Prioritizing and scheduling Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant safeguards upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Edmunds, T.; Saleh, R.; Zevanove, S.

1992-02-01

As part of the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP), facilities are required to develop a Resource Plan (RP). The Resource Plan provides documentation and justification for the facility's planned upgrades, including the schedule, priority, and cost estimates for the safeguards and security upgrades. Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) management has identified and obtained funding approval for a number of safeguards and security upgrades, including line-item construction projects. These upgrade projects were selected to address a variety of concerns identified in the PORTS vulnerability assessments and other reviews performed in support of the SSSP process. However, budgeting and scheduling constraints do not make it possible to simultaneously begin implementation of all of the upgrade projects. A formal methodology and analysis are needed to explicitly address the trade-offs between competing safeguards objectives, and to prioritize and schedule the upgrade projects to ensure that the maximum benefit can be realized in the shortest possible time frame. The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology developed to support these upgrade project scheduling decisions. The report also presents the results obtained from applying the methodology to a set of the upgrade projects selected by PORTS S ampersand S management. Data for the analysis are based on discussions with personnel familiar with the PORTS safeguards and security needs, the requirements for implementing these upgrades, and upgrade funding limitations. The analysis results presented here assume continued highly enriched uranium (HEU) operations at PORTS. However, the methodology developed is readily adaptable for the evaluation of other operational scenarios and other resource allocation issues relevant to PORTS

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Danker, W.J.; Floyd, W.

1993-01-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

The Canadian Safeguards Support Program - A future outlook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keeffe, R.; Truong, Q.S. Bob

2001-01-01

Full text: The Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) is one of the first safeguards support programs with an overall objective to assist the IAEA by providing technical assistance and other resources and by developing equipment to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards. This paper provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the CSSP, from the beginning when the program was under joint management between the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian crown corporation, until recent years when the AECB became responsible for all projects and financial management. Recently, new legislation came into force and the AECB became the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). However, the mandate and management of the CSSP under the CNSC remain fundamentally unchanged. Major CSSP activities are devoted to the following areas: (a) Human resource assistance through the provision of cost-free experts (CFEs) to the IAEA; (b) Training of IAEA inspectors and facility operators, development of training resources and integrated approaches for training; (c) System studies, e.g. the development of integrated safeguards approach for CANDU reactors, geological repository, and physical model; (d) Equipment development, e.g. the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor, Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device, seals, remote monitoring, encryption and authentication; (e) Information technology which includes satellite imagery, Geographical Information System (GIS), and position tracking of spent fuel containers. The CSSP has continued to evolve during the past 25 years. Although formerly larger the CSSP budget has settled to a stable level of just slightly above (Canadian) $2M. Leveraging of the CSSP budget through collaborations with several Member State Support Programs and Canadian government departments has provided mutual benefits for all parties involved and useful results that have been put into practical use by the IAEA. (author)

Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

1985-01-01

The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carrillo-de-Fischer, J.; Martinez, J. D.; Konecni, S.

2015-01-01

Knowledge management is the discipline of enabling individuals and teams to collectively and systematically create, share and apply knowledge. The most important assets in the IAEA Department of Safeguards are people and their knowledge. The focus of the Department’s knowledge management activities are to create an environment within which people share, learn and work together. The efforts to manage the knowledge of an individual leaving the Department have been focused on helping the supervisor of the departing staff member to identify what critical knowledge needs to be retained, and how to retain that knowledge. The Safeguards Knowledge Management team developed a person-centred approach. This approach involves interviews with the staff member, co-workers and/or customers to identify the critical knowledge to be transferred. Although time consuming, this method has been found to be effective in capturing the needed knowledge. This approach has four steps: – Identify the critical knowledge to be retained; – Select the knowledge transfer methods; – Apply the knowledge transfer methods; and – Assess and refine the transfer process. The paper will describe the person-centred approach and lessons learned from implementing this programme in the Department over several years. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Future issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

1991-01-01

The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

Strengthening Performance Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Villiers, V. Z. de

2015-01-01

This paper will describe an initiative to develop a management support tool to improve performance management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The envisaged mechanism should enable the Department to (a) plan, assess and report on the achievement of its objectives and (b) to improve its performance on a continuous basis. The performance management tool should be aligned with related processes in the Department and the IAEA as a whole such as strategic planning, programming and budget, the result-based management approach and various reporting mechanisms. It should be integrated with existing and planned information and other management systems. The initially, departmental working group that was established for this initiative focussed on two aspects: confirmation of the overall and specific objectives to be achieved by the Department of Safeguards, and compiling an inventory of indicators of activities, outputs and outcomes that were being used in the Department. This exercise confirmed that alignment and prioritization of activities relating to assessment of, and reporting on, performance could be improved. A value creation map was subsequently developed to assist in focussing the performance management tool to identified needs of stakeholders. Other activities of the working group included the determination of the desired characteristics of a hierarchy of performance indicators to be used to drive desired behaviour across organizational levels. Complexities to be handled included the following: · reflecting the appropriate component of the results chain (such as activities, outputs, outcomes and impact); · maintaining the linkages between objectives and performance indicators across organizational levels; · developing a balanced set of performance indicators (e.g. reflecting in-field and Headquarters activities, incorporating all main components of Departmental processes and balanced scorecard perspectives, measurable vs qualitative indicators); and �

Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

resources: Developing safeguards professionals, maintaining expertise and managing knowledge; Optimizing technical support to the IAEA; Safeguards programme priorities and activities

Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konecni, S.; McCullough, R.

2015-01-01

Knowledge management is the discipline of enabling individuals and teams to collectively and systematically create, share and apply knowledge. The most important assets in the IAEA Department of Safeguards are people and their knowledge. The focus of the Department is to create an environment within which people share, learn and work together. The efforts to manage the knowledge leaving the Department have been focused on helping the supervisor of the departing staff member to identify what critical knowledge needs to be retained, and how to retain that knowledge. The Safeguards Knowledge Management team developed a person-centred approach. This approach involves interviews with the staff member, co-workers and/or customers to identify the critical knowledge to be transferred. Although time consuming we have found that this method is most effective to capture the needed knowledge. This approach has four steps: · Identify the critical knowledge to be retained; · Select the knowledge transfer methods; · Apply the knowledge transfer methods; and · Assess and refine the transfer process. The paper will describe the person-centred approach and lessons learned from implementing this programme in the Department over several years. (author)

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

1977-09-01

A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

Safeguards on nuclear waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crawford, D.W.

1995-01-01

Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Bowersox, D.F.

1977-09-01

The conceptual design of a materials management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility is developed and evaluated. Dynamic material balances are drawn from information provided by nondestructive-analysis techniques, process-control instrumentation, and conventional chemical analyses augmented by process-monitoring devices. Powerful statistical methods, cast in the framework of decision analysis and applied to unit-process accounting areas, ensure adequate spatial and temporal quantification of possible diversion with minimal process disruption. Modeling and simulation techniques assist in evaluating the sensitivity of the system to various diversion schemes and in comparing safeguards strategies. Features that would improve the safeguardability of the conversion process are discussed

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-01-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1983-01-01

The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-07-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

Training to raise staff awareness about safeguarding children.

Science.gov (United States)

Fleming, Jane

2015-04-01

To improve outcomes for children and young people health organisations are required to train all staff in children's safeguarding. This creates difficulties for large complex organisations where most staff provide services to the adult population. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust is a large acute and community trust that had difficulties in engaging staff in children's safeguarding training. Compliance rates for clinical staff who were trained in children's safeguarding were low and needed to be addressed. This article sets out why safeguarding training is important for all staff and how the trust achieved staff engagement and improved compliance rates. To evaluate, maintain and develop safeguarding knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour further resources are planned to allow access to learning resources in a variety of formats.

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

Structure of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1978-06-01

An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

Licensee safeguards contingency plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

DASAO: software tool for the management of safeguards, waste and decommissioning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noynaert, Luc; Verwaest, Isi; Libon, Henri; Cuchet, Jean-Marie

2013-01-01

Decommissioning of nuclear facilities is a complex process involving operations such as detailed surveys, decontamination and dismantling of equipment's, demolition of buildings and management of resulting waste and nuclear materials if any. This process takes place in a well-developed legal framework and is controlled and followed-up by stakeholders like the Safety Authority, the Radwaste management Agency and the Safeguards Organism. In the framework of its nuclear waste and decommissioning program and more specifically the decommissioning of the BR3 reactor, SCK-CEN has developed different software tools to secure the waste and material traceability, to support the sound management of the decommissioning project and to facilitate the control and the follow-up by the stakeholders. In the case of Belgium, it concerns the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, the National Agency for radioactive waste management and fissile material and EURATOM and IAEA. In 2005, Belgonucleaire decided to shutdown her Dessel MOX fuel fabrication plant and the production stopped in 2006. According to the final decommissioning plan ('PDF') approved by NIRAS, the decommissioning works should start in 2008 at the earliest. In 2006, the management of Belgonucleaire identified the need for an integrated database and decided to entrust SCK-CEN with its development, because SCK-CEN relies on previous experience in comparable applications namely already approved by authorities such as NIRAS, FANC and EURATOM. The main objectives of this integrated software tool are: - simplified and updated safeguards; - waste and material traceability; - computerized documentation; - support to project management; - periodic and final reporting to waste and safety authorities. The software called DASAO (Database for Safeguards, Waste and Decommissioning) was successfully commissioned in 2008 and extensively used from 2009 to the satisfaction of Belgonucleaire and the stakeholders. SCK-CEN is

IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

2007-01-01

The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

2011-12-01

In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Security Management and Safeguards Office

Science.gov (United States)

Bewley, Nathaniel M.

2004-01-01

The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

2010-07-01

It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

1989-04-01

Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

2010-01-01

Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

1991-01-01

Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

2006-01-01

The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions

Guarantying and testing the nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Turcu, Ilie

2002-01-01

Apparently, the nuclear power will ensure an important share of the world energy demand at least for the next decades because there is no viable alternative in the fan of energy sources neither one complying with the environment preservation requirements. The nuclear energy future depends not only on technical and economical aspects but also on preventing any danger of nuclear safeguards nature. The main international legal instrument which provides concrete commitments for nations in this field is the Nuclear Safeguard Convention. It provides guarantees and testings of the nuclear safeguards over the entire service life of the nuclear power plants. In the two general conferences (of 1999 and 2002) the status and measures adopted in the field of nuclear safeguards by the states adhering to the convention were discussed and reviewed, as well as the issues of financial resources, licensing and the adequate measures in emergency cases. The nuclear safeguards is a major issue among the criteria of integration in UE. Essential for maintaining and endorsing the provisions of nuclear safeguards in Romania are specific research and development activities aiming at integrating the equipment and structures, solving the operation problems of nuclear facilities, studying the behavior of installations in transient regimes, investigating the reliability and probabilistic assessing of nuclear safeguards, examining the phenomenology and simulating severe accidents or human factor behavior. Of major importance appears to be the international cooperation aiming that a permanent exchange of information and experience, dissemination of the best results, solutions and practices. The paper presents the status and trends at the world level, as well as in Romania, underlining the main issues of the strategy in this field and stressing the financial and human resources implied the implementing the nuclear safeguards provisions

Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

2011-09-01

During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

Key Management Strategies for Safeguards Authentication and Encryption

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coram, M.; Hymel, R.; McDaniel, M.; Brotz, J.

2015-01-01

Management of cryptographic keys for the authentication and encryption of safeguards data can be the critical weak link in the practical implementation of information security. Within the safeguards community, there is the need to validate that data has not been modified at any point since generation and that it was generated by the monitoring node and not an imposter. In addition, there is the need for that data to be transmitted securely between the monitoring node and the monitoring party such that it cannot be intercepted and read while in transit. Encryption and digital signatures support the required confidentiality and authenticity but challenges exist in managing the cryptographic keys they require. Technologies developed at Sandia National Laboratories have evolved in their use of an associated key management strategy. The first generation system utilized a shared secret key for digital signatures. While fast and efficient, it required that a list of keys be maintained and protected. If control of the key was lost, fraudulent data could be made to look authentic. The second generation changed to support public key / private key cryptography. The key pair is generated by the system, the public key shared, and the private key held internally. This approach eliminated the need to maintain the list of keys. It also allows the public key to be provided to anyone needing to authenticate the data without allowing them to spoof data. A third generation system, currently under development, improves upon the public key / private key approach to address a potential man-in-the-middle attack related to the sharing of the public key. In a planned fourth generation system, secure key exchange protocols will distribute session keys for encryption, eliminating another fixed set of keys utilized by the technology and allowing for periodic renegotiation of keys for enhanced security. (author)

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

1979-02-01

This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process

FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

2008-10-17

Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Programs Summary Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Anzelon, G.; Essner, J.; Dougan, A.; Doyle, J.; Boyer, B.; Hypes, P.; Sokova, E.; Wehling, F.

2008-01-01

Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A and M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

2010-01-01

The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.; Bennett, C.A.

1975-01-01

A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

1987-01-01

The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-07-01

What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stanchi, L.

1991-01-01

The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

2013-01-01

In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, H.A.

1982-03-01

A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, W.C.

1995-01-01

The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

Enrichment plant management and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hurt, N.H.

1978-01-01

The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, P.

1999-01-01

For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keen, L.J.

2007-01-01

L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

University of Texas Safeguards by Design Problem Statement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ruggiero, Christy E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2018-01-22

This document describes the problem statement that students at the University of Texas will use for their senior level capstone design class. The purpose of this project is to introduce students to Safeguards by Design concepts as part of their capstone design course at the culmination of their degree program. This work is supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory with FY17 and FY18 programmatic funding from the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (INS), Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Resource Development Program, Safeguards by Design Project.

Safeguards Knowledge Management & Retention at U.S. National Laboratories.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haddal, Risa [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Jones, Rebecca [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Bersell, Bridget [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Frazar, Sarah [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Burbank, Roberta [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Stevens, Rebecca [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Cain, Ron [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Morell, Sean [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2017-09-01

In 2017, four U.S. National Laboratories collaborated on behalf of DOE/NNSA to explore the safeguards knowledge retention problem, identify possible approaches, and develop a strategy to address it. The one-year effort consisted of four primary tasks. First, the project sought to identify critical safeguards information at risk of loss. Second, a survey and workshop were conducted to assess nine U.S. National Laboratories' efforts to determine current safeguards knowledge retention practices and challenges, and identify best practices. Third, specific tools were developed to identify and predict critical safeguards knowledge gaps and how best to recruit in order to fill those gaps. Finally, based on findings from the first three tasks and research on other organizational approaches to address similar issues, a strategy was developed on potential knowledge retention methods, customized HR policies, and best practices that could be implemented across the National Laboratory Complex.

Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

2010-01-01

The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

Technology development for safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

2005-04-01

The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

IAEA symposium on international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

2011-01-01

Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

Accountability and Transparency: Essential Underpinnings of Quality Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Everton, C.; Floyd, R.

2015-01-01

The fundamental purpose of IAEA safeguards is to maintain confidence in the international community of the compliance of States with their respective non-proliferation commitments. The safeguards system for ensuring this compliance produces the most important output, the IAEA's compliance findings. Confidence in the findings of any compliance verification system requires some basic elements such as independence, accountability, transparency, and quality management systems. Quality management systems are an internal set of documents and procedures that, while clearly important, need to incorporate an external communication component in order to engender confidence as to how compliance is being managed and ensured. This paper will explore the importance of these fundamentals to confidence in IAEA safeguards compliance conclusions, with a focus on the external communication elements of accountability and transparency. Accountability and transparency will be considered with different communication channels through which safeguards implementation matters are explained and reported and at different levels, facility, State, regional, and the IAEA. This will include communications by: the IAEA and State authorities to the general public; State authorities to peers in other national safeguards authorities (regional and beyond); and, the IAEA and State authorities to the international community as represented through the Board of Governors and General Conference. Examples will be presented of good practices in these areas to encourage greater accountability and transparency in the work of safeguards. (author)

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1988-01-01

In recent years considerable attention has been given to upgrading security education programs at facilities across the country. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), a Laboratory-wide Safeguard Awareness Training Program has been established in order to raise the cognizance of the entire staff with regard to safeguards issues and concerns. This aggressive safeguards program involves a strong interface of physical security measure and material control and accountability systems. Within PNL, four distinct audiences were defined and a needs assessment analysis performed for each to determine specific training requirements. The target audiences identified were: material balance area (MBA) custodians, managers of material balance areas, material handlers, and new employees. Five safeguards training courses were created to meet the needs of those audiences. This paper discusses the development of the Safeguards Awareness Program at PNL and its benefits to the Laboratory

Quality management at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory of IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aigner, H.; Doherty, P.; Donohue, D.; Kuno, Y.

2001-01-01

Full text: In the year 2000, SAL'S quality management system was certified for conforming with the requirements of the international standard ISO-9002: 1994. The certification incurred considerable efforts, both in manpower and capital investments. The expected benefits of a formal quality management system do not directly target the correctness and reliability of analytical results. SAL believes that it was already performing well in this respect, even before re-shaping its quality system according to the reference model. Systematic QA and QC procedures have been applied since the begin of SAL'S operations in the mid-70's. The management framework specified in ISO-9002: 1994 complements these technical measures. Besides its value of being internationally recognised and thus enhancing perhaps the credibility in the quality of SAL'S services, the quality management system in this form provides additional advantages for the customer of the services of SAL, i.e. the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA, but also for the control and management of SAL'S internal 'business' processes. The paper discusses if these expected additional benefits are indeed obtained and whether or not their value is in balance with operational and initial investment costs. (author)

International safeguards data management system. System description: Version 1.1.; Release PLI 82

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, T.; Casilli, T.; Costantini, L.; Dondi, M.G.; Franklin, M.

1982-01-01

This document describes a nuclear material accountancy system which has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. Throughout the report, the data base system is referred to as ''ISADAM'', i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System. The system provides tools for a safeguards authority to decide whether an operators MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can be accounted for as an accumulation of operator measurement errors. The principle objective of the applications programs described here is to provide a variance analysis of MUF in which the variance of MUF is computed as a function of the accounting declarations and the error characteristics of the operator measurement system. A overview of ISADAM is presented; then, a detailed description of the processing applied by the system is given. A description of the parameter information required by the four autonomous programs ISADAM is presented. In developing ISADAM, one of the prime factors taken into consideration was the ease with which it could be used

Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-07-01

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

2010-01-01

Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

Preliminary concepts: materials management in an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ostenak, C.A.; Whitty, W.J.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-11-01

Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste

Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

2008-01-01

The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leffer, T.N.

2013-01-01

The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

[Management of human resources, materials, and organization processes in radioprotection].

Science.gov (United States)

Coppola, V

1999-06-01

The radiologist must learn to face daily management responsibilities and therefore he/she needs the relevant knowledge. Aside from the mechanisms of management accounting, which differ only slightly from similar analysis methods used in other centers, the managing radiologist (the person in charge) is directly responsible for planning, organizing, coordinating and controlling radiation protection, a major discipline characterizing diagnostic imaging. We will provide some practical management hints, keeping in mind that radiation protection must not be considered a simple (or annoying) technical task, but rather an extraordinary positive element for the radiologist's cultural differentiation and professional identity. The managing radiologist can use the theory and practice of management techniques successfully applied in business, customizing them to the ethics and economics of health care. Meeting the users' needs must obviously prevail on balancing the budget from both a logical and an accounting viewpoints, since non-profit organizations are involved. In radiological practice, distinguishing the management of human from structural resources (direct funding is not presently available) permits to use internal benchmarking for the former and controlled acquisition and planned replacement of technologies in the latter, obviously after evaluation of specific indicators and according to the relevant laws and technical guidelines. Managing human resources means safeguarding the patient, the operator and the population, which can be achieved or improved using benchmarking in a diagnostic imaging department. The references for best practice will be set per tabulas based on the relevant laws and (inter)national guidelines. The physical-technical and bureaucratic-administrative factors involved will be considered as process indices to evaluate the gap from normal standards. Among the different elements involved in managing structural resources, the appropriate acquisition

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

substantially large. Change in social, economic, environmental and other scenarios might demand recovery of nuclear and other material from the repository sometime in the future. To this end, the Department of Safeguards has developed a policy paper to guide the planner, designer and operator to incorporate safeguards related features, as appropriate. In parallel, a programme for the Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was launched to foster technological advancement. The mission of SAGOR has been to ensure that the safeguards systems developed for the final disposal of spent fuel effectively meet the objectives of IAEA safeguards, optimise IAEA resources, and make best use of existing technologies while still meeting the requirements for safety and environmental protection. (author)

Where are we now? The strengthened safeguards system: Origins, aims, features, issues and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schriefer, D.

1998-01-01

The present status of the strengthened safeguards system includes the origins, aims, features, issues and future prospects. The areas of emphasis concerning the strengthened safeguards system are: access to information (environmental sampling and improved information analysis), access to sites, rational use of resources (cost analysis of present safeguards, increased cooperation with state systems, cost savings in traditional safeguards activities)

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

1999-01-01

A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

The UK safeguards R and D support program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

1991-01-01

The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leffer, Teri N.

2014-01-01

The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

Nuclear safeguards surveys as performed by the Albuquerque operations office

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jewell, D.

1987-01-01

The nuclear safeguards survey program as administered by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is comprehensive in scope and evaluates the facility's safeguards program for an entire appraisal period. The survey program focuses on both the integrated and graded safeguards concepts and includes both compliance and performance evaluations. The program utilizes independent measurement support to verify facility inventory values and measurement system capabilities. The AL survey program is oriented towards facility development and management as opposed to development and management by numerous detailed departmental directives

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-03-01

Canada has established a safeguards research and development program whose purpose is to supplement the resources of the IAEA. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to reactors of Canadian design. This document sets forth those tasks that make up the program

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

SNAP/SOS: a package for simulating and analyzing safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Polito, J.; Sabuda, J.

1983-01-01

The effective analysis of safeguards systems at nuclear facilities requires significant effort. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) and the SNAP Operating System (SOS) reduce that effort to a manageable level. SNAP provides a detailed analysis of site safeguards for tactical evaluation. SOS helps the analyst organize and manage the SNAP effort effectively. SOS provides a database for model storage, automatic model generation, and computer graphics. The SOS/SNAP combination is a working example of a simulation system including executive-level control, database system, and facilities for model creation, editing, and output analysis

30 CFR 77.203 - Use of material or equipment overhead; safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

...; safeguards. 77.203 Section 77.203 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS, SURFACE COAL MINES AND SURFACE WORK AREAS...; safeguards. Where overhead repairs are being made at surface installations and equipment or material is taken...

International safeguards for spent fuel storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

1981-08-01

This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stanbro, W. D.

1990-01-01

The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

Resource management: Hotel Zira human resource management department analysis

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Petrović Jelena

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The world is changing at a fast pace in a number of different areas, economically, politically technologically and socially. All these facts have strong impact on how managers organize their work. Traditionally they focus on delivering efficiency through large bureaucracies which are hierarchical in nature, very much around process and stability. What this mitigates against perhaps it is innovation and flexibility. A demand is no longer predictable and service has to be equally flexible for demand that exists nowadays. The emergence of post bureaucratic organizations is about being leaner, flatter and being much more network-based. Within that network employees are being empowered to take responsibility for producing innovations themselves. In order to speed up the process it is critical to systematize the process of managing people in the back office. Human Resource Management strategies are being transformed by internal social networks and social human resource technologies to better collaborative, transition into social enterprises, and change the positioning of human resource departments from back office to front office activities. All of these subjects are applied and the case study of hotel Zira human resource department is explained and showed in detail with the specific questionnaire. One of the main challenges that human resource management is also facing is the talent management and the number one responsibility of leadership is how to manage talent, how to attract it, utilize and eventually retain it.

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

1977-02-01

A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

1977-02-01

A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.

Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1999-01-01

receives the necessary resources, the IAEA should have no major problem in applying effective safeguards to the nuclear plants that are decommissioned or are kept in production under an NDT regime. Similarly if adequate resources are made available to it, the IAEA should not encounter any major or novel problems in verifying that stocks of formerly military fissile material remain permanently outside military use

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

1975-06-01

There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information

42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

2001-01-01

For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, Pierre

2001-01-01

the tasks of implementing traditional safeguards. New tasks are appearing; a significant recent example is the consequence, for the Department's Security of Material Programme, of the September terrorist attacks in the United States. The gap between what is required and the available resources cannot continue to increase indefinitely. (author)

ESARDA approach to facility oriented safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, R.

1979-01-01

The paper outlines the brief history of a Working Group composed of nuclear fuel plant operators, safeguards research workers and safeguards inspectors who are examining facility orientated problems of nuclear materials control and verification activities. The working program is reviewed together with some examples of various problems and the way the group is collaborating to develop solutions by pooling resources and effort. Work in European low enriched uranium fabrication plants from UF 6 to finished fuel is discussed in connection with mesurement practices, real time accounting, error propagation and analysis, verification and surveillance

Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

1982-06-01

The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

Exercising Synergy of Safeguards Safety and Security at Facility Level of the GA Siwabessy Multi-Purpose Reactor, Indonesia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Susilowati, E.

2015-01-01

Safeguards, safety and security (3Ss) constitute as essential elements for successful development of nuclear technology in the life time of nuclear installation. All 3Ss need to be coordinated due workers, the public and the environment require protection from plant malfunction, human error, malicious acts and proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Then the importance of the 3Ss was deemed valuable, particularly to a country having willingness to expand to nuclear power reactor such as Indonesia that in the near future plans to build small experimental power reactor. This paper is aimed to discuss synergy among safeguards, safety and security which will have opportunity been exercising at the GA Siwabessy Reactor (RSG-GAS), Indonesia. Synergy among safeguards, safety and security offers much opportunity for cost savings and enhance efficiency. Discussion is carried out by first investigating common values and conflicts exist among 3S. Up to now each of them was accomplished separately by different division and using different equipment due lack of coordination among them. The objective of this exercise is to develop more efficient and effective 3Ss infrastructures and also to support skill and knowledge of human resources. Benefitting from synergy between safeguards and security such as management of nuclear material and non proliferation; safeguards and safety such as management of nuclear material and waste management; safety and security such as prevent radiological release and also tension among them if any are discussed. It is expected that outcome of this exercise will able to develop a role model of infrastructures to the up-coming small experimental power reactor in Indonesia. (author)

Safeguards surveillance equipment and data sharing between IAEA and a member state

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Seung Sik

1999-01-01

Efficiency and reliability are two prongs of implementation of safeguards policy. Unattended surveillance is getting wide acceptance through its field trials and technical advances. In achieving goal of safeguards, new safeguards system should provide less intrusiveness than conventional inspection. Unattended surveillance data share will be a major issue among some countries that have own national inspection scheme in place in parallel with international safeguards to check the resources consuming incurred by the repeated installations. Nonetheless, the issue has not been focussed yet among the States concerned, especially for the country like Korea with national inspection in operation. For balanced development in safeguards regime between IAEA and Korea, sharing of unattended surveillance data with SSAC needs to be worked out in conjunction with the joint use of safeguards instruments that is in the process

Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

2016-02-01

A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

Synergy between Security and Safeguards in Uranium Concentrate Export Control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Soumana, T.

2010-01-01

This paper is a proposal to the government of Niger and all national institutions involved in the ISSAS and INSSERV Missions held in Niger to optimally coordinate they activities in nuclear field. It is essential to notice that Niger has significant nuclear activities, mainly in uranium prospecting, mining, milling, and export. In Niger, there are also many radioactive sources in non nuclear use. The safeguards agreement of Niger, infcirc/664, is in force since 16 February 2005 and its relating additional protocol since 2 May 2007. For the safeguards implementation in Niger, Government has requested to the IAEA an ISSAS Mission which was completed in February 2008. A main recommendation of this mission is to consider an overall plan for security measures and in this regards, an INSSERV Mission was completed in December 2008. Nuclear safeguards conclusions focus on correctness and completeness of declarations provided by operators. Nuclear security activities (prevention, detection and response) are useful contributions to confirm safeguards conclusions specially, a good detection strategy at national level can help to confirm the absence of undeclared activities in a country like Niger. Many governmental institutions are involved in nuclear activities and there are lacks of communication between them. Creating a synergy between safeguards and security can federate the mechanisms of control at national level and have impact in many aspects specially in (i) awareness of decision makers (ii) optimal use of the equipments (iii) organizing training activities and human resource management and (iv) designing national strategic plans. The institution which hosted the two IAEA consultative missions (Directorate of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Techniques-DUPTN for the ISSAS Mission and Civil Defence for INSSERV Mission) in consultation with other national institutions had to create a framework for this synergy. This framework must be submitted to the IAEA for observation and

Application of safeguards procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

technical limitations. Upon completion each analysis is formalized in a Safeguards Implementation Practice (SIP) which becomes both an official guide and instruction to the field inspector for his day to day work. Subsequent to the inspections, a formal report is prepared for each facility that has been visited. The report describes the work which was carried out and, most importantly, the technical conclusions which can be drawn are stated. The conclusions are reviewed at successively higher management levels. Starting in 1977, the conclusions of the reports are summarized and presented to the Board of Governors as a 'Special Safeguards Implementation Report'. To help in formulating the criteria for evaluating the reports, the IAEA Secretariat has been given the help of external consultants known colloquially as 'SAGSI', more formally as the 'Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation'. (author)

Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

1985-01-01

The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is a computerized on-line accountability system for the safeguards accountability control of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant. SAN is a dedicated accountability system utilizing source documents filled out on the shop floor as its base. The system incorporates double entry accounting and is developed around the Material Balance Area (MBA) concept. MBA custodians enter transaction information from source documents prepared by personnel in the process areas directly into the SAN system. This provides a somewhat near-real time perpetual inventory system which has limited interaction with MBA custodians. MBA custodians are permitted to inquire into the system and status items on inventory. They are also responsible for the accuracy of the accountability information used as input to the system for their MBA. Monthly audits by the Nuclear Materials Control group assure the timeliness and accuracy of SAN accountability information

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gilligan, Kimberly [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2014-01-01

In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

Technical bases for OCRWM's [Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management] policy decisions on international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprecher, W.M.

1989-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the technical factors that contributed to the formulation of the international safeguards policy enunciated in September 1988 by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), which is the federal organization responsible for the implementation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended

New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

Control and Management of Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) on Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Jae Hwan; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Beom

2009-01-01

Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) is defined as the nuclear material that is below the amount approved in atomic energy act. SQNM generally lists depleted uranium (DU) used as a catalyst or shielding material in exposure devices in industries. The SQNM users have a duty to report information on possessing and using SQNM regularly to the government. All nuclear materials must be included in IAEA reporting lists according to safeguards agreement and additional protocol regardless of amount. However, it is difficult to investigate the status of nuclear material possessed in industries because SQNM is excepted regulation item list in atomic energy act. Most SQNM user industries are small companies so they have some problems like the loss of nuclear material after bankruptcy. Even though the damage of radiation leakage is very low, loss or careless management of nuclear material causes confusion. Thus, developing a control and management system for SQNM is essential. This paper discusses the present condition and prospect of control and management SQNM in Korea

Resource conservation management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, W.

1999-01-01

Resource conservation management is a management program similar to financial management in that its success requires commitment by all levels of the organization to the process as well as an accounting procedure and auditing of critical components. Resource conservation management provides a framework for all elements of efficient building operations and maintenance. The savings connected with the program are principally connected with changes in the way buildings are operated and maintained. Given the reduction in rebates for the installation of energy-efficient equipment, this approach has considerable promise. This paper discusses the evolution of the resource conservation management service and the savings associated with a two-year pilot effort with seven school districts, as well as the critical components of a successful program

Information resource management concepts for records managers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seesing, P.R.

1992-10-01

Information Resource Management (ERM) is the label given to the various approaches used to foster greater accountability for the use of computing resources. It is a corporate philosophy that treats information as it would its other resources. There is a reorientation from simply expenditures to considering the value of the data stored on that hardware. Accountability for computing resources is expanding beyond just the data processing (DP) or management information systems (MIS) manager to include senior organization management and user management. Management`s goal for office automation is being refocused from saving money to improving productivity. A model developed by Richard Nolan (1982) illustrates the basic evolution of computer use in organizations. Computer Era: (1) Initiation (computer acquisition), (2) Contagion (intense system development), (3) Control (proliferation of management controls). Data Resource Era: (4) Integration (user service orientation), (5) Data Administration (corporate value of information), (6) Maturity (strategic approach to information technology). The first three stages mark the growth of traditional data processing and management information systems departments. The development of the IRM philosophy in an organization involves the restructuring of the DP organization and new management techniques. The three stages of the Data Resource Era represent the evolution of IRM. This paper examines each of them in greater detail.

Safeguards implementation at US facilities during 1986 and 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wredberg, L.

1987-01-01

Safeguards procedures were implemented at three nuclear facilities in the United States during 1986 and 1987, namely, the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina; the Salem No. 1 light water reactor (LWR) in New Jersey; and the Turkey Point No. 4 LWR in Florida. These three facilities have been under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since early 1986 in accordance with the voluntary offer agreement between the IAEA and the United States, which went into force in 1980. Because of limited manpower and budget resources allocated to safeguards in nuclear weapon states, only a limited number of facilities can be under IAEA safeguards inspections at a time. Facilities are, therefore, subject to inspection only during a 2-yr period in the case of the United States. After that period other facilities are selected for another 2-yr period from the list of facilities subject to safeguards under the agreement. The facilities have been selected so that they form a fuel cycle, i.e., the inspected reactors are fueled with fuel assemblies manufactured by the inspected fabrication plant. The IAEA applies full scope safeguards at the selected facilities based upon established implementation practice for the facility types

Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

1987-01-01

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2017-02-07

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Price, Mary Alice

2010-01-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC and A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC and A program. The MC and A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

Information resource management concepts for records managers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seesing, P.R.

1992-10-01

Information Resource Management (ERM) is the label given to the various approaches used to foster greater accountability for the use of computing resources. It is a corporate philosophy that treats information as it would its other resources. There is a reorientation from simply expenditures to considering the value of the data stored on that hardware. Accountability for computing resources is expanding beyond just the data processing (DP) or management information systems (MIS) manager to include senior organization management and user management. Management's goal for office automation is being refocused from saving money to improving productivity. A model developed by Richard Nolan (1982) illustrates the basic evolution of computer use in organizations. Computer Era: (1) Initiation (computer acquisition), (2) Contagion (intense system development), (3) Control (proliferation of management controls). Data Resource Era: (4) Integration (user service orientation), (5) Data Administration (corporate value of information), (6) Maturity (strategic approach to information technology). The first three stages mark the growth of traditional data processing and management information systems departments. The development of the IRM philosophy in an organization involves the restructuring of the DP organization and new management techniques. The three stages of the Data Resource Era represent the evolution of IRM. This paper examines each of them in greater detail.

Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

2001-01-01

Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Qun

2001-01-01

Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Safeguard management for operation security in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woo, Tae-Ho; Lee, Un-Chul

2011-01-01

Safeguard modeling is conducted for the successful operations in the nuclear power plants (NPPs). The characteristics of the secure operation in NPPs are investigated using the network effect method which is quantified by the Monte-Carlo algorithm. Fundamentally, it is impossible to predict the exact time of a terror incident. So, the random sampling for the event frequency is a reasonable method, including the characteristics of network effect method such as the zero-sum quantification. The performance of operation with safeguard is the major concern of this study. There are three kinds of considerations as the neutronics, thermo-hydraulics, and safeguard properties which are organized as an aspect of safeguard considerations. The result, therefore, can give the stability of the operations when the power is decided. The maximum value of secure operation is 12.0 in the third month and the minimum value is 1.0 in the 18th and 54th months, in a 10 years period. Thus, the stability of the secure power operation increases 12 times higher than the lowest value according to this study. This means that the secure operation is changeable in the designed NPPs and the dynamical situation of the secure operation can be shown to the operator.

Preliminary concepts: coordinated safeguards for materials management in a thorium--uranium fuel reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Barnes, J.W.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.

1978-10-01

This report addresses preliminary concepts for coordinated safeguards materials management in a typical generic thorium--uranium-fueled light-water reactor (LWR) fuels reprocessing plant. The reference facility is designed to recover thorium and uranium from first-generation (denatured 235 U) startup fuels, first-recycle and equilibrium (denatured 233 U) thorium--uranium LWR fuels, and to recover the plutonium generated in the 238 U denaturant as well. 12 figures, 3 tables

Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

2000-01-01

With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

Evaluation of safeguards inspection techniques--a time for change

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

The adequacy of safeguards is a subject of highest concern--not only to the public and the government but to the nuclear community as a whole. The unusual nature of safeguards with its potential for risk, even to hypothetical and severe threats which have never occurred but are nevertheless being postulated, requires that the highest attention be given. It is with this thought in mind that this paper was written to endorse a new approach to safeguards which not only permits more flexibility for the industry but in large measure should provide a significantly increased assurance to the public and to the world that the nuclear industry can safeguard plutonium and other strategic nuclear material in a fully acceptable manner. The costs of these changes will undoubtedly be high. However, the benefits to be derived from the long-term utilization of nuclear resources, such as those embodied in plutonium, will more than compensate for these additional costs. It may be only with such strict attention to safeguards that the long-term nuclear option will be permitted to prevail

Study On Safeguard Measures for Implementing Overall Planning of Land Use

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

2011-01-01

Based on minutely analysing the main problems existing in safeguard measures for implementing a new round of overall planning of land use,this paper constructs implementation security system of overall planning of land use,and puts forward the principles and basis of formulating safeguard measures for implementing overall planning of land use.Finally,this paper establishes the content system of safeguard measures:effectively strengthen social supervision;strengthen administrative management of land use planning;strengthen economic management of land use planning;reinforce the legal status of planning;establish incentive and constraint mechanism for reinforcing implementation;improve support system of planning.

Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1991-01-01

This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

Innovative audit program for today's safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lillpop, J.W. Jr.

1975-01-01

An internal safeguards audit program was developed and implemented at GE facilities to meet the need for effective audit and accurate, timely reporting to management. The concepts from which the program was evolved are summarized. The documentation and reporting mechanism has worked well for both the auditee and management

Summary of achievements in safeguards implementation at the Nukem plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bigliocca, C.

1983-01-01

This document reviews the achievements in safeguards development studies and in safeguards implementation in a highly enriched uranium fuel fabrication plant. The study was performed at the Nukem plant of Wolfgang-Hanau (Federal Republic of Germany). The report is the result of the combined efforts of the Joint Research Centre (Ispra Establishment, Safeguards and fissile material management project) and the Safegards Directorate of Euratom, with the continuous collaboration of the operator of the plant

Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higinbotham, W.A.

1983-01-01

Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

Managing aquatic ecosystems and water resources under multiple stress--an introduction to the MARS project.

Science.gov (United States)

Hering, Daniel; Carvalho, Laurence; Argillier, Christine; Beklioglu, Meryem; Borja, Angel; Cardoso, Ana Cristina; Duel, Harm; Ferreira, Teresa; Globevnik, Lidija; Hanganu, Jenica; Hellsten, Seppo; Jeppesen, Erik; Kodeš, Vit; Solheim, Anne Lyche; Nõges, Tiina; Ormerod, Steve; Panagopoulos, Yiannis; Schmutz, Stefan; Venohr, Markus; Birk, Sebastian

2015-01-15

Water resources globally are affected by a complex mixture of stressors resulting from a range of drivers, including urban and agricultural land use, hydropower generation and climate change. Understanding how stressors interfere and impact upon ecological status and ecosystem services is essential for developing effective River Basin Management Plans and shaping future environmental policy. This paper details the nature of these problems for Europe's water resources and the need to find solutions at a range of spatial scales. In terms of the latter, we describe the aims and approaches of the EU-funded project MARS (Managing Aquatic ecosystems and water Resources under multiple Stress) and the conceptual and analytical framework that it is adopting to provide this knowledge, understanding and tools needed to address multiple stressors. MARS is operating at three scales: At the water body scale, the mechanistic understanding of stressor interactions and their impact upon water resources, ecological status and ecosystem services will be examined through multi-factorial experiments and the analysis of long time-series. At the river basin scale, modelling and empirical approaches will be adopted to characterise relationships between multiple stressors and ecological responses, functions, services and water resources. The effects of future land use and mitigation scenarios in 16 European river basins will be assessed. At the European scale, large-scale spatial analysis will be carried out to identify the relationships amongst stress intensity, ecological status and service provision, with a special focus on large transboundary rivers, lakes and fish. The project will support managers and policy makers in the practical implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), of related legislation and of the Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources by advising the 3rd River Basin Management Planning cycle, the revision of the WFD and by developing new tools for

Exploiting the Geospatial Dimension of Data in Support of IAEA Safeguard

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McDaniel, M.; Bleakly, D.; Horak, K. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (United States)

2012-06-15

The nuclear fuel cycle is highly dependent upon geographic factors and each step in a state's nuclear fuel cycle occurs in geographically explicit locations. Because of this, information indicative of these activities is likely to have a strong geographic competent. Therefore, it is suggested that open source information management in support of State Level Assessments also be geographically focused. With an explicit geographic interface for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, structuring, and disseminating open source information, the information management challenges faced by the IAEA can be made more intuitive and result in more effective, information-driven safeguards analyses, potentially leading to more timely safeguards conclusions. This paper proposes an information management framework based upon geographic information systems (GIS) principles for open-source information analysis in support of international safeguards.

Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

1983-01-01

The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

2012-01-01

Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

Network resource management

NARCIS (Netherlands)

2009-01-01

The invention provides real time dynamic resource management to improve end-to-end QoS by mobile devices regularly updating a resource availability server (RAS) with resource update information. Examples of resource update information are device battery status, available memory, session bandwidth,

Scenario analysis for integrated water resources planning and management under uncertainty in the Zayandehrud river basin

Science.gov (United States)

Safavi, Hamid R.; Golmohammadi, Mohammad H.; Sandoval-Solis, Samuel

2016-08-01

The goal of this study is to develop and analyze three scenarios in the Zayandehrud river basin in Iran using a model already built and calibrated by Safavi et al. (2015) that has results for the baseline scenario. Results from the baseline scenario show that water demands will be supplied at the cost of depletion of surface and ground water resources, making this scenario undesirable and unsustainable. Supply Management, Demand Management, and Meta (supply and demand management) scenarios are the selected scenarios in this study. They are to be developed and declared into the Zayandehrud model to assess and evaluate the imminent status of the basin. Certain strategies will be employed for this purpose to improve and rectify the current management policies. The five performance criteria of time-based and volumetric reliability, resilience, vulnerability, and maximum deficit will be employed in the process of scenario analysis and evaluation. The results obtained from the performance criteria will be summed up into a so-called 'Water Resources Sustainability Index' to facilitate comparison among the likely trade-offs. Uncertainties arising from historical data, management policies, rainfall-runoff model, demand priorities, and performance criteria are considered in the proposed conceptual framework and modeled by appropriate approaches. Results show that the Supply Management scenario can be used to improve upon the demand supply but that it has no tangible effects on the improvement of the resources in the study region. In this regard, the Demand Management scenario is found to be more effective than the water supply one although it still remains unacceptable. Results of the Meta scenario indicate that both the supply and demand management scenarios must be applied if the water resources are to be safeguarded against degradation and depletion. In other words, the supply management scenario is necessary but not adequate; rather, it must be coupled to the demand

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

2011-12-15

Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

Safeguards and security. Progress report, August 1982-January 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1983-11-01

Activities are described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats a relatively new set of Los Alamos activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

2015-01-01

There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

Natural Resource Management Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Green, T. [Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Schwager, K. [Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

2016-10-01

This comprehensive Natural Resource Management Plan (NRMP) for Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) was built on the successful foundation of the Wildlife Management Plan for BNL, which it replaces. This update to the 2003 plan continues to build on successes and efforts to better understand the ecosystems and natural resources found on the BNL site. The plan establishes the basis for managing the varied natural resources located on the 5,265-acre BNL site, setting goals and actions to achieve those goals. The planning of this document is based on the knowledge and expertise gained over the past 15 years by the Natural Resources management staff at BNL in concert with local natural resource agencies including the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Long Island Pine Barrens Joint Planning and Policy Commission, The Nature Conservancy, and others. The development of this plan works toward sound ecological management that not only benefits BNL’s ecosystems but also benefits the greater Pine Barrens habitats in which BNL is situated. This plan applies equally to the Upton Ecological and Research Reserve (Upton Reserve). Any difference in management between the larger BNL area and the Upton Reserve are noted in the text.

Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Owens, L.; Smith, C.

1996-01-01

The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

Adaptive radar resource management

CERN Document Server

Moo, Peter

2015-01-01

Radar Resource Management (RRM) is vital for optimizing the performance of modern phased array radars, which are the primary sensor for aircraft, ships, and land platforms. Adaptive Radar Resource Management gives an introduction to radar resource management (RRM), presenting a clear overview of different approaches and techniques, making it very suitable for radar practitioners and researchers in industry and universities. Coverage includes: RRM's role in optimizing the performance of modern phased array radars The advantages of adaptivity in implementing RRMThe role that modelling and

Nuclear Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Findlay, T.

2015-01-01

The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

Educating the next generation of nuclear safeguards and security experts at TAMU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Charlton, William S.; Boyle, David; Chirayath, Sunil; Ford, David G.; Gariazzo, Claudio A.; Marianno, Craig; Ragusa, Kelley; Solodov, Alexander

2011-01-01

The Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) has established a Nuclear Nonproliferation specialization for the Master of Science degree within the Nuclear Engineering Department at Texas A and M University (TAMU). Since 2004, twenty-eight students have received MS degrees in this area and over 200 (technical and policy) students have taken classes offered by NSSPI at TAMU. The model for educating safeguards and security experts is being changed at TAMU. Beyond conventional classroom lectures, NSSPI has developed alternative educational models based on practical experience, asynchronous learning portals, and virtual courses in both nuclear safeguards and nuclear security. Due to the experimental and practical past experiences of NSSPI staff and faculty, a heavy hands-on component has been implemented for TAMU nuclear engineering graduate students: hands-on education at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, visiting nuclear installations in other countries to discuss applied safeguards, and summer internships at several national laboratories. In an effort to disseminate basic nuclear education for professionals and students around the globe, NSSPI has developed a publically-available online resource that offers self-paced, independent course modules in basic safeguards and security education: the Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal. Another venture utilized by NSSPI is using a virtual TAMU campus to hold classes for students at a distance. NSSPI is building upon a successful academic program by embracing new educational means. This paper describes the current efforts NSSPI and TAMU have undertaken in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security human resource capacity domestically and internationally and the lessons learned from these efforts. (author)

Past, present and future of safeguards implementation for the on-load RMBK-1500 reactors in Ignalina

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zendel, M.; Yim, S.; Monticone, C.; Kurselis, S.

1999-01-01

The on-load refueled RBMKs ('Reactor Bolshoy Moschnosti Kanalniy - Large Power Channel Type Reactor') are very different from all other power reactors which the Agency has been safeguarding over the past decades. Distinct differences in fuel properties and handling necessitated the formulation of separate, facility specific approaches. The spent fuel management at the RBMKs in Ignalina uses hot cells to cut each spent fuel assembly into two subassemblies. A large number of subassemblies are subsequently stored in large capacity, compact storage baskets at the spent fuel storage ponds adjacent to the reactor hall. The development of the safeguards approach is presented considering limitation in core access, technological feasibility, operation mode and financial as well as human resources of the Agency. The safeguards approach is based on a quarterly inspection scheme using Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures, verification of fresh and spent fuel by Non Destructive Assay (NDA), establishing of flow balances to complement the material accountancy and the application of neutron/gamma monitors in a continuous, unattended mode. The implementation of these safeguards measures is discussed and actual inspection experience with an emphasis on the application of the neutron/gamma monitors is given. The neutron/gamma monitors serve multiple safeguards functions, such as monitoring shipments of waste from cutting operations for irradiated fuel in the hot cells, confirming the unloading history for the on-load reactors, complementing C/S by detecting movements of irradiated fuel materials in the reactor halls and verifying the operational status and the power output of the reactors. Actual measurement results are presented to demonstrate their effectiveness. Power Considerations are given for future safeguards implementation matters at Ignalina Nuclear plant (INPP) including measures for the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS). (author)

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

Tamper proofing of safeguards monitors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Riley, R.J.

1982-11-01

The tamper proofing of safeguards monitors is essential if the data they produce is, and can be seen to be, reliable. This report discusses the problem of tamper proofing and gives guidance on when and how to apply tamper proofing techniques. The report is split into two parts. The first concerns the fundamental problem of how much tamper proofing to apply and the second describes methods of tamper proofing and discusses their usefulness. Both sections are applicable to all safeguards monitors although particular reference will be made to doorway monitors in some cases. The phrase 'tamper proofing' is somewhat misleading as it is impossible to completely tamper proof any device. Given enough time and resources, even the most elaborate tamper proofing can be overcome. In safeguards applications we are more interested in making the device tamper resistant and tamper indicating. That is, it should be able to resist a certain amount of tampering, and if tampering proves successful, that fact should be immediately obvious. Techniques of making a device tamper indicating and tamper resistant will be described below. The phrase tamper proofing will be used throughout this report as a generic term, including both tamper resistance and tamper indicating. (author)

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

2009-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

Computerized map-based information management system for natural resource management

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miller, K.

1995-12-01

Federal agencies, states and resource managers have control and stewardship responsibility over a significant inventory of natural resources. A number of federal regulations require the review, protection and preservation of natural resource protection. Examples of such actions include the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act and the modification of the National Contingency Plan to incorporate the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. To successfully preserve conserve and restore natural resources on federal reservations, and state and private lands, and to comply with Federal regulations designed to protect natural resources located on their sites, and the type of information on these resources required by environmental regulations. This paper presents an approach using a computerized, graphical information management system to catalogue and track data for the management of natural resources under Federal and state regulations, and for promoting resource conservation, preservation and restoration. The system is designed for use by Federal facility resource managers both for the day-to-day management of resources under their control, and for the longer-term management of larger initiatives, including restoration of significant or endangered resources, participation in regional stewardship efforts, and general ecosystem management. The system will be valuable for conducting natural resource baseline inventories an implementing resource management plans on lands other than those controlled by the Federal government as well. The system can provide a method for coordinating the type of natural resource information required by major federal environmental regulations--thereby providing a cost-effective means for managing natural resource information.

Safeguards '85

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-06-01

commonly used, for instance, in shielding on radioactive sources used in hospitals. Other radioactive material, such as most radioactive sources and isotopes used in medicine, industry, agriculture, and water resource management, are not the subject of safeguards and need not be reported to the IAEA under safeguards agreements. Reporting depends on the level of nuclear activity in the country. Declarations pursuant to safeguards agreements and additional protocols for States that do not have nuclear facilities are expected to be short and simple. The IAEA has prepared a document, available upon request, which provides guidance on the reporting requirements for such States. More elaborate guidelines have been prepared for States that do have nuclear facilities subject to routine safeguards inspections. Through its activities in the field, the IAEA seeks to verify the correctness and completeness of States' reports and declarations regarding nuclear material. Each State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement is required to establish and maintain a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), which is the national authority formally designated to keep track of nuclear material and activities in the country. For all States with safeguards agreements in force, the IAEA draws an annual conclusion on the non-diversion of nuclear material and other items placed under safeguard. The IAEA's focal point for the negotiation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and the amendment of SQPs, is the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. Once a State has decided to conclude such an agreement and/or protocol, or amend its SQP, the IAEA can help the country with the implementation of related legal and technical requirements. The appendix of this publication informs how to conclude a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and/or an Additional Protocol and provides 3 model notification letters for (a) conclusion of a safeguards agreement, a

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-04-01

commonly used, for instance, in shielding on radioactive sources used in hospitals. Other radioactive material, such as most radioactive sources and isotopes used in medicine, industry, agriculture, and water resource management, are not the subject of safeguards and need not be reported to the IAEA under safeguards agreements. Reporting depends on the level of nuclear activity in the country. Declarations pursuant to safeguards agreements and additional protocols for States that do not have nuclear facilities are expected to be short and simple. The IAEA has prepared a document, available upon request, which provides guidance on the reporting requirements for such States. More elaborate guidelines have been prepared for States that do have nuclear facilities subject to routine safeguards inspections. Through its activities in the field, the IAEA seeks to verify the correctness and completeness of States' reports and declarations regarding nuclear material. Each State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement is required to establish and maintain a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), which is the national authority formally designated to keep track of nuclear material and activities in the country. For all States with safeguards agreements in force, the IAEA draws an annual conclusion on the non-diversion of nuclear material and other items placed under safeguard. The IAEA's focal point for the negotiation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and the amendment of SQPs, is the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. Once a State has decided to conclude such an agreement and/or protocol, or amend its SQP, the IAEA can help the country with the implementation of related legal and technical requirements. The appendix of this publication informs how to conclude a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and/or an Additional Protocol and provides 3 model notification letters for (a) conclusion of a safeguards agreement, a

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Scientific data base for safeguards components

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hall, R.C.; Jones, R.D.

1978-01-01

The need to store and maintain vast amounts of data and the desire to avoid nonfunctional redundancy have provided an impetus for modern data base technology. Large-scale data base management systems (DBMS) have emerged during the past two decades evolving from earlier generalized file processing systems. This evolution has primarily involved certain business applications (e.g., production control, payroll, order entry) because of their high volume data processing characterization. Current data base technology, however, is becoming increasingly concerned with generality. Many diverse applications, including scientific ones, are benefiting from the generalized data base management software which has resulted. The concept of a data base management system is examined. The three common models which have been proposed for organizing data and relationships are identified: the network model, the hierarchical model, and the relational model. A specific implementation using a hierarchical data base management system is described. This is the data base for safeguards components which has been developed at Sandia Laboratories using the System 2000 developed by MRI Systems Corporation. Its organization, components, and functions are presented. The various interfaces it permits to user programs (e.g., safeguards automated facility evaluation software) and interactive terminal users are described

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

U.S. next generation safeguards initiative: the human capital development program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scholz, M.A.

2013-01-01

The Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogram of the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is developing sustainable academic and technical programs that support the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals. This wide-ranging HCD effort endeavors to develop additional human resources to address current shortfalls, encourage U.S. experts to seek employment at the IAEA, and identify and train a new cadre of safeguards experts to meet the needs of both the United States and the IAEA for decades to come. In recent years, a convergence of factors has challenged the IAEA's ability to carry out its safeguards mission effectively. A staffing study shows that less than 20% of the international safeguards specialists in the U.S. workforce are 44 years of age or younger and that over 80% of the international safeguards specialists at the National Laboratories will be retired or otherwise resigned within 15 years. An aging workforce nearing retirement and growing workload, coupled with a safeguards budget that has remained essentially flat in real terms for nearly two decades, have posed particular challenges to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Recognizing the trends, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) launched NGSI in the fall of 2007. Since that time, the HCD subprogram of NGSI has sponsored over 300 safeguards internships at U.S. National Labs, organized eight annual short safeguards policy and technical courses, worked with ten universities to develop new undergraduate and graduate course-work on international safeguards and nonproliferation, established a highly competitive graduate fellowship program, and completed a human capital requirements study that closely examined the safeguards workforce within the U.S. National Lab complex. Of past NGSI students and interns, nearly four in ten pursue multiple NGSI

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2012-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having “aggressors” as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests “SSN” which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called “SSST” in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. (author)

Water management - management actions applied to water resources system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Petkovski, Ljupcho; Tanchev, Ljubomir

2001-01-01

In this paper are presented a general description of water resource systems, a systematisation of the management tasks and the approaches for solution, including a review of methods used for solution of water management tasks and the fundamental postulates in the management. The management of water resources is a synonym for the management actions applied to water resource systems. It is a general term that unites planning and exploitation of the systems. The modern planning assumes separating the water racecourse part from the hydro technical part of the project. The water resource study is concerned with the solution for the resource problem. This means the parameters of the system are determined in parallel with the definition of the water utilisation regime. The hydro-technical part of the project is the design of structures necessary for the water resource solution. (Original)

Inventory of safeguards software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

2009-03-01

The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stefanka, Z.; Vincze, A.

2015-01-01

The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Synetos, Sotiris

2013-01-01

Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

The safeguards options study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

1995-04-01

The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

The safeguards options study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

1995-04-01

The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

Safeguards and nuclear forensics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gangotra, Suresh

2016-01-01

Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MULTIPROJECT ENVIRONMENT

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Vyara Slavyanska

2015-12-01

Full Text Available А monograph is presented, whose purpose is to justify the need to adapt the system for human resources management to a multiproject context and to propose alternatives for making appropriate amendments. First chapter "Human resources management as a function of general management" examines the relationship between human resource management and organizational effectiveness in the light of the perception of human resources as the main competitive advantage of the modern organization and the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the management of human resources. Special attention is paid to the content and structure of this system. Chapter Two "The multiproject organization as a modern working environment" is dedicated to the project management as a management concept and clarifies the essence of project management, the concept of the project lifecycle, criteria and critical success factors of the project. Emphasis is placed on the multiproject organization as a natural environment of project management by clarifying the nature and characteristics of this type of organization and positioning options for structural projects in it. The focus in the chapter “Specifications of human resource management in the multiproject environment" is the need for changes in the management of human resources and alternatives to adapt the system for managing human resources to conditions of the multiproject environment through specific changes in its content and structure. Chapter Four "Human Resource Management in the multiproject environment" presents the results of an empirical study. Based on the outlined conceptual framework of the study, specifying the purpose, objectives, methodology and tools, consistently carried out a comparative analysis of human resources management as a strategic organizational priority project activity as a strategic organizational priority, efficiency and basic problems of multiproject medium degree of adapting the system

IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moran, B.W.

2005-01-01

In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

Evolution of safeguards systems design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-01-01

Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-01-01

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1981-01-01

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, Deborah A.

2003-01-01

As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

2010-01-01

The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

Towards more efficient safeguards approach of transfer campaign in Wolsong CANDU reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, S. K.; Na, W. W.; Park, W. S.; Jung, S. T.; Park, S. J.

2002-01-01

Due to the unique character of the CANDU reactor, a transfer campaign has been carried out every year for 2 months or so in Wolsong unit 1. It is expected to require performance of the transfer campaign for 4 units of Wolsong site in 2006 and more than 50% of the ROK safeguards inspection efforts. The IAEA and TCNC have gained several years of experience in safeguards approach during transfer campaign. Occasionally the deterrence and interference of operator transfer work have been occurred in order to attain safeguards inspection goal. These could be minimized using optimum C/S applications, NDA and RDT techniques. This paper shows the interrelationship and combinations of these resources and proposes new safeguards approach to maintain the continuity of knowledge from fuel loading in the spent fuel pond to the point of canister loading and closure during transfer campaign

National safeguard systems - Inspector formation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pontes, B.C.

1986-01-01

The safeguards' inspector profile, in consequence of the tasks to be performed is described. An activities'hierarchy which will lead, to the structure and content of an introductory course's curriculum is established. The auditing activity as well as the material verification are described in details. Complementary resources for the upgrading the inspector's knowledge and skills are analised and the paper concludes presenting the training period, its dinamics as well as the recrutment criterium for the candidates. (Author) [pt

Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-12-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) Resource Management Plan (RMP) describes the NTS Stewardship Mission and how its accomplishment will preserve the resources of the ecoregion while accomplishing the objectives of the mission. The NTS Stewardship Mission is to manage the land and facilities at the NTS as a unique and valuable national resource. The RMP has defined goals for twelve resource areas based on the principles of ecosystem management. These goals were established using an interdisciplinary team of DOE/NV resource specialists with input from surrounding land managers, private parties, and representatives of Native American governments. The overall goal of the RMP is to facilitate improved NTS land use management decisions within the Great Basin and Mojave Desert ecoregions.

The future use of pathway analysis in IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Budlong Sylvester, Kory; Pilat, J.; Murphy, Chantell

2013-01-01

Pathway analysis has the potential to play an important role in the development of a safeguards system that is more information driven, leveraging all the information available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pathway analysis should be seen as an extension of traditional hypothesis testing used by the Agency in the past. The most attractive pathways based on the assessed capabilities of a given state can be identified and used in the development of state-level safeguards approaches. This ranking of pathways can be revised based on evidence of pathway use, or preparations for use, allowing limited safeguards resources to flow to the areas of highest concern. The possible uses of pathway analysis in the implementation of the IAEA's state-level concept are described along with implementation issues that will likely arise. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Wilkey, D.D.

1991-01-01

In 1987, a U.S. department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S and S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that S and S considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. This paper reports that the team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications

The safeguards on-site laboratory at Sellafield. Five years operational experience

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duinslaeger, L.; Belle, P. van; Mayer, K.; Casteleyn, K.; Abousahl, S.; Daures, P.; Eberle, H.; Enright, T.; Guiot, A.; Hild, M.; Horta Domenech, J.; Lajarge, P.; Laurent, P.; Le Terrier, A.; Lynch, B.; Marucci, M.; Millet, S.; Ottmar, H.; Richir, P.; Street, S.; Vallet, P.; Zuleger, E. [European Commission, Karlsruhe (Germany). Inst. for Transuranium Elements

2004-06-01

The start of operation of the large reprocessing facilities led Euratom Safeguards to a new approach for verification analysis of samples taken at the facility: the installation of on-site laboratories. The availability of analytical capabilities for independent verification measurements at the site of these facilities offers obvious advantages in view of timeliness of results. The 'On-Site Laboratory' (OSL) at the BNFL Sellafield site was the first ever and entered into operation in 1999. For almost five years, the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has been operating the laboratory under routine conditions. During this period, more than one thousand safeguards samples were analysed. The experience gained in the management, logistics and operation of the OSL allow a critical review based on a significant period in time. This includes also aspects of training of staff, maintenance of equipment, flow of information, and improvements in the efficiency. The analytical issues are of key importance: based on the operational experience, the measurement methods were adapted (changing boundary conditions), the distribution of samples according to material type changed (start up of MOS fabrication plant), and the cutback in resources triggered a further streamlining of the analytical efforts. (orig.)

Measuring Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-07-19

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

2009-07-01

This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

2009-01-01

This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

Date change and safeguards at Dounreay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.; Gregory, C.V.

1999-01-01

The paper briefly describes the arrangements in Dounreay for tackling the Millennium problem and for managing the accountancy of fissile material. The impact of the date change upon safeguards at Dounreauy has been assessed and the paper shows the problems which have been identified and are being tackled with

Chosen Concepts of Human Resources Management

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Marcin W. Staniewski

2007-07-01

Full Text Available The article is a trial of clarifying and making order of terminology that is used in area of human resources management. This is an overview of basic definitions, conceptions and models of people management, that emerged from the beginning (XIX/XX century to nowadays. The article is a kind of presentation of human resources management evolution. It comprises a descriptions of broad range of human resources management models beginning from classic models (Harvard and Michigan models and finishing on strategic human resources models (orthodox model and human resources architecture, proposed by R.G. Klimecki S. A. Litz and D.P. Lepak S.A. Snell.

Structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cole, R.J.; Bennett, C.A.; Edelhertz, H.; Wood, M.T.; Brown, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.

1977-09-01

Improving communication of NRU's requirements is the subject of this study. This summary is organized in terms of four decisions on whether safeguards regulatory documents as communication instruments should be an explicit NRC program, what communication methods should be focused on, what actions are feasible and desirable, and how should the NRC divide its effort and resources among desirable actions

Structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cole, R.J.; Bennett, C.A.; Edelhertz, H.; Wood, M.T.; Brown, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.

1977-09-01

This study develops hypothesis about the relation between the structure and drafting of safeguards regulatory documents and the ability of document users to understand and implement them in a way that reflects the intent and requirements of the NRC. Four decisions are needed to improve communication: (1) Should improvement of safeguards regulatory documents as communication instruments be an explicit NRC program. (2) What specific methods of communication should be the focus of improvement efforts. (3) What actions to improve communications are feasible and desirable. (4) How should the NRC divide its available effort and resources among desirable actions in order to provide the most effective communication through regulatory documents. This volume contains: introduction, conceptual bases, legal requirements, targets, choice of documents, preparation of documents, readability, and further study of recommended changes in structure and drafting

Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haginoya, Tohru

1997-01-01

INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1988-01-01

Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

41 CFR 105-64.108 - How does GSA safeguard personal information?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... personal information? 105-64.108 Section 105-64.108 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION Regional Offices-General... GSA safeguard personal information? (a) System managers will establish administrative, technical, and...

Nuclear safeguards policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1982-01-01

Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwanaga, Masayuki

2000-01-01

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

2007-01-01

Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

Safeguardability of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Li, T. K. (Tien K.); Lee, S. Y. (Sang Yoon); Burr, Tom; Russo, P. A. (Phyllis A.); Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I. (Won Il); Park, S. W.; Park, H. S.

2004-01-01

The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology since 1977 for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. By using of this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which would lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety and economics. In the framework of collaboration agreement to develop the safeguards system for the ACP, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the KAERI since 2002. In this study, the safeguardability of the ACP technology was examined for the pilot-scale facility. The process and material flows were conceptually designed, and the uncertainties in material accounting were estimated with international target values.

Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA program document outlining the various tasks which comprise the program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-12-01

Canada has established a safeguards research and development program, the purpose of which is to supplement the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to facilities safeguarded by the IAEA. This document sets forth those tasks which comprise the program

A resource management architecture for metacomputing systems.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Czajkowski, K.; Foster, I.; Karonis, N.; Kesselman, C.; Martin, S.; Smith, W.; Tuecke, S.

1999-08-24

Metacomputing systems are intended to support remote and/or concurrent use of geographically distributed computational resources. Resource management in such systems is complicated by five concerns that do not typically arise in other situations: site autonomy and heterogeneous substrates at the resources, and application requirements for policy extensibility, co-allocation, and online control. We describe a resource management architecture that addresses these concerns. This architecture distributes the resource management problem among distinct local manager, resource broker, and resource co-allocator components and defines an extensible resource specification language to exchange information about requirements. We describe how these techniques have been implemented in the context of the Globus metacomputing toolkit and used to implement a variety of different resource management strategies. We report on our experiences applying our techniques in a large testbed, GUSTO, incorporating 15 sites, 330 computers, and 3600 processors.

International safeguards for a modern MOX [mixed-oxide] fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating σ/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials

International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

Optimal allocation of international atomic energy agency inspection resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.

1987-01-01

Each year the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections to confirm that nuclear materials and facilities are employed for peaceful purposes. Because of limited inspection resources, however, the IAEA cannot fully attain its safeguards goals either quantitatively as measured by the inspection effort negotiated in the facility attachments or qualitatively as measured by the IAEA criteria for evaluating attainment of safeguards goals. Under current IAEA procedures the allocation of inspection resources assigns essentially equal inspection effort to facilities of the same type. An alternative approach would incorporate consideration of all material categories and facilities to be assigned inspection resources when allocating effort to a particular facility. One such method for allocating inspection resources is based on the IAEA criteria. The criteria provide a framework for allocating inspection effort that includes a ranking of material types according to their safeguards importance, an implicit definition of inspection activities for each material and facility type, and criteria for judging the attainment of safeguards goals in terms of the quality and frequency of these inspection activities. This framework is applicable to resource allocation for an arbitrary group of facilities such as a state's fuel cycle, the facilities inspected by an operations division, or all of the facilities inspected by the IAEA

Water resource management: an Indian perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Khadse, G K; Labhasetwar, P K; Wate, S R

2012-10-01

Water is precious natural resource for sustaining life and environment. Effective and sustainable management of water resources is vital for ensuring sustainable development. In view of the vital importance of water for human and animal life, for maintaining ecological balance and for economic and developmental activities of all kinds, and considering its increasing scarcity, the planning and management of water resource and its optimal, economical and equitable use has become a matter of the utmost urgency. Management of water resources in India is of paramount importance to sustain one billion plus population. Water management is a composite area with linkage to various sectors of Indian economy including the agricultural, industrial, domestic and household, power, environment, fisheries and transportation sector. The water resources management practices should be based on increasing the water supply and managing the water demand under the stressed water availability conditions. For maintaining the quality of freshwater, water quality management strategies are required to be evolved and implemented. Decision support systems are required to be developed for planning and management of the water resources project. There is interplay of various factors that govern access and utilization of water resources and in light of the increasing demand for water it becomes important to look for holistic and people-centered approaches for water management. Clearly, drinking water is too fundamental and serious an issue to be left to one institution alone. It needs the combined initiative and action of all, if at all we are serious in socioeconomic development. Safe drinking water can be assured, provided we set our mind to address it. The present article deals with the review of various options for sustainable water resource management in India.

Management Resource Values

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

A. B. Bakuradze

2013-01-01

Full Text Available The paper looks at the managerial resource values guaranteeing the effective functioning and development of any social institution. The main emphasis is on the asset management in educational sphere and optimizationopportunities of organizational processes. The human, logistical, technical, informational and time resources ofmanagerial activity are outlined and specified from the strategic perspective and effectiveness standpoint. The necessary criteria of a strategic resource are identified as the value, rarity, originality and indispensability. The author makes a conclusion about the priority of human resources in the value hierarchy of social organization in the era of information society. The paper demonstrates both the theoretical and practical ways and means of raising the effectiveness and efficiency of educational institutions, as well as the constant need for teacher’s training, retraining, and stimulation of self-education. The investment in human resources and motivating environment, aimed at developing the potential of academic staff and other employees of educational institutions, benefits both the managers and employees alike and leads to social partnership, harmony, and conciliation of economic and social interests within the organization.

Cost-effectiveness of environmental management for vector control in resource development projects.

Science.gov (United States)

Bos, R

1991-01-01

Vector control methods are traditionally divided in chemical, biological and environmental management approaches, and this distinction also reflected in certain financial and economic aspects. This is particularly true for environmental modification, usually engineering or other structural works. It is highly capital intensive, as opposed to chemical and biological control which require recurrent expenditures, and discount rates are therefore a prominent consideration in deciding for one or the other approach. Environmental manipulation requires recurrent action, but can often be carried out with the community participation, which raises the issue of opportunity costs. The incorporation of environmental management in resource projects is generally impeded by economic considerations. The Internal Rate of Return continues to be a crucial criterion for funding agencies and development banks to support new projects; at the same time Governments of debt-riden countries in the Third World will do their best to avoid additional loans on such frills as environmental and health safeguards. Two approaches can be recommended to nevertheless ensure the incorporation of environmental management measures in resource projects in an affordable way. First, there are several examples of cases where environmental management measures either have a dual benefit (increasing both agricultural production and reducing vector-borne disease transmission) or can be implemented at zero costs. Second, the additional costs involved in structural modifications can be separated from the project development costs considered in the calculations of the Internal Rate of Return, and financial support can be sought from bilateral technical cooperation agencies particularly interested in environmental and health issues. There is a dearth of information in the cost-effectiveness of alternative vector control strategies in the developing country context. The process of integrating vector control in the

IAEA safeguards assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

1981-01-01

This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

2010-03-31

With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

Innovations for Natural Resource Management

Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

First page Back Continue Last page Graphics. Improving input use efficiency and sustainable management of natural resource endowments - a continuous challenge. Improving input use efficiency and sustainable management of natural resource endowments - a continuous challenge. Innovations have focused on ...

GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

Science.gov (United States)

Many of the world's national genebanks, responsible for the safeguarding and availability of their country's Plant Genetic Resource (PGR) collections, have lacked access to high quality IT needed to document and manage their collections electronically. The Germplasm Resource Information System (GRI...

The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

1998-01-01

An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

2008-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

The status of the safeguards implementation under the State-Level Approach at the HANARO

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, H. S.; Lee, B. D.; Kim, I. C.; Kim, H. J.; Jung, J. A.; Lee, S. H. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

The IAEA developed the SLA(State-Level Approach) for the States in order to maximize effectiveness of safeguards in an environment of constrained resources. The SLA has been implemented at KAERI-Daejeon site in the ROK since 2015. The ten nuclear facilities and one LOF(Location Outsides Facility) of the KAERI-Daejeon site are grouped into three categories under the SLA. The HANARO(High flux Advanced Neutron Application ReactOr) and PIEF(Post Irradiation Examination Facility) are involved in the category I “self-contained capability” facilities that have at least one significant quantity of suitable nuclear material and which could support undeclared plutonium production/separation activities without other supporting infrastructures. This paper described the status of the safeguards implementation at the HANARO involved in the category I under the SLA. The status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor developed in 2013 was also investigated. In this paper, the features and status of the safeguards implementation of the HANARO under the SLA were analyzed. Under the SLA, the monthly, quarterly and annual advanced facility operational information for the HANARO has been submitted to the IAEA in a timely manner. The IAEA inspection at HANARO has been successfully performed under the SLA. It is expected that the safeguards implementation work at HANARO under the SLA has the similar level with that under IS. Under the SLA, the data occurred from the surveillance cameras and other equipment installed at HANARO enables to transmit remotely to the IAEA. The IAEA is targeting 2017~2018 to upgrade them. In addition, the development status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor was investigated. It aims at controlling the material inventory for the nuclear material accounting work and the convenient facility operation. The major functions of it are to trace the transfer history of the nuclear materials and non-nuclear materials

The status of the safeguards implementation under the State-Level Approach at the HANARO

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, H. S.; Lee, B. D.; Kim, I. C.; Kim, H. J.; Jung, J. A.; Lee, S. H.

2016-01-01

The IAEA developed the SLA(State-Level Approach) for the States in order to maximize effectiveness of safeguards in an environment of constrained resources. The SLA has been implemented at KAERI-Daejeon site in the ROK since 2015. The ten nuclear facilities and one LOF(Location Outsides Facility) of the KAERI-Daejeon site are grouped into three categories under the SLA. The HANARO(High flux Advanced Neutron Application ReactOr) and PIEF(Post Irradiation Examination Facility) are involved in the category I “self-contained capability” facilities that have at least one significant quantity of suitable nuclear material and which could support undeclared plutonium production/separation activities without other supporting infrastructures. This paper described the status of the safeguards implementation at the HANARO involved in the category I under the SLA. The status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor developed in 2013 was also investigated. In this paper, the features and status of the safeguards implementation of the HANARO under the SLA were analyzed. Under the SLA, the monthly, quarterly and annual advanced facility operational information for the HANARO has been submitted to the IAEA in a timely manner. The IAEA inspection at HANARO has been successfully performed under the SLA. It is expected that the safeguards implementation work at HANARO under the SLA has the similar level with that under IS. Under the SLA, the data occurred from the surveillance cameras and other equipment installed at HANARO enables to transmit remotely to the IAEA. The IAEA is targeting 2017~2018 to upgrade them. In addition, the development status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor was investigated. It aims at controlling the material inventory for the nuclear material accounting work and the convenient facility operation. The major functions of it are to trace the transfer history of the nuclear materials and non-nuclear materials

Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

2009-01-01

There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hannum, W.H.; Wade, D.C.; McFarlane, H.F.; Hill, R.N.

1997-01-01

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has declared that the large and growing stocks of plutonium from weapons dismantlement in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union FSU are a ''clear and present danger'' to peace and security. Moreover, the opinion of some experts that plutonium of any isotopic blend is a proliferation threat has been well publicized, heightening the concern that plutonium produced in the civilian fuel cycle is itself a proliferation threat. Assuring that separated plutonium, from dismantled warheads as well as from civilian power programs, is under effective control has (again) become a high priority of U.S. diplomacy. One pole of the debate on how to manage this material is to declare it to be a waste, and to search for some way to dispose of it safely, securely, and permanently. The other pole is to view it as an energy resource and to safeguard it against diversion, putting it into active use in the civilian power program. The ultimate choice cannot be separated from the long-term strategy for use of peaceful nuclear power. Continued use of a once-through fuel cycle will lead to an ever-increasing quantity of excess plutonium-requiring safeguarding. Alternatively, recycling the world's stocks of plutonium in fast reactors, contrary to common misconception, will cap the world supply of plutonium and hold it in working inventories for generating power. Transition from the current-generation light water cooled reactors (LWRs) to a future fast-reactor-based nuclear energy supply under international safeguards would, henceforth, limit world plutonium inventories to the amount necessary and useful for power generation, with no further excess production. (author)

Effective support for community resource management

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ansink, E.; Bouma, J.A.

2013-01-01

A popular alternative to state-led resource management is community resource management. This decentralised approach is potentially more efficient, but is not necessarily stable. We study this issue using coalition theory, arguing that some of the conditions for effective community resource

U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

1989-01-01

In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

Human Resource Management in Virtual Organizations. Research in Human Resource Management Series.

Science.gov (United States)

Heneman, Robert L., Ed.; Greenberger, David B., Ed.

This document contains 14 papers on human resources (HR) and human resource management (HRM) in virtual organizations. The following papers are included: "Series Preface" (Rodger Griffeth); "Volume Preface" (Robert L. Heneman, David B. Greenberger); "The Virtual Organization: Definition, Description, and…

Natural-resource management in Bangladesh

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hasan, S.; Mulamoottil, G.

1994-01-01

The paper discusses the major natural resource management issues in relation to land, forests, and water in Bangladesh. It shows how government policies and programs in one sector may affect other sectors. A lack of land use, and forest policies can be responsible for degradation of agricultural land and deforestation. The paper argues that better management of the natural resources can only be achieved by an integrated approach covering all the sectors of development. In Bangladesh, with a freely elected government in power, there is a unique opportunity to formulate an integrated natural resource management strategy. 44 refs, 2 figs, 1 tab

Managing Human Resource Learning for Innovation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Nielsen, Peter

Managing human resource learning for innovation develops a systemic understanding of building innovative capabilities. Building innovative capabilities require active creation, coordination and absorption of useful knowledge and thus a cohesive management approach to learning. Often learning...... in organizations and work is approached without considerations on how to integrate it in the management of human resources. The book investigates the empirical conditions for managing human resources learning for innovation. With focus on innovative performance the importance of modes of innovation, clues...

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

2007-01-01

The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

The Canadian safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

1981-12-01

In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

IAEA safeguards glossary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, S.G. de

1986-01-01

The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-12-01

The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

1976-01-01

Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

Generation of SEEAW asset accounts based on water resources management models

Science.gov (United States)

Pedro-Monzonís, María; Solera, Abel; Andreu, Joaquín

2015-04-01

One of the main challenges in the XXI century is related with the sustainable use of water. This is due to the fact that water is an essential element for the life of all who inhabit our planet. In many cases, the lack of economic valuation of water resources causes an inefficient water use. In this regard, society expects of policymakers and stakeholders maximise the profit produced per unit of natural resources. Water planning and the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) represent the best way to achieve this goal. The System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for Water (SEEAW) is displayed as a tool for water allocation which enables the building of water balances in a river basin. The main concern of the SEEAW is to provide a standard approach which allows the policymakers to compare results between different territories. But building water accounts is a complex task due to the difficulty of the collection of the required data. Due to the difficulty of gauging the components of the hydrological cycle, the use of simulation models has become an essential tool extensively employed in last decades. The target of this paper is to present the building up of a database that enables the combined use of hydrological models and water resources models developed with AQUATOOL DSSS to fill in the SEEAW tables. This research is framed within the Water Accounting in a Multi-Catchment District (WAMCD) project, financed by the European Union. Its main goal is the development of water accounts in the Mediterranean Andalusian River Basin District, in Spain. This research pretends to contribute to the objectives of the "Blueprint to safeguard Europe's water resources". It is noteworthy that, in Spain, a large part of these methodological decisions are included in the Spanish Guideline of Water Planning with normative status guaranteeing consistency and comparability of the results.

Resource Management in Mobile Cloud Computing

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Andrei IONESCU

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Mobile cloud computing is a major research topic in Information Technology & Communications. It integrates cloud computing, mobile computing and wireless networks. While mainly built on cloud computing, it has to operate using more heterogeneous resources with implications on how these resources are managed and used. Managing the resources of a mobile cloud is not a trivial task, involving vastly different architectures. The process is outside the scope of human users. Using the resources by the applications at both platform and software tiers come with its own challenges. This paper presents different approaches in use for managing cloud resources at infrastructure and platform levels.

Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), pre-NRC through December 31, 1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-07-01

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

Accessing and disclosing protected resources

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Olesen, Henning; Khajuria, Samant

2015-01-01

Today, data is money. Whether it is private users' personal data or confidential data and assets belonging to service providers, all parties have a strong need to protect their resources when interacting with each other, i.e. for access control and authorization measures to be deployed. Enabling...... advanced user controlled privacy is essential to realize the visions of 5G applications and services. For service providers and enterprises resources are usually well safeguarded, while private users are often missing the tools and the know-how to protect their own data and preserve their privacy. The user...... the framework of User Managed Access (UMA), can enable users to understand the value of their protected resources and possibly give them control of how their data will be used by service providers....

Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1977-12-01

The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

2010-01-01

After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

The DOE safeguards and security technology development program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cherry, R.C.; Wheelock, A.J.

1991-01-01

This paper reports that strategic planning for safeguards and security within the Department of Energy emphasizes the contributions of advanced technologies to the achievement of Departmental protection program goals. The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program provides state-of-the-art technologies, systems and technical services in support of the policies and programmatic requirements for the protection of Departmental assets. The Program encompasses research and development in physical security, nuclear material control and accountability, information security and personnel security, and the integration of these disciplines in advanced applications. Technology development tasks serve goals that range from the maintenance of an effective technology base to the development, testing and evaluation of applications to meet field needs. A variety of factors, from the evolving threat to reconfiguration of the DOE complex and the technical requirements of new facilities, are expected to influence safeguards and security technology requirements and development efforts. Implementation of the Program is based on the systematic identification, prioritization and alignment of technology development tasks and needs. Initiatives currently underway are aimed at enhancing technology development project management. Increased management attention is also being placed on efforts to promote the benefits of the Program through technology transfer and interagency liaison

Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, F.D.

1995-08-01

The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services

Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, F.D.

1995-08-01

The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services.

LHCb: Self managing experiment resources

CERN Multimedia

Stagni, F

2013-01-01

Within this paper we present an autonomic Computing resources management system used by LHCb for assessing the status of their Grid resources. Virtual Organizations Grids include heterogeneous resources. For example, LHC experiments very often use resources not provided by WLCG and Cloud Computing resources will soon provide a non-negligible fraction of their computing power. The lack of standards and procedures across experiments and sites generated the appearance of multiple information systems, monitoring tools, ticket portals, etc... which nowadays coexist and represent a very precious source of information for running HEP experiments Computing systems as well as sites. These two facts lead to many particular solutions for a general problem: managing the experiment resources. In this paper we present how LHCb, via the DIRAC interware addressed such issues. With a renewed Central Information Schema hosting all resources metadata and a Status System ( Resource Status System ) delivering real time informatio...

Safeguard sleuths

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowry, D.

1989-01-01

A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

Nuclear materials safeguards. Volume II. 1975--March 1976 (a bibliography with abstracts). Report for 1975--Mar 1976

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grooms, D.W.

1976-03-01

Citations cover the methods of safeguarding nuclear materials through effective management, accountability, nondestructive assays, instrumentation, and automated continuous inventory systems. Problem areas and recommendations for improving the management of nuclear materials are included. (Contains 88 abstracts) See also NTIS/PS-76/0200, Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Vol. 1. 1964-1974 (A title bibliography)

APPLICATION OF MODERN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Frederick Iraki

strategic perspective and constantly monitor and encourage the development of new skills and ... Human. Resource Management practices affect organizations productivity, corporate and financial ..... Exploring Human Resource. Management ...

Implementing CORAL: An Electronic Resource Management System

Science.gov (United States)

Whitfield, Sharon

2011-01-01

A 2010 electronic resource management survey conducted by Maria Collins of North Carolina State University and Jill E. Grogg of University of Alabama Libraries found that the top six electronic resources management priorities included workflow management, communications management, license management, statistics management, administrative…

Self managing experiment resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stagni, F; Ubeda, M; Charpentier, P; Tsaregorodtsev, A; Romanovskiy, V; Roiser, S; Graciani, R

2014-01-01

Within this paper we present an autonomic Computing resources management system, used by LHCb for assessing the status of their Grid resources. Virtual Organizations Grids include heterogeneous resources. For example, LHC experiments very often use resources not provided by WLCG, and Cloud Computing resources will soon provide a non-negligible fraction of their computing power. The lack of standards and procedures across experiments and sites generated the appearance of multiple information systems, monitoring tools, ticket portals, etc... which nowadays coexist and represent a very precious source of information for running HEP experiments Computing systems as well as sites. These two facts lead to many particular solutions for a general problem: managing the experiment resources. In this paper we present how LHCb, via the DIRAC interware, addressed such issues. With a renewed Central Information Schema hosting all resources metadata and a Status System (Resource Status System) delivering real time information, the system controls the resources topology, independently of the resource types. The Resource Status System applies data mining techniques against all possible information sources available and assesses the status changes, that are then propagated to the topology description. Obviously, giving full control to such an automated system is not risk-free. Therefore, in order to minimise the probability of misbehavior, a battery of tests has been developed in order to certify the correctness of its assessments. We will demonstrate the performance and efficiency of such a system in terms of cost reduction and reliability.

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2011-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having 'aggressors' as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests 'SSN' which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called 'SSST' in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate these policy tools. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more

Managing electronic resources a LITA guide

CERN Document Server

Weir, Ryan O

2012-01-01

Informative, useful, current, Managing Electronic Resources: A LITA Guide shows how to successfully manage time, resources, and relationships with vendors and staff to ensure personal, professional, and institutional success.

Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kovacic, Donald N.; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

2009-01-01

Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

1997-01-01

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

Problem statement: international safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Darby, J.L.

1979-03-01

This report considers the problem of developing international safeguards for a light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocessing/conversion facility that combines the Purex process with conversion of plutonium nitrate to the oxide by means of plutonium (III) oxalate precipitation and calcination. Current international safeguards systems are based on the complementary concepts of materials accounting and containment and surveillance, which are designed to detect covert, national diversion of nuclear material. This report discusses the possible diversion threats and some types of countermeasures, and it represents the first stage in providing integrated international safeguards system concepts that make optimum use of available resources. The development of design methodology to address this problem will constitute a significant portion of the subsequent effort. Additionally, future technology development requirements are identified. 8 figures, 1 table

7 CFR 210.14 - Resource management.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Resource management. 210.14 Section 210.14 Agriculture... Participation § 210.14 Resource management. (a) Nonprofit school food service. School food authorities shall.... Expenditures of nonprofit school food service revenues shall be in accordance with the financial management...

DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

1995-01-01

In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopatin, S.

2010-01-01

Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

Technology Development of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

2007-04-15

The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

2015-01-01

Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

Measuring the safeguards value of material accountability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sicherman, A.

1988-01-01

Material accountability (MA) activities focus on providing after-the-fact indication of diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). MA activities include maintaining records for tracking nuclear material and conducting periodic inventories and audits to ensure that loss has not occurred. This paper presents a value model concept for assessing the safeguards benefits of MA activities and for comparing these benefits to those provided by physical protection (PP) and material control (MC) components. The model considers various benefits of MA, which include: 1) providing information to assist in recovery of missing material, 2) providing assurance that physical protection and material control systems have been working, 3) defeating protracted theft attempts, and 4) properly resolving causes of and responding appropriately to anomalies of missing material and external alarms (e.g., hoax). Such a value model can aid decision-makers in allocating safeguards resources among PP, MC, and MA systems

How safe are nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, E.

1979-01-01

Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

Some developments in safeguards techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beets, C.

1977-01-01

The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank Information Management System

Science.gov (United States)

The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

Novel technologies for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1965-01-01

On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

Ontology-based semantic information technology for safeguards: opportunities and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDaniel, Michael

2014-01-01

The challenge of efficiently handling large volumes of heterogeneous information is a barrier to more effective safeguards implementation. With the emergence of new technologies for generating and collecting information this is an issue common to many industries and problem domains. Several diverse information‑intensive fields are developing and adopting ontology‑based semantic information technology solutions to address issues of information integration, federation and interoperability. Ontology, in this context, refers to the formal specification of the content, structure, and logic of knowledge within a domain of interest. Ontology‑based semantic information technologies have the potential to impact nearly every level of safeguards implementation, from information collection and integration, to personnel training and knowledge retention, to planning and analysis. However, substantial challenges remain before the full benefits of semantic technology can be realized. Perhaps the most significant challenge is the development of a nuclear fuel cycle ontology. For safeguards, existing knowledge resources such as the IAEA’s Physical Model and established upper level ontologies can be used as starting points for ontology development, but a concerted effort must be taken by the safeguards community for such an activity to be successful. This paper provides a brief background of ontologies and semantic information technology, demonstrates how these technologies are used in other areas, offers examples of how ontologies can be applied to safeguards, and discusses the challenges of developing and implementing this technology as well as a possible path forward.

Resource Management in Constrained Dynamic Situations

Science.gov (United States)

Seok, Jinwoo

Resource management is considered in this dissertation for systems with limited resources, possibly combined with other system constraints, in unpredictably dynamic environments. Resources may represent fuel, power, capabilities, energy, and so on. Resource management is important for many practical systems; usually, resources are limited, and their use must be optimized. Furthermore, systems are often constrained, and constraints must be satisfied for safe operation. Simplistic resource management can result in poor use of resources and failure of the system. Furthermore, many real-world situations involve dynamic environments. Many traditional problems are formulated based on the assumptions of given probabilities or perfect knowledge of future events. However, in many cases, the future is completely unknown, and information on or probabilities about future events are not available. In other words, we operate in unpredictably dynamic situations. Thus, a method is needed to handle dynamic situations without knowledge of the future, but few formal methods have been developed to address them. Thus, the goal is to design resource management methods for constrained systems, with limited resources, in unpredictably dynamic environments. To this end, resource management is organized hierarchically into two levels: 1) planning, and 2) control. In the planning level, the set of tasks to be performed is scheduled based on limited resources to maximize resource usage in unpredictably dynamic environments. In the control level, the system controller is designed to follow the schedule by considering all the system constraints for safe and efficient operation. Consequently, this dissertation is mainly divided into two parts: 1) planning level design, based on finite state machines, and 2) control level methods, based on model predictive control. We define a recomposable restricted finite state machine to handle limited resource situations and unpredictably dynamic environments

Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

2001-01-01

Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

Nuclear materials safeguards. Volume I. 1964--1974 (a title bibliography). Report for 1964--1974

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grooms, D.W.

1976-03-01

The research covers the methods of safeguarding nuclear materials through effective management, accountability, nondestructive assays, instrumentation, and automated continuous perpetual inventory systems. Studies on problem areas and recommendations for improving the management of nuclear materials are included. Due to the unavailability of Atomic Energy Commission abstracts during the time period covered by this bibliography, these citations are not included. (Contains 287 titles) See also NTIS/PS-76/0201, Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Vol. 2. 1975-March, 1976 (A bibliography with abstracts)

Strengthening regional safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

1996-01-01

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Nuclear safeguards research and development

Science.gov (United States)

Henry, C. N.

1981-11-01

The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

Potential development of non-destructive assay for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.

1983-01-01

After a brief summary on the role of non-destructive assay in safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, its evolution from NDA methods development to other areas is illustrated. These areas are essentially: a) the evaluation of the performances of NDA techniques in field conditions; b) introduction of full automation of measurement instrument operation, using interactive microprocessors and of measurement data handling evaluation and retrieval features; c) introduction of the adequate link and compatibility to assure NDA measurement data transfer in an integrated safeguards data evaluation scheme. In this field, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is developing and implementing a number of techniques and methodologies allowing an integrated and rational treatment of the large amount of safeguards data produced. In particular for the non-destructive assay measurements and techniques, the JRC has studied and tested methodologies for the automatic generation and validation of data of inventory verification. In order to apply these techniques successfully in field, the JRC has studied the design requirements of NDA data management and evaluation systems. This paper also discusses the functional requirements of an integrated system for NDA safeguards data evaluation

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

IAEA safeguard system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pontes, B.C.

1987-01-01

The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

Nuclear materials safeguards. Volume 2. 1975--February 1977 (a bibliography with abstracts). Report for 1975--Feb 77

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grooms, D.W.

1977-04-01

Citations cover the methods of safeguarding nuclear materials through effective management, accountability, nondestructive assays, instrumentation, and automated continuous inventory systems. Problem areas and recommendations for improving the management of nuclear materials are included. (This updated bibliography contains 143 abstracts, 56 of which are new entries to the previous edition.) See also, NTIS/PS-76/0200, Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Vol. 1. 1964-1974

Current technical issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.

1977-01-01

Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

2014-08-08

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

Managing information resources in libraries collection management in theory and practice

CERN Document Server

Clayton, Peter

2006-01-01

The management of information resources in libraries is of greater importance in the digital world. This book encompasses different areas of collection management and cover topics, such as: collection management in the organizational context; collection development policies; selection principles and resources; budget management; and more.

Managing the human resources in beer industry

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Živković Dragić

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The human resources' management in business systems comprises a selection of goals, a policy determination, as well as planning, organizing, coordination and control of activities in the field of human resources, by taking over the management actions, in order to achieve the selected goals and to realize the purpose of the management function, as a sub-system of an organization's operation. The basic tasks of the human resources management are: planning, knowledge managing, improvement of work process and quality, control and evaluation of achievements. The paper's goal is to point out to a significance, which it has for its successful business, according to an analysis and description of the most important activities of the human resources' management, as theoretically, as well as practically, in a concrete business system.

Resource development and the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donihee, J.

1999-01-01

Changes to the resource management regime of the Northwest Territories based on land claim agreements with native peoples which result from the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act are the result of commitments made by Canada during the negotiation of these land claims. This statute effects important changes to the legislative framework for environmental impact assessment and land and water management. It also establishes land use planning processes for the Gwich'in and Sahtu settlement areas and will result in an environmental and cumulative effects monitoring program for the Mackenzie Valley. The Act also establishes new institutions of public government responsible for environmental impact assessment, land and water management, and land use planning. These boards will play an internal and continuing role in resource development and management in the Mackenzie Valley. A brief overview is included of some features of the new legislative scheme, specifically focussing on environmental impact assessment and water management. An understanding of the new regime will be important for oil and gas companies that are looking north with renewed interest as a result of improved oil and gas prices and also for mining companies given the continuing interest in diamond exploration and development in the Northwest Territories. 29 refs

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

1994-07-01

DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

A systems engineering management approach to resource management applications

Science.gov (United States)

Hornstein, Rhoda Shaller

1989-01-01

The author presents a program management response to the following question: How can the traditional practice of systems engineering management, including requirements specification, be adapted, enhanced, or modified to build future planning and scheduling systems for effective operations? The systems engineering management process, as traditionally practiced, is examined. Extensible resource management systems are discussed. It is concluded that extensible systems are a partial solution to problems presented by requirements that are incomplete, partially immeasurable, and often dynamic. There are positive indications that resource management systems have been characterized and modeled sufficiently to allow their implementation as extensible systems.

Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Self-Assessment 2004

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lunford, Dan; Ramsey, Dwayne

2005-04-01

In 2002 Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory deployed the first Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Self-Assessment process, designed to measure the effect of the Laboratory's ISSM efforts. This process was recognized by DOE as a best practice and model program for self-assessment and training. In 2004, the second Self-Assessment was launched. The cornerstone of this process was an employee survey that was designed to meet several objectives: (1) Ensure that Laboratory assets are protected. (2) Provide a measurement of the Laboratory's current security status that can be compared against the 2002 Self-Assessment baseline. (3) Educate all Laboratory staff about security responsibilities, tools, and practices. (4) Provide security staff with feedback on the effectiveness of security programs. (5) Provide line management with the information they need to make informed decisions about security. This 2004 Self Assessment process began in July 2004 with every employee receiving an information packet and instructions for completing the ISSM survey. The Laboratory-wide survey contained questions designed to measure awareness and conformance to policy and best practices. The survey response was excellent--90% of Berkeley Lab employees completed the questionnaire. ISSM liaisons from each division followed up on the initial survey results with individual employees to improve awareness and resolve ambiguities uncovered by the questionnaire. As with the 2002 survey, the Self-Assessment produced immediate positive results for the ISSM program and revealed opportunities for longer-term corrective actions. Results of the questionnaire provided information for organizational profiles and an institutional summary. The overall level of security protection and awareness was very high--often above 90%. Post-survey work by the ISSM liaisons and line management consistently led to improved awareness and metrics, as shown by a comparison of

44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding systems of... maintained. (b) Personnel information contained in both manual and automated systems of records shall be... alternative storage system providing that it furnished an equivalent degree of physical security as storage in...

Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

2004-01-01

The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Requirements Integration Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed and implemented an innovative management process that will be described in detail. This process systematically integrates S and S planning into construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. It extends and expands the opportunities provided by the DOE project management manual, DOE M 413.3-1. Through a series of LANL documents, a process is defined and implemented that formally identifies an S and S professional to oversee, coordinate, facilitate, and communicate among the identified S and S organizations and the project organizations over the life cycle of the project. The derived benefits, namely (1) elimination/reduction of re-work or costly retrofitting, (2) overall project cost savings because of timely and improved planning, (3) formal documentation, and (4) support of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management at LANL, will be discussed. How many times, during the construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing facility, have the persons responsible for the project waited until the last possible minute or until after construction is completed to approach the security organizations for their help in safeguarding and securing the facility? It's almost like, 'Oh, by the way, do we need access control and a fence around this building and just what are we going to do with our classified anyway?' Not only is it usually difficult; it's also typically expensive to retrofit or plan for safeguards and security after the fact. Safeguards and security organizations are often blamed for budget overruns and delays in facility occupancy and program startup, but these problems are usually due to poor front-end planning. In an effort to help projects engage safeguards and security in the pre-conceptual or conceptual stages, we implemented a high level formality of operations. We

16 CFR 1000.22 - Office of Human Resources Management.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Office of Human Resources Management. 1000... ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS § 1000.22 Office of Human Resources Management. The Office of Human Resources Management, which is managed by the Director of the Office, provides human resources management support to...

Cybernetics in water resources management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alam, N.

2005-01-01

The term Water Resources is used to refer to the management and use of water primarily for the benefit of people. Hence, successful management of water resources requires a solid understanding of Hydrology. Cybernetics in Water Resources Management is an endeavor to analyze and enhance the beneficial exploitation of diverse scientific approaches and communication methods; to control the complexity of water management; and to highlight the importance of making right decisions at the right time, avoiding the devastating effects of drought and floods. Recent developments in computer technology and advancement of mathematics have created a new field of system analysis i.e. Mathematical Modeling. Based on mathematical models, several computer based Water Resources System (WRS) Models were developed across the world, to solve the water resources management problems, but these were not adaptable and were limited to computation by a well defined algorithm, with information input at various stages and the management tasks were also formalized in that well structured algorithm. The recent advancements in information technology has revolutionized every field of the contemporary world and thus, the WRS has also to be diversified by broadening the knowledge base of the system. The updation of this knowledge should be a continuous process acquired through the latest techniques of networking from all its concerned sources together with the expertise of the specialists and the analysis of the practical experiences. The system should then be made capable of making inferences and shall have the tendency to apply the rules based on the latest information and inferences in a given stage of problem solving. Rigid programs cannot adapt to changing conditions and new knowledge. Thus, there is a need for an evolutionary development based on mutual independence of computational procedure and knowledge with capability to adapt itself to the increasing complexity of problem. The subject

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ko, H. S.

2010-01-01

Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms

Resource Management in Broadband Communication Networks

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hansen, Mads Stenhuus

2003-01-01

. The first part gives a brief description of some of the existing protocols for routing and controlling resources, such as RSVP, OSPF, BGP, PNNI, etc. The remaining part concerns the following two fundamentally different approaches to resource management etc.: - Software agents - Simulated ants......This thesis - Resource Management in Broadband Communication Networks - deals with different ways of optimizing the available resources of data- or telecommunication networks. Especially topics like optimal routing, load balancing and fast recovery of routes in case of link failures are covered...

Safeguards can not operate alone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

2013-01-01

There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

From waste management into resource management; Von der Entsorgungswirtschaft zur Ressourcenwirtschaft

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fricke, K.; Bergs, C.G.; Kosak, G.; Wallmann, R.; Vogtmann, H. (eds.)

2005-07-01

The main topic of the meeting was the development of waste management away from deposition management into resource management. The volume contains 63 contributions, which are compiled in several sections: legal and political development; status quo, concepts and prospects of thermal and mechanical waste treatment; sanitary landfills; outage associations; wastes and resources management; international waste management. (uke)

Electronic Resources Management System: Recommendation Report 2017

KAUST Repository

Ramli, Rindra M.

2017-05-01

This recommendation report provides an overview of the selection process for the new Electronic Resources Management System. The library has decided to move away from Innovative Interfaces Millennium ERM module. The library reviewed 3 system as potential replacements namely: Proquest 360 Resource Manager, Ex Libris Alma and Open Source CORAL ERMS. After comparing and trialling the systems, it was decided to go for Proquest 360 Resource Manager.

Safeguards by Design Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-13

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Safeguards by Design Challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

2016-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuously up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilise the national resources more effectively than before. (orig.)

Forest Resource Management Plans: A Sustainability Approach

Science.gov (United States)

Pile, Lauren S.; Watts, Christine M.; Straka, Thomas J.

2012-01-01

Forest Resource Management Plans is the capstone course in many forestry and natural resource management curricula. The management plans are developed by senior forestry students. Early management plans courses were commonly technical exercises, often performed on contrived forest "tracts" on university-owned or other public lands, with a goal of…

Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

1995-01-01

Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Open Source News and Analysis for Safeguards Implementation and Evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khaled, J.; Reed, J.; Ferguson, M.; Hepworth, C.; Serrat, J.; Priori, M.; Hammond, W.

2015-01-01

Analysis of all safeguards-relevant information is an essential component of IAEA safeguards and the ongoing State evaluation underlying IAEA verification activities. In addition to State declared safeguards information and information generated from safeguards activities both in the field and at headquarters, the IAEA collects and analyzes information from a wide array of open sources relevant to States' nuclear related activities. A number of these open sources include information that could be loosely categorized as ''news'': international, regional, and local media; company and government press releases; public records of parliamentary proceedings; and NGO/academic commentaries and analyzes. It is the task of the State Factors Analysis Section of the Department of Safeguards to collect, analyze and disseminate news of relevance to support ongoing State evaluation. This information supports State evaluation by providing the Department with a global overview of safeguards-relevant nuclear developments. Additionally, this type of information can support in-depth analyses of nuclear fuel cycle related activities, alerting State Evaluation Groups to potential inconsistencies in State declarations, and preparing inspectors for activities in the field. The State Factors Analysis Section uses a variety of tools, including subscription services, news aggregators, a roster of specialized sources, and a custom software application developed by an external partner to manage incoming data streams and assist with making sure that critical information is not overlooked. When analyzing data, it is necessary to determine the credibility of a given source and piece of information. Data must be considered for accuracy, bias, and relevance to the overall assessment. Analysts use a variety of methodological techniques to make these types of judgments, which are included when the information is presented to State Evaluation Groups. Dissemination of news to

Equipment support for the implementation of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arlt, R.; Bosler, G.; Goldfarb, M.; Schanfein, M.; Whichello, J.

2001-01-01

Full text: The provision of effective, reliable, and user-friendly equipment needed for the implementation of safeguards is one of the main objectives of the Division of Technical Services (SOTS) in the Department of Safeguards. As an outcome of a review by an independent external consultant firm, the instrumentation sections of the SGTS were reorganized in January 2001 into two new sections, the Section for NDA Systems and Seals (TNS) and Section for Installed Systems (TIE). Each section has 'cradle-to-grave' responsibilities for development, implementation, maintenance, and decommissioning of safeguards instruments and measurement systems. Unattended assay, monitoring and surveillance instruments are the responsibility of TIE while attended nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments and seals are handled by TNS. The principal goals of both sections are to define equipment requirements based on Departmental needs, to coordinate Support Programme tasks concerning development and implementation activities, to provide system engineering of commercial components, manage laboratory and to do field testing and prove system suitability for defined safeguards applications. In addition both sections coordinate equipment and supply needs for the Department, including acquisition, preparation, servicing, installation, commissioning, troubleshooting, maintenance and repair, ensuring their availability when needed. As required, TIE and TNS provide specialized field support to the Operations Divisions. Each section is working to standardize equipment as much as possible and reduce the number of instruments performing the same function. This reduces both inspector and technician training, required parts inventories, and overall life-cycle costs. Development based on User Needs from the Operations Divisions follows a strict quality control program that includes a thorough qualification testing procedure with the last phase being field-testing under actual facility conditions. A

Crew Resource Management: An Introductory Handbook

Science.gov (United States)

1992-08-01

AND MAINTENANCE SKILLS: a cluster of CRM skills focusing on interpersonal relationships and effective team practices. 56 TEAM MANAGEMENT : command and...Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Recent research findings suggest that crew resource management ( CRM ) training can...of ways to achieve effective CRM . 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 62 Crew Resource Management ( CRM ). Air Carrier Training, Flight Crew

IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, Nikolai

2001-01-01

IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

Water Resources Assessment and Management in Drylands

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Magaly Koch

2016-06-01

Full Text Available Drylands regions of the world face difficult issues in maintaining water resources to meet current demands which will intensify in the future with population increases, infrastructure development, increased agricultural water demands, and climate change impacts on the hydrologic system. New water resources evaluation and management methods will be needed to assure that water resources in drylands are optimally managed in a sustainable manner. Development of water management and conservation methods is a multi-disciplinary endeavor. Scientists and engineers must collaborate and cooperate with water managers, planners, and politicians to successfully adopt new strategies to manage water not only for humans, but to maintain all aspects of the environment. This particularly applies to drylands regions where resources are already limited and conflicts over water are occurring. Every aspect of the hydrologic cycle needs to be assessed to be able to quantify the available water resources, to monitor natural and anthropogenic changes, and to develop flexible policies and management strategies that can change as conditions dictate. Optimal, sustainable water management is achieved by cooperation and not conflict, thereby necessitating the need for high quality scientific research and input into the process.

Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1984-01-01

The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

Managing America`s solid waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1998-03-02

This report presents an historical overview of the federal role in municipal solid waste management from 1965 to approximately 1995. Attention is focuses on the federal role in safeguarding public health, protecting the environment, and wisely using material and energy resources. It is hoped that this report will provide important background for future municipal solid waste research and development initiatives.

Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

Nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrampres, J.

2010-01-01

Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

Implementating Information Technology in E-Human Resource Management

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cristina-Dana Popescu (Mitu

2016-01-01

More and more organizations have been replacing face-to-face human resource managementactivities with electronic human resource management, which is considered as one of the keyfactors that every organization needs to focus. Considering that human resource management isone of the necessary needs of today’s business, the goal of this article is to establish the importanceof human resource management (HRM, to examine recent research in e-HRM in order to evaluatethe cumulated evidence on the relationship between HRM and e-HRM and to outline the impact ofe-HRM on human resource. Many specialists underlined the fact that human resource requiresmore attention and careful management than any other resource of an organization. This paperalso deals with the influence of Internet and information technology on work and human resourcemanagement.

Evidence-based human resource management: a study of nurse leaders' resource allocation.

Science.gov (United States)

Fagerström, Lisbeth

2009-05-01

The aims were to illustrate how the RAFAELA system can be used to facilitate evidence-based human resource management. The theoretical framework of the RAFAELA system is based on a holistic view of humankind and a view of leadership founded on human resource management. Nine wards from three central hospitals in Finland participated in the study. The data, stemming from 2006-2007, were taken from the critical indicators (ward-related and nursing intensity information) for national benchmarking used in the RAFAELA system. The data were analysed descriptively. The daily nursing resources per classified patient ratio is a more specific method of measurement than the nurse-to-patient ratio. For four wards, the nursing intensity per nurse surpassed the optimal level 34% to 62.2% of days. Resource allocation was clearly improved in that a better balance between patients' care needs and available nursing resources was maintained. The RAFAELA system provides a rational, systematic and objective foundation for evidence-based human resource management. Data from a systematic use of the RAFAELA system offer objective facts and motives for evidence-based decision making in human resource management, and will therefore enhance the nurse leaders' evidence and scientific based way of working.

Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

1990-01-01

During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs

Human Resources Management within Civil Service

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Victor Teodor Alistar

2012-12-01

Full Text Available The main objective of this article is to examine the notion of management, as an area of study which analyses, regulates and renders the theoretical and technical support in order to provide rationality within the processes that unfold in the civil service. In order to accomplish this task, human resources management will be analyzed as a process which relies in exerting four main functions: ensuring, developing, motivating and maintaining the human resources, which are conditioned by external factors that must be taken into consideration, such as: legislative framework, labor force, unions, cultural context (here one includes management practices and philosophy, and economic circumstances. All these factors are considered to have a significant impact on the management of human resources.

20 Years of Achievement and Future Challenge for International Capacity Building Regarding Safeguards and SSAC at Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senzaki, M.; Naoi, Y.; Kuribayashi, T.; Okumura, Y.

2015-01-01

Developing human resources in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is critical to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The shortfall of human resources in such fields presents a serious challenge. It has, therefore, become important to urgently develop human resources and thereby to ensure. With a long experience in practicing Japan's nuclear non-proliferation policy, JAEA has been contributing since the 1990s to international human-resource development. More than 300 people from about 40 countries have joined the training courses organized by the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of JAEA. These courses use lectures, workshops, group discussions, and facility tours to teach knowledge of the basic concepts of IAEA safeguards, SSAC requirements, and safeguards tools to government officials who are responsible for safeguards implementation and to operators who are engaged in nuclear-material accounting and control. Based on Japan's statement at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, ISCN was established in December 2010. ISCN places top priority on providing support for the development of future leaders, the development of legal and regulatory infrastructure, and the fostering of nuclear non-proliferation culture. For further advancement, ISCN also examines the current situations of the Asian nations that ISCN supports, based on discussions made between the Japanese government and the IAEA. It works on formulating new training courses that focus on specific themes, such as NDA training and table-top exercises for CA under the AP, identified through needs surveys. ISCN is committed to the development of human resources in the field of safeguards and work closely with governmental organizations in Japan and with other Asian countries, the IAEA, US DOE, European Commission, FNCA, and APSN. (author)

Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varjoranta, Tero

2016-01-01

IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

2010-10-01

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Efficient Resource Management in Cloud Computing

OpenAIRE

Rushikesh Shingade; Amit Patil; Shivam Suryawanshi; M. Venkatesan

2015-01-01

Cloud computing, one of the widely used technology to provide cloud services for users who are charged for receiving services. In the aspect of a maximum number of resources, evaluating the performance of Cloud resource management policies are difficult to optimize efficiently. There are different simulation toolkits available for simulation and modelling the Cloud computing environment like GridSim CloudAnalyst, CloudSim, GreenCloud, CloudAuction etc. In proposed Efficient Resource Manage...

The state of human dimensions capacity for natural resource management: needs, knowledge, and resources

Science.gov (United States)

Sexton, Natalie R.; Leong, Kirsten M.; Milley, Brad J.; Clarke, Melinda M.; Teel, Tara L.; Chase, Mark A.; Dietsch, Alia M.

2013-01-01

The social sciences have become increasingly important in understanding natural resource management contexts and audiences, and are essential in design and delivery of effective and durable management strategies. Yet many agencies and organizations do not have the necessary resource management. We draw on the textbook definition of HD: how and why people value natural resources, what benefits people seek and derive from those resources, and how people affect and are affected by those resources and their management (Decker, Brown, and Seimer 2001). Clearly articulating how HD information can be used and integrated into natural resource management planning and decision-making is an important challenge faced by the HD field. To address this challenge, we formed a collaborative team to explore the issue of HD capacity-building for natural resource organizations and to advance the HD field. We define HD capacity as activities, efforts, and resources that enhance the ability of HD researchers and practitioners and natural managers and decision-makers to understand and address the social aspects of conservation.Specifically, we sought to examine current barriers to integration of HD into natural resource management, knowledge needed to improve HD capacity, and existing HD tools, resources, and training opportunities. We conducted a needs assessment of HD experts and practitioners, developed a framework for considering HD activities that can contribute both directly and indirectly throughout any phase of an adaptive management cycle, and held a workshop to review preliminary findings and gather additional input through breakout group discussions. This paper provides highlights from our collaborative initiative to help frame and inform future HD capacity-building efforts and natural resource organizations and also provides a list of existing human dimensions tools and resources.

The Resource Manager the ATLAS Trigger and Data Acquisition System

CERN Document Server

Aleksandrov, Igor; The ATLAS collaboration; Lehmann Miotto, Giovanna; Soloviev, Igor

2016-01-01

The Resource Manager of the ATLAS Trigger and Data Acquisition system The Resource Manager is one of the core components of the Data Acquisition system of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC. The Resource Manager marshals the right for applications to access resources which may exist in multiple but limited copies, in order to avoid conflicts due to program faults or operator errors. The access to resources is managed in a manner similar to what a lock manager would do in other software systems. All the available resources and their association to software processes are described in the Data Acquisition configuration database. The Resource Manager is queried about the availability of resources every time an application needs to be started. The Resource Manager’s design is based on a client-server model, hence it consists of two components: the Resource Manager "server" application and the "client" shared library. The Resource Manager server implements all the needed functionalities, while the Resource Manager c...

Tribal-federal collaboration in resource management

Science.gov (United States)

Ellen M. Donoghue; Sara A. Thompson; John C. Bliss

2010-01-01

The increase in collaborative projects involving American Indian tribes and natural resource management agencies in the United States reflects two emergent trends: 1) the use of collaborative approaches between agencies and groups in managing natural resources; and 2) the concurrent increased recognition of American Indian rights, institutionalization of consultation...

Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

1980-01-01

This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

45 CFR 1304.52 - Human resources management.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Human resources management. 1304.52 Section 1304.52 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT... DELEGATE AGENCIES Program Design and Management § 1304.52 Human resources management. (a) Organizational...

Common Property Resource Management, Institutional Change and ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Common Property Resource Management, Institutional Change and ... Most contemporary discussions on African development since independence forty ... theories on CPR Resource Management in a specific ecological and political setting.

Bridging the gap between landscape ecologyand natural resource management

Science.gov (United States)

Monica G. Turner; Thomas R. Crow; Jianguo Liu; Dale Rabe; Charles F. Rabeni; Patricia A. Soranno; William W. Taylor; Kristiina A. Vogt; John A. Wiens

2002-01-01

The challenges facing natural resource managers occur over entire landscapes and involve landscape components at many scales. Many resource managers are shifting their approach from managing resources such as fish, wildlife, and water separately to managing for the integrity of entire ecosystems (Christensen et al., 1996). Indeed, nearly all resource...

Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

2016-01-01

Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1975-01-01

Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

1991-05-01

The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

Use of curium neutron flux from head-end pyroprocessing subsystems for the High Reliability Safeguards methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Borrelli, R.A., E-mail: r.angelo.borrelli@gmail.com

2014-10-01

The deployment of nuclear energy systems (NESs) is expanding around the world. Nations are investing in NESs as a means to establish energy independence, grow national economies, and address climate change. Transitioning to the advanced nuclear fuel cycle can meet growing energy demands and ensure resource sustainability. However, nuclear facilities in all phases of the advanced fuel cycle must be ‘safeguardable,’ where safety, safeguards, and security are integrated into a practical design strategy. To this end, the High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach is a continually developing safeguardability methodology that applies intrinsic design features and employs a risk-informed approach for systems assessment that is safeguards-motivated. Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as the example system. This paper presents a modeling study that investigates the neutron flux associated with processed materials. The intent of these studies is to determine if the neutron flux will affect facility design, and subsequently, safeguardability. The results presented in this paper are for the head-end subsystems in a pyroprocessing facility. The collective results from these studies will then be used to further develop the HRS methodology.

Reactor safeguards

CERN Document Server

Russell, Charles R

1962-01-01

Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

2012-08-01

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

Safeguard Measures for Implementation of New Round of Land Consolidation Planning

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

LI Chen; LIU Xin-feng; PENG Zhe; SI Tao

2012-01-01

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current situation of security system for implementation of China’s land consolidation planning. The prominent problems in the process of implementing safeguard measures for planning are summarized as follows: the guiding ideology for planning formulation is imperfect; the legal basis is weak, and administrative means are not sound; the economic security mechanism is not brought into full play, and the social security measures still need to be further deepened; the technical safeguard measures are short. From laws and regulations, administrative management, economic security, social supervision, technology management and other aspects, we establish the scientific security system for implementation of land consolidation planning; put forth the recommendations for guaranteeing the implementation of planning in China.

Information resources management for policy formulation ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

This article discusses the findings of a study conducted on the state of information resources management (IRM) in government ministries in Tanzania. The purpose of the study was to investigate and establish the extent to which the information resources management in the ministries reflect and support the process of ...

32 CFR Appendix D to Part 323 - Word Processing Center (WPC) Safeguards

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 323, App. D Appendix D to... (WPCs) operating independent of the customer's function. However, managers of word processing systems... addressed. C. Safeguarding Information During Receipt. 1. The word processing manager will establish...

Data management: Managing data as an organisational resource

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

S. G. Maritz

2003-12-01

Full Text Available Managing data as a resource is an important function of information management. Accurate and relevant data is the source of valuable information. By managing data efficiently, sound management decisions can be made. The traditional file environment is not appropriate for managing data; database management systems are the most popular choice for managing data effectively. Some of the broader trends in data management include outsourcing, data reuse, data re-engineering, archiving, data warehousing and data mining.

Safeguarding critical e-documents implementing a program for securing confidential information assets

CERN Document Server

Smallwood, Robert F

2012-01-01

Practical, step-by-step guidance for corporations, universities and government agencies to protect and secure confidential documents and business records Managers and public officials are looking for technology and information governance solutions to "information leakage" in an understandable, concise format. Safeguarding Critical E-Documents provides a road map for corporations, governments, financial services firms, hospitals, law firms, universities and other organizations to safeguard their internal electronic documents and private communications.Provides practical, step-by-step guidance o

Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

1980-01-01

The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

2010-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

2012-08-01

Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

TOWARDS PROPER CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

GRACE

proper harnessing and management of cultural resources in Nigeria for sustainable development .... and knowledge) to organize the resources available to man with the aim of optimizing their use in the ... needs‖ (World Bank 1992). Thus, as ...

Construction Cost Management in Resource Based Economy

OpenAIRE

Elazzazy, Muhammad

2017-01-01

Resource Based Economy tested according to criteria formulated from the construction cost management best practices. A cost management plan modeled to demonstrate the possibility of construction management under a new socio-economic system, which counts the consumed natural resources by construction as the dry cost to the environment.

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

41 CFR 105-53.143 - Information Resources Management Service.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Information Resources... FUNCTIONS Central Offices § 105-53.143 Information Resources Management Service. (a) Creation and authority. The Information Resources Management Service (IRMS), headed by the Commissioner, Information Resources...

Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

2001-01-01

SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

The Resource Manager the ATLAS Trigger and Data Acquisition System

CERN Document Server

AUTHOR|(INSPIRE)INSPIRE-00210579; The ATLAS collaboration; Avolio, Giuseppe; Lehmann Miotto, Giovanna; Soloviev, Igor

2017-01-01

The Resource Manager is one of the core components of the Data Acquisition system of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC. The Resource Manager marshals the right for applications to access resources which may exist in multiple but limited copies, in order to avoid conflicts due to program faults or operator errors. The access to resources is managed in a manner similar to what a lock manager would do in other software systems. All the available resources and their association to software processes are described in the Data Acquisition configuration database. The Resource Manager is queried about the availability of resources every time an application needs to be started. The Resource Manager’s design is based on a client-server model, hence it consists of two components: the Resource Manager “server” application and the “client” shared library. The Resource Manager server implements all the needed functionalities, while the Resource Manager client library provides remote access to the “server” (i.e....

IAEA Guidance for Safeguards Implementation in Facility Design and Construction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprinkle, J.; Hamilton, A.; Poirier, S.; Catton, A.; Ciuculescu, C.; Ingegneri, M.; Plenteda, R.

2015-01-01

One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. One way the IAEA works to achieve this objective is through the publication of technical series that can provide guidance to Member States. These series include the IAEA Services Series, the IAEA Safety Standard Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. The Nuclear Energy Series is comprised of publications designed to encourage and assist research and development on, and practical application of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This includes guidance to be used by owners and operators of utilities, academia, vendors and government officials. The IAEA has chosen the Nuclear Energy Series to publish guidance for States regarding the consideration of safeguards in nuclear facility design and construction. Historically, safeguards were often applied after a facility was designed or maybe even after it was built. However, many in the design and construction community would prefer to include consideration of these requirements from the conceptual design phase in order to reduce the need for retro-fits and modifications. One can then also take advantage of possible synergies between safeguards, security, safety and environmental protection and reduce the project risk against cost increments and schedule slippage. The IAEA is responding to this interest with a suite of publications in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, developed with the assistance of a number of Member State Support Programmes through a joint support programme task: · International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction (NP-T-2.8, 2013), · International Safeguards in the Design of Nuclear Reactors (NP-T-2.9, 2014), · International Safeguards in the Design of Spent Fuel Management (NF-T-3.1, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Fuel Fabrication Plants (NF-T-4.7, tbd

Importance of Knowledge Management in Human Resource Development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pleslic, Sanda

2014-01-01

Human resource management and knowledge management: • In human resource management - important to identify crucial knowledge base on which competitiveness of company depends → according this ensure appropriate development of human resources. • Era of so-called knowledge economy - only individual and organizational knowledge could give competitive advantage. • From operational perspective, knowledge management - systematic processes by which an organization identifies, creates, captures, acquires, shares and increase knowledge

Human Resource Management Practices in Nigeria

OpenAIRE

Sola Fajana; Oluwakemi Owoyemi; Tunde Elegbede; Mariam Gbajumo-Sheriff

2011-01-01

The globalization of business is having a significant impact on human resource management practices; and it is has now become more imperative than ever for business organizations to engage in human resource management practices on an international standard. While the management of people is mostly associated with HRM, the definition, parameter and context are contested by different writers. Some authors such as Kane (1996) argued that HRM is in its infancy, while other authors such as Welbour...

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

2010-10-15

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

2004-01-01

Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

Managing America's solid waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Phillips, J. A.

1998-09-15

This report presents an historical overview of the federal role in municipal solid waste management from 1965 to approximately 1995. Attention is focuses on the federal role in safeguarding public health, protecting the environment, and wisely using material and energy resources. It is hoped that this report will provide important background for future municipal solid waste research and development initiatives.

Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1976-01-01

With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

A view to the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsuboi, Hiroshi

2000-01-01

The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

Communication and Human Resources Management and Their ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

communication and Human Resources Management in educationalinstitutions in Nigeria. To achieve this, efforts were made to give a general overview of how culture and communication are significant to Human Resources Management. According to the ...

Non-infant adoption from care: lessons for safeguarding children.

Science.gov (United States)

Rees, C A; Selwyn, J

2009-07-01

To explore use of adoption in remedying abuse and neglect, to inform child protection practice and to identify professional responsibilities to adoptive families. A cohort of 130 children was identified for whom adoption was recommended in 1991-1996 at a mean age of 5.7 years (range 3-11). All were in local authority care for child protection reasons. information was gathered from social work records. The children were traced between 6 and 11 years later and their adopters interviewed. The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire and the Parent-Child Communication Scale were completed. All but three birth parents had traumatic childhoods involving abuse, neglect and/or time in care. Eighty-six per cent had violent adult relationships. Mental illness, learning difficulties and substance abuse were prominent. Sixty-seven per cent of families were known to social services when children were born, but 98% experienced abuse or neglect. Most adopters found the first year challenging, though rewarding. Depression, anxiety and marital problems were common. Children's learning difficulties, conduct problems, emotional 'phoniness' and rejection affected closeness. At follow-up 28% described rewarding, happy placements, and 62% described continuing difficulties tempered by rewards. However, 10% reported no rewards. Hyperactivity and inattention frequently persisted despite stable adoption and were associated with conduct and attachment difficulties. Use of professional services was substantial. Thirty-eight per cent of children failed to achieve stable adoption. Later entry to care correlated with poorer outcome. This study highlights the importance in safeguarding children of considering the implications of parental childhood experiences, and indicates the risk of delay. The high prevalence of domestic violence in birth families indicates the need for better resources for managing emotional dysregulation. Adoption is a valuable therapeutic tool, but professional

Achieving competitive advantage through strategic human resource management.

Science.gov (United States)

Fottler, M D; Phillips, R L; Blair, J D; Duran, C A

1990-01-01

The framework presented here challenges health care executives to manage human resources strategically as an integral part of the strategic planning process. Health care executives should consciously formulate human resource strategies and practices that are linked to and reinforce the broader strategic posture of the organization. This article provides a framework for (1) determining and focusing on desired strategic outcomes, (2) identifying and implementing essential human resource management actions, and (3) maintaining or enhancing competitive advantage. The strategic approach to human resource management includes assessing the organization's environment and mission; formulating the organization's business strategy; assessing the human resources requirements based on the intended strategy; comparing the current inventory of human resources in terms of numbers, characteristics, and human resource management practices with respect to the strategic requirements of the organization and its services or product lines; formulating the human resource strategy based on the differences between the assessed requirements and the current inventory; and implementing the appropriate human resource practices to reinforce the strategy and attain competitive advantage.

Evaluating participation in water resource management: A review

Science.gov (United States)

Carr, G.; BlöSchl, G.; Loucks, D. P.

2012-11-01

Key documents such as the European Water Framework Directive and the U.S. Clean Water Act state that public and stakeholder participation in water resource management is required. Participation aims to enhance resource management and involve individuals and groups in a democratic way. Evaluation of participatory programs and projects is necessary to assess whether these objectives are being achieved and to identify how participatory programs and projects can be improved. The different methods of evaluation can be classified into three groups: (i) process evaluation assesses the quality of participation process, for example, whether it is legitimate and promotes equal power between participants, (ii) intermediary outcome evaluation assesses the achievement of mainly nontangible outcomes, such as trust and communication, as well as short- to medium-term tangible outcomes, such as agreements and institutional change, and (iii) resource management outcome evaluation assesses the achievement of changes in resource management, such as water quality improvements. Process evaluation forms a major component of the literature but can rarely indicate whether a participation program improves water resource management. Resource management outcome evaluation is challenging because resource changes often emerge beyond the typical period covered by the evaluation and because changes cannot always be clearly related to participation activities. Intermediary outcome evaluation has been given less attention than process evaluation but can identify some real achievements and side benefits that emerge through participation. This review suggests that intermediary outcome evaluation should play a more important role in evaluating participation in water resource management.

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1986-10-01

Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

Preparing supervisors to provide safeguarding supervision for healthcare staff.

Science.gov (United States)

Smikle, Marcia

2017-11-28

This paper outlines why experienced supervisors at a London healthcare provider received skills training so they could offer safeguarding supervision to front-line colleagues with case management responsibilities for vulnerable children and young people. It examines how supervisors use the main functions of supervision and a cycle of reflection in clinical practice with supervisees. As well as the professional issues encountered by supervisors in relation to the benefits, the challenges of providing supervision and the action required to make safeguarding supervision a part of the organisational culture are also explored. ©2017 RCN Publishing Company Ltd. All rights reserved. Not to be copied, transmitted or recorded in any way, in whole or part, without prior permission of the publishers.

Adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource management.

Science.gov (United States)

Armitage, Derek

2005-06-01

Why do some community-based natural resource management strategies perform better than others? Commons theorists have approached this question by developing institutional design principles to address collective choice situations, while other analysts have critiqued the underlying assumptions of community-based resource management. However, efforts to enhance community-based natural resource management performance also require an analysis of exogenous and endogenous variables that influence how social actors not only act collectively but do so in ways that respond to changing circumstances, foster learning, and build capacity for management adaptation. Drawing on examples from northern Canada and Southeast Asia, this article examines the relationship among adaptive capacity, community-based resource management performance, and the socio-institutional determinants of collective action, such as technical, financial, and legal constraints, and complex issues of politics, scale, knowledge, community and culture. An emphasis on adaptive capacity responds to a conceptual weakness in community-based natural resource management and highlights an emerging research and policy discourse that builds upon static design principles and the contested concepts in current management practice.

The evolution of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.

1999-01-01

The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

Safeguards on nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

2001-01-01

The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

Risk management and the vulnerability assessment process of the United States Department of Energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rivers, J.D.; Johnson, O.B.; Callahan, S.N.

2001-01-01

Full text: Risk management is an essential element in influencing how the United States Department of Energy's safeguards and security mission is executed. Risk management exists as a function of a target's attractiveness, along with the potential consequences associated with the unauthorized use of that target. The goal of risk management encompasses the fielding and operating of appropriate, cost-effective protection systems generating sufficient deterrence to protect sensitive programs and facilities. Risk mitigation and risk prevention are accomplished through the vulnerability assessment process. The implementation and continued validation of measures to prevent or mitigate risk to acceptable levels constitute the fundamental approach of the Department's risk management program. Due to the incomplete knowledge inherent in any threat definition, it is impossible to precisely tailor a protective system to defend against all threats. The challenge presented to safeguards and security program managers lies in developing systems sufficiently effective to defend against an array of threats slightly greater than can be hypothetically postulated (the design basis threat amended for local conditions). These systems are then balanced against technological, resource, and fiscal constraints. A key element in the risk assessment process is analyzing the security systems against the Design Basis Threat (DBT). The DBT is used to define the level and capability of the threat against the DOE facilities and their assets. In particular it defines motivation, numbers of adversaries, capabilities, and their objectives. Site Safeguards and Security Plans (SSSPs) provide the basis and justification for safeguards and security program development, budget, and staffing requirements. The SSSP process examines, describes, and documents safeguards and security programs, site-wide and by facility; establishes safeguards and security program improvement priorities; describes site and

Armenia : Towards Integrated Water Resources Management

OpenAIRE

World Bank

2001-01-01

The objective of this paper is to examine the challenges in the water sector faced by Armenia today, and outline options for management and allocation of its water resources in the future, considering the need for a stable, transparent apublic sector management framework and sustainable resource use for long-term private investment and job creation, and for appropriate balances among water...

Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2010-01-01

In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-10-01

Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gyane, E.

2010-01-01

Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

Resource Management in Diffserv (RMD) Framework

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Westberg, L.; Jacobsson, M.; Oosthoek, S.; Partain, D.; Rexhepi, V.; Szabo, R.; Wallentin, P.; Karagiannis, Georgios

This draft presents the work on the framework for the Resource Management in Diffserv (RMD) designed for edge-to-edge resource reservation in a Differentiated Services (Diffserv) domain. The RMD extends the Diffserv architecture with new resource reservation concepts and features. Moreover, this

International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.

1995-01-01

The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

Integrative learning for practicing adaptive resource management

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Craig A. McLoughlin

2015-03-01

Full Text Available Adaptive resource management is a learning-by-doing approach to natural resource management. Its effective practice involves the activation, completion, and regeneration of the "adaptive management cycle" while working toward achieving a flexible set of collaboratively identified objectives. This iterative process requires application of single-, double-, and triple-loop learning, to strategically modify inputs, outputs, assumptions, and hypotheses linked to improving policies, management strategies, and actions, along with transforming governance. Obtaining an appropriate balance between these three modes of learning has been difficult to achieve in practice and building capacity in this area can be achieved through an emphasis on reflexive learning, by employing adaptive feedback systems. A heuristic reflexive learning framework for adaptive resource management is presented in this manuscript. It is built on the conceptual pillars of the following: stakeholder driven adaptive feedback systems; strategic adaptive management (SAM; and hierarchy theory. The SAM Reflexive Learning Framework (SRLF emphasizes the types, roles, and transfer of information within a reflexive learning context. Its adaptive feedback systems enhance the facilitation of single-, double-, and triple-loop learning. Focus on the reflexive learning process is further fostered by streamlining objectives within and across all governance levels; incorporating multiple interlinked adaptive management cycles; having learning as an ongoing, nested process; recognizing when and where to employ the three-modes of learning; distinguishing initiating conditions for this learning; and contemplating practitioner mandates for this learning across governance levels. The SRLF is a key enabler for implementing the "adaptive management cycle," and thereby translating the theory of adaptive resource management into practice. It promotes the heuristics of adaptive management within a cohesive

All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

2010-01-01

Section (ICA) and Section for Declared and Statistical Information Analysis (IDS) in the Division of Information Management (SGIM), within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Continued investments and voluntary contributions through the Member State Support Programmes are vital to maintain and develop this effort. (author)

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

GREEN,T.ET AL.

2003-12-31

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) is located near the geographic center of Long Island, New York. The Laboratory is situated on 5,265 acres of land composed of Pine Barrens habitat with a central area developed for Laboratory work. In the mid-1990s BNL began developing a wildlife management program. This program was guided by the Wildlife Management Plan (WMP), which was reviewed and approved by various state and federal agencies in September 1999. The WMP primarily addressed concerns with the protection of New York State threatened, endangered, or species of concern, as well as deer populations, invasive species management, and the revegetation of the area surrounding the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC). The WMP provided a strong and sound basis for wildlife management and established a basis for forward motion and the development of this document, the Natural Resource Management Plan (NRMP), which will guide the natural resource management program for BNL. The body of this plan establishes the management goals and actions necessary for managing the natural resources at BNL. The appendices provide specific management requirements for threatened and endangered amphibians and fish (Appendices A and B respectively), lists of actions in tabular format (Appendix C), and regulatory drivers for the Natural Resource Program (Appendix D). The purpose of the Natural Resource Management Plan is to provide management guidance, promote stewardship of the natural resources found at BNL, and to integrate their protection with pursuit of the Laboratory's mission. The philosophy or guiding principles of the NRMP are stewardship, adaptive ecosystem management, compliance, integration with other plans and requirements, and incorporation of community involvement, where applicable.

Information Resources Management Framework for Virtual Enterprise

OpenAIRE

Mao, Lingxiang

2015-01-01

Virtual enterprise is a new form of organization in recent years which adapt to the IT environment. Information resources management implemented in the virtual enterprise is determined by the form of business organization and information exchange mechanisms. According to the present characteristics of virtual enterprise management, it puts forward the strategies and measures of information resources management framework for virtual enterprise.

The international safeguards profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)