Development of safeguards information treatment system at facility level in Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

So, D.S.; Lee, B.D.; Song, D.Y.

2001-01-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System (SITS) at Facility level was developed to implement efficiently the obligations under IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bilateral nuclear cooperation Agreements with other countries and domestic law, and to manage efficiently the information related to safeguards implementation at facility level in Korea. Nuclear facilities in Korea are categorized into 8 types based on its accounting characteristics as follows: (1) Item counting facility or bulk handling facility; (2) Batch follow-up facility or not; (3) MUF (Material Unaccounted For) occurrence or not; (4) Nuclear production facility or not; (5) Operation status of facility; (6) Information management of nuclear material transfer status between KMPs or not; (7) Indication of inventory KMP on the inventory change of nuclear material is required or not. Hardware and Software for SITS can be loaded on a personal computer under operation system of Window 2000 or Window NT. MS SQL server 7 and MS Internet Information Server were adopted for database management system and Web server, respectively. Network environment of SITS was designed to include nuclear research institute, nuclear power plants of PWR and CANDU, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and other facilities. SITS can be operated standalone or under the client-server system if intranet exists. More detailed contents of SITS are described elsewhere. Each module of SITS will be tested during incorporation of existing data into SITS and SITS will be distributed to nuclear facilities in Korea

Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

1991-01-01

Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haginoya, Tohru

1997-01-01

INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

Networking of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

1995-01-01

This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

Protection of unclassified safeguards information; criteria and guidance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kasun, D.J.

1981-10-01

The document was prepared to assist licensees and other persons who possess unclassified safeguards information in establishing an information protection system that satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21. Section 73.21 was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to the provisions of a new Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, titled Safeguards Information

Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

2016-02-01

A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

A view to the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsuboi, Hiroshi

2000-01-01

The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

2010-01-01

All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

Japanese Quality Assurance System Regarding the Provision of Material Accounting Reports and the Safeguards Relevant Information to the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goto, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Kumekawa, H.; Usui, A.; Sano, K.

2015-01-01

The provision of the safeguards relevant reports and information in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the additional protocol (AP) is the basis for the IAEA safeguards. The government of Japan (Japan Safeguards Office, JSGO) has believed that the correct reports contribute to effective and efficient safeguards therefore the domestic quality assurance system for the reporting to the IAEA was already established at the time of the accession of the CSA in 1977. It consists of Code 10 interpretation (including the seminars for operators in Japan), SSAC's checks for syntax error, code and internal consistency (computer based consistency check between facilities) and the discussion with the IAEA on the facilities' measurement system for bulk-handling facilities, which contributes to the more accurate reports from operators. This spirit has been maintained for the entry into force of the AP. For example, questions and amplification from the IAEA will be taken into account the review of the AP declaration before sending to the IAEA and the open source information such as news article and scientific literature in Japanese is collected and translated into English, and the translated information is provided to the IAEA as the supplementary information, which may contribute to broadening the IAEA information source and to their comprehensive evaluation. The other safeguards relevant information, such as the mail-box information for SNRI at LEU fuel fabrication plants, is also checked by the JSGO's QC software before posting. The software was developed by JSGO and it checks data format, batch IDs, birth/death date, shipper/receiver information and material description code. This paper explains the history of the development of the Japanese quality assurance system regarding the reports and the safeguards relevant information to the IAEA. (author)

Use of Equipment Information System (EQUIS) to determine priority for purchasing safeguards equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silberberg, S.

1988-01-01

To manage its large world-wide inventory of safeguards equipment, the IAEA Safeguards department uses a computerized Equipment Information System (EQUIS). EQUIS data have been analyzed using Queueing Theory to determine if inventory is adequate to meet inspector demands and in those cases where it is inadequate, to indicate how many additional units should be procured. Results are tabulated for various types of non-destructive analysis (NDA) equipment. For equipment where there is a high turnover and hence a large amount of data, the analysis provides a powerful tool for assisting procurement decisions

Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haddal, Risa N. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2016-10-01

One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haddal, Risa N.

2016-01-01

One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository's life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwanaga, Masayuki

2000-01-01

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

Evolution of safeguards systems design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-01-01

Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Geological Repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haddal, R.; Finch, R.; Baldwin, G.

2016-01-01

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has noted that long-term information management (LTIM) of safeguards data at geological repositories will be a significant challenge in the future as information and records management systems evolve and permanent disposal of nuclear materials becomes a high-priority in many countries. Identifying approaches to how information on buried high-level nuclear waste will be managed, handled, organized, archived, read, interpreted, and secured for the long-term (1000 years after repository closure and beyond) will be key to safeguards at repositories). The purpose of this study is to explore various long-term information management systems and how they may or may not be adapted for geological repositories for high-level waste. The study will also examine what types of safeguards-related data should be included in such a system. The study will also consider hypotheses about future needs and analyze the pros and cons of very long-term information management. (author

The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liester, N.A.

1995-01-01

The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

16 CFR 314.3 - Standards for safeguarding customer information.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Standards for safeguarding customer... OF CONGRESS STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION § 314.3 Standards for safeguarding customer information. (a) Information security program. You shall develop, implement, and maintain a...

Informing the public on technical effectiveness of international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunt, H.M.

1994-01-01

In recent years, public interest regarding IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards effectiveness has partially shifted to detection of undeclared nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, important segments of the public remain vitally interested in whether international safeguards would be able to reliably and definitively detect diversion of bomb quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from open-quotes bulk handlingclose quotes facilities. There now exists a sizable body of unclassified technical reports, based on experimental results over many years, written by various experts, describing actual capabilities and limitations of safeguards techniques and systems, which collectively lead to definitive evaluations of technical safeguards effectiveness. For a large-scale operation of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium fuel fabrication, or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, an undisputable conclusion is that international safeguards systems would be unable to reliably and definitively detect the diversion in a one-year period of a significant quantity of plutonium or enriched uranium; moreover, diversion of many significant quantities per year (from such an operation) would have negligible probability of definitive detection if conducted in accordance with particle diversion scenarios. To properly inform the public and government agencies, reports on technical effectiveness of international safeguards should incorporate these basic conclusions

The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

1987-01-01

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

Prospects for regional safeguards systems - State-level Approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peixoto, O.J.M.

2013-01-01

The increased co-operation with Regional Safeguard's System (RSAC) is a relevant tool for strengthening effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the international safeguard. The new safeguards system that emerges from the application of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the full use of State-level Concept is a challenge and an opportunity for effectively incorporate RSAC into the international safeguards scheme. The challenge is to determine how the co-operation and coordination will be implemented on this new safeguards scheme. This paper presents some discussions and prospects on the issues to be faced by RSAC and IAEA during the implementation of State-level Approach (SLA) using all information available. It is also discussed how different levels of co-operation could be achieved when SLA is applied by IAEA safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

IAEA safeguard system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pontes, B.C.

1987-01-01

The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

Where are we now? The strengthened safeguards system: Origins, aims, features, issues and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schriefer, D.

1998-01-01

The present status of the strengthened safeguards system includes the origins, aims, features, issues and future prospects. The areas of emphasis concerning the strengthened safeguards system are: access to information (environmental sampling and improved information analysis), access to sites, rational use of resources (cost analysis of present safeguards, increased cooperation with state systems, cost savings in traditional safeguards activities)

Nuclear facility safeguards systems modeling using discrete event simulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.

1977-01-01

The threat of theft or dispersal of special nuclear material at a nuclear facility is treated by studying the temporal relationships between adversaries having authorized access to the facility (insiders) and safeguards system events by using a GASP IV discrete event simulation. The safeguards system events--detection, assessment, delay, communications, and neutralization--are modeled for the general insider adversary strategy which includes degradation of the safeguards system elements followed by an attempt to steal or disperse special nuclear material. The performance measure used in the analysis is the estimated probability of safeguards system success in countering the adversary based upon a predetermined set of adversary actions. An exemplary problem which includes generated results is presented for a hypothetical nuclear facility. The results illustrate representative information that could be utilized by safeguards decision-makers

Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galdoz, Erwin; Calzetta, Osvaldo; Fernández Moreno, Sonia; Llacer, Carlos; Díaz, Gustavo; Vigile, Sebastián; Brunhuber, Christoph

2011-01-01

Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1999-01-01

'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

Some technological aspects of an evaluation and visualisation component for the safeguards integrated information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Belenki, A.; Nishiwaki, Y.; Matsuoka, H.; Fedoseeva, I.

2001-01-01

According to Safeguards strengthening measures which include both Measures under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Measures under Model Additional Protocol, the Agency receives much more information than some years before. It seems reasonable to develop an integrated information system (IIS) because information evaluation and review are important parts of Safeguards assessments. An integrated information system can include the following components: information search, primary messages selection, evaluation of received information, data storage, visualisation and evaluation of State's nuclear programme (SNP) and elaboration of management decisions. Hereby, IIS is a human-computer system where all components listed above are implemented. Within the framework of SNP a human factor plays an important role. SNP has a number of special properties such as uniqueness, multi-dimensions, subjectivity of its state evaluation, time variation, incompleteness of its description and the mentioned above human factor. For realistic simulation of SNP development it is necessary to reduce usage of quantitative methods and apply methods which are closer to perception of the outward things by a human being. This task requires to convert all available information, both qualitative and quantitative, into a special format. The format requires methods which are being developed on the basis of pragmatic, visual and Zadeh's linguistic variables which define corresponding scales. A pragmatic scale is defined on a basic metric scale taking into account a particular pragmatic cut of SNP. In other words pragmatic scale maps a pragmatic cut of the problem which is important from the point of view of IIS goal. By using pragmatic scales it is possible, for example, to estimate the speed of development of processes existing within the framework of SNP. The visual variable allows to solve the following engineering tasks: input of the expert's evaluations in the system and interpretations of its

Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

2010-10-01

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cartan, F.O.

1982-05-01

This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

2010-10-15

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Henry, Michael J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Burtner, IV, E. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, J. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hampton, S. D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); La Mothe, R. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Nordquist, P. L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Zarzhitsky, D. V. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-12-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.; Burtner, IV E.R.; Doehle, J. R.; Hampton, S. D.; La Mothe, R. R.; Nordquist, P. L.; Zarzhitsky, D. V.

2014-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL's safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide ''vision''@ for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1981-01-01

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

Structure of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1978-06-01

An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

2001-01-01

The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gitau, Ernest T. N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, Joel R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Toomey, Christopher M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-09-01

In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

41 CFR 105-64.108 - How does GSA safeguard personal information?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... personal information? 105-64.108 Section 105-64.108 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION Regional Offices-General... GSA safeguard personal information? (a) System managers will establish administrative, technical, and...

A collaborative environment for information driven safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scott, Mark R.; Michel, Kelly D.

2010-01-01

For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu Yuan

1994-09-01

Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA

A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yuan, Wu [Beijing Inst. of Nuclear Engineering (China)

1994-09-01

Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA.

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1976-01-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1978-06-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

Inventory of safeguards software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

2009-03-01

The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

2001-01-01

The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

2009-10-01

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

2009-07-01

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding systems of... maintained. (b) Personnel information contained in both manual and automated systems of records shall be... alternative storage system providing that it furnished an equivalent degree of physical security as storage in...

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

Ontology-based semantic information technology for safeguards: opportunities and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDaniel, Michael

2014-01-01

The challenge of efficiently handling large volumes of heterogeneous information is a barrier to more effective safeguards implementation. With the emergence of new technologies for generating and collecting information this is an issue common to many industries and problem domains. Several diverse information‑intensive fields are developing and adopting ontology‑based semantic information technology solutions to address issues of information integration, federation and interoperability. Ontology, in this context, refers to the formal specification of the content, structure, and logic of knowledge within a domain of interest. Ontology‑based semantic information technologies have the potential to impact nearly every level of safeguards implementation, from information collection and integration, to personnel training and knowledge retention, to planning and analysis. However, substantial challenges remain before the full benefits of semantic technology can be realized. Perhaps the most significant challenge is the development of a nuclear fuel cycle ontology. For safeguards, existing knowledge resources such as the IAEA’s Physical Model and established upper level ontologies can be used as starting points for ontology development, but a concerted effort must be taken by the safeguards community for such an activity to be successful. This paper provides a brief background of ontologies and semantic information technology, demonstrates how these technologies are used in other areas, offers examples of how ontologies can be applied to safeguards, and discusses the challenges of developing and implementing this technology as well as a possible path forward.

International safeguards data management system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

1981-01-01

The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

Light water reactor safeguards system evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.

1978-01-01

A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of safeguards systems was developed in this study and was applied to a typical light water reactor plant. The relative importance of detection systems, barriers, response forces and other safeguards system components was examined in extensive parameter variation studies. (author)

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-01-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

Control of information as an element of nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Green, J.N.

1982-03-01

Control of information as an element of physical protection has a long history in the field of national security. The nuclear industry is familiar with the constraints on proprietary information; and, with an effective date of October 1, 1980 for Parts 25 and 95 in Title 10 of the code of Federal Regulations, certain activities had to cope with rules for safeguarding of classified information. In applying the rules it is important to understand the differences between national security information and restricted data, and how guidance is promulgated both by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and by the Department of Energy. More recently, with a fully effective date of January 20, 1982, the NRC published rules for the protection of unclassified safeguards information. The scope is much broader than for the classified information. For example, the rules are applicable to power reactors. In this paper the directives which provide the details for compliance with all these rules are identified, and their application is discussed. NRC inspectors will be checking for compliance with the rules. Once problems of compliance are resolved, the more difficult question of evaluating the impact of information control procedures on the effectiveness of a physical protection system can be addressed

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-07-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information

Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

1981-01-01

A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

Scientific and technical information as a source for IAEA safeguards state evaluation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Feldman, Y.; Ferguson, M. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

2014-07-01

The IAEA Department of Safeguards is continually working to refine its methodologies and procedures for the analysis of information relevant to the evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle in States that have safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This analysis is required to achieve an understanding of States' nuclear-related activities against which a State's declarations are evaluated for correctness as well as completeness, and to provide credible assurances on the peaceful uses of nuclear material in the State. To achieve this end, diversification of sources and comparison for consistency among available information is essential to ensure an accurate assessment of a State's nuclear activities. Open sources of information on scientific and technical (S&T) developments and research provide the Department of Safeguards with an enhanced basis to evaluate the technical capabilities of States. These information sources are regularly and systematically assessed to provide information about industrial capabilities, patenting activities and research and development activities in States as reflected through published scientific and technical literature. Using such sources, in addition to other, long-established safeguards information sources, helps the IAEA to draw soundly-based safeguards conclusions. The utility of this category of information in terms of the State evaluation process lies primarily in the comparison with other sources of information, especially State-declared information, and in the assessment of consistency of all safeguards-relevant information regarding nuclear fuel cycle technologies and activities in a State. The current paper aims to describe the use of S&T literature, how information from different sources is consolidated, how it is analysed and how it contributes in the overall process of State evaluation in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (author)

Safeguards information treatment in NMCC

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kojo, Yukiko; Tanigawa, Takanori; Iwai, Naobumi; Suzuki, Tsuneo

1994-01-01

The Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) has treated all information of the accounting reports, obligation control reports and plans of import/export or domestic receipt/shipment, etc. submitted by the facilities according to the domestic laws, and prepared the reports to provide the IAEA subject to the safeguards agreement and to provide the partner countries subject to the relevant bilateral agreements. The accounting reports are processed during two weeks in the latter half of month and dispatched to the IAEA by the 30th of the month. On the other hand, the obligation control reports are processed during two weeks in the first half of the next month. The other reports are processed on case's by case's basis and submitted to the IAEA or the partner countries at need. The data processing system consists of the quality check, database update, reporting and conversational inquiry sub-systems with the database management system (ADABAS) which keeps key indexes and summary database. (author)

The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wagner, W.

2000-01-01

A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

2010-01-01

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

Review and evaluation of the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Volume 1. Comparison of DOE nuclear materials information system requirements with NMMSS capabilities and recommendations for NMMSS improvements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-03-01

This report documents the result of a review of the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), a Department of Energy nuclear materials control and accountability data base and information processing system. This review was performed to determine what data are required from the NMMSS, how it is collected, and how it is used. Based upon the review, NMMSS deficiencies and excess capabilities were identified and a draft set of requirements for the nuclear materials information system that the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) should be supporting as well as recommendations for attaining that capability

IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-07-01

What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

Safeguards by Design Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-13

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Safeguards by Design Challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

2016-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Next Generation Germanium Systems for Safeguards Applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreyer, J.; Burks, M.; Hull, E.

2015-01-01

We are developing the latest generation of highly portable, mechanically cooled germanium systems for safeguard applications. In collaboration with our industrial partner, Ph.D.s Co, we have developed the Germanium Gamma Ray Imager (GeGI), an imager with a 2π field of view. This instrument has been thoroughly field tested in a wide range of environments and have performed reliably even in the harshest conditions. The imaging capability of GeGI complements existing safeguards techniques by allowing for the spatial detection, identification, and characterization of nuclear material. Additionally, imaging can be used in design information verification activities to address potential material diversions. Measurements conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant highlight the advantages this instrument offers in the identification and localization of LEU, HEU and Pu holdup. GeGI has also been deployed to the Savannah River Site for the measurement of radioactive waste canisters, providing information valuable for waste characterization and inventory accountancy. Measuring 30 x 15 x 23 cm and weighing approximately 15 kg, this instrument is the first portable germanium-based imager. GeGI offers high reliability with the convenience of mechanical cooling, making this instrument ideal for the next generation of safeguards instrumentation. (author)

40 CFR 2.211 - Safeguarding of business information; penalty for wrongful disclosure.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... for his or her private gain or advantage, any business information which came into his or her... any security procedures for handling and safeguarding business information which are contained in any... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding of business information...

A functional integrated data evaluation system for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, F.; Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.; De Grandi, G.F.; Franklin, M.; Muller, K.; Rota, A.

1983-01-01

The quantitative assurance provided by the safeguards of nuclear material is based on the analysis of a very large amount of data of different origins and quality. They are generated by operators on a regular basis, or provided during discussions of facility attachments or declaration of production schedules. They are also generated by inspectors during their verification activities which are related to accountancy data, auditing, independent measurements, sealing, surveillance, etc. The Joint Research Centre and Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities are studying a Functional Integrated Data Evaluation System (FIDES) for safeguards. A preliminary outline of such a system was presented at the 3rd ESARDA symposium at Karlsruhe. This paper first emphasises the decisional thread which underlies the ESARDA activities and, second, gives a progress report on JRC work which is designed to give effect to these ideas. This progess, reported below, covers two activities. The first is the automatic co-ordination of the operator's measurement system information with the operator's accounting declaration. The second element is the development of a functional structure for NDA data generation evaluation and transmission. (author)

Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beddingfield, David H.; Lafleur, Adrienne M.

2009-01-01

Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of 241 Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased (α,n) production in oxide fuels from the 241 Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of 241 Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of 241 Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of 241 Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

Safeguards evolution towards unattended c/s (containment and surveillance) systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valentino, Lucia I.; Saavedra, Analia D.; Castro, Laura B.; Maceiras, Elena; Llacer, Carlos D.; Vicens, Hugo E.; Mairal, Maria L.; Fernandez Moreno, Sonia

2000-01-01

This paper shows the development and evolution of safeguards towards the use of different containment and surveillance (C/S) systems, which involve the possibility of working unattended. They are designed to transmit safeguards relevant data remotely. It is believed that they would increase safeguards efficiency while maintaining or even enhancing their effectiveness. At present, unattended C/S systems with or without remote transmission are in place at several installations. In addition, some other possible applications are being tested. One of these is the Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) field trial at Embalse nuclear power plant to cover the transfers of spent fuel from the ponds to the dry storage. Some of the matters to be addressed are of general nature (i.e. applicable to any unattended/remote system) while others depend on the specific application in a nuclear installation. Among others, the following are particularly important: -) Sharing of data with the SSAC; -) Impact of a failure of the RMS on the operator, IAEA and the SSAC; -) Provision of relevant operational and accounting information; -) Review of the current safeguard approach for the selected installation; -) RMS cost-effectiveness assessment. This paper describes the status of the RMS field trial as well as the current C/S system in place at Embalse nuclear power plant. (authors)

Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

2011-09-01

During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement and is furthered through a common understanding of the respective rights and obligations of States and the IAEA. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published IAEA Services Series No. 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding and improving cooperation in safeguards implementation. To meet their safeguards obligations, States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up their infrastructure to meet their specific needs. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to differences in the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes, their regulatory framework and other factors. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. This SIP Guide addresses the important topic of the provision of information by States to the IAEA. Declarations by States form the basis for IAEA verification activities, and the quality and timeliness of such declarations impact significantly the efficiency of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and their use is voluntary. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

The evolution of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.

1999-01-01

The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coulter, C.A.

1989-01-01

Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

Safeguards and nuclear forensics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gangotra, Suresh

2016-01-01

Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

32 CFR 310.13 - Safeguarding personal information.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

.... (a) General responsibilities. DoD Components shall establish appropriate administrative, technical..., the sensitivity of the personal information stored, the storage medium used and, to a degree, the... automated environment (see appendix A). (5) Tailor safeguards specifically to the vulnerabilities of the...

Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

1987-01-01

The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

1983-01-01

A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

1978-06-01

This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

ASEA-ATOM's URANUS system for production control, economic control and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mattson, J.C.

1983-01-01

ASEA-ATOM needs a system for production and economic control because: (1) the uranium is the valuable property of the customer; (2) short delivery times are a prime means of competition; (3) the manufacture of fuel necessitates frequent enrichment changes and much enrichment blending; (4) minimizing uranium stock reduces interest costs. A system which meets the above needs will with minor modifications meet safeguard requirements. URANUS is an integrated man/computer system with manual input and automatic data treatment and reporting of information. The man/computer interface is monitored by the automatic checking for plausibility of all input. An item is a quantity of material which is treated as a unit in production. Each item receives a unique identification number which may be used only once. If the qualitative properties of an item are changed a new item number is issued. Items are reported on forms and fed into URANUS by authorized personnel using personal passwords or are directly reported by terminal from certain operations. Pertinent information is entered for each project. The URANUS computer system consists of terminal activated on-line and batch modules which are briefly described. Output is information for planning, economic control and safeguards. Safeguards information consists of the following. For flow and blending control: delivery information; change of nominal enrichment; enrichment blending; internal transactions that change an enrichment/origin account; material status report (MSR); item inventory per MBA; general ledger. For physical inventory: material balance report (MBR); book item inventory per MBA; physical item inventory per MBA; uranium balance per origin and enrichment

Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

2001-01-01

For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1981-01-01

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

12 CFR Appendix A to Part 748 - Guidelines for Safeguarding Member Information

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... ACTS AND BANK SECRECY ACT COMPLIANCE Pt. 748, App. A Appendix A to Part 748—Guidelines for Safeguarding... ventures, outsourcing arrangements, and changes to member information systems. F. Report to the Board. Each... compliance with these guidelines. The report should discuss material matters related to its program...

The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konecni, S.

2015-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

Safeguards on nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

2001-01-01

The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

2007-01-01

Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D

2008-01-01

Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

1996-12-01

17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

Automated 741 document preparation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Automated Safeguards Information System (OASIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Austin, H.C.; Gray, L.M.

1982-01-01

OASIS has been providing for Oak Ridge National Laboratory's total safeguards needs since being place on line in April 1980. The system supports near real-time nuclear materials safeguards and accountability control. The original design of OASIS called for an automated facsimile of a 741 document to be prepared as a functional by-product of updating the inventory. An attempt was made to utilize, intact, DOE-Albuquerque's automated 741 system to generate the facsimile; however, the five page document produced proved too cumbersome. Albuquerque's programs were modified to print an original 741 document utilizing standard DOE/NRC 741 forms. It is felt that the best features of both the automated and manually generated 741 documents have been incorporated. Automation of the source data for 741 shipping documents produces greater efficiency while reducing possible errors. Through utilization of the standard DOE/NRC form, continuity within the NMMSS system is maintained, thus minimizing the confusion and redundancy associated with facsimiles. OASIS now fulfills the original concept of near real-time accountability by furnishing a viable 741 document as a function of updating the inventory

Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beddingfield, David H.; Nordquist, Heather A.; Umebayaashi, Eiji

2009-01-01

Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given.

Current technical issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.

1977-01-01

Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richardson, J.M.

1982-03-01

Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

Reactor safeguards

CERN Document Server

Russell, Charles R

1962-01-01

Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-01-01

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

10 CFR 73.22 - Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific requirements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... protection. Information not classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information related to physical protection, including: (i) The composite physical security plan for the facility or site; (ii... Safeguards Information. (2) Each computer not located within an approved and lockable security storage...

Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1980-09-01

Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

1980-01-01

This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

Safeguards information handling and treatment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.; Liu, J.; Ruan, D.

2001-01-01

Many states are currently discussing the new additional protocol (INFCIRC/540). This expanded framework is expected to establish the additional confirmation that there are no undeclared activities and facilities in that state. The information collected by the IAEA mainly comes from three different sources: information either provided by the state, collected by the IAEA, and from open sources. This information can be uncertain, incomplete, imprecise, not fully reliable, contradictory, etc. Hence, there is a need for a mathematical framework that provides a basis for handling and treatment of multidimensional information of varying quality. We use a linguistic assessment based on fuzzy set theory, as a flexible and realistic approach. The concept of a linguistic variable serves the purpose of providing a means of approximated characterization of information that may be imprecise, too complex or ill-defined, for which the traditional quantitative approach does not give an adequate answer. In the application of this linguistic assessment approach, a problem arises on how to aggregate linguistic information. Two different approaches can be followed: (1) approximation approach using the associated membership function; (2) symbolic approach acting by the direct computation on labels, where the use of membership function and the linguistic approximation is unnecessary, which makes computation simple and quick. To manipulate the linguistic information in this context, we work with aggregation operators for combining the linguistic non-weighted and weighted values by direct computation on labels, like the Min-type and Max-type weighted aggregation operators as well as the median aggregation operator. A case study on the application of these aggregation operators to the fusion of safeguards relevant information is given. The IAEA Physical Model of the nuclear fuel cycle can be taken as a systematic and comprehensive indicator system. It identifies and describes indicators of

Safeguarding critical e-documents implementing a program for securing confidential information assets

CERN Document Server

Smallwood, Robert F

2012-01-01

Practical, step-by-step guidance for corporations, universities and government agencies to protect and secure confidential documents and business records Managers and public officials are looking for technology and information governance solutions to "information leakage" in an understandable, concise format. Safeguarding Critical E-Documents provides a road map for corporations, governments, financial services firms, hospitals, law firms, universities and other organizations to safeguard their internal electronic documents and private communications.Provides practical, step-by-step guidance o

Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

2011-01-01

Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

Safeguards system design methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

1977-01-01

Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

International safeguards data management system. System description: Version 1.1.; Release PLI 82

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, T.; Casilli, T.; Costantini, L.; Dondi, M.G.; Franklin, M.

1982-01-01

This document describes a nuclear material accountancy system which has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. Throughout the report, the data base system is referred to as ''ISADAM'', i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System. The system provides tools for a safeguards authority to decide whether an operators MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can be accounted for as an accumulation of operator measurement errors. The principle objective of the applications programs described here is to provide a variance analysis of MUF in which the variance of MUF is computed as a function of the accounting declarations and the error characteristics of the operator measurement system. A overview of ISADAM is presented; then, a detailed description of the processing applied by the system is given. A description of the parameter information required by the four autonomous programs ISADAM is presented. In developing ISADAM, one of the prime factors taken into consideration was the ease with which it could be used

Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

1980-01-01

Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

1981-11-01

Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Measuring Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-07-19

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Collecting Safeguards Relevant Trade Information: The IAEA Procurement Outreach Programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schot, P.; El Gebaly, A.; Tarvainen, M.

2010-01-01

The increasing awareness of activities of transnational procurement networks to covertly acquire sensitive nuclear related dual use equipment prompted an evolution of safeguards methodologies. One of the responses to this challenge by the Department of Safeguards in the IAEA was to establish the Trade and Technology Unit (TTA) in November 2004 to analyse and report on these covert nuclear related trade activities. To obtain information relevant to this analysis, TTA is engaging States that might be willing to provide this information to the Secretariat on a voluntary basis. This paper will give an overview of current activities, sum up the results achieved and discuss suggestions to further improve this programme made by Member States. (author)

17 CFR 160.30 - Procedures to safeguard customer records and information.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... customer records and information. 160.30 Section 160.30 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION PRIVACY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION Relation to Other Laws; Effective Date § 160.30 Procedures to safeguard customer records and information. Every futures commission...

Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Albert, M.-G.

2001-01-01

The implementation of the new Integrated Safeguards System is a major responsibility for the IAEA and its Member States. Providing not only the capability to better control declared activities, but also to detect clandestine attempts, it is essential to improve the international nuclear weapons control regime and to increase the credibility of assurances given to the international community. Having the sole goal of establishing integrated safeguards in an optimal manner would in itself be a very challenging and demanding task. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is faced with other conflicting challenges: statutory obligations, additional programme requests from Member States and, not the least, the obligation to fit all its activities within a strict budgetary framework. Universal and early acceptance is necessary for the system to be fully effective and credible. It must however be recognised that wide and rapid adherence will be only achieved if the system is attractive enough and offers shared benefits, that is not only increased non-proliferation assurances, but also perspectives of optimisation and reduction of the inspection burden, not to forget the assurance of keeping costs under control. It is essential that the safeguards system be non-discriminatory and apply the same objectives and implementation principles to all States. Integrated Safeguards should only be applied in States which are in good standing with respect to their obligations under their safeguards Agreements and Protocols, and for which the Agency has reached positive conclusions after having applied all necessary verification measures and having performed a complete evaluation of the information available. Cost neutrality is obviously a primary constraint for Integrated Safeguards. Even if one has to recognise the additional costs and difficulties generated in the short term by the implementation of the new system, it is essential to be conscious that budgetary limits will be maintained, and to

SNAP/SOS: a package for simulating and analyzing safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Polito, J.; Sabuda, J.

1983-01-01

The effective analysis of safeguards systems at nuclear facilities requires significant effort. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) and the SNAP Operating System (SOS) reduce that effort to a manageable level. SNAP provides a detailed analysis of site safeguards for tactical evaluation. SOS helps the analyst organize and manage the SNAP effort effectively. SOS provides a database for model storage, automatic model generation, and computer graphics. The SOS/SNAP combination is a working example of a simulation system including executive-level control, database system, and facilities for model creation, editing, and output analysis

Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

1994-01-01

From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment ampersand Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors

The international safeguards system and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1990-02-01

The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aparo, M.; Barnes, B.; Lewis, W.; Hsiung, Sue

1999-01-01

The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

The processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.

1999-01-01

The framework of safeguard activities of the IAEA from the viewpoint of informanagement is described. As methodology, major sources of information are, member state supplied information, information obtained by the Agency through its verification activity, and open source information. Software tools are provided to retrieve and to filter information for storage. Organizational structure of the Agency's information activities, and the changing roles of the inspectors are also described. (Yamamoto, A.)

Advanced safeguards systems development for chemical processing plants. Final report for Fiscal Year 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, C.E.

1980-01-01

A computer system is being installed by INEL to test and evaluate safeguards monitoring concepts in an operating nuclear fuel processing plant. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the ICPP provide plant information to a computer data acquisition and analysis system. Objective of the system is to collect data from process and safeguards sensors and show how this data can be analyzed to detect diversion operations or improper plant operation, and to test the performance of the monitoring devices. Approximately one-third of the installation designs and one-eighth of the installations were completed in FY 1979. The ICPP processing schedule for FY 1980 permits installation of the remaining monitoring devices before process startup in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. All computer hardware was delivered and checked out in FY 1979. Computer software system designs were completed with the majority of the programming scheduled for FY 1980. Sensor and instrument development in FY 1979 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications

ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palacios, E.

1998-01-01

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

Overview of simulation applications in safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, V.L.

1976-01-01

The objective of society relative to the utilization of the nuclear fuel cycle is to maximize the benefits of the high quality energy which is available and to minimize the total ''costs'' associated with acquiring these benefits. The comparison of the resulting ''benefits'' to the ''costs'' must be sufficiently attractive for society to accept nuclear energy. In this paper a representation of the structure determined by the ''costs'' (economic, socio-political, institutional, environmental, and legal) associated with adversary action against the nuclear industry and with the measures implemented to deter, prevent, or recover from adversary actions (safeguards) is used to illustrate a broad view of a dynamic safeguards system. This system representation is then used to describe the subsystem areas to which simulation techniques are currently being applied and to suggest other areas in which various simulation applications may benefit the safeguards decision process

IAEA symposium on international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

1978-11-01

The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

Containment and surveillance systems for international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ney, J.F.

1978-01-01

Important criteria in measuring the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards include timeliness of detection of diversion, timeliness of reporting such detections, and confidence in determining the amount of material diverted. Optimum use of IAEA inspectors, combined with adequate instrumentation, can provide a practical means for achieving these criteria. System studies are being carried out for different types of facilities that may come under IAEA safeguards to determine the proper balance between inspector's efforts and the use of safeguards instrumentation. A description of a typical study is presented. Based on the results of these studies, the program undertaken to develop those containment and surveillance subsystems for which the technical feasibility and operational acceptability need to be established is described

Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neufing, C.; Tschritter, C.; Meylemans, P.; Vandaele, R.; Heppleston, M.; Chare, P.; Kloeckner, W.

2001-01-01

The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

Technical Solution for Improved Safeguards/State Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, S.

2015-01-01

This paper will discuss an information technology solution to allow the IAEA Safeguards Department to improve cooperation with States. The solution will be a portal or hub to integrate the information, processes, and people between Safeguards and States. It will allow for two-way communication and collaboration between Safeguards staff and State representatives. This paper discusses the information security challenges inherent in building such a system. It proposes technical architectures that might allow the existing integration approach (e.g., encrypted email exchange) to be kept, while expanding it to include modern integration technologies (e.g., web services), as well explorer new collaborative web technologies. It looks at current Safeguards processes and approaches to cooperation and discusses efficiencies that could be achieved through the adoption of this technology solution. Example process areas for improvement include: a) Safeguards Agreements: States are obligated to submit data on their nuclear programme to the IAEA on a periodic basis. Declarations are received through two separate systems using encrypted email. The proposed solution would allow for enhanced exchange of declaration where States can submit any type of declaration using one system. When declarations are received and validated, an acknowledgement would automatically be sent to the State. The solution would provide the Safeguards Department the ability to ask for clarification as well as collaborate on the submitted declarations. Both the question and the response would be recorded in the system. The solution could also integrate tools allowing declarations to be added directly and validated before submission. b) Other areas that could benefit from this solution include declarations from States with small quantities protocol, facility declarations, as well as systems that support extra-budgetary funding (e.g., SPRICS). (author)

A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

1995-03-01

In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

Advanced-safeguards systems development for chemical-processing plants. Final report for FY 1980

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cartan, F.O.

1981-04-01

The program is installing a computer system to test and evaluate process monitoring as a new Safeguards function to supplement the usual physical security and accountability functions. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) provide information via a data acquisition system to a Safeguards analysis computer. The monitoring function can significantly enhance current material control (accountability) and containment surveillance capabilities for domestic and international Safeguards uses. Installation of sensors and instruments in the ICPP was more than 75% complete in FY-1980. Installation work was halted at the request of ICPP operations near the end of the year to eliminate possible conflict with instrument calibrations prior to plant startup. Some improvements to the computer hardware were made during FY-1980. Sensor and instrument development during FY-1980 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications. Pressure transducers, pressure switches, a bubble flowmeter, and load cells were tested; an ultrasonic liquid-in-line sensor was developed and tested. Work on the portable, isotope-ratio mass spectrometer led to the comparison of the HP quadrupole instrument with a small magnetic instrument and to the selection of the quadrupole

Safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

1977-09-01

The report describes the development of system concepts for the safeguarding of special strategic nuclear materials (SNM) against malevolent adversary action during the interfacility transport of the SNM. The methodology used includes techniques for defining, classifying, and analyzing adversary action sequences; defining safeguards system components; assessing the vulnerability of various safeguards systems and their component parts to the potential adversary action sequences, and conceptualizing system design requirements. The method of analysis is based primarily on a comparison of adversary actions with safeguards measures, to estimate vulnerability. Because of the paucity of the data available for assessing vulnerability, the Delphi approach was used to generate data: values were estimated in a structured exercise by a panel of experts in the safeguards and terrorist fields. It is concluded that the probability of successful attack against a truck/escort convoy manned by well-trained, well-armed personnel is low enough to discourage all but the strongest adversaries. Secrecy of operations and careful screening of personnel are very important. No reliance should be placed on current capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The recommendation of the study is the use of road transport in the near future and air transport at a later time when the number of shipments reaches a level to justify it, and when present safety problems are resolved

Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

2007-01-01

The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

1978-08-01

An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

1987-01-01

This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. The requirements for...

MACSSA (Macintosh Safeguards Systems Analyzer)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Kohl, M.

1986-01-01

This paper discusses MACSSA a fully interactive menu-driven software system for accountancy of nuclear safeguards systems written for Apple Macintosh. Plant inventory and inventory change records can be entered interactively or can be downloaded from a mainframe database. Measurement procedures and instrument parameters can be defined. Partial or total statistics on propagated errors is performed and shown in tabular or graphic form

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

2016-01-01

Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M. [Craig Everton, Russell Leslie, Stephan Bayer, Michael East, Australia (Australia)

2011-12-15

In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M.

2011-01-01

In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

International seminar on integrated information systems. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-04-01

The information available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreement with an Additional protocol is intended to provide for as complete a picture as practicable of a State's current or planned nuclear programme. The central components of the strengthened safeguards system are: increased IAEA access to and evaluation of information about States' nuclear and nuclear-related activities and increased physical access to relevant locations for verification of the exclusively peaceful content of a States' nuclear programme. Strengthening measures implemented under the existing legal authority of the Agency have contributed to increased information and physical access. Thus the role of integrated information systems for safeguards relevant data acquisition became more significant.

International seminar on integrated information systems. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-04-01

The information available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreement with an Additional protocol is intended to provide for as complete a picture as practicable of a State's current or planned nuclear programme. The central components of the strengthened safeguards system are: increased IAEA access to and evaluation of information about States' nuclear and nuclear-related activities and increased physical access to relevant locations for verification of the exclusively peaceful content of a States' nuclear programme. Strengthening measures implemented under the existing legal authority of the Agency have contributed to increased information and physical access. Thus the role of integrated information systems for safeguards relevant data acquisition became more significant

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Standley, V.; Boeck, H.; Villa, M.

2001-01-01

Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

The Efficacy of Social Media as a Research Tool and Information Source for Safeguards Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skoeld, T.; Feldman, Y.

2015-01-01

The IAEA Department of Safeguards aims to provide credible assurances to the international community that States are fulfiling their safeguards obligations in that all nuclear material remains in peaceful use. In order to draw a soundly-based safeguards conclusion for a State that has a safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA, the Department establishes a knowledge base of the State's nuclear-related infrastructure and activities against which a State's declarations are evaluated for correctness and completeness. Open source information is one stream of data that is used in the evaluation of nuclear fuel cycle activities in the State. The Department is continuously working to ensure that it has access to the most up-to-date, accurate, relevant and credible open source information available, and has begun to examine the use of social media as a new source of information. The use of social networking sites has increased exponentially in the last decade. In fact, social media has emerged as the key vehicle for delivering and acquiring information in near real-time. Therefore, it has become necessary for the open source analyst to consider social media as an essential element in the broader concept of open source information. Characteristics, such as ''immediacy'', ''recency'', ''interractiveness'', which set social networks apart from the ''traditional media'', are also the same attributes that present a challenge for using social media as an efficient information-delivery platform and a credible source of information. New tools and technologies for social media analytics have begun to emerge to help systematically monitor and mine this large body of data. The paper will survey the social media landscape in an effort to identify platforms that could be of value for safeguards verification purposes. It will explore how a number of social networking sites, such as Twitter

Safeguards by Design - Experiences from New Nuclear Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Okko, O.; Honkamaa, T.; Kuusi, A.; Rautjaervi, J.

2010-01-01

The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems, and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore, the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building. For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance of nuclear

Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

1997-03-01

The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

1997-03-01

The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

1991-01-01

During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

2013-01-01

This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

Preliminary Performance Analysis Program Development for Safety System with Safeguard Vessel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, Han-Ok; Lee, Jun; Park, Cheon-Tae; Yoon, Ju-Hyeon; Park, Keun-Bae

2007-01-01

SMART is an advanced modular integral type pressurized water reactor for a seawater desalination and an electricity production. Major components of the reactor coolant system such as the pressurizer, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP), and steam generators are located inside the reactor vessel. The SMART can fundamentally eliminate the possibility of large break loss of coolant accidents (LBLOCAs), improve the natural circulation capability, and better accommodate and thus enhance a resistance to a wide range of transients and accidents. The safety goals of the SMART are enhanced through highly reliable safety systems such as the passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) and the safeguard vessel coupled with the passive safety injection feature. The safeguard vessel is a steel-made, leak-tight pressure vessel housing the RPV, SIT, and the associated valves and pipelines. A primary function of the safeguard vessel is to confine any radioactive release from the primary circuit within the vessel under DBAs related to loss of the integrity of the primary system. A preliminary performance analysis program for a safety system using the safeguard vessel is developed in this study. The developed program is composed of several subroutines for the reactor coolant system, passive safety injection system, safeguard vessel including the pressure suppression pool, and PRHRS. A small break loss of coolant accident at the upper part of a reactor is analyzed and the results are discussed

Scripting Quality of Security Service (QoSS) Safeguard Measures for the Suggested INFOCON System

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Guild, Jennifer

2004-01-01

.... The focus will be on the security of the DOD information infrastructure and the accomplishment of the mission, as well as the usability and the standardization of the INFOCON warning system. The end result is a prototype that is a set of predefined escalation scripts for the evolved INFOCON system's safeguard measures.

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, Deborah A.

2003-01-01

As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

Fuel cycle based safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

1985-07-01

In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

1978-01-01

The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

2015-01-01

Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hammond, G.A.

1987-01-01

The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stefanka, Z.; Vincze, A.

2015-01-01

The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

1985-01-01

The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is a computerized on-line accountability system for the safeguards accountability control of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant. SAN is a dedicated accountability system utilizing source documents filled out on the shop floor as its base. The system incorporates double entry accounting and is developed around the Material Balance Area (MBA) concept. MBA custodians enter transaction information from source documents prepared by personnel in the process areas directly into the SAN system. This provides a somewhat near-real time perpetual inventory system which has limited interaction with MBA custodians. MBA custodians are permitted to inquire into the system and status items on inventory. They are also responsible for the accuracy of the accountability information used as input to the system for their MBA. Monthly audits by the Nuclear Materials Control group assure the timeliness and accuracy of SAN accountability information

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1978-01-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1979-02-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

1978-04-01

DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

1996-04-01

LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A.

1997-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A

1998-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forland, A.

1997-01-01

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keen, L.J.

2007-01-01

L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

Information required from States, including 'small quantities protocol' status, under the Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tuley, N.

1999-01-01

The Model, or Additional, Protocol to the Model Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/153, contains, inter alia, provisions for expanded declarations from Member States to the IAEA. These provisions include earlier design information declarations and information on fuel cycles activities, such a mining and milling, that were not previously part of safeguards. The session discusses the extent of the expanded declarations and provides examples of the forms that will be used to provide the information to the Agency. (author)

Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malek, Z.

1980-10-01

The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

Verification and the safeguards legacy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perricos, Demetrius

2001-01-01

; qualitative and quantitative measurements of nuclear material; familiarity and access to sensitive technologies related to detection, unattended verification systems, containment/surveillance and sensors; examination and verification of design information of large and complex facilities; theoretical and practical aspects of technologies relevant to verification objectives; analysis of inspection findings and evaluation of their mutual consistency; negotiations on technical issues with facility operators and State authorities. This experience is reflected in the IAEA Safeguards Manual which sets out the policies and procedures to be followed in the inspection process as well as in the Safeguards Criteria which provide guidance for verification, evaluation and analysis of the inspection findings. The IAEA infrastructure and its experience with verification permitted in 1991 the organization to respond immediately and successfully to the tasks required by the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) for Iraq as well as to the tasks related to the verification of completeness and correctness of the initial declarations in the cases of the DPRK. and of S. Africa. In the case of Iraq the discovery of its undeclared programs was made possible through the existing verification system enhanced by additional access rights, information and application of modern detection technology. Such discoveries made it evident that there was a need for an intensive development effort to strengthen the safeguards system to develop a capability to detect undeclared activities. For this purpose it was recognized that there was need for additional and extended a) access to information, b) access to locations. It was also obvious that access to the Security Council, to bring the IAEA closer to the body responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, would be a requirement for reporting periodically on non-proliferation and the results of the IAEA's verification activities. While the case

Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

2012-04-01

Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

Evaluating National Nuclear Safeguards System Implementation in the Republic of Moldova

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mursa, E.; Sidorencu, A.; Vasilieva, N.; Sirbu, I.

2015-01-01

Strengthening the multilateral system of Nuclear Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), imposed by the increasing cross-border illicit trafficking of nuclear material and redirecting for military purposes has led Republic of Moldova to ratify on 1 June 2012 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/690) to the Agreement of Nuclear Safeguards in relation with the NPT. This was followed by the adoption in the Parliament on 8 June 2012, of the new Law no. 132 of 08.06.2012 on the safe conduct of nuclear and radiological activities, which extends the power of the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) and details the measures to strengthen the Nuclear Safeguards in the country. The NARNRA implements safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials by: – normative acts development; – establishing a system for inspecting of nuclear material; – implementing inventory-taking and reporting procedures for quantities of nuclear material; – implementing authorisation and monitoring procedures for the movements of nuclear material; – implementing procedures for reporting quantities of nuclear material to the IAEA; – maintaining and updating the national register of nuclear materials. A very important role to achieve results is the cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, was developed and agreed the Joint Action Plan for implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which is an essential aid in fulfilling the country’s international obligations. In this respect have been obtained some good practices: – Routinely performed national inspections; – On-line information provision from the Customs check points; – Developed special form for nuclear material in the National Register; – Systematic interaction with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and authorisation holders; – Annual and quarterly presentation to the IAEA of the reports on SQP and the

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

2015-01-01

There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, R.L.

1985-04-01

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) was developed by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to perform material control and accountability on all the nuclear material under WHC's jurisdiction. SARIS has been in operation for four and one-half years. It has reduced physical inventory plant shutdown time from several days to a few hours. The user-friendly interface has proven successful, as the training time for a new operator is only two to three hours; also errors have been dramatically reduced. The modeling features of SARIS have reduced the reported inventory difference and provide better information for measurement of scrap and waste. The audit files have been usefull in resolving data entry errors and the backup features have averted several potential problems. SARIS as a computerized accountability system has replaced manual record keeping with a consequent increase in productivity. 4 refs

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

2010-01-01

After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

Safeguards research: assessing material control and accounting systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maimoni, A.

1977-01-01

The Laboratory is working for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to improve the safeguarding of special nuclear material at nuclear fuel processing facilities, to provide a basis for improved regulations for material control and accounting systems, and to develop an assessment procedure for verifying compliance with these regulations. Early work included setting up a hierarchy of safeguard objectives and a set of measurable parameters with which systems performance to meet those objectives can be measured. Present work has focused on developing a computerized assessment procedure. We have also completed a test bed (based on a plutonium nitrate storage area) to identify and correct problems in the procedure and to show how this procedure can be used to evaluate the performance of an applicant's material control and accounting system

Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

2004-01-01

Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

The Canadian safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

1981-12-01

In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1998-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1999-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

Safeguards: the industry's role and views

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1975-01-01

Possible improvements in the U. S. safeguards system are discussed: guard forces, physical protection, personnel clearance, accounting and monitoring in plants, communications, the command function, reinforcements, and intelligence information. (U.S.)

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-07-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

Exploiting the Geospatial Dimension of Data in Support of IAEA Safeguard

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McDaniel, M.; Bleakly, D.; Horak, K. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (United States)

2012-06-15

The nuclear fuel cycle is highly dependent upon geographic factors and each step in a state's nuclear fuel cycle occurs in geographically explicit locations. Because of this, information indicative of these activities is likely to have a strong geographic competent. Therefore, it is suggested that open source information management in support of State Level Assessments also be geographically focused. With an explicit geographic interface for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, structuring, and disseminating open source information, the information management challenges faced by the IAEA can be made more intuitive and result in more effective, information-driven safeguards analyses, potentially leading to more timely safeguards conclusions. This paper proposes an information management framework based upon geographic information systems (GIS) principles for open-source information analysis in support of international safeguards.

Safeguards system testing WSRC Insider Exercise Program (U)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Robichaux, J.J.

1991-01-01

One of the major concerns related to the control and accountability of nuclear material located at DOE facilities is the theft or diversion of material by an insider. Many complex safeguards and security systems have been installed to provide timely detection and prevention of the removal of nuclear materials. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company's (WSRC) Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) section has implemented an insider exercise program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of these safeguards systems. Exercises consist of limited scope performance test. This paper describes the structure and controls for the insider exercise program at the Savannah River Site, the lessons learned over the past several years, and methods being utilized to improve the program

An improved safeguards system and its application to large backend facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The evaluation criteria, which are commonly applicable to both Material Accountancy (MA) and Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and applicable to a large backend facilities, are discussed. It is analyzed that substantial increase of the proliferation resistance can be expected by improving the presently existing safeguards systems. The improved safeguards system described in this paper is expected to be applicable to large-scaled backend facilities without giving unnecessary economical and technical burdens. The main purpose of this approach is to move away from the present trend of too much reliance on MA and to develop the synthetical safeguards effects by harmonizing C/S and continuing MA effectively

Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, Hugo; Maceiras, Elena; Dominguez, Cristina A.

2008-01-01

The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

Experience in ensuring authenticity of information from safeguards systems installed in facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Thiele, R.; Wagner, W.; Whichello, J.

1991-01-01

The increasing sophistication of non-destructive assay instruments, containment and surveillance devices and ancillary computer facilities used for safeguards purposes has resulted in a growing requirement for means to ensure the authenticity of information and thus preserve for the IAEA its capability to draw independent conclusions. The achievements of the last few years, particularly with regard to the development of new instruments, one of a kind instrumentation, conceptually new approaches such as the use of near-real-time accounting, and joint use arrangements, are largely the result of cooperation between the IAEA, state authorities, plant operators and certain national laboratories. It is anticipated that demands for various authentication features will further expand as growth in sophistication of equipment and automation of nuclear facilities continues, and that increasing reliance on in-line, unattended use instrumentation will become in future years the approach of choice. 8 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fritzell, Anni

2008-03-01

This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

2008-03-15

This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1984-07-01

The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1990-01-01

This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

2012-08-01

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

1994-01-01

Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopatin, S.

2010-01-01

Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System. ABACC 15 Years

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, H.R.; Maceiras, E.; Dominguez, C.A.

2011-01-01

The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and control of nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendations of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context.

Unattended digital video surveillance: A system prototype for EURATOM safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chare, P.; Goerten, J.; Wagner, H.; Rodriguez, C.; Brown, J.E.

1994-01-01

Ever increasing capabilities in video and computer technology have changed the face of video surveillance. From yesterday's film and analog video tape-based systems, we now emerge into the digital era with surveillance systems capable of digital image processing, image analysis, decision control logic, and random data access features -- all of which provide greater versatility with the potential for increased effectiveness in video surveillance. Digital systems also offer other advantages such as the ability to ''compress'' data, providing increased storage capacities and the potential for allowing longer surveillance Periods. Remote surveillance and system to system communications are also a benefit that can be derived from digital surveillance systems. All of these features are extremely important in today's climate Of increasing safeguards activity and decreasing budgets -- Los Alamos National Laboratory's Safeguards Systems Group and the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate have teamed to design and implement a period surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance and data review. In this Paper we will familiarize you with system components and features and report on progress in developmental areas such as image compression and region of interest processing

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system (Programme 93+2)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tani, Hiroshi

1999-01-01

Present safeguards systems against nuclear proliferation as well as their improvement activities for more effective results are reviewed. First, the mechanism of the NPT Safeguards System is explained, which is the grasp of inventories of nuclear materials through change and transfer booking starting with actual investigation. Then, other various safeguards systems are described, including TLATELOCO (Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America), VO (Voluntary Offer), OCA (Other Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), PA (Project Agreement), US (Unilateral Submission), and OSA (Other Safeguards Agreement). Thirdly, the present status and problems of the nuclear proliferation prevention in the world are described, including competitive nuclear weapon development in India and Pakistan, and Iraq and North Korea problems. Lastly, the 93 + 2 plan to improve the present system is explained. (M.M.)

Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

1997-01-01

In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards sealing systems for Zebra

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ingram, G.; Jamieson, G.R.

1983-01-01

A relatively simple design has been produced for safeguards seals to be applied throughout the fuel containing areas at Zebra. It is based on the use of wire seals and regular Inspector surveillance. The application of the system would allow an Inspector to establish to a high degree of confidence that significant quantities of fuel had not been diverted during an intensive experimental programme. It would add about 5% to the time required for experiments, and careful planning would reduce this value. The inspection effort required to witness element movements during the experimental programme would average about 2 hours per day, with a further 2 hours spent each week on NDA of the fuel exposed. The Safeguards Inspector would require to spend about 25% of his time in the reactor area and would have ample time to deal with the relatively small number of fuel movements taking place in the storage area and with his duties elsewhere in the plant. During a core change, full-time inspection effort would be required for about 6 weeks each year. (author)

Engineered safeguards system activities at Sandia Laboratories for back-end fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sellers, T.A.; Fienning, W.C.; Winblad, A.E.

1978-01-01

Sandia Laboratories have been developing concepts for safeguards systems to protect facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle against potential threats of sabotage and theft of special nuclear material (SNM). Conceptual designs for Engineered Safeguards Systems (ESSs) have been developed for a Fuel Reprocessing Facility (including chemical separations, plutonium conversion, and waste solidification), a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and a Plutonium Transport Vehicle. Performance criteria for the various elements of these systems and a candidate systematic design approach have been defined. In addition, a conceptual layout for a large-scale Fuel-Cycle Plutonium Storage Facility has been completed. Work is continuing to develop safeguards systems for spent fuel facilities, light-water reactors, alternative fuel cycles, and improved transportation systems. Additional emphasis will be placed on the problems associated with national diversion of special nuclear material. The impact on safeguards element performance criteria for surveillance and containment to protect against national diversion in various alternative fuel cycle complexes is also being investigated

The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

1998-01-01

An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

Proposal of a national system to supervise nuclear installations out of international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosa, L.P.

1990-01-01

It is proposed a national system to safeguard, supervise and inspect nuclear facilities in Brazil, apart from international safeguards. It discusses also the military nuclear activities and the uranium enrichment plants. The system should be controlled by Brazilian CNEN. (A.C.A.S.)

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

State system experience with safeguarding power reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roehnsch, W.

1982-01-01

This session describes the development and operation of the State System of Accountancy and Control in the German Democratic Republic, and summarizes operating experience with safeguards at power reactor facilities. Overall organization and responsibilities, containment and surveillance measures, materials accounting, and inspection procedures will be outlined. Cooperation between the IAEA, State system, facility, and supplier authorities will also be addressed

78 FR 48037 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

... Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... the objectives of Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information. The rule allows... signed Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, which was published in the...

Development of a safeguards system for the THTR pebble bed reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engelhardt, H.

1978-08-01

This report provides a survey of the technical possibilities of safeguarding the THTR-300 pebble bed reactor in accordance with the NPT. Description of the reactor system, the operational mode, and the operator's material control system are presented in Sections 2, 3 and 4. A suggested safeguards approach which is based on an item counting of pebble elements with containment and surveillance as a supplementary measure is described in the Sections 5 and 6

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

1991-05-01

The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

Quality assurance procedures for the IAEA Department of Safeguards Twin Minolta Camera Surveillance System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geoffrion, R.R.; Bussolini, P.L.; Stark, W.A.; Ahlquist, A.J.; Sanders, K.E.; Rubinstein, G.

1986-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations are complying with nuclear safeguards treaties. In one aspect of the program, the Department of Safeguards has developed a twin Minolta camera photo surveillance systems program to assure itself and the international community that material handling is accomplished according to safeguards treaty regulations. The camera systems are positioned in strategic locations in facilities such that objective evidence can be obtained for material transactions. The films are then processed, reviewed, and used to substantiate the conclusions that nuclear material has not been diverted. Procedures have been developed to document and aid in: 1) the performance of activities involved in positioning of the camera system; 2) installation of the systems; 3) review and use of the film taken from the cameras

Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

1982-04-01

This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards

Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

1982-04-01

This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

78 FR 48076 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

...-2011-0268] RIN 3150-AJ07 Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information..., Classified National Security Information. The rule would allow licensees flexibility in determining the means... licensee security education and training programs and enhances the protection of classified information...

32 CFR 2001.50 - Telecommunications automated information systems and network security.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.50 Telecommunications automated information systems and... identified in the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) issuances and the Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503, Intelligence Community Information Technology Systems Security Risk Management...

Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

2015-07-12

The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

National safeguards system operations at a bulk-handling facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1981-01-01

The presentation centers on the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for bulk-handling facilities in the licenses sector of the US nuclear community. Details of those material control and accounting measures dealing with the national safeguards program are discussed in Session 6a. The concept and role of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan are discussed with the participants. In Session 6b, the lecture focusses on the international safeguards program of the US SSAC. The relationship of the national and international requirements is discussed as they relate to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 document. The purpose of this session is to enable participants to: (1) understand the basic MC and A elements in an SSAC; (2) understand which MC and A elements serve the country's national interests and those that serve IAEA safeguards

Safeguards and security. Progress report, August 1982-January 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1983-11-01

Activities are described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats a relatively new set of Los Alamos activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, S.G. de

1986-01-01

The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

78 FR 69286 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-19

... Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information. In addition, this direct final rule allowed... licensees (or their designees) to conduct classified [[Page 69287

Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-11-01

This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

Next generation information systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Limback, Nathan P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Medina, Melanie A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Silva, Michelle E [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01

The Information Systems Analysis and Development (ISAD) Team of the Safeguards Systems Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been developing web based information and knowledge management systems for sixteen years. Our vision is to rapidly and cost effectively provide knowledge management solutions in the form of interactive information systems that help customers organize, archive, post and retrieve nonproliferation and safeguards knowledge and information vital to their success. The team has developed several comprehensive information systems that assist users in the betterment and growth of their organizations and programs. Through our information systems, users are able to streamline operations, increase productivity, and share and access information from diverse geographic locations. The ISAD team is also producing interactive visual models. Interactive visual models provide many benefits to customers beyond the scope of traditional full-scale modeling. We have the ability to simulate a vision that a customer may propose, without the time constraints of traditional engineering modeling tools. Our interactive visual models can be used to access specialized training areas, controlled areas, and highly radioactive areas, as well as review site-specific training for complex facilities, and asset management. Like the information systems that the ISAD team develops, these models can be shared and accessed from any location with access to the internet. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the capabilities of information systems and interactive visual models as well as consider the possibility of combining the two capabilities to provide the next generation of infonnation systems. The collection, processing, and integration of data in new ways can contribute to the security of the nation by providing indicators and information for timely action to decrease the traditional and new nuclear threats. Modeling and simulation tied to comprehensive

Nuclear material safeguards technology development in the new structure of BATAN organization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilyas, Zurias

2001-01-01

Full text: The implementation of Nuclear Energy Act No. 10/97 has led to a restructuring in BATAN organization in July 1999. A new unit, Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology (PTPBN), was established to be especially in charge of safeguards facilities. The main responsibility of this unit is to develop the technology of safeguards and physical protection. The function of this unit is also to analyze the operational technical aspect of the International Convention of Nuclear. The duties of Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology can be seen from the various programs set up for every fiscal year. The programs for the year 2000 were: Analyses of SSAC implementation in BATAN; Development of Safeguards information system; Creation of database of physical protection technology; Physical protection simulator for Bandung reactor research; Development of detector technology for physical protection system; Identification of BATAN activities and facilities submitted to IAEA in order to be in line with the Additional Protocol to the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified on September 29th, 1999 in Vienna, Austria; Seminar on Safeguards technology held in Jakarta in September 2000. The program of 2001 will be focusing on the continuation of the previous year's program as well as the creation of new ones, such as: Collaboration with other countries. At initial stage experts from JBC-Japan were invited to share their expertise on their safeguards information system; Development of education and training for safeguards operators by emphasizing more on the techniques of nuclear materials measurement; Seminar on Safeguards technology scheduled for December 2001 by inviting experts from IAEA and modem countries; Field survey to determine the location of radionuclide station in Indonesia in

Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

2011-01-01

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

2008-01-01

The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework

Process information systems in nuclear reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeschke, A.; Keller, H.; Orth, H.

1987-01-01

On a production management level, a process information system in a nuclear reprocessing plant (NRP) has to fulfill conventional operating functions and functions for nuclear material surveillance (safeguards). Based on today's state of the art of on-line process control technology, the progress in hardware and software technology allows to introduce more process-specific intelligence into process information systems. Exemplified by an expert-system-aided laboratory management system as component of a NRP process information system, the paper demonstrates that these technologies can be applied already. (DG) [de

Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, S.; Kim, Y.S.; Ye, S.H.

2015-01-01

This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

Improvements for optical surveillance systems in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gaertner, K.J.; Whichello, J.N.

1988-01-01

Within the next few years, a transition from film camera systems to video surveillance systems will take place in international safeguards. In order to maintain the indispensable requirements of reliability and authentication, development and tests continued under the Federal Republic of Germany Support Programme of video components for IAEA safeguards applications. The prototype of a tamper resistant TV-link was developed under Task D.12/4/. A field test of the TV-link is in preparation using a production model suitable for multiplexed TV applications. The test will utilize an Agency owned, multiplexed TV system. An evaluation of the tamper resistant TV-link is given. After a successful field trial of the prototype Solid State Video Memory (SSVM-516) under task D.14 a production model has been developed under Task D.17. Several operating modes are envisaged, depending on whether it will be used in an on-site video surveillance system or in a video review station. The concept and technical features, including an explanation of the function of the video memory, are discussed

Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

2015-01-01

Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2017-02-07

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, P.

1999-01-01

For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

A design methodology for materials control and accounting information systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Helman, P.; Strittmatter, R.B.

1987-01-01

Modern approaches to nuclear materials safeguards have significantly increased the data processing needs of safeguards information systems. Implementing these approaches will require developing efficient, cost-effective designs. Guided by database design research, we are developing a design methodology for distributed materials control and accounting (MCandA) information systems. The methodology considers four design parameters: network topology, allocation of data to nodes, high-level global processing strategy, and local file structures to optimize system performance. Characteristics of system performance that are optimized are response time for an operation, timeliness of data, validity of data, and reliability. The ultimate goal of the research is to develop a comprehensive computerized design tool specifically tailored to the design of MCandA systems

Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Corynen, G.C.

1979-01-01

An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

Special safeguards study. Scopes of work

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-06-01

The Special Safeguards Study (SSS) will be conducted by a combination of (1) contacts with other agencies, (2) NRC staff studies and analysis and (3) contracted studies in specific areas. Most of the study effort will be carried out by contractual support activities. These activities will be devoted to providing technical information, primarily qualitative because of the short term of the study, to enable the staff to determine the most cost-effective sets of measures for plutonium recycle and high-enriched uranium fuel cycle safeguards. The scope of work for these activities is given. The scope of work describes tasks that range from confirming the Commission's safeguards objective to defining specific protection systems for the following siting arrangements: dispersed sites, collocated fuel cycle plants, and mixed parks where reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication plants are collocated. (U.S.)

Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Danker, W.J.; Floyd, W.

1993-01-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

1977-09-01

A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

The Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Loosch, Reinhard

2001-01-01

Full text: The following main points will be dealt with and underlined by illustrative examples: 0. A preliminary clarification: Contrary to the title's short-hand language, it is of course, not the Additional Protocols entered into by the Agency and States and other Parties to Safeguards Agreements since 1997 nor the Model Additional Protocol adopted by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference in 1997 that are, by themselves, an important tool for the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. They are, however, the necessary legal prerequisite as well as a strong political and moral boost for enabling the Agency to develop and apply additional tools in order to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime more effective and, therefore, more reassuring and at the same time, more efficient and therefore, more widely accepted. 1. The importance of the new tools cannot be assessed yet. Hopefully, it will grow quickly and consistently. This will depend primarily on two factors: - The extent to which Additional Protocols are entered into force and at what speed this is achieved, and the extent to which these Protocols cover all important peaceful nuclear activities and resources, whether these exist in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements or not; - The extent to which the Agency succeeds in merging the new measures with those applicable before into an optimized, integrated toolbox. 2. The first factor tends to increase effectiveness by permitting the collection of safeguards- relevant data provided not only in reports from countries in which such activities are conducted or such resources exist but also in information coming from other sources such as publications in. or intelligence made available by, other countries. Cross-checking all those data against each other may, in the best case, reinforce their credibility or, in the worst case, reveal gaps and inconsistencies, but will at any rate, in one way or other, help

Interim Procedures Safeguarding Mobile Devices during International Travel

Science.gov (United States)

This procedure is for safeguarding EPA information and systems for all employees, contractors, and other users while on international travel or to specifically designated locations within the United States and foreign embassies.

Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

2000-01-01

In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2010-01-01

In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

Anomaly detection in an automated safeguards system using neural networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whiteson, R.; Howell, J.A.

1992-01-01

An automated safeguards system must be able to detect an anomalous event, identify the nature of the event, and recommend a corrective action. Neural networks represent a new way of thinking about basic computational mechanisms for intelligent information processing. In this paper, we discuss the issues involved in applying a neural network model to the first step of this process: anomaly detection in materials accounting systems. We extend our previous model to a 3-tank problem and compare different neural network architectures and algorithms. We evaluate the computational difficulties in training neural networks and explore how certain design principles affect the problems. The issues involved in building a neural network architecture include how the information flows, how the network is trained, how the neurons in a network are connected, how the neurons process information, and how the connections between neurons are modified. Our approach is based on the demonstrated ability of neural networks to model complex, nonlinear, real-time processes. By modeling the normal behavior of the processes, we can predict how a system should be behaving and, therefore, detect when an abnormality occurs

Some developments in safeguards techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beets, C.

1977-01-01

The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-12-15

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Collection and Analysis of Open Source News for Information Awareness and Early Warning in Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cojazzi, Giacomo G.M.; Van Der Goot, Erik; Verile, Marco; Wolfart, Erik; Rutan Fowler, Marcy; Feldman, Yana; Hammond, William; Schweighardt, John; Ferguson, Mattew

2013-01-01

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA’s move towards safeguards implementation based on all safeguards relevant information known about a State. The growing volume of open source information requires the development of technology and tools capable of effectively collecting relevant information, filtering out “noise”, organizing valuable information in a clear and accessible manner, and assessing its relevance. In this context, the IAEA’s Division of Information Management (SGIM) and the EC’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) are currently implementing a joint project to advance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA’s workflow for open source information collection and analysis. The objective is to provide tools to support SGIM in the production of the SGIM Open Source Highlights, which is a daily news brief consisting of the most pertinent news stories relevant to safeguards and non-proliferation. The process involves the review and selection of hundreds of articles from a wide array of specifically selected sources. The joint activity exploits the JRC’s Europe Media Monitor (EMM) and NewsDesk applications: EMM automatically collects and analyses news articles from a pre-defined list of web sites, and NewsDesk allows an analyst to manually select the most relevant articles from the EMM stream for further processing. The paper discusses the IAEA’s workflow for the production of SGIM Open Source Highlights and describes the capabilities of EMM and NewsDesk. It then provides an overview of the joint activities since the project started in 2011, which were focused i) on setting up a separate EMM installation dedicated to the nuclear safeguards and security domain (Nuclear Security Media Monitor, NSMM) and ii) on evaluating the NSMM/NewsDesk for meeting the IAEA’s needs. Finally, it presents the current use NSMM/NewsDesk at the IAEA and proposes options for further integration with the

Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

1977-05-01

A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

1996-01-01

Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector's oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector's workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA

Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leffer, Teri N.

2014-01-01

The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

2000-03-01

During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

2012-06-15

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, Renaud; )

2012-01-01

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

1982-01-01

This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms

Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Owens, L.; Smith, C.

1996-01-01

The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

1979-08-01

Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Role of materials accounting in integrated safeguards systems for reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.

1981-01-01

Integration of materials accounting and containment/surveillance techniques for international safeguards requires careful examination and definition of suitable inspector activities for verification of operator's materials accounting data. The inspector's verification procedures are designed to protect against data falsification and/or the use of measurement uncertainties to conceal missing material. Materials accounting activities are developed to provide an effective international safeguards system when combined with containment/surveillance activities described in a companion paper

NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kyd, D.R.

1993-10-01

Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

OASIS: a COBOL-11 menu-driven information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, W.F. Jr.

1982-01-01

Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Automated Safeguards Information System (OASIS) is a near real-time nuclear materials/precious metals safeguard and accountability control system. Using COBOL and RSTS/E on a dedicated 11/34, the system performs on-line inventory update, inquiry and report functions. Processed transactions consisting of intra-laboratory movements, on-site receipts and off-site shipments are maintained for inquiry and report preparation. A secure, controlled but friendly user environment is maintained by chaining between menu and data manipulation tasks. The use of menus, security and access control, screen manipulation, file access and contention, word processing activities, task size problems and other aspects of this application will be discussed

76 FR 66889 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-10-28

...). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY: DoD is hosting a public meeting to initiate a dialogue with industry... not presently address the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within industry, nor does it... processed through security in a timely fashion. Prior registrants will be given priority if room constraints...

Integrated safeguards and security for a highly automated process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Jaeger, C.D.

1993-01-01

Before the cancellation of the New Production Reactor Programs for the production of tritium, the reactors and associated processing were being designed to contain some of the most highly automated and remote systems conceived for a Department of Energy facility. Integrating safety, security, materials control and accountability (MC and A), and process systems at the proposed facilities would enhance the overall information and protection-in-depth available. Remote, automated fuel handling and assembly/disassembly techniques would deny access to the nuclear materials while upholding ALARA principles but would also require the full integration of all data/information systems. Such systems would greatly enhance MC and A as well as facilitate materials tracking. Physical protection systems would be connected with materials control features to cross check activities and help detect and resolve anomalies. This paper will discuss the results of a study of the safeguards and security benefits achieved from a highly automated and integrated remote nuclear facility and the impacts that such systems have on safeguards and computer and information security

Development of information management system on LWR spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, B. D.; Lee, S. H.; Song, D. Y.; Jeon, I.; Park, S. J.; Seo, D. S.

2002-01-01

LWRs in Korea should manage all the information of spent fuel to implement the obligations under Korea-IAEA safeguards agreement and to perform the nuclear material accountancy work at the facility level. The information management system on LWR spent fuel was developed to manage all movement records from receipt to shipment of LWR fuels, and to get the necessary information such as nuclear fuel inventory lists and status, maps of fresh fuel storage, reactor and spent fuel pool, receipt and shipment records and so on. This information management system has a function to setup the system environments to cover the various kinds of storage types for all LWRs ; reactor, spent fuel pool and fresh fuel storage. The movements of nuclear fuel between the storages can be easily done by double click of the mouse to the destination. It also has a several error checking routines for maintaining the correct accounting data. Using this information management system of LWR spent fuel, facility operators can perform efficiently and effectively the safeguards related works including nuclear material accountancy at each facility

Development of information management system on LWR spent fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, B. D.; Lee, S. H.; Song, D. Y.; Jeon, I.; Park, S. J.; Seo, D. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2002-10-01

LWRs in Korea should manage all the information of spent fuel to implement the obligations under Korea-IAEA safeguards agreement and to perform the nuclear material accountancy work at the facility level. The information management system on LWR spent fuel was developed to manage all movement records from receipt to shipment of LWR fuels, and to get the necessary information such as nuclear fuel inventory lists and status, maps of fresh fuel storage, reactor and spent fuel pool, receipt and shipment records and so on. This information management system has a function to setup the system environments to cover the various kinds of storage types for all LWRs ; reactor, spent fuel pool and fresh fuel storage. The movements of nuclear fuel between the storages can be easily done by double click of the mouse to the destination. It also has a several error checking routines for maintaining the correct accounting data. Using this information management system of LWR spent fuel, facility operators can perform efficiently and effectively the safeguards related works including nuclear material accountancy at each facility.

Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

1977-01-01

Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a track-etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have beeen developed and evaluated. These include a super-8 mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. The information provided by these different instruments should increase the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and, when used in combination with other measures, will facilitate inspection at reactor sites

Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1976-01-01

With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

Goals of measurement systems for international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Weinstock, E.V.

1979-01-01

The safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency are based on technical performance goals and criteria that have been developed, but not officially adopted by the Agency. The goals derive in part from the external consequences that safeguards are intended to prevent and in some cases on internal considerations of feasibility. To the extent that these goals may not be attainable, as may be the case with large-throughput bulk reprocessing plants, the Agency is placed in a difficult position. In this paper safeguards goals and criteria and their underlying rationales are critically examined. Suggestions for a more rational and workable structure of performance goals are offered

Objectives and techniques of an advanced safeguards system for the CANDU reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, R.M.; Zarecki, C.W.; Head, D.A.

1981-01-01

In 1975, Canada began to actively assist the IAEA with manpower and research and development efforts to meet this requirement for CANDU reactors. This paper describes various aspects of the CANDU safeguards scheme, including the containment and surveillance equipment that has been developed. It includes consideration of the following: objectives of the safeguards system, role of equipment in meeting system objectives, cost and maintenance of equipment, capabilities and limitations of equipment, and effectiveness of the scheme and equipment in providing assurance of diversion detection. 11 refs

Executive summary of safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

1977-09-01

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracted with System Development Corporation to develop integrated system concepts for the safeguard of special strategic nuclear materials (SSNM), which include plutonium, uranium 233 and uranium 235 of at least 20 percent enrichment, against malevolent action during interfacility transport. This executive summary outlines the conduct and findings of the project. The study was divided into three major subtasks: (1) The development of adversary action sequences; (2) The assessment of the vulnerability of the transport of nuclear materials to adversary action; (3) The development of conceptual safeguards system design requirements to reduce vulnerabilities

International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

1994-07-01

DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

DYMAC - The first stab at large safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Augustson, R.H.

1987-01-01

This article discussed the evolution of the Los Alamos Safeguards Program that led to the concept of dynamic materials accountability and control (DYMAC). A plant specific DYMAC system was installed at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, TA-55, in 1978. This system was turned over to the plant management and is still operational today. Systems like DYMAC/TA-55 provide necessary and realistic data on the workability of near-real-time accountability in nuclear material processing facilities

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

1996-01-01

During the past decade, IAEA inspectors, national inspectors, and facility operators have used neutron coincidence counters and gamma-ray isotopics measurements extensively to measure the plutonium content of various forms of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle. Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector''s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector''s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained form unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA. The standardized containers and robot-controlled fuel movements in automated facilities enable more accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements than are possible in conventional nonautomated facilities. The NDA instrumentation can be custom designed and optimized for the particular measurement goal in the automated facility

Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pamela Jagger

2014-09-01

Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

The future use of pathway analysis in IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Budlong Sylvester, Kory; Pilat, J.; Murphy, Chantell

2013-01-01

Pathway analysis has the potential to play an important role in the development of a safeguards system that is more information driven, leveraging all the information available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pathway analysis should be seen as an extension of traditional hypothesis testing used by the Agency in the past. The most attractive pathways based on the assessed capabilities of a given state can be identified and used in the development of state-level safeguards approaches. This ranking of pathways can be revised based on evidence of pathway use, or preparations for use, allowing limited safeguards resources to flow to the areas of highest concern. The possible uses of pathway analysis in the implementation of the IAEA's state-level concept are described along with implementation issues that will likely arise. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Aggregated systems model for nuclear safeguards decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

This report summarizes a general analytical tool designed to assist nuclear safeguards decision-makers. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for evaluating complex decision alternatives with uncertain outcomes. The report describes the general analytical approach in the context of safeguards decisions at a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968); Le Systeme de Garanties de l'Agence (1965, provisoirement etendu en 1966 et 1968)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1968-09-24

The Agency's safeguards system, as approved by the Board of Governors in 1965, and provisionally extended in 1966, is set forth in this document for the Information of all Members [French] Le Systeme de garanties de l'Agence, approuve par le Conseil des gouverneurs en 1965 et provisoirement etendu en 1966 et 1968, est reproduit dans le present document pour l'information de tous les Membres.

Design of an engineered safeguards system for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Winblad, A.E.; McKnight, R.P.; Fienning, W.C.; Fenchel, B.R.

1977-06-01

Several Engineered Safeguards System concepts and designs are described that provide increased protection against a wide spectrum of adversary threats. An adversary sequence diagram that outlines all possible adversary paths through the safeguards elements in a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is shown. An example of a critical adversary path is given

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennekens, J.

1988-01-01

The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

Technology development for safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

2005-04-01

The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

Safeguard sleuths

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowry, D.

1989-01-01

A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

Establishing a national safeguards system at the State level

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopez Lizana, Fernando

2001-01-01

This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides an opportunity to address the requirements for the organization that has to carry out the system functions at the State level in a country having a research reactor and ancillary laboratories

Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

2015-01-01

The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, Pierre

2001-01-01

Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

Assurance of the effectiveness of safeguards in light of their objectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kennedy, R.T.; Lyon, H.E.

1977-01-01

and transferring technology to industry and in safeguarding facility design information are also addressed. For the safeguards systems to be effectively implemented, their impact must not degrade operation or increase cost to unacceptable levels. The U.S. and other nations, along with the IAEA, are exchanging technical data and experience in the fast changing safeguards field. We are also pursuing the implementation of IAEA safeguards to commercial nuclear activities in the U.S. under the Presidential Offer of 1967. This program is discussed

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuously up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilise the national resources more effectively than before. (orig.)

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-07-01

The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

1993-07-01

The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Experience on the application of safeguard systems to the Italian nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marzocchi, A.; Venchiarutti, R.; Gatti, S.; Bertini, A.; Zaffiro, B.

1977-01-01

The safeguard systems applied in Italy to the various fuel cycle phases, including nuclear power stations, are presented in this paper in view of the present situation resulting from the Rome Treaty obligations and from the obligations to be defined in relation to the ratification of TNP by Italy. This short survey concerns not only the systems usually applied, but also the research and development aspects of new systems that facilitate the attainment of the aims specified in the Treaties. Moreover this paper illustrates the philosophy of nuclear material physical security, aiming at supplementing the efficiency of the safeguard systems [fr

Design measures to facilitate implementation of safeguards at future water cooled nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The report is intended to present guidelines to the State authorities, designers and prospective purchasers of future water cooled power reactors which, if taken into account, will minimize the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation and ensure efficient and effective acquisition of safeguards data to the mutual benefit of the Member State, the plant operator and the IAEA. These guidelines incorporate the IAEA's experience in establishing and carrying out safeguards at currently operating nuclear power plants, the ongoing development of safeguards techniques and feedback of experience from plant operators and designers on the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation. The following main subjects are included: The IAEA's safeguards function for current and future nuclear power plants; summary of the political and legal foundations of the IAEA's safeguards system; the technical objective of safeguards and the supply and use of required design information; safeguards approaches for nuclear power plants; design implications of experience in safeguarding nuclear power plants and guidelines for future water cooled reactors to facilitate the implementation of safeguards

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

2001-01-01

Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1986-10-01

Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Bowersox, D.F.

1977-09-01

The conceptual design of a materials management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility is developed and evaluated. Dynamic material balances are drawn from information provided by nondestructive-analysis techniques, process-control instrumentation, and conventional chemical analyses augmented by process-monitoring devices. Powerful statistical methods, cast in the framework of decision analysis and applied to unit-process accounting areas, ensure adequate spatial and temporal quantification of possible diversion with minimal process disruption. Modeling and simulation techniques assist in evaluating the sensitivity of the system to various diversion schemes and in comparing safeguards strategies. Features that would improve the safeguardability of the conversion process are discussed

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kelly, P.

1986-01-01

The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bonino, Anibal D; Perez, Adrian C; Krimer, Mario J; Teira, Ruben O; Vigile, Rodolfo S; Valentino, Lucia I; Giordano, Luis A; Ferro, Juan M [Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

2001-07-01

In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H.; Miller, Karen A.; Ianakiev, Kiril D.; Reimold, Benjamin A.; Ward, Steven L.; Howell, John

2010-01-01

Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235 U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

1975-06-01

There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

A video imaging system and related control hardware for nuclear safeguards surveillance applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whichello, J.V.

1987-03-01

A novel video surveillance system has been developed for safeguards applications in nuclear installations. The hardware was tested at a small experimental enrichment facility located at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The system uses digital video techniques to store, encode and transmit still television pictures over the public telephone network to a receiver located in the Australian Safeguards Office at Kings Cross, Sydney. A decoded, reconstructed picture is then obtained using a second video frame store. A computer-controlled video cassette recorder is used automatically to archive the surveillance pictures. The design of the surveillance system is described with examples of its operation

Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Qun

2001-01-01

Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ko, H. S.

2010-01-01

Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

2015-01-01

Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

Trade Analysis and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

2010-01-01

In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-12-01

The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1980-12-01

The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

Use of ISEM in studying the impact of guard tactics on facility safeguards system effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.; Boozer, D.D.

1977-07-01

The Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM) is a stochastic, discrete event, Monte-Carlo Simulation Model used to assess the effectiveness of physical protection systems for facilities which store, process, or use SNM. ISEM simulates the interaction of a group of insiders. The sensor control and alarm locations are correlated with the authorized access areas of the insider(s) and, if the insider has the appropriate access, the probability of an insider successfully defeating a sensor control or alarm is computed based upon the surveillance subsystems and the insider's attributes. Following an alarm and an assessment, actions are initiated by the safeguards system. These actions typically involve dispatching guards to specific locations within the facility. Since the specific guard responses must be predetermined, a safeguards system should be evolved from a consideration of a wide spectrum of feasible adversary strategies. The sensitivity of safeguards system effectiveness to a variety of guard tactics is explored in this paper. The evolution of comprehensive guard tactics for protecting a hypothetical facility is demonstrated. Attention is focused on the potential threat posed by insiders and the necessity of well conceived guard tactics in dealing with this threat

How safe are nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, E.

1979-01-01

Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

Selected nondestructive assay instrumentation for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Baker, M.P.; Strittmatter, R.; Jain, M.; Evans, M.L.

1979-01-01

A selected set of nondestructive assay instruments for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants is currently under development. These instruments are of three types: in-line enrichment meters for feed, product, and tails streams; area radiation monitors for direct detection of high-enriched uranium production, and an enrichment meter for spent alumina trap material. The current status of the development of each of these instruments is discussed, with supporting data, as well as the role each would play in a total international safeguards system. 5 figures

Strengthening regional safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

1996-01-01

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States