WorldWideScience

Sample records for safeguards acrs planning

  1. 77 FR 10786 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-23

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA will hold a... Modeling Application Guide.'' The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC...

  2. 75 FR 27841 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-18

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR The ACRS Subcommittee on EPR will hold a meeting on May 21, 2010, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. The agenda for...

  3. 75 FR 7633 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a....S. EPR Design Certification Document Review. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze...

  4. 75 FR 12804 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-17

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a... Chapters 11 and 16 of the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items associated with the U.S. EPR Design...

  5. 77 FR 74696 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-17

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000 will hold a meeting on January 18, 2013, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The entire meeting will be open to public...

  6. 76 FR 26775 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Cancellation to...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-09

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Cancellation to May 11, 2011, ACRS Meeting-- Federal Register Notice The Federal Register Notice for the ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on the design certification application review of the U.S...

  7. 75 FR 7634 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO...

  8. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  9. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards contingency plan. 72.184 Section 72.184 Energy... Protection § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in appendix C to part...

  10. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  11. Safeguards Technology Strategic Planning Pentachart

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, C. J.

    2017-01-01

    Builds on earlier strategic planning workshops conducted for SGIT, SGTS, and SGCP. Many of recommendations from these workshops have been successfully implemented at the IAEA. Provide a context for evaluating new approaches for anticipated safeguards challenges of the future. Approach used by government and military to plan for an uncertain future. Uses consensus decision-making.

  12. Study On Safeguard Measures for Implementing Overall Planning of Land Use

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    Based on minutely analysing the main problems existing in safeguard measures for implementing a new round of overall planning of land use,this paper constructs implementation security system of overall planning of land use,and puts forward the principles and basis of formulating safeguard measures for implementing overall planning of land use.Finally,this paper establishes the content system of safeguard measures:effectively strengthen social supervision;strengthen administrative management of land use planning;strengthen economic management of land use planning;reinforce the legal status of planning;establish incentive and constraint mechanism for reinforcing implementation;improve support system of planning.

  13. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... contingency plans. (a) The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of... licensee safeguards contingency plan without prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make...

  14. Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, N.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

  15. 75 FR 4882 - Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-29

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a... with Open Items concerning the U.S. EPR Design Certification (DCD) Application and the Calvert Cliffs...

  16. 78 FR 8202 - Meeting of the Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-05

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy and Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy and...

  17. INSPECT: a package of computer programs for planning and evaluating safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, M.F.

    1980-01-01

    As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, PNL has developed a package of computer programs, called INSPECT, that can be used in planning and evaluating safeguards inspections of various types of nuclear facilities. The programs are based on the statistical methods described in Part F of the IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual and can be used to calculate the variance components of the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) statistic, the variance components of the D (difference) statistic, attribute and variables sampling plans, and a measure of the effectiveness of the inspection plan. The paper describes the programs, reviews a number of applications, and indicates areas for future work

  18. Safeguard Measures for Implementation of New Round of Land Consolidation Planning

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LI Chen; LIU Xin-feng; PENG Zhe; SI Tao

    2012-01-01

    We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current situation of security system for implementation of China’s land consolidation planning. The prominent problems in the process of implementing safeguard measures for planning are summarized as follows: the guiding ideology for planning formulation is imperfect; the legal basis is weak, and administrative means are not sound; the economic security mechanism is not brought into full play, and the social security measures still need to be further deepened; the technical safeguard measures are short. From laws and regulations, administrative management, economic security, social supervision, technology management and other aspects, we establish the scientific security system for implementation of land consolidation planning; put forth the recommendations for guaranteeing the implementation of planning in China.

  19. Planning of Medium- and Long-Term Strategy for the Safeguards Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Dong Hoon; Ahn, Gil Hoon; Choi, Kwan Gyu

    2009-01-01

    In Rep. of Korea, active safeguards technology development suitable to phase of a nuclear advanced country is necessary because of below reasons. First reasons are '6th ranked position in the nuclear energy generation all over the world', 'continuously increased outcomes in the various nuclear fields such as research or patent', 'strengthened intention of the new government for nuclear industries', and 'weakness of the R and D foundation related to the safeguards technology'. Second reasons are optimization necessity of the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards according to enlargement of the SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control) role. The reason of the enlargement of the SSAC is IAEA IS (Integrated Safeguards) application for Korea. Third reasons are necessity for the systematic national development plan considering the Korea R and D level and the degree of the difficulty of technology. This is to say, there is necessity of the system construction of safeguards technology development connected to the NuTRM(Nuclear Technology Road Map), integrated national nuclear energy promotion plans because of necessity for concentration of the technology level and development abilities which are spread in the industry fields, the academic world and research fields. So, in this study, the foundation of the advanced safeguards technology is provided through determining the priority of the individual technology of National Safeguards, establishing development strategy for the middle or long term of Safeguards technology, based on domestic and foreign status

  20. Is the IAEA's Safeguard Strategic Plan Sufficient?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sokolski, H.; Gilinsky, V.

    2015-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have much improved and the Safeguards Department is commendably planning to further its technical capabilities and to make full use of its authority. Will this be enough to keep countries from exploiting nuclear power programmes to develop nuclear weapons, or to be in a position to do so rapidly should they so decide? Depending on nuclear programmes developments worldwide, especially on expansions in enrichment and reprocessing, and on how international affairs unfold, the answer may well be no. The fundamental limitations on the Department's ability to prevent proliferation are not technical, but conceptual. The Department is clearly motivated to carry out its technical activities competently. Yet it takes a relatively passive view of its role in the worldwide development of nuclear power-whatever technology comes into use, and whoever deploys it, the Department promises to exert its best effort to safeguard. In our view the Department should be more open about what it can or cannot realistically safeguard, and therefore what technology is permissible for deployment in national programmes. The Department's Strategic Plan says at the outset that its verifications assist the Agency to fulfil its statutory objective to ''accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy. . . '' The Department should judge itself by how well it promotes international security, not by its contribution to expanding nuclear power use. The Department's Vision includes advancing toward a nuclear weapons free world. That vision should include keeping states from deploying technologies that put them within easy reach of nuclear weapons. Our paper will suggest how the Department might supplement its current plan to best accomplish this. (author)

  1. 76 FR 60938 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-30

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on...) associated with the Nine Mile Point extended power uprate application. The [[Page 60939

  2. 75 FR 1831 - Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-13

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor... Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeks qualified candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... amended. ACRS provides independent expert advice on matters related to the safety of existing and proposed...

  3. 76 FR 7883 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-11

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... will review the staff's evaluation of the Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Extended Power Uprate application... can be made. Thirty five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the...

  4. Advanced safeguards research and development plan with an emphasis on its impact on nuclear power-plant design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobin, S.J.; Demuth, S.F.; Miller, M.C.; Swinhoe, M.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    2007-01-01

    One tool for reducing the concern of nuclear proliferation is enhanced safeguards. Present safeguards have evolved over the past 40 years, and future safeguards will grow from this strong base to implement new technologies for improving our ability to quantify nuclear material. This paper will give an overview of the advanced technology research and development plan for safeguarding. One of the research facilities planned by the Department of Energy is the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), to develop a novel nuclear fuel recycling program. Since the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility will receive and reprocess spent fuel and will fabricate fast-reactor fuel, a wide breadth of safeguards technologies is involved. A fundamental concept in safeguards is material control and accounting (MCA). 4 topics concerning MCA and requiring further research have been identified: 1) measuring spent fuel, 2) measuring the plutonium content in the electro-refiner with pyro-processing, 3) measuring plutonium in the presence of other actinides, and 4) measuring neptunium and americium in the presence of other actinides. As for the long-term research and development plan for the AFCF, it will include improving MCA techniques as well as introducing new techniques that are not related to MCA, for example, enhanced containment and surveillance, or enhanced process monitoring. The top priority will stay quantifying the plutonium as accurately as possible and to reach this purpose 4 relevant technologies have been identified: 1) the microcalorimeter, 2) the passive neutron-albedo reactivity, 3) list-mode data acquisition, and 4) a liquid-scintillator multiplicity counter. Incorporating safeguards into the initial design of AFCF (safeguards by design) is a central concept. As the technology research and development plan for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility is examined, particular attention will be given to safeguards technologies that may affect the physical design of nuclear power plants

  5. 77 FR 4585 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-30

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, extended power uprate application. The Subcommittee will hear presentations... possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or...

  6. 77 FR 28637 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-15

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on...) associated with the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 extended power uprate application. The Subcommittee... made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty...

  7. 76 FR 32240 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting on the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-03

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... Expanded Operating Domains-Power Distribution Validation and Pin-by-Pin Gamma Scan). The Subcommittee will... hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty minutes before the...

  8. 78 FR 70596 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-26

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... hold discussions with the licensee, (Northern States Power Company of Minnesota), the NRC staff, and... made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty...

  9. Risk evaluation system for facility safeguards and security planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Udell, C.J.; Carlson, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    The Risk Evaluation System (RES) is an integrated approach to determining safeguards and security effectiveness and risk. RES combines the planning and technical analysis into a format that promotes an orderly development of protection strategies, planning assumptions, facility targets, vulnerability and risk determination, enhancement planning, and implementation. In addition, the RES computer database program enhances the capability of the analyst to perform a risk evaluation of the facility. The computer database is menu driven using data input screens and contains an algorithm for determining the probability of adversary defeat and risk. Also, base case and adjusted risk data records can be maintained and accessed easily

  10. 76 FR 44964 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on U.S...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-27

    ... Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (U.S. EPR) will hold a meeting on August 18, 2011, Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike... the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of...

  11. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  12. Master planning for successful safeguard/security systems engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruckner, D.G.

    1987-01-01

    The development and phased implementation of an overall master plan for weapons systems and facilities engaged in the complexities of high technology provides a logical road map for system accomplishment. An essential factor in such a comprehensive plan is development of an integrated systems security engineering plan. Some DOD programs use new military regulations and policy directives to mandate consideration of the safeguard/security disciplines be considered for weapons systems and facilities during the entire life cycle of the program. The emphasis is to make certain the weapon system and applicable facilities have complementary security features. Together they must meet the needs of the operational mission and, at the same time, provide the security forces practical solutions to their requirements. This paper discusses the process of meshing the safe- guards/security requirements with an overall the master plan and the challenges attendant to this activity

  13. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  14. INSPECT: a package of computer programs for planning safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wincek, M.A.; Mullen, M.F.

    1979-04-01

    As part of the U.S. program to provide technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a package of computer programs was developed for use in planning safeguards inspections of various types of nuclear facilities. The INSPECT software package is a set of five interactive FORTRAN programs which can be used to calculate the variance components of the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) statistic, the variance components of the D (difference) statistic, attribute and variables sampling plans, a measure of the effectiveness of the inspection, and a measurement of the cost of implementing the inspection plan. This report describes the programs and explains how to use them

  15. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  17. Risk evaluation system for facility safeguards and security planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Udell, C.J.; Carlson, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    The Risk Evaluation System (RES) is an integrated approach to determining safeguards and security effectiveness and risk. RES combines the planning and technical analysis into a format that promotes an orderly development of protection strategies, planing assumptions, facility targets, vulnerability and risk determination, enhancement planning, and implementation. In addition, the RES computer database program enhances the capability of the analyst to perform a risk evaluation of the facility. The computer database is menu driven using data input screens and contains an algorithm for determining the probability of adversary defeat and risk. Also, base case and adjusted risk data records can be maintained and accessed easily

  18. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  19. Corporate strategic plan for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-06-01

    Department of Energy (DOE) safeguards and security (S and S) is a team effort, consisting of Field, National Laboratories, Program Office, and Headquarters units cooperating to support the Department's diverse security needs. As an integral part of the nation's security structure, the DOE S and S Program regularly supports and works in cooperation with other US Government agencies and private industry to improve the national security posture. Thus, inter- and intra-agency partnerships play an invaluable role in the continuing efforts to integrate and implement improved ways of doing business. Their Corporate Strategic Plan provides a road map to guide, track, and provide feedback for the incorporation and implementation of S and S activities within DOE. Part 1 Planning Framework, describes those overarching factors which influence the planning endeavors. Part 2, Strategic Perspective, outlines where the S and S Program has been and how they will move to the future through core competencies, changing cultural thinking, and implementing their strategies. Part 3, Strategic and Operational Integration, details critical focus areas, strategies, and success indicators designed to enhance inter-agency S and S integration and promote cooperation with external agencies. This Plan will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains supportive and fully-engaged with the nation's and international security environments

  20. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  1. A compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1990 annual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    This compilation contains 31 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reports submitted to the Commission or to the Executive Director for Operations during calendar year 1990. It also includes a report to the Congress on the NRC Safety Research Program. All reports have been made available to the public through the NRC Public Document Room and the US Library of Congress. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subject. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and by chronological order within project name. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and by chronological order within subject area

  2. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  3. A compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards: 1991 annual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-04-01

    This compilation contains 41 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reports submitted to the Commission, Executive Director for Operations, or to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, during calendar year 1991. It also includes a report to the Congress on the NRC Safety Research Program. All reports have been made available to the public through the NRC Public Document Room and the US Library of Congress. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and by chronological order within project name. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and by chronological order within subject area

  4. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 2. Project Reviews G-P

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order

  5. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  6. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  7. Measures of safeguard and rehabilitation for landscape protection planning: a qualitative approach based on diversity indicators.

    Science.gov (United States)

    La Rosa, Daniele; Privitera, Riccardo; Martinico, Francesco; La Greca, Paolo

    2013-09-01

    Maintaining existing levels of landscape diversity is becoming more and more important for planning considering the increasing pressures on agricultural ecosystems due to soil sealing, sprawl processes and intensive agriculture. Norms for land-use regulation and measures for landscape Safeguard and Rehabilitation have to take into consideration these threats in landscape planning. Evaluating the diversity of agricultural ecosystems is a fundamental step for proposing sound approaches to planning and managing both soil and landscape, as well as maintaining the related ecosystem services. The paper proposes a method aimed at the qualitative evaluation of spatial diversity of agricultural landscapes using a reduced set of ecological indicators based on land-use vector data. Indicators are calculated for defined landscape units characterized by landscape homogeneity. GIS geoprocessing and spatial analysis functions are employed. The study area is the Province of Enna in Sicily (Italy), which is characterized by cultivation mosaics in its southern region, cereal cultivation in the central region and prevailing natural environments in the northern region. Results from the indicator calculations are used to define measures to be included in a Landscape Protection Plan. Safeguard and Rehabilitation measures are introduced, which link indicator scores to planning protection aims. The results highlight the relevance of some agricultural mosaics in proximity to streams and seasonal fluvial environments, where some undamaged natural environments are still present. For these areas, specific landscape safeguard measures are proposed to preserve their diversity features together with their original agricultural functions. The work shows that even with a reduced number of indicators, a differentiated set of measures can be proposed for a Landscape Protection Plan. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  8. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  9. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 4. Generic Subjects A-G

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by subject name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains generic reports arranged alphabetically from A to G

  10. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 5. Generic Subjects H-R

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume presents generic subjects arranged alphabetically from H to R

  11. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 1. Project Reviews A-F

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains project reviews arranged alphabetically from A to F

  12. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 3. Project Reviews Q-Z

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Resports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume includes reports arranged alpbabetically from Q to Z

  13. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2009-07-31

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative

  14. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the

  15. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 6. Generic Subjects R-Z, Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains the generic subjects with an alphabetical listing from R to Z

  16. Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

    2013-01-01

    The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  17. Long-term research plan for human factors affecting safeguards at nuclear power plants. Volume 1. Summary and users' guide. Vol. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, J.N.; Fainberg, A.

    1984-04-01

    This report presents a long-term research plan for addressing human factors which can adversely affect safeguards at nuclear power plants. It was developed in order to prioritize and propose research for NRC in regulating power plant safeguards. Research efforts addressing human factors in safeguards were developed and prioritized according to the importance of human factors areas. Research was also grouped to take advantage of common research approaches and data sources where appropriate. Four main program elements emerged from the analysis, namely (1) Training and Performance Evaluation, (2) Organizational Factors, (3) Man-Machine Interface, and (4) Trustworthiness and Reliability. Within each program element, projects are proposed with results and information flowing between program elements where useful. An overall research plan was developed for a 4-year period and it would lead ultimately to regulatory activities including rulemaking, regulatory guides, and technical bases for regulatory action. The entire plan is summarized in Volume 1 of this report

  18. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative

  19. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2010-11-22

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed

  20. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  1. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures. ...

  2. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, James W.

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  3. Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  4. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    .../Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION... Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures. ...

  5. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  6. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  7. Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

    2010-01-01

    Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

  8. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services

  9. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services.

  10. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  11. Training to raise staff awareness about safeguarding children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fleming, Jane

    2015-04-01

    To improve outcomes for children and young people health organisations are required to train all staff in children's safeguarding. This creates difficulties for large complex organisations where most staff provide services to the adult population. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust is a large acute and community trust that had difficulties in engaging staff in children's safeguarding training. Compliance rates for clinical staff who were trained in children's safeguarding were low and needed to be addressed. This article sets out why safeguarding training is important for all staff and how the trust achieved staff engagement and improved compliance rates. To evaluate, maintain and develop safeguarding knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour further resources are planned to allow access to learning resources in a variety of formats.

  12. Prioritizing and scheduling Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmunds, T.; Saleh, R.; Zevanove, S.

    1992-02-01

    As part of the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP), facilities are required to develop a Resource Plan (RP). The Resource Plan provides documentation and justification for the facility's planned upgrades, including the schedule, priority, and cost estimates for the safeguards and security upgrades. Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) management has identified and obtained funding approval for a number of safeguards and security upgrades, including line-item construction projects. These upgrade projects were selected to address a variety of concerns identified in the PORTS vulnerability assessments and other reviews performed in support of the SSSP process. However, budgeting and scheduling constraints do not make it possible to simultaneously begin implementation of all of the upgrade projects. A formal methodology and analysis are needed to explicitly address the trade-offs between competing safeguards objectives, and to prioritize and schedule the upgrade projects to ensure that the maximum benefit can be realized in the shortest possible time frame. The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology developed to support these upgrade project scheduling decisions. The report also presents the results obtained from applying the methodology to a set of the upgrade projects selected by PORTS S ampersand S management. Data for the analysis are based on discussions with personnel familiar with the PORTS safeguards and security needs, the requirements for implementing these upgrades, and upgrade funding limitations. The analysis results presented here assume continued highly enriched uranium (HEU) operations at PORTS. However, the methodology developed is readily adaptable for the evaluation of other operational scenarios and other resource allocation issues relevant to PORTS

  13. US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.

    1984-07-01

    The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

  14. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  15. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

  16. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  17. Preparing the 1993--94 Safeguards Implementation Support Programme for IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, L.

    1993-01-01

    The 1993-94 Safeguards Implementation Support (IS) Program describes the Department of Safeguards' program of implementation support for the coming two years. The main body of the document describes the IS program for IAEA. A detailed description of the individual IS needs for 1993-1994 is contained in an annex that specifies the nee, assigns priorities and lists tasks and activities underway to address the need. Other annexes address policy and procedures for program planning and management, current Member State Support Programs (MSSP) tasks, and identification of MSSP resources required for implementation of developed technologies that could be provided. The primary responsibility for supporting the implementation of safeguards technology is with the support divisions of the Department of Safeguards. However, in this time of limited resources it is essential that, where possible, the Department receives assistance from MSSPs that have the needed resources. This document should serve as a guide for IAEA, in planning implementation support activities and for identifying tasks for MSSPs wishing to provide assistance

  18. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  19. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  20. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  1. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  2. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  3. Strategic Planning and the Long-term R&D Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooley, J.

    2015-01-01

    The Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency implements a structured strategic planning process to ensure that safeguards will continue to be both effective and efficient in the future. This process provides the Department with a comprehensive and coherent planning framework for the short (2 years), medium (6 years) and long (12 years) term. The Department's suite of planning documents includes a long-term strategic plan and an associated long-term research and development plan as well as a biennial development and implementation support programme. The Department's Long-Term Strategic Plan 2012-2023 addresses the conceptual framework for safeguards implementation, legal authority, technical capabilities (expertise, equipment and infrastructure) and the human and financial resources necessary for Agency verification activities. As research and development (R&D) are essential to meet the safeguards needs of the future, the Department-s Long-Term R&D Plan 2012-2023 is designed to support the Long-Term Strategic Plan 2012-2023 by setting out the capabilities that the Department needs to achieve its strategic objectives, and key milestones towards achieving those capabilities for which Member State R&D support is needed. The Long-Term R&D Plan 2012-2023 addresses the Department's R&D requirements in areas such as safeguards concepts and approaches; detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities; safeguards equipment and communication; information technology, collection, analysis and security; analytical services; new mandates; and training. Long-term capabilities discussed in the presentation include deployed systems (e.g., equipment at facilities); analytical (e.g., sample analysis), operational (e.g., staff expertise and skills) and readiness (e.g., safeguarding new types of facilities) capabilities. To address near-term development objectives and support the implementation of its verification activities as well as to

  4. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  5. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

    2011-01-01

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  6. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

  7. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  8. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  9. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  10. Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, H.; Osabe, T.

    1984-01-01

    A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

  11. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-01-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues

  12. Euratom Safeguards: Improving Safeguards by Cooperation in R&D and Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Ancius, D.; Marszalek, Y.; Smejkal, A.; Vaccaro, S.; De Baere, P.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Meylemans, P.; Murtezi, M.; Persson, L.; Synetos, S.; Tempesta, S.; Canadell Bofarull, V.; Turner, D.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Berndt, R.; Stringa, E.; Richir, P.; Sequeira, V.; Tagziria, H.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Zuleger, E.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; )

    2015-01-01

    Euratom Safeguards, implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty by the European Commission's Directorate Nuclear Safeguards, is the largest Regional Safeguards System and involved in many R&D activities of its own, often in close cooperation with external partners. Most of the results of these activities are shared with or offered to the IAEA. The work described in this paper is complementary to the projects run by the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (ECSP) to the IAEA. The ECSP activities will be described elsewhere at this conference. The present paper will provide an overview on R&D activities run in addition to the ECSP, and will attempt to link them to the capabilities discussed by the IAEA in the Long Term R&D Plan. The range of topics will include work on unattended data acquisition systems (hard- and software), advanced data analysis tools, news from seals related technology, containment and design verification applications of 3D lasers, activities to keep standard measurement technologies sustainable etc. Work done with the IAEA in preparation of new facilities and facility types will be discussed briefly. The paper will also highlight some current challenges and make suggestions how to address them. (author)

  13. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  14. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  15. Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopatin, S.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

  16. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  17. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

    2001-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  18. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

  19. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

  20. Safety and safeguards aspects on retrievability: A German study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biurrun, E.; Engelmann, H.-J.; Brennecke, P.; Kranz, H.

    2000-01-01

    The article refers shortly to the definition of the term 'retrievability' and shows two different possibilities of retrieval scenarios, their advantages and detriments. The second part lists the Safeguards aspects of retrievability, gives a short outlook on the present German Safeguards Reference Concept in the post-closure phase of a repository in a salt dome and about the results of German studies concerning some proposed Safeguards methods. Furthermore, Planned investigations on Safeguards in the post-closure phase of a repository are mentioned. The third and main part finally describes the results of the German Retrievability Study, which was elaborated in the middle of the nineties by DBE on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology, BMBF, under an R and D contract. (author)

  1. Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-01-01

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms

  2. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  3. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  4. Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

    2004-01-01

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Requirements Integration Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed and implemented an innovative management process that will be described in detail. This process systematically integrates S and S planning into construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. It extends and expands the opportunities provided by the DOE project management manual, DOE M 413.3-1. Through a series of LANL documents, a process is defined and implemented that formally identifies an S and S professional to oversee, coordinate, facilitate, and communicate among the identified S and S organizations and the project organizations over the life cycle of the project. The derived benefits, namely (1) elimination/reduction of re-work or costly retrofitting, (2) overall project cost savings because of timely and improved planning, (3) formal documentation, and (4) support of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management at LANL, will be discussed. How many times, during the construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing facility, have the persons responsible for the project waited until the last possible minute or until after construction is completed to approach the security organizations for their help in safeguarding and securing the facility? It's almost like, 'Oh, by the way, do we need access control and a fence around this building and just what are we going to do with our classified anyway?' Not only is it usually difficult; it's also typically expensive to retrofit or plan for safeguards and security after the fact. Safeguards and security organizations are often blamed for budget overruns and delays in facility occupancy and program startup, but these problems are usually due to poor front-end planning. In an effort to help projects engage safeguards and security in the pre-conceptual or conceptual stages, we implemented a high level formality of operations. We

  5. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong Sylvester, Kory W.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  6. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  7. Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, J.D.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Often, international safeguards features are added following completion of the facility design. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly re-designs or retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a project in 2008 through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to establish a global norm for the use of SBD. The NGSI SBD program is evolving in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA, while taking into account the IAEA's SBD achievements and future plans. The NGSI program includes DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its planned use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. Consistent with this effort, the NGSI program has sponsored 'Lessons Learned' studies and the preparation of facility-specific SBD Guidance documents. The NGSI program also takes into account successes that the NNSA has had with implementing safeguards early into facility designs within the U.S. The purpose of this paper is the presentation of the most recent developments in SBD under NGSI within the U.S. as well as the presentation of 'Lessons Learned' integrating safeguards into new nuclear facility designs of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), namely the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and to discuss its relevance to international safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  8. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  9. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  10. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Alexander, Joseph; Bean, Robert; Castle, Brian; DeMuth, Scott; Durst, Phillip; Ehinger, Michael; Golay, Michael; Hase, Kevin; Hebditch, David J.; Hockert, John; Meppen, Bruce; Morgan, James; Phillips, Jerry

    2009-01-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD's principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a 'SBD design loop' that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A 'Generic SBD Process' was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in

  11. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  12. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  13. AECL's advanced CANDU reactor - the ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alizadeh, Ala; Allsop, Peter; Hedges, Ken; Hopwood, Jerry; Yu, Stephen

    2003-01-01

    The ACR, the next generation CANDU design, represents the next step in development of the CANDU family of designs. AECL has achieved significant incremental improvements to the mid-size CANDU 6 nuclear power plant through successive projects, both in design and in project delivery. Building on this knowledge base, AECL is continuing to adapt the CANDU design to develop the ACR. This paper summarizes the ACR design features, which include major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, performance and construction methods. Aimed at producing electrical power at a capital cost significantly less than that of the current reactor designs, the ACR is an evolutionary design based on the very successful CANDU 6 reactor. The new ACR product is specifically designed to produce power at a cost competitive with other forms of power generation while achieving short construction times, improved safety, international licensability, high investor returns, and low investor risk. It achieves these targets by taking advantage of the latest advances in both pressure-tube and pressure-vessel reactor technologies and experience. The flexibility and development potential of the fuel channel approach also enables designs to be developed that address priorities identified in international long-term specification programs such as the US Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Generation IV program and IAEA hosted INPRO program. ACR-700 can be built in 36 months with a 48 month project duration, and deliver a lifetime capacity factor in excess of 90%. Overall, the ACR design represents a balance of proven design basis and innovations to give step improvements in safety, reliability and economics. The ACR development program, now well into the detail design stage, includes parallel formal licensing in the USA and Canada. Based on the status of the ACR design and AECL's on-going experience delivering reactor projects on-time and on-budget, the first ACR could be in service by

  14. Material presented to advisory committee on reactor safeguards, subcommittee on extreme external phenomena, January 29-30, 1981, Los Angeles, California. Seismic safety margins research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Chuang, T.Y.; Cummings, G.E.; Dong, R.G.; Johnson, J.J.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-01-01

    The January 29-30, 1981, meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Subcommittee on Extreme External Phenomena, mark the close of Phase I efforts on the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). Presentations at the meeting focused on results produced. These included computer codes, response computations, failure and release probabilities, data bases, and fragilities and parameter characteristics

  15. The ACR Model

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bec, Frederique; Rahbek, Anders Christian; Shephard, Neil

    2008-01-01

    This paper proposes and analyses the autoregressive conditional root (ACR) time-series model. This multivariate dynamic mixture autoregression allows for non-stationary epochs. It proves to be an appealing alternative to existing nonlinear models, e.g. the threshold autoregressive or Markov...... switching class of models, which are commonly used to describe nonlinear dynamics as implied by arbitrage in presence of transaction costs. Simple conditions on the parameters of the ACR process and its innovations are shown to imply geometric ergodicity, stationarity and existence of moments. Furthermore...

  16. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  17. Proposals for the 1989/90 Safeguards R and D programme and associated meetings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The R and D programme of the IAEA Department of Safeguards as carried out by or undertaken on behalf of the Division of Development and Technical Support, the Division of Safeguards Evaluation and the Division of Safeguards Information Treatment is set out in tables which give the objective of the programme elements, a description of the activities to be performed and a number of items of information required for assessment of the activities. The linkage between R and D activities and planned meetings on safeguards topics in 1989/90 is shown in a table too. 4 tabs

  18. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2006-03-01

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  19. Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

    2015-01-01

    There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

  20. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  1. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  2. ACR-1000: Operator - based development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shalaby, B.; Alizadeh, A.

    2007-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has adapted the successful features of CANDU * reactors to establish Generation III + Advanced CANDU Reactor T M (ACR T M) technology. The ACR-1000 T M nuclear power plant is an evolutionary product, starting with the strong base of CANDU reactor technology, coupled with thoroughly-demonstrated innovative features to enhance economics, safety, operability and maintainability. The ACR-1000 benefits from AECL's continuous-improvement approach to design, that enabled the traditional CANDU 6 product to compile an exceptional track record of on-time, on budget product delivery, and also reliable, high capacity-factor operation. The ACR-1000 engineering program has completed the basic plant design and has entered detailed pre-project engineering and formal safety analysis to prepare the preliminary (non-project-specific) safety case. The engineering program is strongly operator-based, and encompasses much more than traditional pre-project design elements. A team of utility-experienced operations and maintenance experts is embedded in the engineering team, to ensure that all design decisions, at the system and the component level, are taken with the owner-operator interest in mind. The design program emphasizes formal review of operating feedback, along with extensive operator participation in program management and execution. Design attention is paid to layout and access of equipment, to component and material selection, and to ensuring maximum ability for on-line maintenance. This enables the ACR-1000 to offer a three-year interval between scheduled maintenance outages, with a standard 21-day outage duration. SMART CANDU T M technology allows on-line monitoring and diagnostics to further enhance plant operation. Modules of the Advanced CANDU SMART technologies are already being back-fitted to current CANDU plants. As well as reviewing the ACR-1000 design features and their supporting background, the paper describes the status of

  3. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  4. Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

    1996-01-01

    President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

  5. Safeguardability of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Li, T. K. (Tien K.); Lee, S. Y. (Sang Yoon); Burr, Tom; Russo, P. A. (Phyllis A.); Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I. (Won Il); Park, S. W.; Park, H. S.

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology since 1977 for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. By using of this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which would lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety and economics. In the framework of collaboration agreement to develop the safeguards system for the ACP, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the KAERI since 2002. In this study, the safeguardability of the ACP technology was examined for the pilot-scale facility. The process and material flows were conceptually designed, and the uncertainties in material accounting were estimated with international target values.

  6. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, Mary Alice

    2010-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC and A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC and A program. The MC and A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  7. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

  8. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  9. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  10. Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.; Carrillo de Fischer, J.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: Knowledge Management (KM) is an integral part of the Departmental Quality Management System because knowledge (i.e., the ‘know-how’, ‘know-when’, ‘know-who’, ‘know-why’, etc.) is needed to produce high quality products and services on a daily basis. The ability to continue providing such products and services is challenged each time an experienced staff member leaves the IAEA due to retirement or end of contract and takes with them important job-related knowledge. The most important assets in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards (SG) are people and their knowledge. The Department of Safeguards developed a knowledge management (KM) framework and the corresponding approaches as well as specific guidelines for its implementation. Knowledge retention (KR) is part of knowledge management and focusses on eliminating the risk of losing the critical job-related knowledge by putting in place a systematic knowledge retention plan. Particularly, for knowledge retention, the Safeguards Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP) developed a model to draw out and capture the critical knowledge and making it available for use by others. This paper describes the knowledge retention model/approach and lessons learned from implementing the knowledge management programme in SG. (author

  11. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  12. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  13. MO-AB-207-04: ACR Update in Mammography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berns, E.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  14. MO-AB-207-02: ACR Update in MR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  15. MO-AB-207-04: ACR Update in Mammography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berns, E. [University of Colorado Health Science (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  16. MO-AB-207-02: ACR Update in MR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Price, R. [Vanderbilt Medical Center (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  17. MO-AB-207-01: ACR Update in CT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McNitt-Gray, M. [UCLA School of Medicine (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  18. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  19. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  20. Framework for analyzing safeguards alarms and response decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-01-01

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alrms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to possess stolen Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms

  1. A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

    1995-03-01

    In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

  2. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  3. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  4. ACR-1000 design provisions for severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.K.; Santamaura, P.; Shapiro, H.; Snell, V.G.

    2006-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) developed the Advanced CANDU Reactor-700 (ACR-700) as an evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. As a further advancement of the ACR design, AECL is currently developing the ACR-1000 for the Canadian and international market. The ACR-1000 is aimed at producing electrical power for a capital cost and a unit-energy cost significantly less than that of the current generation of operating nuclear plants, while achieving enhanced safety features, shorter construction schedule, high plant capacity factor, improved operations and maintenance, and increased operating life. The reference ACR-1000 plant design is based on an integrated two-unit plant, using enriched fuel and light-water coolant, with each unit having a nominal gross output of about 1200 MWe. The ACR-1000 design meets Canadian regulatory requirements and follows established international practice with respect to severe accident prevention and mitigation. This paper presents the ACR-1000 features that are designed to mitigate limited core damage and severe core damage states, including core retention within vessel, core damage termination, and containment integrity maintenance. While maintaining existing structures of CANDU reactors that provide inherent prevention and retention of core debris, the ACR-1000 design includes additional features for prevention and mitigation of severe accidents. Core retention within vessel in CANDU-type reactors includes both retention within fuel channels, and retention within the calandria vessel. The ACR-1000 calandria vessel design permits for passive rejection of decay heat from the moderator to the shield water. Also, the calandria vessel is designed for debris retention by minimizing penetrations at the bottom periphery and by accommodating thermal and weight loads of the core debris. The ACR-1000 containment is required to withstand external events such as earthquakes, tornados, floods and aircraft crashes

  5. IAEA concerns about advanced containment and surveillance concepts or other alternative safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    von Baeckmann, A.; Powers, J.

    1981-01-01

    Nuclear material accountancy is used in IAEA safeguards as a measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Over the past five years the IAEA has worked with its Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to quantify major terms of the objectives, i.e., timeliness of detection, significant quantities and detection probabilities. The Agency is using those quantifications, as recommended by SAGSI, as guidelines for inspection planning and for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards. The guidelines are used in this paper, together with other criteria like cost-effectiveness, compliance with legal limitation and non-intrusiveness, as yard-sticks for the assessment of the potential capabilities of alternative safeguards approaches. 4 refs

  6. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  7. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  8. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  9. Recruitment of U.S. citizens for vacancies in IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Decaro, D.; Williams, G.; Carelli, J.; Assur, M.

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is important that persons within and outside the US nuclear and safeguards industries become aware of career opportunities available at the IAEA, and informed about important vacancies. The IAEA has established an impressive web page to advertise opportunities for employment. However, additional effort is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient awareness in the US of these opportunities, and assistance for persons interested in taking positions at the IAEA. In 1998, the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) approved a special task under the US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) for improving US efforts to identify qualified candidates for vacancies in IAEA's Department of Safeguards. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) developed a plan that includes increased advertising, development of a web page to support US recruitment efforts, feedback from the US Mission in Vienna, and interaction with other recruitment services provided by US professional organizations. The main purpose of this effort is to educate US citizens about opportunities at the IAEA so that qualified candidates can be identified for the IAEA's consideration

  10. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  11. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  12. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  13. National safeguards system operations at a bulk-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The presentation centers on the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for bulk-handling facilities in the licenses sector of the US nuclear community. Details of those material control and accounting measures dealing with the national safeguards program are discussed in Session 6a. The concept and role of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan are discussed with the participants. In Session 6b, the lecture focusses on the international safeguards program of the US SSAC. The relationship of the national and international requirements is discussed as they relate to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 document. The purpose of this session is to enable participants to: (1) understand the basic MC and A elements in an SSAC; (2) understand which MC and A elements serve the country's national interests and those that serve IAEA safeguards

  14. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  15. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  16. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  17. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  18. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  19. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

    2007-01-01

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  20. ACR-1000: Enhanced response to severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.K.; Santamaura, P.; Shapiro, H.; Snell, V.G.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) developed the Advanced CANDU Reactor-TM700 (ACR-700TM) as an evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6R reactor. As further advancement of the ACR design, AECL is currently developing the ACR-1000TM for the Canadian and international market. The ACR-1000 is aimed at producing electrical power for a capital cost and a unit-energy cost significantly less than that of the current generation of operating nuclear plants, while achieving shorter construction schedule, high plant capacity factor, improved operations and maintenance, increased operating life. and enhanced safety features. The reference ACR-1000 plant design is based on an integrated two-unit plant, using enriched fuel and light-water coolant, with each unit having a nominal gross output of about 1200 MWe. This paper presents the ACR-1000 features that are designed to mitigate limited core damage and severe core damage states, including core retention within vessel, core damage termination, and containment integrity maintenance. Core retention within vessel in CANDU-type reactors includes both retention within fuel channels, and retention within the calandria vessel. The moderator heavy water in the ACR-1000 calandria vessel, as in any other CANDU-type reactor, provides ample heat removal capacity in severe accidents. The ACR-1000 calandria vessel design permits for passive rejection of decay heat from the moderator to the shield water. Also, the calandria vessel will be designed for debris retention. Core damage termination is achieved by flooding of the core components with water and keeping them flooded thereafter. Successful termination can be achieved in the fuel channels, calandria vessel or calandria vault by water supply by the Long Term Cooling (LTC) pumps and by gravity feed from the Reserve Water System. The ACR-1000 containment is required to withstand external events such as earthquakes, tornados, floods and aircraft crashes. Containment

  1. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  2. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  3. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  4. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  5. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

  6. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  7. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  8. Report of the LASCAR forum: Large scale reprocessing plant safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This report has been prepared to provide information on the studies which were carried out from 1988 to 1992 under the auspices of the multinational forum known as Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR) on safeguards for four large scale reprocessing plants operated or planned to be operated in the 1990s. The report summarizes all of the essential results of these studies. The participants in LASCAR were from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Commission of the European Communities - Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency

  9. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacic, Donald N.; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible 'owner' of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal.

  10. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  11. Synergy between Security and Safeguards in Uranium Concentrate Export Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soumana, T.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is a proposal to the government of Niger and all national institutions involved in the ISSAS and INSSERV Missions held in Niger to optimally coordinate they activities in nuclear field. It is essential to notice that Niger has significant nuclear activities, mainly in uranium prospecting, mining, milling, and export. In Niger, there are also many radioactive sources in non nuclear use. The safeguards agreement of Niger, infcirc/664, is in force since 16 February 2005 and its relating additional protocol since 2 May 2007. For the safeguards implementation in Niger, Government has requested to the IAEA an ISSAS Mission which was completed in February 2008. A main recommendation of this mission is to consider an overall plan for security measures and in this regards, an INSSERV Mission was completed in December 2008. Nuclear safeguards conclusions focus on correctness and completeness of declarations provided by operators. Nuclear security activities (prevention, detection and response) are useful contributions to confirm safeguards conclusions specially, a good detection strategy at national level can help to confirm the absence of undeclared activities in a country like Niger. Many governmental institutions are involved in nuclear activities and there are lacks of communication between them. Creating a synergy between safeguards and security can federate the mechanisms of control at national level and have impact in many aspects specially in (i) awareness of decision makers (ii) optimal use of the equipments (iii) organizing training activities and human resource management and (iv) designing national strategic plans. The institution which hosted the two IAEA consultative missions (Directorate of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Techniques-DUPTN for the ISSAS Mission and Civil Defence for INSSERV Mission) in consultation with other national institutions had to create a framework for this synergy. This framework must be submitted to the IAEA for observation and

  12. MO-AB-207-03: ACR Update in Nuclear Medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harkness, B.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  13. MO-AB-207-03: ACR Update in Nuclear Medicine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harkness, B. [Henry Ford Hospital System (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  14. Impact of modules on the ACR construction schedule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choy, Ed; Elgohary, Medhat; Fairclough, Neville; Yu, Stephen; Murayama, Kouichi; Miura, Jun; Kawahata, Junichi

    2003-01-01

    The ACR (Advanced CANDU Reactor), developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), is designed with constructability considerations as a major requirement during all project phases from the concept design stage to the detail design stage. For ACR-700, a project schedule of 48 months has been developed for the nth replicated unit with a 36 month construction period duration from First Concrete to Fuel Load. AECL, recognizing the immense benefit of collective experience, is partnering with Hitachi Ltd in the development of the ACR power plant design. AECL has gained valuable experience in implementing new construction methods at the Qinshan (Phase III) twin unit CANDU 6 plant in China, and Hitachi likewise has enjoyed success in modular construction of ABWRs in Japan. Utilizing these experiences, AECL is developing the ACR nuclear steam plant (NSP) and Hitachi is developing the Turbine Building. An overall construction strategy, which builds on the success of these construction methods from the nuclear power plant developments in China and Japan, has been developed for the ACR. The overall construction strategy comprises the 'Open Top' construction technique using a Very Heavy Lift crane, parallel construction activities, with extensive modularization and prefabrication. Modules and prefabrications are major features of the ACR design, resulting in an excess of 80% of Reactor Building internal work being completed as modules or as very streamlined traditional construction. This paper reviews the ACR construction strategy and provides examples of modules and how they impact on the ACR construction schedule. In conclusion, the ACR-700 is designed using the latest, proven construction methods to achieve a 36 month construction period for the nth replicated unit. (author)

  15. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  16. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-01-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  17. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system (Programme 93+2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tani, Hiroshi

    1999-01-01

    Present safeguards systems against nuclear proliferation as well as their improvement activities for more effective results are reviewed. First, the mechanism of the NPT Safeguards System is explained, which is the grasp of inventories of nuclear materials through change and transfer booking starting with actual investigation. Then, other various safeguards systems are described, including TLATELOCO (Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America), VO (Voluntary Offer), OCA (Other Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), PA (Project Agreement), US (Unilateral Submission), and OSA (Other Safeguards Agreement). Thirdly, the present status and problems of the nuclear proliferation prevention in the world are described, including competitive nuclear weapon development in India and Pakistan, and Iraq and North Korea problems. Lastly, the 93 + 2 plan to improve the present system is explained. (M.M.)

  18. ACR-1000TM Project - Licensing Opportunities and Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.; Doerffer, S.; Ion, R.; Hopwood, J.

    2011-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed the Advanced CANDU Reactor TM 1 1000 (ACR-1000 TM ) as an evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. The ACR-1000 design has evolved from AECL's in-depth knowledge of CANDU TM systems, components, and materials, as well as the experience and feedback received from owners and operators of CANDU plants. The ACR design retains the proven strengths and features of CANDU reactors, while incorporating innovations and state-of-the-art technology. It also features major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, and performance, while retaining the proven benefits of the CANDU family of nuclear power plants. To ensure that the ACR design is compliant with Canadian and international requirements, regulatory pre-project reviews of the ACR-1000 (and ACR-700 TM 1 with lower output) were conducted early in the design work. The regulatory feedback from these pre-project regulatory reviews helped AECL to better understand regulatory expectations in Canada, US and the UK, and to make further advancements and improvements in the ACR design to meet the Canadian and international regulatory requirements. This paper provides an overview of the key design features of the ACR-1000 reactor design, and summary of the pre-project reviews by those above-mentioned regulatory bodies, demonstrating opportunities and challenges in licensing process of and pointing to the importance of efficient vendor-regulator interaction. (author)

  19. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  20. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  1. A Priority-Based View of Future Challenges in International Nuclear Safeguards.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matteucci, Kayla [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-06-01

    The international nuclear safeguards community is faced with a host of challenges in the coming years, many of which have been outlined but have not been described in terms of their urgency. Literature regarding safeguards challenges is either broad and devoid of any reference to prioritization or tailored to a specific problem and removed from the overall goals of the safeguards community. For example, developing new methods of environmental sampling, improving containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies to increase efficiency and decrease inspection time, advancing nuclear material accountancy (NMA) techniques, and planning safeguards approaches for new types of nuclear facilities are all important. They have not, however, been distinctly prioritized at a high level within the safeguards community. Based on a review of existing literature and interviews with experts on these upcoming challenges, this paper offers a high-level summary of present and future priorities in safeguards, with attention both to what is feasible and to what is most imperative. In doing so, the paper addresses the potential repercussions for failing to prioritize, with a focus on the risk of diversion of nuclear material. Within the context of shifts in the American political landscape, and keeping in mind that nonproliferation issues may take a backseat to others in the near future, a prioritized view of safeguards objectives will be vital. In the interest of expanding upon this work, the paper offers several potential conceptual models for prioritization which can be explored in greater depth upon further research.

  2. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  3. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  4. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  5. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  6. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  7. 7 CFR 1412.21 - Election of base acres.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Election of base acres. 1412.21 Section 1412.21... CROP REVENUE ELECTION PROGRAM FOR THE 2008 AND SUBSEQUENT CROP YEARS Establishment of Base Acres for a Farm for Covered Commodities § 1412.21 Election of base acres. (a) Subject to adjustments in paragraph...

  8. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat. Theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, Scott; Mullen, Mark; Pan, Paul

    2011-01-01

    In recent years, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept has received significant interest with respect to international (IAEA) safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic (or national) Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses domestic requirements for material control and accounting (MC and A) and for physical protection, such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts for international safeguards sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA. This paper identifies the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e., MC and A and physical protection) and explains how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems. (author)

  9. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demuth, Scott F.; Mullen, Mark

    2011-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC and A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC and A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  10. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  11. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  12. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  13. Seismic design features of the ACR Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Saudy, A.; Aziz, T.

    2003-01-01

    Through their worldwide operating records, CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have repeatedly demonstrated safe, reliable and competitive performance. Currently, there are fourteen CANDU 6 single unit reactors operating or under construction worldwide. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Advanced CANDU Reactor - the ACR. - is the genesis of a new generation of technologically advanced reactors founded on the CANDU reactor concept. The ACR is the next step in the evolution of the CANDU product line. The ACR products (ACR-700 and ACR-1000) are based on CANDU 6 (700 MWe class) and CANDU 9 (900 MWe class) reactors, therefore continuing AECL's successful approach of offering CANDU plants that appeal to a broad segment of the power generation market. The ACR products are based on the proven CANDU technology and incorporate advanced design technologies. The ACR NPP seismic design complies with Canadian standards that were specifically developed for nuclear seismic design and also with relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Design Standards and Guides. However, since the ACR is also being offered to several markets with many potential sites and different regulatory environments, there is a need to develop a comprehensive approach for the seismic design input parameters. These input parameters are used in the design of the standard ACR product that is suitable for many sites while also maintaining its economic competitiveness. For this purpose, the ACR standard plant is conservatively qualified for a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) with a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.3g for a wide range of soil/rock foundation conditions and Ground Response Spectra (GRS). These input parameters also address some of the current technical issues such as high frequency content and near field effects. In this paper, the ACR seismic design philosophy and seismic design approach for meeting the safety design requirements are reviewed. Also the seismic design

  14. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1998-01-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

  15. 7 CFR 1412.44 - Notification of base acres.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of base acres. 1412.44 Section 1412.44... through 2012 § 1412.44 Notification of base acres. The operator and owners of record of a farm will be notified in writing of the number of base acres eligible for enrollment in a contract, unless such operator...

  16. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  17. Advanced construction methods in ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Choy, E.; Yu, S.K.W.

    2002-01-01

    The ACR - Advanced CANDU Reactor, developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), is designed with constructability considerations as a major requirement during all project phases from the concept design stage to the detail design stage. This necessitated a much more comprehensive approach in including constructability considerations in the design to ensure that the construction duration is met. For the ACR-700, a project schedule of 48 months has been developed for the nth replicated unit with a 36 month construction period duration from First Concrete to Fuel Load. An overall construction strategy that builds on the success of the construction methods that are proven in the construction of the Qinshan CANDU 6 project has been developed for the ACR. The overall construction strategy comprises the 'Open Top' construction technique using a Very Heavy Lift crane, parallel construction activities, with extensive modularization and prefabrication. In addition, significant applications of up to date construction technology will be implemented, e.g. large volume concrete pours, prefabricated rebar, use of climbing forms, composite structures, prefabricated permanent formwork, automatic welding, and utilization of the latest electronic technology tools such as 3D CADDs modelling yields a very high quality, clash free product to allow construction to be completed 'right the first time' and eliminates rework. Integration of 3D CADDs models and scheduling tools such as Primavera has allowed development of actual construction sequences and an iterative approach to schedule verification and improvement. Modularization and prefabrication are major features of the ACR design in order to achieve the project schedule. For the reactor building approximately 80% of the volume will be installed as modules or prefabricated assembles. This ensures critical path activities are achieved. This paper examines the advanced construction methods implemented in the design in order to

  18. Nuclear facility safeguards as specified by the Czechoslovak administrative law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, J.; Svab, J.

    1978-01-01

    A study is presented of the legal aspects of nuclear safeguards for the operation of nuclear power facilities evaluating the development of the legal arrangement over the past five years, i.e., encoding nuclear safeguards for nuclear facilities in the new building regulations (Act No. 50/1976 Coll. of Laws on Urban Planning and Building Regulations and implementing provisions). It also discusses the juridical position of State surveillance over the nuclear safety of nuclear facilities and its relation to surveillance carried out by specialized bodies of the State work safety inspection and to surveillance carried out by hygiene inspection bodies. (J.S.)

  19. U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

    1989-01-01

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

  20. ACR-700 advanced technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tapping, R.L.; Turner, C.W.; Yu, S.K.W.; Olmstead, R.; Speranzini, R.A.

    2004-01-01

    A successful advanced reactor plant will have optimized economics including reduced operating and maintenance costs, improved performance, and enhanced safety. Incorporating improvements based on advanced technologies ensures cost, safety and operational competitiveness of the ACR-700. These advanced technologies include modern configuration management; construction technologies; operational technology for the control centre and information systems for plant monitoring and analysis. This paper summarizes the advanced technologies used to achieve construction and operational improvements to enhance plant economic competitiveness, advances in the operational technology used for reactor control, and presents the development of the Smart CANDU suite of tools and its application to existing operating reactors and to the ACR-700. (author)

  1. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  2. Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1984-01-01

    The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

  3. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  4. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Programs Summary Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Anzelon, G.; Essner, J.; Dougan, A.; Doyle, J.; Boyer, B.; Hypes, P.; Sokova, E.; Wehling, F.

    2008-01-01

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A and M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students

  5. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  6. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  7. Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M. [Craig Everton, Russell Leslie, Stephan Bayer, Michael East, Australia (Australia)

    2011-12-15

    In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

  8. Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M.

    2011-01-01

    In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

  9. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  10. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  11. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  12. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  14. Functional relevance of AcrB Trimerization in pump assembly and substrate binding.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wei Lu

    Full Text Available AcrB is a multidrug transporter in the inner membrane of Escherichia coli. It is an obligate homotrimer and forms a tripartite efflux complex with AcrA and TolC. AcrB is the engine of the efflux machinery and determines substrate specificity. Active efflux depends on several functional features including proton translocation across the inner membrane through a proton relay pathway in the transmembrane domain of AcrB; substrate binding and migration through the substrate translocation pathway; the interaction of AcrB with AcrA and TolC; and the formation of AcrB homotrimer. Here we investigated two aspects of the inter-correlation between these functional features, the dependence of AcrA-AcrB interaction on AcrB trimerization, and the reliance of substrate binding and penetration on protein-protein interaction. Interaction between AcrA and AcrB was investigated through chemical crosslinking, and a previously established in vivo fluorescent labeling method was used to probe substrate binding. Our data suggested that dissociation of the AcrB trimer drastically decreased its interaction with AcrA. In addition, while substrate binding with AcrB seemed to be irrelevant to the presence or absence of AcrA and TolC, the capability of trimerization and conduction of proton influx did affect substrate binding at selected sites along the substrate translocation pathway in AcrB.

  15. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS... Requirements § 108.506 Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to... document describing your control procedures. ...

  16. 10 CFR 73.22 - Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... protection. Information not classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information related to physical protection, including: (i) The composite physical security plan for the facility or site; (ii... Safeguards Information. (2) Each computer not located within an approved and lockable security storage...

  17. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

    2010-10-01

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  18. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  19. Safeguards sealing systems for Zebra

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingram, G.; Jamieson, G.R.

    1983-01-01

    A relatively simple design has been produced for safeguards seals to be applied throughout the fuel containing areas at Zebra. It is based on the use of wire seals and regular Inspector surveillance. The application of the system would allow an Inspector to establish to a high degree of confidence that significant quantities of fuel had not been diverted during an intensive experimental programme. It would add about 5% to the time required for experiments, and careful planning would reduce this value. The inspection effort required to witness element movements during the experimental programme would average about 2 hours per day, with a further 2 hours spent each week on NDA of the fuel exposed. The Safeguards Inspector would require to spend about 25% of his time in the reactor area and would have ample time to deal with the relatively small number of fuel movements taking place in the storage area and with his duties elsewhere in the plant. During a core change, full-time inspection effort would be required for about 6 weeks each year. (author)

  20. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  1. 7 CFR 1412.23 - Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program. 1412.23... Base Acres for a Farm for Covered Commodities § 1412.23 Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program. (a... year, adjust the base acres for covered commodities and peanuts with respect to the farm by the number...

  2. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  3. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  4. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  5. ACRE: Absolute concentration robustness exploration in module-based combinatorial networks

    KAUST Repository

    Kuwahara, Hiroyuki; Umarov, Ramzan; Almasri, Islam; Gao, Xin

    2017-01-01

    To engineer cells for industrial-scale application, a deep understanding of how to design molecular control mechanisms to tightly maintain functional stability under various fluctuations is crucial. Absolute concentration robustness (ACR) is a category of robustness in reaction network models in which the steady-state concentration of a molecular species is guaranteed to be invariant even with perturbations in the other molecular species in the network. Here, we introduce a software tool, absolute concentration robustness explorer (ACRE), which efficiently explores combinatorial biochemical networks for the ACR property. ACRE has a user-friendly interface, and it can facilitate efficient analysis of key structural features that guarantee the presence and the absence of the ACR property from combinatorial networks. Such analysis is expected to be useful in synthetic biology as it can increase our understanding of how to design molecular mechanisms to tightly control the concentration of molecular species. ACRE is freely available at https://github.com/ramzan1990/ACRE.

  6. ACRE: Absolute concentration robustness exploration in module-based combinatorial networks

    KAUST Repository

    Kuwahara, Hiroyuki

    2017-03-01

    To engineer cells for industrial-scale application, a deep understanding of how to design molecular control mechanisms to tightly maintain functional stability under various fluctuations is crucial. Absolute concentration robustness (ACR) is a category of robustness in reaction network models in which the steady-state concentration of a molecular species is guaranteed to be invariant even with perturbations in the other molecular species in the network. Here, we introduce a software tool, absolute concentration robustness explorer (ACRE), which efficiently explores combinatorial biochemical networks for the ACR property. ACRE has a user-friendly interface, and it can facilitate efficient analysis of key structural features that guarantee the presence and the absence of the ACR property from combinatorial networks. Such analysis is expected to be useful in synthetic biology as it can increase our understanding of how to design molecular mechanisms to tightly control the concentration of molecular species. ACRE is freely available at https://github.com/ramzan1990/ACRE.

  7. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  8. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  9. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  10. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  11. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  12. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  13. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  14. ACRES At-Risk Task Force: Dropout Survey.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bull, Kay S.; And Others

    This paper describes a study by the American Council on Rural Special Education (ACRES) to determine its membership's opinions on priorities and expertise regarding the dropout problem. ACRES members, primarily rural special-education teachers, parents, and collateral service workers, were surveyed about the dropout problem and what research they…

  15. The Automated Conflict Resolution System (ACRS)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaplan, Ted; Musliner, Andrew; Wampler, David

    1993-01-01

    The Automated Conflict Resolution System (ACRS) is a mission-current scheduling aid that predicts periods of mutual interference when two or more orbiting spacecraft are scheduled to communicate with the same Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) at the same time. The mutual interference predicted has the potential to degrade or prevent communications. Thus the ACRS system is a useful tool for aiding in the scheduling of Space Network (SN) communications.

  16. Strengthening Performance Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villiers, V. Z. de

    2015-01-01

    This paper will describe an initiative to develop a management support tool to improve performance management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The envisaged mechanism should enable the Department to (a) plan, assess and report on the achievement of its objectives and (b) to improve its performance on a continuous basis. The performance management tool should be aligned with related processes in the Department and the IAEA as a whole such as strategic planning, programming and budget, the result-based management approach and various reporting mechanisms. It should be integrated with existing and planned information and other management systems. The initially, departmental working group that was established for this initiative focussed on two aspects: confirmation of the overall and specific objectives to be achieved by the Department of Safeguards, and compiling an inventory of indicators of activities, outputs and outcomes that were being used in the Department. This exercise confirmed that alignment and prioritization of activities relating to assessment of, and reporting on, performance could be improved. A value creation map was subsequently developed to assist in focussing the performance management tool to identified needs of stakeholders. Other activities of the working group included the determination of the desired characteristics of a hierarchy of performance indicators to be used to drive desired behaviour across organizational levels. Complexities to be handled included the following: · reflecting the appropriate component of the results chain (such as activities, outputs, outcomes and impact); · maintaining the linkages between objectives and performance indicators across organizational levels; · developing a balanced set of performance indicators (e.g. reflecting in-field and Headquarters activities, incorporating all main components of Departmental processes and balanced scorecard perspectives, measurable vs qualitative indicators); and

  17. Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

    2015-01-01

    The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

  18. Assurance of the effectiveness of safeguards in light of their objectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.T.; Lyon, H.E.

    1977-01-01

    The purpose of nuclear safeguards is to prevent unauthorized use of SNM or sabotage of facilities in which significant quantities of SNM are located. A balanced safeguards system includes the three elements of material accountability, material control, and physical protection. These safeguard systems must detect unauthorized activities, initiate timely response and, as necessary, provide sufficient delay for an appropriate action to be taken. Methods used to assure effectiveness of safeguards systems for both ERDA and licensed facilities will be reviewed in this paper. The respective responsibilities of ERDA and NRC are briefly outlined as are the procedures and methods used for implementing these responsibilities. The objective of achieving overall comparability between ERDA and licensed facilities is discussed. The manner in which adequacy of safeguards is assessed is discussed. New techniques which are beginning to be employed and further refined is presented. These involve characterization of the representative threats, development of modeling of outsider and insider threats, site specific analysis of facility vulnerabilities to threats and selection of critical paths. Modeling is used to assess effectiveness with which a system protects against a postulated threat along critical attack paths. Assumptions with regard to the protection provided by the different elements can be varied to improve (decrease) vulnerability along any path. This method along with graphic analysis techniques can be used to: - Identify current weaknesses in existing or as designed systems. - Evaluate upgrading plans. - Develop design trade-offs. - Identify hardware or other developments required. Research and development is required to deal with the problems identified in these assessments and in the safeguards related studies conducted by both ERDA and NRC. These efforts and a summary of the areas currently under review will be described briefly. The practical problems of proof testing

  19. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  20. Ontology-based semantic information technology for safeguards: opportunities and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDaniel, Michael

    2014-01-01

    The challenge of efficiently handling large volumes of heterogeneous information is a barrier to more effective safeguards implementation. With the emergence of new technologies for generating and collecting information this is an issue common to many industries and problem domains. Several diverse information‑intensive fields are developing and adopting ontology‑based semantic information technology solutions to address issues of information integration, federation and interoperability. Ontology, in this context, refers to the formal specification of the content, structure, and logic of knowledge within a domain of interest. Ontology‑based semantic information technologies have the potential to impact nearly every level of safeguards implementation, from information collection and integration, to personnel training and knowledge retention, to planning and analysis. However, substantial challenges remain before the full benefits of semantic technology can be realized. Perhaps the most significant challenge is the development of a nuclear fuel cycle ontology. For safeguards, existing knowledge resources such as the IAEA’s Physical Model and established upper level ontologies can be used as starting points for ontology development, but a concerted effort must be taken by the safeguards community for such an activity to be successful. This paper provides a brief background of ontologies and semantic information technology, demonstrates how these technologies are used in other areas, offers examples of how ontologies can be applied to safeguards, and discusses the challenges of developing and implementing this technology as well as a possible path forward.

  1. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  2. Comparison of Urine Albumin-to-Creatinine Ratio (ACR) Between ACR Strip Test and Quantitative Test in Prediabetes and Diabetes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cho, Seon; Kim, Suyoung; Cho, Han-Ik

    2017-01-01

    Background Albuminuria is generally known as a sensitive marker of renal and cardiovascular dysfunction. It can be used to help predict the occurrence of nephropathy and cardiovascular disorders in diabetes. Individuals with prediabetes have a tendency to develop macrovascular and microvascular pathology, resulting in an increased risk of retinopathy, cardiovascular diseases, and chronic renal diseases. We evaluated the clinical value of a strip test for measuring the urinary albumin-to-creatinine ratio (ACR) in prediabetes and diabetes. Methods Spot urine samples were obtained from 226 prediabetic and 275 diabetic subjects during regular health checkups. Urinary ACR was measured by using strip and laboratory quantitative tests. Results The positive rates of albuminuria measured by using the ACR strip test were 15.5% (microalbuminuria, 14.6%; macroalbuminuria, 0.9%) and 30.5% (microalbuminuria, 25.1%; macroalbuminuria, 5.5%) in prediabetes and diabetes, respectively. In the prediabetic population, the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, and overall accuracy of the ACR strip method were 92.0%, 94.0%, 65.7%, 99.0%, and 93.8%, respectively; the corresponding values in the diabetic population were 80.0%, 91.6%, 81.0%, 91.1%, and 88.0%, respectively. The median [interquartile range] ACR values in the strip tests for measurement ranges of 300 mg/g were 9.4 [6.3-15.4], 46.9 [26.5-87.7], and 368.8 [296.2-575.2] mg/g, respectively, using the laboratory method. Conclusions The ACR strip test showed high sensitivity, specificity, and negative predictive value, suggesting that the test can be used to screen for albuminuria in cases of prediabetes and diabetes. PMID:27834062

  3. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  4. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  5. Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

  6. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  7. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  8. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  9. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  10. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  11. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  12. Unfolding study of a trimeric membrane protein AcrB.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Cui; Wang, Zhaoshuai; Lu, Wei; Wei, Yinan

    2014-07-01

    The folding of a multi-domain trimeric α-helical membrane protein, Escherichia coli inner membrane protein AcrB, was investigated. AcrB contains both a transmembrane domain and a large periplasmic domain. Protein unfolding in sodium dodecyl sulfate (SDS) and urea was monitored using the intrinsic fluorescence and circular dichroism spectroscopy. The SDS denaturation curve displayed a sigmoidal profile, which could be fitted with a two-state unfolding model. To investigate the unfolding of separate domains, a triple mutant was created, in which all three Trp residues in the transmembrane domain were replaced with Phe. The SDS unfolding profile of the mutant was comparable to that of the wild type AcrB, suggesting that the observed signal change was largely originated from the unfolding of the soluble domain. Strengthening of trimer association through the introduction of an inter-subunit disulfide bond had little effect on the unfolding profile, suggesting that trimer dissociation was not the rate-limiting step in unfolding monitored by fluorescence emission. Under our experimental condition, AcrB unfolding was not reversible. Furthermore, we experimented with the refolding of a monomeric mutant, AcrBΔloop , from the SDS unfolded state. The CD spectrum of the refolded AcrBΔloop superimposed well onto the spectra of the original folded protein, while the fluorescence spectrum was not fully recovered. In summary, our results suggested that the unfolding of the trimeric AcrB started with a local structural rearrangement. While the refolding of secondary structure in individual monomers could be achieved, the re-association of the trimer might be the limiting factor to obtain folded wild-type AcrB. © 2014 The Protein Society.

  13. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  14. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  15. Brownfields/IGD: EF_ACRES

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — EF_ACRES is a subset of facilities from FRS_INTEREST and FRS_FACILITY_SITE which are updated on a monthly basis as part of the Locational Reference Tables (LRT)...

  16. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  17. Characterization and enzymatic properties of protein kinase ACR4 from Arabidopsis thaliana.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Yu; Liu, Xuehe; Xu, Ziyan; Yang, Hui; Li, Jixi

    2017-07-22

    Serine/threonine-protein kinase-like protein ARABIDOPSIS CRINKLY4 (ACR4), a transmembrane protein of Arabidopsis thaliana, plays important roles in cell division and differentiation. Although accumulating studies shed light on the function of ACR4, the structure and catalytic mechanism of ACR4 remain to be elucidated. Here, we report the purification and enzymatic properties of the intracellular kinase domain (residues 464-799) of ACR4 (ACR4 IKD ). Through Ni-affinity chromatography and gel filter chromatography methods, we successfully obtain high-purity ACR4 IKD protein from Escherichia coli. Dynamic light scattering and gel-filtration methods reveal that ACR4 IKD distributes with high homogeneity and exists as a monomer in solution. In addition, the ACR4 IKD protein has typical kinase activity with myelin basic protein (MBP) as the substrate. Our study may lay the foundation for structure determination of ACR4 IKD and further functional research, for example, screening significant substrates of ACR4 in Arabidopsis thaliana. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  19. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  20. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  1. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  2. The Prevalence of acrA and acrB Genes Among Multiple-Drug Resistant Uropathogenic Escherichia coli Isolated From Patients With UTI in Milad Hospital, Tehran

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Maleki

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Background Urinary tract infection (UTI is one of the most common infectious diseases and nosocomial infections worldwide, and uropathogenic Escherichia coli is the primary cause of UTI. Due to increased antibiotic resistance and the emergence of multidrug resistant (MDR UPEC clones, the treatment of UTI is difficult. The occurrence of MDR in E. coli has been attributed to the AcrAB-TolC complex of efflux pumps. Objectives The aim of this study was to complete a frequency evaluation of acrA and acrB genes among UPEC MDR strains isolated from patients with UTI who were admitted to Milad hospital in Tehran. Methods For 123 UPEC strains that were isolated and diagnosed from the urine samples of patients using biochemical tests, antibiotic susceptibility was carried out using the disc diffusion method according to CLSI guidelines. Isolates that were resistant to at least one antimicrobial agent in three or more of the categories were considered to be MDR. The presence and frequency of acrA and acrB genes was determined using PCR. Results The rates of antibiotic resistance to ampicillin, cefalotin, tetracycline, cefazolin, ceftriaxone, ceftizoxime, ceftazidime, ciprofloxacin, and cotrimoxazole were 82.9%, 78.1%, 61.1%, 49.5%, 38.2%, 30.2%, 26.1%, 42.2%, and 60.1%, respectively. The isolates were most sensitive to nitrofurantoin (95.9%, gentamicin (77.2%, and amikacin (71.5%. A total of 78% of the isolates were MDR. The frequency of the acrA gene was 82.90%, the acrB gene was 95.90% and acrA + acrB was 95.90%. There was no significant difference between acrA and acrB frequency relating to bacterial antibiotic resistance. Conclusions Our results showed that ways to control the treatment of UTI for the prevention of MDR occurrence should be sought. For a better study of efflux pumps, a comprehensive and detailed study regarding the presence of efflux pumps gees is required.

  3. Automatic coding method of the ACR Code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Kwi Ae; Ihm, Jong Sool; Ahn, Woo Hyun; Baik, Seung Kook; Choi, Han Yong; Kim, Bong Gi

    1993-01-01

    The authors developed a computer program for automatic coding of ACR(American College of Radiology) code. The automatic coding of the ACR code is essential for computerization of the data in the department of radiology. This program was written in foxbase language and has been used for automatic coding of diagnosis in the Department of Radiology, Wallace Memorial Baptist since May 1992. The ACR dictionary files consisted of 11 files, one for the organ code and the others for the pathology code. The organ code was obtained by typing organ name or code number itself among the upper and lower level codes of the selected one that were simultaneous displayed on the screen. According to the first number of the selected organ code, the corresponding pathology code file was chosen automatically. By the similar fashion of organ code selection, the proper pathologic dode was obtained. An example of obtained ACR code is '131.3661'. This procedure was reproducible regardless of the number of fields of data. Because this program was written in 'User's Defined Function' from, decoding of the stored ACR code was achieved by this same program and incorporation of this program into program in to another data processing was possible. This program had merits of simple operation, accurate and detail coding, and easy adjustment for another program. Therefore, this program can be used for automation of routine work in the department of radiology

  4. Steam generator design requirements for ACR-1000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subash, S.; Hau, K.

    2006-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed the ACR-1000 (Advanced CANDU Reactor-1000 ) to meet market expectations for enhanced safety of plant operation, high capacity factor, low operating cost, increased operating life, simple component replacement, reduced capital cost, and shorter construction schedule. The ACR-1000 design is based on the use of horizontal fuel channels surrounded by a heavy water moderator, the same feature as in all CANDU reactors. The major innovation in the ACR-1000 is the use of low enriched uranium fuel, and light water as the coolant, which circulates in the fuel channels. This results in a compact reactor core design and a reduction of heavy water inventory, both contributing to a significant decrease in capital cost per MWe produced. The ACR-1000 plant is a two-unit, integrated plant with each unit having a nominal gross output of about 1165 MWe with a net output of approximately 1085 MWe. The plant design is adaptable to a single unit configuration, if required. This paper focuses on the technical considerations that went into developing some of the important design requirements for the steam generators for the ACR-1000 plant and how these requirements are specified in the Technical Specification, which is the governing document for the steam generator (SG) detail design. Layout of these SGs in the plant is briefly described and their impacts on the SG design. (author)

  5. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

    2001-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

  6. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  7. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  8. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  9. Comparing new diagnostic criteria of 2010 ACR/EULAR with 1987 ACR criteria in rheumatoid arthritis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fatemeh Shirani

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Background: Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA is a chronic inflammatory disease presenting with inflammation, tenderness and destruction of the synovial joints, resulting in severe disability and early death due to complication of disease. Previous diagnostic criteria are not useful for identifying patients who need early treatment. Thus, new diagnostic criteria for faster diagnosis of disease are introduced in 2010. The aim of this study was to compared 1987 ACR (American College of Rheumatology criteria and 2010 ACR/EULAR (European League Against Rheumatism classification criteria for diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. Methods: In this Cohort prospective study, patients with early arthritis were evaluated   according to the old and new diagnostic criteria and followed-up every two monthly for one year (2012-2013 in Hazrat-e Rasool University Hospital, Tehran. Inclusion criteria of this study were age more than 18 year and indefinite diagnosis of arthritis. For all of patients physical examination by expert rheumatologist was done and lab data include erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR, C-reactive protein (CRP, anti-cyclic citrullinated peptide (Anti-CCP and rheumatoid factor was requested. The sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values were then determined for each diagnostic criteria. Results: In this study 104 patients including 28 males (26.9% and 76 females (73.1% with the mean age of 44.2±13.7 years were included. At the end of one year follow-up, 82 were diagnosed to have RA while other 22 patients were not categorized as RA. Sensitivity for ESR, CRP, Anti-CCP and rheumatoid factor in 2010 ACR/EULAR criteria was 52%, 19%, 48%, 28% and specificity for them was 45%, 71%, 27%, 79% respectively. Number of small and large joint arthritis were more in patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA rather than other arthritis (P=0.0001. Sensitivity and specificity for small joints involvement was 87% and 54% and for large joints

  10. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  11. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  12. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  13. The DOE safeguards and security technology development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cherry, R.C.; Wheelock, A.J.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that strategic planning for safeguards and security within the Department of Energy emphasizes the contributions of advanced technologies to the achievement of Departmental protection program goals. The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program provides state-of-the-art technologies, systems and technical services in support of the policies and programmatic requirements for the protection of Departmental assets. The Program encompasses research and development in physical security, nuclear material control and accountability, information security and personnel security, and the integration of these disciplines in advanced applications. Technology development tasks serve goals that range from the maintenance of an effective technology base to the development, testing and evaluation of applications to meet field needs. A variety of factors, from the evolving threat to reconfiguration of the DOE complex and the technical requirements of new facilities, are expected to influence safeguards and security technology requirements and development efforts. Implementation of the Program is based on the systematic identification, prioritization and alignment of technology development tasks and needs. Initiatives currently underway are aimed at enhancing technology development project management. Increased management attention is also being placed on efforts to promote the benefits of the Program through technology transfer and interagency liaison

  14. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  15. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

    1991-05-01

    The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

  16. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  17. Women's Leadership in the ACR, 2001-2015.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patel, Amy K; Fielding, Julia; Macura, Katarzyna J; Applegate, Kimberly E; Zackula, Rosalee; Arleo, Elizabeth Kagan

    2017-06-01

    To assess the trends of women in voluntary leadership roles in the ACR from 2001 to 2015. Retrospective leadership records from 2001 to 2015 were collected from the ACR Membership Database based on member demographics, gender, and participation in leadership roles at the national and state level. Data were sorted by gender and year to assess the proportion of women in each leadership position relative to total member/representation counts. Overall, there were increasing numbers of women represented in ACR leadership. From 2001 to 2015, there were increasing rates of women achieving fellowship in the College (7%-11%), now at parity with male member rates. Representation by women has risen from 7% to 21% for state chapter presidents and from 14% to 18% for state councilors. Comparing rolling 5-year averages from 2001-2005 and 2011-2015 showed statistically significant increases (P leadership roles. Women members of the council steering committee rose from 13% in 2001 to 19% in 2015, peaking at 24% in 2014. The Board of Chancellors (BOC) showed the largest increase in women, from 9% to 33%, with a peak at 37% in 2014. However, no BOC chairs were women, one council speaker was a woman, two women were ACR presidents, and two women were vice presidents. Women's participation in ACR leadership has increased significantly at the state level and in fellowship recognition. Although there are increasing numbers of women on the BOC, top positions remain male-dominated at the national level. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  18. ACR: Licensing and design readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alizadeh, A.

    2009-01-01

    Full text The Canadian nuclear technology has a long history dating back to the 1940s. In this regard, Canada is in a unique situation, shared only by a very few countries, where original nuclear power technology has been invented and further developed. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), then called AECB, was established in 1946. CNSC focuses on nuclear security, nuclear safety, establishing health and safety regulations, and has also played an instrumental role in the formation of the IAEA. CNSC has provided assistance to the establishment of regulatory authorities in AECL's client countries such as Korea, Argentina, China and Romania. AECL has developed the Gen III+ ACR 1000 as evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. ACR-1000 has evolved from AECL's in depth experience with CANDU systems, components, and materials, as well as the feedback received from owners and operators of CANDU plants. The ACR-1000 design retains the proven strengths and features of CANDU reactors, while incorporating innovations and state-of-the-art technology. It also features major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, and performance. ACR-1000 has completed its Basic Engineering, has advanced in the licensing process in Canada, and is ready for deployment in Canadian and world markets. EC6 is an evolution of CANDU 6 and is a Gen III natural uranium fuelled reactor. Its medium size and potential for fuel localization and advanced fuel cycles is an optimal strategic solution in many markets.AECL's reactor products are shown to be compliant with a variety of licensing and regulatory requirements. These include the new CNSC DRD-337, IAEA NS-R1, and EUR. This allows the countries interested in CANDU reactor products to be confident of its licensing in their own regulatory regimes.

  19. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

  20. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  1. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  2. Human-Centred Computing for Assisting Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szoke, I.

    2015-01-01

    With the rapid evolution of enabling hardware and software, technologies including 3D simulation, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), advanced user interfaces (UI), and geographical information systems (GIS) are increasingly employed in many aspects of modern life. In line with this, the nuclear industry is rapidly adopting emerging technologies to improve efficiency and safety by supporting planning and optimization of maintenance and decommissioning work, as well as for knowledge management, surveillance, training and briefing field operatives, education, etc. For many years, the authors have been involved in research and development (R&D) into the application of 3D simulation, VR, and AR, for mobile, desktop, and immersive 3D systems, to provide a greater sense of presence and situation awareness, for training, briefing, and in situ work by field operators. This work has resulted in a unique software base and experience (documented in numerous reports) from evaluating the effects of the design of training programmes and briefing sessions on human performance and training efficiency when applying various emerging technologies. In addition, the authors are involved in R&D into the use of 3D simulation, advanced UIs, mobile computing, and GIS systems to support realistic visualization of the combined radiological and geographical environment, as well as acquisition, analyzes, visualization and sharing of radiological and other data, within nuclear installations and their surroundings. The toolkit developed by the authors, and the associated knowledge base, has been successfully applied to various aspects of the nuclear industry, and has great potential within the safeguards domain. It can be used to train safeguards inspectors, brief inspectors before inspections, assist inspectors in situ (data registration, analyzes, and communication), support the design and verification of safeguards systems, conserve data and experience, educate future safeguards

  3. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  4. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  5. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  6. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  7. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  8. Cost-benefit analysis of nuclear waste disposal: accounting for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grossman, P.Z.; Cassedy, E.S.

    1985-01-01

    Radioactive waste discussions have centered, to date, on whether sites can be found and whether storage methods can be made sound enough to prevent accidental leakage into the environment. Seldom raised in public discussion, however, is the threat of intentional release of waste into the environment through acts of terrorism, an issue involving long-term safeguards. Part of the problem lies in the methodology used to evaluate large-scale projects using cost benefit or risk-cost-benefit analyses. After examining the terrorist threat and current planning for safeguards, the authors review the concept of irreversible disposal and other technological steps as well as the possibilities for changing how economists and engineers make decisions. They conclude that no credible means of analysis exists today

  9. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  10. Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, W.C.

    1995-01-01

    The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

  11. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security Activities under Euratom Research and Training Programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abousahl, S.; Palajova, Z.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Aregbe, Y.; )

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards and security are absolute priorities for the EU. At technical level, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) as the European Commission's in-house science service plays an important role in the field of nuclear research, training and education that include nuclear safety, safeguards and security. The JRC's nuclear research activities are defined in a Council Regulation on the research and training programme of the European Atomic Energy Community. The JRC works closely with EC safeguards authority, whose mission is to ensure that nuclear material within the EU is not diverted from its intended use according to Euratom treaty. Technologies, methodologies and trainings are developed according to the Euratom Safeguards inspectorate's needs. In the area of nuclear security, the JRC contributes to the development of specific expertise in the field of nuclear forensics and border security detection as well as related training efforts for first front-line responders and national experts. The JRC provides its expert support for the implementation of internal EU action plans mainly in the field of radiological and nuclear security. At an international level, the JRC cooperates with the IAEA mainly through the EC support programme on the control of nuclear materials and facilities in order to avoid proliferation or diversion. Close cooperation with IAEA nuclear security is developed through the recent signature of a dedicated practical arrangement. Key partnerships have also been developed in the field of safeguards and security with the US-DoE, Russia, Japan and China. In addition, JRC contributes significantly to the EU nuclear safeguards and security outreach activities implemented under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. In this paper we will highlight some of the JRC contributions to the enhancement of nuclear safeguards and security at EU and international levels. (author)

  12. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  13. Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

  14. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  15. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  16. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.; Kim, Y.S.; Ye, S.H.

    2015-01-01

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  17. Application of safeguards techniques to the Eurodif gas diffusion plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coates, J.H.; Goens, J.R.

    1979-01-01

    The characteristic features of gas diffusion plants are such that safeguards procedures specifically suited for this technique can be proposed. The first of these features is the fact that appreciably altering the enrichment level of the plant product is not possible without making easily detectable changes either in the plant structure itself or in the movement of incoming and outgoing materials. Furthermore, because of the size of gas diffusion plants large stocks of uranium are present in them. Although inventory differences may be small in relative terms, they are large in abosolute terms and exceed the quantities of low-enriched uranium considered significant from the standpoint of safeguards. Lastly, the impossibility for economic reasons for taking a physical inventory of the plant after it has been emptied prevents a comparison of the physical inventory with the book inventory. It would therefore seem that the safeguarding of a gas diffusion plant should be focused on the movement of nuclear material between the plant and the outside world. The verification of inputs and outputs can be considered satisfactory from the safeguards standpoint as long as it is possible to make sure of the containment of the plant and of the surveillance for the purpose of preventing clandestine alterations of structure. The description of the Eurodif plant and the movement of materials planned there at present indicate that the application of such a safeguards technique to the plant should be acceptable to the competent authorities. For this purpose a monitoring area has been set aside in which the inspectors will be able to keep track of all movements between the outside world and the enrichment plant

  18. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1986-10-01

    Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

  19. Constructability - from Qinshan to the ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Fairclough, N.; Ricciuti, R.

    2003-01-01

    AECL has recognised the importance of Constructability for many years and is applying its principals to CANDU projects with increasing success. Constructability is defined as the consideration of construction knowledge and experience during all phases of a project, and recognizes that maximum benefit can be achieved during the concept phases of a project. The CANDU 6 Nuclear Power Plant has been constructed eleven times in the last 25 years, however, the last two units being completed on the Qinshan project in China have employed some very innovative construction methods that have not been used on the previous units. In order to make nuclear power generation more competitive, shorter construction schedules and reduced project costs and risks are essential objectives. The application of constructability principles is a major contributor to achieving these objectives. The success of Qinshan has increased the confidence in the new construction methods which are being implemented on the ACR (Advanced CANDU Reactor) successfully. An ACR construction strategy that utilizes advanced construction techniques has been developed by AECL. The strategy includes paralleling of activities by using extensive modularization and the vertical installation of equipment and modules into the reactor building, using a VHL (Very Heavy Lift) crane. This strategy allows short schedules to be met with a minimum risk to the project. This paper describes the latest construction methods used successfully on the Qinshan CANDU 6 project and looks at the extensive implementation of similar methods for ACR. It is concluded, based on the Qinshan success, that the ACR construction schedule is readily achievable. (author)

  20. Cooling water facilities at a nuclear station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurst, W.L.; Ghadiali, B.M.; Kanovich, J.S.

    1983-01-01

    The use of ponds for holding a reserve of cooling water obtained as sewage effluent and also for collection of waste water for disposal by evaporation, was made at a nuclear power plant site in southern Arizona. The power output of the plant will be 3,900 MW. Two single cell ponds are 80 acres (30 ha) and 250 acres (100 ha) in size. Excavated materials from the 80-acre (30ha) pond were used for structural backfill as planned, and the 250-acre (100ha) pond was designed for limited dike height with balanced cut and fill and some excess materials used as side berms for additional safety. Both ponds are being lined with a unique combination of linings to provide environmental safeguards and at the same time cost-effectiveness is compared to alternative schemes

  1. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  2. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  3. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  4. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  5. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  6. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

  7. Expression of the AcrAB Components of the AcrAB-TolC Multidrug Efflux Pump of Yersinia enterocolitica Is Subject to Dual Regulation by OmpR.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adrianna Raczkowska

    Full Text Available OmpR is a transcriptional regulator implicated in the control of various cellular processes and functions in Enterobacteriaceae. This study was undertaken to identify genes comprising the OmpR regulon in the human gastrointestinal pathogen Yersinia enterocolitica. Derivatives of an ompR-negative strain with random transposon insertions creating transcriptional fusions with the reporter gene lacZ were isolated. These were supplied with the wild-type ompR allele in trans and then screened for OmpR-dependent changes in β-galactosidase activity. Using this strategy, five insertions in genes/operons positively regulated by OmpR and two insertions in genes negatively regulated by this protein were identified. Genetic analysis of one of these fusion strains revealed that the gene acrR, encoding transcriptional repressor AcrR is negatively regulated by OmpR. Differential analysis of membrane proteins by SDS-PAGE followed by mass spectrometry identified the protein AcrB, a component of the AcrAB-TolC multidrug efflux pump, as being positively regulated by OmpR. Analysis of the activity of the acrR and acrAB promoters using gfp fusions confirmed their OmpR-dependent repression and activation, respectively. The identification of putative OmpR-binding sites and electrophoretic mobility shift assays confirmed that this regulator binds specifically to both promoter regions with different affinity. Examination of the activity of the acrR and acrAB promoters after the exposure of cells to different chemicals showed that bile salts can act as an OmpR-independent inducer. Taken together, our findings suggest that OmpR positively controls the expression of the AcrAB-TolC efflux pump involved in the adaptive response of Y. enterocolitica O:9 to different chemical stressors, thus conferring an advantage in particular ecological niches.

  8. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  9. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  10. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  11. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    Generally, the scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues, (1) global safeguards effectiveness, or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on (1) while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed at (2). SAFE addresses (1) in that it considers the entire facility, i.e., the composite system of hardware and human components, in one global analysis. SNAP addresses (2) by providing a safeguards modeling symbology sufficiently flexible to represent quite complex scenarios from the standpoint of hardware interfaces while also accounting for a rich variety of human decision making. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example

  12. Standard format and content of a licensee physical protection plan for strategic special nuclear material in transit - April 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events is required to be prepared, based on personnel and other physical protection resources described in the Physical Protection Plan for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit. Specific requirements for the contingency plan are provided in Appendix C. Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.56, Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Transportation, provides guidance for the preparation of transportation contingency plans. Licensee is reminded that all three submissions - the Physical Protection Plan, the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, and the Safeguards Contingency Plan - together describe the system for physical protection of each particular shipment. They should be developed and maintained to be completely consistent with each other for each shipment

  13. State-wide performance criteria for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budlong-Sylvester, K.W.; Pilat, Joseph F.; Stanbro, W.D.

    2001-01-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured State-wide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  14. Structural and functional aspects of the multidrug efflux pump AcrB.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eicher, Thomas; Brandstätter, Lorenz; Pos, Klaas M

    2009-08-01

    The tripartite efflux system AcrA/AcrB/TolC is the main pump in Escherichia coli for the efflux of multiple antibiotics, dyes, bile salts and detergents. The inner membrane component AcrB is central to substrate recognition and energy transduction and acts as a proton/drug antiporter. Recent structural studies show that homotrimeric AcrB can adopt different monomer conformations representing consecutive states in an allosteric functional rotation transport cycle. The conformational changes create an alternate access drug transport tunnel including a hydrophobic substrate binding pocket in one of the cycle intermediates.

  15. Disposition scenarios and safeguardability of fissile materials under START Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) signed in 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, a large inventory of fissile materials will be removed from the weapons fuel cycles of the United States and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The Lisbon Protocol calls for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Byelarus to become nonnuclear members of the treaty and for Russia to assume the responsibility of the treaty as a nuclear weapons state. In addition, the START-II Treaty, which was signed in 1993 by the United States and Russia, further reduces deployed nuclear warheads and adds to the inventory of excess special nuclear materials (SNM). Because storage of in-tact warheads has the potential for a open-quotes breakout,close quotes it would be desirable to dismantle the warheads and properly dispose of the SNMs under appropriate safeguards to prevent their reentry into the weapons fuel cycle. The SNM recovered from dismantled warheads can be disposed of in several ways, and the final choices may be up to the country having the title to the SNM. Current plans are to store them indefinitely, leaving serious safeguards concerns. Recognizing that the underlying objective of these treaties is to prevent the fissile materials from reentering the weapons fuel cycle, it is necessary to establish a verifiable disposal scheme that includes safeguards requirements. This paper identifies some realistic scenarios for the disposal of SNM from the weapons fuel cycle and examines the safeguardability of those scenarios

  16. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  17. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  18. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  19. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  20. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  1. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  2. Diversion analysis and safeguards measures for liquid metal fast breeder reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1981-10-01

    The general objective of the study is to perform a diversion analysis and an assessment of the available safeguards methods and systems for verifying inventory and flow of nuclear material in accessible and inaccessible areas of liquid-metal fast breeder reactor, LMFBR, systems. The study focuses primarily on the assembly-handling operations, assembly storage facilities, and reactor operations facilities relating to existing and/or near-term planned experimental, demonstration and prototypal reactor plants. The safeguards systems and methods presented are considered to be feasible for development and for implementation within the resource limitation of the IAEA and are considered to be consistent with the objectives, requirements, and constraints of the IAEA as outlined in the IAEA documents INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/66-Rev-2

  3. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

    2008-01-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

  4. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  5. MRI quality assurance using the ACR phantom in a multi-unit imaging center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ihalainen, Toni M.; Kuusela, Linda J.; Savolainen, Sauli E.; Loennroth, Nadja T.; Peltonen, Juha I.; Uusi-Simola, Jouni K.; Timonen, Marjut H.; Sipilae, Outi E.

    2011-01-01

    Background. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) instrumentation is vulnerable to technical and image quality problems, and quality assurance is essential. In the studied regional imaging center the long-term quality assurance has been based on MagNET phantom measurements. American College of Radiology (ACR) has an accreditation program including a standardized image quality measurement protocol and phantom. The ACR protocol includes recommended acceptance criteria for clinical sequences and thus provides possibility to assess the clinical relevance of quality assurance. The purpose of this study was to test the ACR MRI phantom in quality assurance of a multi-unit imaging center. Material and methods. The imaging center operates 11 MRI systems of three major manufacturers with field strengths of 3.0 T, 1.5 T and 1.0 T. Images of the ACR phantom were acquired using a head coil following the ACR scanning instructions. Both ACR T1- and T2-weighted sequences as well as T1- and T2-weighted brain sequences in clinical use at each site were acquired. Measurements were performed twice. The images were analyzed and the results were compared with the ACR acceptance levels. Results. The acquisition procedure with the ACR phantom was faster than with the MagNET phantoms. On the first and second measurement rounds 91% and 73% of the systems passed the ACR test. Measured slice thickness accuracies were not within the acceptance limits in site T2 sequences. Differences in the high contrast spatial resolution between the ACR and the site sequences were observed. In 3.0 T systems the image intensity uniformity was slightly lower than the ACR acceptance limit. Conclusion. The ACR method was feasible in quality assurance of a multi-unit imaging center and the ACR protocol could replace the MagNET phantom tests. An automatic analysis of the images will further improve cost-effectiveness and objectiveness of the ACR protocol

  6. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  7. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  8. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  9. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  10. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table

  11. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-01-01

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  12. Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

    1979-08-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  13. Licensing the ACR-700 in the USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langman, V.; Ion, R.; Reid, C.; Snell, V.

    2003-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), via its 100% owned US subsidiary AECL Technologies Inc., is performing a pre-application review of the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Completion of this pre-application review by mid-2004, is in support of an application to the USNRC for Standard Design Certification that is targeted for the fall of 2004. The intent of the pre-application review is to deal up-front with potential issues associated with the CANDU reactor genealogy of the ACR that are different from the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) regulatory framework in the USA. The focus of the paper will be to describe the pre-application review process currently underway with the NRC staff. In the context of the pre-application review this paper will provide an overview of the licensing approach being used to introduce the ACR-700 to the USA. (author)

  14. Licensing the ACR-700 in the USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langman, V.; Ion, R. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada); Reid, C. [Bechtel Power Corporation, San Fransisco, California (United States); Snell, V. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2003-07-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), via its 100% owned US subsidiary AECL Technologies Inc., is performing a pre-application review of the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Completion of this pre-application review by mid-2004, is in support of an application to the USNRC for Standard Design Certification that is targeted for the fall of 2004. The intent of the pre-application review is to deal up-front with potential issues associated with the CANDU reactor genealogy of the ACR that are different from the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) regulatory framework in the USA. The focus of the paper will be to describe the pre-application review process currently underway with the NRC staff. In the context of the pre-application review this paper will provide an overview of the licensing approach being used to introduce the ACR-700 to the USA. (author)

  15. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  16. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  17. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1988-01-01

    In recent years considerable attention has been given to upgrading security education programs at facilities across the country. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), a Laboratory-wide Safeguard Awareness Training Program has been established in order to raise the cognizance of the entire staff with regard to safeguards issues and concerns. This aggressive safeguards program involves a strong interface of physical security measure and material control and accountability systems. Within PNL, four distinct audiences were defined and a needs assessment analysis performed for each to determine specific training requirements. The target audiences identified were: material balance area (MBA) custodians, managers of material balance areas, material handlers, and new employees. Five safeguards training courses were created to meet the needs of those audiences. This paper discusses the development of the Safeguards Awareness Program at PNL and its benefits to the Laboratory

  18. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  19. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  20. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  1. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  2. Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

    2011-01-01

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

  3. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  4. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  5. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  6. Bioinjection Performance Review for the Building 100 Area and 4.5 Acre Site at the Pinellas County, Florida, Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Survochak, Scott [US Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). Office of Legacy Management; Daniel, Joe [Navarro Research and Engineering, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-05-01

    This document provides a summary of a review of the performance of bioinjection activities at the Building 100 Area and the 4.5 Acre Site at the Pinellas County, Florida, Site since 2010, determines how best to optimize future injection events, and identifies the approach for the bioinjection event in 2016 at (1) the 4.5 Acre Site and (2) the Essentra property at the Building 100 Area. Because this document describes the next bioinjection event at the 4.5 Acre Site, it also serves as an addendum to the Interim Remedial Action Plan for Emulsified Edible Oil Injection at the 4.5 Acre Site (DOE 2013). In addition, this document revises the injection layout and injection intervals for the Essentra property that were originally described in the Interim Corrective Measure Work Plan for Source and Plume Treatment at the Building 100 Area (DOE 2014), and is a de facto update of that document. Bioinjection consists of injection of emulsified vegetable oil (EVO) and the microorganism Dehalococcoides mccartyi (DHM; formerly known as Dehalococcoides ethenogenes) into the subsurface to enhance biodegradation of trichloroethene (TCE), dichloroethene (DCE), and vinyl chloride (VC). VC is the only contaminant that exceeds its maximum contaminant level (10 micrograms per liter onsite and 1 microgram per liter onsite) on the 4.5 Acre Site and the Essentra property. Bioinjection was conducted at the 4.5 Acre Site in 2010 and 2013. Approximately 49,900 gallons of EVO and DHM were injected at 95 injection points in February 2010, and approximately 22,900 gallons of EVO and DHM were injected at 46 injection points in July 2013. The injection locations are shown on Figure 1. The goal of bioinjection at the 4.5 Acre Site is to decrease contaminant concentrations to maximum contaminant levels along the west and southwest property boundaries (to meet risk–based corrective action requirements) and to minimize the extent of the contaminant plume in the interior of the site. Bioinjection was

  7. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  8. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  9. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  10. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  11. MO-AB-207-00: ACR Update in MR, CT, Nuclear Medicine, and Mammography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  12. MO-AB-207-00: ACR Update in MR, CT, Nuclear Medicine, and Mammography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  13. Protection planning and risk management at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, J.S.; Altman, W.D.; Hockert, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    Effective safeguards and security management begins with comprehensive strategic planning that synthesizes protection objectives, threat information, existing protection capabilities, consequences of protection failure, and the costs and impacts of safeguards changes into cost effective protection strategies that adequately address credible threats. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed a structured risk management approach to safeguards and security planning that is designed to lead to protection strategies that are cost effective, meet the intent of Department of Energy (DOE) orders, balance protection needs with programmatic priorities, and acknowledge a level of residual risks that is not cost effective to eliminate. This risk management approach to safeguards decision making was used to develop the first DOE-approved Master Safeguards and Security Agreement (MSSA) that addresses all security interests at a major facility including: special nuclear material, classified information and materials, computer and communication security, and other DOE property. This risk management approach also provides the strategic basis for day-to-day management of the LLNL security program as well as the integration of safeguards program upgrades

  14. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  15. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

    2015-01-01

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  16. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

    2012-06-15

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  17. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, Renaud; )

    2012-01-01

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  18. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  19. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  20. Some basic concepts of fast breeder reactor safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tkharev, E.; Walford, F.J.

    1987-04-01

    The range of discussion topics of this report is restricted to a few key areas of safeguards importance at Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) only. The differences between thermal and fast reactors that may have safeguards significance in the case of FBRs are listed. The FBR principles of design are mentioned. The relevant safeguards objectives and criteria are given. The fundamental issues for safeguarding FBR are treated. An outline safeguards approach is presented. Model inspection activities are mentioned. 4 figs

  1. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  2. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  3. IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

  4. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  5. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

  6. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-01-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

  7. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

  8. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-01-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

  9. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

    1978-08-01

    An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  10. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  11. A Legal Analysis of Safeguard Measures in the European Community

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guang Ma

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in thIn 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the "Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China" and the "Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO

  12. Guarantying and testing the nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turcu, Ilie

    2002-01-01

    Apparently, the nuclear power will ensure an important share of the world energy demand at least for the next decades because there is no viable alternative in the fan of energy sources neither one complying with the environment preservation requirements. The nuclear energy future depends not only on technical and economical aspects but also on preventing any danger of nuclear safeguards nature. The main international legal instrument which provides concrete commitments for nations in this field is the Nuclear Safeguard Convention. It provides guarantees and testings of the nuclear safeguards over the entire service life of the nuclear power plants. In the two general conferences (of 1999 and 2002) the status and measures adopted in the field of nuclear safeguards by the states adhering to the convention were discussed and reviewed, as well as the issues of financial resources, licensing and the adequate measures in emergency cases. The nuclear safeguards is a major issue among the criteria of integration in UE. Essential for maintaining and endorsing the provisions of nuclear safeguards in Romania are specific research and development activities aiming at integrating the equipment and structures, solving the operation problems of nuclear facilities, studying the behavior of installations in transient regimes, investigating the reliability and probabilistic assessing of nuclear safeguards, examining the phenomenology and simulating severe accidents or human factor behavior. Of major importance appears to be the international cooperation aiming that a permanent exchange of information and experience, dissemination of the best results, solutions and practices. The paper presents the status and trends at the world level, as well as in Romania, underlining the main issues of the strategy in this field and stressing the financial and human resources implied the implementing the nuclear safeguards provisions

  13. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  14. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.; Irola, G.; Glynn, K.

    2015-01-01

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  15. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  16. The Canadian experience in implementing the State-level integrated safeguards concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kent, M.A.; Ellacott, T.

    2013-01-01

    After receiving the Broad Safeguards Conclusion in 2005 that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, Canada began implementing the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada (SLISAC) on a Sector-by-Sector basis, culminating in the full State-wide implementation of Integrated Safeguards in January 2010. The Approach has resulted in a significant reduction in IAEA person days of inspection, a shift from scheduled routine inspections to randomized, short-notice and unannounced inspections, increased information streams on operational activities and inventory flows to the IAEA, and closer collaboration between the Agency and the SSAC (State System of Accounting and Control). This paper will describe the implementation of this new approach, touching on: the main features of the Canadian SLA (State-level Approach); the agreed order of priority in the transition to the approach within the various sectors of the Canadian fuel cycle; the work plan established for moving forward in a logical and orderly manner, thereby allowing all parties to put in place the necessary protocols and procedures; and some initial thoughts on the lessons learned throughout this process. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  17. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  18. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  19. The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.H.F.

    1982-09-01

    In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

  20. International safeguards for a modern MOX [mixed-oxide] fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating σ/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials

  1. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  2. A collaborative environment for information driven safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scott, Mark R.; Michel, Kelly D.

    2010-01-01

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  3. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rames, J.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation discusses the legal framework of IAEA Safeguards which consists of a number of elements, including agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings, basic safeguards documents (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, INFCIRC/153 (Corr..), INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, GC(V)/INF/39), the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements, and finally the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Boards of Governors. Major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguard agreements are described

  4. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  5. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  6. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

    1977-01-01

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  7. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

    1977-08-01

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  8. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets for...

  9. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  10. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  11. Leveraging physical protection technology for international safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glidewell, Don

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In an effort to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of equipment used for International Safeguards, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) Reflection Group requested the ESARDA Containment and Surveillance Working Group to investigate the feasibility of employing physical protection technologies for international safeguards applications. The physical protection market has traditionally been much greater than the international safeguards market. Consequently, physical protection technology has been subjected to greater testing and evaluation, and has enjoyed much greater real world experience. The larger market yields economies of scale, and the greater testing and experience should arguably result in improved reliability. This paper will compare requirements for physical protection versus international safeguards equipment, and identify types of physical protection equipment, which have potential for safeguards applications. It will evaluate both Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) and non-COTS equipment. Finally, for selected physical protection equipment, the paper will evaluate the degree of modification that would be needed to make it acceptable for safeguards applications. (author)

  12. Operational facility-integrated computer system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armento, W.J.; Brooksbank, R.E.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system for safeguards in an active, remotely operated, nuclear fuel processing pilot plant has been developed. This sytem maintains (1) comprehensive records of special nuclear materials, (2) automatically updated book inventory files, (3) material transfer catalogs, (4) timely inventory estimations, (5) sample transactions, (6) automatic, on-line volume balances and alarmings, and (7) terminal access and applications software monitoring and logging. Future development will include near-real-time SNM mass balancing as both a static, in-tank summation and a dynamic, in-line determination. It is planned to incorporate aspects of site security and physical protection into the computer monitoring

  13. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

    2010-01-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  14. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  15. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  16. NRC study of control room habitability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayes, J.J. Jr.; Muller, D.R.; Gammill, W.P.

    1985-01-01

    Since 1980, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has held several meetings with the NRC staff to discuss the subject of control room habitability. Several meetings between the ACRS and the staff have resulted in ACRS letters that express specific concerns, and the staff has provided responses in reports and meetings. In June of 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations directed the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Inspection and Enforcement to develop a plan to handle the issues raised by the ACRS and to report to him specific proposed courses of action to respond to the ACRS's concerns. The NRC control room habitability working group has reviewed the subject in such areas as NRR review process, transformation of control room habitability designs to as-built systems, and determination of testing protocol. The group has determined that many of the ACRS concerns and recommendations are well founded, and has recommended actions to be taken to address these as well as other concerns which were raised independent of the ACRS. The review has revealed significant areas where the approach presently utilized in reviews should be altered

  17. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  18. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  19. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  20. The voluntary safeguards offer of the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houck, F.S.

    1985-01-01

    During negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that their acceptance of Agency safeguards would put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the nuclear-weapon States. To allay these concerns, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1967 made voluntary offers to accept Agency safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, France made a voluntary offer, the safeguards agreement for which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1978, with a view to encouraging acceptance of Agency safeguards by additional States. More recently, in February 1985 the Board approved the safeguards agreement for the voluntary offer of the USSR, made inter alia to encourage further acceptance of Agency safeguards. These safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon-States have two important features in common: Namely, they result from voluntary offers to accept safeguards rather than from multilateral or bilateral undertakings, and they give the Agency the right but generally not an obligation to apply its safeguards. The agreements differ in certain respects, the most noteworthy of which is the scope of the nuclear activities covered by each offer. The agreements of the United States and United Kingdom are the broadest, covering all peaceful nuclear activities in each country. The safeguards agreement for the US voluntary offer has been in force since December 1980. Now is an appropriate time to review the experience with the agreement's implementation during its first four years, as well as its history and salient features

  1. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  2. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  3. Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

  4. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rockwood, Laura

    2001-01-01

    The legal framework of IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements, not at all of which are documents. These elements include the Statute of the IAEA; treaties and supply agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings; the basic safeguards documents, the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements; and finally, the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Board of Governors. After a discussion of these elements the major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Finally the procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguards agreements are described. (author)

  5. Safeguards Culture: Analogies from Safety Culture and Security Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naito, K.

    2013-01-01

    The terminology of 'safeguards culture' has been used loosely by safeguards experts as an essential element for establishing an organizational environment of stakeholders for the effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards. However, unlike the other two triplet brothers/ sisters of 3S's (Safety, Security, Safeguards), there is no formally established definition of safeguards culture. In the case of safety culture, INSAG (the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group) has extensively dealt with its concept, elaborating its definition and key characteristics, and published its report, INSAG-4, as the IAEA Safety Series 75. On the other hand, security culture has also been defined by AdSec (the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security). In this paper, a provisional definition of safeguards culture is made on the analogies of safety culture and security culture, and an effort is made to describe essential elements of safeguards culture. It is proposed for SAGSI (the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) to formally consider the definition of safeguards culture and its characteristics. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  6. Safeguards By Design - As applied to the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chare, Peter; Lahogue, Yves; Schwalbach, Peter; Smejkal, Andreas; Patel, Bharat [European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Directorate E - Nuclear Safeguards, Euroforum, Luxembourg (Luxembourg)

    2011-12-15

    Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS) is a new facility that has been constructed on the site of Sellafield. The design work started in early 2001 and active commissioning commenced with the introduction of the first nuclear material which arrived in the building early 2011. The store has been designed for the long term storage of Plutonium product (PuO2) from Thorp and Magnox, MOX residue powder from Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) as well as pellet, powder or granular PuO2 residues from the older stores on the Sellafield site. This paper describes the application of Safeguards By Design commencing at the early design stage based upon the Safeguards Approach to be applied by DG ENER at the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS). The approach had been developed based upon the requirements for implementing Commission Regulation 302(2005) and the technical measures to be implemented in order to meet Article 77(a) of the Euratom Treaty. In order to meet these requirements a close dialogue was established between the different interested parties and the design team for the installation of instrumentation with associated cabling in order to implement the agreed safeguards measures. Early contacts at the design stage facilitated the inclusion of installed safeguards supplied instrumentation into the overall design and facility construction. The equipment and cabling supplied by Euratom was incorporated into the planning and construction phases. This ensured that upon plant completion the safeguards tools were commissioned and ready for the verification of the first nuclear material to be introduced into SPRS. Detailed discussions at the early stages of the design phase raised the profile of nuclear material safeguards and made certain that the necessary instrumentation infrastructure was incorporated into the plant infrastructure.

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  9. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-01-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

  10. 77 FR 38033 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-26

    ... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Foreign Agricultural Service WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels... and trigger levels for safeguard measures provided for in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement... measures under the safeguard provisions of the WTO [[Page 38034

  11. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  12. Evapotranspiration Cover for the 92-Acre Area Retired Mixed Waste Pits:Interim CQA Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This Interim Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Report is for the 92-Acre Evapotranspiration Cover, Area 5 Waste Management Division (WMD) Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for the period of January 20, 2011 to May 12, 2011. This Interim Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Report is for the 92-Acre Evapotranspiration Cover, Area 5 Waste Management Division (WMD) Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for the period of January 20, 2011 to May 12, 2011. Construction was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) under the Approval of Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, on January 6, 2011, pursuant to Subpart XII.8a of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The project is located in Area 5 of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, located in southern Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, in Nye County. The project site, in Area 5, is located in a topographically closed basin approximately 14 additional miles north of Mercury Nevada, in the north-central part of Frenchman Flat. The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste. The 92-Acre Area encompasses the southern portion of the Area 5 RWMS, which has been designated for the first final closure operations. This area contains 13 Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes, 16 narrow trenches, and 9 broader pits. With the exception of two active pits (P03 and P06), all trenches and pits in the 92-Acre Area had operational covers approximately 2.4 meters thick, at a minimum, in most areas when this project began. The units within the 92-Acre Area are grouped into the following six informal categories based on physical location

  13. Evapotranspiration Cover for the 92-Acre Area Retired Mixed Waste Pits:Interim CQA Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    The Delphi Groupe, Inc., and J. A. Cesare and Associates, Inc.

    2011-06-20

    This Interim Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Report is for the 92-Acre Evapotranspiration Cover, Area 5 Waste Management Division (WMD) Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for the period of January 20, 2011 to May 12, 2011. This Interim Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Report is for the 92-Acre Evapotranspiration Cover, Area 5 Waste Management Division (WMD) Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for the period of January 20, 2011 to May 12, 2011. Construction was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) under the Approval of Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, on January 6, 2011, pursuant to Subpart XII.8a of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The project is located in Area 5 of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, located in southern Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, in Nye County. The project site, in Area 5, is located in a topographically closed basin approximately 14 additional miles north of Mercury Nevada, in the north-central part of Frenchman Flat. The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste. The 92-Acre Area encompasses the southern portion of the Area 5 RWMS, which has been designated for the first final closure operations. This area contains 13 Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes, 16 narrow trenches, and 9 broader pits. With the exception of two active pits (P03 and P06), all trenches and pits in the 92-Acre Area had operational covers approximately 2.4 meters thick, at a minimum, in most areas when this project began. The units within the 92-Acre Area are grouped into the following six informal categories based on physical location

  14. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  15. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  16. Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

  17. Research on seal control systems for international nuclear safeguard and the vulnerability assessment on the seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Hongjian; Liu Tianshu; Cao Fangfang; Xu Chunyan

    2014-01-01

    Safeguard seals, also called Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), are widely used to detect tampering or unauthorized entry in the international safeguard and security systems, Seal control systems consist of seal implementing plan, seal development and the vulnerability assessment on tbe seals, effective implementing procedures and methods of the seals. The vulnerability assessment contents of safeguard seals, thermo-shrinked film seals being as an example, and seals control systems in the implementation program are researched. The seal control systems discuss task assignment, seals management flow and seals program data flow to promote applying effectively seals. The vulnerability assessment program of seals studies assurance level to some different tampering techniques and measures. The researches must promote utilizing seals effectively for nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, radioactive waste management, and the nuclear material accounting and control. (authors)

  18. Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

    1975-06-01

    There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

  19. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  20. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  1. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  2. Prospects for regional safeguards systems - State-level Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peixoto, O.J.M.

    2013-01-01

    The increased co-operation with Regional Safeguard's System (RSAC) is a relevant tool for strengthening effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the international safeguard. The new safeguards system that emerges from the application of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the full use of State-level Concept is a challenge and an opportunity for effectively incorporate RSAC into the international safeguards scheme. The challenge is to determine how the co-operation and coordination will be implemented on this new safeguards scheme. This paper presents some discussions and prospects on the issues to be faced by RSAC and IAEA during the implementation of State-level Approach (SLA) using all information available. It is also discussed how different levels of co-operation could be achieved when SLA is applied by IAEA safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  3. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-07-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

  4. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  5. Characterization Report for the 92-Acre Area of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bechtel Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2006-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office manages two low-level Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site. The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste. This report summarizes characterization and monitoring work pertinent to the 92-Acre Area in the southeast part of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites. The decades of characterization and assessment work at the Area 5 RWMS indicate that the access controls, waste operation practices, site design, final cover design, site setting, and arid natural environment contribute to a containment system that meets regulatory requirements and performance objectives for the short- and long-term protection of the environment and public. The available characterization and Performance Assessment information is adequate to support design of the final cover and development of closure plans. No further characterization is warranted to demonstrate regulatory compliance. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is proceeding with the development of closure plans for the six closure units of the 92-Acre Area

  6. Characterization Report for the 92-Acre Area of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bechtel Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2006-06-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office manages two low-level Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site. The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste. This report summarizes characterization and monitoring work pertinent to the 92-Acre Area in the southeast part of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites. The decades of characterization and assessment work at the Area 5 RWMS indicate that the access controls, waste operation practices, site design, final cover design, site setting, and arid natural environment contribute to a containment system that meets regulatory requirements and performance objectives for the short- and long-term protection of the environment and public. The available characterization and Performance Assessment information is adequate to support design of the final cover and development of closure plans. No further characterization is warranted to demonstrate regulatory compliance. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is proceeding with the development of closure plans for the six closure units of the 92-Acre Area.

  7. Outcome and Perspectives from the First IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norman, C.; Binner, R.; Peter, N. J.; Wuester, J.; Zhao, K.; Krieger, T.; Walczak-Typke, A.C.; Richet, S.; Portaix, C.G.; Martin, K.; Bonner, E.R.

    2015-01-01

    Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g., missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In addition, the evaluation of verification data with a view to drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions rests on the application of various advanced statistical methodologies. The considerable progress of information technology in the field of data processing and computational capabilities as well as the evolution of safeguards concepts and the steep increase in the volume of verification data in the last decades call for the review and modernization of safeguards statistical methodologies, not only to improve the efficiency of the analytical processes but also to address new statistical and probabilistic questions. Modern computer-intensive approaches are also needed to fully exploit the large body of verification data collected over the years in the increasing number and diversifying types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the world. The first biennial IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was held in Vienna from the 16 to 18 October 2013. Recommendations and a working plan were drafted which identify and chart necessary steps to review, harmonize, update and consolidate statistical methodologies for safeguards. Three major problem spaces were identified: Random Verification Schemes, Estimation of Uncertainties and Statistical Evaluation of Safeguards Verification Data for which a detailed list of objectives and actions to be taken were established. Since the meeting, considerable progress was made to meet these objectives. The actions undertaken and their outcome are presented in this paper. (author)

  8. Drug transport mechanism of the AcrB efflux pump.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pos, Klaas M

    2009-05-01

    In Gram-negative bacteria such as Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, tripartite multidrug efflux systems extrude cytotoxic substances from the cell directly into the medium bypassing periplasm and the outer membrane. In E. coli, the tripartite efflux system AcrA/AcrB/TolC is the pump that extrudes multiple antibiotics, dyes, bile salts and detergents. The inner membrane component AcrB, a member of the Resistance Nodulation cell Division (RND) family, is the major site for substrate recognition and energy transduction of the entire tripartite system. The drug/proton antiport processes in this secondary transporter are suggested to be spatially separated, a feature frequently observed for primary transporters like membrane-bound ATPases. The recently elucidated asymmetric structure of the AcrB trimer reveals three different monomer conformations proposed to represent consecutive states in a directional transport cycle. Each monomer shows a distinct tunnel system with entrances located at the boundary of the outer leaflet of the inner membrane and the periplasm through the periplasmic porter (pore) domain towards the funnel of the trimer and TolC. In one monomer a hydrophobic pocket is present which has been shown to bind the AcrB substrates minocyclin and doxorubicin. The energy conversion from the proton motive force into drug efflux includes proton binding in (and release from) the transmembrane part. The conformational changes observed within a triad of essential, titratable residues (D407/D408/K940) residing in the hydrophobic transmembrane domain appear to be transduced by transmembrane helix 8 and associated with the conformational changes seen in the periplasmic domain. From the asymmetric structure a possible peristaltic pump transport mechanism based on a functional rotation of the AcrB trimer has been postulated. The novel drug transport model combines the alternate access pump mechanism with the rotating site catalysis of F(1)F(o) ATPase as

  9. Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-02-21

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

  10. Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 (as amended March 2010)). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

  11. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  12. MANAGEMENT OF Amburana cearensis var. acreana IN ACRE STATE, BRAZIL

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Evaldo Muñoz Braz

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available http://dx.doi.org/10.5902/1980509814586This work has as its objectives: a to assess the geographical distribution and population structure of Amburana cearensis var. acreana; b to calculate sustainable cutting rates, according to stipulated cutting cycles, and c to simulate the projected recovery potential in volume based on the calculated cutting rate. It was used data from sustainable forest management plans, and the results will contribute for future decisions about its endangered condition. The results did not corroborate the information that Amburana cearensis var. acreana is endangered in Acre state. However the management sustainability will only be feasible if considered the ideal remaining population structure and the estimative of the optimal cutting rate according to the cutting cycle.

  13. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  14. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  15. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  16. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  17. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  18. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (ES-konsult, Solna (Sweden))

    2011-01-15

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  19. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2011-01-01

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  20. Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, T.

    2001-01-01

    Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

  1. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  2. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Border safeguarding is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and this is a joint responsibility of the military and the police. Military doctrine for conventional warfare is not sufficient for Border Safeguarding operations due...

  3. Concept for fuel-cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    deMontmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-01-01

    Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international independence are to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. A concept whereby safeguards might more effectively and efficiently accomplish the purposes of NPT safeguards is explored. The principal features are: (1) division of the fuel cycle into three zones, each containing material having a different degree of significance for safeguards; (2) closing a verified material balance around each zone, supplementing the present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them for others; (3) maintenance by the IAEA of a current book inventory for each facility by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility transfers; (4) near real-time analysis of material flow patterns through the fuel cycle; and (5) a periodic statement of the findings for the entire State that takes the form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty

  4. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  5. Points for Improvement in Mexican Legislation on Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maciel Sánchez, S.; Carreño Padilla, A. L.

    2015-01-01

    The main goal of this paper is to underline the specific points needed still to be improved on safeguards in the Mexican legal framework. The problem: Mexico proposed the Tlatelolco Treaty which was before the TNP. So the Mexican legislation on safeguards should to be one of the best around the world, but there are still points to be improved, such as a specific regulation on the topic. Justification: Remembering that the exact sciences need of the law in order to be applied in a desirable way. I mean, the safeguards could be well conceived and well worked from the physics and mathematics point of view, but in order to be followed in any country, it is necessary the right legal framework. Hypothesis: What has Mexico now in its legislation on safeguards and what remains to be done (what is pending in the Mexican legal scope of the safeguards)? Objectives: – To propose legal solutions to correct the weakness of the Mexican legal framework on Safeguards; taking into account my own experience drafting the Mexican regulation on safeguards from 2008 for the Mexican Government in my nuclear law firm “Martínez and Maciel”. – To propose a legal framework on safeguards for Mexico as it is understood by the IAEA. – To update the legal frame work on safeguards in Mexico linking it to the Back end of the spent fuel. (Considering that sooner or later the Mexican Government will have to define its politic on this topic). (author)

  6. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  7. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wigeland, R.; Bjornard, T.; Castle, B.

    2009-01-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization's purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations' approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  8. IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Close, D.A.

    1995-06-01

    This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

  9. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  10. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schanfein, Mark; Johnson, Shirley

    2012-01-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  11. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  12. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    Safeguards at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) facilities are discussed in this paper. The NRC is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  13. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

    2000-01-01

    With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

  14. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

  15. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  16. From safeguards to treaty verification and the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.

    1997-01-01

    Changes in safeguards techniques and changes in the context in which it has to be applied have led to a continuous evolution of safeguards. Nuclear material accountancy and its verification is still the basis of safeguards. But also other, less technical, tools are developed for the future. Will safeguards not become an idle story but continue to lay effectively and efficiently a concrete foundation for international trust and peace, there is a need for more investment in new methods and techniques to allow safeguards to keep pace with the developments, both politically and technically. Safeguards serves the international community by enhancing the mutual trust that leads to national security. That also enabled the rapid growth of international co-operation on the applications of nuclear energy. But international security is based on confidence. It is not a priori the technique that creates that sphere of confidence, the human and political interactions are at least equally important. In different cultures there are marked differences in behaviour and such differences can be easily misinterpreted. Therefore also the new safeguards has to be equally objectively established and critically executed under the close attention of all parties concerned

  17. Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

  18. Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-09-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

  19. DCS emulator development for the ACR-1000 simulator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakashima, Y.; Trueman, R.; Ishii, K.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) simulators are the main means for operator training and as such are a crucial part of the NPP operation life-cycle. Hitachi, Ltd., Information and Control Systems Company (henceforth 'Hitachi') is the preferred DCS and DCS emulator developer and supplier for the ACR-1000 NPP control system. Hitachi's concept for the DCS (distributed control system) portion of the ACR-1000 simulator is 'total emulation of the DCS' by software. This paper will review the current status of the technical development and the major project milestones. (author)

  20. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  1. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  2. A landscape analysis plan

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nancy E. Fleenor

    2002-01-01

    A Landscape Analysis Plan (LAP) sets out broad guidelines for project development within boundaries of the Kings River Sustainable Forest Ecosystems Project. The plan must be a dynamic, living document, subject to change as new information arises over the course of this very long-term project (several decades). Two watersheds, each of 32,000 acres, were dedicated to...

  3. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  4. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards at the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and in IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s the measurements evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations

  5. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  6. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lammer, M.; Schwerer, O.

    1991-06-01

    This handbook contains nuclear data needed by safeguards users for their work. It was initiated by an IAEA working group, and the contents were defined by the relies to a questionnaire sent to safeguards specialists. This is a preliminary edition of the handbook for distribution to safeguards and nuclear data experts for review. The present edition of the handbook contains the following basic nuclear data: actinides: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals, prompt neutron data, delayed neutron data; fission products: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron capture cross sections and resonance integrals; fission product yields. Also included are appendices that summarize the data requested by safeguards users, and that present a number of questions to them and to data experts on the data contained in this preliminary issue and about additional data for possible inclusion in future editions and updates of the handbook

  7. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

  8. Burnup dependence of coolant void reactivity for ACR-1000 cell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Tellier, R.; Marleau, G.; Hebert, A.; Roubstov, D.; Altiparmakov, D.; Irish, D.

    2008-01-01

    The Advanced Candu Reactor (ACR-1000) is light water cooled, fueled with enriched uranium and has a smaller lattice pitch than the Candu-6. As a result, the neutronic behavior of the ACR-1000 cell is expected to be somewhat different from that of the Candu-6 leading to a negative coolant void reactivity (CVR). Here we evaluate the CVR for the ACR-1000 cell using the lattice code DRAGON and compare our results with those obtained using the code WIMS-AECL. The differences observed between these two codes for the burnup dependence of the CVR is mainly explained in terms of the specific cell leakage model used by both codes. (authors)

  9. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

    2016-01-01

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is ''to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.'' The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  10. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division; Gaudet, Rachel N. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  11. Patient phenotypes in fibromyalgia comorbid with systemic sclerosis or rheumatoid arthritis: influence of diagnostic and screening tests. Screening with the FiRST questionnaire, diagnosis with the ACR 1990 and revised ACR 2010 criteria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perrot, Serge; Peixoto, Mariana; Dieudé, Philippe; Hachulla, Eric; Avouac, Jerome; Ottaviani, Sebastien; Allanore, Yannick

    2017-01-01

    Fibromyalgia (FM) may occur with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and systemic sclerosis (SSc), and debate remains about its diagnosis. We aimed to use three FM tools (a screening tool (FiRST), diagnostic criteria (ACR 1990 and revised 2010), to compare FM prevalence between RA and SSc patients, to describe the phenotypes of patients with comorbid FM, and to analyze links between FM and secondary Sjögren's syndrome (SS). Consecutive adult patients with confirmed RA or SSc from four university hospitals were tested with the three FM tools. FiRST detected FM in 22.6% of the 172 RA patients, with confirmation in 22.1% (ACR1990) and 19.1% (ACR2010). ACR1990FM+ RA patients had more diffuse pain, whereas ACR2010FM+ RA patients had higher BMI and pain intensity, more diffuse pain, active disease, disability, and associated SS. FiRST detected FM in 27.8% of the 122 SSc patients, with confirmation in 30.3% (ACR1990) and 23.7% (ACR2010). ACR1990FM+ SSc patients had greater disability and pain intensity, and more diffuse pain, whereas ACR2010FM+ SSc patients had higher BMI, pain intensity, more disability and diffuse pain, and associated SS. Correlations between FM diagnostic and screening tool results were modest in both conditions. Secondary SS was associated with comorbid FM. The prevalence of FM is high in SSc and RA, whatever the FM diagnostic tool used. Secondary SS is associated with FM in both RA and SSc. The revised ACR 2010 FM criteria and FiRST screening tool reveal specific phenotypes potentially useful for improving disease management.

  12. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  13. Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

  14. Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.; Bennett, C.A.

    1975-01-01

    A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

  15. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  16. Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolchenkov, D.L.

    1983-01-01

    By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

  17. The present status and development of the state's system of safeguards in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.; Haginoya, T.; Natsume, H.; Hirata, M.

    1977-01-01

    This paper summarizes developmental activities aiming at improving, the status of the Japan's System of safeguards. The integral tests are described which are now being implemented by the Japanese Government to check the effectiveness of the State's System, which must be maintained by the Government under the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified by Japan in June 1976. A joint experiment has been now implemented by the Nuclear Safety Bureau and the NMCC for knowing and improving the precision and accuracy of analytical measurements used at the bulk-facilities. JAERI, is conducting various R and D work on its own, and through cooperation with NMCC, NSB etc. The authors describe the results of non-destructive γ-spectrometry for the development of isotopic correlation techniques, as well as for the identification, and also refer briefly to measurement methods using the Fast Critical Assembly in JAERI. Measurement methods used in the Pu-fabrication facility of the PNC, and the problem of spent fuels application of safeguards for the reprocessing plant are discussed. The accounting reports coming from Japanese facilities are processed by the computer at the NMCC, and converted into (a) the State's material balance, and (b) the formats to be sent to IAEA. The authors discuss the experience of such data-processing as well as the developmental works for analysing MUF. As a part of the integral test, the experiences concerning planning and performance of inspection are discussed. The present status and future plans of the system of national analytical laboratories are described

  18. Assessment, Cleanup and Redevelopment Exchange System (ACRES)

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — The Assessment, Cleanup and Redevelopment Exchange System (ACRES) is an online database for Brownfields Grantees to electronically submit data directly to EPA.

  19. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  20. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  1. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  2. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  3. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  4. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  5. Light water reactor safeguards system evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.

    1978-01-01

    A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of safeguards systems was developed in this study and was applied to a typical light water reactor plant. The relative importance of detection systems, barriers, response forces and other safeguards system components was examined in extensive parameter variation studies. (author)

  6. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical testing...

  7. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  8. Usefulness of ACR MRI phantom for quality assurance of MRI instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jung Whee; Ahn, Kook Jin; Lee, Seung Koo; Na, Dong Gyu; Oh, Chang Hyun; Chang, Yong Min; Lim, Tae Hwan

    2006-01-01

    To examine whether the ACR phantom could be used in quality standards for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) instruments in Korea. We conducted the phantom test using the ACR MRI phantom in 20 MRI instruments currently used in Korea. According to ACR criteria, we acquired the phantom images which were then assessed by the following seven tests: geometric accuracy, high spatial resolution, slice thickness accuracy, slice position accuracy, image intensity uniformity, percent signal ghosting, and low contrast object detectability. The phantom images were interpreted by three experienced radiologists according to ACR criteria. Then, we examined the failure rate of each test and evaluated the inter-observer variation in the measurements and test failure. The failure rate of each test could be broken into the following components: geometric accuracy (11-21%), high contrast spatial resolution (10-15%), slice thickness accuracy(6-22%), slice position accuracy (5-17%), image intensity uniformity (6%), percent signal ghosting (16%), and low contrast object detectability (8-10%). In this series, all the failure rates were less than 30%. In addition, no inter-observer variation was seen in the measurements and test failure. ACR MRI phantom promises to be established as the standard phantom for MRI instruments in Korea because of its objectivity in assessing the phantom images

  9. Evaluating National Nuclear Safeguards System Implementation in the Republic of Moldova

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mursa, E.; Sidorencu, A.; Vasilieva, N.; Sirbu, I.

    2015-01-01

    Strengthening the multilateral system of Nuclear Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), imposed by the increasing cross-border illicit trafficking of nuclear material and redirecting for military purposes has led Republic of Moldova to ratify on 1 June 2012 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/690) to the Agreement of Nuclear Safeguards in relation with the NPT. This was followed by the adoption in the Parliament on 8 June 2012, of the new Law no. 132 of 08.06.2012 on the safe conduct of nuclear and radiological activities, which extends the power of the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) and details the measures to strengthen the Nuclear Safeguards in the country. The NARNRA implements safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials by: – normative acts development; – establishing a system for inspecting of nuclear material; – implementing inventory-taking and reporting procedures for quantities of nuclear material; – implementing authorisation and monitoring procedures for the movements of nuclear material; – implementing procedures for reporting quantities of nuclear material to the IAEA; – maintaining and updating the national register of nuclear materials. A very important role to achieve results is the cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, was developed and agreed the Joint Action Plan for implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which is an essential aid in fulfilling the country’s international obligations. In this respect have been obtained some good practices: – Routinely performed national inspections; – On-line information provision from the Customs check points; – Developed special form for nuclear material in the National Register; – Systematic interaction with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and authorisation holders; – Annual and quarterly presentation to the IAEA of the reports on SQP and the

  10. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  11. IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Christer

    1999-03-01

    feasible undertaking. Such a unit capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguard tasks will give the Agency an effective instrument for reference, monitoring, verification, and detection of declared and undeclared activities. It is also demonstrated in the study that more than 20% of the envisaged work tasks in all of the major Safeguards applications will achieve a better decision support from the use of commercial satellite imagery. At the same time the potential savings in costs is calculated to approximately USD 500,000 per year by reductions in on-site inspections and by more efficient planning and logistics. The total cost for implementing commercial satellite imagery at the Department for Safeguards, as simulated in this study, is approximately USD 1,500,000 per year. This cost rises when utilising the full potential of high-resolution imagery in all five applications including monitoring and detection of undeclared facilities. The cost/benefit simulation is founded on an activity scenario with a staff of 4 experts working in an IAEA imagery unit with a workload of three dossiers or 'issues' per week. The imagery unit is built around an advanced workstation PC image processing system capable of handling several hundreds of pre-processed imagery per year

  12. The UK safeguards R and D support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

    1991-01-01

    The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented

  13. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, W.J.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is desinged for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both safeguards and production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  14. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is designed for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both Safeguards and Production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  15. Paying tribute to 25 years of safeguards leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    After phases of intensive development in the 1970s and consolidation in the 1980s, the IAEA's international safeguards system is now in a phase of transition. The 1990s look to be a time when verification activities are further expanded in response to global developments and challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. How far have safeguards come, and where are they headed? This article offers some thoughts and perspectives on the main challenges and opportunities facing IAEA safeguards, in the context of some recent developments and the overall evolution of the safeguards system

  16. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  17. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  18. The emergency plan of the ININ; El plan de emergencia del ININ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ruiz C, M A [ININ, Salazar, Estado de Mexico (Mexico)

    1991-07-01

    The emergency plan of the ININ, it was elaborated in 1988 and revised by the National Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (CNSNS) in 1989. At the beginning of 1990 and with the support of the IAEA it was practiced the first revision to the text of this plan, for what the proposal revision is what constitutes the development of this report.

  19. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  20. Safeguards through secure automated fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMerschman, A.W.; Carlson, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    Westinghouse Hanford Company, a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, is constructing the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line for fabrication of mixed oxide breeder fuel pins. Fuel processing by automation, which provides a separation of personnel from fuel handling, will provide a means whereby advanced safeguards concepts will be introduced. Remote operations and the inter-tie between the process computer and the safeguards computer are discussed