system to nondestructively verify the internal construction of these containers. The MIVR system is based on previously deployed high-frequency, ground penetrating radar (GPR) systems that have been developed by STL for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Whereas GPR technology utilizes microwave radio frequency energy to create subsurface images, MTVR is a variation for which the medium is concrete instead of soil. The purpose is to nondestructively verify the placement of concrete-reinforcing materials, pipes, inner liners, and other attributes of the internal construction. The MIVR system underwent an initial field test on CANDU reactor spent fuel storage canisters at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Chalk River Laboratories, Ontario, Canada, in October 1995. A second field test at the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant in Embalse, Argentina, was completed in May 1996. The DOE GPR also was demonstrated at the site. Data collection and analysis were performed for the Argentine National Board of Nuclear Regulation (ENREN). IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (ABACC) personnel were present as observers during the test. Reinforcing materials were evident in the color, two-dimensional images produced by the MIVR system. A continuous pattern of reinforcing bars was evident and accurate estimates on the spacing, depth, and size were made. The potential uses for safeguard applications were jointly discussed. The MIVR system, as successfully demonstrated in the two field tests, can be used as a design verification tool for IAEA safeguards. A deployment of MIVR for Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ

  1. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  2. Inventory of present verification techniques. Viewpoint of EURATOM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloeckner, W.; Eecken, D. Van der; Gmelin, W.

    1998-01-01

    Starting from the role of Euratom as an established regional safeguards system, an overview is given of verification techniques currently practised by Euratom. In the stage-light of a rapidly changing and complex international safeguards scene, Euratom considers it has an important role to play. Having in mind the possibilities created by accelerating modern technology, recommendations are given for an enhanced use of technological means in safeguards. The viewpoint of Euratom is that the majority of methodologies and techniques in place may very well be copied to or used for a cut-off verification system currently under discussion

  3. Theoretical interpretations and experimental verifications of a radioelectric resonance method for measuring the electronic density and collision frequency in a discharge plasma in gases; Interpretations theoriques et verifications experimentales d'une methode de resonance radioelectrique pour la mesure de la densite d'une decharge dans les gaz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nguyen Trong, Khoi [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France).Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1960-07-01

    Theoretical discussions and experimental verifications of one radioelectric resonance method for measuring plasma electronic density and collision frequency. (author) [French] Discussions theoriques et verifications experimentales sur une methode de resonance radioelectrique pour la mesure de la densite electronique et de la frequence de collision d'un plasma d'une decharge dans le gaz. (auteur)

  4. Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keen, L.J.

    2007-01-01

    L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

  5. Improvements of the fluoride reactivation method for the verification of nerve agent exposure

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Degenhardt, C.E.A.M.; Pleijsier, K.; Schans, M.J. van der; Langenberg, J.P.; Preston, K.E.; Solano, M.I.; Maggio, V.L.; Barr, J.R.

    2004-01-01

    One of the most appropriate biomarkers for the verification of organophosphorus nerve agent exposure is the conjugate of the nerve agent to butyrylcholinesterase (BuChE). The phosphyl moiety of the nerve agent can be released from the BuChE enzyme by incubation with fluoride ions, after which the

  6. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  7. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  8. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.; Kroc, T.K.

    1981-11-01

    The purpose of this study is to investigate the applicability of isotope correlation techniques (ICT) to the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) fuel cycles for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards surveillance. The isotopic measurement of the inventory input to the reprocessing phase of the fuel cycle is the primary direct determination that an anomaly may exist in the fuel management of nuclear material. The nuclear materials accountancy gap which exists between the fabrication plant output and the input to the reprocessing plant can be minimized by using ICT at the dissolver stage of the reprocessing plant. The ICT allows a level of verification of the fabricator's fuel content specifications, the irradiation history, the fuel and blanket assemblies management and scheduling within the reactor, and the subsequent spent fuel assembly flows to the reprocessing plant. The investigation indicates that there exist relationships between isotopic concentration which have predictable, functional behavior over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial core assembly-averaged composition. The selection of the more effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors on the correlation functions and respective sensitivities to isotopic compositional changes have been examined and found to be consistent with current measurement methods

  9. IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

  10. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  11. Safeguards implementation in UP3 reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laurent, J.P.; Regnier, J.; Talbourdet, Y.; De Jong, P.

    1991-01-01

    The implementation of safeguards in a large size reprocessing plant is a challenge, considering the high throughput of nuclear material and the sophisticated automation of such facilities. In the case of UP3, a pragmatic and realistic approach has been devised and is applied through an efficient cooperation between the safeguards organizations, the french national authorities and the operator. In essence, they consist in verification of every significant inputs and outputs, in timely analysis by NDA (e.g. solutions of dissolution through an on site k-edge equipment), in monitoring selected parts of the inprocess inventory and in specific containment/surveillance systems for the spent fuel storage ponds and the PuO2 storage. (author)

  12. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  13. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2011-01-01

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  14. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (ES-konsult, Solna (Sweden))

    2011-01-15

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  15. Content analysis of age verification, purchase and delivery methods of internet e-cigarette vendors, 2013 and 2014.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Rebecca S; Derrick, Jason; Liebman, Aliza Kate; LaFleur, Kevin; Ribisl, Kurt M

    2018-05-01

    Identify the population of internet e-cigarette vendors (IEVs) and conduct content analyses of their age verification, purchase and delivery methods in 2013 and 2014. We used multiple sources to identify IEV websites, primarily complex search algorithms scanning more than 180 million websites. In 2013, we manually screened 32 446 websites, identifying 980 IEVs, selecting the 281 most popular for content analysis. This methodology yielded 31 239 websites for screening in 2014, identifying 3096 IEVs, with 283 selected for content analysis. The proportion of vendors that sold online-only, with no retail store, dropped significantly from 2013 (74.7%) to 2014 (64.3%) (ponline age verification services (7.1% in 2013 and 8.5% in 2014), driving licences (1.8% in 2013 and 7.4% in 2014, ponline e-cigarette sales are needed, including strict age and identity verification requirements. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.

  16. Verification of fluid-structure-interaction algorithms through the method of manufactured solutions for actuator-line applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vijayakumar, Ganesh; Sprague, Michael

    2017-11-01

    Demonstrating expected convergence rates with spatial- and temporal-grid refinement is the ``gold standard'' of code and algorithm verification. However, the lack of analytical solutions and generating manufactured solutions presents challenges for verifying codes for complex systems. The application of the method of manufactured solutions (MMS) for verification for coupled multi-physics phenomena like fluid-structure interaction (FSI) has only seen recent investigation. While many FSI algorithms for aeroelastic phenomena have focused on boundary-resolved CFD simulations, the actuator-line representation of the structure is widely used for FSI simulations in wind-energy research. In this work, we demonstrate the verification of an FSI algorithm using MMS for actuator-line CFD simulations with a simplified structural model. We use a manufactured solution for the fluid velocity field and the displacement of the SMD system. We demonstrate the convergence of both the fluid and structural solver to second-order accuracy with grid and time-step refinement. This work was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Wind Energy Technologies Office, under Contract No. DE-AC36-08-GO28308 with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

  17. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  18. Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

    1994-01-01

    Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

  19. Fuel Rod Vibration Measurement Method using a Flap and its Verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoo, Joo Young; Park, Nam Gyu; Suh, Jung Min; Jeon, Kyeong Lak [KEPCO NF Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    Flow-induced vibration is a critical factor for the mechanical integrity of a fuel rod. This vibration can cause leaked fuel through the mechanism, such as grid to rod fretting. To minimize the failures caused by flow-induced vibration, a robust design is needed which takes into account vibrational characteristics. That is, the spacer grid design should be developed to avoid any excessive vibration. On the one hand, if fuel rod vibration can be measured, an estimation of the excitation forces, which are a critical cause of rod failure, should be possible. Therefore, by applying an external force, flow-induced vibration can be roughly estimated when the fuel rod vibration model is used. KEPCO Nuclear Fuel developed the test loop to research flow-induced vibration as shown in Fig.1. The investigation flow-induced vibration (INFINIT) - the test facility - can measure the grid strap vibration and pressure drop of a 5x5 small scale fuel bundle. Basically, using a Laser Doppler Vibrometer (LDV), the vibration of a structure immersed in high speed fluid can be measured. Grid strap vibration is easily measured using an LDV. However, it is quite difficult to measure fuel rod vibration because of the round surface shape of the rods. In addition, measuring current method using the LDV, it was only possible to directly measure fuel rod vibration at the first row of the bundle as the rods behind the first row are obscured. To solve this problem, a thin flap, as shown in Fig. 2(a) can be used as a reflecting target, gaining access to rods within the bundle. The flap is attached to the fuel rod, as in Fig. 2(b). As a result, most of the inner rod vibration can be measured. Before using a flap to measure fuel rod vibration, a verification process was needed to show whether the LDV signal from the flap vibration provided equivalent and reliable signals. Therefore, impact testing was carried out on the fuel rod using a flap. The LDV signals were then compared with accelerometer

  20. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  1. Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

  2. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

    2012-06-15

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  3. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, Renaud; )

    2012-01-01

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  4. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

  5. An ESARDA view of future implementation of science and modern technology for safeguards following recent ESARDA and INMM initiatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guardini, Sergio; Stein, Gotthard

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The new challenges posed by integrated safeguards, ensuring correctness and completeness without cost increase, may require that new techniques are employed or existing techniques modified to cope with the new requirements. Conscious of this new scenario, ESARDA decided to undertake a thorough review of current Science and Technology initiatives aimed, in particular, at identifying new techniques not yet applied in Safeguards that could help in increasing efficiency and effectiveness at no additional cost. To that purpose ESARDA organized, together with the INMM, a series of workshops on 'Science and Modem Technology for Safeguards' with the aim 'to inform the safeguards community about selected sciences and advanced technologies that are currently available or that will become available in the next few years and that could be used to support needed advances in international safeguards' and to 'stimulate interchange amongst experts in the various technologies and in safeguards'. Three Workshops have been held, the first in Arona in October 1996, then at Albuquerque, September 1998 and the third in Tokyo, November 2000. In 1998 ESARDA also dedicated an annual meeting, in Helsinki, to the topic, 'Modem Verification Regimes: Similarities, Synergies and Challenges'. The ESARDA Co-ordinators have examined the outcome of these Workshops to establish whether the aims were achieved, analyzing the status of the development of those techniques and methods presented that may have an application for Safeguards and suggesting future directions for the ESARDA activities and for Safeguards R and D. Following the main format followed by the Workshops, the Co-ordinators' analysis has been structured along the following areas: 1. 'hard' sciences (instruments, C and S); 2. 'soft' sciences (data and information treatment, knowledge building); 3. nontechnical (or socio-political) aspects; 4. the role of the Regional Systems of Accountancy and Control (RSAC) and of the State

  6. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  7. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  8. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

    1980-01-01

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  9. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  10. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  11. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  12. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  13. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  14. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  15. International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future. V.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

  16. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  17. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

  18. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  19. Development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; So, Dong Sup; Kwack, Eun Ho [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-04-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described. 3 tabs. (Author)

  20. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  1. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  2. Verification of the fulfilment of the purposes of Basel II, Pillar 3 through application of the web log mining methods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Munk

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available The objective of the paper is the verification of the fulfilment of the purposes of Basel II, Pillar 3 – market discipline during the recent financial crisis. The objective of the paper is to describe the current state of the working out of the project that is focused on the analysis of the market participants’ interest in mandatory disclosure of financial information by a commercial bank by means of advanced methods of web log mining. The output of the realized project will be the verification of the assumptions related to the purposes of Basel III by means of the web mining methods, the recommendations for possible reduction of mandatory disclosure of information under Basel II and III, the proposal of the methodology for data preparation for web log mining in this application domain and the generalised procedure for users’ behaviour modelling dependent on time. The schedule of the project has been divided into three phases. The paper deals with its first phase that is focusing on the data pre-processing, analysis and evaluation of the required information under Basel II, Pillar 3 since 2008 and its disclosure into the web site of a commercial bank. The authors introduce the methodologies for data preparation and known heuristic methods for path completion into web log files with respect to the particularity of investigated application domain. They propose scientific methods for modelling users’ behaviour of the webpages related to Pillar 3 with respect to time.

  3. A day in the life of a safeguards inspector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2016-01-01

    Walking several miles through the winding, narrow corridors of a nuclear facility in protective gear while carrying heavy equipment, often escorted by facility operator personnel: welcome to the life of an IAEA safeguards inspector. Safeguards inspectors are an essential part of the global non-proliferation regime, carrying out verification activities, so the IAEA can provide assurances to States worldwide that other countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes or misusing nuclear technology. One important activity is the inspection of declared stocks of nuclear material: the IAEA is the only organization in the world with the mandate to verify the use of nuclear material and technology globally.

  4. Tamper proofing of safeguards monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Riley, R.J.

    1982-11-01

    The tamper proofing of safeguards monitors is essential if the data they produce is, and can be seen to be, reliable. This report discusses the problem of tamper proofing and gives guidance on when and how to apply tamper proofing techniques. The report is split into two parts. The first concerns the fundamental problem of how much tamper proofing to apply and the second describes methods of tamper proofing and discusses their usefulness. Both sections are applicable to all safeguards monitors although particular reference will be made to doorway monitors in some cases. The phrase 'tamper proofing' is somewhat misleading as it is impossible to completely tamper proof any device. Given enough time and resources, even the most elaborate tamper proofing can be overcome. In safeguards applications we are more interested in making the device tamper resistant and tamper indicating. That is, it should be able to resist a certain amount of tampering, and if tampering proves successful, that fact should be immediately obvious. Techniques of making a device tamper indicating and tamper resistant will be described below. The phrase tamper proofing will be used throughout this report as a generic term, including both tamper resistance and tamper indicating. (author)

  5. The safeguards on-site laboratory at Sellafield. Five years operational experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duinslaeger, L.; Belle, P. van; Mayer, K.; Casteleyn, K.; Abousahl, S.; Daures, P.; Eberle, H.; Enright, T.; Guiot, A.; Hild, M.; Horta Domenech, J.; Lajarge, P.; Laurent, P.; Le Terrier, A.; Lynch, B.; Marucci, M.; Millet, S.; Ottmar, H.; Richir, P.; Street, S.; Vallet, P.; Zuleger, E. [European Commission, Karlsruhe (Germany). Inst. for Transuranium Elements

    2004-06-01

    The start of operation of the large reprocessing facilities led Euratom Safeguards to a new approach for verification analysis of samples taken at the facility: the installation of on-site laboratories. The availability of analytical capabilities for independent verification measurements at the site of these facilities offers obvious advantages in view of timeliness of results. The 'On-Site Laboratory' (OSL) at the BNFL Sellafield site was the first ever and entered into operation in 1999. For almost five years, the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has been operating the laboratory under routine conditions. During this period, more than one thousand safeguards samples were analysed. The experience gained in the management, logistics and operation of the OSL allow a critical review based on a significant period in time. This includes also aspects of training of staff, maintenance of equipment, flow of information, and improvements in the efficiency. The analytical issues are of key importance: based on the operational experience, the measurement methods were adapted (changing boundary conditions), the distribution of samples according to material type changed (start up of MOS fabrication plant), and the cutback in resources triggered a further streamlining of the analytical efforts. (orig.)

  6. Outcome and Perspectives from the First IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norman, C.; Binner, R.; Peter, N. J.; Wuester, J.; Zhao, K.; Krieger, T.; Walczak-Typke, A.C.; Richet, S.; Portaix, C.G.; Martin, K.; Bonner, E.R.

    2015-01-01

    Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g., missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In addition, the evaluation of verification data with a view to drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions rests on the application of various advanced statistical methodologies. The considerable progress of information technology in the field of data processing and computational capabilities as well as the evolution of safeguards concepts and the steep increase in the volume of verification data in the last decades call for the review and modernization of safeguards statistical methodologies, not only to improve the efficiency of the analytical processes but also to address new statistical and probabilistic questions. Modern computer-intensive approaches are also needed to fully exploit the large body of verification data collected over the years in the increasing number and diversifying types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the world. The first biennial IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was held in Vienna from the 16 to 18 October 2013. Recommendations and a working plan were drafted which identify and chart necessary steps to review, harmonize, update and consolidate statistical methodologies for safeguards. Three major problem spaces were identified: Random Verification Schemes, Estimation of Uncertainties and Statistical Evaluation of Safeguards Verification Data for which a detailed list of objectives and actions to be taken were established. Since the meeting, considerable progress was made to meet these objectives. The actions undertaken and their outcome are presented in this paper. (author)

  7. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  8. The particle analysis based on FT-TIMS technique for swipe sample under the frame of nuclear safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Tianli; Liu Xuemei; Liu Zhao; Tang Lei; Long Kaiming

    2008-06-01

    Under the frame of nuclear safeguard, the particles analysis for swipe sample is an advance mean to detect the undeclared uranium enriched facilities and undeclared uranium enriched activity. The technique of particle analysis based on fission track-thermal ionization mass spectrometry (FT-TIMS) for swipe sample have been built. The reliability and the experimental background for selecting particles consisting of uranium from swipe sample by FT method have been verified. In addition, the utilization coefficient of particles on the surface of swipe sample have also been tested. These works have provided the technique support for application in the area of nuclear verification. (authors)

  9. International safeguards without material balance areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ''full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ''flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ''mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material

  10. Constrained structural dynamic model verification using free vehicle suspension testing methods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blair, Mark A.; Vadlamudi, Nagarjuna

    1988-01-01

    Verification of the validity of a spacecraft's structural dynamic math model used in computing ascent (or in the case of the STS, ascent and landing) loads is mandatory. This verification process requires that tests be carried out on both the payload and the math model such that the ensuing correlation may validate the flight loads calculations. To properly achieve this goal, the tests should be performed with the payload in the launch constraint (i.e., held fixed at only the payload-booster interface DOFs). The practical achievement of this set of boundary conditions is quite difficult, especially with larger payloads, such as the 12-ton Hubble Space Telescope. The development of equations in the paper will show that by exciting the payload at its booster interface while it is suspended in the 'free-free' state, a set of transfer functions can be produced that will have minima that are directly related to the fundamental modes of the payload when it is constrained in its launch configuration.

  11. Verification of the coupled space-angle adaptivity algorithm for the finite element-spherical harmonics method via the method of manufactured solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H.; De Oliveira, C. R. E.

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the verification of the recently developed space-angle self-adaptive algorithm for the finite element-spherical harmonics method via the Method of Manufactured Solutions. This method provides a simple, yet robust way for verifying the theoretical properties of the adaptive algorithm and interfaces very well with the underlying second-order, even-parity transport formulation. Simple analytic solutions in both spatial and angular variables are manufactured to assess the theoretical performance of the a posteriori error estimates. The numerical results confirm reliability of the developed space-angle error indicators. (authors)

  12. Isotopic safeguards statistics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.; Stewart, K.B.

    1978-06-01

    The methods and results of our statistical analysis of isotopic data using isotopic safeguards techniques are illustrated using example data from the Yankee Rowe reactor. The statistical methods used in this analysis are the paired comparison and the regression analyses. A paired comparison results when a sample from a batch is analyzed by two different laboratories. Paired comparison techniques can be used with regression analysis to detect and identify outlier batches. The second analysis tool, linear regression, involves comparing various regression approaches. These approaches use two basic types of models: the intercept model (y = α + βx) and the initial point model [y - y 0 = β(x - x 0 )]. The intercept model fits strictly the exposure or burnup values of isotopic functions, while the initial point model utilizes the exposure values plus the initial or fabricator's data values in the regression analysis. Two fitting methods are applied to each of these models. These methods are: (1) the usual least squares fitting approach where x is measured without error, and (2) Deming's approach which uses the variance estimates obtained from the paired comparison results and considers x and y are both measured with error. The Yankee Rowe data were first measured by Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) and remeasured by Nuclear Audit and Testing Company (NATCO). The ratio of Pu/U versus 235 D (in which 235 D is the amount of depleted 235 U expressed in weight percent) using actual numbers is the isotopic function illustrated. Statistical results using the Yankee Rowe data indicates the attractiveness of Deming's regression model over the usual approach by simple comparison of the given regression variances with the random variance from the paired comparison results

  13. Recover Act. Verification of Geothermal Tracer Methods in Highly Constrained Field Experiments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Becker, Matthew W. [California State University, Long Beach, CA (United States)

    2014-05-16

    The prediction of the geothermal system efficiency is strong linked to the character of the flow system that connects injector and producer wells. If water flow develops channels or “short circuiting” between injection and extraction wells thermal sweep is poor and much of the reservoir is left untapped. The purpose of this project was to understand how channelized flow develops in fracture geothermal reservoirs and how it can be measured in the field. We explored two methods of assessing channelization: hydraulic connectivity tests and tracer tests. These methods were tested at a field site using two verification methods: ground penetrating radar (GPR) images of saline tracer and heat transfer measurements using distributed temperature sensing (DTS). The field site for these studies was the Altona Flat Fractured Rock Research Site located in northeastern New York State. Altona Flat Rock is an experimental site considered a geologic analog for some geothermal reservoirs given its low matrix porosity. Because soil overburden is thin, it provided unique access to saturated bedrock fractures and the ability image using GPR which does not effectively penetrate most soils. Five boreholes were drilled in a “five spot” pattern covering 100 m2 and hydraulically isolated in a single bedding plane fracture. This simple system allowed a complete characterization of the fracture. Nine small diameter boreholes were drilled from the surface to just above the fracture to allow the measurement of heat transfer between the fracture and the rock matrix. The focus of the hydraulic investigation was periodic hydraulic testing. In such tests, rather than pumping or injection in a well at a constant rate, flow is varied to produce an oscillating pressure signal. This pressure signal is sensed in other wells and the attenuation and phase lag between the source and receptor is an indication of hydraulic connection. We found that these tests were much more effective than constant

  14. Accountability and Transparency: Essential Underpinnings of Quality Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everton, C.; Floyd, R.

    2015-01-01

    The fundamental purpose of IAEA safeguards is to maintain confidence in the international community of the compliance of States with their respective non-proliferation commitments. The safeguards system for ensuring this compliance produces the most important output, the IAEA's compliance findings. Confidence in the findings of any compliance verification system requires some basic elements such as independence, accountability, transparency, and quality management systems. Quality management systems are an internal set of documents and procedures that, while clearly important, need to incorporate an external communication component in order to engender confidence as to how compliance is being managed and ensured. This paper will explore the importance of these fundamentals to confidence in IAEA safeguards compliance conclusions, with a focus on the external communication elements of accountability and transparency. Accountability and transparency will be considered with different communication channels through which safeguards implementation matters are explained and reported and at different levels, facility, State, regional, and the IAEA. This will include communications by: the IAEA and State authorities to the general public; State authorities to peers in other national safeguards authorities (regional and beyond); and, the IAEA and State authorities to the international community as represented through the Board of Governors and General Conference. Examples will be presented of good practices in these areas to encourage greater accountability and transparency in the work of safeguards. (author)

  15. Swarm Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holzmann, Gerard J.; Joshi, Rajeev; Groce, Alex

    2008-01-01

    Reportedly, supercomputer designer Seymour Cray once said that he would sooner use two strong oxen to plow a field than a thousand chickens. Although this is undoubtedly wise when it comes to plowing a field, it is not so clear for other types of tasks. Model checking problems are of the proverbial "search the needle in a haystack" type. Such problems can often be parallelized easily. Alas, none of the usual divide and conquer methods can be used to parallelize the working of a model checker. Given that it has become easier than ever to gain access to large numbers of computers to perform even routine tasks it is becoming more and more attractive to find alternate ways to use these resources to speed up model checking tasks. This paper describes one such method, called swarm verification.

  16. Next Generation Germanium Systems for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreyer, J.; Burks, M.; Hull, E.

    2015-01-01

    We are developing the latest generation of highly portable, mechanically cooled germanium systems for safeguard applications. In collaboration with our industrial partner, Ph.D.s Co, we have developed the Germanium Gamma Ray Imager (GeGI), an imager with a 2π field of view. This instrument has been thoroughly field tested in a wide range of environments and have performed reliably even in the harshest conditions. The imaging capability of GeGI complements existing safeguards techniques by allowing for the spatial detection, identification, and characterization of nuclear material. Additionally, imaging can be used in design information verification activities to address potential material diversions. Measurements conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant highlight the advantages this instrument offers in the identification and localization of LEU, HEU and Pu holdup. GeGI has also been deployed to the Savannah River Site for the measurement of radioactive waste canisters, providing information valuable for waste characterization and inventory accountancy. Measuring 30 x 15 x 23 cm and weighing approximately 15 kg, this instrument is the first portable germanium-based imager. GeGI offers high reliability with the convenience of mechanical cooling, making this instrument ideal for the next generation of safeguards instrumentation. (author)

  17. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  18. Formal Verification -26 ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    by testing of the components and successful testing leads to the software being ... Formal verification is based on formal methods which are mathematically based ..... scenario under which a similar error could occur. There are various other ...

  19. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  20. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  1. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  2. Safeguards on MOX assemblies at LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arenas Carrasco, J.; Koulikov, I.; Heinonen, O.J.; Arlt, R.; Grigoleit, K.; Clarke, R.; Swinhoe, M.

    2000-01-01

    Operating within the framework of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) for unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in LWRs, the IAEA and EURATOM have gained experience in safeguarding 13 LWRs licensed to operate with MOX assemblies. In order to fulfil SIR requirements, verification methods and techniques capable of measuring MOX assemblies under water have been and are still being developed. These encompass both qualitative tests for the detection of plutonium (gross attribute tests) and quantitative tests for the measurement of the amount of plutonium (partial defect tests) and are based on gamma and neutron detection techniques. There are nine PWR and two BWR where the reactor and the spent fuel pond can be covered by the same surveillance device. These are Type I reactors where the reactor and the pond are located in the same hall. In these types of facilities relying on surveillance during the MOX refuelling is especially difficult at the BWRs due to the depth of the core pond. There are two PWR type facilities where the reactor and the spent fuel pond are located in different halls and cannot be covered by the same surveillance device (Type II). An open core camera has not been installed during refuelling and therefore indirect surveillance is currently used to survey MOX loading. Improvements are therefore required and are under consideration. After receipt at the facility, there are a few facilities which must keep the received fresh MOX fuel in wet storage, not only for a short period prior to refuelling, but for more than a year, until the next refuelling campaign. In these cases timely inspections for direct use fresh nuclear material require considerable inspection effort. Additionally, where human surveillance of core loading and finally core closure are necessary there is also a large demand for manpower. Either an agreement should be reached with the operators to delay the MOX loading until the end of the fuelling campaign, or alternative approaches should be

  3. Determination of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste by spectrophotometry using neodymium as an internal standard for safeguards analysis. Japan support program for agency safeguards (JASPAS) JC-19

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taguchi, Shigeo; Surugaya, Naoki; Sato, Soichi; Kurosawa, Akira; Watahiki, Masaru; Hiyama, Toshiaki

    2006-06-01

    A spectrophotometric determination using neodymium as an internal standard was developed for safeguards verification analysis of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste which is produced by the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The internal standard is used as a means to analyze plutonium and also to authenticate the instrument conditions. The method offers reduced sample preparation and analysis time compared to isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The sample was mixed with a known amount of internal standard. Subsequently, plutonium was quantitatively oxidized to Pu(VI) by the addition of Ce(IV) for spectrophotometry. Plutonium concentration was calculated from a relation between Nd(III)/Pu(VI) molar extinction coefficient ratio and their absorbance ratio. The relative expanded uncertainty of the repeated analysis (n=5) was 8.9% (coverage factor k=2) for a highly radioactive liquid waste sample (173 mg L -1 ). The determination limit was 6 mg L -1 (ten fold's the standard deviation). This method was validated through comparison experiments with isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The analytical results of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste using this method were agree well with values obtained using isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The proposed method can be applied to independent on-site safeguards analysis at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant. (author)

  4. Lightweight Methods for Effective Verification of Software Product Lines with Off-the-Shelf Tools

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Iosif-Lazar, Alexandru Florin

    Certification is the process of assessing the quality of a product and whether it meets a set of requirements and adheres to functional and safety standards. I is often legally required to provide guarantee for human safety and to make the product available on the market. The certification process...... relies on objective evidence of quality, which is produced by using qualified and state-of-the-art tools and verification and validation techniques. Software product line (SPL) engineering distributes costs among similar products that are developed simultaneously. However, SPL certification faces major...... SPL reengineering projects that involve complex source code transformations. To facilitate product (re)certification, the transformation must preserve certain qualitative properties such as code structure and semantics—a difficult task due to the complexity of the transformation and because certain...

  5. Method and practice on safety software verification and validation for digital reactor protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Duo; Zhang Liangju; Feng Junting

    2010-01-01

    The key issue arising from digitalization of reactor protection system for Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is in essence, how to carry out Verification and Validation (V and V), to demonstrate and confirm the software is reliable enough to perform reactor safety functions. Among others the most important activity of software V and V process is unit testing. This paper discusses the basic concepts on safety software V and V and the appropriate technique for software unit testing, focusing on such aspects as how to ensure test completeness, how to establish test platform, how to develop test cases and how to carry out unit testing. The technique discussed herein was successfully used in the work of unit testing on safety software of a digital reactor protection system. (author)

  6. Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

  7. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  8. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  9. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  10. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  11. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  12. A novel method for sub-arc VMAT dose delivery verification based on portal dosimetry with an EPID.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cools, Ruud A M; Dirkx, Maarten L P; Heijmen, Ben J M

    2017-11-01

    The EPID-based sub-arc verification of VMAT dose delivery requires synchronization of the acquired electronic portal images (EPIs) with the VMAT delivery, that is, establishment of the start- and stop-MU of the acquired images. To realize this, published synchronization methods propose the use of logging features of the linac or dedicated hardware solutions. In this study, we developed a novel, software-based synchronization method that only uses information inherently available in the acquired images. The EPIs are continuously acquired during pretreatment VMAT delivery and converted into Portal Dose Images (PDIs). Sub-arcs of approximately 10 MU are then defined by combining groups of sequentially acquired PDIs. The start- and stop-MUs of measured sub-arcs are established in a synchronization procedure, using only dosimetric information in measured and predicted PDIs. Sub-arc verification of a VMAT dose delivery is based on comparison of measured sub-arc PDIs with synchronized, predicted sub-arc PDIs, using γ-analyses. To assess the accuracy of this new method, measured and predicted PDIs were compared for 20 clinically applied VMAT prostate cancer plans. The sensitivity of the method for detection of delivery errors was investigated using VMAT deliveries with intentionally inserted, small perturbations (25 error scenarios; leaf gap deviations ≤ 1.5 mm, leaf motion stops during ≤ 15 MU, linac output error ≤ 2%). For the 20 plans, the average failed pixel rates (FPR) for full-arc and sub-arc dose QA were 0.36% ± 0.26% (1 SD) and 0.64% ± 0.88%, based on 2%/2 mm and 3%/3 mm γ-analyses, respectively. Small systematic perturbations of up to 1% output error and 1 mm leaf offset were detected using full-arc QA. Sub-arc QA was able to detect positioning errors in three leaves only during approximately 20 MU and small dose delivery errors during approximately 40 MU. In an ROC analysis, the area under the curve (AUC) for the combined full-arc/sub-arc approach was

  13. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

    2010-01-01

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  14. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  15. State Token Petri Net modeling method for formal verification of computerized procedure including operator's interruptions of procedure execution flow

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2012-01-01

    The Computerized Procedure System (CPS) is one of the primary operating support systems in the digital Main Control Room. The CPS displays procedure on the computer screen in the form of a flow chart, and displays plant operating information along with procedure instructions. It also supports operator decision making by providing a system decision. A procedure flow should be correct and reliable, as an error would lead to operator misjudgement and inadequate control. In this paper we present a modeling for the CPS that enables formal verification based on Petri nets. The proposed State Token Petri Nets (STPN) also support modeling of a procedure flow that has various interruptions by the operator, according to the plant condition. STPN modeling is compared with Coloured Petri net when they are applied to Emergency Operating Computerized Procedure. A converting program for Computerized Procedure (CP) to STPN has been also developed. The formal verification and validation methods of CP with STPN increase the safety of a nuclear power plant and provide digital quality assurance means that are needed when the role and function of the CPS is increasing.

  16. An Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Development Status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, E.; McDonald, B.; Miller, K.; Garner, J.; March-Leuba, J.; Poland, R.

    2015-01-01

    In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by advanced centrifuge technologies and the growth in separative work unit capacity at modern centrifuge enrichment plants. These measures would include permanently installed, unattended instruments capable of performing the routine and repetitive measurements previously performed by inspectors. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) that could provide independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, U-235 mass and total uranium mass of all declared cylinders moving through the plant, as well as the application and verification of a ''Non-destructive Assay Fingerprint'' to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. As IAEA's vision for a UCVS has evolved, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory have been developing and testing candidate non-destructive assay (NDA) methods for inclusion in a UCVS. Modeling and multiple field campaigns have indicated that these methods are capable of assaying relative cylinder enrichment with a precision comparable to or substantially better than today's high-resolution handheld devices, without the need for manual wall-thickness corrections. In addition, the methods interrogate the full volume of the cylinder, thereby offering the IAEA a new capability to assay the absolute U-235 mass in the cylinder, and much-improved sensitivity to substituted or removed material. Building on this prior work, and under the auspices of the United States Support Programme to the IAEA, a UCVS field prototype is being developed and tested. This paper provides an overview of: a) hardware and software design of the prototypes, b) preparation

  17. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  18. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  19. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durst, Philip Casey; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  20. Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolchenkov, D.L.

    1983-01-01

    By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

  1. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  2. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  3. Technology of remote nuclear activity monitoring for national safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwack, Eun Ho; Kim, B. K.; Kim, J. S.; Yoon, W. K.; Kim, J. S.; Kim, J. S.; Cha, H. R.; Na, W. W.; Choi, Y. M.

    2001-07-01

    This project mainly focused on technical development on remote monitoring. It covers optical fiber scintillator to be used as NDA sensor to targets to be applied. Optical fiber scintillator was tested at the high radioactive environment. It is the first try in its kind for spent fuel measurement. It is confirmed that optical fiber sensor can be used for safeguards verification. Its feasibility for spent fuel storage silo at Wolsong reactor was studied. And to optimize remote transmission cost which can be regarded as a major barrier, virtual private network was studied for possible application for safeguards purpose. It can drastically reduce transmission cost and upgrade information surety. As target for remote monitoring, light water reactor and heavy water reactor were feasibly studied. Especially heavy water reactor has much potential for reduction of inspection efforts if remote monitoring is introduced. In overall remote monitoring can play a pivotal role to streamline safeguards inspection

  4. Annual report of the Director of Safeguards 1988-1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) operates Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It also contributes to the IAEA safeguards network, in support of the Australian Government's committment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Activities carried out during the year ended 30 June 1989 in each of these areas are reviewed. It is reported that 54 export shipments of uranium ore concentrates containing 5061 tonnes of uranium oxide were made by Australia's three producers and that no unreconcilied differences in quantities of Australian obligated nuclear material, wherever situated, or nuclear material within Australia, regardless of origin, as at 30 June 1989. The report also includes copies of IAEA's statements related to the verification inspections pursuant to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement

  5. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

    2007-01-01

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  6. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-01-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  7. Maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franssen, F.; Islam, A.B.M.N.; Sonnier, C.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Baumann, M.

    1992-01-01

    The conclusions of the vulnerability test on VOPAN (verification of Operator's Analysis) as conducted at Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (ASA) at Seibersdorf, Austria in October 1990 and documented in STR-266, indicate that ''whenever samples are taken for safeguards purposes extreme care must be taken to ensure that they have not been interfered with during the sample taking, transportation, storage or sample preparation process.'' Indeed there exist a number of possibilities to alter the content of a safeguards sample vial from the moment of sampling up to the arrival of the treated (or untreated) sample at SAL. The time lapse between these two events can range from a few days up to months. The sample history over this period can be subdivided into three main sub-periods: (1) the period from when the sampling activities are commenced up to the treatment in the operator's laboratory, (2) during treatment of samples in the operator's laboratory, and finally, (3) the period between that treatment and the arrival of the sample at SAL. A combined effort between the Agency and the United States Support Program to the Agency (POTAS) has resulted in two active tasks and one proposed task to investigate improving the maintenance of continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples during the entire period of their existence. This paper describes the use of the Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC), of the Authenticated Secure Container System (ASCS), and of the Secure Container for Storage and Transportation of samples (SCST) to guarantee that a representative portion of the solution sample will be received at SAL

  8. Design features for enhancing international safeguards of AFR dry storage for spent LWR fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roberts, F.P.; Harms, N.L.

    1985-05-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed a study for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to identify and analyze design features that can facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards at facilities for dry storage of light water reactor spent fuels. Specific design features are identified that can enhance nuclear material flow and inventory verification. These are assessed from the viewpoint of safeguards effectiveness and possible impacts on the IAEA and the operator of the AFR facility. 11 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

  9. Enhancing Efficiency of Safeguards at Facilities that are Shutdown or Closed-Down, including those being Decommissioned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moran, B. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Stern, W. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Colley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Marzo, M. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2016-12-15

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards involves verification activities at a wide range of facilities in a variety of operational phases (e.g., under construction, start-up, operating, shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned). Safeguards optimization for each different facility type and operational phase is essential for the effectiveness of safeguards implementation. The IAEA’s current guidance regarding safeguards for the different facility types in the various lifecycle phases is provided in its Design Information Examination (DIE) and Verification (DIV) procedure. 1 Greater efficiency in safeguarding facilities that are shut down or closed down, including those being decommissioned, could allow the IAEA to use a greater portion of its effort to conduct other verification activities. Consequently, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards sponsored this study to evaluate whether there is an opportunity to optimize safeguards approaches for facilities that are shutdown or closed-down. The purpose of this paper is to examine existing safeguards approaches for shutdown and closed-down facilities, including facilities being decommissioned, and to seek to identify whether they may be optimized.

  10. Nuclear safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1978-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1977 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) 891 HP 892 AP [de

  11. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  12. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  13. Brazilian reactors under safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    Three nuclear reactors in Brazil have been placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to military use. They are used for research purposes under a bilateral treaty with the USA, and are located at Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte

  14. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  15. Safeguards in the European Union: The new partnership approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorstensen, S.; Chitumbo, K.

    1995-01-01

    This article highlights the circumstances surrounding the birth of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) and the status of its implementation. It particularly looks at elements of the NPA and practical arrangements that are being followed for specific types of nuclear and related facilities. Since elements of the NPA have been put into practice, significant savings have been realized in the allocation of safeguards inspection resources for Euratom countries, while ensuring effective verification. 1 graph, 1 tab

  16. The processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    The framework of safeguard activities of the IAEA from the viewpoint of informanagement is described. As methodology, major sources of information are, member state supplied information, information obtained by the Agency through its verification activity, and open source information. Software tools are provided to retrieve and to filter information for storage. Organizational structure of the Agency's information activities, and the changing roles of the inspectors are also described. (Yamamoto, A.)

  17. New and Emerging Satellite Imaging Capabilities in Support of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, M.; Paquette, J.P.; Spyropoulos, N.; Rainville, L.; Schichor, P.; Hong, M.

    2015-01-01

    This abstract is focused on new and emerging commercial satellite imagery (CSI) capabilities. For more than a decade, experienced imagery analysts have been exploiting and analyzing CSI in support of the Department of Safeguards. As the remote sensing industry continues to evolve, additional CSI imagery types are becoming available that could enhance our ability to evaluate and verify States' declarations and to investigate the possible presence of undeclared activities. A newly available and promising CSI capability that may have a Safeguards application is Full Motion Video (FMV) imagery collection from satellites. For quite some time, FMV imagery has been collected from airborne platforms, but now FMV sensors are being deployed into space. Like its airborne counterpart, satellite FMV imagery could provide analysts with a great deal of information, including insight into the operational status of facilities and patterns of activity. From a Safeguards perspective, FMV imagery could help the Agency in the evaluation and verification of States' declared facilities and activities. There are advantages of FMV imaging capabilities that cannot be duplicated with other CSI capabilities, including the ability to loiter over areas of interest and the potential to revisit sites multiple times per day. Additional sensor capabilities applicable to the Safeguards mission include, but are not limited to, the following sensors: · Thermal Infrared imaging sensors will be launched in late 2014 to monitor operational status, e.g., heat from a transformer. · High resolution ShortWave Infrared sensors able to characterize materials that could support verification of Additional Protocol declarations under Article 2.a(v). · Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with individual sensors or specific sensor combinations. The Safeguards Symposium provides a forum to showcase and demonstrate safeguards applications for these emerging satellite imaging capabilities. (author)

  18. Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2016-01-01

    The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

  19. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  20. Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leffer, T.N.

    2013-01-01

    The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

  1. Passive Tomography for Spent Fuel Verification: Analysis Framework and Instrument Design Study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    White, Timothy A.; Svard, Staffan J.; Smith, Leon E.; Mozin, Vladimir V.; Jansson, Peter; Davour, Anna; Grape, Sophie; Trellue, H.; Deshmukh, Nikhil S.; Wittman, Richard S.; Honkamaa, Tapani; Vaccaro, Stefano; Ely, James

    2015-05-18

    The potential for gamma emission tomography (GET) to detect partial defects within a spent nuclear fuel assembly is being assessed through a collaboration of Support Programs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the first phase of this study, two safeguards verification objectives have been identified. The first is the independent determination of the number of active pins that are present in the assembly, in the absence of a priori information. The second objective is to provide quantitative measures of pin-by-pin properties, e.g. activity of key isotopes or pin attributes such as cooling time and relative burnup, for the detection of anomalies and/or verification of operator-declared data. The efficacy of GET to meet these two verification objectives will be evaluated across a range of fuel types, burnups, and cooling times, and with a target interrogation time of less than 60 minutes. The evaluation of GET viability for safeguards applications is founded on a modelling and analysis framework applied to existing and emerging GET instrument designs. Monte Carlo models of different fuel types are used to produce simulated tomographer responses to large populations of “virtual” fuel assemblies. Instrument response data are processed by a variety of tomographic-reconstruction and image-processing methods, and scoring metrics specific to each of the verification objectives are defined and used to evaluate the performance of the methods. This paper will provide a description of the analysis framework and evaluation metrics, example performance-prediction results, and describe the design of a “universal” GET instrument intended to support the full range of verification scenarios envisioned by the IAEA.

  2. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

    2008-01-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

  3. Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galdoz, Erwin; Calzetta, Osvaldo; Fernández Moreno, Sonia; Llacer, Carlos; Díaz, Gustavo; Vigile, Sebastián; Brunhuber, Christoph

    2011-01-01

    Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

  4. Meeting the safeguards challenges of a commercial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Chesnay, B.; Pearsall, C.; Takeda, S.; Tomikawa, H.; Fujimaki, K.; Iwamoto, T.

    2004-01-01

    Never before has the IAEA taken on such a large challenge as implementing a safeguards system at a commercial reprocessing plant. The challenges lay in a wide range of areas. This paper will present an overview of how specific challenges are being met in: Providing an initial and continuing design verification approach that maintains continuity of knowledge for the life-time of the plant; Providing a robust safeguards approach, including added assurance measures to confirm the operational conditions of the facility; Providing verification systems with the highest sensitivity and reliability, while also being cost efficient; Providing timely and accurate analytical laboratory results; Providing sufficient authentication to joint-use, unattended verification systems to assure that independent conclusions can be reached; Providing a comprehensive integrated software system that allows for remote inspector data handling and evaluation and thus reducing inspection effort. A primary prerequisite to developing and implementing a safeguards approach of this magnitude is the transparent and interactive cooperation of the State and the operator. The JNFL Project has been a model example of this cooperation. This cooperation has been in the areas of system security, operational modifications, schedule adjustments, technical development and financial support. (author)

  5. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  6. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bates, Cameron Russell [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  7. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security

  8. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N. (comp.)

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  9. Comparison of measurement methods with a mixed effects procedure accounting for replicated evaluations (COM3PARE): method comparison algorithm implementation for head and neck IGRT positional verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roy, Anuradha; Fuller, Clifton D; Rosenthal, David I; Thomas, Charles R

    2015-08-28

    Comparison of imaging measurement devices in the absence of a gold-standard comparator remains a vexing problem; especially in scenarios where multiple, non-paired, replicated measurements occur, as in image-guided radiotherapy (IGRT). As the number of commercially available IGRT presents a challenge to determine whether different IGRT methods may be used interchangeably, an unmet need conceptually parsimonious and statistically robust method to evaluate the agreement between two methods with replicated observations. Consequently, we sought to determine, using an previously reported head and neck positional verification dataset, the feasibility and utility of a Comparison of Measurement Methods with the Mixed Effects Procedure Accounting for Replicated Evaluations (COM3PARE), a unified conceptual schema and analytic algorithm based upon Roy's linear mixed effects (LME) model with Kronecker product covariance structure in a doubly multivariate set-up, for IGRT method comparison. An anonymized dataset consisting of 100 paired coordinate (X/ measurements from a sequential series of head and neck cancer patients imaged near-simultaneously with cone beam CT (CBCT) and kilovoltage X-ray (KVX) imaging was used for model implementation. Software-suggested CBCT and KVX shifts for the lateral (X), vertical (Y) and longitudinal (Z) dimensions were evaluated for bias, inter-method (between-subject variation), intra-method (within-subject variation), and overall agreement using with a script implementing COM3PARE with the MIXED procedure of the statistical software package SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA). COM3PARE showed statistically significant bias agreement and difference in inter-method between CBCT and KVX was observed in the Z-axis (both p - value<0.01). Intra-method and overall agreement differences were noted as statistically significant for both the X- and Z-axes (all p - value<0.01). Using pre-specified criteria, based on intra-method agreement, CBCT was deemed

  10. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    ; Control of non-conforming products; Corrective Action; and Preventative Action. The following instructions were prepared to ensure that the IAEA expectations were met and that the products conform to the requirements as specified: Completion of Design Information Questionnaires; MBA-KMP Structure; Completion of Accounting Reports and Related Document; Planning and Conducting of Inspections; Physical Inventory Taking and Verification; Measurement System and Measurement Control Programme; Shipper / Receiver Differences; Material Unaccounted For. Technical Specifications were also prepared to define requirements regarding the supply of support systems, infrastructure and facilities to ensure the successful implementation of monitoring systems. The objective of these procedures, instructions and specifications is to provide assurance to the Safeguards Division that it can state, with a high level of confidence, that the information and products provided to the IAEA are formally and physically correct and that no diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material occurred. Benchmarking is a good method to measure the performance of the SSAC and to enhance continual improvement. Therefore one of the objectives is to measure South Africa's SSAC's performance against that of other member states

  11. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  12. Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leffer, Teri N.

    2014-01-01

    The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

  13. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

  14. Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Director General will open the symposium by presenting a series of challenges facing the international safeguards community: the need to ensure a robust system, with strong verification tools and a sound research and development programme; the importance of securing the necessary support for the system, in terms of resources; the effort to achieve universal participation in the non-proliferation regime; and the necessity of re-energizing disarmament efforts. Special focus will be given to the challenge underscored by recent events, of strengthening international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. (author)

  15. Sustaining a verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moyland, S. van

    1999-01-01

    Sustaining high levels of commitment to and enthusiasm for the verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW) would be a considerable challenge, but the price of failure would be high. No verification system for a complete ban on a whole of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has been in existence long enough to provide a precedent or the requisite experience. Nevertheless, lessons from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear safeguards system are instructive. A potential problem over the long haul is the gradual erosion of the deterrent effect of verification that may result from the continual overlooking of minor instances of non-compliance. Flaws in the verification system must be identified and dealt with early lest they also corrode the system. To achieve this the verification organisation's inspectors and analytical staff will need sustained support, encouragement, resources and training. In drawing attention to weaknesses, they must be supported by management and at the political level. The leaking of sensitive information, either industrial or military, by staff of the verification regime is a potential problem. 'Managed access' techniques should be constantly examined and improved. The verification organisation and states parties will need to sustain close co-operation with the nuclear and related industries. Frequent review mechanisms must be established. States must invest time and effort to make them effective. Another potential problem is the withering of resources for sustained verification. Verification organisations tend to be pressured by states to cut or last least cap costs, even if the verification workload increases. The verification system must be effective as knowledge and experience allows. The organisation will need continuously to update its scientific methods and technology. This requires in-house resources plus external research and development (R and D). Universities, laboratories and industry need incentives to

  16. Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

    1978-01-01

    The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

  17. Structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cole, R.J.; Bennett, C.A.; Edelhertz, H.; Wood, M.T.; Brown, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.

    1977-09-01

    Improving communication of NRU's requirements is the subject of this study. This summary is organized in terms of four decisions on whether safeguards regulatory documents as communication instruments should be an explicit NRC program, what communication methods should be focused on, what actions are feasible and desirable, and how should the NRC divide its effort and resources among desirable actions

  18. Design verification for large reprocessing plants (Proposed procedures)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rolandi, G.

    1988-07-01

    In the 1990s, four large commercial reprocessing plants will progressively come into operation: If an effective and efficient safeguards system is to be applied to these large and complex plants, several important factors have to be considered. One of these factors, addressed in the present report, concerns plant design verification. Design verification provides an overall assurance on plant measurement data. To this end design verification, although limited to the safeguards aspects of the plant, must be a systematic activity, which starts during the design phase, continues during the construction phase and is particularly performed during the various steps of the plant's commissioning phase. The detailed procedures for design information verification on commercial reprocessing plants must be defined within the frame of the general provisions set forth in INFCIRC/153 for any type of safeguards related activities and specifically for design verification. The present report is intended as a preliminary contribution on a purely technical level, and focusses on the problems within the Agency. For the purpose of the present study the most complex case was assumed: i.e. a safeguards system based on conventional materials accountancy, accompanied both by special input and output verification and by some form of near-real-time accountancy involving in-process inventory taking, based on authenticated operator's measurement data. C/S measures are also foreseen, where necessary to supplement the accountancy data. A complete ''design verification'' strategy comprehends: informing the Agency of any changes in the plant system which are defined as ''safeguards relevant''; ''reverifying by the Agency upon receiving notice from the Operator on any changes, on ''design information''. 13 refs

  19. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  20. Inter-laboratory verification of European pharmacopoeia monograph on derivative spectrophotometry method and its application for chitosan hydrochloride.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marković, Bojan; Ignjatović, Janko; Vujadinović, Mirjana; Savić, Vedrana; Vladimirov, Sote; Karljiković-Rajić, Katarina

    2015-01-01

    Inter-laboratory verification of European pharmacopoeia (EP) monograph on derivative spectrophotometry (DS) method and its application for chitosan hydrochloride was carried out on two generation of instruments (earlier GBC Cintra 20 and current technology TS Evolution 300). Instruments operate with different versions of Savitzky-Golay algorithm and modes of generating digital derivative spectra. For resolution power parameter, defined as the amplitude ratio A/B in DS method EP monograph, comparable results were obtained only with algorithm's parameters smoothing points (SP) 7 and the 2nd degree polynomial and those provided corresponding data with other two modes on TS Evolution 300 Medium digital indirect and Medium digital direct. Using quoted algorithm's parameters, the differences in percentages between the amplitude ratio A/B averages, were within accepted criteria (±3%) for assay of drug product for method transfer. The deviation of 1.76% for the degree of deacetylation assessment of chitosan hydrochloride, determined on two instruments, (amplitude (1)D202; the 2nd degree polynomial and SP 9 in Savitzky-Golay algorithm), was acceptable, since it was within allowed criteria (±2%) for assay deviation of drug substance, for method transfer in pharmaceutical analyses. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  1. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  2. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  3. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  4. Euratom Safeguards: Improving Safeguards by Cooperation in R&D and Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Ancius, D.; Marszalek, Y.; Smejkal, A.; Vaccaro, S.; De Baere, P.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Meylemans, P.; Murtezi, M.; Persson, L.; Synetos, S.; Tempesta, S.; Canadell Bofarull, V.; Turner, D.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Berndt, R.; Stringa, E.; Richir, P.; Sequeira, V.; Tagziria, H.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Zuleger, E.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; )

    2015-01-01

    Euratom Safeguards, implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty by the European Commission's Directorate Nuclear Safeguards, is the largest Regional Safeguards System and involved in many R&D activities of its own, often in close cooperation with external partners. Most of the results of these activities are shared with or offered to the IAEA. The work described in this paper is complementary to the projects run by the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (ECSP) to the IAEA. The ECSP activities will be described elsewhere at this conference. The present paper will provide an overview on R&D activities run in addition to the ECSP, and will attempt to link them to the capabilities discussed by the IAEA in the Long Term R&D Plan. The range of topics will include work on unattended data acquisition systems (hard- and software), advanced data analysis tools, news from seals related technology, containment and design verification applications of 3D lasers, activities to keep standard measurement technologies sustainable etc. Work done with the IAEA in preparation of new facilities and facility types will be discussed briefly. The paper will also highlight some current challenges and make suggestions how to address them. (author)

  5. VHTRC experiment for verification test of H{infinity} reactivity estimation method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fujii, Yoshio; Suzuki, Katsuo; Akino, Fujiyoshi; Yamane, Tsuyoshi; Fujisaki, Shingo; Takeuchi, Motoyoshi; Ono, Toshihiko [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

    1996-02-01

    This experiment was performed at VHTRC to acquire the data for verifying the H{infinity} reactivity estimation method. In this report, the experimental method, the measuring circuits and data processing softwares are described in details. (author).

  6. Thermal Analysis of the Driving Component Based on the Thermal Network Method in a Lunar Drilling System and Experimental Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dewei Tang

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available The main task of the third Chinese lunar exploration project is to obtain soil samples that are greater than two meters in length and to acquire bedding information from the surface of the moon. The driving component is the power output unit of the drilling system in the lander; it provides drilling power for core drilling tools. High temperatures can cause the sensors, permanent magnet, gears, and bearings to suffer irreversible damage. In this paper, a thermal analysis model for this driving component, based on the thermal network method (TNM was established and the model was solved using the quasi-Newton method. A vacuum test platform was built and an experimental verification method (EVM was applied to measure the surface temperature of the driving component. Then, the TNM was optimized, based on the principle of heat distribution. Through comparative analyses, the reasonableness of the TNM is validated. Finally, the static temperature field of the driving component was predicted and the “safe working times” of every mode are given.

  7. All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

    2010-01-01

    All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

  8. Verifications of ES-DCPD method for piping wall thickness monitoring in the SFASL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryu, Kyung Ha; Kim, Ji Hak; Hwang, Il Soon

    2009-01-01

    Although various monitoring systems, algorithm and the concept of redundant systems were developed for nuclear power plant's (NPP) aged components, accidents in NPPs have been reported continuously such as Surry unit-2 flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) accident and Mihama unit-3 FAC accident. We developed a new piping wall loss monitoring system using equipotential switching direct current potential drop (ES-DCPD) method. This method can be used as a screening method with high speed, thus can also be used as a precise online monitoring method. This method has been developed and planned for a demonstration to a NPP's secondary side piping system in Korea

  9. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  10. Uranium Enrichment Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Demuth, Scott F. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Trahan, Alexis Chanel [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-06-26

    DIV of facility layout, material flows, and other information provided in the DIQ. Material accountancy through an annual PIV and a number of interim inventory verifications, including UF6 cylinder identification and counting, NDA of cylinders, and DA on a sample collection of UF6. Application of C/S technologies utilizing seals and tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) on cylinders, containers, storage rooms, and IAEA instrumentation to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection. Verification of the absence of undeclared material and operations, especially HEU production, through SNRIs, LFUA of cascade halls, and environmental swipe sampling

  11. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  12. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  13. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  14. Study on dynamic rod worth measurement method and its test verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Lei; Liu Tongxian; Zhao Wenbo; Li Songling; Yu Yingrui

    2015-01-01

    An advanced rod worth measurement technique, the dynamic rod worth measurement method (DRWM) has been developed. Static Spatial Factors (SSF) and Dynamic Spatial Factor (DSF) were introduced to improve the inverse kinetics method. The three dimensional steady and transient simulations for the measurement process was carried out to calculate the modification factors. The rod worth measurement, test was performed on a research reactor to verify DRWM. The results showed that the DRWM method provided the improved accuracy and could be a replacement of the traditional methods. (authors)

  15. Application of virtualised reality to safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goncalves, J.G.M.; Sequeira, V.; Sorel, F.

    1999-01-01

    For several years the JRC has been working with laser range finders aiming at the complete 3D reconstruction of real environments 'as built'. This technique is known as Virtualised Reality. By scanning the environment with a laser range finder, a map of the distances is acquired. This 'depth map' is at the basis of the 3D model to be created. 3D data analysis can detect and resolve occlusions, i.e., it can detect regions which are hidden and thus cannot modelled from a particular capture point. The 3D model is automatically textured with photographic quality pictures from the environment itself. The final complete model is encoded in the VRML format and can be accessed by inspectors with a standard Web browser. The paper describes the technique used for building the complete 3D models from reality, the corresponding accuracy, and will focus on immediate and future applications for Safeguards, in particular training and design information verification. (author)

  16. Reliability analysis of safety systems of nuclear power plant and utility experience with reliability safeguarding of systems during specified normal operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.

    1989-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of the methods applied for reliability analysis of safety systems in nuclear power plant. The main tasks are to check the system design for detection of weak points, and to find possibilities of optimizing the strategies for inspection, inspection intervals, maintenance periods. Reliability safeguarding measures include the determination and verification of the broundary conditions of the analysis with regard to the reliability parameters and maintenance parameters used in the analysis, and the analysis of data feedback reflecting the plant response during operation. (orig.) [de

  17. Development of IAEA safeguards at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    1988-01-01

    In this report the nuclear material at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants under IAEA safeguards is studied. The current verification practices of the nuclear material and future improvements are also considered. The problems met during the implementation of the the verification measures of the nuclear material - particularly for the fuel assemblies are discussed. The additional verification activities as proposed for future improvements are also discussed including the physical inventory verification and the verification of receipts and shipments. It is concluded that the future development of the present IAEA verification practices at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants would necessitate the application of quantitative measures of the nuclear material and the implementation of advanced measurement techniques and instruments. 2 fig., 4 tab

  18. Ultrasonic wave propagation through aberrating layers: experimental verification of the conjugate gradient Rayleigh method

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ledoux, L.A.F.; Berkhoff, Arthur P.; Thijssen, J.M.

    The Conjugate Gradient Rayleigh method for the calculation of acoustic reflection and transmission at a rough interface between two media was experimentally verified. The method is based on a continuous version of the conjugate gradient technique and plane-wave expansions. We measured the beam

  19. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  20. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Qun

    2001-01-01

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For