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Sample records for safeguards support program

  1. The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desmond, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

  2. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-01-01

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions

  3. Evolution of a safeguards support program: POTAS past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kessler, J.C.; Reisman, A.W.

    1992-01-01

    When the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became for the first time responsible for implementing full-scope safeguards in many countries, including countries with large and sophisticated nuclear programs. The IAEA's Department of Safeguards did not have the safeguards technology appropriate for these rapidly expanding responsibilities, nor did it have a research and development program to respond to that need. In response to this situation, the United States initiated the US Program of Technical Assitance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) in 1977. This program was originally intended to be a 5-yr, $5 million program. As the United States and the IAEA began to implement this program, several things rapidly became clear. Meeting the evolving safeguards technology needs would require much more than $5 million; within the first 5 yr, the United States allocated more than $20 million. This paper summarizes the policies activities, and practices POTAS has employed in support of IAEA safeguards program

  4. The Canadian Safeguards Support Program - A future outlook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keeffe, R.; Truong, Q.S. Bob

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) is one of the first safeguards support programs with an overall objective to assist the IAEA by providing technical assistance and other resources and by developing equipment to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards. This paper provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the CSSP, from the beginning when the program was under joint management between the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian crown corporation, until recent years when the AECB became responsible for all projects and financial management. Recently, new legislation came into force and the AECB became the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). However, the mandate and management of the CSSP under the CNSC remain fundamentally unchanged. Major CSSP activities are devoted to the following areas: (a) Human resource assistance through the provision of cost-free experts (CFEs) to the IAEA; (b) Training of IAEA inspectors and facility operators, development of training resources and integrated approaches for training; (c) System studies, e.g. the development of integrated safeguards approach for CANDU reactors, geological repository, and physical model; (d) Equipment development, e.g. the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor, Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device, seals, remote monitoring, encryption and authentication; (e) Information technology which includes satellite imagery, Geographical Information System (GIS), and position tracking of spent fuel containers. The CSSP has continued to evolve during the past 25 years. Although formerly larger the CSSP budget has settled to a stable level of just slightly above (Canadian) $2M. Leveraging of the CSSP budget through collaborations with several Member State Support Programs and Canadian government departments has provided mutual benefits for all parties involved and useful results that have been put into practical use by the IAEA. (author)

  5. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  6. IAEA Safeguards and technical support programs: POTAS in the 1990s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kessler, C.J.

    1991-01-01

    The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) has since 1978 provided technology and technical assistance to the IAEA to support its nuclear safeguards activities. The present level of support, $6.9 million per year, equals 10% of the Department of Safeguards annual budget. During the next decade, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will face new technical challenges in carrying out its verification activities. To help the IAEA acquire the technology and other technical support that it will require in the 1990s, POTAS expects to continue its assistance, both in the areas established in the past and in additional areas dictated by newly identified IAEA safeguards requirements. This paper will look at the political and policy context within which the Department of Safeguards, and hence POTAS, operates, and how that context is expected to evolve over the next decade. The roles and functions of POTAS will be identified and discussed in terms of their historical evolution. Lastly, the paper will consider how POTAS is expected to change during the 1990s, both to maintain effectiveness in existing roles and functions, and to meet the challenge of the changing policy context. 5 refs

  7. Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA program document outlining the various tasks which comprise the program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-12-01

    Canada has established a safeguards research and development program, the purpose of which is to supplement the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to facilities safeguarded by the IAEA. This document sets forth those tasks which comprise the program

  8. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  9. The UK safeguards R and D support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

    1991-01-01

    The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented

  10. Preparing the 1993--94 Safeguards Implementation Support Programme for IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, L.

    1993-01-01

    The 1993-94 Safeguards Implementation Support (IS) Program describes the Department of Safeguards' program of implementation support for the coming two years. The main body of the document describes the IS program for IAEA. A detailed description of the individual IS needs for 1993-1994 is contained in an annex that specifies the nee, assigns priorities and lists tasks and activities underway to address the need. Other annexes address policy and procedures for program planning and management, current Member State Support Programs (MSSP) tasks, and identification of MSSP resources required for implementation of developed technologies that could be provided. The primary responsibility for supporting the implementation of safeguards technology is with the support divisions of the Department of Safeguards. However, in this time of limited resources it is essential that, where possible, the Department receives assistance from MSSPs that have the needed resources. This document should serve as a guide for IAEA, in planning implementation support activities and for identifying tasks for MSSPs wishing to provide assistance

  11. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-01-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

  12. Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    Canada has established a safeguards research and development program whose purpose is to supplement the resources of the IAEA. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to reactors of Canadian design. This document sets forth those tasks that make up the program

  13. Improving technical support to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundquist, D.

    1986-01-01

    Changes present new safeguards challenges and require that the entire safeguards process become more efficient. A development process has evolved at the Agency that aids in matching appropriate technology to the needs, primarily through the mechanism of voluntary Member States Support Programme, which gives IAEA access to many of the worlds finest nuclear laboratories. The function of these programs is discussed in this article with particular emphasis on the Agency's co-ordination role. Besides a description of the Member States Support Programme the problems involved (coordination and communication aspects) as well as the results achieved are indicated. The support is categorized under the following headlines: 1) Information and expertise; 2) Instrumentation, methods and techniques; 3) Training; 4) Test and calibration facilities. As mentioned in the article Member States also benefit from the Support Programme. Other means of technical support such as multi-national co-operation programmes and bilateral research agreements are mentioned

  14. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diaz,R.A.

    2008-06-13

    The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

  15. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  16. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  17. Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant by IAEA Member State Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, H. S.; Kim, H. D.; Song, D. Y.; Eom, S. H.; Lee, T. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Park, S. H.; Han, B. Y.; Choi, Y.

    2012-01-01

    The objective of this project is to analyze the safeguard ability of pyroprocess facility and to establish the safeguards system for pyroprocess by developing the technology of nuclear material accounting for unit process, surveillance technology and nuclear characteristic analysis technology which are needed to demonstrate the safeguards technology of pyroprocess. Therefore, the development of a safeguards approach for pyroprocessing facilities is required as the interest of pyroprocessing increases. Regarding this issue, the IAEA made a contract the 3-years long Member State Support Program (MSSP) for the 'Support for Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant' with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in July 2008. Even though the pyroprocess technology is currently being developed all over the world, its safeguards approach has not been established yet, and especially, nuclear material accountancy technology which is the core of safeguards has not been established as well. Therefore, the development of new accountancy technology which is appropriate for the construction of pyroprocess facility is needed. Due to the nature of the process, pyroprocess has various kinds of process material form, and the composition of Pu and U isotopes included in process material is not homogeneous. Also, the existing nuclear material accountancy technology for a wet reprocessing facility is hard to apply because of a large quantity of gamma-ray radiation which is emitted from the fissile products in process material. In this report, the study for the development of a safeguards approach for a pyroprocessing plant pyroprocessing has been described. As the previous results six pyroprocessing facility concepts suggested by US, Japan, and Republic of Korea had been summarized and analyzed, and the determination principles were established to determine a reference pyroprocessing facility concept. The reference pyroprocessing facility was determined to be the ESPF of KAERI

  18. The DOE safeguards and security technology development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cherry, R.C.; Wheelock, A.J.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that strategic planning for safeguards and security within the Department of Energy emphasizes the contributions of advanced technologies to the achievement of Departmental protection program goals. The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program provides state-of-the-art technologies, systems and technical services in support of the policies and programmatic requirements for the protection of Departmental assets. The Program encompasses research and development in physical security, nuclear material control and accountability, information security and personnel security, and the integration of these disciplines in advanced applications. Technology development tasks serve goals that range from the maintenance of an effective technology base to the development, testing and evaluation of applications to meet field needs. A variety of factors, from the evolving threat to reconfiguration of the DOE complex and the technical requirements of new facilities, are expected to influence safeguards and security technology requirements and development efforts. Implementation of the Program is based on the systematic identification, prioritization and alignment of technology development tasks and needs. Initiatives currently underway are aimed at enhancing technology development project management. Increased management attention is also being placed on efforts to promote the benefits of the Program through technology transfer and interagency liaison

  19. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  20. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards

  1. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  2. Department of energy defense programs perspectives on safeguards, security, and classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eyck, E.Q.T.

    1989-01-01

    This paper discusses why national and international safeguards and the protection of sensitive information are important to the United States and to other nations. It demonstrates that while the opposite consequence appears logical these functions will probably become even more important if the major powers agree on further arms reductions. Some of the steps taken by the U.S. Department of Energy to improve the effectiveness of its safeguards, security, and classification programs are reviewed. The valuable contributions in these areas since 1968 and 1976, respectively by the Technical Support Organization and the International Safeguards Project Offoce at Brookhaven are noted

  3. Introducing the Brazilian program of technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency - Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vinhas, Laercio A.; Palhares, Lilia C.; Dias, Fabio C.; Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2009-01-01

    As an active Member State of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Brazil has applied substantial resources in order to maintain the best possible cooperation with the Agency, aiming at a continuous improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Over the last decades a number of projects, involving the participation of high-level Brazilian professionals in the nuclear area, have already been jointly completed. To continue providing this voluntary support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards for research, development and implementation, in 2006 Brazil decided to accept the IAEA's invitation to participate in the IAEA Member States Support Programmes initiative, which currently includes 21 Member States. The Research and Development (R and D) Programme for Nuclear Verification is the IAEA reference in this regard, establishing the high priority needs and describing each recognized departmental project. The Programme is issued every two years. The 'Brazilian Support Programme (BRZ SP)' was established on the basis of a set of administrative procedures titled 'Cooperation Arrangements and Guidelines', agreed between the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the IAEA - Department of Safeguards. The scope of the BRZ SP includes: the participation in field tests and the evaluation of state-of-the-art technologies as requested by the IAEA for its safeguards applications; the training of safeguards personnel involved with safeguards implementation at both facility and State levels; laboratorial support in the area of destructive and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials; the analysis of safeguards issues; information acquisition, analysis and evaluation; and the provision of human resources, such as experts and consultants to work directly with the IAEA Secretariat. The activities agreed under the BRZ SP are not restricted to CNEN staff members. Professionals from other Brazilian organizations may also be involved

  4. Contribution of the Member State Support Programmes to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortakov, V.; Gardiner, D.; Rautjaervi, J.

    1999-01-01

    Over the last twenty years, Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have provided invaluable technical support to IAEA Safeguards. This support has covered practically all aspects of traditional safeguards activities and also those activities recently proposed and introduced for strengthening the safeguards system. As of August 1997, there were fourteen Member States, plus EURATOM, with active programmes in support of IAEA safeguards and the activities conducted under these Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) are currently valued at an annual twenty million dollars of extra-budgetary contribution to the IAEA. The overall administration in the IAEA of the support programmes is the responsibility of Support Programmes Administration (SPA) in the Safeguards Division of Technical Services. This paper describes the roles and the contributions of the MSSPs, the functions of the MSSP administration activities, and the vital importance the IAEA attaches to the MSSPs. (author)

  5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM INTERSHIP PROGRAM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PEPPER, S.E.

    2003-01-01

    In 2002, the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards established a program of one-year paid internships with the IAEA Department of Safeguards for students and recent graduates. Six interns are currently working with the IAEA in software development and information collection activities. The program is administered through the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). Software development assignments were considered to be most feasible because of the considerable abilities of many computer science students after a few years' education. Candidates in information science were also recruited because of an existing internship program managed by the Monterey Institute of International Studies. ISPO recruited students from US. colleges and other sources. Applications were collected and provided to the IAEA for review and selection. SGIT then identified the best applicants and, after confirming their intention to accept the position, tailored assignments based on their qualifications. Before the assignments started, ISPO conducted an orientation to provide the interns with information to ease their transition into working with the IAEA and living in Vienna. Four interns began their assignments in software development in June 2002 and two others began their assignments in information collection in July and August. The IAEA, the interns, and the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support have found the assignments to be beneficial. The internship program provides additional staff to the IAEA at low cost to the USSP, introduces young professionals to careers in the nuclear industry and international civil service, and provides the IAEA access to U.S. academic institutions. In 2003, the program will be expanded to include engineering and technical writing in support of the Division of Safeguards Technical Services. The paper will discuss the recruitment and selection of interns and the administration of the program

  6. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

  7. U.S. next generation safeguards initiative: the human capital development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.A.

    2013-01-01

    The Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogram of the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is developing sustainable academic and technical programs that support the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals. This wide-ranging HCD effort endeavors to develop additional human resources to address current shortfalls, encourage U.S. experts to seek employment at the IAEA, and identify and train a new cadre of safeguards experts to meet the needs of both the United States and the IAEA for decades to come. In recent years, a convergence of factors has challenged the IAEA's ability to carry out its safeguards mission effectively. A staffing study shows that less than 20% of the international safeguards specialists in the U.S. workforce are 44 years of age or younger and that over 80% of the international safeguards specialists at the National Laboratories will be retired or otherwise resigned within 15 years. An aging workforce nearing retirement and growing workload, coupled with a safeguards budget that has remained essentially flat in real terms for nearly two decades, have posed particular challenges to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Recognizing the trends, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) launched NGSI in the fall of 2007. Since that time, the HCD subprogram of NGSI has sponsored over 300 safeguards internships at U.S. National Labs, organized eight annual short safeguards policy and technical courses, worked with ten universities to develop new undergraduate and graduate course-work on international safeguards and nonproliferation, established a highly competitive graduate fellowship program, and completed a human capital requirements study that closely examined the safeguards workforce within the U.S. National Lab complex. Of past NGSI students and interns, nearly four in ten pursue multiple NGSI

  8. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  9. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapir, J.L.

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer

  10. Equipment support for the implementation of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arlt, R.; Bosler, G.; Goldfarb, M.; Schanfein, M.; Whichello, J.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The provision of effective, reliable, and user-friendly equipment needed for the implementation of safeguards is one of the main objectives of the Division of Technical Services (SOTS) in the Department of Safeguards. As an outcome of a review by an independent external consultant firm, the instrumentation sections of the SGTS were reorganized in January 2001 into two new sections, the Section for NDA Systems and Seals (TNS) and Section for Installed Systems (TIE). Each section has 'cradle-to-grave' responsibilities for development, implementation, maintenance, and decommissioning of safeguards instruments and measurement systems. Unattended assay, monitoring and surveillance instruments are the responsibility of TIE while attended nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments and seals are handled by TNS. The principal goals of both sections are to define equipment requirements based on Departmental needs, to coordinate Support Programme tasks concerning development and implementation activities, to provide system engineering of commercial components, manage laboratory and to do field testing and prove system suitability for defined safeguards applications. In addition both sections coordinate equipment and supply needs for the Department, including acquisition, preparation, servicing, installation, commissioning, troubleshooting, maintenance and repair, ensuring their availability when needed. As required, TIE and TNS provide specialized field support to the Operations Divisions. Each section is working to standardize equipment as much as possible and reduce the number of instruments performing the same function. This reduces both inspector and technician training, required parts inventories, and overall life-cycle costs. Development based on User Needs from the Operations Divisions follows a strict quality control program that includes a thorough qualification testing procedure with the last phase being field-testing under actual facility conditions. A

  11. U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

    1989-01-01

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

  12. Safeguard and security issues for the U.S. Fissile Materials Disposition Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Office of Materials Disposition (MD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for fissile materials, preparing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), preparing for a Record of Decision (ROD) regarding this material, and conducting other related activities. A primary objective of this program is to support U.S. nonproliferation policy by reducing major security risks. Particular areas of concern are the acquisition of this material by unauthorized persons and preventing the reintroduction of the material for use in weapons. This paper presents some of the issues, definitions, and assumptions addressed by the Safeguards and Security Project Team in support of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP). The discussion also includes some preliminary ideas regarding safeguards and security criteria that are applicable to the screening of disposition options

  13. Safeguards and security issues for the U.S. Fissile Materials Disposition Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Office of Materials Disposition (MD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for fissile materials, preparing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), preparing for a Record of Decision (ROD) regarding this material, and conducting other related activities. A primary objective of this program is to support US nonproliferation policy by reducing major security risks. Particular areas of concern are the acquisition of this material by unauthorized persons and preventing the reintroduction of the material for use in weapons. This paper presents some of the issues, definitions, and assumptions addressed by the Safeguards and Security Project Team in support of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP). The discussion also includes some preliminary ideas regarding safeguards and security criteria that are applicable to the screening of disposition options

  14. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  15. Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

  16. The international framework for safeguarding peaceful nuclear energy programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mazer, B.M.

    1980-01-01

    International law, in response to the need for safeguard assurances, has provided a framework which can be utilized by supplier and recipient states. Multilateral treaties have created the International Atomic Energy Agency which can serve a vital role in the establishment and supervision of safeguard agreements for nuclear energy programs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created definite obligations on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to alleviate some possibilities of proliferation and has rejuvenated the function of the IAEA in providing safeguards, especially to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty. States which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty may receive nuclear energy co-operation subject to IAEA safeguards. States like Canada, have insisted through the bilateral nuclear energy co-operation agreements that either individual or joint agreement be reached with the IAEA for the application of safeguards. Trilateral treaties among Canada, the recipient state and the IAEA have been employed and can provide the necessary assurances against the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs to military or non-peaceful uses. The advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its guidlines has definitely advanced the cause of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective should be the creation of an international structure incorporating the application of the most comprehensive safeguards which will be applied universally to all nuclear energy programs

  17. Innovative audit program for today's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lillpop, J.W. Jr.

    1975-01-01

    An internal safeguards audit program was developed and implemented at GE facilities to meet the need for effective audit and accurate, timely reporting to management. The concepts from which the program was evolved are summarized. The documentation and reporting mechanism has worked well for both the auditee and management

  18. Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

    1979-08-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  19. Safeguards system testing WSRC Insider Exercise Program (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robichaux, J.J.

    1991-01-01

    One of the major concerns related to the control and accountability of nuclear material located at DOE facilities is the theft or diversion of material by an insider. Many complex safeguards and security systems have been installed to provide timely detection and prevention of the removal of nuclear materials. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company's (WSRC) Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) section has implemented an insider exercise program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of these safeguards systems. Exercises consist of limited scope performance test. This paper describes the structure and controls for the insider exercise program at the Savannah River Site, the lessons learned over the past several years, and methods being utilized to improve the program

  20. Development of Virtual Environment under Member State Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Byungmarn; Lee, Nayoung

    2013-01-01

    Member State Support Program (MSSP) is comprised of various programs such as development of safeguards approach, training, information analysis and so on. Each support programs would be evaluated biennially through coordinators' meeting. IAEA publish 'Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification' so that the member state can review it. In the program, IAEA specify the need to develop the virtual reality based training tools. The objective of this project is to develop comprehensive training software dedicated to verification activities in the field based on the virtual environment. The training for the IAEA inspector is indispensable to maintain or improve their verification capability and to be prepared for the inspection of the complicated facilities. However, the grabbing of the available facility is not easy due to following limitations such as security, confidentiality, interference of the commercial operation and so on. Therefore, the virtual environment, which can replace a real facility, is required for the IAEA training. The objective of this software is to support the IAEA's verification capability. It is useful for the trainer and trainee to better understand how nuclear materials are processed in the fuel fabrication facility and what kind safeguards approaches are needed at each process before inspections. The final product will be integrated in the IAEA safeguards training courses to improve the efficiency of the safeguards training. Also we are going to make a decision if additional projects such as CANDU fuel parts or other facilities depending on evaluation results at the IAEA training course will be held on Korea in this year

  1. Development of Virtual Environment under Member State Support Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koh, Byungmarn; Lee, Nayoung [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    Member State Support Program (MSSP) is comprised of various programs such as development of safeguards approach, training, information analysis and so on. Each support programs would be evaluated biennially through coordinators' meeting. IAEA publish 'Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification' so that the member state can review it. In the program, IAEA specify the need to develop the virtual reality based training tools. The objective of this project is to develop comprehensive training software dedicated to verification activities in the field based on the virtual environment. The training for the IAEA inspector is indispensable to maintain or improve their verification capability and to be prepared for the inspection of the complicated facilities. However, the grabbing of the available facility is not easy due to following limitations such as security, confidentiality, interference of the commercial operation and so on. Therefore, the virtual environment, which can replace a real facility, is required for the IAEA training. The objective of this software is to support the IAEA's verification capability. It is useful for the trainer and trainee to better understand how nuclear materials are processed in the fuel fabrication facility and what kind safeguards approaches are needed at each process before inspections. The final product will be integrated in the IAEA safeguards training courses to improve the efficiency of the safeguards training. Also we are going to make a decision if additional projects such as CANDU fuel parts or other facilities depending on evaluation results at the IAEA training course will be held on Korea in this year.

  2. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  3. Field Test of a DCVD Using an Ixon Camera with a Lumogen-Coated EMCCD Detector. Prepared for the Canadian Safeguards Support Program and the Swedish Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, J.D.; Gerwing, A.F.; Maxwell, R.; Larsson, M.; Axell, K.; Hildingsson, L.; Lindberg, B.; Vinnaa, F.

    2003-12-01

    The Canadian and Swedish Safeguards Support Programs have developed a new digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) to verify spent fuel. The new system, based upon an electron-multiplied charge-coupled device that is lumogen coated, can operate at 14 frames per second using the fast 5 MHz analogue to digital converter. The new DCVD was successful in measuring the long-cooled Aagesta fuel with a burnup of 1,200 MWd/t U and a cooling time of 31 years, which is well below the target of 10,000 MWd/t U and 40- years- cooled. Scanning of fuel assemblies was successfully demonstrated. With the aid of a laser pointer system, random verification within a reasonable time frame was also demonstrated

  4. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Programs Summary Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Anzelon, G.; Essner, J.; Dougan, A.; Doyle, J.; Boyer, B.; Hypes, P.; Sokova, E.; Wehling, F.

    2008-01-01

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A and M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students

  5. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  6. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  7. INSPECT: a package of computer programs for planning and evaluating safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, M.F.

    1980-01-01

    As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, PNL has developed a package of computer programs, called INSPECT, that can be used in planning and evaluating safeguards inspections of various types of nuclear facilities. The programs are based on the statistical methods described in Part F of the IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual and can be used to calculate the variance components of the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) statistic, the variance components of the D (difference) statistic, attribute and variables sampling plans, and a measure of the effectiveness of the inspection plan. The paper describes the programs, reviews a number of applications, and indicates areas for future work

  8. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs

  9. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security

  10. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N. (comp.)

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  11. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  12. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  13. Nuclear safeguards surveys as performed by the Albuquerque operations office

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jewell, D.

    1987-01-01

    The nuclear safeguards survey program as administered by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is comprehensive in scope and evaluates the facility's safeguards program for an entire appraisal period. The survey program focuses on both the integrated and graded safeguards concepts and includes both compliance and performance evaluations. The program utilizes independent measurement support to verify facility inventory values and measurement system capabilities. The AL survey program is oriented towards facility development and management as opposed to development and management by numerous detailed departmental directives

  14. A safeguards program for implementing Department of Energy requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.

    1989-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a new materials control and accountability (MC ampersand A) order 5633.3 in February of 1988. This order contains all of the requirements for an effective MC ampersand A (safeguards) program for facilities that control and account for nuclear materials in their operations. All contractors were expected to come into compliance with the order by April 30, 1989, or obtain approval for exceptions and/or extensions. The order also contains various performance requirements that are not in effect until the DOE issues the guidelines to the performance requirements. After evaluations were completed in February 1989, it was determined there were several deficiencies in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) safeguards program. Documentation of policy and procedures needed correction before LANL could be in compliance with the new MC ampersand A order. Differences between the old and new orders were addressed. After this determination, action teams were established to corrected LANL's safeguards program. Compliance with the DOE requirements was the goal of this activity. The accomplishments of the action teams are the subject of this paper

  15. Isotopic safeguards data bank (ISTLIB) and control program (MISTY)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.

    1978-09-01

    As part of the U.S. program to provide technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a computer code and data bank to aid in the safeguards verification of spent fuel content at the head end of a reprocessing facility. A description and user instructions that uses isotopic safeguards techniques are presented for MISTY, a computer program for analyzing an isotopic data base (ISTLIB). The input, operating procedures, and output from MISTY are explained in detail. An output listing of an example computer run is provided to illustrate the program's operation. The contents of the data bank are summarized, and show the isotopic data sets that are available

  16. Exploiting the Geospatial Dimension of Data in Support of IAEA Safeguard

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McDaniel, M.; Bleakly, D.; Horak, K. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (United States)

    2012-06-15

    The nuclear fuel cycle is highly dependent upon geographic factors and each step in a state's nuclear fuel cycle occurs in geographically explicit locations. Because of this, information indicative of these activities is likely to have a strong geographic competent. Therefore, it is suggested that open source information management in support of State Level Assessments also be geographically focused. With an explicit geographic interface for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, structuring, and disseminating open source information, the information management challenges faced by the IAEA can be made more intuitive and result in more effective, information-driven safeguards analyses, potentially leading to more timely safeguards conclusions. This paper proposes an information management framework based upon geographic information systems (GIS) principles for open-source information analysis in support of international safeguards.

  17. University of Texas Safeguards by Design Problem Statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ruggiero, Christy E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2018-01-22

    This document describes the problem statement that students at the University of Texas will use for their senior level capstone design class. The purpose of this project is to introduce students to Safeguards by Design concepts as part of their capstone design course at the culmination of their degree program. This work is supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory with FY17 and FY18 programmatic funding from the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (INS), Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Resource Development Program, Safeguards by Design Project.

  18. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  19. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  20. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  1. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  2. New and Emerging Satellite Imaging Capabilities in Support of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, M.; Paquette, J.P.; Spyropoulos, N.; Rainville, L.; Schichor, P.; Hong, M.

    2015-01-01

    This abstract is focused on new and emerging commercial satellite imagery (CSI) capabilities. For more than a decade, experienced imagery analysts have been exploiting and analyzing CSI in support of the Department of Safeguards. As the remote sensing industry continues to evolve, additional CSI imagery types are becoming available that could enhance our ability to evaluate and verify States' declarations and to investigate the possible presence of undeclared activities. A newly available and promising CSI capability that may have a Safeguards application is Full Motion Video (FMV) imagery collection from satellites. For quite some time, FMV imagery has been collected from airborne platforms, but now FMV sensors are being deployed into space. Like its airborne counterpart, satellite FMV imagery could provide analysts with a great deal of information, including insight into the operational status of facilities and patterns of activity. From a Safeguards perspective, FMV imagery could help the Agency in the evaluation and verification of States' declared facilities and activities. There are advantages of FMV imaging capabilities that cannot be duplicated with other CSI capabilities, including the ability to loiter over areas of interest and the potential to revisit sites multiple times per day. Additional sensor capabilities applicable to the Safeguards mission include, but are not limited to, the following sensors: · Thermal Infrared imaging sensors will be launched in late 2014 to monitor operational status, e.g., heat from a transformer. · High resolution ShortWave Infrared sensors able to characterize materials that could support verification of Additional Protocol declarations under Article 2.a(v). · Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with individual sensors or specific sensor combinations. The Safeguards Symposium provides a forum to showcase and demonstrate safeguards applications for these emerging satellite imaging capabilities. (author)

  3. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms

  4. Private sector involvement in the US program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Epel, L.; Maise, G.; Reisman, A.; Skalyo, J.

    1995-01-01

    The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) relies on technical expertise found in the U. S private and public sectors. Since 1993, the international Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) has sought to increase the role of the private sector in POTAS. ISPO maintains and continues to develop a database of US companies interested in providing technical expertise to the IAEA. This database is used by ISPO to find appropriate contractors to respond to IAEA requests for technical assistance when the assistance can be provided by the private sector. The private sector is currently providing support in the development of equipment, training, and procedure preparation. POTAS also supports the work of private consultants. This paper discusses ISPO's efforts to identify suitable vendors and discusses conditions that hinder more substantial involvement by the private sector. In addition, the paper will discuss selected projects that are currently in progress and identify common problems that impede the progress and success of tasks performed by the private sector

  5. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  6. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  7. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  8. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  9. The New Brunswick Laboratory Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cacic, C.G.; Trahey, N.M.; Zook, A.C.

    1987-01-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) has been tasked by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) to assess and evaluate the adequacy of measurement technology as applied to materials accounting in DOE nuclear facilities. The Safeguards Measurement Evaluation (SME) Program was developed as a means to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of accounting measurements by site, material balance area (MBA), or unit process. Phase I of the SME Program, initiated during 1985, involved evaluation of the primary accountability measurement methods at six DOE Defense Programs facilities: Savannah River Plant, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Y-12 Plant, Rocky Flats Plant, Rockwell Hanford Operations, and NBL. Samples of uranyl nitrate solution, dried plutonium nitrates, and plutonium oxides were shipped to the participants for assay and isotopic abundance measurements. Resulting data are presented and evaluated as indicators of current state-of-the-practice accountability measurement methodology, deficiencies in materials accounting practices, and areas for possible assistance in upgrading measurement capabilities. Continuing expansion of the SME Program to include materials which are representative of specific accountability measurement points within the DOE complex is discussed

  10. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  11. Preliminary Performance Analysis Program Development for Safety System with Safeguard Vessel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Han-Ok; Lee, Jun; Park, Cheon-Tae; Yoon, Ju-Hyeon; Park, Keun-Bae

    2007-01-01

    SMART is an advanced modular integral type pressurized water reactor for a seawater desalination and an electricity production. Major components of the reactor coolant system such as the pressurizer, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP), and steam generators are located inside the reactor vessel. The SMART can fundamentally eliminate the possibility of large break loss of coolant accidents (LBLOCAs), improve the natural circulation capability, and better accommodate and thus enhance a resistance to a wide range of transients and accidents. The safety goals of the SMART are enhanced through highly reliable safety systems such as the passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) and the safeguard vessel coupled with the passive safety injection feature. The safeguard vessel is a steel-made, leak-tight pressure vessel housing the RPV, SIT, and the associated valves and pipelines. A primary function of the safeguard vessel is to confine any radioactive release from the primary circuit within the vessel under DBAs related to loss of the integrity of the primary system. A preliminary performance analysis program for a safety system using the safeguard vessel is developed in this study. The developed program is composed of several subroutines for the reactor coolant system, passive safety injection system, safeguard vessel including the pressure suppression pool, and PRHRS. A small break loss of coolant accident at the upper part of a reactor is analyzed and the results are discussed

  12. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of masters students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5 1/2-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  13. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    education, and in particular regional programs and exchanges of experts, practitioners, and students, can therefore play an important role in building safeguards expertise. (5) NGSI will work with the IAEA and international partners to develop a safeguards conscious nuclear infrastructure, especially among states with limited nuclear power programs or those expressing interest in such programs. The IAEA milestones process will help advance such a culture, as will linking safeguards with safety and security, as set forth in the 38's concept introduced by Japan and endorsed recently by the G-8. Recognizing this we support the just announced World Institute for Nuclear Security

  14. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  15. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  16. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  17. IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program (I2SIP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arlt, R.; Fortakov, V.; Gaertner, K.J.

    1995-01-01

    This article is a review of the IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program. The historical development of the program is outlined, and current activities are also noted. Brief technical descriptions of certain features are given. It is concluded that the results of this year's efforts in this area will provide significant input and be used to assess the viability of the proposed concepts and to decide on the directions to pursue in the future

  18. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  19. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  20. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  3. Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1990--September 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research And Development (R ampersand D) program from October 1990 through September 1991. The activities presented in the first three parts--Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, and Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support--were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS). The activities described in Part 4--International Safeguards--were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (OACN/IS). Part 5 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS or OACN/IS. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R ampersand D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published in 1991

  4. How the Office of Safeguards and Security Technology development program facilitates safeguarding and securing the DOE complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smoot, W.

    1995-01-01

    The technology development program's (TDP's) mission is to provide technologies or methodologies that address safeguards and security requirements throughout the U.S. DOE complex as well as to meet headquarters' policy needs. This includes developing state-of-the-art technologies or modifying existing technologies in physical security, material control and accountability, information security, and integrated safeguards systems. The TDP has an annual process during which it solicits user requirements from the field. These requirements are analyzed by DOE headquarters and laboratory personnel for technical merit. The requirements are then prioritized at headquarters, and the highest priorities are incorporated into our budget. Although this user-needs process occurs formally once a year, user requirements are accepted at any time. The status of funded technologies is communicated through briefings, programs reviews, and various documents that are available to all interested parties. Participants in several interagency groups allows our program to benefit from what others are doing and to prevent duplications of efforts throughout the federal community. Many technologies are transferred to private industry

  5. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  6. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

  7. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, M.

    1995-05-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English

  8. Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Owens, L.; Smith, C.

    1996-01-01

    The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

  9. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  10. Safeguards material control and accounting program: quarterly report, January-March 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maimoni, A.; Dunn, D.R.

    1980-06-01

    The operation and use of the Safeguards Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) Input/Output programming written for a Tektronix 4050 series computer is described. The programming consists of the Facility Description Program and its continuation, the Accounting System Program, plus several service routines. These programs generate the input files that will be used by the SVAP codes in a main frame computer, such as the CDC 7600 at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

  11. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in open-quotes Observational Skillsclose quotes. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector's job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector's job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA's consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program

  12. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  13. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  14. Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

    2001-01-01

    The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

  15. US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.

    1984-07-01

    The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

  16. Investigating Safety, Safeguards and Security (3S) Synergies to Support Infrastructure Development and Risk-Informed Methodologies for 3S by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, M.; Izumi, Y.; Kimoto, T.; Naoi, Y.; Inoue, T.; Hoffheins, B.

    2010-01-01

    In 2008, Japan and other G8 countries pledged to support the Safeguards, Safety, and Security (3S) Initiative to raise awareness of 3S worldwide and to assist countries in setting up nuclear energy infrastructures that are essential cornerstones of a successful nuclear energy program. The goals of the 3S initiative are to ensure that countries already using nuclear energy or those planning to use nuclear energy are supported by strong national programs in safety, security, and safeguards not only for reliability and viability of the programs, but also to prove to the international audience that the programs are purely peaceful and that nuclear material is properly handled, accounted for, and protected. In support of this initiative, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been conducting detailed analyses of the R and D programs and cultures of each of the 'S' areas to identify overlaps where synergism and efficiencies might be realized, to determine where there are gaps in the development of a mature 3S culture, and to coordinate efforts with other Japanese and international organizations. As an initial outcome of this study, incoming JAEA employees are being introduced to 3S as part of their induction training and the idea of a President's Award program is being evaluated. Furthermore, some overlaps in 3S missions might be exploited to share facility instrumentation as with Joint-Use-Equipment (JUE), in which cameras and radiation detectors, are shared by the State and IAEA. Lessons learned in these activities can be applied to developing more efficient and effective 3S infrastructures for incorporating into Safeguards by Design methodologies. They will also be useful in supporting human resources and technology development projects associated with Japan's planned nuclear security center for Asia, which was announced during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. In this presentation, a risk-informed approach regarding integration of 3S will be introduced. An initial

  17. Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

  18. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table

  19. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  20. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper, Susan E. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  1. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services

  2. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services.

  3. Recruitment of U.S. citizens for vacancies in IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Decaro, D.; Williams, G.; Carelli, J.; Assur, M.

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is important that persons within and outside the US nuclear and safeguards industries become aware of career opportunities available at the IAEA, and informed about important vacancies. The IAEA has established an impressive web page to advertise opportunities for employment. However, additional effort is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient awareness in the US of these opportunities, and assistance for persons interested in taking positions at the IAEA. In 1998, the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) approved a special task under the US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) for improving US efforts to identify qualified candidates for vacancies in IAEA's Department of Safeguards. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) developed a plan that includes increased advertising, development of a web page to support US recruitment efforts, feedback from the US Mission in Vienna, and interaction with other recruitment services provided by US professional organizations. The main purpose of this effort is to educate US citizens about opportunities at the IAEA so that qualified candidates can be identified for the IAEA's consideration

  4. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1994 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1995-05-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English.

  5. Safeguards and security by design support for the next generation nuclear plant project - Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, T.; Casey Durst, P.

    2013-01-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project was authorized by the United States Energy Policy Act of 2005 with the principal objective of designing, licensing, and building a Generation IV nuclear plant capable of producing both high-temperature process heat and electricity. The two candidate NGNP reactor concepts are pebble- and prismatic-fueled high-temperature gas reactors that will be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The conceptual design phase of the project was completed in December 2010. This paper summarizes support provided to the NGNP project to facilitate consideration of international safeguards during the design phase, or safeguards by design (SBD). Additional support was provided for domestic safeguards (material control and accounting) and physical protection, or safeguards and security by design (2SBD). The main focus of this paper is on SBD and international safeguards. Included is an overview of the international safeguards guidance contained in guidance reports for SBD. These reports contain guidance and suggestions intended to be useful to the industry design teams, but they do not contain ready-made solutions. Early and frequent interaction of design stakeholders with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NRC are essential to a successful endeavor. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  6. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1988-01-01

    In recent years considerable attention has been given to upgrading security education programs at facilities across the country. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), a Laboratory-wide Safeguard Awareness Training Program has been established in order to raise the cognizance of the entire staff with regard to safeguards issues and concerns. This aggressive safeguards program involves a strong interface of physical security measure and material control and accountability systems. Within PNL, four distinct audiences were defined and a needs assessment analysis performed for each to determine specific training requirements. The target audiences identified were: material balance area (MBA) custodians, managers of material balance areas, material handlers, and new employees. Five safeguards training courses were created to meet the needs of those audiences. This paper discusses the development of the Safeguards Awareness Program at PNL and its benefits to the Laboratory

  7. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  8. Nuclear safeguards research. Program status report. Progress report, September--December 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-04-01

    This report presents the status of the Nondestructive Assay R and D program of the LASL Nuclear Safeguards Research Group, R-1, covering the period September-December 1975. It covers: holdup measurements at the Kerr-McGee Pu facility at Crescent, Okla.; calculations for Random Driver; instrument development and measurement controls; ERDA nondestructive assay training program; and in-plant dynamic materials control (DYMAC) program. 22 figures, 5 tables

  9. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  10. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. [comp.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  11. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R ampersand D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R ampersand D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994

  12. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Santi, Peter A.; Demuth, Scott F.; Klasky, Kristen L.; Lee, Haeok; Miller, Michael C.; Sprinkle, James K.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Williams, Bradley

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  13. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Klasky, Kristen L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Haeok [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sprinkle, James K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Bradley [DOE, NE

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  14. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  15. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  16. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  18. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

    2008-01-01

    Energy Agency safeguards into the design of nuclear facilities. This paper describes the work that has been completed in the development of a Safeguards by Design process for a project, illustrated by flow diagrams based upon the project phases described in U.S. Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The institutionalization of the Safeguards by Design process directly supports the goals of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and also aligns with goals and objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Other benefits from institutionalizing this Safeguards by Design process are discussed within this paper

  19. Croatian Support for Strengthening International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, Ankica; Novosel, Nevenka

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear science and technology has the potential to contribute to health and prosperity. However, it is also the basis for the development of nuclear weapons. The acceptance and implementation of IAEA safeguards therefore serve as important confidence building measures, through which a State can demonstrate, and other States can be assured, that nuclear energy is being used only for peaceful purpose. Practically, all countries around the world use nuclear techniques for a variety of peaceful purposes, including food and water security, energy, industrial application and human health. Only a few of these activities involve the type of nuclear material that could potentially be diverted to make nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. And here the safeguards are on duty. The safeguards system aims at detecting the diversion of nuclear material. In this paper will be presented international conventions and bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear safety as well as the Croatian cooperation with international organizations and associations in the nuclear area, such as Nuclear Supplier Group, Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Arrangement, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban treaty Organization, Euratom and civil expert groups of NATO. (author)

  20. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  1. A measurement evaluation program to support nuclear material control and accountability measurements in Brazilian laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dias, Fabio C.; Mason, Peter

    2013-01-01

    A measurement evaluation program (MEP) is one of a number of valuable tools that analytical chemists can use to ensure that the data produced in the laboratory are fit for their intended purpose and consistent with expected performance values at a given time. As such, participation in a MEP is an important indicator of the quality of analytical data, and is recognized as such by independent regulatory and/or accreditation bodies. With the intent to implement such a program in Brazil, in November 2012 the Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN), with support from the Department of Energy of the United States' (US-DOE International Safeguards and Engagement Program), decided to initiate a technical cooperation project aiming at organizing a Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program (SMEP) for Brazilian facilities. The project, entitled Action Sheet 23, was formalized under the terms of the Agreement between the US-DOE and the CNEN concerning research and development in nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for International Safeguards Applications. The work, jointly performed by the CNEN's Safeguards Laboratory (LASAL) and the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), has the objective to strengthen the traceability of accountability measurements and ensure adequate quality of safeguards measurements for facilities within Brazil, utilizing test samples characterized and provided by NBL. Recommendations to participants included measurement frequency, number of results per sample and format for reporting results using ISO methods for calculating and expressing measurement uncertainties. In this paper, we discuss the main steps taken by CNEN and NBL aiming at implementing such a program and the expected results, in particular the impact of uncertainty estimation on the evaluation of performance of each participant laboratory. The program is considered by Brazilian safeguards authorities

  2. A measurement evaluation program to support nuclear material control and accountability measurements in Brazilian laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dias, Fabio C., E-mail: fabio@ird.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Mason, Peter, E-mail: peter.mason@ch.doe.gov [New Brunswick Laboratory (DOE/NBL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    2013-07-01

    A measurement evaluation program (MEP) is one of a number of valuable tools that analytical chemists can use to ensure that the data produced in the laboratory are fit for their intended purpose and consistent with expected performance values at a given time. As such, participation in a MEP is an important indicator of the quality of analytical data, and is recognized as such by independent regulatory and/or accreditation bodies. With the intent to implement such a program in Brazil, in November 2012 the Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN), with support from the Department of Energy of the United States' (US-DOE International Safeguards and Engagement Program), decided to initiate a technical cooperation project aiming at organizing a Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program (SMEP) for Brazilian facilities. The project, entitled Action Sheet 23, was formalized under the terms of the Agreement between the US-DOE and the CNEN concerning research and development in nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for International Safeguards Applications. The work, jointly performed by the CNEN's Safeguards Laboratory (LASAL) and the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), has the objective to strengthen the traceability of accountability measurements and ensure adequate quality of safeguards measurements for facilities within Brazil, utilizing test samples characterized and provided by NBL. Recommendations to participants included measurement frequency, number of results per sample and format for reporting results using ISO methods for calculating and expressing measurement uncertainties. In this paper, we discuss the main steps taken by CNEN and NBL aiming at implementing such a program and the expected results, in particular the impact of uncertainty estimation on the evaluation of performance of each participant laboratory. The program is considered by Brazilian safeguards

  3. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1993; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1993 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1994-03-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

  4. Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1992; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1992 toimintakertomus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [ed.

    1993-04-01

    Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

  5. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

  6. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  7. INSPECT: a package of computer programs for planning safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wincek, M.A.; Mullen, M.F.

    1979-04-01

    As part of the U.S. program to provide technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a package of computer programs was developed for use in planning safeguards inspections of various types of nuclear facilities. The INSPECT software package is a set of five interactive FORTRAN programs which can be used to calculate the variance components of the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) statistic, the variance components of the D (difference) statistic, attribute and variables sampling plans, a measure of the effectiveness of the inspection, and a measurement of the cost of implementing the inspection plan. This report describes the programs and explains how to use them

  8. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  9. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  10. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-Dong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  11. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  12. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, M.

    2000-08-01

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

  13. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.; Elborn, M.; Grahn, P.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon

  14. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  15. Interfacing Nuclear Security and Safeguards through Education and Support Centre Networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nikonov, D.

    2015-01-01

    This paper presents the work of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) and the International Nuclear Security Training and Support Centre Network (NSSC) as the means to achieve sustainable human resource development in member states. The paper also examines how both security and safeguards can benefit from collaborative and coordinated activities when such networks focus on practical achievements. (author)

  16. The status of United States R and D programs in safeguards and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mangan, D.L.; Tape, J.W.

    1993-01-01

    The breakup of former Soviet Union and the strategic nuclear arms reduction agreements, START 1 and 2, when fully implemented, will result in the significant reduction and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. These events will produce the significant increase of stored nuclear materials requiring the utmost control and care for indefinite future. Some of these materials in addition to existing wastes and residues may need further processing. The control of nuclear materials through safeguards, both domestic and international, is one of only a few effective barriers to nuclear proliferation. The improved technology is the key to the cost effective safeguards of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy carries out the research and development programs at its national laboratories. As the most notable demonstration and training efforts of new technologies, there is International Training Courses on the State System of Accounting and Control and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials. The Office of Research and Development of the Office of Intelligence and National Security Affairs, the Department of Energy, the Office of Safeguards and Security, International Safeguards Division and so on carry out the activities of the R and D on safeguards and physical protection. (K.I.)

  17. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1986-10-01

    Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

  18. Developing indigenous safeguards capabilities within the MPC ampersand A program: A transition from near-term upgrades to long-term sustainability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robinson, P.W.; Leutters, F.O.; Horton, R.D.; Soo Hoo, M.S.

    1997-01-01

    Approximately five years ago, the United States and countries of ampersand Former Soviet Union (FSU) started the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The program's purpose was to accelerate reduction of the risk of nuclear proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This goal would be accomplished through near-term upgrades to strengthen the nuclear material protection, control, and accounting systems within the FSU countries. In addition to this near-term goal, a long-term goal of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC ampersand A) program is to promote a new safeguards culture and to support the establishment of a sustaining MPC ampersand A infrastructure in the FSU. This long-term goal is vital to assuring that the near-term upgrades remain effective for safeguarding nuclear material as these countries experience political and social changes. The MPC ampersand A program is managed by DOE's Russia/Newly Independent States (NIS) Nuclear Materials Security Task Force. A coordinated effort is underway to promote and to help establish a new safeguards culture and a sustaining infrastructure. Elements being implemented at both the national and site levels include system operational performance evaluations, development of MPC ampersand A training, operational procedures, national MPC ampersand A regulations, and adaptation of modern MPC ampersand A methodologies to suit the conditions in the FSU countries. This paper identifies current efforts in several countries that are undergoing transition from near-term upgrades to sustainable MPC ampersand A systems

  19. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for the Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hodong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  20. International safeguards concerns of Spent Fuel Disposal Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussions on the subjects of safeguarding large quantities of plutonium contained in spent fuels to be disposed of in geologic respositories. All the spent fuel disposal scenarios examined here pose a variety of safeguards problems, none of which are adequately addressed by the international safeguards community. The spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles in underground repositories would become an increasingly attractive target for diversion because of their plutonium content and decreasing radioactivity. Current design of the first geologic repository in the US will have the capacity to accommodate wastes equivalent to 70,000 Mt of uranium from commercial and defense fuel cycles. Of this, approximately 62,000 Mt uranium equivalent will be commerical spent fuel, containing over 500 Mt of plutonium. International safeguards commitments may require us to address the safeguards issues of disposing of such large quanities of plutonium in a geologic repository, which has the potential to become a plutonium mine in the future. This paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries and the DOE before geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality

  1. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  2. An integrated approach to validation of safeguards and security program performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altman, W.D.; Hunt, J.S.; Hockert, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increasingly performance oriented. Master Safeguards and Security Agreemtns specify performance levels for systems protecting DOE security interests. In order to measure and validate security system performance, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed cost effective validation tools and a comprehensive validation approach that synthesizes information gained from different activities such as force on force exercises, limited scope performance tests, equipment testing, vulnerability analyses, and computer modeling; into an overall assessment of the performance of the protection system. The analytic approach employs logic diagrams adapted from the fault and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessment. The synthesis of the results from the various validation activities is accomplished using a method developed by LLNL, based upon Bayes' theorem

  3. Nuclear material safeguards technology development in the new structure of BATAN organization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilyas, Zurias

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The implementation of Nuclear Energy Act No. 10/97 has led to a restructuring in BATAN organization in July 1999. A new unit, Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology (PTPBN), was established to be especially in charge of safeguards facilities. The main responsibility of this unit is to develop the technology of safeguards and physical protection. The function of this unit is also to analyze the operational technical aspect of the International Convention of Nuclear. The duties of Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology can be seen from the various programs set up for every fiscal year. The programs for the year 2000 were: Analyses of SSAC implementation in BATAN; Development of Safeguards information system; Creation of database of physical protection technology; Physical protection simulator for Bandung reactor research; Development of detector technology for physical protection system; Identification of BATAN activities and facilities submitted to IAEA in order to be in line with the Additional Protocol to the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified on September 29th, 1999 in Vienna, Austria; Seminar on Safeguards technology held in Jakarta in September 2000. The program of 2001 will be focusing on the continuation of the previous year's program as well as the creation of new ones, such as: Collaboration with other countries. At initial stage experts from JBC-Japan were invited to share their expertise on their safeguards information system; Development of education and training for safeguards operators by emphasizing more on the techniques of nuclear materials measurement; Seminar on Safeguards technology scheduled for December 2001 by inviting experts from IAEA and modem countries; Field survey to determine the location of radionuclide station in Indonesia in

  4. Development of an international safeguards approach to the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Moran, B.W.; Fattah, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently pursuing development of an international safeguards approach for the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories through consultants meetings and through the Program for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR). The consultants meetings provide policy guidance to IAEA; SAGOR recommends effective approaches that can be efficiently implemented by IAEA. The SAGOR program, which is a collaboration of eight Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), was initiated in July 1994 and has identified 15 activities in each of three areas (i.e. conditioning facilities, active repositories, and closed repositories) that must be performed to ensure an efficient, yet effective safeguards approach. Two consultants meetings have been held: the first in May 1991 and the last in November 1995. For nuclear materials emplaced in a geological repository, the safeguards objectives were defined to be (1) to detect the diversion of spent fuel, whether concealed or unconcealed, from the repository and (2) to detect undeclared activities of safeguards concern (e.g., tunneling, underground reprocessing, or substitution in containers)

  5. Development programs of cutting-edge technologies for measurement and detection of nuclear material for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seya, Michio; Wakabayashi, Shuji; Naoi, Yosuke; Ohkubo, Michiaki; Senzaki, Masao

    2011-01-01

    The Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security ('ISCN', hereafter) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has development programs of cutting-edge technologies for measurement and detection of nuclear materials for nuclear safeguards and security, under the sponsorship of Japanese government (MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology). ISCN started development programs of the following technologies this year. (1) NRF (Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence) NDA technology using laser Compton scattering (LCS) gamma-rays, (2) Alternative to 3 He neutron detection technology using inorganic solid scintillator. ISCN is also going to conduct a demonstration test of a spent fuel Pu-NDA system that is to be developed by LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) using very sophisticated neutron measurement technologies, under JAEA/USDOE cooperation agreement. This presentation shows the above programs of ISCN. (author)

  6. Lessons learned in testing of Safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan; Farnitano, Michael; Carelli, Joseph

    2001-01-01

    Full text: During the 1990s, the IAEA Department of Safeguards began a transition from analog to digital equipment. This included surveillance equipment, seals, NDA measurement systems, and other instruments. The transition to digital equipment was intended to facilitate compatibility between and integration of instruments, remote communication of data, improved data storage, and modernization. Many of the instruments are designed to operate on battery power during loss of facility power, and therefore, are designed to consume minimal power. In 2000, the IAEA experienced a number of failures in digital image surveillance (DIS) equipment. A study of the performance data revealed that the failures occurred in 'high risk' environments where the systems were exposed to neutrons. As a supporter of IAEA equipment development and implementation, the U.S. Support Program worked with the IAEA, the equipment designer, and the equipment manufacturer in special meetings on DIS to determine the cause of the failures. It was as a result of these meetings that single event upset (SEU) was determined to be the root cause of the failures. The meeting participants also identified a list of actions to improve the reliability of DIS systems. As a result of the DIS meetings and the identified actions, the U.S. Support Program approved a request from the IAEA and established Task E.125, 'Remote Monitoring and Unattended Digital Surveillance Systems.' This task is an umbrella task intended to provide a mechanism for response to IAEA needs related to improving the reliability of unattended, remote monitoring and DIS equipment. Subtasks approved under this task include: E.125.1, 'SDIS Software Consolidation and DCM-14 Audit' - This subtask involves the consolidation of a number of individual upgrades to the SDIS and review of the DCM-14 software. As the sponsor of the design of the DCM-14 by Dr. Neumann, the German Support Program is also a participant in this subtask; E.125.2, 'DIS

  7. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  8. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  9. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  10. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  11. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  12. Report of the Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force: the role of material control and material accounting in the safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    Results are presented of NRC Task Force investigations to identify the functions of a safeguards program in relation to the NRC safeguards objective, define the role and objectives of material control and material accounting systems within that program, develop goals for material control and material accounting based on those roles and objectives, assess current material control and material accounting requirements and performance levels in the light of the goals, and recommend future actions needed to attain the proposed goals. It was found that the major contribution of material accounting to the safeguards program is in support of the assurance function. It also can make secondary contributions to the prevention and response functions. In the important area of loss detection, a response measure, it is felt that limitations inherent in material accounting for some fuel cycle operations limit its ability to operate as a primary detection system to detect a five formula kilogram loss with high assurance (defined by the Task Force as a probability of detection of 90 percent or more) and that, in those cases, material accounting can act only in a backup role. Physical security and material control must make the primary contributions to the prevention and detection of theft, so that safeguards do not rely primarily for detection capabilities on material accounting. There are several areas of accounting that require more emphasis than is offered by the current regulatory base. These areas include: timely shipper-receiver difference analysis and reconciliation; a demand physical inventory capability; improved loss localization;discard measurement verification; timely recovery of scrap; improved measurement and record systems; and limits on cumulative inventory differences and shipper-receiver differences. An increased NRC capability for monitoring and analyzing licensee accounting data and more timely and detailed submittals of data to NRC by licensees are recommended

  13. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  14. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  15. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  16. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  17. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, Deborah A.

    2003-01-01

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  18. Quality assurance measures applicable to IAEA anomaly and discrepancy resolution (ISPO Task D.52). Program for technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harms, N.L.; Smith, B.W.

    1984-11-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations comply with their commitments for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This assurance is based on the capabilities of the IAEA safeguards program to detect diversion of nuclear material. Anomalies and discrepancies, which occur in the event of a diversion or concealment, are detected as part of the IAEA safeguards program. Anomalies and discrepancies normally result from innocent causes and it is the purpose of the resolution process to determine the significance of them. The IAEA is instituting quality assurance measures for the IAEA inspection process. This paper reviews the anomaly and discrepancy resolution process and describes quality control measures which are the basis for quality assurance. 13 references, 6 tables

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.; Irola, G.; Glynn, K.

    2015-01-01

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  20. DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

    1978-04-01

    DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

  1. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  2. National Machine Guarding Program: Part 1. Machine safeguarding practices in small metal fabrication businesses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Parker, David L; Yamin, Samuel C; Brosseau, Lisa M; Xi, Min; Gordon, Robert; Most, Ivan G; Stanley, Rodney

    2015-11-01

    Metal fabrication workers experience high rates of traumatic occupational injuries. Machine operators in particular face high risks, often stemming from the absence or improper use of machine safeguarding or the failure to implement lockout procedures. The National Machine Guarding Program (NMGP) was a translational research initiative implemented in conjunction with two workers' compensation insures. Insurance safety consultants trained in machine guarding used standardized checklists to conduct a baseline inspection of machine-related hazards in 221 business. Safeguards at the point of operation were missing or inadequate on 33% of machines. Safeguards for other mechanical hazards were missing on 28% of machines. Older machines were both widely used and less likely than newer machines to be properly guarded. Lockout/tagout procedures were posted at only 9% of machine workstations. The NMGP demonstrates a need for improvement in many aspects of machine safety and lockout in small metal fabrication businesses. © 2015 The Authors. American Journal of Industrial Medicine published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  3. Laboratory quality assurance and its role in the safeguards analytical laboratory evaluation (SALE) program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delvin, W.L.; Pietri, C.E.

    1981-07-01

    Since the late 1960's, strong emphasis has been given to quality assurance in the nuclear industry, particularly to that part involved in nuclear reactors. This emphasis has had impact on the analytical chemistry laboratory because of the importance of analytical measurements in the certification and acceptance of materials used in the fabrication and construction of reactor components. Laboratory quality assurance, in which the principles of quality assurance are applied to laboratory operations, has a significant role to play in processing, fabrication, and construction programs of the nuclear industry. That role impacts not only process control and material certification, but also safeguards and nuclear materials accountability. The implementation of laboratory quality assurance is done through a program plan that specifies how the principles of quality assurance are to be applied. Laboratory quality assurance identifies weaknesses and deficiencies in laboratory operations and provides confidence in the reliability of laboratory results. Such confidence in laboratory measurements is essential to the proper evaluation of laboratories participating in the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory Evaluation (SALE) Program

  4. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  5. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  6. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  7. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  8. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    analysis can be a useful tool in safeguards design. (3) An important obstacle to straight forward application of life-cycle cost analysis is that there is no single organization responsible for the entire life-cycle cost of the facility. (4) The Safeguards Effectiveness Report (SGER) is proposed as a focus for the safeguards design activities, and is intended to be a living document that contains increasing safeguards relevant scope and content as the facility design emerges. Further work is required in a number of areas. The authors note that other studies supported by NGSI are addressing the development of requirements and performance criteria, as well as contributing to the design toolkit through the development of technology, methodology, and safeguards guidelines for designers. With respect to further development of the SBD design process, the authors recommend: (1) In the short term, conduct a workshop with interested industry representatives, to ensure that their perspectives and needs are factored into further development. (2) In the short term, provide NGSI SBD project documents to IAEA, and support them in the conduct of an 'SBD Workshop II.' (3) In the medium term, continue to support the SBD demonstration work started with the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project. (4) In the longer term, conduct further studies to examine the integration of SBD into projects with concurrent consideration of physical security and safety.

  9. 16 CFR 314.3 - Standards for safeguarding customer information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Standards for safeguarding customer... OF CONGRESS STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION § 314.3 Standards for safeguarding customer information. (a) Information security program. You shall develop, implement, and maintain a...

  10. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

  11. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  12. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  13. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacic, Donald N.; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

  14. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  15. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

    2010-01-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  16. National machine guarding program: Part 1. Machine safeguarding practices in small metal fabrication businesses

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamin, Samuel C.; Brosseau, Lisa M.; Xi, Min; Gordon, Robert; Most, Ivan G.; Stanley, Rodney

    2015-01-01

    Background Metal fabrication workers experience high rates of traumatic occupational injuries. Machine operators in particular face high risks, often stemming from the absence or improper use of machine safeguarding or the failure to implement lockout procedures. Methods The National Machine Guarding Program (NMGP) was a translational research initiative implemented in conjunction with two workers' compensation insures. Insurance safety consultants trained in machine guarding used standardized checklists to conduct a baseline inspection of machine‐related hazards in 221 business. Results Safeguards at the point of operation were missing or inadequate on 33% of machines. Safeguards for other mechanical hazards were missing on 28% of machines. Older machines were both widely used and less likely than newer machines to be properly guarded. Lockout/tagout procedures were posted at only 9% of machine workstations. Conclusions The NMGP demonstrates a need for improvement in many aspects of machine safety and lockout in small metal fabrication businesses. Am. J. Ind. Med. 58:1174–1183, 2015. © 2015 The Authors. American Journal of Industrial Medicine published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. PMID:26332060

  17. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

  18. Results in Developing an Engineering Degree Program in Safeguards and Security of Nuclear Materials at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2007-01-01

    The world's first master's degree program in nuclear safeguards and security, established at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), has now graduated nine classes of students. Most of the graduates have gone on to work at government agencies, research organizations, or obtain their PhD. In order to meet the demand for safeguards and security specialists at nuclear facilities, MEPhI established a 5-1/2 year engineering degree program that provides more hands-on training desired by facilities. In February 2004, the first students began their studies in the new discipline Nuclear Material Safeguards and Nonproliferation. This class, as well as other subsequent classes, included students who started the program in their third year of studies, as the first 2-1/2 years consists of general engineering curriculum. Fourteen students made up the first graduating class, receiving their engineering degrees in February 2007. The topics addressed in this paper include specific features of the program caused by peculiarities of Russian education legislation and government quality control of academic education. This paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken by MEPhI and the US National Laboratories in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy, to develop the engineering degree program. Also discussed are the program's specific training requirements, student internships, and job placement. The paper concludes with recommendations from a recent international seminar on nonproliferation education and training

  19. Evaluation of the United States Support Program’s Internship and Junior Professional Officer Programs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cruz J.; Patterson, J.; Pepper, S.

    2012-07-15

    The U.S. Support Program (USSP) to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards established a program of one-year paid internships for students and recent graduates. The program was in effect from 2002 until 2006 with a total of forty-one U.S. citizens and permanent residents placed in the IAEA. The USSP created a Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Program in 2005 that replaced the internship program at the IAEA. The JPO program creates opportunities for U.S. college graduates to become IAEA employees for a period of one to two years to help increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. The twenty three former and current JPOs work in varying fields such as software development, information collection and analysis, non-destructive analysis systems, and unattended monitoring systems. This paper will look at the impacts of the USSP internship and JPO program on the interns and JPOs, the U.S. government, and the IAEA. Academic backgrounds, past involvement in nuclear fields, program assessment, and post-program positions were recorded and analyzed through two studies using questionnaires sent to former interns and former and current JPOs. This paper will discuss the effects of the programs on the careers of the interns and JPOs, present the evaluations of the internship and JPO Programs, and report the recommendations for changes.

  20. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  1. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

  2. Close-up on safeguards training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strelkov, D.; Kashirsky, A.

    1985-01-01

    Continuous training is provided to IAEA inspector personnel to assure their proficiency in carrying out the mission of the Agency in prohibiting the potential diversion of nuclear material. The number and complexity of nuclear facilities under safeguards have increased since the Agency's founding, resulting in an ever increasing number of inspectors and, concurrently, in the need for higher quality of technical training. Basic training for newly recruited inspectors and inspection assistants is provided by the Department of Safeguards and training is programmed throughout the working experience of an inspector. Over the years, it has been proven beneficial to utilize the capability and facilities of Member States to provide specialized training at operating nuclear facilities. The training exercise described here is one of those funded by the USSR and conducted at an operating nuclear facility in the USSR. These support training courses are an effective way of providing the specialized training needed to maintain the proficiency of the inspectorate staff and supplement the training that is offered by the Agency in Vienna

  3. The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.H.F.

    1982-09-01

    In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

  4. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  5. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  6. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  7. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  8. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  9. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years

  10. FY2017 Final Report: Power of the People: A technical ethical and experimental examination of the use of crowdsourcing to support international nuclear safeguards verification.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gastelum, Zoe Nellie [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sentz, Kari [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Swanson, Meili Claire [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rinaudo, Cristina [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-01

    Recent advances in information technology have led to an expansion of crowdsourcing activities that utilize the “power of the people” harnessed via online games, communities of interest, and other platforms to collect, analyze, verify, and provide technological solutions for challenges from a multitude of domains. To related this surge in popularity, the research team developed a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities as they relate to international nuclear safeguards, evaluated the potential legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of crowdsourcing to support safeguards, and proposed experimental designs to test the capabilities and prospect for the use of crowdsourcing to support nuclear safeguards verification.

  11. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  12. Safeguards and security. Progress report, August 1982-January 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1983-11-01

    Activities are described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats a relatively new set of Los Alamos activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  13. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, Mary Alice

    2010-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC and A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC and A program. The MC and A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  14. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  15. Enrichment plant management and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1978-01-01

    The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

  16. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R and D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  17. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

    2001-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

  18. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

    2000-01-01

    With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

  19. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-01-01

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  20. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  1. Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-01-01

    Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions

  2. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S.

    2003-01-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection

  3. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  4. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  5. Maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franssen, F.; Islam, A.B.M.N.; Sonnier, C.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Baumann, M.

    1992-01-01

    The conclusions of the vulnerability test on VOPAN (verification of Operator's Analysis) as conducted at Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (ASA) at Seibersdorf, Austria in October 1990 and documented in STR-266, indicate that ''whenever samples are taken for safeguards purposes extreme care must be taken to ensure that they have not been interfered with during the sample taking, transportation, storage or sample preparation process.'' Indeed there exist a number of possibilities to alter the content of a safeguards sample vial from the moment of sampling up to the arrival of the treated (or untreated) sample at SAL. The time lapse between these two events can range from a few days up to months. The sample history over this period can be subdivided into three main sub-periods: (1) the period from when the sampling activities are commenced up to the treatment in the operator's laboratory, (2) during treatment of samples in the operator's laboratory, and finally, (3) the period between that treatment and the arrival of the sample at SAL. A combined effort between the Agency and the United States Support Program to the Agency (POTAS) has resulted in two active tasks and one proposed task to investigate improving the maintenance of continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples during the entire period of their existence. This paper describes the use of the Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC), of the Authenticated Secure Container System (ASCS), and of the Secure Container for Storage and Transportation of samples (SCST) to guarantee that a representative portion of the solution sample will be received at SAL

  6. National machine guarding program: Part 1. Machine safeguarding practices in small metal fabrication businesses

    OpenAIRE

    Parker, David L.; Yamin, Samuel C.; Brosseau, Lisa M.; Xi, Min; Gordon, Robert; Most, Ivan G.; Stanley, Rodney

    2015-01-01

    Background Metal fabrication workers experience high rates of traumatic occupational injuries. Machine operators in particular face high risks, often stemming from the absence or improper use of machine safeguarding or the failure to implement lockout procedures. Methods The National Machine Guarding Program (NMGP) was a translational research initiative implemented in conjunction with two workers' compensation insures. Insurance safety consultants trained in machine guarding used standardize...

  7. Welcome from ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van der Meer, K.

    2015-01-01

    ESARDA, on the one hand being part of that European family and on the other hand working in practice to support peace by the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, can be considered as a perfect representative of that European peace process. Going now from the European to the global perspective, peace should be our motivating force and this is also expressed in the basis of safeguards: the non-proliferation Treaty. Several articles of the Treaty deal with not developing nuclear weapons and not supporting the development of nuclear weapons by other countries, and one article (Article VI) deals with the general and complete nuclear disarmament. What is ESARDA doing in practice- First we provide a forum to exchange scientific information for the benefit of all safeguards stakeholders. The most important forum is the biannual open ESARDA safeguards symposium that will be held next year from 19-21 May in Manchester. Next to the ESARDA symposia, we coordinate European safeguards research via our ESARDA Working Groups. Also non-members are welcome in these WG as observers. JRC Ispra maintains the ESARDA website that also supports exchange of safeguards information

  8. The technical support organization at BNL is twenty years old

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indusi, J.P.

    1988-01-01

    The Technical Support Organization was established by the Atomic Energy Commission in January 1968 at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The original idea came from a small group of scientists at BNL. The group included Willy Higinbotham, Herb Kouts, Frank Miles, Richard Dodson, and Gerhardt Friedlander. The AEC endorsed the idea of a technical support group to provide technical assistance to AEC's Office of Safeguards and Materials Management and they sent requests for expressions of interest throughout the complex. For a number of reasons, to be discussed in the paper, the Technical Support Organization was established at BNL. An early project was the Conceptual Design for Safeguarding Nuclear Material which formed the first logical and systematic description of the integration of several elements into a safeguards system for protecting nuclear materials. Many other projects were undertaken over the years. TSO today provides technical assistance to the DOE Office of Safeguards and Secuirty, the Office of Classification and Technology Policy, and the Office of Security Evaluations. Technical support to the IAEA is provided under the Program of Technical Assistance to Agency Safeguards (POTAS). Recently, TSO began a program of technical assistance to the Air Force Weapons Laboratory in the area of nuclear systems security

  9. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

    1991-05-01

    The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

  10. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  11. Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is aimed at enhancing States' understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in 'Safeguards Implementation Practices' (SIPs) to be published separately.

  12. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

  13. Preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards at Chalmers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avdic, Senada; Pazsit, Imre

    2004-03-01

    The Department of Reactor Physics at Chalmers University of Technology plans to start-up a research program in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material management. The program is aimed at utilizing the experimental facilities as well as the experience in reactor physics, criticality safety, signal processing and unfolding, and experimental nuclear techniques, in tackling problems in non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. For the introductory part of this program, support has been received from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate to host Dr. Senada Avdic, University of Tuzla, Bosnia, as a post-doc for three months to participate in the preparatory program. The preparations were focussed on a survey of existing active non-destructive assay methods and preparations of their application in the experimental and theoretical/calculational research of our Department. The methods surveyed comprise - the use of a 252 Cf source in active NDA measurements; - planning of an experiment with the existing equipments of the Department; - time correlation measurements with a 252 Cf source and/or a 252 Cf detector; - Monte Carlo simulations of the time correlations between gammas and neutrons from a measurement with a 252 Cf detector: the MCNP-PoliMi code; - Identification of fissile material (enrichment/mass) with 252 Cf measurements; the use of various unfolding techniques (artificial neural networks) for identifying nuclear parameters; use of neutron activation analysis with a neutron generator for determination of distribution of material in an unknown sample; - determination of fissile material content by measurements of delayed neutrons

  14. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  15. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  16. Security Transition Program Office 1994 fiscal year work plan WBS 6.11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brogdon, R.C. Jr.

    1993-10-01

    The Security Transition Program Office (STPO) will change the Hanford Safeguards and Security Protection Program from one that supported the national defense program to one that supports environmental restoration and waste management. A Successful Safeguards and Security Protection Program transition will have an industrial security foundation supplemented to protect material interests and information resources. The transition will change the current approaches to protection philosophy to ones that will provide the Hanford Site with the following: consolidation, reduction, and elimination of safeguards and security interests and targets; greater open Site access; maximum application of technology and automation; interpretation of security policies and procedures in light of the Hanford Site's environmental mission; coexistence with other emergency services; streamlined operations; and protection of employees and the public from health, safety, fire, security, and safeguards risks. This report describes the 1994 program objectives, the technical base, schedule baseline, cost, funding, manpower, and the 1993 program workscope

  17. Los Alamos National Laboratory Facilities, Security and Safeguards Division, Safeguards and Security Program Office, Protective Force Oversight Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to identify and describe the duties and responsibilities of Facility Security and Safeguards (FSS) Safeguards and Security (SS) organizations (groups/offices) with oversight functions over the Protection Force (PF) subcontractor. Responsible organizations will continue their present PF oversight functions under the Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) assessment, but now will be required to also coordinate, integrate, and interface with other FSS S and S organizations and with the PF subcontractor to measure performance, assess Department of Energy (DOE) compliance, reduce costs, and minimize duplication of effort. The role of the PF subcontractor is to provide the Laboratory with effective and efficient protective force services. PF services include providing protection for the special nuclear material, government property and classified or sensitive information developed and/or consigned to the Laboratory, as well as protection for personnel who work or participate in laboratory activities. FSS S and S oversight of both performance and compliance standards/metrics is essential for these PF objectives to be met

  18. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  19. Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests and ideas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDermott, Constance L.; Coad, Lauren; Helfgott, Ariella; Schroeder, Heike

    2012-01-01

    “REDD+” is a mechanism created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for Reducing {carbon} Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and forest enhancement. In addition, REDD+ “safeguards” are intended to protect non-carbon forest values. While REDD+ countries are formally requested to provide information on safeguards, there is as yet no agreement on the relative priority of carbon versus non-carbon values, and the appropriate level of safeguard standardization. This, we argue, has allowed REDD+ to function as a “boundary object” spanning disparate priorities. Meanwhile, the contestation of these priorities has been displaced from intergovernmental processes to the various organizations involved in operationalizing REDD+ activities. This article applies a set of organizational, substantive and conceptual typologies to compare differences in the balance of actors, interests and ideas across these organizations. It finds that multi-lateral funding programs have drawn heavily on existing safeguards for international aid, while private certification schemes have specialized in different niche priorities at the project level. In regards to the substance of safeguard requirements, the involvement of donors and investors appears correlated with a stronger emphasis on carbon and risk mitigation while greater NGO involvement and the decoupling of safeguards design from REDD+ funding appear correlated with greater emphasis on social rights and benefits. These findings have several critical implications for future REDD+ activities. Firstly, the choice of organizations involved in defining, funding and verifying safeguard activities, and the balance of actors in their governing structures, are likely to influence the relative emphasis on non-carbon values. Secondly, a diversity of approaches to disbursing REDD+ incentives may be necessary to maintain widespread support for REDD+. Thirdly, it remains to be seen whether REDD

  20. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

    1987-01-01

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  1. The Impact of Interdependencies on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kyriakopoulos, Nicholas [Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The George Washington University, Washington, DC (United States)

    2012-06-15

    The purpose of Integrated Safeguards is to evaluate a State as a whole and provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The new system is not viewed as an addition to the traditional safeguards system but as a collection of measures to verify the correctness and completeness of the declarations. The broadening of the scope to evaluate the State for the purpose of enhancing non-proliferation introduces uncertainties that affect the performance of the safeguards system. The processes within a State that Integrated Safeguards seeks to monitor are not clearly defined. Neither are the measurement and evaluation systems for the verification of the absence of undeclared activities. A refinement of the existing diversion process model is needed that takes into account the likelihood that a State would undertake a clandestine program. To develop such a model this paper examines the nuclear programs of seven States that have built or attempted to build nuclear weapons and one that is being accused of having one but denies it. Analysis of the factors that are essential in the decision of a State to embark on a nuclear weapons program indicates leads to the identification of certain indicators for clandestine nuclear weapons programs. It identifies the conditions and interdependencies that most likely lead those States to undertake clandestine weapons programs and develops a set of likelihood indicators that can be used in the application of safeguards to a State as a whole. Existence of serious conflicts involving territorial disputes, transparency in the social system, militarization of the State, and democratization of the political process are the common characteristics of those States. Although these are not easily quantifiable indicators, concepts such as fuzzy logic can be used to construct likelihood estimators for the presence of absence of clandestine programs leading to a State-specific safeguards approach adapted to the conditions of

  2. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  3. Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that is supported by detailed guidance and examples in safeguards implementation practices presented in other publications in the series. (This version is the 2016 update.)

  4. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  5. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  6. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  7. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1978-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  8. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1979-02-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  9. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  10. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  11. Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pamela Jagger

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

  12. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  13. Preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards at Chalmers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Avdic, Senada; Pazsit, Imre

    2004-03-01

    The Department of Reactor Physics at Chalmers University of Technology plans to start-up a research program in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material management. The program is aimed at utilizing the experimental facilities as well as the experience in reactor physics, criticality safety, signal processing and unfolding, and experimental nuclear techniques, in tackling problems in non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. For the introductory part of this program, support has been received from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate to host Dr. Senada Avdic, University of Tuzla, Bosnia, as a post-doc for three months to participate in the preparatory program. The preparations were focussed on a survey of existing active non-destructive assay methods and preparations of their application in the experimental and theoretical/calculational research of our Department. The methods surveyed comprise - the use of a {sup 252}Cf source in active NDA measurements; - planning of an experiment with the existing equipments of the Department; - time correlation measurements with a {sup 252}Cf source and/or a {sup 252}Cf detector; - Monte Carlo simulations of the time correlations between gammas and neutrons from a measurement with a {sup 252}Cf detector: the MCNP-PoliMi code; - Identification of fissile material (enrichment/mass) with {sup 252}Cf measurements; the use of various unfolding techniques (artificial neural networks) for identifying nuclear parameters; use of neutron activation analysis with a neutron generator for determination of distribution of material in an unknown sample; - determination of fissile material content by measurements of delayed neutrons.

  14. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  15. Validating safeguards effectiveness given inherently limited test data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    A key issue in designing and evaluating nuclear safeguards systems is how to validate safeguards effectiveness against a spectrum of potential threats. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by a performance indicator such as the probability of defeating an adversary attempting a malevolent act. Effectiveness validation means a testing program that provides sufficient evidence that the performance indicator is at an acceptable level. Traditional statistical program when numerous independent system trials are possible. However, within the safeguards environment, many situations arise for which traditional statistical approaches may be neither feasible nor appropriate. Such situations can occur, for example, when there are obvious constraints on the number of possible tests due to operational impacts and testing costs. Furthermore, these tests are usually simulations (e.g., staged force-on-force exercises) rather than actual tests, and the system is often modified after each test. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to make and justify inferences about system performance by using traditional statistical techniques. In this paper, the authors discuss several alternative quantitative techniques for validating system effectiveness. The techniques include: (1) minimizing the number of required tests using sequential testing; (2) combining data from models inspections and exercises using Bayesian statistics to improve inferences about system performance; and (3) using reliability growth and scenario modeling to help specify which safeguards elements and scenarios to test

  16. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  17. Improvement and validation of isotopic libraries of commercial gamma spectra evaluation packages. Report on task FIN A 955 of Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nikkinen, M.

    1997-06-01

    The Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is running gamma spectroscopy analysis with various samples taken at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. It was found that the commercial gamma spectra analysis packages available do not include proper gamma-line libraries for the various tasks needed for the safeguards purposes because the libraries of these packages are often incomplete and outdated. New libraries were developed to satisfy the needs in the analysis tasks required for the safeguards purposes. These lines are limited by the number of gamma lines to avoid the problems with too many candidates for a single gamma peak. The work was carried out under the Task FIN A 955 Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. (orig.) (18 refs.).

  18. {sup 3}He Replacement for Nuclear Safeguards Applications- an integrated test program to compare alternative neutron detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menlove, H. O.; Henzlova, D.; Evans, L. G.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Marlow, J. B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Safeguards Science and Technology Group, Los Alamos, (United States)

    2011-12-15

    During the past several years, the demand for {sup 3}He gas has far exceeded the gas supply. This shortage of {sup 3}He gas is projected to continue into the foreseeable future. There is a need for alternative neutron detectors that do not require {sup 3}He gas. For more than four decades, neutron detection has played a fundamental role in the safeguarding and control of nuclear materials at production facilities, fabrication plants and storage sites worldwide. Neutron measurements for safeguards applications have requirements that are unique to the quantitative assay of special nuclear materials. These neutron systems measure the neutron multiplicity distributions from each spontaneous fission and/or induced fission event. The neutron time correlation counting requires that two or more neutrons from a single fission event be detected. The doubles and triples neutron counting rate depends on the detector efficiency to the 2nd and 3rd power, respectively, so low efficiency systems will not work for the coincidence measurements, and any detector instabilities are greatly amplified. In the current test program, we will measure the alternative detector properties including efficiency, die-away time, multiplicity precision, gamma sensitivity, dead-time, and we will also consider the detector properties that would allow commercial production to safeguards scale assay systems. This last step needs to be accomplished before the proposed technologies can reduce the demand on {sup 3}He gas in the safeguards world. This paper will present the methodology that includes MCNPX simulations for comparing divergent detector types such as {sup 10}B lined proportional counters with {sup 3}He gas based systems where the performance metrics focus on safeguards applications.

  19. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  20. Development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; So, Dong Sup; Kwack, Eun Ho [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-04-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described. 3 tabs. (Author)

  1. Containment and surveillance systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.

    1978-01-01

    Important criteria in measuring the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards include timeliness of detection of diversion, timeliness of reporting such detections, and confidence in determining the amount of material diverted. Optimum use of IAEA inspectors, combined with adequate instrumentation, can provide a practical means for achieving these criteria. System studies are being carried out for different types of facilities that may come under IAEA safeguards to determine the proper balance between inspector's efforts and the use of safeguards instrumentation. A description of a typical study is presented. Based on the results of these studies, the program undertaken to develop those containment and surveillance subsystems for which the technical feasibility and operational acceptability need to be established is described

  2. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  3. Safeguards and security deficiencies fulfilled through technology development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smoot, W.

    1996-01-01

    The Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) sponsors research and development activities based on identified field and headquarters customer requirements. Annually, a formal solicitation of safeguards and security user needs is conducted. Currently, there are over 300 valid safeguards and security deficiencies that have been identified. These user needs serve as the basis for formulating the OSS Technology Development Program (TDP). Due to budget constraints, the TDP can only address approximately 47% of these needs in FY 1996. This paper will discuss, in a general sense, the current deficiencies and how the TDP is responding to each. Specifically, the paper will highlight technologies in the areas of Material Control and Accounting, Physical Security, and Information Security. A brief discussion of unfulfilled user requirements will also be presented as a catalyst for leveraging available or developing technologies from other similar programs or from private industry

  4. Corporate strategic plan for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-06-01

    Department of Energy (DOE) safeguards and security (S and S) is a team effort, consisting of Field, National Laboratories, Program Office, and Headquarters units cooperating to support the Department's diverse security needs. As an integral part of the nation's security structure, the DOE S and S Program regularly supports and works in cooperation with other US Government agencies and private industry to improve the national security posture. Thus, inter- and intra-agency partnerships play an invaluable role in the continuing efforts to integrate and implement improved ways of doing business. Their Corporate Strategic Plan provides a road map to guide, track, and provide feedback for the incorporation and implementation of S and S activities within DOE. Part 1 Planning Framework, describes those overarching factors which influence the planning endeavors. Part 2, Strategic Perspective, outlines where the S and S Program has been and how they will move to the future through core competencies, changing cultural thinking, and implementing their strategies. Part 3, Strategic and Operational Integration, details critical focus areas, strategies, and success indicators designed to enhance inter-agency S and S integration and promote cooperation with external agencies. This Plan will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains supportive and fully-engaged with the nation's and international security environments

  5. IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

  6. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  7. Integrated Information Technology Framework for Analysis of Data from Enrichment Plants to Support the Safeguards Mission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marr, Clifton T.; Thurman, David A.; Jorgensen, Bruce V.

    2008-01-01

    Many examples of software architectures exist that support process monitoring and analysis applications which could be applied to enrichment plants in a fashion that supports the Safeguards Mission. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed mature solutions that will provide the framework to support online statistical analysis of enrichment plans and the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently, PNNL has developed a refined architecture and supporting tools that address many of the common problems analysis and modeling environments experience: pipelining, handling large data volumes, and real-time performance. We propose the architecture and tools may be successfully used in furthering the goals of nuclear material control and accountability as both an aid to processing plant owners and as comprehensive monitoring for oversight teams.

  8. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  9. Safeguards issues of long-term waste management at DOE sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1992-06-01

    Waste management at US Department of Energy (DOE) sites is not often regarded as a safeguard-sensitive step in the nuclear fuel cycle because the material concerned is relatively unattractive for diversion or theft. However, the accumulation of large amounts of fissile materials in wastes over a period of time can be a safeguards concern. One estimate shows that high-level and transuranic wastes and some miscellaneous radioactive materials at DOE sites may contain as much as 15 Mt of fissile materials. In the context of present US strategies for the disposal of these radioactive wastes, this study identifies safeguards issues relevant to proposed scenarios for the long-term management and permanent disposal of the above-mentioned waste forms in geologic repositories. This study points out areas of concern and the need to examine the issues before the wastes are processed for geologic disposal. Good waste management practices may offer unique opportunities to address the safeguards issues identified here. A judicious approach to examining the safeguards requirements of waste disposal programs may also contribute to DOE's new effort to establish and maintain public confidence in its environmental restoration programs

  10. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  11. Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately

  12. Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately.

  13. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  14. Technology transfer - insider protection workshop (Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    The Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is a field-applicable tool to evaluate facility safeguards against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by nonviolent insiders. To ensure successful transfer of this technology from the laboratory to DOE field offices and contractors, LLNL developed a three-part package. The package includes a workbook, user-friendly microcomputer software, and a three-day training program. The workbook guides an evaluation team through the Safeguards Evaluation Method and provides forms for gathering data. The microcomputer software assists in the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness. The software is designed for safeguards analysts with no previous computer experience. It runs on an IBM Personal Computer or any compatible machine. The three-day training program is called the Insider Protection Workshop. The workshop students learn how to use the workbook and the computer software to assess insider vulnerabilities and to evaluate the benefits and costs of potential improvements. These activities increase the students' appreciation of the insider threat. The workshop format is informal and interactive, employing four different instruction modes: classroom presentations, small-group sessions, a practical exercise, and ''hands-on'' analysis using microcomputers. This approach to technology transfer has been successful: over 100 safeguards planners and analysts have been trained in the method, and it is being used at facilities through the DOE complex

  15. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-01-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues

  16. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  17. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schanfein, Mark; Johnson, Shirley

    2012-01-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  18. Safeguards Implementation in Kazakhstan: Experience and Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhantikin, T.

    2015-01-01

    Experience of Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993, just after desintegration of USSR, and enforced Safeguards Agreement in 1995 can be interesting in implementation of safeguards in non-standard cases. Having weapon materials and test infrastructure legacy, the country together with IAEA and several donor countries found acceptable approaches to meet NPT provisions. One of challenges was to provide protection of sensitive information that could be accidentally disclosed in safeguards activities. With support of several weapon countries in close cooperation with the IAEA Kazakhstan liquidated test infrastructure in Semipalatinsk, implemented projects on elimination and minimization of use of HEU in civil sector, decommissioning of BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Now the IAEA LEU Bank is going to be established in Kazakhstan, and more challenges are coming in implementation of safeguards. Some technical and organizational details will be described from the experience of Kazakhstan in these projects. (author)

  19. Quality assurance procedures for the IAEA Department of Safeguards Twin Minolta Camera Surveillance System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geoffrion, R.R.; Bussolini, P.L.; Stark, W.A.; Ahlquist, A.J.; Sanders, K.E.; Rubinstein, G.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations are complying with nuclear safeguards treaties. In one aspect of the program, the Department of Safeguards has developed a twin Minolta camera photo surveillance systems program to assure itself and the international community that material handling is accomplished according to safeguards treaty regulations. The camera systems are positioned in strategic locations in facilities such that objective evidence can be obtained for material transactions. The films are then processed, reviewed, and used to substantiate the conclusions that nuclear material has not been diverted. Procedures have been developed to document and aid in: 1) the performance of activities involved in positioning of the camera system; 2) installation of the systems; 3) review and use of the film taken from the cameras

  20. Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

    2015-01-01

    There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

  1. National safeguards system operations at a bulk-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The presentation centers on the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for bulk-handling facilities in the licenses sector of the US nuclear community. Details of those material control and accounting measures dealing with the national safeguards program are discussed in Session 6a. The concept and role of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan are discussed with the participants. In Session 6b, the lecture focusses on the international safeguards program of the US SSAC. The relationship of the national and international requirements is discussed as they relate to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 document. The purpose of this session is to enable participants to: (1) understand the basic MC and A elements in an SSAC; (2) understand which MC and A elements serve the country's national interests and those that serve IAEA safeguards

  2. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

    2001-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  3. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aparo, M.; Barnes, B.; Lewis, W.; Hsiung, Sue

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

  4. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, S.F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1985-01-01

    The DSD-2056-4K portable multi-channel analyzer (PMCA) is a standard tool used in both international and domestic safeguards. This tool and the built-in user programs have been field proven. For applications where the manpower to program built-in programs is not available, programs in external computers can control the PMCA. A set of general purpose setup and analysis subroutines have been written in BASIC to be used directly or as a guide in the external applications. While safeguards and the nuclear industry are just beginning to make use of the present PMCA, we are looking into ways of making it easier to write internal programs for the PMCA and into replacing its current 8-bit processor with a 16-bit processor to give it the capability to do very involved analysis such as peak fitting and detailed plutonium isotopic analysis. 8 refs., 3 figs

  5. Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

    2010-01-01

    Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

  6. Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, D.R.; Huebel, J.G.; Poggio, A.J.

    1980-01-01

    The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

  7. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP

  8. Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

    2015-01-01

    The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

  9. Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.; Ford, Kerrie D.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-15

    There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or

  10. The first 50 years: A review of the Department of Energy domestic safeguards and security program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Desmond, W.J.; Zack, N.R.; Tape, J.W.

    1997-12-01

    World War II not only brought the United States rapidly into the nuclear age, but it also brought a new term, {open_quotes}safeguards.{close_quotes} By that time, physical security was an already established activity that dealt with the protection of possessions such as property, vehicles, and other valuables. A secret nuclear project under a stadium at the University of Chicago would add a new dimension to physical security. Similarly, a community known only by its post office box at a location 27 miles from Santa Fe, New Mexico (PO Box 1663) would initiate new programs to protect information and technology while their programs changed the science and warfare around the world. The Manhattan Project and what was to become the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos National Laboratory) would extend the applications of physical security and, soon to be implemented, safeguards to produce important technical advances for the protection, accounting, control, and nonproliferation of fissile nuclear materials. Security for nuclear materials and weapons information began as a foremost consideration with the start of the nuclear programs in the early 1940s. In the 1960s, the Atoms for Peace Program promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy and made the US a supplier of nuclear materials and peaceful-use nuclear technology to other states. This program also changed the focus on nuclear materials from that of worldwide control to inspection by an independent agency, the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. At this same time the nuclear weapons states increased from three to five. Other nations worked to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, resulting in increasing concerns about nuclear proliferation.

  11. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  12. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  13. Euratom Safeguards: Improving Safeguards by Cooperation in R&D and Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Ancius, D.; Marszalek, Y.; Smejkal, A.; Vaccaro, S.; De Baere, P.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Meylemans, P.; Murtezi, M.; Persson, L.; Synetos, S.; Tempesta, S.; Canadell Bofarull, V.; Turner, D.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Berndt, R.; Stringa, E.; Richir, P.; Sequeira, V.; Tagziria, H.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Zuleger, E.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; )

    2015-01-01

    Euratom Safeguards, implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty by the European Commission's Directorate Nuclear Safeguards, is the largest Regional Safeguards System and involved in many R&D activities of its own, often in close cooperation with external partners. Most of the results of these activities are shared with or offered to the IAEA. The work described in this paper is complementary to the projects run by the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (ECSP) to the IAEA. The ECSP activities will be described elsewhere at this conference. The present paper will provide an overview on R&D activities run in addition to the ECSP, and will attempt to link them to the capabilities discussed by the IAEA in the Long Term R&D Plan. The range of topics will include work on unattended data acquisition systems (hard- and software), advanced data analysis tools, news from seals related technology, containment and design verification applications of 3D lasers, activities to keep standard measurement technologies sustainable etc. Work done with the IAEA in preparation of new facilities and facility types will be discussed briefly. The paper will also highlight some current challenges and make suggestions how to address them. (author)

  14. Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, J.D.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Often, international safeguards features are added following completion of the facility design. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly re-designs or retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a project in 2008 through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to establish a global norm for the use of SBD. The NGSI SBD program is evolving in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA, while taking into account the IAEA's SBD achievements and future plans. The NGSI program includes DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its planned use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. Consistent with this effort, the NGSI program has sponsored 'Lessons Learned' studies and the preparation of facility-specific SBD Guidance documents. The NGSI program also takes into account successes that the NNSA has had with implementing safeguards early into facility designs within the U.S. The purpose of this paper is the presentation of the most recent developments in SBD under NGSI within the U.S. as well as the presentation of 'Lessons Learned' integrating safeguards into new nuclear facility designs of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), namely the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and to discuss its relevance to international safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  15. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation

  16. Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

    1978-11-01

    The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

  17. Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, H.; Osabe, T.

    1984-01-01

    A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

  18. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  19. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  20. Special safeguards study. Scopes of work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    The Special Safeguards Study (SSS) will be conducted by a combination of (1) contacts with other agencies, (2) NRC staff studies and analysis and (3) contracted studies in specific areas. Most of the study effort will be carried out by contractual support activities. These activities will be devoted to providing technical information, primarily qualitative because of the short term of the study, to enable the staff to determine the most cost-effective sets of measures for plutonium recycle and high-enriched uranium fuel cycle safeguards. The scope of work for these activities is given. The scope of work describes tasks that range from confirming the Commission's safeguards objective to defining specific protection systems for the following siting arrangements: dispersed sites, collocated fuel cycle plants, and mixed parks where reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication plants are collocated. (U.S.)

  1. Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Standley, V.; Boeck, H.; Villa, M.

    2001-01-01

    Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

  2. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

  3. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

  4. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-04-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

  5. Financial incentives for healthy behavior: ethical safeguards for behavioral economics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lunze, Karsten; Paasche-Orlow, Michael K

    2013-06-01

    Economic incentives to promote healthy behavior are becoming increasingly common and have been suggested as an approach to decreasing healthcare costs. Ethical concerns about programs with such incentives are that they may contribute to inequities, be coercive, interfere with therapeutic relationships, undermine personal responsibility for health, and decrease social solidarity. Additionally, they may be a source of stigma or discrimination, promote dependence, and be unfair for those already engaged in targeted health behaviors or those who cannot fulfill the incentivized behaviors. Incentive programs need to incorporate appropriate safeguards to monitor these risks and support fairness in offering economic incentives to promote healthy behavior. Copyright © 2013 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  6. ESARDA approach to facility oriented safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, R.

    1979-01-01

    The paper outlines the brief history of a Working Group composed of nuclear fuel plant operators, safeguards research workers and safeguards inspectors who are examining facility orientated problems of nuclear materials control and verification activities. The working program is reviewed together with some examples of various problems and the way the group is collaborating to develop solutions by pooling resources and effort. Work in European low enriched uranium fabrication plants from UF 6 to finished fuel is discussed in connection with mesurement practices, real time accounting, error propagation and analysis, verification and surveillance

  7. Insider safeguards effectiveness model (ISEM). User's guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-11-01

    A comprehensive presentation of the ISEM computer program is provided. ISEM was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a fixed-site facility safeguards system in coping with the theft, sabotage, or dispersal of radiological material by a single person who has authorized access to the facility. This insider may be aided by a group of insiders who covertly degrade sensor systems. Each ISEM run evaluates safeguards system performance for a particular scenario specified by the user. The dispatching of guards following alarms and their interaction with the insider are explicitly treated by the model

  8. State Regulatory Authority (SRA) Coordination of Safety, Security, and Safeguards of Nuclear Facilities: A Framework for Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladineo, S.; Frazar, S.; Kurzrok, A.; Martikka, E.; Hack, T.; Wiander, T.

    2013-01-01

    In November 2012 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sponsored a Technical Meeting on the Interfaces and Synergies in Safety, Security, and Safeguards for the Development of a Nuclear Power Program. The goal of the meeting was to explore whether and how safeguards, safety, and security systems could be coordinated or integrated to support more effective and efficient nonproliferation infrastructures. While no clear consensus emerged, participants identified practical challenges to and opportunities for integrating the three disciplines’ regulations and implementation activities. Simultaneously, participants also recognized that independent implementation of safeguards, safety, and security systems may be more effective or efficient at times. This paper will explore the development of a framework for conducting an assessment of safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to provide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation either with a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully developed SRA.

  9. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  10. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  11. Annual report on the U.S. program of technical assistance to safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS), January--December 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Major accomplishments are highlighted in the following six fields of IAEA safeguards: measurement technology, training, system studies, information processing, surveillance and containment, and support for field operations

  12. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  13. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  14. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  15. All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

    2010-01-01

    All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

  16. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

  17. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

  18. Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory. FY 1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-06-01

    The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory is published annually by the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), and is Intended to inform recipients of the full scope of the OSS R&D program. It is distributed for use by DOE headquarters personnel, DOE program offices, DOE field offices, DOE operating contractors, national laboratories, other federal agencies, and foreign governments. Chapters 1 through 7 of the Directory provide general information regarding the Technology Development Program, including the mission, program description, organizational roles and responsibilities, technology development lifecycle, requirements analysis, program formulation, the task selection process, technology development infrastructure, technology transfer activities, and current research and development tasks. These chapters are followed by a series of appendices which contain more specific information on aspects of the Program. Appendix A is a summary of major technology development accomplishments made during FY 1992. Appendix B lists S&S technology development reports issued during FY 1992 which reflect work accomplished through the OSS Technology Development Program and other relevant activities outside the Program. Finally, Appendix C summarizes the individual task statements which comprise the FY 1993 Technology Development Program.

  19. Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Wilkey, D.D.

    1991-01-01

    In 1987, a U.S. department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S and S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that S and S considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. This paper reports that the team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications

  20. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  1. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  2. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durst, Philip Casey; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  3. Determination of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste by spectrophotometry using neodymium as an internal standard for safeguards analysis. Japan support program for agency safeguards (JASPAS) JC-19

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taguchi, Shigeo; Surugaya, Naoki; Sato, Soichi; Kurosawa, Akira; Watahiki, Masaru; Hiyama, Toshiaki

    2006-06-01

    A spectrophotometric determination using neodymium as an internal standard was developed for safeguards verification analysis of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste which is produced by the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The internal standard is used as a means to analyze plutonium and also to authenticate the instrument conditions. The method offers reduced sample preparation and analysis time compared to isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The sample was mixed with a known amount of internal standard. Subsequently, plutonium was quantitatively oxidized to Pu(VI) by the addition of Ce(IV) for spectrophotometry. Plutonium concentration was calculated from a relation between Nd(III)/Pu(VI) molar extinction coefficient ratio and their absorbance ratio. The relative expanded uncertainty of the repeated analysis (n=5) was 8.9% (coverage factor k=2) for a highly radioactive liquid waste sample (173 mg L -1 ). The determination limit was 6 mg L -1 (ten fold's the standard deviation). This method was validated through comparison experiments with isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The analytical results of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste using this method were agree well with values obtained using isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The proposed method can be applied to independent on-site safeguards analysis at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant. (author)

  4. Process data in safeguards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1988-01-01

    The desire to improve timeliness and sensitivity of material control and accounting capabilities is the basis for evaluation and upgrade of regulatory requirements throughout the nuclear industry. Improvements invariably require better measurement capabilities and more frequent measurements. Operating plants typically include a broad range of measurements and equipment devoted to process control. How can these measurements be used to benefit safeguards? A part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has focused on the use of process data for safeguards. This report discusses recent safeguards demonstrations and current activities in a test facility at Oak Ridge

  5. Study on the development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, B. D.; Song, D. Y.; So, D. S.; Kwak, E. H. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this paper, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described.

  6. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  7. EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P. [Euratom, Communaute europeenne de l' energie atomique - CEEA (European Commission (EC))

    2015-07-01

    The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

  8. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  9. Safeguarding critical e-documents implementing a program for securing confidential information assets

    CERN Document Server

    Smallwood, Robert F

    2012-01-01

    Practical, step-by-step guidance for corporations, universities and government agencies to protect and secure confidential documents and business records Managers and public officials are looking for technology and information governance solutions to "information leakage" in an understandable, concise format. Safeguarding Critical E-Documents provides a road map for corporations, governments, financial services firms, hospitals, law firms, universities and other organizations to safeguard their internal electronic documents and private communications.Provides practical, step-by-step guidance o

  10. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  11. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  12. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product

  13. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  14. Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

    1983-01-01

    The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

  15. GPS positioning and desktop mapping. Applications to environmental monitoring. Report on task JNT B898 on the Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kansanaho, A.; Ilander, T.; Toivonen, H.

    1995-10-01

    Satellite navigation has been used for in-field applications by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety since 1993. Because of this experience, training in the use of GPS positioning and desktop mapping was chosen as a task under the Finnish Support programme to IAEA safeguards. A lecture and a field experiment was held in the training course on environmental monitoring at the IAEA headquarters in June 1995. Real-time mapping of the co-ordinates and storing information on sampling sites and procedures can make safeguards implementation more efficient and effective. Further software development are needed for these purposes. (author) (6 figs.)

  16. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  17. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  18. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  19. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the U.S. Department of Energy. Quarter ending December 31, 1996

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strauch, M.S.

    1997-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 1997 (October through December, 1996). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in four areas: (1) safeguards technology; (2) safeguards and material accountability; (3) computer security--distributed systems; and (4) physical and personnel security support. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these four areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  20. National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

    1999-01-01

    This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

  1. Human-Centred Computing for Assisting Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szoke, I.

    2015-01-01

    With the rapid evolution of enabling hardware and software, technologies including 3D simulation, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), advanced user interfaces (UI), and geographical information systems (GIS) are increasingly employed in many aspects of modern life. In line with this, the nuclear industry is rapidly adopting emerging technologies to improve efficiency and safety by supporting planning and optimization of maintenance and decommissioning work, as well as for knowledge management, surveillance, training and briefing field operatives, education, etc. For many years, the authors have been involved in research and development (R&D) into the application of 3D simulation, VR, and AR, for mobile, desktop, and immersive 3D systems, to provide a greater sense of presence and situation awareness, for training, briefing, and in situ work by field operators. This work has resulted in a unique software base and experience (documented in numerous reports) from evaluating the effects of the design of training programmes and briefing sessions on human performance and training efficiency when applying various emerging technologies. In addition, the authors are involved in R&D into the use of 3D simulation, advanced UIs, mobile computing, and GIS systems to support realistic visualization of the combined radiological and geographical environment, as well as acquisition, analyzes, visualization and sharing of radiological and other data, within nuclear installations and their surroundings. The toolkit developed by the authors, and the associated knowledge base, has been successfully applied to various aspects of the nuclear industry, and has great potential within the safeguards domain. It can be used to train safeguards inspectors, brief inspectors before inspections, assist inspectors in situ (data registration, analyzes, and communication), support the design and verification of safeguards systems, conserve data and experience, educate future safeguards

  2. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

    2010-10-01

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  3. The nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Hongjun; Chen Desheng

    1994-04-01

    The constitution of nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities is introduced and the main contents are the data flow of nuclear safeguards. If the data flow moves positively, i.e. from source data →supporting documents→accounting records→accounting reports, the systems of records and reports will be constituted. If the data flow moves negatively, the way to trace inspection of nuclear material accounting quality will be constituted

  4. Evaluating Safeguards in a Conservation Incentive Program: Participation, Consent, and Benefit Sharing in Indigenous Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Torsten Krause

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Critics suggest that Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+ may not generate improvements in well-being for participating stakeholders, and may in fact undermine indigenous rights. To ensure positive social benefits from REDD+ projects, the United Nations REDD Programme has proposed core safeguards, including local stakeholder participation; free, prior, and informed consent; and equitable distribution of benefits. However, there is little experience to date in implementing and evaluating these safeguards. We apply these core safeguards as a framework to study how people in indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon perceive and benefit from Programa Socio Bosque, a conservation incentive program in Ecuador's national REDD+ Programme portfolio. We interviewed 101 individuals in five communities that had participated in the Programa Socio Bosque for at least 18 months. Close to 80% of respondents reported that the decision to join Socio Bosque was made democratically, that they were familiar with the conservation goals of Socio Bosque, and that they were aware which area their community had selected for conservation. However, only 17% were familiar with the overall terms of the conservation agreement, implying that they were either not fully informed of or did not fully understand what they were consenting to in joining the program. Although the terms of the program require a community investment plan to be democratically developed by community members, less than half of respondents were aware of the existence of the investment plan, and fewer than 20% had participated in its development. The majority of respondents (61% reported that they did not know the amount of incentives that their community currently receives, and only 44% stated that incentives were managed democratically in communal assemblies. Moreover, although a slight majority (53% said they had noticed benefits to the community from participating in

  5. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

  6. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  7. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M.; Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B.; Moore, L.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S ampersand S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S ampersand S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S ampersand S team as well as some specific S ampersand S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S ampersand S requirements, S ampersand S criteria for assessing risk, S ampersand S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards

  8. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-01-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity

  9. Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

    1996-01-01

    President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

  10. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  11. Open Source Information in Support of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christopher, G.

    2015-01-01

    Open source techniques are an increasingly important tool for in safeguards. From social networking sites, such as Linkedin, to B2B portals like Alibaba, there are large open source databases that touch all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, from goods to scientists. This is in addition to the wealth of more traditional open source tools such as search engines. In this paper we focus on the potential of B2B sites to provide dual use goods for use in the nuclear fuel cycle. We will discuss the availability of these items as well as the frequency and content of tenders. As many of the largest sites—by traffic and content—are in Asia we will examine the potential of these sites to provide goods used in the nuclear fuel cycle. (author)

  12. Nuclear material data management and integration. A safeguard perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkey, David D.; Martin, H.R.; O'Leary, Jerry

    1999-01-01

    This paper is a discussion of the use of available data in the performance of nuclear material (NM) safeguards. The discussion considers the various sources of data and system requirements for collecting and managing that data, and is preliminary concerned with domestic safeguards requirements such as those specified by the US Department of Energy. The preferred configuration for integrated data management does not necessarily require a single computer system; however, separate computerized systems with direct inter-system connections is preferred. Use of all relevant data NM accounting, NM control, physical protection, and non-safeguards) is necessary to assure the most effective protection for the NM inventories. Where direct exchange of data is not possible, a systematic program to implement indirect exchange is essential [ru

  13. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  14. Leveraging Safety Programs to Improve and Support Security Programs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leach, Janice [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Snell, Mark K. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Pratt, R. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sandoval, S. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-10-01

    There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.

  15. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  16. Safeguards decision making in the public and regulatory environment, and the potential role of quantitative approaches

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sherr, T.S.

    1981-01-01

    This paper briefly examines the nature of the safeguards program's objectives and constraints, and the inherent limitations on comprehensive quantification. It discusses the nature of the public and regulatory processes employed in safeguards decision making, and examines their implications regarding the potential role of quantitative approaches to safeguards policy and operational decision making

  17. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  18. Activities of special committee on 'quality assurance of accountancy analysis for safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    For the long-term stable operation of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, it is essential to satisfy the requirements of IAEA safeguards agreement. It could be attained by precise implementation of accountancy analysis of nuclear materials and application of Destructive Analysis (DA) which enables highly precise measurement is necessary. The requirements to maintain and improve the precision of DA are supposed to grow along with nuclear fuel cycle fully in progress and Pu handling amount increases. In order to maintain long-term stability of quality level of accountancy analysis for safeguards, a special committee on 'Quality Assurance (QA) for Accountancy /Safeguards analysis' was established at Atomic Energy Society Japan supported by INNM-Japan Chapter. Experts of safeguards analysis, reference materials, statistics and QA were gathered and drafted the committee standard document for isotope dilution mass spectrometry, the major accountancy analysis technique for Pu and U, supported Pu standard preparation at JAEA and summarized the items needed for QA of DA. (author)

  19. IAEA Guidance for Safeguards Implementation in Facility Design and Construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.; Hamilton, A.; Poirier, S.; Catton, A.; Ciuculescu, C.; Ingegneri, M.; Plenteda, R.

    2015-01-01

    One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. One way the IAEA works to achieve this objective is through the publication of technical series that can provide guidance to Member States. These series include the IAEA Services Series, the IAEA Safety Standard Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. The Nuclear Energy Series is comprised of publications designed to encourage and assist research and development on, and practical application of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This includes guidance to be used by owners and operators of utilities, academia, vendors and government officials. The IAEA has chosen the Nuclear Energy Series to publish guidance for States regarding the consideration of safeguards in nuclear facility design and construction. Historically, safeguards were often applied after a facility was designed or maybe even after it was built. However, many in the design and construction community would prefer to include consideration of these requirements from the conceptual design phase in order to reduce the need for retro-fits and modifications. One can then also take advantage of possible synergies between safeguards, security, safety and environmental protection and reduce the project risk against cost increments and schedule slippage. The IAEA is responding to this interest with a suite of publications in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, developed with the assistance of a number of Member State Support Programmes through a joint support programme task: · International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction (NP-T-2.8, 2013), · International Safeguards in the Design of Nuclear Reactors (NP-T-2.9, 2014), · International Safeguards in the Design of Spent Fuel Management (NF-T-3.1, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Fuel Fabrication Plants (NF-T-4.7, tbd

  20. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  1. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  2. Prioritizing and scheduling Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmunds, T.; Saleh, R.; Zevanove, S.

    1992-02-01

    As part of the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP), facilities are required to develop a Resource Plan (RP). The Resource Plan provides documentation and justification for the facility's planned upgrades, including the schedule, priority, and cost estimates for the safeguards and security upgrades. Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) management has identified and obtained funding approval for a number of safeguards and security upgrades, including line-item construction projects. These upgrade projects were selected to address a variety of concerns identified in the PORTS vulnerability assessments and other reviews performed in support of the SSSP process. However, budgeting and scheduling constraints do not make it possible to simultaneously begin implementation of all of the upgrade projects. A formal methodology and analysis are needed to explicitly address the trade-offs between competing safeguards objectives, and to prioritize and schedule the upgrade projects to ensure that the maximum benefit can be realized in the shortest possible time frame. The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology developed to support these upgrade project scheduling decisions. The report also presents the results obtained from applying the methodology to a set of the upgrade projects selected by PORTS S ampersand S management. Data for the analysis are based on discussions with personnel familiar with the PORTS safeguards and security needs, the requirements for implementing these upgrades, and upgrade funding limitations. The analysis results presented here assume continued highly enriched uranium (HEU) operations at PORTS. However, the methodology developed is readily adaptable for the evaluation of other operational scenarios and other resource allocation issues relevant to PORTS

  3. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    nuclear activities. Development of equipment and techniques for safeguards is continuing with the help of national support programmes that assist the IAEA in keeping pace with the evolution of new technology. The IAEA defines the safeguards needs, co-ordinates the support programmes, and tests and evaluates the techniques and the resulting equipment being developed. All aspects of equipment performance are evaluated, including compliance with specifications, reliability and transportability and, most importantly, suitability for use by IAEA inspectors in nuclear facilities. The IAEA has an established quality assurance procedure to authorize equipment and software for routine inspection use. The equipment and techniques highlighted in this booklet are those in frequent use for inspection purposes or in the late stages of development. The overall objective of this publication is to provide a comprehensive overview of the techniques and equipment underlying the implementation of IAEA safeguards

  4. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1998-01-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

  5. 2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

  6. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  7. Nuclear safeguards in Brazil and Argentina: 25 years of ABACC

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kassenova, Togzhan

    2017-11-01

    As possessors of advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina bear special responsibility for helping the international community and neighbors in their region feel confident that their nuclear programs are peaceful, secure, and safe. Over the past 25 years, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has played an indispensable role in strengthening such confidence by implementing nuclear safeguards in the two countries. Today, ABACC carries out safeguards inspections at a total of 76 nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. This article describes how Brazil and Argentina view trends in the global nonproliferation regime and international nuclear safeguards, and explains how these trends relate to unique challenges and opportunities facing Brazil, Argentina, and ABACC.

  8. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information

  9. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  10. Proposals for the 1989/90 Safeguards R and D programme and associated meetings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The R and D programme of the IAEA Department of Safeguards as carried out by or undertaken on behalf of the Division of Development and Technical Support, the Division of Safeguards Evaluation and the Division of Safeguards Information Treatment is set out in tables which give the objective of the programme elements, a description of the activities to be performed and a number of items of information required for assessment of the activities. The linkage between R and D activities and planned meetings on safeguards topics in 1989/90 is shown in a table too. 4 tabs

  11. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  12. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  14. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  15. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  16. Safeguarding nuclear energy in the Pacific: the role of Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indyk, M.

    1980-01-01

    Measures necessary for the establishment of an effective safeguards regime are outlined. These include the establishment of multinational institutions to control and limit the number of sensitive facilities, the establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites and regional plutonium banks to be placed under international control, the establishment of international uranium banks to provide fuel assurances to cooperating countries and the cooperation between suppliers and consumers in improving safeguard techniques. The possibility of a Pacific regional non-proliferation initiative and the role Australia is likely to play in such an initiative are considered. From the public record, the Australian Government would appear to be a deeply committed supporter of international measures to control reprocessing, to store spent fuel and plutonium, to strengthen safeguards and to provide fuel assurances to consumers. However, the Government's actions are not as consistent. It is concluded that Australia will be willing to support non-proliferation efforts as long as they do not unduly jeopardise uranium exports

  17. Study On Safeguard Measures for Implementing Overall Planning of Land Use

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    Based on minutely analysing the main problems existing in safeguard measures for implementing a new round of overall planning of land use,this paper constructs implementation security system of overall planning of land use,and puts forward the principles and basis of formulating safeguard measures for implementing overall planning of land use.Finally,this paper establishes the content system of safeguard measures:effectively strengthen social supervision;strengthen administrative management of land use planning;strengthen economic management of land use planning;reinforce the legal status of planning;establish incentive and constraint mechanism for reinforcing implementation;improve support system of planning.

  18. Hungarian experience in the role of a Technical Support Organization - Expert support and R and D activities in nuclear safeguards and forensics, participation in international cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szeles, E.; Kovacs, A.; Biro, T.

    2010-01-01

    The Institute of Isotopes (IoI) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been - since the mid-fifties - engaged not only in basic and applied research related to the use of radioisotopes in Hungary but also in the production, trade and safety of radioisotopes supported by the central accountancy at national level. Based on its experience and capabilities the technical tasks of nuclear safeguards and forensics have been delegated to the Institute by governmental decrees. Thus the Institute is one of the Technical Support Organizations of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) providing expert support in the areas mentioned above and maintaining the central isotope registry. An Agreement between HAEA and IoI specifies both routine and R and D activities supporting authority functions. These include the development and application of both non-destructive (i.e. gamma spectrometry, neutron-coincidence counting and laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry) and destructive (i.e. inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry) analytical methods to satisfy domestic needs as well as to explore novel methods both for safeguards and nuclear forensics purposes. Methods have been developed to identify and quantify nuclear material in fresh and spent fuel assemblies and to characterize seized or found nuclear material of unknown origin and also environmental samples. The validation of these measurement methods have been performed in inter-laboratory comparisons organized by the Joint Research Centers of the European Union and by other international organizations such as IAEA and the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG). The presentation describes TSO activities both at domestic level and in potential international cooperation initiatives. The need of regional cooperation is emphasized discussing advantages and difficulties. (author)

  19. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

    2009-01-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  20. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Synetos, Sotiris

    2013-01-01

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  1. A safeguards case study of the Nuclear Materials and equipment corporation uranium processing plant Apollo, Pennsylvania. Appendix B with proprietary information removed. Staff technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altman, W.; Hockert, J.; Quinn, E.

    1980-04-01

    The report characterizes the Atomic Energy Commission safeguards requirements and the safeguards systems and procedures in place at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment (NUMEC) uranium processing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania during the spring of 1964. Based upon this characterization, a list of safeguards weaknesses which would be considered deficiencies under 1979 requirements is developed. Appendixes A and B to the report provide a detailed characterization of AEC safeguards requirements as well as a side by side comparison of NUMEC's safeguards program in 1964 with the safeguards program currently required of a comparable licensed facility

  2. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  3. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper, Susan E. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Pickett, Chris A. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Queirolo, Al [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Bachner, Katherine M. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Worrall, Louise G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  4. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-01-01

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers' goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term ''software sustainability'' was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  5. Technical Solution for Improved Safeguards/State Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.

    2015-01-01

    This paper will discuss an information technology solution to allow the IAEA Safeguards Department to improve cooperation with States. The solution will be a portal or hub to integrate the information, processes, and people between Safeguards and States. It will allow for two-way communication and collaboration between Safeguards staff and State representatives. This paper discusses the information security challenges inherent in building such a system. It proposes technical architectures that might allow the existing integration approach (e.g., encrypted email exchange) to be kept, while expanding it to include modern integration technologies (e.g., web services), as well explorer new collaborative web technologies. It looks at current Safeguards processes and approaches to cooperation and discusses efficiencies that could be achieved through the adoption of this technology solution. Example process areas for improvement include: a) Safeguards Agreements: States are obligated to submit data on their nuclear programme to the IAEA on a periodic basis. Declarations are received through two separate systems using encrypted email. The proposed solution would allow for enhanced exchange of declaration where States can submit any type of declaration using one system. When declarations are received and validated, an acknowledgement would automatically be sent to the State. The solution would provide the Safeguards Department the ability to ask for clarification as well as collaborate on the submitted declarations. Both the question and the response would be recorded in the system. The solution could also integrate tools allowing declarations to be added directly and validated before submission. b) Other areas that could benefit from this solution include declarations from States with small quantities protocol, facility declarations, as well as systems that support extra-budgetary funding (e.g., SPRICS). (author)

  6. Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L

    1978-08-17

    There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient energy sources. If this is true then it cannot be said that the NPT is a failure, merely that its success does not correspond to its apparent purposes.

  7. The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liester, N.A.

    1995-01-01

    The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

  8. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  9. Annual report of the Director of Safeguards 1988-1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) operates Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It also contributes to the IAEA safeguards network, in support of the Australian Government's committment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Activities carried out during the year ended 30 June 1989 in each of these areas are reviewed. It is reported that 54 export shipments of uranium ore concentrates containing 5061 tonnes of uranium oxide were made by Australia's three producers and that no unreconcilied differences in quantities of Australian obligated nuclear material, wherever situated, or nuclear material within Australia, regardless of origin, as at 30 June 1989. The report also includes copies of IAEA's statements related to the verification inspections pursuant to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement

  10. Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

    2004-01-01

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Requirements Integration Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed and implemented an innovative management process that will be described in detail. This process systematically integrates S and S planning into construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. It extends and expands the opportunities provided by the DOE project management manual, DOE M 413.3-1. Through a series of LANL documents, a process is defined and implemented that formally identifies an S and S professional to oversee, coordinate, facilitate, and communicate among the identified S and S organizations and the project organizations over the life cycle of the project. The derived benefits, namely (1) elimination/reduction of re-work or costly retrofitting, (2) overall project cost savings because of timely and improved planning, (3) formal documentation, and (4) support of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management at LANL, will be discussed. How many times, during the construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing facility, have the persons responsible for the project waited until the last possible minute or until after construction is completed to approach the security organizations for their help in safeguarding and securing the facility? It's almost like, 'Oh, by the way, do we need access control and a fence around this building and just what are we going to do with our classified anyway?' Not only is it usually difficult; it's also typically expensive to retrofit or plan for safeguards and security after the fact. Safeguards and security organizations are often blamed for budget overruns and delays in facility occupancy and program startup, but these problems are usually due to poor front-end planning. In an effort to help projects engage safeguards and security in the pre-conceptual or conceptual stages, we implemented a high level formality of operations. We

  11. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  12. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  13. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  14. Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2000-01-01

    In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

  15. Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, W.C.

    1995-01-01

    The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

  16. Development and application of a safeguards system in a fabrication plant for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuypers, M.; Stricht, E. van der

    1979-01-01

    This paper gives a general view of the safeguards activities performed at the Nukem Fabrication plant (Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany) during the last seven years. The main safeguards-relevant features of the plant are given and discussed. The importance is stressed of a good working relationship between the three principal partners, viz. the operator, the safeguards authority and the latter's technical support service. The definition, implementation and improvement of safeguards equipment and activities are outlined. The paper describes the internal organization established by the operator to fulfil his responsibilities, the safeguards philosophy, the Non-Destructive Assay equipment permanently installed by Euratom Safeguards, the results obtained, and the evaluation of the material balances. Conclusions are drawn (and specific comments made throughout the paper) from the experience gained over this period of seven years. (author)

  17. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  18. Application of a portable briefcase personal computer to research reactor safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryan, R.D.

    1985-01-01

    The Kookaburra Portable Briefcase Personal Computer (PBPC) has been applied to safeguards inspections at the HIFAR research reactor. A complete portable measuring system provides for non-destructive assay on both fresh and spent fuel. Application programs developed for the PBPC make it possible to immediately analyse the results of the measurements to verify the amounts of nuclear material declared by the operator. This contributes significantly to meeting the essential safeguards criteria of timely detection of diversion

  19. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security Activities under Euratom Research and Training Programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abousahl, S.; Palajova, Z.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Aregbe, Y.; )

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards and security are absolute priorities for the EU. At technical level, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) as the European Commission's in-house science service plays an important role in the field of nuclear research, training and education that include nuclear safety, safeguards and security. The JRC's nuclear research activities are defined in a Council Regulation on the research and training programme of the European Atomic Energy Community. The JRC works closely with EC safeguards authority, whose mission is to ensure that nuclear material within the EU is not diverted from its intended use according to Euratom treaty. Technologies, methodologies and trainings are developed according to the Euratom Safeguards inspectorate's needs. In the area of nuclear security, the JRC contributes to the development of specific expertise in the field of nuclear forensics and border security detection as well as related training efforts for first front-line responders and national experts. The JRC provides its expert support for the implementation of internal EU action plans mainly in the field of radiological and nuclear security. At an international level, the JRC cooperates with the IAEA mainly through the EC support programme on the control of nuclear materials and facilities in order to avoid proliferation or diversion. Close cooperation with IAEA nuclear security is developed through the recent signature of a dedicated practical arrangement. Key partnerships have also been developed in the field of safeguards and security with the US-DoE, Russia, Japan and China. In addition, JRC contributes significantly to the EU nuclear safeguards and security outreach activities implemented under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. In this paper we will highlight some of the JRC contributions to the enhancement of nuclear safeguards and security at EU and international levels. (author)

  20. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  1. Investigation of techniques for the application of safeguards to a continuously fuelled reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hodgkinson, J.G.; Head, D.A.

    1978-03-01

    The following three areas of prime safeguards concern are analyzed: 1) at the reactor face, where spent fuel is first removed from the channel, 2) along the system for transporting spent fuel from the reactor to the storage bay, and 3) in the spent fuel storage bay. The program is designed to develop techniques and instruments to safeguard these areas

  2. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat. Theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, Scott; Mullen, Mark; Pan, Paul

    2011-01-01

    In recent years, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept has received significant interest with respect to international (IAEA) safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic (or national) Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses domestic requirements for material control and accounting (MC and A) and for physical protection, such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts for international safeguards sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA. This paper identifies the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e., MC and A and physical protection) and explains how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems. (author)

  3. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demuth, Scott F.; Mullen, Mark

    2011-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC and A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC and A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  4. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  5. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  6. Passive and Active Fast-Neutron Imaging in Support of Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Safeguards Campaign

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blackston, Matthew A.; Hausladen, Paul

    2010-01-01

    Results from safeguards-related passive and active coded-aperture fast-neutron imaging measurements of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) material configurations performed at Idaho National Laboratory s Zero Power Physics Reactor facility are presented. The imaging measurements indicate that it is feasible to use fast neutron imaging in a variety of safeguards-related tasks, such as monitoring storage, evaluating holdup deposits in situ, or identifying individual leached hulls still containing fuel. The present work also presents the first demonstration of imaging of differential die away fast neutrons.

  7. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  8. DOE enrichment plants-safeguards means business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, R.

    1987-01-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., is a full service enrichment plant. Its long enriching cascade can process uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) feeds at almost any 235 U level and can produce UF 6 over the complete spectrum from depleted to very highly enriched uranium. The DOE uranium enrichment program is a government-owned enterprise operating as a business. The operating concerns of the DOE uranium enrichment plants and their safeguards programs have evolved together over the past three decades, and that evolution will likely continue. As the risk associated with possession, processing, and shipment of strategic nuclear material increased, the protection and control of it increased; as the value of the product grew with time, better ways were found to measure and conserve it. In each of these areas, safeguards objectives and the business requirements of the plant are complementary, and the progress made in one area has been reflected by progress in the other. The plant's material control and accountability program has become crucial to such business requirements as quantifying the enriched uranium (separative work units) produced in each monthly period and convincing financial auditors that the multibillion dollar enriched uranium assets located at the Portsmouth plant are properly stated

  9. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  10. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  11. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

    1977-09-01

    A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

  12. Development of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tan Yajun

    1996-01-01

    The development method of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards is presented. The paper describes the design methods of graphical user interface (GUI), multiwindow and multitask-based spectrum graph display, data acquisition and processing and the application of object-oriented programming (OOP). Using the package, an effective prototype design path can be found for MS-Windows-based software. The methods and programs have been applied in some safeguard non-destructive assay system

  13. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  14. Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koroyasu, M.

    1987-06-01

    Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

  15. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  16. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  17. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  18. Analysis on the status of the application of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tao Zhangsheng; Zhao Yingjun

    2008-01-01

    Based on the application status of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards, advantage of satellite remote sensing technology is analyzed, main types of satellite image used in nuclear safeguards are elaborated and the main application of satellite images is regarded to detect, verify and monitor nuclear activities; verify additional protocol declaration and design information, support performing complementary access inspections; investigate alleged undeclared activities based on open source or the third party information. Application examples of satellite image in nuclear safeguards to analyze nuclear facilities by other countries, the ability of remote sensing technology in nuclear safeguards is discussed. (authors)

  19. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  20. Research on seal control systems for international nuclear safeguard and the vulnerability assessment on the seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Hongjian; Liu Tianshu; Cao Fangfang; Xu Chunyan

    2014-01-01

    Safeguard seals, also called Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), are widely used to detect tampering or unauthorized entry in the international safeguard and security systems, Seal control systems consist of seal implementing plan, seal development and the vulnerability assessment on tbe seals, effective implementing procedures and methods of the seals. The vulnerability assessment contents of safeguard seals, thermo-shrinked film seals being as an example, and seals control systems in the implementation program are researched. The seal control systems discuss task assignment, seals management flow and seals program data flow to promote applying effectively seals. The vulnerability assessment program of seals studies assurance level to some different tampering techniques and measures. The researches must promote utilizing seals effectively for nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, radioactive waste management, and the nuclear material accounting and control. (authors)

  1. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  2. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  3. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  4. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  5. Safety, Security and Safeguards (3S) Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladineo, S.V.; Frazar, S.

    2013-01-01

    A meaningful discussion of Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) Culture requires a review of the concepts related to the culture of the three components. The concept of culture can be confusing, and so careful use of terminology is needed to enable a focused and constructive dialogue. To this end, this paper will use the concept of organizational culture as a backdrop for a broader discussion about how the three subcultures of safety, security and safeguards come together to enhance the mission of an organization. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the nuclear industry has embraced the concept of safety culture. The work on safety culture has been used to develop programs and concepts in the culture of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting and Nuclear Security Culture. More recently, some work has been done on defining an International Safeguards Culture. Others have spoken about a 3S Culture, but there has been little rigorous consideration of the concept. This paper attempts to address 3S Culture, to begin to evaluate the merit of the concept, and to propose a definition. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  6. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  7. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy: Quarter ending September 30, 1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-10-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1993 (July through September, 1993). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in five areas: Safeguards Technology, Safeguard System Studies, Computer Security, DOE Automated Physical Security and DOE Automated Visitor Access Control System. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these five areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  8. Structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cole, R.J.; Bennett, C.A.; Edelhertz, H.; Wood, M.T.; Brown, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.

    1977-09-01

    This study develops hypothesis about the relation between the structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents and the ability of document users to understand and implement them in a way that reflects the intent and requirements of the NRC. Four decisions are needed to improve communication: (1) Should improvement of safeguards regulatory documents as communication instruments be an explicit NRC program. (2) What specific methods of communication should be the focus of improvement efforts. (3) What actions to improve communications are feasible and desirable. (4) How should the NRC divide its available effort and resources among desirable actions in order to provide the most effective communication through regulatory documents. This volume contains: introduction, conceptual bases, legal requirements, targets, choice of documents, preparation of documents, readability, and further study of recommended changes in structure and drafting

  9. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  10. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  11. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Science.gov (United States)

    1995-04-01

    Hexapar- reactors were originally designed to use HEU, the tite safeguards agreement already in place for cen- RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research...See discussion below on the RERTR program.) partite agreement. Such short notice is possible in Some reactors, however, have yet to be converted, Europe...the fuel and compares them to those of 1994.21 alternate policies. The RERTR program has made significant Of the some 22,700 fuel elements slated for

  12. Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  13. Evaluation Program initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rich, B.L.

    1987-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide the Department of Energy's (DOE) safeguards and security community with some insights on an important management initiative by the Office of Security Evaluations (OSE). The paper will present the ''what, where, who, when, and why'' of a new Evaluation Program. The Evaluation Program will be comprised of a continuing series of regular and special evaluations of DOE safeguards and security programs and policies. The evaluations will be integrative and ''crosscutting,'' i.e. will extend across DOE organizational lines. Evaluations will be offered as positive advisories to DOE managers with safeguards and security responsibilities and will not be rated. They will complement the ongoing OSE Inspection Program of inspections conducted by OSE's Inspection Division. The purpose for the evaluations is to establish an accurate and current assessment of the effectiveness and status of safeguards and security programs and policies and to provide DOE managers with required information on program and policy effectiveness

  14. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

    2016-01-01

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is ''to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.'' The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  15. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division; Gaudet, Rachel N. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  16. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  17. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  18. Russian University Education in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Boiko, Vladimir I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Demyanyuk, Dmitry G.; Killinger, Mark H.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.

    2009-01-01

    As safeguards and security (S and S) systems are installed and upgraded in nuclear facilities throughout Russia, it becomes increasingly important to develop mechanisms for educating future Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in the technologies and methodologies of physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A). As part of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) program to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Education Project supports technical S and S degree programs at key Russian universities and nonproliferation education initiatives throughout the Russian Federation that are necessary to achieve the overall objective of fostering qualified and vigilant Russian S and S personnel. The Education Project supports major educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU). The S and S Graduate Program is available only at MEPhI and is the world's first S and S degree program. Ten classes of students have graduated with a total of 79 Masters Degrees as of early 2009. At least 84% of the graduates over the ten years are still working in the S and S field. Most work at government agencies or research organizations, and some are pursuing their PhD. A 5 and 1/2 year Engineering Degree Program (EDP) in S and S is currently under development at MEPhI and TPU. The EDP is more tailored to the needs of nuclear facilities. The program's first students (14) graduated from MEPhI in February 2007. Similar-sized classes are graduating from MEPhI each February. All of the EDP graduates are working in the S and S field, many at nuclear facilities. TPU also established an EDP and graduated its first class of approximately 18 students in February 2009. For each of these degree programs, the American project team works with MEPhI and TPU to develop appropriate curriculum, identify and acquire various training aids, develop and publish textbooks, and strengthen instructor skills

  19. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong Sylvester, Kory W.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  20. 32 CFR Appendix D to Part 323 - Word Processing Center (WPC) Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 323, App. D Appendix D to... (WPCs) operating independent of the customer's function. However, managers of word processing systems... addressed. C. Safeguarding Information During Receipt. 1. The word processing manager will establish...

  1. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  2. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  3. Automated 741 document preparation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Automated Safeguards Information System (OASIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Austin, H.C.; Gray, L.M.

    1982-01-01

    OASIS has been providing for Oak Ridge National Laboratory's total safeguards needs since being place on line in April 1980. The system supports near real-time nuclear materials safeguards and accountability control. The original design of OASIS called for an automated facsimile of a 741 document to be prepared as a functional by-product of updating the inventory. An attempt was made to utilize, intact, DOE-Albuquerque's automated 741 system to generate the facsimile; however, the five page document produced proved too cumbersome. Albuquerque's programs were modified to print an original 741 document utilizing standard DOE/NRC 741 forms. It is felt that the best features of both the automated and manually generated 741 documents have been incorporated. Automation of the source data for 741 shipping documents produces greater efficiency while reducing possible errors. Through utilization of the standard DOE/NRC form, continuity within the NMMSS system is maintained, thus minimizing the confusion and redundancy associated with facsimiles. OASIS now fulfills the original concept of near real-time accountability by furnishing a viable 741 document as a function of updating the inventory

  4. Strengthening Performance Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villiers, V. Z. de

    2015-01-01

    This paper will describe an initiative to develop a management support tool to improve performance management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The envisaged mechanism should enable the Department to (a) plan, assess and report on the achievement of its objectives and (b) to improve its performance on a continuous basis. The performance management tool should be aligned with related processes in the Department and the IAEA as a whole such as strategic planning, programming and budget, the result-based management approach and various reporting mechanisms. It should be integrated with existing and planned information and other management systems. The initially, departmental working group that was established for this initiative focussed on two aspects: confirmation of the overall and specific objectives to be achieved by the Department of Safeguards, and compiling an inventory of indicators of activities, outputs and outcomes that were being used in the Department. This exercise confirmed that alignment and prioritization of activities relating to assessment of, and reporting on, performance could be improved. A value creation map was subsequently developed to assist in focussing the performance management tool to identified needs of stakeholders. Other activities of the working group included the determination of the desired characteristics of a hierarchy of performance indicators to be used to drive desired behaviour across organizational levels. Complexities to be handled included the following: · reflecting the appropriate component of the results chain (such as activities, outputs, outcomes and impact); · maintaining the linkages between objectives and performance indicators across organizational levels; · developing a balanced set of performance indicators (e.g. reflecting in-field and Headquarters activities, incorporating all main components of Departmental processes and balanced scorecard perspectives, measurable vs qualitative indicators); and

  5. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  6. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  7. Structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cole, R.J.; Bennett, C.A.; Edelhertz, H.; Wood, M.T.; Brown, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.

    1977-09-01

    Improving communication of NRU's requirements is the subject of this study. This summary is organized in terms of four decisions on whether safeguards regulatory documents as communication instruments should be an explicit NRC program, what communication methods should be focused on, what actions are feasible and desirable, and how should the NRC divide its effort and resources among desirable actions

  8. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

  9. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  10. NGSI student activities in open source information analysis in support of the training program of the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the additional protocol

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    In 2008 a joint team from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) consisting of specialists in training of IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S. Doe laboratories for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. As a major part of the support of the activity, LANL summer interns provided open source information analysis to the LANL-BNL mock inspection team. They were a part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's (NGSI) summer intern program aimed at producing the next generation of safeguards specialists. This paper describes how they used open source information to 'backstop' the LANL-BNL team's effort to construct meaningful Additional Protocol Complementary Access training scenarios for each of the three DOE laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

  11. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  12. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  13. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  14. US Support Program Topical Meetings 1999 to 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-10

    In 1999, the International Safeguards Project Office began organizing topical workshops to explore technical issues facing the International Atomic Energy Agency's Department of Safeguards. Representatives from IAEA member states including the United States, national laboratories and companies were invited to the workshops to discuss the technical issues. In some cases professional facilitators were hired to lead the discussions and in some cases business gaming techniques were employed. Since 1999, the following topics have been addressed Data Communication Technologies (1999), Information Security (2000), Design and Testing for High Reliability (2001), Standardization and Integration of Unattended and Remote Monitoring Systems (2002), Roadmapping: Surveillance (2003), IAEA Seals Technology Roadmapping Workshop (2004), Turning Information Into Knowledge (2004), Safeguards Tools of the Future (2005), and Advanced Sensors for Safeguards (2007). This paper will review the scope of the workshops and summarize their results.

  15. Computerization of the nuclear material accounting system for safeguards purposes at nuclear power plants with WWER-440 reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Antonov, V.P.; Konnov, Yu.I.; Semenets, A.N.

    1983-01-01

    The paper sets forth the basic principles underlying nuclear material accounting at nuclear power plants with WWER-440 reactors. It briefly describes the general structure and individual units in a program for computerized accounting. The use of this program is illustrated by the actual accounting data from the fifth unit of the Novovoronezh nuclear power station. The NUMIS program seems to be of interest both for the purposes of IAEA safeguards and for nuclear power plant operators in countries where power plants with WWER-440 reactors subject to IAEA safeguards are either in operation or under construction. The research in question was conducted initially under an IAEA research contract; the system is now being developed further and tested under the IAEA-USSR technical and scientific co-operation programme on safeguards. (author)

  16. Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Danker, W.J.; Floyd, W.

    1993-01-01

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

  17. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  18. Assurance of the effectiveness of safeguards in light of their objectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.T.; Lyon, H.E.

    1977-01-01

    and transferring technology to industry and in safeguarding facility design information are also addressed. For the safeguards systems to be effectively implemented, their impact must not degrade operation or increase cost to unacceptable levels. The U.S. and other nations, along with the IAEA, are exchanging technical data and experience in the fast changing safeguards field. We are also pursuing the implementation of IAEA safeguards to commercial nuclear activities in the U.S. under the Presidential Offer of 1967. This program is discussed

  19. Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

  20. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  1. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  2. IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol in the Eurasia Region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murakami, K.

    2001-01-01

    Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT. Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States. In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols

  3. DASAO: software tool for the management of safeguards, waste and decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noynaert, Luc; Verwaest, Isi; Libon, Henri; Cuchet, Jean-Marie

    2013-01-01

    Decommissioning of nuclear facilities is a complex process involving operations such as detailed surveys, decontamination and dismantling of equipment's, demolition of buildings and management of resulting waste and nuclear materials if any. This process takes place in a well-developed legal framework and is controlled and followed-up by stakeholders like the Safety Authority, the Radwaste management Agency and the Safeguards Organism. In the framework of its nuclear waste and decommissioning program and more specifically the decommissioning of the BR3 reactor, SCK-CEN has developed different software tools to secure the waste and material traceability, to support the sound management of the decommissioning project and to facilitate the control and the follow-up by the stakeholders. In the case of Belgium, it concerns the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, the National Agency for radioactive waste management and fissile material and EURATOM and IAEA. In 2005, Belgonucleaire decided to shutdown her Dessel MOX fuel fabrication plant and the production stopped in 2006. According to the final decommissioning plan ('PDF') approved by NIRAS, the decommissioning works should start in 2008 at the earliest. In 2006, the management of Belgonucleaire identified the need for an integrated database and decided to entrust SCK-CEN with its development, because SCK-CEN relies on previous experience in comparable applications namely already approved by authorities such as NIRAS, FANC and EURATOM. The main objectives of this integrated software tool are: - simplified and updated safeguards; - waste and material traceability; - computerized documentation; - support to project management; - periodic and final reporting to waste and safety authorities. The software called DASAO (Database for Safeguards, Waste and Decommissioning) was successfully commissioned in 2008 and extensively used from 2009 to the satisfaction of Belgonucleaire and the stakeholders. SCK-CEN is

  4. Radiometric characterisation supports, burnup credit, safeguards and radionuclide inventory determination for spent fuel transport, storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chesterman, A.S.; Clapham, M.J.; Gardner, N.

    1999-01-01

    Spent nuclear fuel characterisation measurements play an essential role in a range of fuel handling activities. In particular, they are necessary to support the application of burnup credit to the transport of spent fuel, to detect diversion of safeguarded nuclear material and to determine the radionuclide inventory of materials destined for final disposal. To apply measurements to these activities the measurement procedures need to be approved by the relevant regulatory bodies. Often key to the measurement procedures is the method of instrument system calibration and what a priori data is acceptable to aid the measurement process. Discussion of these, pertinent to the three areas of application mentioned above, is presented with suggestions of alternative approaches where considered appropriate. (author)

  5. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  6. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  7. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  8. Nondestructive Neutron And Gamma-Ray Technologies Applied To GNEP And Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dougan, A D; Snyderman, N; Ham, Y; Nakae, L; Dietrich, D; Kerr, P; Wang, T; Stoeffl, W; Choi, J S

    2007-01-01

    In recent years, LLNL has developed methods for diagnosing significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Homeland security problems have recently focused our attention on detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is a weak signal problem. Current and advanced safeguards applications will require working in the opposite extreme of strong but buried signals. We will review some of the technologies that have been developed at LLNL for homeland security applications and discuss how they might be used in support of international safeguards

  9. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  10. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  11. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  12. Safeguarding vulnerable families: work with refugees and asylum seekers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burchill, John

    2011-02-01

    This paper will highlight one of the key findings of a qualitative study based on the analysis of in-depth interviews with 14 health visitors describing their experiences working with refugees and asylum seekers. Despite changes in government legislation to improve children's services in order to prevent harm to children, this recent study demonstrated that health visitors were working with the complexities of needs among refugees and asylum seekers related to safeguarding both children and vulnerable women. The health visitors often worked with families and individuals with no support from other professional services, they worked with failed asylum seekers who were unable to access other forms of support and they worked with women and children who were caught in a cycle of domestic abuse due to their immigration status. They were also working with families who would disappear from the systems in place to safeguard children.

  13. Use of fuel reprocessing plant instrumentation for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.L.

    1977-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has a program for developing instrumentation to be used by safeguards inspectors at reprocessing facilities. These instruments have generally been individual pieces of equipment for improving the accuracy of existing measurement instrumentation or equipment to perform nondestructive assay on a selected basis. It is proposed that greater use be made of redundant plant instrumentation and data recovery systems that could augment plant instrumentation to verify the validity of plant measurements. Use of these methods for verfication must be proven as part of an operating plant before they can be relied upon for safeguards surveillance. Inspectors must be qualified in plant operations, or have ready access to those so qualified, if the integrity of the operation is to be properly assessed. There is an immediate need for the development and in-plant proof testing of an integrated gamma, passive neutron, and active neutron measurement system for drum quantities of radioactive trash. The primary safeguards effort should be limited to plutonium and highly enriched uranium

  14. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  15. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  16. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  17. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    Generally, the scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues, (1) global safeguards effectiveness, or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on (1) while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed at (2). SAFE addresses (1) in that it considers the entire facility, i.e., the composite system of hardware and human components, in one global analysis. SNAP addresses (2) by providing a safeguards modeling symbology sufficiently flexible to represent quite complex scenarios from the standpoint of hardware interfaces while also accounting for a rich variety of human decision making. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example

  18. Cooperation in the Implementation of Safeguards at Fukushima Dai-ichi Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumekawa, H.; Usui, A.; Sano, K.; Ishii, T.; Ninagawa, J.; Namekawa, M.; Iso, S.; Nakamura, N.; Hirato, Y.; Murajiri, M.; Hori, K.; Oyama, K.; Takagi, A.; Hirabayashi, N.

    2015-01-01

    The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 had a major impact on the safeguards situation at the site. JSGO, NMCC, TEPCO and JAEA are tackling the challenges posed by the accident jointly with the IAEA and in cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). From the day of the earthquake, JSGO and the IAEA have shared information on decommissioning activities and discussed how to deal with this difficult issue. In May 2012, the Fukushima Task Force was established. Its objective is to develop a holistic approach to safeguards implementation measures for the site, to monitor the re-establishment of safeguards, to facilitate discussion of relevant issues, and to consider possible approaches to longer-term safeguards challenges. All the fuels in spent fuel ponds in Units 5 and 6 and Common Spent Fuel Storage have been successfully re-verified. Re-verification of fuels kept in spent fuel pond in Unit 4 is underway. A special arrangement called SNOS (Short Notice Operational Support Activities) has been introduced to confirm non-diversion of declared material at Fukushima Dai-ichi site. Based on extensive information exchange, proactive discussions on safeguards approaches are being held for near-term issues. The damaged core material in Units 1-3 will pose extreme difficulties in longer-term. A special sub-group has been established under the task force to address the issues. Although lessons learned from past nuclear accidents resulting in damage of core material have some relevance, none of them can be directly applicable for Fukushima. Thus a foresighted and creative approach is needed. Close coordination with the IAEA and support from technically competent institutions in Japan and from abroad, such as DOE, are also essential to tackle the issues. (author)

  19. State-wide performance criteria for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budlong-Sylvester, K.W.; Pilat, Joseph F.; Stanbro, W.D.

    2001-01-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured State-wide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  20. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  1. Integrating Safeguards into the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, T.G.

    2002-01-01

    In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation entered into an agreement which stipulates each country will irreversibly transform 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium into material which could not be used for weapon purposes. Supporting the Department of Energy's (DOE) program to dispose of excess nuclear materials, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) is being designed and constructed to disassemble the weapon ''pits'' and convert the nuclear material to an oxide form for fabrication into reactor fuel at the separate Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. The PDCF design incorporates automation to the maximum extent possible to facilitate material safeguards, reduce worker dose, and improve processing efficiency. This includes provisions for automated guided vehicle movements for shipping containers, material transport via automated conveyor between processes, remote process control monitoring, and automated Nondestructive Assay product systems

  2. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  3. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  4. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  5. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  6. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  7. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  8. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  9. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  10. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neufing, C.; Tschritter, C.; Meylemans, P.; Vandaele, R.; Heppleston, M.; Chare, P.; Kloeckner, W.

    2001-01-01

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

  11. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  12. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  13. Safeguards and security issues at the MRS facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McGuinn, E.; Birch, M.; Jones, J.; Floyd, W.

    1993-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high level radioactive waste in a way that ensures the protection of the public from any unacceptable radiological risks and the maintenance of the national security. To achieve these objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved security program at its facilities including the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility. This program will safeguard nuclear information and provide not only for the physical protection of facilities but also for the nuclear material being handled and stored. Several key regulatory issues were identified during the development of the safeguards and security (S ampersand S) program for the MRS. These issues relate to developing a realistic definition of the security threat at the MRS and establishing a single set of regulatory requirements. Resolution of these issues is important to implement a realistic S ampersand S program who scope is commensurate with the potential risk at the MRS and complies with all appropriate regulatory requirements. OCRWM is working toward a timely resolution of these issues and on the formulation of an S ampersand S program for implementation at the MRS. As an initial step, DOE has proposed an S ampersand S strategy for the MRS based on a set of assumed resolutions to the key regulatory issues. With this approach, the facility designers will be able to evaluate possible S ampersand S concepts for integration into the MRS early in the design process

  14. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  15. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  16. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  17. Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

    2011-01-01

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

  18. Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, N.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

  19. Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

  20. Mass media differences in ''nuclear news'' reporting: implications for public opinions and acceptable safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, A.; Williams, J.

    1975-01-01

    The technical and political issues of diversion safeguards are at best confusing to the general public, who derive most of their information about nuclear science from the mass media. This investigation compared ''nuclear news'' of all kinds in three national mass media for thirty-three months of 1972-1974 to examine the quantity and quality of atom-related news they provide. Findings from The New York Times, U. S. News and World Report, and the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news indicate grounds for low public familiarity with essential concepts of safeguards, and consequently, for consumer value conflicts and weak popular supports for safeguards-related policy

  1. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  2. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  3. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  4. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  5. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

    2015-01-01

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  6. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

    2012-06-15

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  7. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, Renaud; )

    2012-01-01

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  8. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  9. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  10. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  11. Some basic concepts of fast breeder reactor safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tkharev, E.; Walford, F.J.

    1987-04-01

    The range of discussion topics of this report is restricted to a few key areas of safeguards importance at Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) only. The differences between thermal and fast reactors that may have safeguards significance in the case of FBRs are listed. The FBR principles of design are mentioned. The relevant safeguards objectives and criteria are given. The fundamental issues for safeguarding FBR are treated. An outline safeguards approach is presented. Model inspection activities are mentioned. 4 figs

  12. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, James W.

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  13. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  14. Development of Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, S.; El-Jaby, A.; Doucet, F.; Bouchard, P.; Sabsabi, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the IAEA Task A1855, the Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) undertook the development of laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) technologies for safeguards applications. Collaboration between the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), the National Research Council Canada, and the IAEA has demonstrated that the LIBS technique combined with chemometrics can determine the origins of yellowcake, identify maraging steels, aluminium alloys, and magnesium alloys, among other materials involved in the nuclear industry; and determine heavy water content as well as the isotope ratios of other actinides. As part of the task, the CSSP has developed a portable LIBS system to enable inspectors to characterize specific nuclear and non-nuclear material during complementary access and inspections. This device was recently tested by the IAEA in both Vienna and Siebersdorf for various metals and uranium bearing materials. The laser source proved to be stable and the chemometrics software was able to identify various materials. The device is ready for further in-depth testing. The chemometrics algorithm that has been developed for LIBS can also be adapted to nuclear forensics for the querying database. Multi-stage pattern recognition algorithms can reliably identify unknown materials among database populations (e.g., identify origins of yellowcake). Further work in this field is being undertaken as part of the CNSC's National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) development activities for the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP). The paper will provide an overview of the LIBS techniques being developed for safeguards and forensic applications, and of progress in integrating all components into a compact unit. (author)

  15. Educating the next generation of nuclear safeguards and security experts at TAMU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charlton, William S.; Boyle, David; Chirayath, Sunil; Ford, David G.; Gariazzo, Claudio A.; Marianno, Craig; Ragusa, Kelley; Solodov, Alexander

    2011-01-01

    The Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) has established a Nuclear Nonproliferation specialization for the Master of Science degree within the Nuclear Engineering Department at Texas A and M University (TAMU). Since 2004, twenty-eight students have received MS degrees in this area and over 200 (technical and policy) students have taken classes offered by NSSPI at TAMU. The model for educating safeguards and security experts is being changed at TAMU. Beyond conventional classroom lectures, NSSPI has developed alternative educational models based on practical experience, asynchronous learning portals, and virtual courses in both nuclear safeguards and nuclear security. Due to the experimental and practical past experiences of NSSPI staff and faculty, a heavy hands-on component has been implemented for TAMU nuclear engineering graduate students: hands-on education at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, visiting nuclear installations in other countries to discuss applied safeguards, and summer internships at several national laboratories. In an effort to disseminate basic nuclear education for professionals and students around the globe, NSSPI has developed a publically-available online resource that offers self-paced, independent course modules in basic safeguards and security education: the Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal. Another venture utilized by NSSPI is using a virtual TAMU campus to hold classes for students at a distance. NSSPI is building upon a successful academic program by embracing new educational means. This paper describes the current efforts NSSPI and TAMU have undertaken in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security human resource capacity domestically and internationally and the lessons learned from these efforts. (author)

  16. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

  17. 235U Holdup Measurement Program in support of facility shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomason, R.S.; Griffin, J.C.; Lien, O.G.; McElroy, R.D.

    1991-01-01

    In 1989, the Department of Energy directed shutdown of an enriched uranium processing facility at Savannah River Site. As part of the shutdown requirements, deinventory and cleanout of process equipment and nondestructive measurement of the remaining 235 U holdup were required. The holdup measurements had safeguards, accountability, and nuclear criticality safety significance; therefore, a technically defensible and well-documented holdup measurement program was needed. Appropriate standards were fabricated, measurement techniques were selected, and an aggressive schedule was followed. Early in the program, offsite experts reviewed the measurement program, and their recommendations were adopted. Contact and far-field methods were used for most measurements, but some process equipment required special attention. All holdup measurements were documented, and each report was subjected to internal peer review. Some measured values were checked against values obtained by other methods; agreement was generally good

  18. Material presented to advisory committee on reactor safeguards, subcommittee on extreme external phenomena, January 29-30, 1981, Los Angeles, California. Seismic safety margins research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Chuang, T.Y.; Cummings, G.E.; Dong, R.G.; Johnson, J.J.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-01-01

    The January 29-30, 1981, meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Subcommittee on Extreme External Phenomena, mark the close of Phase I efforts on the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). Presentations at the meeting focused on results produced. These included computer codes, response computations, failure and release probabilities, data bases, and fragilities and parameter characteristics

  19. Pipe support program at Pickering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sahazizian, L.A.; Jazic, Z.

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes the pipe support program at Pickering. The program addresses the highest priority in operating nuclear generating stations, safety. We present the need: safety, the process: managed and strategic, and the result: assurance of critical piping integrity. In the past, surveillance programs periodically inspected some systems, equipment, and individual components. This comprehensive program is based on a managed process that assesses risk to identify critical piping systems and supports and to develop a strategy for surveillance and maintenance. The strategy addresses all critical piping supports. Successful implementation of the program has provided assurance of critical piping and support integrity and has contributed to decreasing probability of pipe failure, reducing risk to worker and public safety, improving configuration management, and reducing probability of production losses. (author)

  20. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-01-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards