Unannounced inspection for integrated safeguards: A theoretical perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Avenhaus, R.

2001-01-01

Full text: The application of a safeguards verification regime based on existing agreements under INFCIRC/153 and on the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540, has the potential to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to relax its traditional facility and material-oriented inspection procedures. The relaxation will take into account the IAEA's enhanced access to information as well as complementary access to locations gained through the application of extended measures foreseen under the Additional Protocol. It will reflect the associated confidence achieved at the State level. It is generally agreed that such a trade-off between the new strengthening measures and the traditional measures is reasonable and desirable, both from the point of view of the inspected State, which would like to receive tangible credit for providing increased openness and transparency in its peaceful nuclear activities, and from the viewpoint of the IAEA, which must apportion its limited inspection resources efficiently. An often-discussed proposal to reduce routine inspection effort while maintaining safeguards effectiveness is to replace scheduled interim inspections with a smaller number of random, unannounced visits. Intuitively, the unpredictability aspect is appealing, as it places the potential diverter in a permanent state of uncertainty. There are also some disadvantages, however, such as the difficulty of planning and implementing truly random inspections and the burden experienced by facility operators obliged to accommodate them. An objective evaluation of a randomized inspection regime vis-a-vis conventional routine inspections requires an objective measure of effectiveness and a means of optimizing that measure - in other words a theoretical framework for analyzing verification problems. In our paper we provide such a framework by quantifying the notion of timely detection and by treating the problem consistently a strategic one. We present a series of models which

Scoping Study of Machine Learning Techniques for Visualization and Analysis of Multi-source Data in Nuclear Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cui, Yonggang

2018-05-07

In implementation of nuclear safeguards, many different techniques are being used to monitor operation of nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear materials, ranging from radiation detectors, flow monitors, video surveillance, satellite imagers, digital seals to open source search and reports of onsite inspections/verifications. Each technique measures one or more unique properties related to nuclear materials or operation processes. Because these data sets have no or loose correlations, it could be beneficial to analyze the data sets together to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards processes. Advanced visualization techniques and machine-learning based multi-modality analysis could be effective tools in such integrated analysis. In this project, we will conduct a survey of existing visualization and analysis techniques for multi-source data and assess their potential values in nuclear safeguards.

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

Safeguards by Design Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-13

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Safeguards by Design Challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

2016-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Some developments in safeguards techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beets, C.

1977-01-01

The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

1977-05-01

Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a Track-Etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have been developed and evaluated. These include a super-8-mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. (author)

IAEA safeguards technical manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-03-01

Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

IAEA safeguards and classified materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

1997-01-01

The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Safeguards '85

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

Machine safety: proper safeguarding techniques.

Science.gov (United States)

Martin, K J

1992-06-01

1. OSHA mandates certain safeguarding of machinery to prevent accidents and protect machine operators. OSHA specifies moving parts that must be guarded and sets criteria for the guards. 2. A 1989 OSHA standard for lockout/tagout requires locking the energy source during maintenance, periodically inspecting for power transmission, and training maintenance workers. 3. In an amputation emergency, first aid for cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shock, and bleeding are the first considerations. The amputated part should be wrapped in moist gauze, placed in a sealed plastic bag, and placed in a container of 50% water and 50% ice for transport. 4. The role of the occupational health nurse in machine safety is to conduct worksite analyses to identify proper safeguarding and to communicate deficiencies to appropriate personnel; to train workers in safe work practices and observe compliance in the use of machine guards; to provide care to workers injured by machines; and to reinforce safe work practices among machine operators.

Information-Driven Inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar

2010-01-01

New uranium enrichment capacity is being built worldwide in response to perceived shortfalls in future supply. To meet increasing safeguards responsibilities with limited resources, the nonproliferation community is exploring next-generation concepts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards, such as advanced technologies to enable unattended monitoring of nuclear material. These include attribute measurement technologies, data authentication tools, and transmission and security methods. However, there are several conceptual issues with how such data would be used to improve the ability of a safeguards inspectorate such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reach better safeguards conclusions regarding the activities of a State. The IAEA is pursuing the implementation of information-driven safeguards, whereby all available sources of information are used to make the application of safeguards more effective and efficient. Data from continuous, unattended monitoring systems can be used to optimize on-site inspection scheduling and activities at declared facilities, resulting in fewer, better inspections. Such information-driven inspections are the logical evolution of inspection planning - making use of all available information to enhance scheduled and randomized inspections. Data collection and analysis approaches for unattended monitoring systems can be designed to protect sensitive information while enabling information-driven inspections. A number of such inspections within a predetermined range could reduce inspection frequency while providing an equal or greater level of deterrence against illicit activity, all while meeting operator and technology holder requirements and reducing inspector and operator burden. Three options for using unattended monitoring data to determine an information-driven inspection schedule are to (1) send all unattended monitoring data off-site, which will require advances in data analysis techniques to

Activities at Forschungszentrum Juelich in Safeguards Analytical Techniques and Measurements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duerr, M.; Knott, A.; Middendorp, R.; Niemeyer, I.; Kueppers, S.; Zoriy, M.; Froning, M.; Bosbach, D.

2015-01-01

The application of safeguards by the IAEA involves analytical measurements of samples taken during inspections. The development and advancement of analytical techniques with support from the Member States contributes to strengthened and more efficient verification of compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Since recently, a cooperation agreement has been established between Forschungszentrum Juelich and the IAEA in the field of analytical services. The current working areas of Forschungszentrum Juelich are: (i) Production of synthetic micro-particles as calibration standard and reference material for particle analysis, (ii) qualification of the Forschungszentrum Juelich as a member of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories for safeguards (NWAL), and (iii) analysis of impurities in nuclear material samples. With respect to the synthesis of particles, a dedicated setup for the production of uranium particles is being developed, which addresses the urgent need for material tailored for its use in quality assurance and quality control measures for particle analysis of environmental swipe samples. Furthermore, Forschungszentrum Juelich has been nominated as a candidate laboratory for membership in the NWAL network. To this end, analytical capabilities at Forschungszentrum Juelich have been joined to form an analytical service within a dedicated quality management system. Another activity is the establishment of analytical techniques for impurity analysis of uranium-oxide, mainly focusing on inductively coupled mass spectrometry. This contribution will present the activities at Forschungszentrum Juelich in the area of analytical measurements and techniques for nuclear verification. (author)

Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badawy, I.

2007-01-01

The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

2001-01-01

Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

Neutron techniques in Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zucker, M.S.

1982-01-01

An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

Safeguards techniques and equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuroi, Hideo

1986-01-01

This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

Randomization of inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.

1989-01-01

As the numbers and complexity of nuclear facilities increase, limitations on resources for international safeguards may restrict attainment of safeguards goals. One option for improving the efficiency of limited resources is to expand the current inspection regime to include random allocation of the amount and frequency of inspection effort to material strata or to facilities. This paper identifies the changes in safeguards policy, administrative procedures, and operational procedures that would be necessary to accommodate randomized inspections and identifies those situations where randomization can improve inspection efficiency and those situations where the current nonrandom inspections should be maintained. 9 refs., 1 tab

Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Qun

2001-01-01

Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

International safeguards for spent fuel storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

1981-08-01

This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1983-01-01

The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

A new fast neutron collar for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies containing burnable poison rods

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Evans, Louise G., E-mail: evanslg@ornl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Schwalbach, Peter; Baere, Paul De [European Commission, Euratom Safeguards Office (Luxembourg); Browne, Michael C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

2013-11-21

Safeguards inspection measurements must be performed in a timely manner in order to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. A shorter measurement time can increase the number of items that a nuclear safeguards inspector can reliably measure during a period of access to a nuclear facility. In turn, this improves the reliability of the acquired statistical sample, which is used to inform decisions regarding compliance. Safeguards inspection measurements should also maintain independence from facility operator declarations. Existing neutron collars employ thermal neutron interrogation for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh fuel assemblies. A new fast neutron collar has been developed for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies containing gadolinia (Gd{sub 2}O{sub 3}) burnable poison rods. The Euratom Fast Collar (EFC) was designed with high neutron detection efficiency to make a fast (Cd) mode measurement viable whilst meeting the high counting precision and short assay time requirements of the Euratom safeguards inspectorate. A fast mode measurement reduces the instrument sensitivity to burnable poison rod content and therefore reduces the applied poison correction, consequently reducing the dependence on the operator declaration of the poison content within an assembly. The EFC non-destructive assay (NDA) of typical modern European pressurized water reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly designs have been simulated using Monte Carlo N-particle extended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. Simulations predict that the EFC can achieve 2% relative statistical uncertainty on the doubles neutron counting rate for a fast mode measurement in an assay time of 600 s (10 min) with the available {sup 241}AmLi (α,n) interrogation source strength of 5.7×10{sup 4} s{sup −1}. Furthermore, the calibration range of the new collar has been extended to verify {sup 235}U content in variable PWR fuel

A new fast neutron collar for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies containing burnable poison rods

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, Louise G.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Schwalbach, Peter; Baere, Paul De; Browne, Michael C.

2013-01-01

Safeguards inspection measurements must be performed in a timely manner in order to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. A shorter measurement time can increase the number of items that a nuclear safeguards inspector can reliably measure during a period of access to a nuclear facility. In turn, this improves the reliability of the acquired statistical sample, which is used to inform decisions regarding compliance. Safeguards inspection measurements should also maintain independence from facility operator declarations. Existing neutron collars employ thermal neutron interrogation for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh fuel assemblies. A new fast neutron collar has been developed for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies containing gadolinia (Gd 2 O 3 ) burnable poison rods. The Euratom Fast Collar (EFC) was designed with high neutron detection efficiency to make a fast (Cd) mode measurement viable whilst meeting the high counting precision and short assay time requirements of the Euratom safeguards inspectorate. A fast mode measurement reduces the instrument sensitivity to burnable poison rod content and therefore reduces the applied poison correction, consequently reducing the dependence on the operator declaration of the poison content within an assembly. The EFC non-destructive assay (NDA) of typical modern European pressurized water reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly designs have been simulated using Monte Carlo N-particle extended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. Simulations predict that the EFC can achieve 2% relative statistical uncertainty on the doubles neutron counting rate for a fast mode measurement in an assay time of 600 s (10 min) with the available 241 AmLi (α,n) interrogation source strength of 5.7×10 4 s −1 . Furthermore, the calibration range of the new collar has been extended to verify 235 U content in variable PWR fuel designs in the presence of up to

Inspection program for U.S. research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Isaac, Patrick J.

2010-01-01

This paper presents an established program for inspection of nuclear research reactors to ensure that systems and techniques are in accordance with regulatory requirements and to provide protection for the health and safety of the public. The inspection program, implemented from the time a facility gets licensed, remains in effect through operations, shutdown, decommissioning, and until the license is terminated. The program establishes inspection methodology for operating, safeguards, and decommissioning activities. Using a performance- based approach, inspectors focus their attention on activities important to safety. Inspection procedures allow the inspectors to assess facility safety and compliance to applicable requirements. A well designed inspection program is an integral part of the mechanism to ensure that the level of performance in the strategic areas of reactor safety, radiation safety, and safeguards is acceptable and provides adequate protection of public health and safety. (author)

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

Towards more efficient safeguards approach of transfer campaign in Wolsong CANDU reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, S. K.; Na, W. W.; Park, W. S.; Jung, S. T.; Park, S. J.

2002-01-01

Due to the unique character of the CANDU reactor, a transfer campaign has been carried out every year for 2 months or so in Wolsong unit 1. It is expected to require performance of the transfer campaign for 4 units of Wolsong site in 2006 and more than 50% of the ROK safeguards inspection efforts. The IAEA and TCNC have gained several years of experience in safeguards approach during transfer campaign. Occasionally the deterrence and interference of operator transfer work have been occurred in order to attain safeguards inspection goal. These could be minimized using optimum C/S applications, NDA and RDT techniques. This paper shows the interrelationship and combinations of these resources and proposes new safeguards approach to maintain the continuity of knowledge from fuel loading in the spent fuel pond to the point of canister loading and closure during transfer campaign

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galdoz, Erwin G.; Pinkalla, Mark

2010-01-01

The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malek, Z.

1980-10-01

The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

Current technical issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.

1977-01-01

Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

Mass-spectrometric measurements for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

1982-01-01

The need of an on-site inspection device to provide isotopic ratio measurements led to the development of a quadrupole mass spectrometer mounted in a van. This mobile laboratory has the ability, through the use of the resin bead technique, to acquire, prepare, and analyze samples of interest to nuclear safeguards. Precision of the measurements is about 1 to 2%

The IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

1976-01-01

The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaclav, J.

2010-01-01

The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

Safeguards aspects for future fuel management alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Gerstler, R.

1987-01-01

In the future, more flexible fuel management strategies will be realized in light-water reactor power stations. The incentives for this development are based on considerations related to safe and economic plant operation, e.g. improved fuel strategies can save fuel resources and waste management efforts. A further important aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle deals with recycling strategies. At the back-end of the fuel cycle, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will have to be assessed as an alternative to recycling strategies. These major development fields will also have consequences for international safeguards. In particular, reactor fuel strategies may involve higher burn-up, conditioning of spent fuel directly in the power plant, gadolinium-poisoned fuel and different levels of enrichment. These strategies will have an impact on inspection activities, especially on the applicability of NDA techniques. The inspection frequency could also be affected in recycling strategies using MOX fuel. There may be problems with NDA methods if reprocessed feed is used in enrichment plants. On the other hand, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will raise safeguards problems regarding design verification, long-term safeguarding and the very feasibility of inaccessible nuclear material

Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

1995-01-01

Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

Safeguards implementation at US facilities during 1986 and 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wredberg, L.

1987-01-01

Safeguards procedures were implemented at three nuclear facilities in the United States during 1986 and 1987, namely, the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina; the Salem No. 1 light water reactor (LWR) in New Jersey; and the Turkey Point No. 4 LWR in Florida. These three facilities have been under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since early 1986 in accordance with the voluntary offer agreement between the IAEA and the United States, which went into force in 1980. Because of limited manpower and budget resources allocated to safeguards in nuclear weapon states, only a limited number of facilities can be under IAEA safeguards inspections at a time. Facilities are, therefore, subject to inspection only during a 2-yr period in the case of the United States. After that period other facilities are selected for another 2-yr period from the list of facilities subject to safeguards under the agreement. The facilities have been selected so that they form a fuel cycle, i.e., the inspected reactors are fueled with fuel assemblies manufactured by the inspected fabrication plant. The IAEA applies full scope safeguards at the selected facilities based upon established implementation practice for the facility types

International safeguards for critical facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

1979-01-01

A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

Validating safeguards effectiveness given inherently limited test data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sicherman, A.

1987-01-01

A key issue in designing and evaluating nuclear safeguards systems is how to validate safeguards effectiveness against a spectrum of potential threats. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by a performance indicator such as the probability of defeating an adversary attempting a malevolent act. Effectiveness validation means a testing program that provides sufficient evidence that the performance indicator is at an acceptable level. Traditional statistical program when numerous independent system trials are possible. However, within the safeguards environment, many situations arise for which traditional statistical approaches may be neither feasible nor appropriate. Such situations can occur, for example, when there are obvious constraints on the number of possible tests due to operational impacts and testing costs. Furthermore, these tests are usually simulations (e.g., staged force-on-force exercises) rather than actual tests, and the system is often modified after each test. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to make and justify inferences about system performance by using traditional statistical techniques. In this paper, the authors discuss several alternative quantitative techniques for validating system effectiveness. The techniques include: (1) minimizing the number of required tests using sequential testing; (2) combining data from models inspections and exercises using Bayesian statistics to improve inferences about system performance; and (3) using reliability growth and scenario modeling to help specify which safeguards elements and scenarios to test

Fuel cycle based safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

1985-07-01

In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

Remote and unattended monitoring techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Whichello, J.

1998-01-01

In the last years, there has been a tremendous growth in the number of unattended assay and monitoring systems in the field. These systems have enabled reduced presence of inspectors while increasing the verification coverage. As part of the Strengthened safeguards System and in particular as part of the measures to improve the cost-effectiveness of safeguards, the possibility of remote transfer of authenticated and encrypted video surveillance, seals and radiation sensor data via telephone or special satellite links have been demonstrated and the necessary arrangements and infrastructure have been prepared. The evaluation of field trials of the remote monitoring systems have shown that the systems are effective in monitoring events of safeguards relevance in near real times. The systems are competitive from a cost standpoint when compared to current methods. The reduction of inspection efforts can be realized by application of remote monitoring technique with scheduled inspections and more effectively with the short notice or unannounced random inspections. It is expected that, upon completion of the necessary arrangements with the Member States authorities, the safeguards department will implement the technique widely before the year 2000

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

Application of safeguards procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

Research and development of safeguards measures for the large scale reprocessing plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kikuchi, Masahiro; Sato, Yuji; Yokota, Yasuhiro; Masuda, Shoichiro; Kobayashi, Isao; Uchikoshi, Seiji; Tsutaki, Yasuhiro; Nidaira, Kazuo [Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo (Japan)

1994-12-31

The Government of Japan agreed on the safeguards concepts of commercial size reprocessing plant under the bilateral agreement for cooperation between the Japan and the United States. In addition, the LASCAR, that is the forum of large scale reprocessing plant safeguards, could obtain the fruitful results in the spring of 1992. The research and development of safeguards measures for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant should be progressed with every regard to the concepts described in both documents. Basically, the material accountancy and monitoring system should be established, based on the NRTA and other measures in order to obtain the timeliness goal for plutonium, and the un-attended mode inspection approach based on the integrated containment/surveillance system coupled with radiation monitoring in order to reduce the inspection efforts. NMCC has been studying on the following measures for a large scale reprocessing plant safeguards (1) A radiation gate monitor and integrated surveillance system (2) A near real time Shipper and Receiver Difference monitoring (3) A near real time material accountancy system operated for the bulk handling area (4) A volume measurement technique in a large scale input accountancy vessel (5) An in-process inventory estimation technique applied to the process equipment such as the pulse column and evaporator (6) Solution transfer monitoring approach applied to buffer tanks in the chemical process (7) A timely analysis technique such as a hybrid K edge densitometer operated in the on-site laboratory (J.P.N.).

Optimal allocation of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.

1987-12-01

The Safeguards Department of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections to assure the peaceful use of a state's nuclear materials and facilities. Because of limited resources for conducting inspections, the careful disposition of inspection effort among these facilities is essential if the IAEA is to attain its safeguards goals. This report describes an optimization procedure for assigning an inspection effort to maximize attainment of IAEA goals. The procedure does not require quantitative estimates of safeguards effectiveness, material value, or facility importance. Instead, the optimization is based on qualitative, relative prioritizations of inspection activities and materials to be safeguarded. This allocation framework is applicable to an arbitrary group of facilities such as a state's fuel cycle, the facilities inspected by an operations division, or all of the facilities inspected by the IAEA

Optimal allocation of international atomic energy agency inspection resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.

1987-01-01

Each year the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections to confirm that nuclear materials and facilities are employed for peaceful purposes. Because of limited inspection resources, however, the IAEA cannot fully attain its safeguards goals either quantitatively as measured by the inspection effort negotiated in the facility attachments or qualitatively as measured by the IAEA criteria for evaluating attainment of safeguards goals. Under current IAEA procedures the allocation of inspection resources assigns essentially equal inspection effort to facilities of the same type. An alternative approach would incorporate consideration of all material categories and facilities to be assigned inspection resources when allocating effort to a particular facility. One such method for allocating inspection resources is based on the IAEA criteria. The criteria provide a framework for allocating inspection effort that includes a ranking of material types according to their safeguards importance, an implicit definition of inspection activities for each material and facility type, and criteria for judging the attainment of safeguards goals in terms of the quality and frequency of these inspection activities. This framework is applicable to resource allocation for an arbitrary group of facilities such as a state's fuel cycle, the facilities inspected by an operations division, or all of the facilities inspected by the IAEA

Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

2013-01-01

This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kelly, P.

1986-01-01

The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

Employing innovative techniques to reduce inspection times

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heumueller, R.; Guse, G.; Dirauf, F.; Fischer, E.

1997-01-01

Shorter inspection periods mean lower revision costs and less tight revision schedules, but must not detract from the quality of inspection findings. This requirement imposes upon the company performing the inspection the need for top achievements both in quality management and in the use of innovative techniques. Flexible equipment systems and inspection techniques adapted to specific purposes are able to reduce inspection times in many inspection jobs. As part of a complete system designed to reduce inspection times, the new Saphir (Siemens Alok Phased Array Integrated Reliable UT-System) inspection equipment system is the core of most of the recent innovations. Being an integrated inspection equipment system, it is able to handle conventional US probes as well as arrays and phased arrays. It is open for further matching to specific inspection and administrative requirements and developments, and it may be incorporated in the network of an integrated system with a database. A technological leap in probe design in the past few years has allowed controllable wave fields to be generated which are in no way inferior to those of conventional probes with fixed angles of incidence. In this way, a number of inspection techniques can be implemented with a single probe. This reduces inspection times, setup and retooling times, and doses. Typical examples already used in practice are the LLT (longitudinal-longitudinal-transverse waves) technique and the integration of inspections for longitudinal and transverse defects in a single run. In the near future, surfaces with complicated curvatures will be inspected by novel modular robot systems consisting of individual modules of linear axes and rotational axes. (orig.) [de

Safeguards surveillance equipment and data sharing between IAEA and a member state

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Seung Sik

1999-01-01

Efficiency and reliability are two prongs of implementation of safeguards policy. Unattended surveillance is getting wide acceptance through its field trials and technical advances. In achieving goal of safeguards, new safeguards system should provide less intrusiveness than conventional inspection. Unattended surveillance data share will be a major issue among some countries that have own national inspection scheme in place in parallel with international safeguards to check the resources consuming incurred by the repeated installations. Nonetheless, the issue has not been focussed yet among the States concerned, especially for the country like Korea with national inspection in operation. For balanced development in safeguards regime between IAEA and Korea, sharing of unattended surveillance data with SSAC needs to be worked out in conjunction with the joint use of safeguards instruments that is in the process

Preliminary concepts: safeguards for spent light-water reactor fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-06-01

The technology available for safeguarding spent nuclear fuels from light-water power reactors is reviewed, and preliminary concepts for a spent-fuel safeguards system are presented. Essential elements of a spent-fuel safeguards system are infrequent on-site inspections, containment and surveillance systems to assure the integrity of stored fuel between inspections, and nondestructive measurements of the fuel assemblies. Key safeguards research and development activities necessary to implement such a system are identified. These activities include the development of tamper-indicating fuel-assembly identification systems and the design and development of nondestructive spent-fuel measurement systems

Computed Radiography: An Innovative Inspection Technique

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klein, William A.; Councill, Donald L.

2002-01-01

Florida Power and Light Company's (FPL) Nuclear Division combined two diverse technologies to create an innovative inspection technique, Computed Radiography, that improves personnel safety and unit reliability while reducing inspection costs. This technique was pioneered in the medical field and applied in the Nuclear Division initially to detect piping degradation due to flow-accelerated corrosion. Component degradation can be detected by this additional technique. This approach permits FPL to reduce inspection costs, perform on line examinations (no generation curtailment), and to maintain or improve both personnel safety and unit reliability. Computed Radiography is a very versatile tool capable of other uses: - improving the external corrosion program by permitting inspections underneath insulation, and - diagnosing system and component problems such as valve positions, without the need to shutdown or disassemble the component. (authors)

Future issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

1991-01-01

The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunt, Alan; Tobin, S. J.

2015-01-01

In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hunt, Alan [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Idaho Accelerator Center, Dept. of Physics; Reedy, E. T.E. [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Dept. of Phyics, Idaho Accelerator Center; Mozin, V. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Nonproliferation

2015-02-12

In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

2010-01-01

Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

1983-01-01

The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

Safeguarding research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Powers, J.A.

1983-03-01

The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

Safeguard sleuths

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowry, D.

1989-01-01

A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eccleston, G.W.

1994-01-01

Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions

Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

Short notice inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pouchkarev, V.

1998-01-01

For 30 years the IAEA safeguards system have evolved and have been strengthened by the regular introduction of new methods and techniques, improving both its effectiveness and efficiency. The member States of the IAEA have indicated their willingness to accept new obligations and associated technical measure that greatly strengthen the nuclear safeguards system. One element of this is the extent to which the IAEA inspectors have physical access to relevant locations for the purpose of providing independent verification of the exclusively peaceful intent of a State nuclear program. The Protocol to Safeguards granted new legal authority with respect to information on, and short notice inspector access to, all buildings on a nuclear site and administrative agreements that improve the process of designating inspectors and IAEA access to modern means of communication. This report is a short description of unannounced or short notice inspections as measures on which the new strengthened and cost efficient system will be based

Application of safeguards techniques to the Eurodif gas diffusion plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coates, J.H.; Goens, J.R.

1979-01-01

The characteristic features of gas diffusion plants are such that safeguards procedures specifically suited for this technique can be proposed. The first of these features is the fact that appreciably altering the enrichment level of the plant product is not possible without making easily detectable changes either in the plant structure itself or in the movement of incoming and outgoing materials. Furthermore, because of the size of gas diffusion plants large stocks of uranium are present in them. Although inventory differences may be small in relative terms, they are large in abosolute terms and exceed the quantities of low-enriched uranium considered significant from the standpoint of safeguards. Lastly, the impossibility for economic reasons for taking a physical inventory of the plant after it has been emptied prevents a comparison of the physical inventory with the book inventory. It would therefore seem that the safeguarding of a gas diffusion plant should be focused on the movement of nuclear material between the plant and the outside world. The verification of inputs and outputs can be considered satisfactory from the safeguards standpoint as long as it is possible to make sure of the containment of the plant and of the surveillance for the purpose of preventing clandestine alterations of structure. The description of the Eurodif plant and the movement of materials planned there at present indicate that the application of such a safeguards technique to the plant should be acceptable to the competent authorities. For this purpose a monitoring area has been set aside in which the inspectors will be able to keep track of all movements between the outside world and the enrichment plant

The Agency programme for the development of safeguards techniques and instrumentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopez-Menchero, E.; Waligura, A.J.

1976-01-01

The programme of the Division of Development concentrates attention upon a variety of technical problems and tasks to enable the Agency safeguards system to achieve its safeguards objectives most economically for the Agency, the Member States and the nuclear facility operators. The programme must take into account the changes which may occur in the Agency's tasks as a consequence of implementation of safeguards in States with important nuclear activities. This paper attempts to summarize where the Agency methods and techniques development programme stands on meeting defined technical objectives, to point out where the main problems lie and to offer some guidelines for their solution. (author)

Some basic concepts of fast breeder reactor safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tkharev, E.; Walford, F.J.

1987-04-01

The range of discussion topics of this report is restricted to a few key areas of safeguards importance at Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) only. The differences between thermal and fast reactors that may have safeguards significance in the case of FBRs are listed. The FBR principles of design are mentioned. The relevant safeguards objectives and criteria are given. The fundamental issues for safeguarding FBR are treated. An outline safeguards approach is presented. Model inspection activities are mentioned. 4 figs

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1978-01-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1979-02-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

2010-01-01

range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

2000-01-01

With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

Promoting transparency: The Korean national inspection experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, B.K.

1999-01-01

The Republic of Korea started the LAMA full-scope safeguards inspection with the TRIGA research reactor in 1976 when the nuclear industry was at its infancy. Over two decades of rapid economic growth was propelled by stable supply of electricity, substantially from nuclear energy. Today nearly half of the nations electricity comes from sixteen operating nuclear power plants (12 LWRs + 4 OLRs). Total number of facilities under IAEA inspection reaches 30 where the Agency conducts about 400 PDIs annually. Within the last decade, nuclear transparency in Korea has transformed into the international norm primarily from the needs of rapidly expanding domestic nuclear program. In addition, possibility of North/South mutual inspection helped initiate the national inspection regime in addition to the IAEA inspection. The Technology Center for Nuclear Control was established at KAERI in 1994 in order to maintain the nation's nuclear verification expertise in support of the Korean government. National inspections have been carried out simultaneously with the IAEA inspection since 1997 with trial facilities, and all domestic facilities are being inspected from this year. Necessary legal framework and working procedures were developed and field-tried for LWRs, OLRs, fuel fabrication plants and research reactor facilities. Although the inspection equipment and technology along with the safeguards criteria are quite similar to those of the Agency, it is essential to maintain the independent conclusion capabilities between IAEA and the national authority. Substantial improvements in the IAEA safeguards inspection goal attainments since 1997 are credited to the increasing safeguards awareness among operators and SSAC. Further work is necessary to develop the evaluation criteria based on the field inspection results to meet the national inspection goals. The Korean Government signed the Additional Protocol with IAEA on June, 1999 after much deliberation since it involves facilities

The international safeguards profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1986-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

Development of in-field monitoring techniques. Report on Task FIN A845 on the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Toivonen, H; Honkamaa, T; Kansanaho, A; Poellaenen, R [Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Helsinki (Finland). Aerosol Lab.; Aarnio, P; Ala-Heikkilae, J; Nikkinen, M [Helsinki Univ. of Technology, Otaniemi (Finland). Nuclear Engineering Lab.

1994-12-01

Several in-field measuring techniques were identified for use in safeguards inspections. The radiation measurements play a major role in seeking environmetal signatures. A high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer, either in-situ or in sample analysis, gives unequivocal evidence of nuclear activities on the site of interest. Although portable spectrometers are commercially available, hardware development and software tailoring seem to be necessary before efficient mobile measurements can be initiated. To understand trends and pattern of contamination, the results of the measurements have be displayed on digital maps. GPS-integration is an essential requirement for the equipment in environmental monitoring. (orig.) (14 refs., 5 figs., 17 tabs.).

Development of in-field monitoring techniques. Report on Task FIN A845 on the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toivonen, H.; Honkamaa, T.; Kansanaho, A.; Poellaenen, R.; Aarnio, P.; Ala-Heikkilae, J.; Nikkinen, M.

1994-12-01

Several in-field measuring techniques were identified for use in safeguards inspections. The radiation measurements play a major role in seeking environmetal signatures. A high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer, either in-situ or in sample analysis, gives unequivocal evidence of nuclear activities on the site of interest. Although portable spectrometers are commercially available, hardware development and software tailoring seem to be necessary before efficient mobile measurements can be initiated. To understand trends and pattern of contamination, the results of the measurements have be displayed on digital maps. GPS-integration is an essential requirement for the equipment in environmental monitoring. (orig.) (14 refs., 5 figs., 17 tabs.)

A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

1995-03-01

In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

Verification and the safeguards legacy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perricos, Demetrius

2001-01-01

A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

Optical inspection techniques for security instrumentation

Science.gov (United States)

van Renesse, Rudolf L.

1996-03-01

This paper reviews four optical inspection systems, in which development TNO Institute of Applied Physics was involved: (1) intaglio scanning and recognition, (2) banknote quality inspection, (3) visualization and reading of a finger pattern, and (4) 3DAS authentication. (1) Intaglio is reserved for high security printing. It renders a tactile relief that can be recognized by a laser scanning technique. This technique is applied by various national banks to detect counterfeit banknotes returning from circulation. A new system is proposed that will detect intaglio on arbitrary wrinkled banknotes. (2) A banknote fitness inspection system (BFIS) that inspects banknotes in specularly reflected light is described. As modern banknotes are provided increasingly with reflective security foils, a new system is proposed that inspects banknotes in specular and diffuse reflection, as well as in transmission. (3) An alternative visualization method for visualization of finger patterns is described, employing a reflective elastomer. A CD scanning system reads the finger patterns. (4) A nonwoven structure has two advantageous properties for card authentication: a random structure which renders each few square millimeters of the pattern uniqueness (identification) and a 3D structure which makes it virtually impossible to be counterfeited (authentication). Both properties are inspected by an extremely simple lenseless reader.

Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gartner, K.J.

1986-01-01

Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nardi, J.

1984-01-01

The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

Investigation of techniques for the application of safeguards to a continuously fuelled reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hodgkinson, J.G.; Head, D.A.

1978-03-01

The following three areas of prime safeguards concern are analyzed: 1) at the reactor face, where spent fuel is first removed from the channel, 2) along the system for transporting spent fuel from the reactor to the storage bay, and 3) in the spent fuel storage bay. The program is designed to develop techniques and instruments to safeguard these areas

Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cronin, J.J.; Kohen, M.D.; Rivers, J.D.

1996-01-01

The Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) was established by the Department of Defense in 1990 to assist defense facilities in preparing for treaty verification activities. Led by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), an element of the Department of Defense, DTIRP''s membership includes representatives from other Department of Defense agencies, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Commerce, and others. The Office of Safeguards and Security has a significant interest in this program, due to the number of national defense facilities within its purview that are candidates for future inspections. As a result, the Office of Safeguards and Security has taken a very active role in DTIRP. This paper discusses the Office of Safeguards and Security''s increasing involvement in various elements of the DTIRP, ranging from facility assessments to training development and implementation

OSE inspection of materials control and accountability: Review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coady, K.J.

1987-01-01

As part of its task to confirm that Department of Energy (DOE) field offices provide levels of security and safeguards commensurate with defined threats, the DOE Office of Security Evaluations (OSE) conducts inspections of the nuclear materials control and accountability (MC and A) systems at DOE facilities throughout the United States. Inspections are based on the DOE Safeguards and Security Standards and Criteria, tailored to the specific aspects at and threats to each individual site. This paper reviews the process of inspecting MC and A systems during the planning, preinspection, and inspection/reporting phases

MC ampersand A policy issues for international inspections at DOE nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crawford, D.W.; Zack, N.R.

1994-01-01

Recent initiatives and executive decisions within the US have included an offer to place certain special nuclear materials from the former weapons stockpile under international safeguards inspections. The nuclear materials at issue are excess materials; other materials characterized as strategic reserve will not be subject to these international activities. Current Department of Energy requirements and procedures to account for and control these nuclear materials may need to be modified to accommodate these inspections. Safeguards issues, such as physical inventory frequency and verification requirements, may rise from the collateral safeguards activities in support of both domestic and international safeguards. This paper will discuss Office of Safeguards and Security policy and views on these international inspection activities at former nuclear weapons facilities, including implications for current domestic safeguards approaches currently implemented at these facilities

Estimation of inspection effort

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mullen, M.F.; Wincek, M.A.

1979-06-01

An overview of IAEA inspection activities is presented, and the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of an inspection is discussed. Two models are described - an effort model and an effectiveness model. The effort model breaks the IAEA's inspection effort into components; the amount of effort required for each component is estimated; and the total effort is determined by summing the effort for each component. The effectiveness model quantifies the effectiveness of inspections in terms of probabilities of detection and quantities of material to be detected, if diverted over a specific period. The method is applied to a 200 metric ton per year low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facility. A description of the model plant is presented, a safeguards approach is outlined, and sampling plans are calculated. The required inspection effort is estimated and the results are compared to IAEA estimates. Some other applications of the method are discussed briefly. Examples are presented which demonstrate how the method might be useful in formulating guidelines for inspection planning and in establishing technical criteria for safeguards implementation

Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gyane, E.

2010-01-01

Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

Advanced inspection and repair techniques for primary side components

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elm, Ralph

1998-01-01

The availability of nuclear power plant mainly depends on the components of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) such as reactor pressure vessel, core internals and steam generators. The last decade has been characterized by intensive inspection and repair work on PWR steam generators. In the future, it can be expected, that the inspection of the reactor pressure vessel and the inspection and repair of its internals, in both PWR and BWR will be one of the challenges for the nuclear community. Due to this challenge, new, advanced inspection and repair techniques for the vital primary side components have been developed and applied, taking into account such issues as: use of reliable and fast inspection methods, repair of affected components instead of costly replacement, reduction of outage time compared to conventional methods, minimized radiation exposure, acceptable costs. This paper reflects on advanced inspection and repair techniques such as: Baffle Former Bolt inspection and replacement, Barrel Former Bolt inspection and replacement, Mechanized UT and visual inspection of reactor pressure vessels, Steam Generator repair by advanced sleeving technology. The techniques described have been successfully applied in nuclear power plants and improved the operation performance of the components and the NPP. (author). 6 figs

Operation of inspection data acquisition and evaluation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takahashi, Yoichi; Harada, Hiroshi; Watanabe, Masayuki; Sakaguchi, Makoto; Ishikawa, Masayuki

2016-01-01

Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) is a large scale plant to treat a huge amount of Plutonium significant for safeguards. The LArge SCAle Reprocessing plant safeguards (LASCAR) Forum recommended an effective utilization of unattended verification systems and automated data acquisition system etc. Based on LASCAR recommendation, Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) has developed the inspection data acquisition system as the automated data acquisition system from the unattended verification systems (including non-destructive assay equipment, solution monitoring system and surveillance camera). The data gathered from the unattended verification system are provided to the inspection data evaluation system for the State and the IAEA. In this development, redundancy concepts for data transfer line, in order to prevent inspection data missing, were introduced, and the timely confirmation of solution behaver such as material flows and inventories by the solution monitoring can be achieved. Furthermore, for purpose of efficiency of evaluation of inspection activity for the State, NMCC has developed the inspection data evaluation system which operates automated partition of inspection data coming from each verification equipment. Additionally, the inspection data system evaluation can manage the inspection activities and their efforts. These development and operation have been funded by JSGO (Japan Safeguards Office). This paper describes development history and operation of the inspection data acquisition and evaluation system. (author)

Testimony from a former safeguards inspector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, R.

1981-01-01

Testimony by a former inspector relates the ineffectiveness and deficiencies of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections to Iraq's controversial nuclear program. He notes that all Iraqi inspections since 1976 were conducted by Soviet and Hungarian nationals and that the procedures require prior notice, limited authority, and other loopholes that permit numerous opportunities for materials to be diverted to facilities not subject to inspection. Granting that IAEA inspections are essential, he urges removing some of the constraints that permit noncooperating nations to thwart the intent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1984-07-01

The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

JOINT STUDY OF IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS METHODOLOGY USING NO-NOTICE RANDOMIZED INSPECTION AT JNC'S Pu HANDLING FACILITIES

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

LU, M.S.; SANBORN, J.B.

2000-01-01

After the Iraq war, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 93+2 Program was developed to strengthen and improve the cost-effectiveness of the existing safeguards system. In particular, the Program aims to enhance the IAEA ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and materials. The IAEA 93+2 Program includes: (1) Increased access to information and its effective use; (2) Increased physical access; (3) Optimum use of the existing system. The measures considered are divided in two parts: measures in Part 1 are those, which may be implemented within the existing IAEA authority; Part 2 measures require complementary legal authority, in the form of an additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540. A description of the status of its implementation can be found in ''Implementation of the Additional Protocol'' (Cooley, 1999). In particular, increased physical access includes access beyond locations requiring additional authorities derived from the INFCIRC/540 and no-notice randomized inspections. No-notice randomized inspections could enhance the inspection effectiveness and efficiency by increasing the coverage of the material involved, providing better confirmation of the operational status of the facilities and higher degree of confidence that no undeclared activities or materials existed at the facilities--including the detection of possible measures to conceal diversions

UF/sub 6/ test loop for evaluation and implementation of international enrichment plant safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cooley, J.N.; Fields, L.W.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1987-01-01

A functional test loop capable of simulating UF/sub 6/ flows, pressures, and pipe deposits characteristic of gas centrifuge enrichment plant piping has been designed and fabricated by the Enrichment Safeguards Program of Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. The purpose of the test loop is twofold: (1) to enable the IAEA to evaluate and to calibrate enrichment safeguards measurement instrumentation to be used in limited frequency-unannounced access (LFUA) inspection strategy measurements at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and (2) to train IAEA inspectors in the use of such instrumentation. The test loop incorporates actual sections of cascade header pipes from the centrifuge enrichment plants subject to IAEA inspections. The test loop is described, applications for its use by the IAEA are detailed, and results from an initial demonstration session using the test loop are summarized. By giving the IAEA the in-house capability to evaluate LFUA inspection strategy approaches, to develop inspection procedures, to calibrate instrumentation, and to train inspectors, the UF/sub 6/ cascade header pipe test loop will contribute to the IAEA's success in implementing LFUA strategy inspections at gas centrifuge enrichment facilities subject to international safeguards inspections

The evolution of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.

1999-01-01

The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

2012-04-01

Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1988-01-01

Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-01

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Close, D.A.

1995-06-01

This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

Development of inspection data collection and evaluation system for large scale MOX fuel fabrication plant safeguards (3)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumakura, Shinichi; Masuda, Shoichiro; Iso, Shoko; Hisamatsu, Yoshinori; Kurobe, Hiroko; Nakajima, Shinji

2015-01-01

Inspection Data Collection and Evaluation System is the system to store inspection data and operator declaration data collected from various measurement equipment, which is installed in fuel fabrication processes of the large-scale MOX fuel fabrication plant, and to make safeguards evaluation based on Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA) using these data. Nuclear Material Control Center developed the simulator to simulate fuel fabrication process, in-process material inventory/flow data and the measurement data and the adequacy/impact to the uncertainty of the material balance using the simulation results, such as the facility operation and the operational status, has been reviewed. Following the 34th INMM Japan chapter presentation, the model similar to the real nuclear material accountancy during the fuel fabrication process was simulated and the nuclear material accountancy and its uncertainty (Sigma MUF) have been reviewed. Some findings have been obtained, such as regarding evaluation related indicators for verification under a more realistic accountancy which could be applied by operator. (author)

Implementation of the INSPECT software package for statistical calculation in nuclear material accountability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marzo, M.A.S.

1986-01-01

The INSPECT software package was developed in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory for statistical calculations in nuclear material accountability. The programs apply the inspection and evaluation methodology described in Part of the Safeguards Technical Manual. In this paper the implementation of INSPECT at the Safeguards Division of CNEN, and the main characteristics of INSPECT are described. The potential applications of INSPECT to the nuclear material accountability is presented. (Author) [pt

Optimizing the design of international safeguards inspection systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of international inspections for verifying the operation of a nuclear facility requires that available resources be allocated among inspection activities to maximize detection of misoperation. This report describes a design and evaluation method for selecting an inspection system that is optimal for accomplishing inspection objectives. The discussion includes methods for identifying system objectives, defining performance measures, and choosing between candidate systems. Optimization theory is applied in selecting the most preferred inspection design for a single nuclear facility, and an extension to optimal allocation of inspection resources among States containing multiple facilities is outlined. 3 figures, 5 tables

Experience of Brazilian safeguards analytical laboratory in DA analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bezerra, J.H.B.; Araujo, R.M.S.; Pereira, J.C.A.

2001-01-01

Full text: The Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, inaugurated in September 1983, performs uranium analysis in samples of nuclear materials taken during national safeguards inspections as well as in samples taken during ABACC's inspections performed in Argentina. The Laboratory analyzes Intercomparison samples provided by IAEA, NBL, ABACC, CEN and EQRAIN. The method used to perform uranium analysis is the Davies and Gray/NBL. All the steps of the analytical procedures, such as chemical kinetics of the reactions and instrumental parameters, are rigorously controlled. An internal Quality Control of the measurements is made by means of analysis of Certified Reference Materials and the performance of the results meets the ESARDA's Target Values for Random and Systematic Components both in Intercomparison Samples and in samples taken during inspections. The typical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, and accuracy obtained in a routine basis for nuclear grade materials is 0.1% and 0.14% respectively. The performance of the results obtained are comparable to the best international laboratories which perform uranium analysis in nuclear materials for safeguards purposes. (author)

Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

2001-01-01

SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

1976-01-01

Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

A safeguards approach for a closed geological repository for spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meer, K. van der; Carchon, R.

1999-01-01

After closure of a geological repository a diversion of fissile material can only take place by excavating spent fuel containers and bringing them to the surface. Therefore mining activities are required, either by reopening the original shaft, by creating a new shaft or by approaching the containers underground via a neighbouring mine The recovery time of the stored spent fuel plays an important role in the determination of the timeliness criterion and, therefore, the inspection frequency of the site. Obviously, this frequency can create a financial constraint due to the infinite character of the spent fuel storage in a geological repository. Anomalies for detection of a possible diversion are undeclared mining activities. The safeguards approach has to assure Continuity Of Knowledge (COK) of the fissile material. By consequence, a safeguards approach that is developed for a closed repository, is influenced by the safeguards approach applied to an open. repository and a conditioning facility. A closed repository is verified by DIV. To perform the DIV satellite monitoring could be performed for surface verification and e.g. seismic techniques could be used for verification that no undeclared mining activities underground take place. Visual inspections of the site by inspectors have to reveal concealment methods used by a potential diverter. These measures should guarantee that the disposed spent fuel remains untouched. (author)

IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol in the Eurasia Region

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murakami, K.

2001-01-01

Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT. Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States. In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols

Advanced digital video surveillance for safeguard and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumar, R.

2002-01-01

Full text: Video surveillance is a very crucial component in safeguard and physical protection. Digital technology has revolutionized the surveillance scenario and brought in various new capabilities like better image quality, faster search and retrieval of video images, less storage space for recording, efficient transmission and storage of video, better protection of recorded video images, and easy remote accesses to live and recorded video etc. The basic safeguard requirement for verifiably uninterrupted surveillance has remained largely unchanged since its inception. However, changes to the inspection paradigm to admit automated review and remote monitoring have dramatically increased the demands on safeguard surveillance system. Today's safeguard systems can incorporate intelligent motion detection with very low rate of false alarm and less archiving volume, embedded image processing capability for object behavior and event based indexing, object recognition, efficient querying and report generation etc. It also demands cryptographically authenticating, encrypted, and highly compressed video data for efficient, secure, tamper indicating and transmission. In physical protection, intelligent on robust video motion detection, real time moving object detection and tracking from stationary and moving camera platform, multi-camera cooperative tracking, activity detection and recognition, human motion analysis etc. is going to play a key rote in perimeter security. Incorporation of front and video imagery exploitation tools like automatic number plate recognition, vehicle identification and classification, vehicle undercarriage inspection, face recognition, iris recognition and other biometric tools, gesture recognition etc. makes personnel and vehicle access control robust and foolproof. Innovative digital image enhancement techniques coupled with novel sensor design makes low cost, omni-directional vision capable, all weather, day night surveillance a reality

Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

1995-01-01

The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

A Priority-Based View of Future Challenges in International Nuclear Safeguards.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matteucci, Kayla [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2017-06-01

The international nuclear safeguards community is faced with a host of challenges in the coming years, many of which have been outlined but have not been described in terms of their urgency. Literature regarding safeguards challenges is either broad and devoid of any reference to prioritization or tailored to a specific problem and removed from the overall goals of the safeguards community. For example, developing new methods of environmental sampling, improving containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies to increase efficiency and decrease inspection time, advancing nuclear material accountancy (NMA) techniques, and planning safeguards approaches for new types of nuclear facilities are all important. They have not, however, been distinctly prioritized at a high level within the safeguards community. Based on a review of existing literature and interviews with experts on these upcoming challenges, this paper offers a high-level summary of present and future priorities in safeguards, with attention both to what is feasible and to what is most imperative. In doing so, the paper addresses the potential repercussions for failing to prioritize, with a focus on the risk of diversion of nuclear material. Within the context of shifts in the American political landscape, and keeping in mind that nonproliferation issues may take a backseat to others in the near future, a prioritized view of safeguards objectives will be vital. In the interest of expanding upon this work, the paper offers several potential conceptual models for prioritization which can be explored in greater depth upon further research.

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunn, D.R.; Huebel, J.G.; Poggio, A.J.

1980-01-01

The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-09-01

The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

Safeguards on MOX assemblies at LWRs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arenas Carrasco, J.; Koulikov, I.; Heinonen, O.J.; Arlt, R.; Grigoleit, K.; Clarke, R.; Swinhoe, M.

2000-01-01

Operating within the framework of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) for unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in LWRs, the IAEA and EURATOM have gained experience in safeguarding 13 LWRs licensed to operate with MOX assemblies. In order to fulfil SIR requirements, verification methods and techniques capable of measuring MOX assemblies under water have been and are still being developed. These encompass both qualitative tests for the detection of plutonium (gross attribute tests) and quantitative tests for the measurement of the amount of plutonium (partial defect tests) and are based on gamma and neutron detection techniques. There are nine PWR and two BWR where the reactor and the spent fuel pond can be covered by the same surveillance device. These are Type I reactors where the reactor and the pond are located in the same hall. In these types of facilities relying on surveillance during the MOX refuelling is especially difficult at the BWRs due to the depth of the core pond. There are two PWR type facilities where the reactor and the spent fuel pond are located in different halls and cannot be covered by the same surveillance device (Type II). An open core camera has not been installed during refuelling and therefore indirect surveillance is currently used to survey MOX loading. Improvements are therefore required and are under consideration. After receipt at the facility, there are a few facilities which must keep the received fresh MOX fuel in wet storage, not only for a short period prior to refuelling, but for more than a year, until the next refuelling campaign. In these cases timely inspections for direct use fresh nuclear material require considerable inspection effort. Additionally, where human surveillance of core loading and finally core closure are necessary there is also a large demand for manpower. Either an agreement should be reached with the operators to delay the MOX loading until the end of the fuelling campaign, or alternative approaches should be

Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

2010-01-01

The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

Regional safeguards arrangements: The Argentina-Brazil experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marzo, M.; Gonzales, H.L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Vicens, H.

1997-01-01

A Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) was established by Argentina and Brazil in July 1992. It is a full scope safeguard's system in both countries. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created to apply the SCCC. The main elements of the SCCC are presented. The main safeguards' procedures are described. A brief discussion of the inspection methodology and its impact for facility operators is performed. The safeguard's implementation from the operator's point of view is commented, taking as example a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina and a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. (author)

On qualification of TOFD technique for austenitic stainless steel welds inspection

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Martinez-Ona, R. [Tecnatom, San Sebastian de los Reyes (Spain); Viggianiello, S.; Bleuze, A. [Metalscan, Saint-Remy (France)

2006-07-01

Time of Flight Diffraction (TOFD) technique is gaining ground as a solid method for detection and sizing of defects. It has been reported that TOFD technique provides good results on the inspection of fine grain steels. However, there are few results regarding the application and performance of this technique on austenitic stainless steels. A big challenge of these inspections is the coarse grain structure that produces low signal to noise ratio and may mask the diffraction signals. Appropriate transducer design, selection of technique parameters and analysis tools could overcome the actual difficulties. In this paper, the main design aspects and parameters of the TOFD technique for austenitic steels are presented. It follows the description of qualification tests carried out to validate the technique for inspecting stainless steels welds. To conclude, discussion of results from actual inspections is shown. (orig.)

The development of in-process inventory walk-through examination system in the process at borrowing inspection between LEU fuel fabrication plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nakamura, Norihito; Namekawa, Masaru; Owada, Isao; Kikuchi, Masaru; Kodani, Yoshiki; Nozawa, Yukio

2005-01-01

Since the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) was designed the safeguards inspection organization by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) in December 1999, the NMCC has been performing safeguards inspection for the Nuclear Facilities in Japan. The NMCC has carried out the safeguards inspections to LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants (FFPs) and the NMCC has improved the method of safeguards inspection as it has changed over to the integrated safeguards from the year of 2005. Concerning the Borrowing inspection between LEU FFPs, which is the precondition to change over to the integrated safeguards, it is needed to estimate the entire inventory in the facility within the limited time. Therefore, the NMCC has developed the system called IWES (In-process inventory Walk-through Examination System) to examine the inventory in process smoothly, quickly and correctly at borrowing inspection, check the entire inventory quantity and evaluate them. This report describes how IWES aiming at effective/efficient confirmation of in-process inventory has been developed and how it is applied to the borrowing inspection activities. (author)

Nuclear facility safeguards as specified by the Czechoslovak administrative law

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elias, J.; Svab, J.

1978-01-01

A study is presented of the legal aspects of nuclear safeguards for the operation of nuclear power facilities evaluating the development of the legal arrangement over the past five years, i.e., encoding nuclear safeguards for nuclear facilities in the new building regulations (Act No. 50/1976 Coll. of Laws on Urban Planning and Building Regulations and implementing provisions). It also discusses the juridical position of State surveillance over the nuclear safety of nuclear facilities and its relation to surveillance carried out by specialized bodies of the State work safety inspection and to surveillance carried out by hygiene inspection bodies. (J.S.)

Engineers find climbing techniques work well for dam inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

O`Shea, M.; Graves, A. [Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, CO (United States)

1996-10-01

Climbing techniques adopted by the Bureau of Reclamation to inspect previously inaccessible or difficult to reach features at dams are described. Following the failure of the steel radial-arm gate at Folsom Dam, engineers mounted an effort to reach and inspect the dam`s seven other spillway gates. This close-up examination was performed to: (1) determine the condition of these gates; and (2) gather clues about the failure of the one gate. The access techniques described involved mountaineering techniques, as opposed to high scaling techniques, performed with dynamic and static nylon kermantle ropes.

Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuroi, H.; Osabe, T.

1984-01-01

A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

Development of environmental sample analysis techniques for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Magara, Masaaki; Hanzawa, Yukiko; Esaka, Fumitaka

1999-01-01

JAERI has been developing environmental sample analysis techniques for safeguards and preparing a clean chemistry laboratory with clean rooms. Methods to be developed are a bulk analysis and a particle analysis. In the bulk analysis, Inductively-Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometer or Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer are used to measure nuclear materials after chemical treatment of sample. In the particle analysis, Electron Probe Micro Analyzer and Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometer are used for elemental analysis and isotopic analysis, respectively. The design of the clean chemistry laboratory has been carried out and construction will be completed by the end of March, 2001. (author)

Evaluation of techniques for inspection and diagnostics of HWR pressure tubes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Jong-Ho

2008-01-01

Efficient and accurate inspection and diagnostic techniques for various reactor components and systems, especially pressure tubes for Heavy Water Reactors (HWRs), are an important factor in assuring reliable and safe plant operation. To foster international collaboration in the efficient and safe use of nuclear power, the IAEA conducted a Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on Inter-comparison of Techniques for HWR Pressure Tube Inspection and Diagnostics. The objective of the CRP was to inter-compare inspection and diagnostic techniques, in use and being developed, for structural integrity assessment of HWR pressure tubes. During the first phase of the CRP, participants investigated the capability of different techniques to detect and characterize flaws. During the second phase, participants collaborated to determine the hydrogen concentration and to detect and characterize hydride blisters in zirconium alloy pressure tubes. Eight organizations from six countries, which operate HWRs, have participated in this CRP, Most of the techniques examined are well established and many of them are regularly used during in-service inspection of pressure tubes. The inter-comparison of these techniques provides a platform for identifying a particular technique (or a set of techniques), which is more accurate and reliable as compared to others for a specified task. The CRP also witnessed some new methodologies, which can be implemented on in-service inspection tools. These new techniques could complement the existing ones to overcome their limitations, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of in-service inspection. This CRP also identified future areas of research and development. (author)

The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Synetos, Sotiris

2013-01-01

Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Defect sizing using automated ultrasonic inspection techniques at RNL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rogerson, A.; Highmore, P.J.; Poulter, L.N.J.

1983-10-01

RNL has developed and applied automated wide-beam pulse-echo and time-of-flight techniques with synthetic aperture processing for sizing defects in clad thick-section weldments and nozzle corner regions. These techniques were amongst those used in the four test plate inspections making up the UKAEA Defect Detection Trials. In this report a critical appraisal is given of the sizing procedures adopted by RNL in these inspections. Several factors influencing sizing accuracy are discussed and results from particular defects highlighted. The time-of-flight technique with colour graphics data display is shown to be highly effective in imaging near-vertical buried defects and underclad defects of height greater than 5 mm. Early characterisation of any identified defect from its ultrasonic response under pulse-echo inspection is seen as a desirable aid to the selection of an appropriate advanced sizing technique for buried defects. (author)

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

Technology of remote nuclear activity monitoring for national safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwack, Eun Ho; Kim, B. K.; Kim, J. S.; Yoon, W. K.; Kim, J. S.; Kim, J. S.; Cha, H. R.; Na, W. W.; Choi, Y. M.

2001-07-01

This project mainly focused on technical development on remote monitoring. It covers optical fiber scintillator to be used as NDA sensor to targets to be applied. Optical fiber scintillator was tested at the high radioactive environment. It is the first try in its kind for spent fuel measurement. It is confirmed that optical fiber sensor can be used for safeguards verification. Its feasibility for spent fuel storage silo at Wolsong reactor was studied. And to optimize remote transmission cost which can be regarded as a major barrier, virtual private network was studied for possible application for safeguards purpose. It can drastically reduce transmission cost and upgrade information surety. As target for remote monitoring, light water reactor and heavy water reactor were feasibly studied. Especially heavy water reactor has much potential for reduction of inspection efforts if remote monitoring is introduced. In overall remote monitoring can play a pivotal role to streamline safeguards inspection

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

Quality assurance inspections in the transportation packaging supplier industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jankovich, J.P.

1991-01-01

In this paper the quality assurance inspections of the transportation packaging supplier industry, conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on a routine basis since 1989 are discussed. The term supplier is used to include designers, fabricators, and distributors that hold NRC approved Quality Assurance Programs and Certificates of Compliance for packagings to transport radioactive materials. The objective of the inspections is to provide assurance that transportation packagings are fabricated and procured in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 21 and 71 requirements. The inspections are conducted in a systematic and comprehensive manner, utilizing uniform inspection techniques in order to assure uniformity and comparability. During the April 1989 and May 1991 period approximately 21 inspections were conducted by the Transportation Branch, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards of the NRC. The majority of the findings were identified in the areas of quality assurance procedures, control of special processes (e.g. welding, radiography), and maintenance of QA records

Verification of Remote Inspection Techniques for Reactor Internal Structures of Liquid Metal Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joo, Young Sang; Lee, Jae Han

2007-02-01

The reactor internal structures and components of a liquid metal reactor (LMR) are submerged in hot sodium of reactor vessel. The division 3 of ASME code section XI specifies the visual inspection as major in-service inspection (ISI) methods of reactor internal structures and components. Reactor internals of LMR can not be visually examined due to opaque liquid sodium. The under-sodium viewing techniques using an ultrasonic wave should be applied for the visual inspection of reactor internals. Recently, an ultrasonic waveguide sensor with a strip plate has been developed for an application to the under-sodium inspection. In this study, visualization technique, ranging technique and monitoring technique have been suggested for the remote inspection of reactor internals by using the waveguide sensor. The feasibility of these remote inspection techniques using ultrasonic waveguide sensor has been evaluated by an experimental verification

Verification of Remote Inspection Techniques for Reactor Internal Structures of Liquid Metal Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Joo, Young Sang; Lee, Jae Han

2007-02-15

The reactor internal structures and components of a liquid metal reactor (LMR) are submerged in hot sodium of reactor vessel. The division 3 of ASME code section XI specifies the visual inspection as major in-service inspection (ISI) methods of reactor internal structures and components. Reactor internals of LMR can not be visually examined due to opaque liquid sodium. The under-sodium viewing techniques using an ultrasonic wave should be applied for the visual inspection of reactor internals. Recently, an ultrasonic waveguide sensor with a strip plate has been developed for an application to the under-sodium inspection. In this study, visualization technique, ranging technique and monitoring technique have been suggested for the remote inspection of reactor internals by using the waveguide sensor. The feasibility of these remote inspection techniques using ultrasonic waveguide sensor has been evaluated by an experimental verification.

Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

1997-01-01

The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table

Proposal of a national system to supervise nuclear installations out of international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosa, L.P.

1990-01-01

It is proposed a national system to safeguard, supervise and inspect nuclear facilities in Brazil, apart from international safeguards. It discusses also the military nuclear activities and the uranium enrichment plants. The system should be controlled by Brazilian CNEN. (A.C.A.S.)

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

Safeguards sealing systems for Zebra

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ingram, G.; Jamieson, G.R.

1983-01-01

A relatively simple design has been produced for safeguards seals to be applied throughout the fuel containing areas at Zebra. It is based on the use of wire seals and regular Inspector surveillance. The application of the system would allow an Inspector to establish to a high degree of confidence that significant quantities of fuel had not been diverted during an intensive experimental programme. It would add about 5% to the time required for experiments, and careful planning would reduce this value. The inspection effort required to witness element movements during the experimental programme would average about 2 hours per day, with a further 2 hours spent each week on NDA of the fuel exposed. The Safeguards Inspector would require to spend about 25% of his time in the reactor area and would have ample time to deal with the relatively small number of fuel movements taking place in the storage area and with his duties elsewhere in the plant. During a core change, full-time inspection effort would be required for about 6 weeks each year. (author)

The nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Hongjun; Chen Desheng

1994-04-01

The constitution of nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities is introduced and the main contents are the data flow of nuclear safeguards. If the data flow moves positively, i.e. from source data →supporting documents→accounting records→accounting reports, the systems of records and reports will be constituted. If the data flow moves negatively, the way to trace inspection of nuclear material accounting quality will be constituted

OSE inspections: A different perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ware, J.H.

1987-01-01

The Office of Security Evaluation (OSE) is a staff activity of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (ASDP) and is responsible for the conduct of an inspection and evaluation program. The OSE Inspection Division conducts assessments of the effectiveness of Department of Energy (DOE) Safeguards and Security policies and protection programs. The inspections are conducted by OSE Inspectors and Support Specialists. Prior to the author's participation in the inspection of the San Francisco Operations Office, a DOE Field Office employee had never played an active role in an OSE Inspection of another field office. This paper discloses his experience as an OSE Inspector

Heat Exchanger Tube Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants using IRIS Technique

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, Byung Sik; Yang, Seung Han; Song, Seok Yoon; Kim, Yong Sik; Lee, Hee Jong

2005-01-01

Inspection of heat exchange tubing include steam generator of nuclear power plant mostly performed with eddy current method. Recently, various inspection technique is available such as remote field eddy current, flux leakage and ultrasonic methods. Each of these techniques has its merits and limitations. Electromagnetic techniques are very useful to locate areas of concern but sizing is hard because of the difficult interpretation of an electric signature. On the other hand, ultrasonic methods are very accurate in measuring wall loss damage, and are reliable for detecting cracks. Additionally ultrasound methods is not affected by support plates or tube sheets and variation of electrical conductivity or permeability. Ultrasound data is also easier to analyze since the data displayed is generally the remaining wall thickness. It should be emphasized that ultrasound is an important tool for sizing defects in tubing. In addition, it can be used in situations where eddy current or remote field eddy current is not reliable, or as a flaw assessment tool to supplement the electromagnetic data. The need to develop specialized ultrasonic tools for tubing inspection was necessary considering the limitations of electromagnetic techniques to some common inspection problems. These problems the sizing of wall loss in carbon steel tubes near the tube sheet or support plate, sizing internal erosion damage, and crack detection. This paper will present an IRIS(Internal Rotating Inspection System) ultrasonic tube inspection technique for heat exchanger tubing in nuclear power plant and verify inspection reliability for artificial flaw embedded to condenser tube

Experience on inspection at PFPF

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aoki, I.; Yamamoto, Y.; Takahashi, Saburo; Ooshima, Hirofumi; Kuniyasu, Kazufusa.

1993-01-01

In order to reduce a personal radiation exposure, Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) introduced an automated MOX fabrication technology. Safeguards system for the PFPF was designed and installed so as to be compatible with automated process operation as much as possible. Introduction of these system in PFPF made possible to do the inspection measurements with unattended mode and Near Real Time Material Accountancy (NRTA), consequently inspection has been carrying out effectively and efficiently. This paper describes the new Inspection activities as a comparison with old Inspection activities based on our experience. (author)

Reliability of surface inspection techniques for pressurized components

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kauppinen, P.; Sillanpaeae, J.

1991-01-01

In the Nordtest NDT-programme (1984 - 1988) the detection of flaws by surface inspection methods has been studied. In the round-robin exercise, 133 test pieces have been inspected by 32 inspectors in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. From the results, the detectability of defects by magnetic particle and liquid-penetrant testing and the influence of materials and techniques used are evaluated. (author)

Inspection activities of other strategic points (OSPs) at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kaifuki, Yukinobu; Ebata, Takashi; Nakano, Sadayuki; Fujimaki, Kazunori

2008-01-01

At Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test (AT) using actual spent fuels for the final confirmation of the equipment and the system has been performed since March 31, 2006 toward the commercial operation. The safeguards inspection during AT is required in the same manner as commercial operation condition because plutonium is handled. In RRP automated verification systems are established by using unattended verification systems including a number of process monitoring systems along with main plutonium handling process from the spent fuel storage until the MOX product storages. Even under the modernized safeguards, inspection activities at Other Strategic Points (OSPs) are required to confirm plant status in accordance with requirements of the IAEA safeguards criteria. This paper presents procedures and inspection activities at OSPs which has been implemented in RRP since start of AT. (author)

Concept for fuel-cycle based safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

deMontmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

1985-01-01

Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international independence are to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. A concept whereby safeguards might more effectively and efficiently accomplish the purposes of NPT safeguards is explored. The principal features are: (1) division of the fuel cycle into three zones, each containing material having a different degree of significance for safeguards; (2) closing a verified material balance around each zone, supplementing the present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them for others; (3) maintenance by the IAEA of a current book inventory for each facility by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility transfers; (4) near real-time analysis of material flow patterns through the fuel cycle; and (5) a periodic statement of the findings for the entire State that takes the form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

The Canadian experience in implementing the State-level integrated safeguards concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kent, M.A.; Ellacott, T.

2013-01-01

After receiving the Broad Safeguards Conclusion in 2005 that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, Canada began implementing the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada (SLISAC) on a Sector-by-Sector basis, culminating in the full State-wide implementation of Integrated Safeguards in January 2010. The Approach has resulted in a significant reduction in IAEA person days of inspection, a shift from scheduled routine inspections to randomized, short-notice and unannounced inspections, increased information streams on operational activities and inventory flows to the IAEA, and closer collaboration between the Agency and the SSAC (State System of Accounting and Control). This paper will describe the implementation of this new approach, touching on: the main features of the Canadian SLA (State-level Approach); the agreed order of priority in the transition to the approach within the various sectors of the Canadian fuel cycle; the work plan established for moving forward in a logical and orderly manner, thereby allowing all parties to put in place the necessary protocols and procedures; and some initial thoughts on the lessons learned throughout this process. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1984-01-01

The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gitau, Ernest T. N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, Joel R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Toomey, Christopher M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-09-01

In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

Experience in safeguarding nuclear material at the Rheinsberg nuclear power station

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Winkler, R.

1976-01-01

The three years' experience that has been gained in application of the Safeguards Agreement shows that the carrying out of inspections at the nuclear power plant has virtually no effect on operating conditions. In future it will be possible to reduce this effect even further and still maintain the operational reliability of the station. Verification of the transfer of nuclear material and detection of possible violations have proved relatively simple. The labour requirement of each unit at the station for the performance of inspections is not more that thirty man-days. Constructive collaboration between power station staff and inspectors is of great importance in improving the safeguards procedures. (author)

ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palacios, E.

1998-01-01

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

2007-01-01

Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

1978-08-01

An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

IFSS: The IAEA's inspection field support system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Muller, R.; Heinonen, O.J.; Schriefer, D.

1990-01-01

Recently, highly automated nuclear facilities with enormous volumes of nuclear material accounting data have come into operation. A few others will become operational shortly. Analysis and verification of the data for safeguards purposes is manageable only with improved computer support in the field. To assist its safeguards inspectors, the IAEA has developed the Inspection Field Support System (IFSS). It allows safeguards inspectors to collect, maintain, analyse, and evaluate inspection data on site at nuclear facilities. Previously, field computer support to safeguards inspectors concentrated on providing measurement instrumentation with data storage, but data analysis capabilities were elementary. Also, generic statistical tools were available to handle data that inspectors could (usually manually) input into a computer. Electronic links between these two directions were rudimentary. IFSS integrates the data required for verification and accounting so that inspectors will be able to devote more time to measurements and to derive conclusions at the site in a more timely manner. The system operates on stationary personal computers as well as on portable ones. Its introduction reflects the IAEA Department of Safeguards determination to further improve operational efficiency. It should be emphasized that IFSS implementation is still under development. Several field installations have been made to obtain practical experience and to determine the system's effectiveness

Advanced Inspection and Repair Welding Techniques for SCC Countermeasures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takagi, T.; Nishimoto, K.; Uchimoto, T.

2012-01-01

Feasibility studies of advanced inspection and repair welding techniques were conducted in the framework of the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency of Japan (NISA) project on the enhancement of ageing management and maintenance of NPPs. In this paper, features of NDE methods investigated in the projects, main results of research activities and prospect of nickel based alloy weld inspection are discussed. We also make a review for the integrity and reliability evaluation techniques for repair welding of ageing plants which were intensively investigated in view of regulatory criteria, in NISA project. (author)

Wall thinning inspection technique for large-diameter piping using guided wave

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miki, Masahiro; Nagashima, Yoshiaki; Endou, Masao; Kodaira, Kojiro; Maniwa, Kazuhiko

2009-01-01

Guided wave inspection technique is effective for detecting defects like corrosion in piping, because it can perform long range inspection. It is possible to expect this inspection as a method that leads to the decrease of the inspection process and its cost, because the incidental work can be reduced. Especially, the contraction effect of the inspection work is extensive in large-diameter piping inspection. In this paper, we introduce the guided wave inspection system to large-diameter piping. The feature is a guided wave sensor that can freely transform according to the curvature of inspection object, and portable inspection equipment. We discuss the result of detection examination for artificial wall-thinning in large-diameter piping using this system. (author)

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuously up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilise the national resources more effectively than before. (orig.)

Simulation tools for industrial applications of phased array inspection techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mahaut, St.; Roy, O.; Chatillon, S.; Calmon, P.

2001-01-01

Ultrasonic phased arrays techniques have been developed at the French Atomic Energy Commission in order to improve defects characterization and adaptability to various inspection configuration (complex geometry specimen). Such transducers allow 'standard' techniques - adjustable beam-steering and focusing -, or more 'advanced' techniques - self-focusing on defects for instance -. To estimate the performances of those techniques, models have been developed, which allows to compute the ultrasonic field radiated by an arbitrary phased array transducer through any complex specimen, and to predict the ultrasonic response of various defects inspected with a known beam. Both modeling applications are gathered in the Civa software, dedicated to NDT expertise. The use of those complementary models allows to evaluate the ability of a phased array to steer and focus the ultrasonic beam, and therefore its relevancy to detect and characterize defects. These models are specifically developed to give accurate solutions to realistic inspection applications. This paper briefly describes the CIVA models, and presents some applications dedicated to the inspection of complex specimen containing various defects with a phased array used to steer and focus the beam. Defect detection and characterization performances are discussed for the various configurations. Some experimental validation of both models are also presented. (authors)

Development of the Risk-Based Inspection Techniques and Pilot Plant Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Phillips, J.H.

1997-01-01

Risk-based techniques have been developed for commercial nuclear power plants. System boundaries and success criteria is defined using the probabilistic risk analysis or probabilistic safety analysis developed to meet the individual plant evaluation. Final ranking of components is by a plant expert panel similar to the one developed for maintenance rule. Components are identified as being high risk-significant or low-risk significant. Maintenance and resources are focused on those components that have the highest risk-significance. The techniques have been developed and applied at a number of pilot plants. Results from the first risk-based inspection pilot plant indicates that safety due to pipe failure can be doubled while the inspection reduced to about 80% when compared with current inspection programs. The reduction in inspection reduces the person-rem exposure resulting in further increases in safety. These techniques have been documented in publication by the ASME CRTD

Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopatin, S.

2010-01-01

Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, J. W.

1998-01-01

In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

Development of ultrasonic inspection technique for crack detection in retaining rings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brook, M.V.

1990-01-01

The majority of retaining rings which are currently in service, are composed of a material which is susceptible to stress corrosion when exposed to moisture. Due to the inherent stress levels in the shrunk-on areas, they are particularly susceptible to stress corrosion attack. Therefore, retaining rings require non-destructive examination to avert catastrophic failure. Guidelines for retaining ring inspection issued by EPRI recommend ultrasonic manual and automated methods of inspection for rings in place. Application of the conventional manual method, using S-waves is difficult, and yields unreliable results. Due to the unreliability factor, utilities have been forced to depend upon surface examination methods, such as visual and penetrant techniques. In most instances, a surface exam will necessitate the costly and potentially damaging removal of the rings from the rotor to provide full access to areas of interest. Due to the various complexities of conventional ultrasonic retaining ring inspections, it is essential that the front end ultrasonics (i.e., transducers and techniques) be optimized to produce the best possible examination. For this reason, AMDATA has developed custom transducers and techniques to enhance automated detection capability of flaws in the various suspect areas of retaining rings. When the optimized techniques are applied to generate the best possible raw data, the Intraspect /98 trademark is then used to reliably apply technique, acquire the data and perform post processing evaluations. One of the most promising ultrasonic techniques for retaining ring inspection is creeping waves. This paper investigates the use of creeping waves for retaining ring inspection

Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

1978-01-01

The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

2010-01-01

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

2015-01-01

The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

1986-01-01

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

Inspections talks with IAEA again broken off

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1993-01-01

North Korea again appears likely to resist more detailed safeguards inspections of its disputed nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The country's loner status was reinforced during the IAEA General Conference in September, when no other nation joined North Korea in voting against the placement of the inspection issue on the conference's agenda

Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ogawa, T.

2001-01-01

Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, S.G. de

1986-01-01

The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

2010-01-01

The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

1978-04-01

DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

Evaluation for the status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Sook; Lee, Byung Doo

2007-11-15

Safeguards implementation of nuclear material was carried out at facility level in an effect to support the peaceful nuclear activities in KAERI. Safeguards implementation is to fulfill the obligations associated with international agreements such as IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. IAEA inspection is the most important and basic factor of the safeguards implementation for the purpose of verifying whether all source or special fissionable material is diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor during 2001-2006 is evaluated in this report.

Evaluation for the status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Sook; Lee, Byung Doo

2007-11-01

Safeguards implementation of nuclear material was carried out at facility level in an effect to support the peaceful nuclear activities in KAERI. Safeguards implementation is to fulfill the obligations associated with international agreements such as IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. IAEA inspection is the most important and basic factor of the safeguards implementation for the purpose of verifying whether all source or special fissionable material is diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor during 2001-2006 is evaluated in this report

Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

1991-01-01

Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

Application of ultrasonic phased array technique for inspection of stud bolts in nuclear reactor vessel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Sang Woo; Lee, Joon Ho; Park, Min Su; Cho, Youn Ho; Park, Moon Ho

2004-01-01

The stud bolt is one of crucial parts for safety of reactor vessels in nuclear power plants. Cracks initiation and propagation were reported in stud bolts using closure of reactor vessel and head. Stud bolts are inspected by ultrasonic technique during overhaul periodically for the prevention of stud bolt failure and radioactive leakage from nuclear reactor. In conventional ultrasonic testing for inspection of stud bolts, crack was detected by using shadow effect. It take too much time to inspect stud bolt by using conventional ultrasonic technique. In addition, there were numerous spurious signal reflected from every thread. In this study, the advanced ultrasonic phased array technique was introduced for inspect stud bolts. The phased array technique provide fast inspection and high detectability of defects. There are sector scanning and linear scanning method in phased array technique, and these scanning methods were applied to inspect stud bolt and detectability was investigated.

All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

2010-01-01

All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

UF6 test loop for evaluation and implementation of international enrichment plant safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cooley, J.N.; Fields, L.W.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1987-06-01

A functional test loop capable of simulating UF 6 flows, pressures, and pipe deposits characteristic of gas centrifuge enrichment plant piping has been designed and fabricated by the Enrichment Safeguards Program of Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., for use by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Purpose of the test loop is twofold: (1) to enable the IAEA to evaluate and to calibrate enrichment safeguards measurement instrumentation to be used in limited frequency-unannounced access (LFUA) inspection strategy measurements at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and (2) to train IAEA inspectors in the use of such instrumentation. The test loop incorporates actual sections of cascade header pipes from the centrifuge enrichment plants subject to IAEA inspections. The test loop is described, applications for its use by the IAEA are detailed, and results from an initial demonstration session using the test loop are summarized

Development of FBR visual inspection technique in sodium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, T.; Nagai, S.; Shioyama, T.; Sato, M.; Karasawa, H.; Maruyama, F.; Ota, S.; Hida, T.; Kai, M.

1995-01-01

Because the reactor vessel of Fast Breeder Reactor is filled with opaque liquid sodium, it is expected to develop an acoustic visual inspection technique in sodium. The acoustic 3 dimensional image processing technique and the elemental parts of the visual inspection equipment in sodium have been developed at the first stage of the in-sodium visual inspection technique development. The cross correlation processing has been applied to improve the S/N ratio in the acoustic echo that are deteriorated by wetting in sodium and the low sensitivity that are also deteriorated by rather smaller diameter to integrate the high density multiple acoustic sensors. The improvement of S/N ratio has been realized by the cross correlation between acoustic echo data that is reflected from the objects and M-series continuous wave that is transmitted from the acoustic transducer. The high speed parallel processing circuits, in which DSPs (Digital Signal Processors) are included, have been developed to realize high speed processing by employing (the circuits connected to) each of sensors in parallel. Synthetic Aperture Focussing Technique (SAFT) has been applied to the acoustic 3-dimensional image processing. The amounts of ellipsoids must be drawn into the 3-dimensional memory to compose the 3-dimensional image by SAFT. Then, a high performance work-station has been employed to deal with enormous data to compose the acoustic 3 dimensional image. Motors and cables, which can be operated under the condition of high-temperature and high-radiation environment, have been developed as the parts of the manipulator which will be used for visual inspection equipment in sodium. A prototype drive mechanism consists of the manipulator with three joints and a scanner with an arrayed acoustic sensors which a sweeps in fan-shape mechanically. The manipulatory type prototype drive mechanism and the signal processing device have been developed and tested, and the acoustic 3-dimensional image of pyramid

Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

2001-01-01

Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

Survey of nuclear safeguards in the European Community

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.

1992-01-01

The control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy comprises activities related to nuclear safety, to the protection of persons and of the environment, to physical protection of the nuclear materials against theft or terrorism and to nuclear safeguards. Nuclear safeguards means the set of measures performed by the IAEA in the context of non-proliferation safeguards and, in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, those measures enabling the European Commission to satisfy itself that the nuclear material is not diverted from its intended and declared uses (particularly to unlawful non-peaceful applications) and that the obligations arising from International Agreements are complied with. This contribution to the International Conference on Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy at Liege briefly reviews the history of nuclear safeguards in Europe since the early 1960ies. It also notes the practical aspects for, constraints and impacts to the nuclear operators imposed on them by the European law such as inspections, accountancy, reporting and describes the trend of the future development of the safeguards operation. The paper finally addresses non-proliferation issues and, notably, the relations between the IAEA and Euratom which in an exemplary way resulted in effective international safeguards and high non-proliferation credentials of the European Community. (author)

Two new NDT techniques for inspection of containment welds beneath coatings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fitzpatrick, G.L.; Thome, D.K.

1991-06-01

Two new nondestructive testing methods were evaluated for inspection of containment welds beneath coatings, including magneto-optic imaging and Hall effect measurements. Traditional inspection methods, including magnetic particle inspection, are unsatisfactory in the nuclear containment environment coatings must be removed to provide reliable results. This creates radioactive waste, potential airborne contamination, and prolonged radiation exposure to inspection personnel. The new methods offer great improvement because of increased sensitivity and rapid scanning capability. Results obtained during Phase 1 demonstrated that magneto-optic imaging methods offered good detection of cracking in welded carbon steel samples, even through paint. Direct, real-time images were obtained with this technique in a video format ideal for complete documentation of the full inspection. A new method for rapidly inducing the required magnetic fields for inspection was also demonstrated and offers the potential for eliminating bulky, high current power supplies or magnetic yokes. Results obtained with the Hall effect were not as promising as they were on aluminum, due to electrical interference problems and variables biasing caused by residual magnetic fields in the parts. The technique may still be useful for inspecting tight spaces not accessible with magneto-optic imaging devices, but will require significant development. 13 refs., 18 figs

Surface Casting Defects Inspection Using Vision System and Neural Network Techniques

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Świłło S.J.

2013-12-01

Full Text Available The paper presents a vision based approach and neural network techniques in surface defects inspection and categorization. Depending on part design and processing techniques, castings may develop surface discontinuities such as cracks and pores that greatly influence the material’s properties Since the human visual inspection for the surface is slow and expensive, a computer vision system is an alternative solution for the online inspection. The authors present the developed vision system uses an advanced image processing algorithm based on modified Laplacian of Gaussian edge detection method and advanced lighting system. The defect inspection algorithm consists of several parameters that allow the user to specify the sensitivity level at which he can accept the defects in the casting. In addition to the developed image processing algorithm and vision system apparatus, an advanced learning process has been developed, based on neural network techniques. Finally, as an example three groups of defects were investigated demonstrates automatic selection and categorization of the measured defects, such as blowholes, shrinkage porosity and shrinkage cavity.

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

JOE, J.

2007-01-01

Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders

From safeguards to treaty verification and the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, J.

1997-01-01

Changes in safeguards techniques and changes in the context in which it has to be applied have led to a continuous evolution of safeguards. Nuclear material accountancy and its verification is still the basis of safeguards. But also other, less technical, tools are developed for the future. Will safeguards not become an idle story but continue to lay effectively and efficiently a concrete foundation for international trust and peace, there is a need for more investment in new methods and techniques to allow safeguards to keep pace with the developments, both politically and technically. Safeguards serves the international community by enhancing the mutual trust that leads to national security. That also enabled the rapid growth of international co-operation on the applications of nuclear energy. But international security is based on confidence. It is not a priori the technique that creates that sphere of confidence, the human and political interactions are at least equally important. In different cultures there are marked differences in behaviour and such differences can be easily misinterpreted. Therefore also the new safeguards has to be equally objectively established and critically executed under the close attention of all parties concerned

Nuclear safeguards in Brazil and Argentina: 25 years of ABACC

Science.gov (United States)

Kassenova, Togzhan

2017-11-01

As possessors of advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina bear special responsibility for helping the international community and neighbors in their region feel confident that their nuclear programs are peaceful, secure, and safe. Over the past 25 years, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has played an indispensable role in strengthening such confidence by implementing nuclear safeguards in the two countries. Today, ABACC carries out safeguards inspections at a total of 76 nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. This article describes how Brazil and Argentina view trends in the global nonproliferation regime and international nuclear safeguards, and explains how these trends relate to unique challenges and opportunities facing Brazil, Argentina, and ABACC.

Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

Development of Inspection Technique for Socket Weld of Small Bore Piping in Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, Byungsik; Kim, Yongsik; Lee, Jeongseok

2013-01-01

The losses incurred by unplanned shutdowns are significant; consequently, early crack initiation and crack detection, including the detection of fillet weld manufacturing defects, is of the utmost importance. Current inspection techniques are not capable of reliably inspecting socket welds; therefore, new approaches are needed. The new technique must be sensitive to socket weld cracking, which usually initiates from the root, in order to detect the cracking during the early failure phase. In 2008, Kori unit 3 experienced leakage from the drain line socket weld of a steam generator. From this experience, KHNP enforced a management program to focus on enhancing the reliability of small bore socket weld piping inspections. Currently, conventional manual ultrasonic inspection techniques are used to detect service induced fatigue cracks. But there was uncertainty on manual ultrasonic inspection because of limited access to the welds and difficulties with contact between the ultrasonic probe and the OD surface of small bore piping. In this study, phased array ultrasonic inspection techniques are applied to increase inspection speed and reliability. Additionally a manually encoded scanner has been developed to enhance contact conditions and maintain constant signal quality. A phased array UT technique and system was developed to inspect small bore socket welds. The experimental results show all artificial flaws in the specimen were detected and measured. These experimental results show, that the newly developed inspection system, has improved the reliability and speed of small bore socket weld inspection. Based on these results, future works shall focus on additional experiments, with more realistic flaw responses. By applying this technique to the field, we expect that it can improve the integrity of small bore piping in nuclear power plants

IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aparo, M.; Barnes, B.; Lewis, W.; Hsiung, Sue

1999-01-01

The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

Non cooperative games applied to nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goutal, P.

1997-01-01

This study presents the utilization of the non cooperative games in the nuclear safeguards. In order to dissuade from possible diversions of nuclear materials, an inspector has to realize a certain number of inspections in a nuclear installation. The inspector has to minimize the detection time of a diversion and the diverter has to maximize this time. A software, JADIS, is realized to obtain optimum inspection strategy for a great number of periods. Another game is studied: the infiltration game. An infiltration agent has to brake into the installation without being headed off. (A.L.B.)

Application of a portable briefcase personal computer to research reactor safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ryan, R.D.

1985-01-01

The Kookaburra Portable Briefcase Personal Computer (PBPC) has been applied to safeguards inspections at the HIFAR research reactor. A complete portable measuring system provides for non-destructive assay on both fresh and spent fuel. Application programs developed for the PBPC make it possible to immediately analyse the results of the measurements to verify the amounts of nuclear material declared by the operator. This contributes significantly to meeting the essential safeguards criteria of timely detection of diversion

Present status and progress of safeguards activities and physical protection on the eve of year 2000 in Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simov, R.; Gotzev, A.

1999-01-01

From the very beginning of the IAEA safeguards implementation in Bulgaria, up to now the IAEA inspections verified no deviations or uncertainties in accounting of the nuclear materials. According to the official IAEA reports Bulgaria has fulfilled completely its duties under the safeguards and the Non-proliferation Treaty and has fully assisted the IAEA inspection activity. As for the physical protection, the complicated up-to-date system was established contributing to the safety of Kozloduy NPP and the plant operation

Performance values for non destructive assay (NDA) techniques applied to safeguards: the 2002 evaluation by the ESARDA NDA Working Group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guardini, S.

2003-01-01

The first evaluation of NDA performance values undertaken by the ESARDA Working Group for Standards and Non Destructive Assay Techniques (WGNDA) was published in 1993. Almost 10 years later the Working Group decided to review those values, to report about improvements and to issue new performance values for techniques which were not applied in the early nineties, or were at that time only emerging. Non-Destructive Assay techniques have become more and more important in recent years, and they are used to a large extent in nuclear material accountancy and control both by operators and control authorities. As a consequence, the performance evaluation for NDA techniques is of particular relevance to safeguards authorities in optimising Safeguards operations and reducing costs. Performance values are important also for NMAC regulators, to define detection levels, limits for anomalies, goal quantities and to negotiate basic audit rules. This paper presents the latest evaluation of ESARDA Performance Values (EPVs) for the most common NDA techniques currently used for the assay of nuclear materials for Safeguards purposes. The main topics covered by the document are: techniques for plutonium bearing materials: PuO 2 and MOX; techniques for U-bearing materials; techniques for U and Pu in liquid form; techniques for spent fuel assay. This issue of the performance values is the result of specific international round robin exercises, field measurements and ad hoc experiments, evaluated and discussed in the ESARDA NDA Working Group. (author)

The UK safeguards R and D support program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

1991-01-01

The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented

In-service inspection techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Backfisch, W.; Zipser, R.R.

1980-01-01

The owner of a nuclear power plant (NPP) is obligated and interested to maintain - by regular maintenance and in-service inspections - the operational safety and availability of the plant for the subsequent operating period in a condition, as is specified as the basis of the erection and the last operational permits. In-service inspections are performed to verify the operational safety, and maintenance work is performed to guarantee the availability. Below, the typical in-service inspections of a light-water reactor NPP (operated on a pressurized-water reactor or on a boiling-water reactor) are described with details and examples of typical inspections, especially of recurrent performance tests of the systems. (orig./RW)

Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezniczek, A.

2013-01-01

Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Analysis on the status of the application of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tao Zhangsheng; Zhao Yingjun

2008-01-01

Based on the application status of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards, advantage of satellite remote sensing technology is analyzed, main types of satellite image used in nuclear safeguards are elaborated and the main application of satellite images is regarded to detect, verify and monitor nuclear activities; verify additional protocol declaration and design information, support performing complementary access inspections; investigate alleged undeclared activities based on open source or the third party information. Application examples of satellite image in nuclear safeguards to analyze nuclear facilities by other countries, the ability of remote sensing technology in nuclear safeguards is discussed. (authors)

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-09-28

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-01-01

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

IAEA concerns about advanced containment and surveillance concepts or other alternative safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

von Baeckmann, A.; Powers, J.

1981-01-01

Nuclear material accountancy is used in IAEA safeguards as a measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Over the past five years the IAEA has worked with its Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to quantify major terms of the objectives, i.e., timeliness of detection, significant quantities and detection probabilities. The Agency is using those quantifications, as recommended by SAGSI, as guidelines for inspection planning and for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards. The guidelines are used in this paper, together with other criteria like cost-effectiveness, compliance with legal limitation and non-intrusiveness, as yard-sticks for the assessment of the potential capabilities of alternative safeguards approaches. 4 refs

Lessons learned: Experiences with Integrated Safeguards in Norway

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sekse, T.; Hornkjol, S.

2010-01-01

Integrated safeguards (IS) was implemented in Norway in 2002 as one of the first countries in the world. The implementation of IS has provided both advantages and disadvantages for Norway. Lessons learned will be discussed. The concept of unannounced inspections under the integrated safeguards regime compared to traditional safeguards is one of the major issues. Small users with depleted uranium as shielding containers and the effort used to safeguard them is an aspect of this issue. Recently there has been an interest from the IAEA to investigate the historical boundaries between a research reactor site and a neighboring defense research site. The paper will address this issue as a part of the implementation of IS. Lately, we have seen that several commercial parties have started research on nuclear fuel cycle related projects. This raises some questions concerning what to declare under Article 2 of the Additional Protocol (AP). Today anyone with a computer connected to the internet could carry out research amenable to declaration under the AP. This paper will discuss this issue. (author)

Annual report of the Director of Safeguards 1988-1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

The Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) operates Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It also contributes to the IAEA safeguards network, in support of the Australian Government's committment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Activities carried out during the year ended 30 June 1989 in each of these areas are reviewed. It is reported that 54 export shipments of uranium ore concentrates containing 5061 tonnes of uranium oxide were made by Australia's three producers and that no unreconcilied differences in quantities of Australian obligated nuclear material, wherever situated, or nuclear material within Australia, regardless of origin, as at 30 June 1989. The report also includes copies of IAEA's statements related to the verification inspections pursuant to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement

Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, Pierre

2001-01-01

Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

Review of the nuclear safeguards problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

1979-10-01

The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties

International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Challenge and response

Science.gov (United States)

Spector, Leonard S.

2017-11-01

This article provides a critical review of the nuclear accounting and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), known as "IAEA safeguards." The article focuses on the multiple challenges the Agency confronts in verifying that all nuclear activities in the countries under its safeguards system are being pursued for exclusively peaceful purposes. The principal challenges noted are those posed by: undeclared facilities, the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, illicit procurement activities, denial of inspector access, difficulties in verifying absence of weaponization activities, and difficulties in establishing that all nuclear-relevant activities in a state are peaceful. The article is in the form of annotated PowerPoint briefing slides.

State system experience with safeguarding power reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roehnsch, W.

1982-01-01

This session describes the development and operation of the State System of Accountancy and Control in the German Democratic Republic, and summarizes operating experience with safeguards at power reactor facilities. Overall organization and responsibilities, containment and surveillance measures, materials accounting, and inspection procedures will be outlined. Cooperation between the IAEA, State system, facility, and supplier authorities will also be addressed

Consideration regarding the scheduling of unannounced or randomized inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanborn, J.

2001-01-01

Full text: Randomized inspection strategies, including unannounced, short notice, or randomly selected scheduled inspections can play an useful role in integrated safeguards by allowing a reduction in the number of inspections without sacrificing coverage of diversion scenarios. The Agency and member states have proposed such strategies as important elements of integrated safeguards proposals at reactors as well as bulk handling facilities. The Agency, however, has limited experience with such inspections, and a number of issues need to be addressed before effective implementation can occur; how these issues are resolved will determine how effective the inspections will be. This paper focuses on the question of how to determine the timing of such inspections. It is pointed out that there are a large number of variants of the idea of 'randomized inspection,' and that each option will have advantages and disadvantages from the points of view of the operator, the logistics of inspection scheduling, and the capabilities for detection. The method chosen should depend on the type of scenarios that the Agency wishes to detect. The mathematically purest form of randomized schedule will have broad theoretical applicability, but may prove more difficult to put into practice, and may be unnecessary, or even sub-optimal, depending on the inspection objective. On the other hand, each restriction on inspection that provides the operator with information on when the inspection will occur must be taken into account when assessing detection probability. The paper reviews a number of scheduling approaches in the context of different objectives and considers effectiveness, operational impact, and practicality. (author)

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

Development of analytical techniques for safeguards environmental samples at JAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sakurai, Satoshi; Magara, Masaaki; Usuda, Shigekazu; Watanabe, Kazuo; Esaka, Fumitaka; Hirayama, Fumio; Lee, Chi-Gyu; Yasuda, Kenichiro; Inagawa, Jun; Suzuki, Daisuke; Iguchi, Kazunari; Kokubu, Yoko S.; Miyamoto, Yutaka; Ohzu, Akira

2007-01-01

JAEA has been developing, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan, analytical techniques for ultra-trace amounts of nuclear materials in environmental samples in order to contribute to the strengthened safeguards system. Development of essential techniques for bulk and particle analysis, as well as screening, of the environmental swipe samples has been established as ultra-trace analytical methods of uranium and plutonium. In January 2003, JAEA was qualified, including its quality control system, as a member of the JAEA network analytical laboratories for environmental samples. Since 2004, JAEA has conducted the analysis of domestic and the IAEA samples, through which JAEA's analytical capability has been verified and improved. In parallel, advanced techniques have been developed in order to expand the applicability to the samples of various elemental composition and impurities and to improve analytical accuracy and efficiency. This paper summarizes the trace of the technical development in environmental sample analysis at JAEA, and refers to recent trends of research and development in this field. (author)

Safeguards applications of far infrared radiometric techniques for the detection of contraband

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hodges, D.T.; Reber, E.E.; Foote, F.B.; Schellenbaum, R.L.

1980-02-01

A new safeguards system under development employs radiometers in the 100 to 300 GHz spectral band to detect contraband, including shielding materials (used to attenuate the gamma ray emissions from nuclear materials), weapons, or explosives covertly concealed on personnel. Clothing is highly transparent at these frequencies and imaging techniques can detect contraband by its emissivity and reflectivity differences relative to human tissues. Experimental data are presented and sample images are used as a basis to discuss system advantages and limitations

Safeguards applications of far infrared radiometric techniques for the detection of contraband

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hodges, D.T.; Reber, E.E.; Foote, F.B.; Schellenbaum, R.L.

1980-02-01

A new safeguards system under development employs radiometers in the 100 to 300 GHz spectral band to detect contraband, including shielding materials (used to attenuate the gamma ray emissions from nuclear materials), weapons, or explosives covertly concealed on personnel. Clothing is highly transparent at these frequencies and imaging techniques can detect contraband by its emissivity and reflectivity differences relative to human tissues. Experimental data are presented and sample images are used as a basis to discuss system advantages and limitations.

In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ward, R.; Rosenthal, M.

2009-01-01

Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector's efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the 'Option 4' safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo's paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

NRC program of inspection and enforcement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

LeDoux, J.C.; Rehfuss, C.

1978-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates civilian uses of nuclear materials to ensure the protection of the public health and safety and the environment. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) develops and implements the inspection, investigation, and enforcement programs for the NRC. The IE conducts inspection programs for reactors under construction and in operation, nuclear industry vendors, fuel facilities and users of nuclear materials, and all aspects of the safeguarding of facilities and materials. Recently the IE began implementing a program that will place inspectors on site at nuclear power reactors and will provide for national appraisal of licensee performance and for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the inspection programs

Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

1979-08-01

Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

2010-12-01

This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

Minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST): Analysis and visualization of gas centrifuge enrichment plant process data using the MSTAR model

Science.gov (United States)

Shephard, Adam M.; Thomas, Benjamin R.; Coble, Jamie B.; Wood, Houston G.

2018-05-01

This paper presents a development related to the use of minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST) and the MSTAR cascade model as it relates to the application of international nuclear safeguards at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The product of this paper is a derivation of the universal and dimensionless MSTAR cascade model. The new model can be used to calculate the minor uranium isotope concentrations in GCEP product and tails streams or to analyze, visualize, and interpret GCEP process data as part of MIST. Applications of the new model include the detection of undeclared feed and withdrawal streams at GCEPs when used in conjunction with UF6 sampling and/or other isotopic measurement techniques.

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Sanborn, J.

1994-12-01

Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on (1) a database of about 650 facilities a total of eight states, i.e., the five nuclear-weapons states and three ''threshold'' states; (2) typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derived from IAEA experience, where applicable; and (3) alternative estimates of inspection effort in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated. Considerable uncertainty must be attached to the effort estimates. About 50--60% of the effort for each option is attributable to 16 large-scale reprocessing plants assumed to be in operation in the eight states; it is likely that some of these will be shut down by the time the convention enters into force. Another important question involving about one third of the overall effort is whether Euratom inspections in France and the U.K. could obviate the need for full-scale IAEA inspections at these facilities. Finally, the database does not yet contain many small-scale and military-related facilities. The results are therefore not presented as predictions but as the consequences of alternative assumptions. Despite the preliminary nature of the estimates, it is clear that a broad application of NPT-like safeguards to the eight states would require dramatic increases in the IAEA's safeguards budget. It is also clear that the major component of the increased inspection effort would occur at large reprocessing plants (and associated plutonium facilities). Therefore, significantly bounding the increased effort requires a limitation on the inspection effort in these facility types

International safeguards for a modern MOX [mixed-oxide] fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating σ/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials

International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

A study on improvements of inspection efficiency with remote transmission of inspection data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, Masahiro

2010-01-01

Current information networks technology brought secure and convenient condition of information transmission, so that inspectorates intend to apply such technology to optimize current inspection efforts. IAEA established the Remote Monitoring Project (RMP) in 1996 and started to draft safeguards concepts, and approaches to refer the implementation of remote monitoring technology and to compromise with relationship between current inspection activities and the remote monitoring technologies. Although communications costs and conditions of secured communication should be further investigated, the technologies would have a possibility to reduce current inspection efforts. We would face at the step to study on the several issues such as what measures could be candidate to use, how much cost we needs, what kind of technical risks would be concerned, further improvements could be achieved by comparison with current inspection costs and effectiveness. This paper reports on the expectation points and relevant technical attention points which are related to apply unattended inspection system with remote data transmission to the flows and inventory verification of item and bulk facility, respectively, in order to improve inspection efforts. (author)

Calculation of parameters for inspection planning and evaluation: mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reardon, P.T.; Mullen, M.F.

1982-08-01

As part of Task C.35 (Calculation of Parameters for Inspection Planning and Evaluation) of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed some quantitative analyses of IAEA inspection activities for mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities. There were four distinct efforts involved in this task. These were as follows: show the effect on a material balance verification of using two variables measurement methods in some strata; perform additional calculations for the reference facility described in STR-89; modify the INSPECT computer programs to be used as an after-inspection analysis tool, as well as a preinspection planning tool; provide written comments and explantations of text and graphs of the first draft of STR-89, Safeguards Considerations for Mixed-Oxide Fuel Element Fabrication Facilities, by W. Bahm, T. Shea, and D. Tolchenkov, System Studies Section, IAEA

Development of ultrasonic immersion inspection technique for spent fuel canisters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schankula, J.J.

1982-07-01

This report summarizes ultrasonic nondestructive testing development for metal matrix supported spent fuel disposal canisters. The work has concentated in two areas: inspection for lack of bond at the shell/matrix interface and inspection for voids in the matrix. The capabilities and limitations of these techniques have been fully established. Unbonded areas as small as 4 mm in diameter and voids 6 mm in diameter, 25 mm deep in the matrix, can readily be detected

Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

2008-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stanchi, L.

1991-01-01

The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

A day in the life of a safeguards inspector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henriques, Sasha

2016-01-01

Walking several miles through the winding, narrow corridors of a nuclear facility in protective gear while carrying heavy equipment, often escorted by facility operator personnel: welcome to the life of an IAEA safeguards inspector. Safeguards inspectors are an essential part of the global non-proliferation regime, carrying out verification activities, so the IAEA can provide assurances to States worldwide that other countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes or misusing nuclear technology. One important activity is the inspection of declared stocks of nuclear material: the IAEA is the only organization in the world with the mandate to verify the use of nuclear material and technology globally.

Knowledge-based inspection:modelling complex processes with the integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abazi, F.

2011-01-01

Increased level of complexity in almost every discipline and operation today raises the demand for knowledge in order to successfully run an organization whether to generate profit or to attain a non-profit mission. Traditional way of transferring knowledge to information systems rich in data structures and complex algorithms continue to hinder the ability to swiftly turnover concepts into operations. Diagrammatic modelling commonly applied in engineering in order to represent concepts or reality remains to be an excellent way of converging knowledge from domain experts. The nuclear verification domain represents ever more a matter which has great importance to the World safety and security. Demand for knowledge about nuclear processes and verification activities used to offset potential misuse of nuclear technology will intensify with the growth of the subject technology. This Doctoral thesis contributes with a model-based approach for representing complex process such as nuclear inspections. The work presented contributes to other domains characterized with knowledge intensive and complex processes. Based on characteristics of a complex process a conceptual framework was established as the theoretical basis for creating a number of modelling languages to represent the domain. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) is formalized through an integrated meta-model. The diagrammatic modelling languages represent the verification domain and relevant nuclear verification aspects. Such a meta-model conceptualizes the relation between practices of process management, knowledge management and domain specific verification principles. This fusion is considered as necessary in order to create quality processes. The study also extends the formalization achieved through a meta-model by contributing with a formalization language based on Pattern Theory. Through the use of graphical and mathematical constructs of the theory, process structures are formalized enhancing

Quality assurance for IAEA inspection planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.

1986-01-01

Under the provisions of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other agreements with states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections at nuclear facilities to confirm that their operation is consistent with the peaceful use of nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards at the IAEA is considering a quality assurance program for activities related to the planning of these facility inspections. In this report, we summarize recent work in writing standards for planning inspections at the types of facilities inspected by the IAEA. The standards specify the sequence of steps in planning inspections, which are: (1) administrative functions, such as arrangements for visas and travel, and communications with the state to confirm facility operating schedules and the state's acceptance of the assigned inspectors; (2) technical functions including a specification of the required inspection activities, determination of personnel and equipment resources, and a schedule for implementing the inspection activities at the facility; and (3) management functions, such as pre- and post-inspection briefings, where the planned and implemented inspection activities are reviewed

Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.

1981-01-01

This paper presents the initial phase of the US study program and involves the computation of isotopic correlations for the LMFBR fuel cycle. The LWR fuel cycle phase of the study is currently in progress. The selection of the more safeguards effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of isotope correlation technique (ICT) for verification, but also on the capability and difficulty of developing measurement methods. Performance characteristics of existing and proposed isotopic measurement techniques cover the general areas including assay and isotopic wet chemistry and NDA: (1) simultaneous multicomponent analysis techniques, (2) mass spectrometry, (3) x-ray fluorescence or densitometry with high flux monochromatic x-ray sources and high dispersion spectrometers, (4) passive and active neutron interrogation, (5) high level gamma-ray spectroscopy, (6) coulometry, and (7) potentiometry. The measurement capabilities and inherent limitations of these systems are to be evaluated in terms of total systems, operational mode, sample preparation requirements and consequent effect on dissolver solution representation, accuracy and precision estimates (if available), development status of the technique, and development requirements. The isotopic correlation technique shows considerable promise for use in verifying the initial isotopic composition and burnup of discharged assemblies based on the measured ratios of several key isotopes, obtained probably at the dissolver stage in reprocessing. This technique should, for example, easily be capable of indicating the exchange of a blanket assembly for a fuel assembly

Development of Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic Applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen, S.; El-Jaby, A.; Doucet, F.; Bouchard, P.; Sabsabi, M.

2015-01-01

Under the IAEA Task A1855, the Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) undertook the development of laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) technologies for safeguards applications. Collaboration between the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), the National Research Council Canada, and the IAEA has demonstrated that the LIBS technique combined with chemometrics can determine the origins of yellowcake, identify maraging steels, aluminium alloys, and magnesium alloys, among other materials involved in the nuclear industry; and determine heavy water content as well as the isotope ratios of other actinides. As part of the task, the CSSP has developed a portable LIBS system to enable inspectors to characterize specific nuclear and non-nuclear material during complementary access and inspections. This device was recently tested by the IAEA in both Vienna and Siebersdorf for various metals and uranium bearing materials. The laser source proved to be stable and the chemometrics software was able to identify various materials. The device is ready for further in-depth testing. The chemometrics algorithm that has been developed for LIBS can also be adapted to nuclear forensics for the querying database. Multi-stage pattern recognition algorithms can reliably identify unknown materials among database populations (e.g., identify origins of yellowcake). Further work in this field is being undertaken as part of the CNSC's National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) development activities for the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP). The paper will provide an overview of the LIBS techniques being developed for safeguards and forensic applications, and of progress in integrating all components into a compact unit. (author)

A collaborative environment for information driven safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scott, Mark R.; Michel, Kelly D.

2010-01-01

For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

Remote Inspection Techniques for Reactor Internals of Liquid Metal Reactor by using Ultrasonic Waveguide Sensor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joo, Young Sang; Kim, Seok Hun; Lee, Jae Han

2006-02-01

The primary components such as a reactor core, heat exchangers, pumps and internal structures of a liquid metal reactor (LMR) are submerged in hot sodium of reactor vessel. The division 3 of ASME code section XI specifies the visual inspection and continuous monitoring as major in-service inspection (ISI) methods of reactor internal structures. Reactor core and internal structures of LMR can not be visually examined due to an opaque liquid sodium. The under-sodium viewing and remote inspection techniques by using an ultrasonic wave should be applied for the in-service inspection of reactor internals. The remote inspection techniques using ultrasonic wave have been developed and applied for the visualization and ISI of reactor internals. The under sodium viewing technique has a limitation for the application of LMR due to the high temperature and irradiation environment. In this study, an ultrasonic waveguide sensor with a strip plate has been developed for an application to the under-sodium viewing and remote inspection. The Lamb wave propagation of a waveguide sensor has been analyzed and the zero-order antisymmetric A 0 plate wave was selected as the application mode of the sensor. The A 0 plate wave can be propagated in the dispersive low frequency range by using a liquid wedge clamped to the waveguide. A new technique is presented which is capable of steering the radiation beam angle of a waveguide sensor without a mechanical movement of the sensor assembly. The steering function of the ultrasonic radiation beam can be achieved by a frequency tuning method of the excitation pulse in the dispersive range of the A 0 mode. The technique provides an opportunity to overcome the scanning limitation of a waveguide sensor. The beam steering function has been evaluated by an experimental verification. The ultrasonic C-scanning experiments are performed in water and the feasibility of the ultrasonic waveguide sensor has been verified. The various remote inspection

The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennekens, J.H.F.

1982-09-01

In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

Experience with short notice (SNRI) and unannounced (UI) inspections in Sweden

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andre, E.; Dahlin, G.

2013-01-01

Integrated Safeguards (IS) has been implemented in Sweden since 15 January, 2009. This presentation will describe some of the preparations that were done to facilitate the change to new safeguards. For Sweden, the IAEA drew the necessary conclusions late 2008 to start IS-implementation. There is a mixture of short notice random inspections and unannounced inspections. During 2008 discussions with the IAEA, the Commission, the State authority and operators were performed to pave the road towards IS. The most difficult task was the LEU (Low Enrichment Uranium Fuel) fuel fabrication plant but also for the state authority to arrange so that its inspectors can, with very short notice, get to the facilities. This presentation will describe how we in Sweden have come to organise the implementation of IS on all levels including the communication ways with the IAEA and the European Commission. The experience gained from the SNRIs (Short Notice Reported Inspections) and UIs (Unannounced inspections) that have been conducted in Sweden will be presented. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997). And IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997). And IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997); and IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition appears as a publication in the International Nuclear Verification Series. Other publications appearing in this series are as follows: IAEA/N VS/I Safeguards Techniques and Equipment (1997); and IAEA/NVS/2 the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards (1998)

37Ar monitoring techniques and on-site inspection system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duan Rongliang; Chen Yinliang; Li Wei; Wang Hongxia; Hao Fanhua

2001-01-01

37 Ar is separated, purified and extracted from air sample with a low temperature gas-solid chromatographic purifying method, prepared into a radioactive measurement source and its radioactivity is measured with a proportional counter. Based on the monitoring result, a judgement can be made if an nuclear explosion event has happened recently in a spectabilis area. A series of element techniques that are associated the monitoring of the trace element 37 Ar have been investigated and developed. Those techniques include leaked gas sampling, 37 Ar separation and purification, 37 Ar radioactivity measurement and the on-site inspection of 37 Ar. An advanced 37 Ar monitoring method has been developed, with which 200 liters of air can be treated in 2 hours with sensitivity of 0.01 Bq/L for 37 Ar radioactivity measurement. A practical 37 Ar On-site Inspection system has been developed. This research work may provide technical and equipment support for the verification protection, verification supervision and CTBT verification

Current trends in the implementation of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Adamson, A.; Bychkov, V.

1993-01-01

A practical goal, embodying the principle that a minimum amount of material is required in order to manufacture a nuclear explosive device, is that safeguards activities should enable the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material. It is important to note that the safeguards activities are not restricted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (the agency) but impose obligations on both state (and consequently on facility operators) and the agency. The beneficiaries are member states of the world community which have enhanced confidence in the competence and probity of states with safeguards agreements. Neither safeguards nor the nuclear industry have remained stationary. As new techniques have been developed, they have found applications, and as new challenges were encountered, the system has responded, for example, through improved measurements; through new or improved techniques for the operator, state or agency; and through new regulations. This paper details approaches, procedures and techniques developed for new complex nuclear facilities. Trends toward increase efficiency and effectiveness, and developments leading to more automated analysis and collection of data and the development of nondestructive assay methods are examined. Also important are trends in the presentation of safeguards results to the states and the general public

EURATOM safeguards implementation in France and cooperation with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oddou, J.

2013-01-01

International safeguards in France are applied both by: -) the European Commission (EC), through the Chapter 7 of the EURATOM Treaty; -) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as France is a party to the NPT and has concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. With the exception of mining, France has a complete nuclear fuel cycle from ore concentrates to waste. Based on the legal framework of the EURATOM Treaty, all civil nuclear facilities and all civil nuclear materials are safeguarded by EURATOM wherever they are in France. Therefore the two conversion plants, the two enrichment plants, the three fuel fabrication plants, the 59 nuclear power plants including the EPR of Flamanville under construction, the 2 reprocessing plants in La Hague, the five facilities for waste treatment and numerous research centers and reactors of CEA are declared and controlled by the European Commission. The activities of the EURATOM inspectors are of various kind depending of the facility and the type of inspection. The most common checks are: identification and counting of the nuclear material, verification of accountancy declaration vs. physical follow-up of the nuclear material, non-destructive analysis and destructive analysis after sampling in large bulk handling facilities. There is a strong cooperation between IAEA and EC: the majority of IAEA inspections in France are joint team inspections with the EC. This pooling of equipment and teams can save money and human resources. Equipment for containment and surveillance are paid whether by the EC or by the IAEA and can be used by both bodies of inspectors. With the principle of 'One Job One Person', verification activities are done only once and it saves time for the inspectors and the operators. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-07-01

What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

1996-01-01

Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector's oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector's workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA

The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-11-01

The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

1986-01-01

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

To Russia with love: how the Australian Government's much vaunted safeguards policy has been watered down, step by step

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Milliken, R.

1981-01-01

Australia's uranium safeguards policy was announced in May 1977. The following conditions were included: no contracts could be signed until safeguards agreements had been concluded; uranium sold must remain Australian owned until it had been processed into a form attracting IAEA safeguards inspection; and prior Australian consent was required before a customer could reprocess Australian uranium, transfer it to a third country, or enrich it to a grade higher than that needed for normal power plants. Australia has signed 9 safeguards agreements and two more are due to be finalised soon. The author discusses changes in policy since the first agreement was signed. One problem has been conflict between commercial and safeguards issues

Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1996-05-01

Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Owens, L.; Smith, C.

1996-01-01

The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

Use of mountaineering rope climbing techniques vs custom-built platforms for penstock inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bechai, M.; Dmochowski, A.; Conlon, J.; Bhat, P.D. [Ontario Hydro, Toronto, ON (Canada); Henderson, D. [Remote Access Technology Inc., Dartmouth, NS (Canada)

1998-12-01

Ontario Hydro has developed an inspection and maintenance strategy that requires periodic inspections of their ageing penstocks. The utility has 149 operating penstocks distributed throughout the province. Ontario Hydro experienced problems ranging from minor deterioration to major failures requiring immediate and costly shut-down of entire stations. Three levels of the inspection and maintenance strategy are described. These are a routine external inspections, periodic internal and external inspections, and detailed inspection and assessment. Detailed inspection requires full access to all areas of the penstock, inside and outside, with detailed testing and analysis. Rope access techniques have been used successfully and cost effectively to gain access for close up observation and tactile contact allowing for evaluation and testing. Minor, quick repairs can also be carried out. It was noted that specially designed platforms will still be needed when extensive repairs and maintenance is required. 2 refs., 1 tab., 3 figs.

Technique for rapid at-wavelength inspection of extreme ultraviolet mask blanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spector, S. J.; White, D. L.; Tennant, D. M.; Ocola, L. E.; Novembre, A. E.; Peabody, M. L.; Wood, O. R. II

1999-01-01

We have developed two new methods for at-wavelength inspection of mask blanks for extreme-ultraviolet (EUV) lithography. In one method an EUV photoresist is applied directly to a mask blank which is then flood exposed with EUV light and partially developed. In the second method, the photoresist is applied to an EUV transparent membrane that is placed in close proximity to the mask and then exposed and developed. Both reflectivity defects and phase defects alter the exposure of the resist, resulting in mounds of resist at defect sites that can then be located by visual inspection. In the direct application method, a higher contrast resist was shown to increase the height of the mounds, thereby improving the sensitivity of the technique. In the membrane method, a holographic technique was used to reconstruct an image of the mask, revealing the presence of very small defects, approximately 0.2 μm in size. The demonstrated clean transfer of phase and amplitude defects to resist features on a membrane will be important when flagging defects in an automatic inspection tool. (c) 1999 American Vacuum Society

Close-up on safeguards training

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strelkov, D.; Kashirsky, A.

1985-01-01

Continuous training is provided to IAEA inspector personnel to assure their proficiency in carrying out the mission of the Agency in prohibiting the potential diversion of nuclear material. The number and complexity of nuclear facilities under safeguards have increased since the Agency's founding, resulting in an ever increasing number of inspectors and, concurrently, in the need for higher quality of technical training. Basic training for newly recruited inspectors and inspection assistants is provided by the Department of Safeguards and training is programmed throughout the working experience of an inspector. Over the years, it has been proven beneficial to utilize the capability and facilities of Member States to provide specialized training at operating nuclear facilities. The training exercise described here is one of those funded by the USSR and conducted at an operating nuclear facility in the USSR. These support training courses are an effective way of providing the specialized training needed to maintain the proficiency of the inspectorate staff and supplement the training that is offered by the Agency in Vienna

Past, present and future of safeguards implementation for the on-load RMBK-1500 reactors in Ignalina

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zendel, M.; Yim, S.; Monticone, C.; Kurselis, S.

1999-01-01

The on-load refueled RBMKs ('Reactor Bolshoy Moschnosti Kanalniy - Large Power Channel Type Reactor') are very different from all other power reactors which the Agency has been safeguarding over the past decades. Distinct differences in fuel properties and handling necessitated the formulation of separate, facility specific approaches. The spent fuel management at the RBMKs in Ignalina uses hot cells to cut each spent fuel assembly into two subassemblies. A large number of subassemblies are subsequently stored in large capacity, compact storage baskets at the spent fuel storage ponds adjacent to the reactor hall. The development of the safeguards approach is presented considering limitation in core access, technological feasibility, operation mode and financial as well as human resources of the Agency. The safeguards approach is based on a quarterly inspection scheme using Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures, verification of fresh and spent fuel by Non Destructive Assay (NDA), establishing of flow balances to complement the material accountancy and the application of neutron/gamma monitors in a continuous, unattended mode. The implementation of these safeguards measures is discussed and actual inspection experience with an emphasis on the application of the neutron/gamma monitors is given. The neutron/gamma monitors serve multiple safeguards functions, such as monitoring shipments of waste from cutting operations for irradiated fuel in the hot cells, confirming the unloading history for the on-load reactors, complementing C/S by detecting movements of irradiated fuel materials in the reactor halls and verifying the operational status and the power output of the reactors. Actual measurement results are presented to demonstrate their effectiveness. Power Considerations are given for future safeguards implementation matters at Ignalina Nuclear plant (INPP) including measures for the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS). (author)

IAEA safeguards technical manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-02-01

The necessity for statistical inference procedures arises because of time and cost limitations imposed on inspection activities, and also because of inherent limitations of inspection measurement instruments and techniques. This manual produces statistical concepts and techniques in the field of nuclear material control

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Coke drums inspection and evaluation using stress and strain analysis techniques

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haraguchi, Marcio Issamu [Tricom Tecnologia e Servicos de Manutencao Industrial Ltda., Piquete, SP (Brazil); Samman, Mahmod [Houston Engineering Solutions, Houston, TX (United States); Tinoco, Ediberto Bastos; Marangone, Fabio de Castro; Silva, Hezio Rosa da; Barcelos, Gustavo de Carvalho [Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (PETROBRAS), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

2012-07-01

Coke drums deform due to a complex combination of mechanical and thermal cyclic stresses. Bulges have progressive behavior and represent the main maintenance problem related to these drums. Bulge failure typically result in through-wall cracks, leaks, and sometimes fires. Such failures generally do not represent a great risk to personnel. Repairs needed to maintain reliability of these vessels might require extensive interruption to operation which in turn considerably impacts the profitability of the unit. Therefore the condition, progression and severity of these bulges should be closely monitored. Coke drums can be inspected during turnaround with 3D Laser Scanning and Remote Visual Inspection (RVI) tools, resulting in a detailed dimensional and visual evaluation of the internal surface. A typical project has some goals: inspect the equipment to generate maintenance or inspection recommendations, comparison with previous results and baseline data. Until recently, coke drum structural analysis has been traditionally performed analyzing Stress Concentration Factors (SCF) thought Finite Element Analysis methods; however this technique has some serious technical and practical limitations. To avoid these shortcomings, the new strain analysis technique PSI (Plastic Strain Index) was developed. This method which is based on API 579/ ASME FFS standard failure limit represents the state of the art of coke drum bulging severity assessment has an excellent correlation with failure history. (author)

Enhanced cooperation between IAEA and Republic of Korea on safeguards implementation at light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan-Sou; Kim, Byung-Koo; Yim, Seuk-Soon

2001-01-01

Full text: In Korea, national inspection has been initiated from the second half of 1997. From 1999, national inspection has been carried out for all nuclear facilities in Korea. In 2000, national inspections were performed successfully in 32 nuclear facilities including 12 PWRs, 4 CANDU reactors, 10 research facilities, 4 fuel fabrication plants and others. As the national inspection system settled down, both the IAEA and Korea were looking for possible ways of cooperation for mutual benefit. It was expected that considerable saving on inspection resources as well as more effective safeguards implementation could be achieved, if more enhanced cooperation work was realized. In 1999, the IAEA and Korea agreed to establish a working group for the enhanced cooperation between both sides. A working group, composed of experts from the IAEA and ROK, reviewed several options for enhanced cooperation on LWRs in Korea and suggested a measure for implementing the current safeguards approach for LWRs with remote monitoring. The basic concepts of the Enhanced Cooperation Scheme are: 1. The SSAC shall carry out all scheduled inspections for each facility for each year, while the Agency shall carry out the annual PIV and post-PIV, and a random selection of the remaining inspections; 2, The remote monitoring (RM) data necessary for technical and safeguards review shall be shared between the Agency and SSAC; 3. The IAEA shall bear the costs of purchasing RM equipment and communication operating costs from the central hub station in Korea to Vienna; the ROK will bear the costs of installing all RM equipment and communication operating costs from each LWR to the central hub station in Korea. Typically, around 8-9 inspections are performed for one LWR per annum under current safeguards approach; 1 pre-PIV, 1 PIV, 1 post-PIV, 3-4 interim inspections, fresh fuel receipts and simultaneous inspection. RM design includes 2 digital cameras (equipment hatch and spent fuel pond), VACOSS

Multispectral fluorescence imaging techniques for nondestructive food safety inspection

Science.gov (United States)

Kim, Moon S.; Lefcourt, Alan M.; Chen, Yud-Ren

2004-03-01

The use of spectral sensing has gained acceptance as a rapid means for nondestructive inspection of postharvest food produce. Current technologies generally use color or a single wavelength camera technology. The applicability and sensitivity of these techniques can be expanded through the use of multiple wavelengths. Reflectance in the Vis/NIR is the prevalent spectral technique. Fluorescence, compared to reflectance, is regarded as a more sensitive technique due to its dynamic responses to subtle changes in biological entities. Our laboratory has been exploring fluorescence as a potential means for detection of quality and wholesomeness of food products. Applications of fluorescence sensing require an understanding of the spectral characteristics emanating from constituents and potential contaminants. A number of factors affecting fluorescence emission characteristics are discussed. Because of relatively low fluorescence quantum yield from biological samples, a system with a powerful pulse light source such as a laser coupled with a gated detection device is used to harvest fluorescence, in the presence of ambient light. Several fluorescence sensor platforms developed in our laboratory, including hyperspectral imaging, and laser-induced fluorescence (LIF) and steady-state fluorescence imaging systems with multispectral capabilities are presented. We demonstrate the potential uses of recently developed fluorescence imaging platforms in food safety inspection of apples contaminated with animal feces.

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

1991-05-01

The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

Potential development of non-destructive assay for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.

1983-01-01

After a brief summary on the role of non-destructive assay in safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, its evolution from NDA methods development to other areas is illustrated. These areas are essentially: a) the evaluation of the performances of NDA techniques in field conditions; b) introduction of full automation of measurement instrument operation, using interactive microprocessors and of measurement data handling evaluation and retrieval features; c) introduction of the adequate link and compatibility to assure NDA measurement data transfer in an integrated safeguards data evaluation scheme. In this field, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is developing and implementing a number of techniques and methodologies allowing an integrated and rational treatment of the large amount of safeguards data produced. In particular for the non-destructive assay measurements and techniques, the JRC has studied and tested methodologies for the automatic generation and validation of data of inventory verification. In order to apply these techniques successfully in field, the JRC has studied the design requirements of NDA data management and evaluation systems. This paper also discusses the functional requirements of an integrated system for NDA safeguards data evaluation

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

1999-08-01

KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

Considerations on safeguards approach for small centrifuge enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, Hugo E.; Marzo, Marco A.; Nunes, Vitorio E.

2004-01-01

The safeguards' objectives for enrichment facilities encompass the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and of facility misuse. The safeguard's approach presently applied for commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities is based on the Hexa partite Project and seems not to be directly applicable to cases of small plants. Since ABACC started its operation one of the main problems faced was the application of safeguards to small centrifuge enrichment plants for testing centrifuges in cascade mode or for small LEU production. These plants consist of a few fully independent cascades, does not operate in a routine basis and panels prevent visual access to the centrifuges and their surroundings for preserving sensitive information. For such plants misuse scenarios seems to dominate, particularly those associated with feeding the plant with undeclared LEU. This paper presents a concise analysis of misuse strategies in small centrifuge facility and alternative safeguard's approach, describing the main control elements to be applied. The particularities arising from the existence of panels or boxes covering the centrifuges are specifically addressed. Two alternatives approaches based on the application of a transitory perimeter control to increase the effectiveness of unannounced inspection and on the application of permanent perimeter control are presented. (author)

Under-Sodium Inspection Techniques for Reactor Internals of KALIMER-600 using Ultrasonic Waveguide Sensor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joo, Young Sang; Kim, Seok Hoon; Lee, Jae Han

2005-01-01

KALIMER-600 is a pool type liquid metal reactor (LMR) which is operated with a sodium coolant. The reactor internals of KALIMER-600 are submerged in a liquid sodium pool. As the liquid sodium is opaque to the light, a conventional visual inspection can not be used for observing the internal structures under a sodium condition. An under-sodium viewing (USV) technique using an ultrasonic wave should be applied for the observation of the refueling maneuver and the in-service inspection of the reactor internals. Under-sodium inspection technology utilizing ultrasonic waves has been widely developed for a visualization of the reactor core and internal components of LMR. Immersion sensors and waveguide sensors have been applied to the USV inspection. The immersion sensor has a precise imaging capability, but may have high temperature restrictions and an uncertain life. The waveguide sensor has the advantages of simplicity and reliability, but limited in its movement. The new plate-type waveguide sensor has been developed as a useful alternative to immersion sensors for USV applications. In the viewing and monitoring applications, a beam steering function of a waveguide sensor might be required. A new waveguide sensor and technique are being developed to overcome the limitations of a waveguide ultrasonic sensor. In this study, the under-sodium inspection techniques using the newly developed waveguide sensor for the reactor internal structures of KALIMER-600 is proposed

Evaluating National Nuclear Safeguards System Implementation in the Republic of Moldova

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mursa, E.; Sidorencu, A.; Vasilieva, N.; Sirbu, I.

2015-01-01

Strengthening the multilateral system of Nuclear Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), imposed by the increasing cross-border illicit trafficking of nuclear material and redirecting for military purposes has led Republic of Moldova to ratify on 1 June 2012 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/690) to the Agreement of Nuclear Safeguards in relation with the NPT. This was followed by the adoption in the Parliament on 8 June 2012, of the new Law no. 132 of 08.06.2012 on the safe conduct of nuclear and radiological activities, which extends the power of the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) and details the measures to strengthen the Nuclear Safeguards in the country. The NARNRA implements safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials by: – normative acts development; – establishing a system for inspecting of nuclear material; – implementing inventory-taking and reporting procedures for quantities of nuclear material; – implementing authorisation and monitoring procedures for the movements of nuclear material; – implementing procedures for reporting quantities of nuclear material to the IAEA; – maintaining and updating the national register of nuclear materials. A very important role to achieve results is the cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, was developed and agreed the Joint Action Plan for implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which is an essential aid in fulfilling the country’s international obligations. In this respect have been obtained some good practices: – Routinely performed national inspections; – On-line information provision from the Customs check points; – Developed special form for nuclear material in the National Register; – Systematic interaction with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and authorisation holders; – Annual and quarterly presentation to the IAEA of the reports on SQP and the

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

Inspection with non destructive assay techniques of the aluminium coating of the TRIGA Mark III reactor vat

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reyes A, A.I.; Gonzalez M, A.; Castaneda J, G.; Rivera M, H.; Sandoval G, I.

2001-01-01

In June 2000, the Reactor Department assigned to the Scientific Research Direction of the National Institute of Nuclear Research requested to the Non-destructive Assays Laboratory (LEND), assigned to the Materials Science Management, the inspection and measurement of thickness of the aluminium coating (liner) of the TRIGA Mark III reactor vat with non-destructive assay techniques, due to that the aluminium coating is exposed mainly to undergo slimming on its back side due to corrosion phenomena. Activity that was able to be carried out from april until august 2001. It is worth pointing out that this type of inspection with these techniques was realized by first time. The non-destructive assays (NDA) are techniques which use indirect physical methods for inspecting the sanitation of components in process or in service, for detect lack of continuity or defects which affect their quality or usefulness. The application of those do not alter the physical, chemical, mechanical or dimensional properties of the part subject of inspection. The results of the application of the ultrasound inspection techniques, industrial radiography and penetrating liquids are presented. (Author)

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

1977-02-01

A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

1977-02-01

A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.

Implementation of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Sierra Leone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, M.

2015-01-01

Sierra Leone under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) has enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (NSRP) Act 2012 and has given numerous powers to the Authority to implement the above mentioned act fully. The NSRP Act 2012 established the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority which among other things to regulate, control and supervise the acquisition, importation, exportation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive sources and devices emitting Ionizing Radiation. The Authority is bounded by law to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of Safeguards Agreement and any protocol thereto between Sierra Leone and the International Atomic Energy Agency including conducting inspections and providing any assistance or information required by designated IAEA inspectors in the fulfillment of their responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, Subsection 2, Article xvi of the NSRP Act 2012. The Authority is also granted powers to adopt all necessary measures including a system of licensing to control the export, re-export, transit and transhipment of any nuclear material, equipment or technology in order to protect the safety and security of Sierra Leone. The Regulatory Authority has established departments for the control of nuclear materials: One of which is The Regulatory Control Department; responsible for Inspections, Authorization and Enforcement actions for all radiation sources and nuclear materials. The Authority has been conducting inspections regularly on various facilities ranging from medical radiation generating equipment to industrial radiography sources. The methodology to be used is the issuance of the standard IAEA checklist which is consistent with the Regulatory Authority’s documents for inspection of sources and is in line with the General Safety Requirements(GSR)Part III. The expected outcomes would be increasing training of regulatory authority’s staff, the procurement of

Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mollah, A.S.

2010-01-01

Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

1996-01-01

During the past decade, IAEA inspectors, national inspectors, and facility operators have used neutron coincidence counters and gamma-ray isotopics measurements extensively to measure the plutonium content of various forms of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle. Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector''s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector''s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained form unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA. The standardized containers and robot-controlled fuel movements in automated facilities enable more accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements than are possible in conventional nonautomated facilities. The NDA instrumentation can be custom designed and optimized for the particular measurement goal in the automated facility

Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

1981-11-01

Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

Review of inspection of Torness reactor internals using remote techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dynan, J.

1993-01-01

Inspection of reactor internals is increasingly being achieved by deployment of cameras into areas of sometimes high radiation fields using manipulators. The manipulators have been developed over a number of years and from a variety of sources and those provided at Torness can maybe be seen to be the state of the art development of such machines for AGRS. Torness and Heysham 2 reactors were specifically designed for inspection using remote techniques and special facilities have been provided for this purpose. This paper is written by an operator and not a manipulator specialist and is intended to show what the operator needs versus what the designer gave him. (author)

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

2010-10-01

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

A Study on Techniques for Focusing Circumferential Array Guided Waves for Long Range Inspection of Pipes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, To; Kim, Hak Joon; Song, Sung Jin; Cho, Young Do; Lee, Dong Hoon; Cho, Hyun Joon

2009-01-01

Ultrasonic guided waves have been widely utilized for long range inspection of structures. Especially, development of array guided waves techniques and its application for long range gas pipe lines(length of from hundreds meters to few km) were getting increased. In this study, focusing algorithm for array guided waves was developed in order to improve long range inspectability and accuracy of the array guided waves techniques for long range inspection of gas pipes, and performance of the developed techniques was verified by experiments using the developed array guided wave system. As a result, S/N ratio of array guided wave signals obtained with the focusing algorithm was increased higher than that of signals without focusing algorithm

LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

2001-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, W.C.

1995-01-01

The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

Optimized inspection techniques and structural analysis in lifetime management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aguado, M.T.; Marcelles, I.

1993-01-01

Preservation of the option of extending the service lifetime of a nuclear power plant beyond its normal design lifetime requires correct remaining lifetime management from the very beginning of plant operation. The methodology used in plant remaining lifetime management is essentially based on the use of standard inspections, surveillance and monitoring programs and calculations, such as thermal-stress and fracture mechanics analysis. The inspection techniques should be continuously optimized, in order to be able to detect and dimension existing defects with the highest possible degree of accuracy. The information obtained during the inspection is combined with the historical data of the components: design, quality, operation, maintenance, and transients, and with the results of destructive testing, fracture mechanics and thermal fatigue analysis. These data are used to estimate the remaining lifetime of nuclear power plant components, systems and structures with the highest degree possible of accuracy. The use of this methodology allows component repairs and replacements to be reduced or avoided and increases the safety levels and availability of the nuclear power plant. Use of this strategy avoids the need for heavy investments at the end of the licensing period

Implementation of integrated safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olaru, Vasilica; Ivana, Tiberiu; Epure, Gheorghe

2010-01-01

The nuclear activity in ROMANIA was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now, the opportunity exists to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (NFP) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited NFP and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the disposal times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, measuring methods, weighting method and elaborating procedure of the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and NFP representatives established the main points for starting the IS at NFP: performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI); communication of the days established for SNRI for each year; communication of the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year: daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the deposit time for several nuclear materials i.e. advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and NFP (WRMD) has taken all measures to implement this objective. (authors)

Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, N.

2001-01-01

Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.

1986-01-01

A framework is presented for comparing various safeguards verification approaches which have been proposed for consideration. Each inventory change, inventory, and material balance for each nuclear facility, reported by a state, may be verified. Verification approaches are compared by listing which of these reports would be verified and to what degree for each approach as they might be applied to a state with a closed fuel cycle. The comparison indicates that the extended-material-balance-area (or zone), the information-correlation, and the randomization-over-facilities approaches make more efficient use of Agency resources than the facility-oriented approach for states with large nuclear power programs. In contrast, any advantages of randomizing inspections over inspection activities within facilities are, percentagewise, relatively independent of the size of a state's nuclear program

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

2007-01-01

The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

1999-01-01

A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

2010-10-15

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

2015-01-01

Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

Review of potential technology contributions to safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sellers, T.A.

1977-01-01

Separate, uncoordinated approaches to nuclear facility safeguards such as physical security and accounting are no longer adequate. A comprehensive, integrated strategy for improved in-depth protection of nuclear facilities with acceptable operational impact is needed. The safeguards system concept, analysis techniques, and hardware required to implement such a strategy are presented in this paper. Handbooks for intrusion detection, entry control systems, barrier, etc. are described briefly. 17 figures

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, L.

1984-01-01

Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

Meeting the safeguards challenges of a commercial reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Chesnay, B.; Pearsall, C.; Takeda, S.; Tomikawa, H.; Fujimaki, K.; Iwamoto, T.

2004-01-01

Never before has the IAEA taken on such a large challenge as implementing a safeguards system at a commercial reprocessing plant. The challenges lay in a wide range of areas. This paper will present an overview of how specific challenges are being met in: Providing an initial and continuing design verification approach that maintains continuity of knowledge for the life-time of the plant; Providing a robust safeguards approach, including added assurance measures to confirm the operational conditions of the facility; Providing verification systems with the highest sensitivity and reliability, while also being cost efficient; Providing timely and accurate analytical laboratory results; Providing sufficient authentication to joint-use, unattended verification systems to assure that independent conclusions can be reached; Providing a comprehensive integrated software system that allows for remote inspector data handling and evaluation and thus reducing inspection effort. A primary prerequisite to developing and implementing a safeguards approach of this magnitude is the transparent and interactive cooperation of the State and the operator. The JNFL Project has been a model example of this cooperation. This cooperation has been in the areas of system security, operational modifications, schedule adjustments, technical development and financial support. (author)

Safeguards in the European Union: The new partnership approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorstensen, S.; Chitumbo, K.

1995-01-01

This article highlights the circumstances surrounding the birth of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) and the status of its implementation. It particularly looks at elements of the NPA and practical arrangements that are being followed for specific types of nuclear and related facilities. Since elements of the NPA have been put into practice, significant savings have been realized in the allocation of safeguards inspection resources for Euratom countries, while ensuring effective verification. 1 graph, 1 tab

The particle analysis based on FT-TIMS technique for swipe sample under the frame of nuclear safeguard

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Tianli; Liu Xuemei; Liu Zhao; Tang Lei; Long Kaiming

2008-06-01

Under the frame of nuclear safeguard, the particles analysis for swipe sample is an advance mean to detect the undeclared uranium enriched facilities and undeclared uranium enriched activity. The technique of particle analysis based on fission track-thermal ionization mass spectrometry (FT-TIMS) for swipe sample have been built. The reliability and the experimental background for selecting particles consisting of uranium from swipe sample by FT method have been verified. In addition, the utilization coefficient of particles on the surface of swipe sample have also been tested. These works have provided the technique support for application in the area of nuclear verification. (authors)

Application of the ultrasonic phased array technique to alloy 182 weld inspection in PWR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hsiao, Chu Chung; Shie, Namg Chian; Chu, Shyr Liang; Lee, Sou See; Toung, Jean Chung; Su, Liang Chun; Yang, Hai Ming

2006-01-01

Cracks were found in nickel-based welds frequently in some nuclear power plants. The development of inspection technique capability of finding these cracks is thus in great demand. The difficulties of inspection and evaluation for nickel-based welds include ultrasonic reflection of interface of dissimilar materials, ultrasonic distortion of anisotropic microstructure, and signal-to-noise ratio reduction of coarse grain. In this study, an Alloy 182 mock-up with the same size and material properties as in the field is designed and fabricated. The Alloy 182 mock-up specimen contains various cracks and notches for calibration. Phased array UT and other ultrasonic inspection techniques are used in this study. Based on the experiment results, the phased array probe with 2D dual crystals and low frequency (1.5MHz) longitudinal wave is found to perform well. Finally, phased array ultrasonic testing technique has been approved to be an effectively nondestructive test method for DMW with real size testing block involved. Typically, phased array probe can generate sharp tip diffraction signal and thus reliable and accurate result can be obtained for sizing the defect. Furthermore, phased array probe can also generate various angles and focal lengths and thus combinatorial effect can be achieved for several traditional probes. With a full understanding of the beam behavior and an optimized delay laws, the phased away ultrasonic technique integrated with an automatic scanner will achieve not only to save scanning time but also to reduce the amount of radiation exposure on field inspection.

Inspection of an artificial heart by the neutron radiography technique

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pugliesi, R.; Geraldo, L.P.; Andrade, M.L.G.; Menezes, M.O.; Pereira, M.A.S.; Maizato, M.J.S.

1999-01-01

The neutron radiography technique was employed to inspect an artificial heart prototype which is being developed to provide blood circulation for patients expecting heart transplant surgery. The radiographs have been obtained by the direct method with a gadolinium converter screen along with the double coated Kodak-AA emulsion film. The artificial heart consists of a flexible plastic membrane located inside a welded metallic cavity, which is employed for blood pumping purposes. The main objective of the present inspection was to identify possible damages in this plastic membrane, produced during the welding process of the metallic cavity. The obtained radiographs were digitized as well as analysed in a PC and the improved images clearly identify several damages in the plastic membrane, suggesting changes in the welding process

Inspection of an artificial heart by the neutron radiography technique

CERN Document Server

Pugliesi, R; Andrade, M L G; Menezes, M O; Pereira, M A S; Maizato, M J S

1999-01-01

The neutron radiography technique was employed to inspect an artificial heart prototype which is being developed to provide blood circulation for patients expecting heart transplant surgery. The radiographs have been obtained by the direct method with a gadolinium converter screen along with the double coated Kodak-AA emulsion film. The artificial heart consists of a flexible plastic membrane located inside a welded metallic cavity, which is employed for blood pumping purposes. The main objective of the present inspection was to identify possible damages in this plastic membrane, produced during the welding process of the metallic cavity. The obtained radiographs were digitized as well as analysed in a PC and the improved images clearly identify several damages in the plastic membrane, suggesting changes in the welding process.

Tamper proofing of safeguards monitors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Riley, R.J.

1982-11-01

The tamper proofing of safeguards monitors is essential if the data they produce is, and can be seen to be, reliable. This report discusses the problem of tamper proofing and gives guidance on when and how to apply tamper proofing techniques. The report is split into two parts. The first concerns the fundamental problem of how much tamper proofing to apply and the second describes methods of tamper proofing and discusses their usefulness. Both sections are applicable to all safeguards monitors although particular reference will be made to doorway monitors in some cases. The phrase 'tamper proofing' is somewhat misleading as it is impossible to completely tamper proof any device. Given enough time and resources, even the most elaborate tamper proofing can be overcome. In safeguards applications we are more interested in making the device tamper resistant and tamper indicating. That is, it should be able to resist a certain amount of tampering, and if tampering proves successful, that fact should be immediately obvious. Techniques of making a device tamper indicating and tamper resistant will be described below. The phrase tamper proofing will be used throughout this report as a generic term, including both tamper resistance and tamper indicating. (author)

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

1990-11-01

From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

The present status and development of the state's system of safeguards in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurihara, H.; Haginoya, T.; Natsume, H.; Hirata, M.

1977-01-01

This paper summarizes developmental activities aiming at improving, the status of the Japan's System of safeguards. The integral tests are described which are now being implemented by the Japanese Government to check the effectiveness of the State's System, which must be maintained by the Government under the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified by Japan in June 1976. A joint experiment has been now implemented by the Nuclear Safety Bureau and the NMCC for knowing and improving the precision and accuracy of analytical measurements used at the bulk-facilities. JAERI, is conducting various R and D work on its own, and through cooperation with NMCC, NSB etc. The authors describe the results of non-destructive γ-spectrometry for the development of isotopic correlation techniques, as well as for the identification, and also refer briefly to measurement methods using the Fast Critical Assembly in JAERI. Measurement methods used in the Pu-fabrication facility of the PNC, and the problem of spent fuels application of safeguards for the reprocessing plant are discussed. The accounting reports coming from Japanese facilities are processed by the computer at the NMCC, and converted into (a) the State's material balance, and (b) the formats to be sent to IAEA. The authors discuss the experience of such data-processing as well as the developmental works for analysing MUF. As a part of the integral test, the experiences concerning planning and performance of inspection are discussed. The present status and future plans of the system of national analytical laboratories are described

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramakumar, K.L.

2016-01-01

The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

The international safeguards system and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1990-02-01

The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higinbotham, W.A.

1983-01-01

Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

The Site Approach - Lessons Learned from the Integrated Safeguards Approach for JNC-1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, M.; Iso, S.; Tomine, K.; Hirato, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Takasugi, N.; Watanabe, M.; Tsutaki, Y.; Asano, T.; Nagatani, T.; Ninagawa, J.; Fujiwara, S.; Takahashi, S.; Kimura, T.; Kodani, Y.; Fukuhara, J.; Miyaji, N.; Kawakami, Y.; Koizumi, A.; Yamazaki, Y.; Nishinosono, S.; Sasaki, K.

2010-01-01

Integrated safeguards approaches for specific sites are recognized important elements in the design of a State-level approach under the concept of grouping facilities. Japan and the IAEA agreed further improvement of integrated safeguards implementation in effective and efficient manner, particularly at large complex nuclear sites in Japan. Japan and the IAEA developed the integrated safeguards approach for specific sites defined at Article 18 of Additional Protocol. In 2008, the IAEA started the three-year test implementation of JNC-1 site approach for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards implementation of UDU material handling facilities. Japan and IAEA agreed to adopt the sector concept in order to make clear of subjected nuclear material to be verified. The sector is defined as spatial assignment that treats the same material stratum beyond MBAs in the site. The arrangement of MBAs and related material balance calculations as well as statistical analysis is maintained as a fundamental safeguards measure. At the boundaries of each sector, appropriate unattended NDA system and/or C/S system are installed, and material flows across the boundaries are verified by the system or attendance of resident inspectors. For inventory verification of the nuclear material stayed in sectors, an appropriate numbers of randomly scheduled inspections will be implemented. IAEA can access to the randomly selected sectors within 2 hours after notification. NRTA based on frequent operator's declaration will be performed for achievement of timeliness detection goal. The JNC-1 site approach has been implemented under the enhanced co-operation between the IAEA and SSAC through joint use of equipment and arrangements for DA analysis. Especially, national inspectors are working with IAEA together for coordination with operators. Because NMCC lab analyses all DA samples taken from facilities and the analysis results will be shared by the IAEA, certain numbers of DA

Airplane tire inspection by image processing techniques

OpenAIRE

Jovancevic , Igor; Arafat , Al; Orteu , Jean-José; Sentenac , Thierry

2016-01-01

International audience; In this paper, we propose a new approach to detect and inspect airplane tires. We use normalized correlation based template matching to detect tires and GrabCut segmentation method to extract them from the background. We inspect the tires condition by investigating the tire treads. Ridge based intensity profiling gives satisfying inspection results.

Objectives and techniques of an advanced safeguards system for the CANDU reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, R.M.; Zarecki, C.W.; Head, D.A.

1981-01-01

In 1975, Canada began to actively assist the IAEA with manpower and research and development efforts to meet this requirement for CANDU reactors. This paper describes various aspects of the CANDU safeguards scheme, including the containment and surveillance equipment that has been developed. It includes consideration of the following: objectives of the safeguards system, role of equipment in meeting system objectives, cost and maintenance of equipment, capabilities and limitations of equipment, and effectiveness of the scheme and equipment in providing assurance of diversion detection. 11 refs

Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

1978-06-01

This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galdoz, Erwin; Calzetta, Osvaldo; Fernández Moreno, Sonia; Llacer, Carlos; Díaz, Gustavo; Vigile, Sebastián; Brunhuber, Christoph

2011-01-01

Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Containment and surveillance -- A principle IAEA safeguards measure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.

1997-01-01

In October 1954, the Statue of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) had been signed by 70 nations. The Agency was established in 1957, and at the end of its first year of operation 130 professionals were employed in all departments. By the end of 1990, the number of professionals in the Safeguards Department had increased to over 270, over 200 of whom are designated inspectors. One of the unique features of the IAEA which directly interfaces with Member States is that of on-site inspections by international officials of the IAEA. This growth cycle, spanning some 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. This paper addresses the specific subject of technical means to maintain continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals--classically referred to as Containment and Surveillance

Reactor antineutrino monitoring with a plastic scintillator array as a new safeguards method

OpenAIRE

Oguri, S.; Kuroda, Y.; Kato, Y.; Nakata, R.; Inoue, Y.; Ito, C.; Minowa, M.

2014-01-01

We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintillators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.

The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

1977-01-01

IAEA Safeguards are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the Agency. They lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; the more modern types of agreements, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do that in quite some details. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. Those are based on two basic obligations: that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the Agency to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' system, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations States - IAEA rule that the Agency should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' system and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy from that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in that respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rational has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rational for coordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with IAEA's inspectorate was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted in order to reduce to a certain extent the Agency's independent verification work in case the States would do extensive verifications themselves in a manner transparent to IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are quite a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards objective

The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

1977-01-01

IAEA Safeguards, which are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the IAEA, lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; and the more modern types of agreement, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do this in quite some detail. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. These are based on two basic obligations - that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the IAEA to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' systems, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations between States and the IAEA rule that the IAEA should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' systems and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy on that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in this respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rationale has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rationale for co-ordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with that of the IAEA was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted so as to reduce to a certain extent the IAEA's independent verification work in case the States would themselves do extensive verifications in a manner transparent to the IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards

Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D.

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF 6 cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D. [Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, A1400 Vienna (Austria)

2009-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF{sub 6} cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

Use of artificial intelligence techniques for visual inspection systems prototyping. Application to magnetoscopy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pallas, Christophe

1987-01-01

The automation of visual inspection is a complex task that requires collaboration between experts, for example inspection specialist, vision specialist. on-line operators. Solving such problems through prototyping promotes this collaboration: the use of a non specific programming environment allows rapid, concrete checking of method validity, thus leading incrementally to the final system. In this context, artificial intelligence techniques permit easy, extensible, and modular design of the prototype, together with heuristic solution building. We define and achieve the SPOR prototyping environment, based on object-oriented programming and rules-basis managing. The feasibility and the validity of an heuristic method for automated visual inspection in fluoroscopy have been proved through prototyping in SPOR. (author) [fr

Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

2014-01-01

As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA�

Using LIBS Method in Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kovacs-Szeles, E.; Almasi, I.

2015-01-01

Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) is a type of atomic emission spectroscopic technique which is capable to detect almost all the elements from the periodic table in different sample types (solid, liquid or gas). Other advantage of the technique is that a LIBS analysis is much faster than a conventional laboratory technique. Beside the easy usability and fastness of the system the main advantages of the technique is that portable systems are also available. Using a so-called ''backpack'' version in-field analysis can be carried out. Therefore, LIBS is a more and more popular technique also e.g., in the nuclear analytics due to its several advantages. It is also tested for Safeguards purposes as a novel technology. In this work development and test of a portable LIBS system is discussed in detail. Detector system with higher resolution and specific software for evaluation of uranium isotope composition has been developed. Different kind of uranium fuel pellets with various enrichments was analyzed as test samples. Concerning the test measurements the developed LIBS instrument was found well-applicable for analysis of Safeguards samples and determination of higher enrichment of uranium in-field. The method is rapid and simple enough for short in-field sample analysis. (author)

Calculation of parameters for inspection planning and evaluation: low enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reardon, P.T.; Mullen, M.F.; Harms, N.L.

1981-02-01

As part of Task C.35 (Calculation of Parameters for Inspection Planning and Evaluation) of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed some quantitative analyses of IAEA inspection activities at low-enriched uranium (LEU) conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. This report presents the results and conclusions of those analyses. Implementation of IAEA safeguards at LEU conversion and fuel fabrication facilities must take into account a variety of practical problems and constraints. One of the key concerns is the problem of flow verification, especially product verification. The objective of this report is to help put the problem of flow verification in perspective by presenting the results of some specific calculations of inspection effort and probability of detection for various product measurement strategies. In order to provide quantitative information about the advantages and disadvantages of the various strategies, eight specific cases were examined

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Fifty Years of Safeguards under the EURATOM Treaty. A Regulatory Review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patel, B.; Chare, P.

2007-01-01

March 2007 marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of one of the founding treaties of the European Community. The EURATOM Treaty has its origins at a time when the stability of energy supplies in Europe was a major concern. Recently, much debate has centred on the possible reform or repeal of some parts of the treaty, given that its original aim was to promote and oversee the development of nuclear energy in Europe. This debate has focused attention on the future contribution of nuclear power to increasing energy demands in an enlarged Europe. However, despite these issues there is near universal agreement that the EURATOM Treaty has played a vital role in the protection of European citizens through the controls required for nuclear materials. Chapter 7 of the treaty (Safeguards) confers wide regulatory powers to the European Commission to ensure that civil nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended use as declared by the operators. This paper describes the early period of operation of the safeguards inspectorate, and gives statistics on the numbers and types of inspections carried out by the EURATOM inspectors, and discusses from an operational point of view the value of inspection activities. Further, a critical appraisal of Articles 77-85 within Chapter 7 is made. The paper also considers those safeguards requirements that are important to strengthen, in order to maintain a strong regulatory system to oversee future challenges, particularly in the context of increasing decommissioning activities within Europe. It is noteworthy that fifty-years after the founding of the treaty, many of the concerns about security of energy supply have re-emerged. It is a measure of the vision and forward thinking of its founders that the treaty has successfully overseen the safe and secure development of nuclear power in Europe (which currently provides a third of its electricity needs) and despite the many changes and developments that have occurred, that the

Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2010-01-01

In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2010-01-01

In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Curtis, Michael M.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Johnson, Shirley J.; Schanfein, Mark; Toomey, Christopher

2013-09-20

Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.

Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bardsley, J.

1996-01-01

With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues

Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Standley, V.; Boeck, H.; Villa, M.

2001-01-01

Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

The use of ICP-MS and LA-ICP-MS techniques for uranium analysis in real-life swipe samples for safeguards purposes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pestana, Rafael C.B.; Sarkis, Jorge E.S.; Carvalho, Elita F.U., E-mail: rcbpestana@gmail.com, E-mail: jesarkis@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil); Abreu Junior, Cassio H. [Centro de Energia Nuclear na Agricultura (CENA/USP), Piracicaba, SP (Brazil)

2013-07-01

Environmental swipe sampling for safeguards purposes is a powerful tool to detect undeclared materials and activities, and has been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1997. This work describes the utilization of the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) for determining uranium isotopic ratios in a real-life swipe samples collected in a conversion plant at IPEN/CNEN, Brazil. Uncertainties were estimated by following the International Organization for Standardization - Guide to the Expression of Uncertainties in Measurement (ISO GUM), with a confidence level of 95%. The major uncertainties percentage for n({sup 235}U)/n({sup 238}U) ratio for ICP-MS was 3% and for LA-ICP-MS was 30% The values of uranium isotopic ratios obtained for each technique demonstrate the viability of these analytical techniques as an alternative tool for uranium analysis in swipe samples for safeguards purposes. (author)

The use of ICP-MS and LA-ICP-MS techniques for uranium analysis in real-life swipe samples for safeguards purposes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pestana, Rafael C.B.; Sarkis, Jorge E.S.; Carvalho, Elita F.U.; Abreu Junior, Cassio H.

2013-01-01

Environmental swipe sampling for safeguards purposes is a powerful tool to detect undeclared materials and activities, and has been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1997. This work describes the utilization of the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) for determining uranium isotopic ratios in a real-life swipe samples collected in a conversion plant at IPEN/CNEN, Brazil. Uncertainties were estimated by following the International Organization for Standardization - Guide to the Expression of Uncertainties in Measurement (ISO GUM), with a confidence level of 95%. The major uncertainties percentage for n( 235 U)/n( 238 U) ratio for ICP-MS was 3% and for LA-ICP-MS was 30% The values of uranium isotopic ratios obtained for each technique demonstrate the viability of these analytical techniques as an alternative tool for uranium analysis in swipe samples for safeguards purposes. (author)

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

1977-09-01

A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

Inspection of internal tank welds using the ACFM inspection method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Topp, D.A.; Lugg, M.C.

2009-01-01

The paper describes recent developments of the ACFM technique and describes several case studies where ACFM has been used to inspect the internal plate welds on large steel storage tanks in refineries. For weld inspection, conventional methods such as magnetic particle inspection or vacuum box testing are generally used. This paper presents comparisons of the results from ACFM with those from the conventional methods, from which conclusions are drawn as to the benefits this technique offers in terms of cost, time savings and inspection reliability. (author)

A model to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards measures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

D'Amato, Eduardo; Llacer, Carlos; Vicens, Hugo

2001-01-01

verification of nuclear material inventories complemented by containment and surveillance measures and by non- traditional safeguard it is understood the qualitative measures stated in the A.P. The implementation of this integrated system will impact directly in the inspection effort, which will be limited by budget constraints. Besides, considering that the implementation of the new qualitative measures merely added to the traditional ones will substantially increase inspection costs related, not necessarily improving efficiency; it seems reasonable to attempt finding new ways of maintaining an adequate level of detection and deterrence. As a conclusion, an optimization in the distribution of a nearly fix budget must be strongly considered. A nuclear fuel cycle model is proposed where the nuclear power plants are fed with only natural uranium fuels assemblies. The model stated describes some generic sequential stages to be covered. In addition, a generic acquisition path of nuclear material with their strategic value associated is assumed. Many factors had been considered in this analysis, such as the diversion at any stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, the strategic value of the nuclear material and the cost related to make this hypothesis true. In our approach the cost of the detection measure, considerably vary from one stage to another in the nuclear fuel cycle. In this exercise some general bounded conditions are assumed and they are combined with the factors already mentioned. To carry on this study the stages at which the lowest detection probability is got are identified. Once these points had been found, it is possible to define the stages at which the traditional safeguards measures had better been complemented to the non traditional ones without getting as a result any significant decrease of the confidence in the total detection probability, improving safeguard effectiveness and efficiency. (author)

A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

2011-12-15

Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

International target values 2000 for measurement uncertainties in safeguarding nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aigner, H.; Binner, R.; Kuhn, E.

2001-01-01

The IAEA has prepared a revised and updated version of International Target Values (ITVs) for uncertainty components in measurements of nuclear material. The ITVs represent uncertainties to be considered in judging the reliability of analytical techniques applied to industrial nuclear and fissile material subject to safeguards verification. The tabulated values represent estimates of the 'state of the practice' which ought to be achievable under routine conditions by adequately equipped, experienced laboratories. The ITVs 2000 are intended to be used by plant operators and safeguards organizations as a reference of the quality of measurements achievable in nuclear material accountancy, and for planning purposes. The IAEA prepared a draft of a technical report presenting the proposed ITVs 2000, and in April 2000 the chairmen or officers of the panels or organizations listed below were invited to co- author the report and to submit the draft to a discussion by their panels and organizations. Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate, ESAKDA Working Group on Destructive Analysis, ESARDA Working Group on Non Destructive Analysis, Institute of Nuclear Material Management, Japanese Expert Group on ITV-2000, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Spent Fuel Reprocessing, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Uranium Fuel Fabrication, ISO Working Group on Analyses in MOX Fuel Fabrication, Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC). Comments from the above groups were received and incorporated into the final version of the document, completed in April 2001. The ITVs 2000 represent target standard uncertainties, expressing the precision achievable under stipulated conditions. These conditions typically fall in one of the two following categories: 'repeatability conditions' normally encountered during the measurements done within one inspection period; or 'reproducibility conditions' involving additional sources of measurement variability such as

United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

1993-11-01

This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ''Knowledge Acquisition Skills'' in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non

Measurement of 235U Enrichment Using the Semi-Peak-Ratio Technique with CdZnTe Gamma-Ray Detector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ha, J. H.; Ko, W. I.; Lee, S. Y.; Song, D. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Yang, M. S.

2001-01-01

In uranium enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, exact measurement of fissile isotope enrichment of Uranium is required for material accounting in international safeguards inspection as well as process quality control. The purpose of this study was to develop a simple measurement system which can portably be used at nuclear fuel fabrication plants especially dealing with low enriched uranium. For this purpose, a small size CZT (CdZnTe) detector was used, and the detector performance in low uranium gamma/X-rays energy range was investigated by use of various enriched uranium oxide samples. New enrichment measurement technique and analysis method for low enriched uranium oxide, so-called, 'semi-peak ratio technique' was developed. The newly developed method was considered as an alternative technique for the low enrichment and would be useful to account nuclear material in safeguarding activity at nuclear fuel fabrication facility

The application of state-level integration of safeguards in Sweden. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dahlin, G.; Haeggblom, E.; Larsson, Mats; Rehn, I.

2000-12-01

SSAC/SKI activities as well as activities of the Euratom inspectorate. IAEA would be required to carry out the necessary measures, including sufficient independent verification activities, to assure that the results obtained are correct, and that they correctly represent the actual inventory of nuclear material. One or two unannounced inspections are foreseen to provide, as applicable, material balance verification and quality assurance, as well as to contribute to deterrence. It is expected, however, that such inspections will be co-ordinated between IAEA and Euratom to ensure the cost-effectiveness. The use of advanced technology, C/S and NDA instruments, with or without remote monitoring capability, would be limited to situations where repetition of costly verification measurements could be avoided. As regards fresh MOX, such instruments could be used to avoid costly measurements and to increase the detection capability of diversion, thus providing additional deterrence. Such technology and measures may also be used in special safeguard situations. The implementation of integrated safeguards in a cost-effective manner in Sweden would depend, on one hand, on the ability of the IAEA to ensure the application of all measures so that 'there is credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials' in Sweden. On the other hand, the increased use of SSAC/SKI and RSAC/Euratom would facilitate the optimal use of all resources involved in implementation of integrated safeguards in Sweden. In order to add credibility to any decision that would reduce measures aimed at assuring the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials, the value of the measures of the Additional Protocol should be better understood in that respect. The confidence in the ability of the IAEA to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a State is expected to increase as experience is gained. The roles and functional responsibilities of the four

Additive Manufacturing Infrared Inspection

Science.gov (United States)

Gaddy, Darrell; Nettles, Mindy

2015-01-01

The Additive Manufacturing Infrared Inspection Task started the development of a real-time dimensional inspection technique and digital quality record for the additive manufacturing process using infrared camera imaging and processing techniques. This project will benefit additive manufacturing by providing real-time inspection of internal geometry that is not currently possible and reduce the time and cost of additive manufactured parts with automated real-time dimensional inspections which deletes post-production inspections.

Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

2015-01-01

There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

Human-Centred Computing for Assisting Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Szoke, I.

2015-01-01

With the rapid evolution of enabling hardware and software, technologies including 3D simulation, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), advanced user interfaces (UI), and geographical information systems (GIS) are increasingly employed in many aspects of modern life. In line with this, the nuclear industry is rapidly adopting emerging technologies to improve efficiency and safety by supporting planning and optimization of maintenance and decommissioning work, as well as for knowledge management, surveillance, training and briefing field operatives, education, etc. For many years, the authors have been involved in research and development (R&D) into the application of 3D simulation, VR, and AR, for mobile, desktop, and immersive 3D systems, to provide a greater sense of presence and situation awareness, for training, briefing, and in situ work by field operators. This work has resulted in a unique software base and experience (documented in numerous reports) from evaluating the effects of the design of training programmes and briefing sessions on human performance and training efficiency when applying various emerging technologies. In addition, the authors are involved in R&D into the use of 3D simulation, advanced UIs, mobile computing, and GIS systems to support realistic visualization of the combined radiological and geographical environment, as well as acquisition, analyzes, visualization and sharing of radiological and other data, within nuclear installations and their surroundings. The toolkit developed by the authors, and the associated knowledge base, has been successfully applied to various aspects of the nuclear industry, and has great potential within the safeguards domain. It can be used to train safeguards inspectors, brief inspectors before inspections, assist inspectors in situ (data registration, analyzes, and communication), support the design and verification of safeguards systems, conserve data and experience, educate future safeguards

Preliminary concepts: materials management in an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ostenak, C.A.; Whitty, W.J.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-11-01

Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste

Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-03-01

Canada has established a safeguards research and development program whose purpose is to supplement the resources of the IAEA. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to reactors of Canadian design. This document sets forth those tasks that make up the program

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

A review of existing model of no-notice randomized inspection and their potential application to model Pu handling facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanborn, J.; Lu, M.S.

1997-01-01

Literature regarding two alternative safeguards concepts--randomization and zones--is reviewed. The concepts were introduced in the early 1980's to address the need to make safeguards more efficient in the light of the increasing number of facilities under safeguards and a fixed IAEA inspection budget. The paper discusses literature broadly relating these approaches to IAEA needs and objectives, reports from IAEA consultants meetings, reports of field trials, and other technical papers. The review suggests that the approaches have been extensively considered on a theoretical and practical level, and that the safeguards community endorses them on a conceptual level as potentially valid ways of achieving safeguards objectives. Actual utilization of the ideas in safeguards practice has to proceed on a case-by-case basis, but progress is being made

Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1980-09-01

Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

Integrated software package for nuclear material safeguards in a MOX fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, H.J.; Piana, M.; Moussalli, G.; Saukkonen, H.

2000-01-01

Since computerized data processing was introduced to Safeguards at large bulk handling facilities, a large number of individual software applications have been developed for nuclear material Safeguards implementation. Facility inventory and flow data are provided in computerized format for performing stratification, sample size calculation and selection of samples for destructive and non-destructive assay. Data is collected from nuclear measurement systems running in attended, unattended mode and more recently from remote monitoring systems controlled. Data sets from various sources have to be evaluated for Safeguards purposes, such as raw data, processed data and conclusions drawn from data evaluation results. They are reported in computerized format at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters and feedback from the Agency's mainframe computer system is used to prepare and support Safeguards inspection activities. The integration of all such data originating from various sources cannot be ensured without the existence of a common data format and a database system. This paper describes the fundamental relations between data streams, individual data processing tools, data evaluation results and requirements for an integrated software solution to facilitate nuclear material Safeguards at a bulk handling facility. The paper also explains the basis for designing a software package to manage data streams from various data sources and for incorporating diverse data processing tools that until now have been used independently from each other and under different computer operating systems. (author)

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, John

1998-01-01

'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

Identification of uranium signatures in swipe samples on verification of nuclear activities for nuclear safeguards purposes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pestana, Rafael Cardoso Baptistini

2013-01-01

The use of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes, has been applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency–IAEA since 1996 and are routinely used as a complementary measure to strengthen the traditional nuclear safeguards procedures. The aim is verify if the states signatory to the safeguards agreements are not diverging their peaceful nuclear activities for undeclared nuclear activities. This work describes a new protocol of collect and analysis of the swipe samples for identification of nuclear signatures that may be related to the nuclear activities developed in the inspected facility. This work was used as a case of study a real uranium conversion plant of the nuclear fuel cycle of IPEN. The strategy proposed uses different analytical techniques, such as alpha radiation meter, SEM-EDX and ICP-MS to identify signatures of uranium adhered to the swipe samples. In the swipe samples analysis, it was possible to identify particles of UO 2 F 2 and UF4 through the morphological comparison and semi-quantitative analyses performed by SEM-EDX technique. In this work, methods were used that as a result has the average isotopic composition of the sample, in which the enrichment ranged from 1.453 ± 0.023 to 18.24 % ± 0.15 % in the 235 U isotope. Through these externally collections, a non-intrusive sampling, it was possible to identify enriched material handling activities with enrichment of 1.453 % ± 0.023 % to 6.331 ± 0.055 % in the isotope 235 U, as well as the use of reprocessed material, through the identification of the 236 U isotope. The uncertainties obtained for the n( 235 U)/n( 238 U) ratio varied from 0.40% to 0.86 % for the internal swipe samples. (author)

International safeguards without material balance areas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

1992-01-01

Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ''full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ''flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ''mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

Synthetic Aperture Focusing Technique in Ultrasonic Inspection of Coarse Grained Materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stepinski, Tadeusz (Uppsala Univ., Signals and Systems, Box 528, SE-751 20 Uppsala (Sweden))

2007-12-15

Experience from the ultrasonic inspection of nuclear power plants has shown that large focused transducers are relatively effective in suppressing grain (structure) noise. Operation of a large focused transducer can be thought of as an integration (coherent summation) of individual beams reflected from the target and received by individual points at the transducer surface. Synthetic aperture focusing technique (SAFT), in its simplest version mimics an acoustic lens used for focusing beams at a desired point in the region of interest. Thus, SAFT should be able to suppress the grain noise in the similar way as the focused transducer does. This report presents the results of investigation of SAFT algorithms applied for post-processing of ultrasonic data acquired in inspection of coarse grained metals. The performance of SAFT in terms of its spatial (cross-range) resolution and grain noise suppression is studied. The evaluation is made based on the experimental data obtained from the ultrasonic inspection of test specimens with artificial defects (side drilled holes). SAFT algorithms for both contact and immersion mode are introduced and experimentally verified

Review of techniques for on-line monitoring and inspection of laser welding

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shao, J; Yan, Y

2005-01-01

Laser welding has been applied to various industries, in particular, automotive, aerospace and microelectronics. However, traditional off-line testing of the welds is costly and inefficient. Therefore, on-line inspection systems with low cost have being developed to increase productivity and maintain high welding quality. This paper presents the applications of acoustic, optical, visual, thermal and ultrasonic techniques and latest development of laser welding monitoring. The advantages and limitations of these techniques are also discussed

Analysis of the impact of safeguards criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mullen, M.F.; Reardon, P.T.

1981-01-01

As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to assist in developing and demonstrating a model for assessing the impact of setting criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards. This report presents the results of PNL's work on the task. The report is in three parts. The first explains the technical approach and methodology. The second contains an example application of the methodology. The third presents the conclusions of the study. PNL used the model and computer programs developed as part of Task C.5 (Estimation of Inspection Efforts) of the Program of Technical Assistance. The example application of the methodology involves low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The effects of variations in seven parameters are considered: false alarm probability, goal probability of detection, detection goal quantity, the plant operator's measurement capability, the inspector's variables measurement capability, the inspector's attributes measurement capability, and annual plant throughput. Among the key results and conclusions of the analysis are the following: the variables with the greatest impact on the probability of detection are the inspector's measurement capability, the goal quantity, and the throughput; the variables with the greatest impact on inspection costs are the throughput, the goal quantity, and the goal probability of detection; there are important interactions between variables. That is, the effects of a given variable often depends on the level or value of some other variable. With the methodology used in this study, these interactions can be quantitatively analyzed; reasonably good approximate prediction equations can be developed using the methodology described here

Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

1994-01-01

Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H

2004-07-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility.

Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H.

2004-07-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard

2010-01-01

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

Proposal for Analysis of the Safeguarded Nuclear Materials 235U and 239Pu by Delayed Neutrons Technique

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

El-Mongy, S.A.

2000-01-01

This paper introduces, describes and initiates a very sensitive and rapid non-destructive technique to be used for analysis of the safeguarded nuclear materials 235 U and 239 Pu. The technique is based on fission of the nuclear material by neutrons and then measuring the delayed neutrons produced from the neutron rich fission products. By this technique, fissile isotope content ( 235 U) can be determined in the presence of the other fissile (e.g. 239 Pu) or fertile isotopes (e.g. 238 U) in fresh and spent fuel. The time consumed for analysis of bulk materials by this technique is only 4 minutes. The method is also used for analysis of uranium in rock, sediment, soil, meteorites, lunar, biological, urine, archaeological, zircon sand and seawater samples. The method enables uranium in a sample to be measured without respect to its oxidation state, organic and inorganic elements

Nuclear Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Findlay, T.

2015-01-01

The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

Challenges for Incorporation of additional safeguards requirements in a fuel fabrication facility in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ishikawa, Tadatsugu; Suzuki, Katsuyuki

2004-01-01

Recent introduction of strengthened SG measure (i.e.: SNRI (Short Notice Random Inspection)) necessitated semi-real-time reporting including non-prescribed data in the FA for vital processes. These requirements have been bet by endeavors of both Inspectorates and operators. Using the integrated databases it will also be possible to produce most of reports required for safeguards purposes on a semi-real time basis, albeit with additional investment for softwares. However, in order to fully enjoy the advancements of information technology it is necessary to streamline the legal and procedural platform in addition to technical matters, in particular what are 'must' for safeguards and abolish if they are not really needed anymore. (author)

Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

2010-01-01

Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

Informing the public on technical effectiveness of international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunt, H.M.

1994-01-01

In recent years, public interest regarding IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards effectiveness has partially shifted to detection of undeclared nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, important segments of the public remain vitally interested in whether international safeguards would be able to reliably and definitively detect diversion of bomb quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from open-quotes bulk handlingclose quotes facilities. There now exists a sizable body of unclassified technical reports, based on experimental results over many years, written by various experts, describing actual capabilities and limitations of safeguards techniques and systems, which collectively lead to definitive evaluations of technical safeguards effectiveness. For a large-scale operation of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium fuel fabrication, or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, an undisputable conclusion is that international safeguards systems would be unable to reliably and definitively detect the diversion in a one-year period of a significant quantity of plutonium or enriched uranium; moreover, diversion of many significant quantities per year (from such an operation) would have negligible probability of definitive detection if conducted in accordance with particle diversion scenarios. To properly inform the public and government agencies, reports on technical effectiveness of international safeguards should incorporate these basic conclusions

National Machine Guarding Program: Part 1. Machine safeguarding practices in small metal fabrication businesses.

Science.gov (United States)

Parker, David L; Yamin, Samuel C; Brosseau, Lisa M; Xi, Min; Gordon, Robert; Most, Ivan G; Stanley, Rodney

2015-11-01

Metal fabrication workers experience high rates of traumatic occupational injuries. Machine operators in particular face high risks, often stemming from the absence or improper use of machine safeguarding or the failure to implement lockout procedures. The National Machine Guarding Program (NMGP) was a translational research initiative implemented in conjunction with two workers' compensation insures. Insurance safety consultants trained in machine guarding used standardized checklists to conduct a baseline inspection of machine-related hazards in 221 business. Safeguards at the point of operation were missing or inadequate on 33% of machines. Safeguards for other mechanical hazards were missing on 28% of machines. Older machines were both widely used and less likely than newer machines to be properly guarded. Lockout/tagout procedures were posted at only 9% of machine workstations. The NMGP demonstrates a need for improvement in many aspects of machine safety and lockout in small metal fabrication businesses. © 2015 The Authors. American Journal of Industrial Medicine published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1990-01-01

This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

A safeguards verification technique for solution homogeneity and volume measurements in process tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suda, S.; Franssen, F.

1987-01-01

A safeguards verification technique is being developed for determining whether process-liquid homogeneity has been achieved in process tanks and for authenticating volume-measurement algorithms involving temperature corrections. It is proposed that, in new designs for bulk-handling plants employing automated process lines, bubbler probes and thermocouples be installed at several heights in key accountability tanks. High-accuracy measurements of density using an electromanometer can now be made which match or even exceed analytical-laboratory accuracies. Together with regional determination of tank temperatures, these measurements provide density, liquid-column weight and temperature gradients over the fill range of the tank that can be used to ascertain when the tank solution has reached equilibrium. Temperature-correction algorithms can be authenticated by comparing the volumes obtained from the several bubbler-probe liquid-height measurements, each based on different amounts of liquid above and below the probe. The verification technique is based on the automated electromanometer system developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The IAEA has recently approved the purchase of a stainless-steel tank equipped with multiple bubbler and thermocouple probes for installation in its Bulk Calibration Laboratory at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. The verification technique is scheduled for preliminary trials in late 1987

An overview of artificial intelligence applications to safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, C.E.

1987-01-01

The rapidly growing discipline of artificial intelligence (AI) has delivered a number of expert systems that aid analyses of processes and procedures by emulating the analysis and decisions of experts. Expert systems have not reached the point of replacing experts, but can provide assistance in their absence. In narrow domains, expert systems can relieve the expert of less demanding analyses and decisions, freeing him/her for more important tasks. Safeguards experts are in great demand, and the decision processes they perform are not always well-defined. The general area of safeguards analysis is representative of the type of activity that benefits from the assistance provided by AI techniques. The American Nuclear Society is holding a topical meeting, Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Computer Applications in the Nuclear Industry, on August 31-September 2, 1987. The technical papers cover a number of applications of potential benefit to safeguards and the safeguards interface with facility operations. This paper is a technical review of papers presented at the topical meeting

Implementation of integrated safeguards in Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti, Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olaru, V.; Ivana, T.; Epure, Gh.

2009-01-01

The nuclear activity was conducted for many years in Romania under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions the specific nuclear safeguards. Now there is a good opportunity to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and at the same time to increase the accountancy and control of nuclear materials by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS) implementation. The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional completion to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA relating to safeguards. It is part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between the Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) representatives and IAEA inspectors has taken place in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited FCN and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storage and the technological flow and it was reviewed the residence times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, metrological methods, weighting method and procedures of elaborating the implied documents and lists. At the same time the IAEA and FCN representatives established the main points for implementing the IS at FCN i.e. performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), communicating the eligible days for SNRI for each year, communicating the estimated deliveries and shipments for the first quarter and then for the rest of the year, mail box daily declaration (DD) with respect to the residence time for several nuclear materials, advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), etc. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and FCN (RO

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

Physical protection in relation to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.

1984-01-01

The general structure of the safeguards system, the SSAC interfaces, and physical protection principles, equipment, and techniques are reviewed. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

2009-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-02-01

This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

Application of the cylindrically guided wave technique for bolt and pump-shaft inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Light, G.M.; Ruescher, E.H.; Bloom, E.A.; Tsai, Y.M.

1990-01-01

Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) has been working with the cylindrically guided wave technique (CGWT) since late 1982. The initial work was aimed at inspecting reactor pressure vessel hold-down studs. The CGWT was shown to be able to detect defects as small as 0.060 inch (1.5 mm) deep through metal paths up to 120 inches (304 cm) in stud bolt carbon steel. Later developments in the application of CGWT were aimed at inspecting reactor coolant pump (RCP) shafts. The RCP shafts are usually approximately 2 meters long and have changing diameters along the length, from approximately 12 cm to 23 cm in discrete steps. The pump shafts have been susceptible to small cracks and can be inspected most cost-effectively from the top of the shaft. A matrix transducer composed of six 1-inch (2.54-cm) diameter transducers along with pulsing and receiving electronics (EPRI Pump-Shaft Inspection System) was developed during 1988. A patent application for this technology has been made. This report describes the work conducted during 1989 and the results obtained

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Bowersox, D.F.

1977-09-01

The conceptual design of a materials management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility is developed and evaluated. Dynamic material balances are drawn from information provided by nondestructive-analysis techniques, process-control instrumentation, and conventional chemical analyses augmented by process-monitoring devices. Powerful statistical methods, cast in the framework of decision analysis and applied to unit-process accounting areas, ensure adequate spatial and temporal quantification of possible diversion with minimal process disruption. Modeling and simulation techniques assist in evaluating the sensitivity of the system to various diversion schemes and in comparing safeguards strategies. Features that would improve the safeguardability of the conversion process are discussed

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Inspection of disposal canisters components

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pitkaenen, J.

2013-12-01

This report presents the inspection techniques of disposal canister components. Manufacturing methods and a description of the defects related to different manufacturing methods are described briefly. The defect types form a basis for the design of non-destructive testing because the defect types, which occur in the inspected components, affect to choice of inspection methods. The canister components are to nodular cast iron insert, steel lid, lid screw, metal gasket, copper tube with integrated or separate bottom, and copper lid. The inspection of copper material is challenging due to the anisotropic properties of the material and local changes in the grain size of the copper material. The cast iron insert has some acoustical material property variation (attenuation, velocity changes, scattering properties), which make the ultrasonic inspection demanding from calibration point of view. Mainly three different methods are used for inspection. Ultrasonic testing technique is used for inspection of volume, eddy current technique, for copper components only, and visual testing technique are used for inspection of the surface and near surface area